Summary

HILLARY CLINTON - PT. 1

Source Archive Films by Getty Images
Title: HILLARY CLINTON - PT. 1
File Number: FSN-147 Beta SP
Color: Color
Type: News
Year: 2004
Description: Part 1 - Senator Hillary Clinton critiquing Bush administration's foreign policy in a speech at the Brookings Institution on February 25, 2004 [TRANSCRIPT] Addressing the National Security Challenges of Our Time: Fighting Terror and the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction The Brookings Institution Thank you very much. Thank you, Jim, for that introduction and for our years working together and friendship that goes back a ways. And I also want to thank Strobe Talbot and, of course, he and I and my husband are friends of the longest-standing--and Brooke, I thank you for being here this morning, as well. And to all of you, thank you for this opportunity to spend a little bit of time talking about these issues and then having question and answer opportunities, as well. You know, today, as we gather, we are at a unique moment in the foreign policy of this Administration. In the context of Iraq, we are seeing signs of a shift, even a reversal in the Administration's fundamental attitude toward international allies toward international institutions and multilateralism. When you step back, the changes are striking. As we all know, in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, the Administration chose to ignore many allies and the United Nations before U.S. troops crossed the border into Iraq. Now, an Administration that has celebrated freedom of action over collective action in Iraq, is scrambling for friends and institutions to bail us out. The go-it-alone instinct of this Administration has now demonstrably failed. Our experience in Iraq demonstrates that power, not harnessed to a sense of international legitimacy, is a flawed strategy. The question is whether the Administration's about-face in Iraq signifies a deeper re-evaluation of their attitudes toward the world. That is, has the Administration come to understand that the 50-year bipartisan consensus supporting multilateralism was not an excuse for weakness, but an exercise of strength? The answer to this question is critical to understanding whether the Administration's foreign policy is undergoing a shift, brought on by our experience in Iraq that views our allies and the international community as partners in the War on Terror. For a failure to learn the lessons from our policy failure in Iraq will be disastrous in the War on Terror. So, this morning, I'd like to talk about the dangers of pursuing a policy of unilateralism and the need for allies in every aspect of our security. Critical to fighting this new 21st century war is a fundamental re-orientation away from a unilateral posture to a multilateral strategy that strengthens all who participate. Such a change would bring us back in line with more than a half-century of bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. But we must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach. We must consider reforming some of the institutions and alliances we're now part of revamping some of the agreements we've reached or are still working on and examining new ways to work together if we are to be as effective as we possibly can in meeting these new challenges of terror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If we do that, I believe we can build a world with more friends and fewer terrorists and create a climate in which we can move from fear to hope. As Jim said, over Thanksgiving, I visited both Iraq and Afghanistan with Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, where I did have the honor of visiting with U.S. troops, including those from the Tenth Mountain Division based at Fort Drum, New York. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in December, I laid out many of my concerns about our policies in Iraq and Afghanistan. And great deal has occurred since then that I'd like to take just a moment to address. If we look about what happened in Iraq, I think we can reach several conclusions: First, I believe our military victory in Iraq was assured. We knew that victory would be inevitable. We may not have been able to put the timeline in place. But we not only have an extraordinarily dedicated military, we have the most advanced technology we have the best trained troops we have a level of professionalism, skill, and judgment that is incredibly impressive. And I would urge more attention to that. In fact, our troops are now being called to engage in nation building something that had been derided by then-Governor Bush, during the 2000 campaign. But from what I saw, the victories that we can look to in the post-conflict period in Iraq, are largely due to the actions of our military. And not just our generals but, literally, all up and down the chain of command. And it has been an extraordinary display of American know-how and willingness to dig in and do some very difficult work, while still trying to engage the Iraqis and create a condition of stability and security. During the 2000 campaign, I recall Vice President Cheney saying that there is almost nothing you can do to improve the quality of a force created by your predecessors. And then after the Gulf War, he wrote a letter to former President Reagan thanking him for building the military that fought so capably. Well, I don't know, but I don't think any letters have yet arrived on the desks of anyone associated with the Clinton Administration. But that military success does not counteract the second point of the war that many of us have discussed. And that is the fact that before the war actually began, many questions were raised about what would happen--what was the post-war Iraq plan? How many troops for how long how much what was the nature of the mission? Not only were I and other members of Congress raising questions about the plan for a post-Saddam Iraq, but we now know that many within the Administration raised similar questions and cautions. Indeed, report after report have recently come out, literally, volumes of writing, showing that the CIA, the State Department and think tanks in this town and others predicted all of the problems we are now witnessing in Iraq. They actually predicted the looting the problems of disbanding the army and the civil strife that would ensue. When I was in Iraq, I don't think I met with any Iraqi who did not ask me how could you have let the looting go on? It's a very important question that this Administration has yet to address. Now, were these people in the State Department and elsewhere in this town lauded for their brilliant insight? No, they were fired, relegated or ignored. According to "The Washington Post" and I quote, "The Bush Administration ignored their planning, fired planners who disagreed with it and in several instances barred Pentagon officials from attending meeting with planners suspected of harboring thoughts not approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld." That is a chilling indictment of this Administration. Only in Washington is the reward for being right getting fired. And now where are we? Well, we have a rush to turn over the helm to anyone. As I stated in December, I have serious concerns about the Administration's plan to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis in a little more than three months. Indeed, the Administration's policy seems in disarray, except for their commitment to the date of July, since it has now announced that it is abandoning its plan for caucuses to choose new leaders. I have argued for combining a turnover of the political reigns being done in a more timely and thoughtful way. I have expressed concerns about doing a turnover of such significance while we are still in the midst of turning over our own troops. Removing from literally the front lines, people who have created relationships with Iraqis at all levels of the government and the, you know, nascent military and police forces. I believe that we should definitely consider delaying a transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis by a few months, at least so we can be better assured of a safer transition. And then, just recently we have heard that the Governing council is not even committed to negotiating the terms of a continuing American involvement until that transfer of sovereignty. There are other problems associated with the Administration's expedited schedule. One is we have no idea who might emerge as the leaders of a new Iraq. We, obviously, cannot and should not expect to hand pick that leader or leaders, but we should have some sense of what will be the frame work for governance. Will Iraq have a religious or secular government? Will it have a federal structure or allow autonomous regions. We have a date, but not a destination. We are at a critical point and it appears to me that, once again, the Administration is in disarray. We must not let adherence to artificial deadlines create a situation that fosters greater instability from which our efforts to create a free and democratic Iraq may not recover. We should not adhere slavishly to an artificial deadline decided, for whatever reason, in Washington, if it risks chaos and unraveling in Iraq. And let me turn now to Afghanistan, because I believe we still have failed to pay adequate attention or have we given the appropriate resources that are necessary to Afghanistan. This was summarized for me when I was greeted by a soldier, an American soldier in Afghanistan who said "welcome to the forgotten front line of the War on Terror." I laid out my concerns about Afghanistan, also, in my December speech. In recent reports that the political transition in Afghanistan may have to be delayed because of problems ensuring security and building political institutions suggests that we are once again on the brink of if not failure, certainly, considerable setbacks because we have not provided the appropriate focus on what Afghanistan needs in order to makes it way through this transition. Having achieved quick military success, we should not repeat the same mistakes that were made in 1989. Yet, I fear that unless we and our NATO allies ramp up our involvement in this forgotten front line in the War in Terror, we stand in danger of doing so. Despite the differences in how and why we went into Iraq and Afghanistan, there are lessons to be learned from each as we consider how best to fight the wider War on Terror. First and foremost, I believe, we've got to, once again, take a hard look at how we treat our allies and how we expect them to work with us in providing security and reconstruction in these two countries. You know, this is not a new problem, dealing with allies. And it's not a new problem dealing with particular countries with whom we often have prickly relationships. As Churchill once said, the only thing worse than having allies is not having them. And I think this Administration has finally begun to realize that. The irony is that while the Administration was dismissive of broader international support before the war, it is now seeking NATO and U.N. involvement in Iraq. It is attempting to get NATO to fulfill it's pledge to provide more troops and equipment in Afghanistan, yet to be committed to. And it's sending James Baker abroad to build support for debt reduction. We already have a profound problem with how we are perceived in the world, with many viewing the United States as arrogant and unilateralist. Recent international polls confirm what many of us sense and feel, which is that respect and admiration for the United States has plummeted in many places around the world. Ironically, this schizophrenic policy that the Administration has put before us is at odds with a growing bipartisan consensus on Capital Hill that recognizes our interests are advanced when we win allies to our causes. Republican Senators Hagel and McCain Representatives Wolf and Shays, along with Joe Biden, and a chorus of Democrats, understand that to gain allies we need to share control. That's an important lesson, not just for Iraq and Afghanistan, but for winning the War on Terror. And, yet, how do we operationalize that? How do we have a situation in which even this Administration can begin to move back toward that consensus which has served us so well? Well, you know, sometimes we need troops sometimes we need economic assistance sometimes we need intelligence sometimes we need nations to use their own police and security forces to crack down on terror cells and money laundering within their own borders. We need all kinds of collaboration. And, unfortunately, our current policy does not focus on such collaboration with the vigor it deserves. Now, America's detachment from the world began well before September 11. Remember how the Administration withdrew from the playing field in the Middle East. Of course it is a difficult and turbulent environment, but our laissez faire approach gave us no advantage in pushing the Palestinians to crack down on the terrorists as they stepped up their attacks on Israelis in 2001 and 2002. We retreated from the world when we abandoned the Kyoto Global Warming Treaty process, without even attempting to create some kind of consensus that would enable that process to continue. When we withdrew from the ABM Treaty, buried the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and abandoned the effort to give teeth to the Biological Weapons Treaty. That sequence of diplomatic retrenchments sent a clear message: We're going it alone, whether you like it or not. In fact, we hope you don't like it, because that will make us feel even stronger as we pursue our objectives around the world. We do not trust international efforts to deal with common problems. We are better served by freedom of action, rather than collective action. And that gets to the heart of such a big difference between this Administration and the bipartisan consensus of the 20th century about foreign policy. Indeed, the benefits of international support has been apparent during the 20th century, most obviously in the defeat of fascism in World War II and the defeat of communism during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the model can be seen in Kosovo and Bosnia. I believe that we prevailed in Kosovo because 19 democracies of NATO did not break rank. And as a result Milosovic is on trial in the Hague. NATO and the U.N. remain in the Balkans to this day, nurturing democratic movements, a painstaking and time-taking task, but I think we are viewed there as a liberator, not an occupier. And we at least have a decent chance of seeing a better outcome because of our continuing efforts. Cooperative international efforts did help prevent terrorist attacks before 9 11 prevented terrorists from blowing up airliners attacking major targets during the millennium and I think there are many other examples that all of you know we could point to. Now, I believe, as I think any American believes that we should never put alliances before our own security, but it's my point that abandonment of alliances can harm our security. And I think we're beginning to understand that. Indeed, in the post-9 11 world, it is, perhaps, even more important that we work with others. We have many threats that transcend states, like health and environmental crises. Others ignore state borders, like terrorist cells and international criminal networks. And, therefore, we have to have international and institutional cooperation to counter these threats. Alliances can endure, they obviously have to be updated they have to be understood in the proper context, but they allow a sharing of risks and burdens and, over time, the development of common visions on the threats that we face together. We cannot go it alone and expect to stop terror. And it is clear to me that no one nation in the global climate in which we find ourselves can keep marching to the tune of its own drummer. That's not a parade, it is more like walking a gang plank. Within the frame work of an international approach that supports multilateralism and the rule-of-law, I believe we need to take several steps to fight the War on Terror most effectively. First, we obviously and clearly have to address our problems with intelligence. In this new high-tech, fast-paced, interdependent and, oft-times dangerous world of ours, existing institutions will have to change. And we should not be shy or defensive about discussing what changes are needed. We have to have more confidence in the intelligence on which we base our decisions. Much has been said about our intelligence failures and, clearly, those to me should rank at the top of a bipartisan, in fact, nonpartisan effort to get to the bottom of what occurred. I hope that the various commissions that are in operation today the commission chaired by former Governor Kean the commission just appointed by the President will be able to do the job that we, as a nation, need them to do. And it's imperative that we have more understanding of the curve of intelligence where it comes from how it is analyzed what the sources were. And I hope this Administration will strongly repudiate the statements recently reported by Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi, his recent assessment that the faulty intelligence that he helped provide to the United States was, quote, "not important." On the contrary, the extent that our intelligence services depended on unreliable sources of intelligence, such as defectors steered to us by Chalabi is deadly serious. When the President recently announced the creation of a commission to examine efforts to track the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and examine intelligence failures regarding what we have not found in Iraq, I was pleased that there were many distinguished citizens who agreed to serve. But I think the commission would have had more credibility if the President had not assumed responsibility for appointing all of its members. And, indeed, the appointment of one member, Laurence Silberman, raises serious concerns about the independence and integrity of this commission. Further, the commission does not include many members who have deep experience in the intelligence community, nor does it address the disparity between what the intelligence community said and what the policy makers claimed. As troubling as the fact that the commission will not report until after the election, which unfortunately, makes it look like an attempt to brush aside troubling questions rather than attempt to fully address the problems--is the fact that Britain is making its report on intelligence failure this summer. You know, the Administration had a different precedent to look to. If it did not wish to look to our very special ally, Britain, it could have just looked back to the Reagan Administration. Following the disaster in Beirut, President appointed and convened a commission to conduct a broad-ranging inquiry that not only focused on the attack, but, also, on the mission of U.S. forces in Lebanon. Less than two months after that attack, the five-member commission, headed by Retired Admiral Robert Long and, including a high-level official from the Carter Administration, issued its report. It not only criticized the Administration and the Department of Defense for lack of preparedness in dealing with terrorism, but it also called into question the mission itself the rules of engagement for the troops and the effectiveness of the chain of command. These recommendations, honest and unvarnished, led to substantial policy improvements. Unfortunately, in contrast, the approach chosen by the Bush Administration could lead to the impression that they are less interested in looking for answers and more interested in providing excuses. I hope my concerns about the commission are not well-founded and that they will produce a report that draws important lessons from our intelligence failures and provides solid recommendations for a road map to ensure that we don't make these same mistakes again. Fixing the gaps in our intelligence is crucial to our national security and this should be beyond debate and it should be done with a vigorous and intense desire to find the truth wherever it may lead. We also have to consider creating new institutions and alliances. I really appreciate the proposals by Senator Biden to create an international antiterrorist organization to deal with security threats that we face in common. Modeled on NATO, such an organization would focus on the unique military and non-military challenges that terrorism poses. We understand that terrorism has a global reach. We need to have a global cooperative approach in order to deal with it. We also have to examine whether, in the new Global War on Terror, our own military forces are being stretched too thin. We have to move, in my view, from a conception of fighting two wars in two theaters to a mix of troops that is able to fight terror using various combinations of forces as the situation requires, while maintaining sufficient capability to deter nations like North Korea from provoking a crisis. That means, more, not fewer troops. That's why I've joined Senator Jack Reed and Senator Chuck Hagel and others to push for a larger army. It is just recognizing the reality that we are above authorized levels and there's no real end in sight for the continuing stresses and expectations that our Army, in particular, is going to be expected to meet. We also have to look at a change in the mix of forces. We need more, so-called, psychological operations, civil affairs officers, military police. And we need to look hard at the burden that we're imposing on our National Guard and Reserves who often fulfill those functions and, as a result, have been called up sometimes for a year or more. But I also believe that winning the War on Terror will not happen by military strength alone. This is fundamentally about America's values and leadership. President Bush has said that the terrorists hate freedom. And he is absolutely right. And I think we have to take a number of steps in order to demonstrate that what we believe, our values is the right direction for people to be heading and rallying around. First, the idea of winning hearts and minds has been derided by some. But I don't think that we can overlook its singular importance. And we need to do more to combat the influence of hatred and bias and, for example, I think, with respect to education, we are doing far too little around the world. I met, coming out of Afghanistan at midnight, with President Musharraf, and Senator Reed and I discussed a number of issues, one of which was his recently announced effort to deal with the proliferation of the Madrassas, which, obviously, we know is the only alternative for many young boys to attend school because of the poverty of their families and the failure to provide an educational establishment throughout the country. We need to provide more help than we currently are doing. We spend a pittance on global education, about $200 million a year. I would like to see us focus on creating a global education fund that the United States would lead, but which would use contributions from other countries around the world. I'd like to see us expand that to $500 million and to make a very serious effort to spread real education to provide a replacement for the indoctrination that too often serves as a training ground for future terrorists. Second, we need to fully fund our development programs and I applaud the Administration for its efforts in the Millennium Challenge Accounts. I'm hopeful that we'll see our way through some of the difficulties that those accounts present. The winners and the losers, if you will. Leaving out countries that I think it's quite risk for us to ignore. But I am supporting the effort to try to create conditions in which at least we can build support within the Congress for more foreign aid to go to many of the most distressed parts of the world. But I strongly disagree with the Administration's approach towards the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This is the kind of international cooperation that we should be supporting not turning away from. And the Bush Administration is cutting back on the U.S. contribution to the Global AIDS Fund by about 64 percent in the new budget, despite its pledge to cooperate and collaborate on a strategy to deal with these three killers. Congress allocated $547 million for the Fund in 2004, the Administration's 2005 budget calls for $200 million. This, again, is a perfect example of the go-it-alone approach. And while we are recognizing problems through our new AIDS Initiative that the Administration is announcing, in 14 countries, we're, you know, setting up a parallel program, duplicating efforts, reinventing the wheel, not only with respect to what other governments are doing, but NGOs that have gotten into those countries. And it is, I think, a lost opportunity that we don't support the Global Fund More and especially that, apparently, our AIDS strategy intends to ignore Asia, when even the CIA's analysis predicts that Asia will become an explosive problem for HIV AIDS, in Russia, China, and India. Countries that, clearly, have long-term, strategic interest to us. And so, I think we are missing the boat not supporting the Global Fund and we're missing another boat by not supporting anti-AIDS efforts in those three nations. We also have to do more on women's rights and roles. And I have been deeply troubled by what I hear coming out of Iraq. When I was there and met with women members of the governing councils and local--of the national governing councils and local governing councils in Baghdad and Kirkuk, they were starting to express concerns about some of the pullbacks in the rights that they were given under Saddam Hussein. He was an equal opportunity oppressor, but on paper women had rights they went to school they participated in the professions they participated in government and business and, as long as they stayed out of his way, they had considerable freedom of movement. Now, what we see happening in Iraq is the governing council attempting to shift large parts of civil law into religious jurisdiction. This would be a horrific mistake and especially for it to happen on our watch. And I have spoken to the White House about this on several occasions. I appreciated Ambassador Bremer speaking out about the need to involve women. But we must go much further. I would like to see a statement from the President. I would like to see a much greater emphasis that we will not have become the vehicle by which women's rights in Iraq are turned back. And, similarly, in Afghanistan, we know that we got good language in the constitutional process out of the Loya Jirga, but on the ground, the situation is very dangerous for a lot of women. In both countries, the security issues are foremost. Women tell me they can't leave their homes they can't go about their daily business. And in Afghanistan, there is a concerted effort to burn schools that are educating girls and to...[TRANSCRIPT CONTINUES ON FSN-148]
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