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Summary
NEW ORLEANS - 0900EDT - Third session of the Joint Investigation -There will be a public hearing for the joint BOEM/USCG investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion, fire, pollution, and sinking of the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with multiple loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Media coverage of the hearing proceedings is permitted by the Joint Investigation Co-Chairmen as long as it remains consistent with the proper and orderly functioning of the investigation. There will be morning and afternoon sessions, and a media pool will be in effect for the duration of the hearing. The BOEM/USCG Joint Investigation into the Deepwater Horizon Incident What: Third session of the Joint Investigation Where: Radisson New Orleans Airport, 2150 Veterans Blvd., Kenner, La. - Bayou Meeting Room When: July 19-23, 2010 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. (CDT) daily Witness list below. Session (all times eastern) 9-1p then break until 2p, ends 6pEST Witness List - July 19, 2010 The purpose of this joint investigation is to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010. The facts collected at this hearing, along with the lead investigators' conclusions and recommendations will be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and BOEM for approval. Once approved, the final investigative report will be made available to the public and the media. No analysis or conclusions will be presented during the hearing. The following is a list of witnesses who will be questioned during this FACT-FINDING joint investigation. Monday July 19, 2010: 1. Stephen Bertone - Transocean, Chief Engineer, providing status and proper maintenance of generators and electrical distribution system. 2. Lance John - Weatherford, Rig System Specialist, providing information on the casing running and the presence of ruptured disks in the 16" casing string. 3. Leo Linder - MI-Swaco, Drilling Fluid Specialist, providing information on the displacement path from the riser to Deepwater Horizon MODU. 4. Wyman Wheeler - Transocean, Toolpusher, providing recollection of incident aboard Deepwater Horizon. 5. Tyrone Benton - Oceaneering, ROV Technician, providing information on the leaks associated with BOP stack. LOG of first half of Proceedings 08:59:49 Start of proceedings CH--Capt Hong Quin?, Head of invesgation panel 09:00:32 CH: Objective Determine source of emission and vessel stability two examine why backup and standby generator didn't work, three determine adequacy of oil plan, four adequacy of drilling equipment testing five adequacy of safeguards of drilling six determine oil control issues, seven oil crew actions, eight receive testimony 01:24 CH: Receive testimony on witnesses, wyatt willer will not be appearing 09:04:44 Attorneys object not having enough time to examine documents to be introduced into the proceedings. 16:25 CH: I would ike to call on Steven Berone SB-Steven Bertone, Chief engineer of transocean, deep water horizon 16:37 SB walks in and takes oath for testimoiny 16:58 SP: Steven London, attorney of Steve Bertone, is he a person of interst? 17:18 CH: No sir the board has not designated him 17:26 do you anticipate designation CH: No. 17:41 Steven Ray Bertone, employed by transocean, chief engineer Q: prior to being engineer, did you hold any other postion with transoceawn SB: I was a electrical supervisior, for 7 years Q: was it all aboard the deepwater horizon? SB: No sir Q: what other rigs did you work on SB: Ive been on the f100 and transocearn marianis Q: had experience with transcoen outside of deepwater SB: I started with falcon drilling, purcharsed by reading and bates purchased by transocean Q: how long have you been assigne to deepwater horizxon/. SB: since 2003 9:18:521 Q: and how long have you been chief engineer? SB: since November 2008 Q: prior to aspril 20th, how long have you been on your hitch? SB: probably for 18 days Q: Was there any safety issues on deepwater horizon 19:27 Do you know what A chair Bchiar and C chair is? SB: yes, sir Q: Were there any problems with any of those? SB: I Dont recall. Q: were there any problems specifically with the a chiar where there was a loss of power? SB: I don't'. Q: Can you define what the A chair is? SB: The A Chiar is where the driller sits. 19:48 Q: and where does the colonel of the driller sits? What is he monitoring? SB He's monitoring the block placement the top drive torque, depth of the well, mud pumps Q: any incident wth a chair assoc with loss of electrical power? SB: during the event or prior to? Q: prior to SB; yes there was. Q: and when were those, the latest? SB: I don't recall. 09:20:14 Q: was there any problesm with number four thruster SB: Yes. Q: for how long SB: Roughly eight months. Q: any alarms bypassed of any visual alarms for any gas situations? SB: I don't know Q:Were any alarms bypassed on deepwater horizon? SB: I don't know. Q: you are the chief enginerr and you don't know? SB: I'm not in control of those alarms. Q: Who is in control of those alarms? SB: DP operators. 09:2:10 Q: Dp operators? Who are the DP operators? On april 20th A: Yancy Keplinger and andrea Fuentes Q: if there was a alarm that was bypassed would it have to be under your approval? SB: No sir. Q: Alright lets go to april 20th Can you give us a detail of that day up until the incident. SB: From the time I woke up? Q: Yes sir: 21:49 SB: We had a 630 meeting between OIM Capt, senior tool pusher, RSTC and myself. That was a phone call to town where we spoke to james kent, asset manager and Paul Johnson performance manager. After that at around 830 we always have our supervisors meeting where all supervisors are required to attend. After that I went back to my office to work on upcoming rig move and second rig move preparing budgetary items for bp officials that were arriving later that day. 22:42 went to lunch at 1130 11 45 went back to office to continue working on documents and at apporx 330 4pm, we had a meeting with sp officials and transocean and deemed that we would go tour the rig. We toured several spaced, made our way to floor. And when ed got to floor we went to drill shack. I was last one in the drill shack out was standing room only. At that point I knew there was something going on but didn't know what it was. I was asked by jimmy and randy to please continue the toru==our without them. They needed to stay up there. We went to pump rooms and showed them thrusters and went to dinner at 630. After dinner we had supervisor meeting with bp and transocean officials until 9 915. Afer that I had a cigarette, went to state room, took a shower and went to bed. 24:21 I just opened up my book, reading, when I heard what sounded like the tensioners being blown off. I thought that was kind of strange bc I just spoke with chris pleasant who said they were just finished leading off the tensioners. It got louder, it sounded like a freight train going through my bedroom, and there was a loud thumping, and with each thumping I felt a shake. There was an initial boom, the lights went out. I ran out of my room to the door to get dressed by emergency lights. 25:03 when I opened up the door I smelt some kind of fuel and tasted it. When I turned to get my clothing the second explosion occurred which threw me across the room. I ran into hallway to center stairwell and observed four five ppl standing there froze looking at stairwell. I shouted to head to the port forward or spiral forward staircase and go to your emergency stations. I ran to the port spiral staircase and made my way to the bridge. (speaks with attorney) 26:16 Once I arrived to the bridge I went to my station which is the port side computer station system. A t that point I observed that we had no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever. I picked up the phone and called the engine control room and there was no dial tone. There were no phones. I hollered out that we have no comms. At this point I ran to the starboard window to the bridge to look out the the derricks. 26:56 Whatever the second explosion everything did not register with me. I initially thought that the block had not parted and that thumping sound was the block coming down the derrick. I was expecting to see steel and pipe from the floor. When I looked out at the derrick I saw fire, derrick leg to derrick leg as high as I could see. At that point I realized that we had a blow out. 27:23 I ran back to my station thinking that the engines should be starting up because after 25 to 30 secs two engines start up come on line and start filling the KG filler breakers as well as starting up thrusters. There was still no power of any kind. No indication of engines starting. I heard the water tight door band which was behind me. And I heard someone saying the engine room, ECr and pump room are gone. Theyre all gone. I turned around and I didn't' recognize who it was at the time because he was covered in blood. 28:05 And I asked him what you mean gone. And he said they're blown up. It was mike wiliams the chief BDT. He had a laceration across his forehead. I hollered out the medical supplies were. They said the restroom at the back of the bridge. I ran to there. Tried to find some kind of gauze or something. I found a roll of toilet paper, ran back and stuck it to his head. I ran back to my station, still not truly believing that these engines were gone. I couldn't fathom that. I looked back at my screen and there was nothing. No engines starting no thrusters. We were dead ship. 28:58 I heard the water tight door slam again. When I turned around I saw an individual holding a rag to his head. He hollered im hurt. I'm hurt real bad chief. At that point I recognized his voice because he was covered in blood as well. I ran back and pulled the rag away from his head and looked as his wound and hollered for a medic. There was no medic at the time. I ran to the starboard door and hollered to lifeboats we need a medic now. I ran back to my station hoping that the engines would start-nothing. I turned back to Brent and noticed that standing behind him was chris pleasant. The sub C supervisor was standing at the bop panel. 30:03 I hollered out to chris pleasant have you EDSed. HE said he needed permission to EDS. When I turned to my left, Don winslow, the performance operations manager for transocean was standing right next to me. I asked if we could eds, and he said yes. Chris pleasant somebody on the bridge hollered out, he cannot eds with out the OIM's approval. I spun back around and saw Jimmy hearald the OIM running across the bridge by the BP consoles. I hollered out to jimmy can we eds we said yes, eds, eds. When I turned back to chris he was in a panel pushing a button. 30:42 I hollered to chris I need confirmation that we EDSed. He said yes, I reconfirmed and he pointed out a light on the panel. At that point I turned to the forward at the bridge and hollered to kurt for permission to go to the standby generator room and manually start it. My thinking was the BOP had latched, what would be remaining of the fuel would be burned away, and we were going to need power as well as fire pumps. Kurt said yes go. The Chief mate came over to me running with a radio. We looked at the radios turned them on and tried to get comms through the radios. 31:33 For whatever reason we could not get comms through the radios standing five feet from each other. We verified that we were on the same channel and still no comms. I said don't worry about it and I laid the radio down. When I went to the bridge I shut the water tight door for whatever reason, and mike Williams pushed it back and said, you're not going alone chief. I said well come on. Paul mineheart, the motorman also fell in line and we ran to the standby generator. As I listened to the standby generator, I looked at the part where the crown should be and I could see nothing but flames way past the crown. I remember looking down at the deck because it was very slick, and I saw a substance that had the consistency of snot. 32:24 I remember thinking to myself, why is this snot on this deck. It was approx inch to an inch and a half thick. As I mad e my way to the standby generator room, we walked past the bop house which has a huge door, which is 80 90 feet tall 50 feet wide, that you can look down into moon pool. When you looked down into that space all I could see were flames. There was no equipment whatsoever. It was solid flames. 32:59 When we walked into standby generator room, myself and mike Williams ran to the start up panel. I flipped the switch from auto to manual hit the reset and start button, there was no returning of the engine. I tried again and again nothing happened. Mike shouted out that we have 24 bolts. Stood by fr a second. Paul mineheart was standing by the door, I looked at him and told him to shut the door because he was standing there looking at the flames. At that point I thought if the engines are all gone, maybe there is some electrical interference or something that is nto allowing the generator to start. So I turned and ran to the 480 switch gear for the standby generator room, I closed the main feeder breaker for the generator and I reopened it. SO I turned the witch for automatic sync on the panel to manual. 34:17 I ran back to the panel and tried again to reset and to start. T here was no turning over for the engine. Mike hollered out try the second battery pack just in case. Paul I think flipped the switch. There was nothing. The engine didn't turn. I said lets go back to the bridge.. When we reopened the watertight doors, that was the first time that I actually felt the heat. IT was very very intense. We ran to the bridge, we came in to the port side watertight door. I observed that yancy and andrea were still standing with radios. I ran across the bridge to the starboard side, kurt was standing at the door and looking at the lifeboat station. When I ran over I saw lifeboat number one pulling away from the rig. Lifeboat two was already gone. 35:35 At that point I turned to mike and Paul and hollered out, that's it abandon ship let's go! They ran past by me. I turned and looked, yancy and andrea were still by the radios and I hollered at them that's it lets abandon ship lets go now. I turned and went out the watertight door. Capt Kurt was in front of me and we made our way to the lifeboat deck as we were coming down the stairs, I observed a man on the gurney at the bottom of the stairs, with three people trying to get a life vest on him. 36:12 The three ppl were stan carton, chad murray and randy essel. At this point I did not know who was in that gurney. At this point we made it down the stairs to the DAVIT the life raft. We hooked the life raft up and proceed to crank out of lift and drop it to inflate raft and clear the rig. There was a shackling device that had two metal hooks. I do not know what this rope was for but it hindered the life raft and davit to clear the rig. At that point we hollered for a knife, no one had one, mike tried to remove the shackles but could not. He pulled out a pair of ET dikes which are nail clippers on steroids. He unscrewed the shackles and freed the life raft to the side of the rig. 37:27 We started pulling the painter line. I looked at the man on the gurney and tried to get him to the life raft. There were two people already on the life raft, one was david young , I do not know who the other person was. But I made eye contact with david young. I shoved lyman into the life raft and followed him directly afterwards. As I entered the life raft there was, prior to that , there were a lot of smaller explosions still going on and immense heat. All the flames and heat from the rig floor were coming down the front part of the deck, as well as all the flame and heat form under the rig were meeting like at vortex under the life raft. 38:44 As I jumped in I had my leather work gloves on. I can remember feeling the intense heat through those gloves and on my knees. I went to the far side of the life raft and heard the injured person on the gurney start hollering my leg my leg. I also heard andreas screaming we're going to die. At that point I honestly thought we were going to cook right there. 39:15 I guess from hurriedness from jumping there, it--- 39:30 At that point the life raft actually dipped forward and back. It started rocking back and forth. There was smoke in the life raft and it started descending into the water. the smoke cleared out when we touched the water. I heard someone say where are the panels. I was by the exit door and jumped out of the life raft and grabbed hold of the rope by the side of the life raft, trying the push the life raft away from the boat. I know chad murray jumped out and was right behind me. mineheart jumped in front of me. I was swimming on my side looking at the rig, I would say 25 30 feet above me. There was a tremendous amount of smoke bellowing out of the rig. At that point I saw a person's boots and his clothing come shooting through the smoke. Just before he landed I noticed that it was Kurt. 40:39 He landed approx five feet from me. Within seconds, Half a second later, another person and boots came flying out of the smoke. And he was approx ten feet from me. Just before he hit the water, I noticed that it was Yancy Keplinger. As were swimming trying to pull the life raft form the rig, I got to the point where I could see the helideck and witnessed an individual running at full speed across the helideck. When he jumped off he was still running, just before he splashed into the water, he was actually looking right at us and that was mike Williams. I noticed that shortly after that we were not going any further away form the rig. 41:30 About that time I heard someone hollering out omg the painter line is tied to the rig. I looked and saw the white painter line going into the smoke. I heard Chad murray shouting out for help. I looked out to see, and prob 50 60 yards away there was the fast rescue craft from daimon bankston. I saw two flashing light in the water just as I looked at it, one of those was being hauled into the boat. And seconds later, the second person was hauled into the boat. The FRC started driving towards us, and we were hollering we need a knife, we need a knife. When they got 10 or 15 feet from us, an individual came to the bowel of the boat with a very large folding pocket knife. Kurt swam out, grabbed the knife and swam back to the life boat. 42:34 I followed kurt to the back of the life raft to assist, he cut the rope I start swimming puling the life raft again. Chad murray and paul were tying to the FRC to the life raft, and it began backing away from the rig. When we got to the boat, we were all still in the water, the ones that got out of the life raft. The only people who are still in the life raft were Randy Essel, Stan Carotn and the injured person on the gurney. When we exited the water I stayed on the FRC and assisted in getting the injured person out of the life raft which I learned was Wyman Wheeler. Once on deck, Once all the lifeboats and life rafts were empty we had the first muster that I had witnessed. At that point it was determined that 11 individuals didn't make it. 43:47 From there I went and stared checking to make sure that all my people were accounted for. I did not find Brent Mansfield. I learned of the makeshift hospital on the vessel itself and found Brent there. He was laying on the floor. He had bandages and gauze around his head. He had cuts on his mouth and he also had a neck brace. His head was facing a man that was on a bunk. I stepped between them and was trying to keep brent from going to sleep. The man on the bed was buddy trahan and tried talking to him as well to keep him awake. 33:59 When the coast guard arrived, he came in and asked who's the critical. At that point troy had the rstc and bill stated that buddy trahan was the worst. They brought in the gurney and put buddy on gurney. He was screaming that his leg was hurt. He had a severe laceration and a twisted mangled calf. His fingernails were gone, he had a hole in his neck, he had multiple lacerations all over him. As I rolled him to get a second position, bill was standing on the other side and said omg, and I looked and buddy's back was burnt from belt to head. 46:24 One we got him on the gurney I helped brent best I could. I stayed with them until they got brent. Made my way up to the upper levels and watched the rig burn. 47:02 Q: Thank you for the detailed summary. In the statement you said there was standing room only in the driller's shed. What time was that at? 47:13 SB: IT was apprx 530. Q: And is that common practice to have standing room only? SB: Generally during tower change around 1130 and 12. Q: Were there additional people in the shed around 530 because of the people from BP and Transocean? SB: Yes, there were several people there. Q: Any activity on rig floor? SB: I don't recall 47:52 During your conversation with chris pleasant, you said he said yes we have multiple times when you asked about ETS. Did he ever mention that we have no hydraulics? SB: No sir. Q: Any time did he point to the panel and indicate problems? SB: No sir. Q: In written statement you said the capt was screaming at Adriana for pushing the distress button--- Attorney: I want to lodge objection for statement after being detained for 26 hours and will not be questioned on minute in statement. Will not clarify statement. 50:05 Q: Does Adriana have the authority to start the ETS or call out distress? SB: I don't know. Q: Is Mike Williams a subordinate of yours? SB: Correct. Q: And in chain of command how does he communicate DPL? Earlier you said that the DP officer would be aware of any alarms, would he report that to you or the dynamic positions officer? SB: Generally the DP officer. They would call the electronic supervisor or the chief tower directly. 51:02 Q: While you were in your room was there any indication to evacuate? SB: Not to evacuate no. Q: To muster? SB: As I opened up, as I was running to the door I heard Yancy Keplinger and he started yelling fire fire fire, and he started naming engine rooms ECR multiple locations. After the second explosion I didn't hear any more PA announcements. Q: And that was just audio to the whole rig? SB: Yes sir. 51:47 Q: If there was a gas alarm that had detected too high gas in one zone would it trip a general alarm? SB: Yes sir. Q: Did you hear a general alarm? SB: I don't recall. Q: Would you hear it from where you were located? SB: Yes. 52:09 Q: At any point were you told to leave anyone behind? Attorney: Objection! (inaudible) Q: Which engines were running at the time of the incident. SB: Not sure. Q: are you familiar with the engines? SB: Yes. Q: Is there any safety devices to prevent engine overspeed? SB: Yes. Q: And what are those? SB: Your overspeed device. Q: Mechanical or electronic? SB: IT's both mechanical and electronic. 53:06 Q: Do you know when they were last tested and inspected SB: A week prior. Q; Did you witness that inspection? SB: No not personally. Q: Who would have witnessed that? SB: first engineer. Brent Mansfeld. Or the engineer in the tower. Q; What was the frequency of inspecting those devices? SB: I don't recall. Q: were you responsible? Who is? SB: The engineers. First engineer, third and second engineer. 53:58 Q: And do they report to you? SB: They report to the RMS system if there are any problems they notify me. Q: So you don't know the inspection frequency? SB: I don't recall. Q: Have you seen any inspectors on the rig outside of motorspect auditors? SB: Yes the coast guard. As well as bp auditors. 54:46 Q: is there an emergency shut down system in the control room? SB: Yes. Q: Do know if anyone in the engine room was told to shut down their engines? SB: I do not know. Q: DO you know if there is a policy in place for ppl in engine room to shut down if given any warning? SB: NO. 55:15 Q: Earlier you said you heard a discussion in the driller shack. How familiar are you with well operations? SB: Very very limited. Q: Do you recall any part of that conversation? SB: No Q: Who was leading the conversation do you know? SB: No. Q: Are you familiar with the air intake systems for the engine rooms? SB: Yes. Q: Is that the detailed map of the engine floor in front of you sir?' 57:06 SB: Yes that is the hazardous area. Q: How far away are the air intake systems for the engine room? SB: I don't know the actual distance. 57:35 SB walks up to map of engine room to highlight intake sites. 58:18 I don't know the actual intake site for engine three. 58:48 Q: Do you know how often they inspected the air intake systems that prevented the flow of gas into the engine rooms. SB: I don't recall from the BM system. Q: Who is responsible for that? SB: The engineers. 59:17 Q: Were you aware of this BP audit "Deepwater horizon audit sept 2009"? Did you participate in that audit performed by BP? 10:00:43 SB: Yes. Q: Who is the Deep water horizon supervisor? SB: That is technically classified as well. Q: Are you responsible for responding that what's in that audit? SB: Yes. Q: And how do you respond to that audit and actually complete the recommendations that are made by BP? SB: When we receive back audit and convert to Excel spreadsheet and assigned to department heads. Dept heads report back to me in regards to progress and I forward on the asset manager and performance manager. Q: That audit references repairs had deteriorated again or not addressed since final instance. 10:01:50 Attorney objects. 02:06 Q: Was the equipment deterioration presented to you from that audit? SB: Yes. From the initial audit. Q: What was the follow up audit? Were the problems form the initial audit not properly addressed? SB: I don't know. Q: Please elaborate on RMS. SB: Rig maintenance systems. IT'S where all the Pms and equipment ordering systems, all the orders are carried out. It's a transocean maintenance system. 02:55 Q: Was there any excessive jobs overdue on deepwater horizon? Objection. Was there a problem on deepwater horizon that was not addressed because of lack of personnel. 03:36 SB: The thing was the RMS system, was it was just implemented back in 2009 marine assurance audit. There were also a lot of PMs and crafts that were not appropriate. Many were duplicates and we were going through the process of eliminating those. If you look back at history of it, you would see that there were a lot of PMs not done in an allotted time, but a lot of those did not apply to this vessel. 04:33 SB: Most of those as I recall were not major PMs past due. Most of them were moderate to minor. Q: at the time of the incidents were there any problems being behind planned or scheduled maintenance. SB: No. I don't know. Q: Were there personnel changes under your supervision? SB: Yes. Q: How many? SB: I don't know. Q: Did personnel turnover had effect on maintenance operation? SB: I don't know. 06:34 Q: IS there a competency assurance program for maintenance on deepwater horizon? SB: Are you referring the rules and responsibility? Q: I'm talking about competency that ensures the job you are performing. SB: Yes. Q: Did Transocean have personnel from outside that they would bring in when they were behind schedule on jobs? SB: Yes. Q: Were they qualified to do their jobs? Based on your evaluation? Sb: Yes. 06:49 Q: The report that I referred to cited that marine supervisor said lack of man power was reasons for delayed maintenance of engines. SB: I don't recall. Q: Do you know who the auditors were? SB: I don't recall their names. Q: Did you participate in the motorspec audit? SB: I was there at the motorspec. Q: Did you participate at engine level? SB: No. 07:38 Q: Reports said tests on overdrive on engines were successful? How were they tested? SB: They were manually oversped. Q: Did they shut down? SB: From my knowledge yes. My engineers relayed it back to me. Q: Was deepwater horizon scheduled to go to the ship yard? SB: yes. Q: When was that? SB: IT was supposed to be early part of 2011. 08:35 Q: Do you know how long it was going to be in the shipyard for? SB: I don't recall the number of days.Q:Was there any information passed to you along the lines of maintence being the reason going to the ship yard? Post motorspec audit. SB: I did not hear them talking about it. Q: What was planned for the ship yard visit? SB: There were many items planned but I don't have specifics of what it was. Q: What was most important part of maintenance that needs to get done in the ship yard? SB: That would be your thrusters your engines your seawater systems your ballast systems and your drilling systems. Q: Based on that what needed to be performed? SB: I don't want to speculate. Q: But you were chief engineer. Did you have a punch list of items that needed to be taken care of at the shipyard? SB: Yes. Q; What was on the punch list? SB: Thrusters, sea water systems, ballast, engines and drilling equipment.' 11:26 Q: On April 20th did you discuss with any bp or transocean execs rig maintenance? SB: Yes. Q: And what did you discuss? SB: We discussed out of service periods between wells. For the upcoming rig move, as well as the next upcoming rig move. Q: And what was scheduled to be repaired during the out of service period? SB: Multiple items. Q: What were they? SB: I don't recall. Q: You've been on deepwater horizon since 2003 correct? SB: Yes. Q: Have you seen able bodied men in the bridge go into areas that had high gas alarms go off with gas detectors? In lieu of an electric alarm that sends off general alarm? SB: No I have not.
Footage Information
Source | ABCNEWS VideoSource |
---|---|
Direct Link: | View details on ABCNEWS VideoSource site |
Title: | USCG BOEM OIL SPILL HEARING P1 |
Date: | 07/19/2010 |
Library: | ABC |
Tape Number: | NYU25529 |
Content: | NEW ORLEANS - 0900EDT - Third session of the Joint Investigation -There will be a public hearing for the joint BOEM/USCG investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion, fire, pollution, and sinking of the Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with multiple loss of life in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010. Media coverage of the hearing proceedings is permitted by the Joint Investigation Co-Chairmen as long as it remains consistent with the proper and orderly functioning of the investigation. There will be morning and afternoon sessions, and a media pool will be in effect for the duration of the hearing. The BOEM/USCG Joint Investigation into the Deepwater Horizon Incident What: Third session of the Joint Investigation Where: Radisson New Orleans Airport, 2150 Veterans Blvd., Kenner, La. - Bayou Meeting Room When: July 19-23, 2010 from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. (CDT) daily Witness list below. Session (all times eastern) 9-1p then break until 2p, ends 6pEST Witness List - July 19, 2010 The purpose of this joint investigation is to develop conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the Deepwater Horizon MODU explosion and loss of life on April 20, 2010. The facts collected at this hearing, along with the lead investigators' conclusions and recommendations will be forwarded to Coast Guard Headquarters and BOEM for approval. Once approved, the final investigative report will be made available to the public and the media. No analysis or conclusions will be presented during the hearing. The following is a list of witnesses who will be questioned during this FACT-FINDING joint investigation. Monday July 19, 2010: 1. Stephen Bertone - Transocean, Chief Engineer, providing status and proper maintenance of generators and electrical distribution system. 2. Lance John - Weatherford, Rig System Specialist, providing information on the casing running and the presence of ruptured disks in the 16" casing string. 3. Leo Linder - MI-Swaco, Drilling Fluid Specialist, providing information on the displacement path from the riser to Deepwater Horizon MODU. 4. Wyman Wheeler - Transocean, Toolpusher, providing recollection of incident aboard Deepwater Horizon. 5. Tyrone Benton - Oceaneering, ROV Technician, providing information on the leaks associated with BOP stack. LOG of first half of Proceedings 08:59:49 Start of proceedings CH--Capt Hong Quin?, Head of invesgation panel 09:00:32 CH: Objective Determine source of emission and vessel stability two examine why backup and standby generator didn't work, three determine adequacy of oil plan, four adequacy of drilling equipment testing five adequacy of safeguards of drilling six determine oil control issues, seven oil crew actions, eight receive testimony 01:24 CH: Receive testimony on witnesses, wyatt willer will not be appearing 09:04:44 Attorneys object not having enough time to examine documents to be introduced into the proceedings. 16:25 CH: I would ike to call on Steven Berone SB-Steven Bertone, Chief engineer of transocean, deep water horizon 16:37 SB walks in and takes oath for testimoiny 16:58 SP: Steven London, attorney of Steve Bertone, is he a person of interst? 17:18 CH: No sir the board has not designated him 17:26 do you anticipate designation CH: No. 17:41 Steven Ray Bertone, employed by transocean, chief engineer Q: prior to being engineer, did you hold any other postion with transoceawn SB: I was a electrical supervisior, for 7 years Q: was it all aboard the deepwater horizon? SB: No sir Q: what other rigs did you work on SB: Ive been on the f100 and transocearn marianis Q: had experience with transcoen outside of deepwater SB: I started with falcon drilling, purcharsed by reading and bates purchased by transocean Q: how long have you been assigne to deepwater horizxon/. SB: since 2003 9:18:521 Q: and how long have you been chief engineer? SB: since November 2008 Q: prior to aspril 20th, how long have you been on your hitch? SB: probably for 18 days Q: Was there any safety issues on deepwater horizon 19:27 Do you know what A chair Bchiar and C chair is? SB: yes, sir Q: Were there any problems with any of those? SB: I Dont recall. Q: were there any problems specifically with the a chiar where there was a loss of power? SB: I don't'. Q: Can you define what the A chair is? SB: The A Chiar is where the driller sits. 19:48 Q: and where does the colonel of the driller sits? What is he monitoring? SB He's monitoring the block placement the top drive torque, depth of the well, mud pumps Q: any incident wth a chair assoc with loss of electrical power? SB: during the event or prior to? Q: prior to SB; yes there was. Q: and when were those, the latest? SB: I don't recall. 09:20:14 Q: was there any problesm with number four thruster SB: Yes. Q: for how long SB: Roughly eight months. Q: any alarms bypassed of any visual alarms for any gas situations? SB: I don't know Q:Were any alarms bypassed on deepwater horizon? SB: I don't know. Q: you are the chief enginerr and you don't know? SB: I'm not in control of those alarms. Q: Who is in control of those alarms? SB: DP operators. 09:2:10 Q: Dp operators? Who are the DP operators? On april 20th A: Yancy Keplinger and andrea Fuentes Q: if there was a alarm that was bypassed would it have to be under your approval? SB: No sir. Q: Alright lets go to april 20th Can you give us a detail of that day up until the incident. SB: From the time I woke up? Q: Yes sir: 21:49 SB: We had a 630 meeting between OIM Capt, senior tool pusher, RSTC and myself. That was a phone call to town where we spoke to james kent, asset manager and Paul Johnson performance manager. After that at around 830 we always have our supervisors meeting where all supervisors are required to attend. After that I went back to my office to work on upcoming rig move and second rig move preparing budgetary items for bp officials that were arriving later that day. 22:42 went to lunch at 1130 11 45 went back to office to continue working on documents and at apporx 330 4pm, we had a meeting with sp officials and transocean and deemed that we would go tour the rig. We toured several spaced, made our way to floor. And when ed got to floor we went to drill shack. I was last one in the drill shack out was standing room only. At that point I knew there was something going on but didn't know what it was. I was asked by jimmy and randy to please continue the toru==our without them. They needed to stay up there. We went to pump rooms and showed them thrusters and went to dinner at 630. After dinner we had supervisor meeting with bp and transocean officials until 9 915. Afer that I had a cigarette, went to state room, took a shower and went to bed. 24:21 I just opened up my book, reading, when I heard what sounded like the tensioners being blown off. I thought that was kind of strange bc I just spoke with chris pleasant who said they were just finished leading off the tensioners. It got louder, it sounded like a freight train going through my bedroom, and there was a loud thumping, and with each thumping I felt a shake. There was an initial boom, the lights went out. I ran out of my room to the door to get dressed by emergency lights. 25:03 when I opened up the door I smelt some kind of fuel and tasted it. When I turned to get my clothing the second explosion occurred which threw me across the room. I ran into hallway to center stairwell and observed four five ppl standing there froze looking at stairwell. I shouted to head to the port forward or spiral forward staircase and go to your emergency stations. I ran to the port spiral staircase and made my way to the bridge. (speaks with attorney) 26:16 Once I arrived to the bridge I went to my station which is the port side computer station system. A t that point I observed that we had no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever. I picked up the phone and called the engine control room and there was no dial tone. There were no phones. I hollered out that we have no comms. At this point I ran to the starboard window to the bridge to look out the the derricks. 26:56 Whatever the second explosion everything did not register with me. I initially thought that the block had not parted and that thumping sound was the block coming down the derrick. I was expecting to see steel and pipe from the floor. When I looked out at the derrick I saw fire, derrick leg to derrick leg as high as I could see. At that point I realized that we had a blow out. 27:23 I ran back to my station thinking that the engines should be starting up because after 25 to 30 secs two engines start up come on line and start filling the KG filler breakers as well as starting up thrusters. There was still no power of any kind. No indication of engines starting. I heard the water tight door band which was behind me. And I heard someone saying the engine room, ECr and pump room are gone. Theyre all gone. I turned around and I didn't' recognize who it was at the time because he was covered in blood. 28:05 And I asked him what you mean gone. And he said they're blown up. It was mike wiliams the chief BDT. He had a laceration across his forehead. I hollered out the medical supplies were. They said the restroom at the back of the bridge. I ran to there. Tried to find some kind of gauze or something. I found a roll of toilet paper, ran back and stuck it to his head. I ran back to my station, still not truly believing that these engines were gone. I couldn't fathom that. I looked back at my screen and there was nothing. No engines starting no thrusters. We were dead ship. 28:58 I heard the water tight door slam again. When I turned around I saw an individual holding a rag to his head. He hollered im hurt. I'm hurt real bad chief. At that point I recognized his voice because he was covered in blood as well. I ran back and pulled the rag away from his head and looked as his wound and hollered for a medic. There was no medic at the time. I ran to the starboard door and hollered to lifeboats we need a medic now. I ran back to my station hoping that the engines would start-nothing. I turned back to Brent and noticed that standing behind him was chris pleasant. The sub C supervisor was standing at the bop panel. 30:03 I hollered out to chris pleasant have you EDSed. HE said he needed permission to EDS. When I turned to my left, Don winslow, the performance operations manager for transocean was standing right next to me. I asked if we could eds, and he said yes. Chris pleasant somebody on the bridge hollered out, he cannot eds with out the OIM's approval. I spun back around and saw Jimmy hearald the OIM running across the bridge by the BP consoles. I hollered out to jimmy can we eds we said yes, eds, eds. When I turned back to chris he was in a panel pushing a button. 30:42 I hollered to chris I need confirmation that we EDSed. He said yes, I reconfirmed and he pointed out a light on the panel. At that point I turned to the forward at the bridge and hollered to kurt for permission to go to the standby generator room and manually start it. My thinking was the BOP had latched, what would be remaining of the fuel would be burned away, and we were going to need power as well as fire pumps. Kurt said yes go. The Chief mate came over to me running with a radio. We looked at the radios turned them on and tried to get comms through the radios. 31:33 For whatever reason we could not get comms through the radios standing five feet from each other. We verified that we were on the same channel and still no comms. I said don't worry about it and I laid the radio down. When I went to the bridge I shut the water tight door for whatever reason, and mike Williams pushed it back and said, you're not going alone chief. I said well come on. Paul mineheart, the motorman also fell in line and we ran to the standby generator. As I listened to the standby generator, I looked at the part where the crown should be and I could see nothing but flames way past the crown. I remember looking down at the deck because it was very slick, and I saw a substance that had the consistency of snot. 32:24 I remember thinking to myself, why is this snot on this deck. It was approx inch to an inch and a half thick. As I mad e my way to the standby generator room, we walked past the bop house which has a huge door, which is 80 90 feet tall 50 feet wide, that you can look down into moon pool. When you looked down into that space all I could see were flames. There was no equipment whatsoever. It was solid flames. 32:59 When we walked into standby generator room, myself and mike Williams ran to the start up panel. I flipped the switch from auto to manual hit the reset and start button, there was no returning of the engine. I tried again and again nothing happened. Mike shouted out that we have 24 bolts. Stood by fr a second. Paul mineheart was standing by the door, I looked at him and told him to shut the door because he was standing there looking at the flames. At that point I thought if the engines are all gone, maybe there is some electrical interference or something that is nto allowing the generator to start. So I turned and ran to the 480 switch gear for the standby generator room, I closed the main feeder breaker for the generator and I reopened it. SO I turned the witch for automatic sync on the panel to manual. 34:17 I ran back to the panel and tried again to reset and to start. T here was no turning over for the engine. Mike hollered out try the second battery pack just in case. Paul I think flipped the switch. There was nothing. The engine didn't turn. I said lets go back to the bridge.. When we reopened the watertight doors, that was the first time that I actually felt the heat. IT was very very intense. We ran to the bridge, we came in to the port side watertight door. I observed that yancy and andrea were still standing with radios. I ran across the bridge to the starboard side, kurt was standing at the door and looking at the lifeboat station. When I ran over I saw lifeboat number one pulling away from the rig. Lifeboat two was already gone. 35:35 At that point I turned to mike and Paul and hollered out, that's it abandon ship let's go! They ran past by me. I turned and looked, yancy and andrea were still by the radios and I hollered at them that's it lets abandon ship lets go now. I turned and went out the watertight door. Capt Kurt was in front of me and we made our way to the lifeboat deck as we were coming down the stairs, I observed a man on the gurney at the bottom of the stairs, with three people trying to get a life vest on him. 36:12 The three ppl were stan carton, chad murray and randy essel. At this point I did not know who was in that gurney. At this point we made it down the stairs to the DAVIT the life raft. We hooked the life raft up and proceed to crank out of lift and drop it to inflate raft and clear the rig. There was a shackling device that had two metal hooks. I do not know what this rope was for but it hindered the life raft and davit to clear the rig. At that point we hollered for a knife, no one had one, mike tried to remove the shackles but could not. He pulled out a pair of ET dikes which are nail clippers on steroids. He unscrewed the shackles and freed the life raft to the side of the rig. 37:27 We started pulling the painter line. I looked at the man on the gurney and tried to get him to the life raft. There were two people already on the life raft, one was david young , I do not know who the other person was. But I made eye contact with david young. I shoved lyman into the life raft and followed him directly afterwards. As I entered the life raft there was, prior to that , there were a lot of smaller explosions still going on and immense heat. All the flames and heat from the rig floor were coming down the front part of the deck, as well as all the flame and heat form under the rig were meeting like at vortex under the life raft. 38:44 As I jumped in I had my leather work gloves on. I can remember feeling the intense heat through those gloves and on my knees. I went to the far side of the life raft and heard the injured person on the gurney start hollering my leg my leg. I also heard andreas screaming we're going to die. At that point I honestly thought we were going to cook right there. 39:15 I guess from hurriedness from jumping there, it--- 39:30 At that point the life raft actually dipped forward and back. It started rocking back and forth. There was smoke in the life raft and it started descending into the water. the smoke cleared out when we touched the water. I heard someone say where are the panels. I was by the exit door and jumped out of the life raft and grabbed hold of the rope by the side of the life raft, trying the push the life raft away from the boat. I know chad murray jumped out and was right behind me. mineheart jumped in front of me. I was swimming on my side looking at the rig, I would say 25 30 feet above me. There was a tremendous amount of smoke bellowing out of the rig. At that point I saw a person's boots and his clothing come shooting through the smoke. Just before he landed I noticed that it was Kurt. 40:39 He landed approx five feet from me. Within seconds, Half a second later, another person and boots came flying out of the smoke. And he was approx ten feet from me. Just before he hit the water, I noticed that it was Yancy Keplinger. As were swimming trying to pull the life raft form the rig, I got to the point where I could see the helideck and witnessed an individual running at full speed across the helideck. When he jumped off he was still running, just before he splashed into the water, he was actually looking right at us and that was mike Williams. I noticed that shortly after that we were not going any further away form the rig. 41:30 About that time I heard someone hollering out omg the painter line is tied to the rig. I looked and saw the white painter line going into the smoke. I heard Chad murray shouting out for help. I looked out to see, and prob 50 60 yards away there was the fast rescue craft from daimon bankston. I saw two flashing light in the water just as I looked at it, one of those was being hauled into the boat. And seconds later, the second person was hauled into the boat. The FRC started driving towards us, and we were hollering we need a knife, we need a knife. When they got 10 or 15 feet from us, an individual came to the bowel of the boat with a very large folding pocket knife. Kurt swam out, grabbed the knife and swam back to the life boat. 42:34 I followed kurt to the back of the life raft to assist, he cut the rope I start swimming puling the life raft again. Chad murray and paul were tying to the FRC to the life raft, and it began backing away from the rig. When we got to the boat, we were all still in the water, the ones that got out of the life raft. The only people who are still in the life raft were Randy Essel, Stan Carotn and the injured person on the gurney. When we exited the water I stayed on the FRC and assisted in getting the injured person out of the life raft which I learned was Wyman Wheeler. Once on deck, Once all the lifeboats and life rafts were empty we had the first muster that I had witnessed. At that point it was determined that 11 individuals didn't make it. 43:47 From there I went and stared checking to make sure that all my people were accounted for. I did not find Brent Mansfield. I learned of the makeshift hospital on the vessel itself and found Brent there. He was laying on the floor. He had bandages and gauze around his head. He had cuts on his mouth and he also had a neck brace. His head was facing a man that was on a bunk. I stepped between them and was trying to keep brent from going to sleep. The man on the bed was buddy trahan and tried talking to him as well to keep him awake. 33:59 When the coast guard arrived, he came in and asked who's the critical. At that point troy had the rstc and bill stated that buddy trahan was the worst. They brought in the gurney and put buddy on gurney. He was screaming that his leg was hurt. He had a severe laceration and a twisted mangled calf. His fingernails were gone, he had a hole in his neck, he had multiple lacerations all over him. As I rolled him to get a second position, bill was standing on the other side and said omg, and I looked and buddy's back was burnt from belt to head. 46:24 One we got him on the gurney I helped brent best I could. I stayed with them until they got brent. Made my way up to the upper levels and watched the rig burn. 47:02 Q: Thank you for the detailed summary. In the statement you said there was standing room only in the driller's shed. What time was that at? 47:13 SB: IT was apprx 530. Q: And is that common practice to have standing room only? SB: Generally during tower change around 1130 and 12. Q: Were there additional people in the shed around 530 because of the people from BP and Transocean? SB: Yes, there were several people there. Q: Any activity on rig floor? SB: I don't recall 47:52 During your conversation with chris pleasant, you said he said yes we have multiple times when you asked about ETS. Did he ever mention that we have no hydraulics? SB: No sir. Q: Any time did he point to the panel and indicate problems? SB: No sir. Q: In written statement you said the capt was screaming at Adriana for pushing the distress button--- Attorney: I want to lodge objection for statement after being detained for 26 hours and will not be questioned on minute in statement. Will not clarify statement. 50:05 Q: Does Adriana have the authority to start the ETS or call out distress? SB: I don't know. Q: Is Mike Williams a subordinate of yours? SB: Correct. Q: And in chain of command how does he communicate DPL? Earlier you said that the DP officer would be aware of any alarms, would he report that to you or the dynamic positions officer? SB: Generally the DP officer. They would call the electronic supervisor or the chief tower directly. 51:02 Q: While you were in your room was there any indication to evacuate? SB: Not to evacuate no. Q: To muster? SB: As I opened up, as I was running to the door I heard Yancy Keplinger and he started yelling fire fire fire, and he started naming engine rooms ECR multiple locations. After the second explosion I didn't hear any more PA announcements. Q: And that was just audio to the whole rig? SB: Yes sir. 51:47 Q: If there was a gas alarm that had detected too high gas in one zone would it trip a general alarm? SB: Yes sir. Q: Did you hear a general alarm? SB: I don't recall. Q: Would you hear it from where you were located? SB: Yes. 52:09 Q: At any point were you told to leave anyone behind? Attorney: Objection! (inaudible) Q: Which engines were running at the time of the incident. SB: Not sure. Q: are you familiar with the engines? SB: Yes. Q: Is there any safety devices to prevent engine overspeed? SB: Yes. Q: And what are those? SB: Your overspeed device. Q: Mechanical or electronic? SB: IT's both mechanical and electronic. 53:06 Q: Do you know when they were last tested and inspected SB: A week prior. Q; Did you witness that inspection? SB: No not personally. Q: Who would have witnessed that? SB: first engineer. Brent Mansfeld. Or the engineer in the tower. Q; What was the frequency of inspecting those devices? SB: I don't recall. Q: were you responsible? Who is? SB: The engineers. First engineer, third and second engineer. 53:58 Q: And do they report to you? SB: They report to the RMS system if there are any problems they notify me. Q: So you don't know the inspection frequency? SB: I don't recall. Q: Have you seen any inspectors on the rig outside of motorspect auditors? SB: Yes the coast guard. As well as bp auditors. 54:46 Q: is there an emergency shut down system in the control room? SB: Yes. Q: Do know if anyone in the engine room was told to shut down their engines? SB: I do not know. Q: DO you know if there is a policy in place for ppl in engine room to shut down if given any warning? SB: NO. 55:15 Q: Earlier you said you heard a discussion in the driller shack. How familiar are you with well operations? SB: Very very limited. Q: Do you recall any part of that conversation? SB: No Q: Who was leading the conversation do you know? SB: No. Q: Are you familiar with the air intake systems for the engine rooms? SB: Yes. Q: Is that the detailed map of the engine floor in front of you sir?' 57:06 SB: Yes that is the hazardous area. Q: How far away are the air intake systems for the engine room? SB: I don't know the actual distance. 57:35 SB walks up to map of engine room to highlight intake sites. 58:18 I don't know the actual intake site for engine three. 58:48 Q: Do you know how often they inspected the air intake systems that prevented the flow of gas into the engine rooms. SB: I don't recall from the BM system. Q: Who is responsible for that? SB: The engineers. 59:17 Q: Were you aware of this BP audit "Deepwater horizon audit sept 2009"? Did you participate in that audit performed by BP? 10:00:43 SB: Yes. Q: Who is the Deep water horizon supervisor? SB: That is technically classified as well. Q: Are you responsible for responding that what's in that audit? SB: Yes. Q: And how do you respond to that audit and actually complete the recommendations that are made by BP? SB: When we receive back audit and convert to Excel spreadsheet and assigned to department heads. Dept heads report back to me in regards to progress and I forward on the asset manager and performance manager. Q: That audit references repairs had deteriorated again or not addressed since final instance. 10:01:50 Attorney objects. 02:06 Q: Was the equipment deterioration presented to you from that audit? SB: Yes. From the initial audit. Q: What was the follow up audit? Were the problems form the initial audit not properly addressed? SB: I don't know. Q: Please elaborate on RMS. SB: Rig maintenance systems. IT'S where all the Pms and equipment ordering systems, all the orders are carried out. It's a transocean maintenance system. 02:55 Q: Was there any excessive jobs overdue on deepwater horizon? Objection. Was there a problem on deepwater horizon that was not addressed because of lack of personnel. 03:36 SB: The thing was the RMS system, was it was just implemented back in 2009 marine assurance audit. There were also a lot of PMs and crafts that were not appropriate. Many were duplicates and we were going through the process of eliminating those. If you look back at history of it, you would see that there were a lot of PMs not done in an allotted time, but a lot of those did not apply to this vessel. 04:33 SB: Most of those as I recall were not major PMs past due. Most of them were moderate to minor. Q: at the time of the incidents were there any problems being behind planned or scheduled maintenance. SB: No. I don't know. Q: Were there personnel changes under your supervision? SB: Yes. Q: How many? SB: I don't know. Q: Did personnel turnover had effect on maintenance operation? SB: I don't know. 06:34 Q: IS there a competency assurance program for maintenance on deepwater horizon? SB: Are you referring the rules and responsibility? Q: I'm talking about competency that ensures the job you are performing. SB: Yes. Q: Did Transocean have personnel from outside that they would bring in when they were behind schedule on jobs? SB: Yes. Q: Were they qualified to do their jobs? Based on your evaluation? Sb: Yes. 06:49 Q: The report that I referred to cited that marine supervisor said lack of man power was reasons for delayed maintenance of engines. SB: I don't recall. Q: Do you know who the auditors were? SB: I don't recall their names. Q: Did you participate in the motorspec audit? SB: I was there at the motorspec. Q: Did you participate at engine level? SB: No. 07:38 Q: Reports said tests on overdrive on engines were successful? How were they tested? SB: They were manually oversped. Q: Did they shut down? SB: From my knowledge yes. My engineers relayed it back to me. Q: Was deepwater horizon scheduled to go to the ship yard? SB: yes. Q: When was that? SB: IT was supposed to be early part of 2011. 08:35 Q: Do you know how long it was going to be in the shipyard for? SB: I don't recall the number of days.Q:Was there any information passed to you along the lines of maintence being the reason going to the ship yard? Post motorspec audit. SB: I did not hear them talking about it. Q: What was planned for the ship yard visit? SB: There were many items planned but I don't have specifics of what it was. Q: What was most important part of maintenance that needs to get done in the ship yard? SB: That would be your thrusters your engines your seawater systems your ballast systems and your drilling systems. Q: Based on that what needed to be performed? SB: I don't want to speculate. Q: But you were chief engineer. Did you have a punch list of items that needed to be taken care of at the shipyard? SB: Yes. Q; What was on the punch list? SB: Thrusters, sea water systems, ballast, engines and drilling equipment.' 11:26 Q: On April 20th did you discuss with any bp or transocean execs rig maintenance? SB: Yes. Q: And what did you discuss? SB: We discussed out of service periods between wells. For the upcoming rig move, as well as the next upcoming rig move. Q: And what was scheduled to be repaired during the out of service period? SB: Multiple items. Q: What were they? SB: I don't recall. Q: You've been on deepwater horizon since 2003 correct? SB: Yes. Q: Have you seen able bodied men in the bridge go into areas that had high gas alarms go off with gas detectors? In lieu of an electric alarm that sends off general alarm? SB: No I have not. |
Media Type: | Archived Unity File |