Summary

JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILED ATF BUREAU RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN COMPOUND NEAR WACO, TEXAS ON FEBRUARY 28, 1993. THE COMMITTEE IS ALSO INVESTIGATING THE APRIL 19TH FBI RAID ON THE COMPOUND WHERE 76 CULT MEMBERS DIED.

Source CONUS Archive
Record ID 256833
Story Slug WACO HEARINGS DAY 10 / JANET RENO TESTIFIES PT. 3(1995)
Location WASHINGTON, DC
Format B-ROLL
Date 8/1/1995
Archive Time 11:41:56
TRT 28:59
Video Description ATTORNEY JANET RENO, REP. JOHN CONYERS (D-MI), REP. HENRY HYDE (R-IL), REP. ROBERT SCOTT (D-VA), REP. WILLIAM CLINGER (R-PA), REP. TOM LANTOS (D-CA)
Description JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING TO INVESTIGATE THE FAILED ATF BUREAU RAID ON THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN COMPOUND NEAR WACO, TEXAS ON FEBRUARY 28, 1993. THE COMMITTEE IS ALSO INVESTIGATING THE APRIL 19TH FBI RAID ON THE COMPOUND WHERE 76 CULT MEMBERS DIED.
Script (SUGGESTED TRANSCRIPT OF AUDIO) 00:00 I'm chairman. Hi, Chairman McCollum, I don't know Chairman selloff as well. And for the members of this committee, they have been nothing but supportive in terms of my capacity to do the job. They may disagree with me on a number of occasions, and we will continue to disagree. But they have been very supportive of, of my ability to do the job, even if I am. 00:25 Well, I think that I think you've held yourself in good stead, because you immediately made it clear that if there was any responsibility or culpability to be assigned anyone, that you would offer your resignation, which was refused by the President of the United States. And I for one, thinking this matter out, I think that you made the right decision. And I'm glad you're still on the job. Because there's a lot of work to be done. I think that that the time that you are here at this particular point in American history, gives you a unique opportunity to move on correcting things that that still need correcting. And we've been talking about them across already the short period that you've been Attorney General. Now, what about losing the element of surprise as a tactical error? Can you come in on on that? And by the way, that wasn't discovered by these two committees? That's been known for quite some time. But how did losing the element of surprise affect the strategy that was employed at Waco man? 01:51 Well, again, is in response to Congresswoman Ross Layton. And I have not delved into the intricacies of of what led to the Treasury raid on nine and on February 28 1993. I inherited that and obviously had an impact, but I had been very impressed with Treasury's response. It's candid in depth investigation. From from what I hear, as I indicated to the congresswoman, people think it was a thorough investigation, and I think clearly, it clearly reflects that it had a very adverse effect. 02:29 Thank you very much. I, I was impressed with Chairman Hyde, my friend reading my comments earlier about this matter. And I sorry, I don't have his comments, which were very instructive that I plan to bring up on the next round, and, and they are of such magnitude I plan to put them in the record. But I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Conyers. Speaking of Mr. Hyde, he is recognized for five minutes. 03:01 I just wished the distinguished gentleman would put them on a chart 03:07 or the record is quite sufficient, sir. I'm 03:10 not sure you're serious about about what you're saying. Madam Attorney General reading from the report to the Deputy Attorney General on the events at Waco, Texas, February 28 April 19, a Department of Justice document, dated October 8 1993, and turning to page 271. On April 16, Richard met with Hubble and Carl Stern. According to Richard Hubble advised him that the Attorney General had disapproved the plan to end the FBI standoff. Hubble then asked Richard what he thought the FBIs reaction might be. Richard answered that the FBI would not be pleased that they would nonetheless accept the decision and that they may then talk in terms of withdrawal. When Hubble asked Richard if he would like to speak to the attorney general about the decision, Richard declined, explaining he had nothing more to say. According to Richard stern commented that going ahead with the plan might be looked down on in the eyes of the public and likened it to Saddam Hussein's gassing of the Kurds. Richard disagreed with Stern's analogy. A short time after humbled spoke to the FBI to report the decision. Director sessions, Clark and Potts arrived in his office. According to Richard when Hubbell advised them that the Attorney General had disapproved the plan, Director sessions asked to speak with her to her humble left and return 10 minutes later with the Attorney General, who made no reference to her disapproval of the plan. Instead, Reno who was still not convinced about the timing requested the preparation of a documented statement describing the situation inside the compound, the progress of the negotiations and the merits of the proposal. She asked that the statement be completed by the following afternoon. Now, there is a footnote number 35. The Attorney General did not read the prepared statement carefully. Nor did she read the supporting documentation provided along with the statement. She read only a chronology, gave the rest of the materials a cursory review and satisfied herself that quote, the documentation was there. Now, something caused you to change your mind? Was it director sessions? Obviously, it wasn't this memorandum because you only you didn't really read it. You looked at it. cursorily. I just have two questions. Who who convinced you was at Hubble was it sessions, that you should go ahead with this and give it approval? And why didn't you read the documentation, the briefing book that they gave you? 06:13 I did not ask for this briefing book. Mr. Chairman, what I had asked in the course since I had first been confronted with the possibility that there might be a gasp plan. The week before, I had been gaining additional information. When the formal plan was submitted to me on August, April the 12, you're aware of the questions that I asked. The first question I asked was about the gaffes its impact on the elderly and the children. I continued to explore that I listened to how people described how the representatives of the HRT team how Dr. Salem, describe its impact, and that was of concern to me, I would not like to use it on a child if I didn't find another alternative, because it would be uncomfortable, but it would be far better if I could bring those children out than exposing them to danger down the road from suicide plans that Koresh himself had rehearsed. So that was one of the considerations. I then looked as I had explained before, because this was a gradual process, I had not decided on April 12, or on April the 13th. What to do or not to do, I just knew I wasn't going ahead at that point, because I didn't have enough information. I've explored with you what I did in terms of identifying the food supply of reexamining the water supply of looking to see what had been done about negotiations. With the advent of the letter, which put a whole new twist to it. We started talking about the letter and what might be expected and what they had been able to get out in terms of any tangible evidence that he was indeed going to comply with the terms of the letter on like the terms of his march 2 statement that he would come out when the tape had been played. When Hubble came in to see me, I had at that point, was still concerned about where we stood with respect to all of the issues. When I went to see them. I walked with Hubble to his office where the representatives of the FBI were I think it was director sessions Floyd Clark and Larry Potts, I don't know who else was there. We talked further. And one of the points that kept coming up was what the HRT team had told me, I mean, the military HRT team, that 51 days on site, you would begin to lose a state of readiness, you should be pulled back to be retrained. As we discussed it. What was clear to me was, again, they were not going to be able to control that perimeter and control the circumstances. You do 08:48 agree that only one hostage rescue team is not enough that we learned that from this event? Did we not? 08:54 As I indicated to you and as you, when we look back to our conversations a little over two years ago, what I was faced with, I said, why can't we pull the HRT team back and put in a SWAT team. I was told by both the military commanders and the FBI that the SWAT team as it existed at the time was not trained to properly protect and provide the security that was necessary, and that they would be reluctant to do that. As you know, one of my first recommendations that I followed through one was to try to enhance the capacity of the SWAT teams that were already in existence to interlink with the HRT team and to expand the HRT team, because if I had had the expanded capacity, the very question I asked was, can't we put somebody else in there? What about local law enforcement? I asked them about that. Couldn't we go to some of the really good local law enforcement agencies in the country and see if they had a capacity to substitute and was told that that was not the case. So clearly, as I said in my opening statement, one of the recommendations We have made, because as you had pointed out to the administration had had asked for additional SWAT team, and it was immediately approved after this matter had been aired in in April of 1993. But it was at that point in the discussion with Director sessions with the other people there. Nobody, no one person changed my mind. It was I was not prepared to move with the additional statements from the FBI, that they were going to ultimately have to pull that HRT team back, and that they were reaching the limit. This seemed to be the best time not knowing if six days later, 10:45 in other words, the the fatigue, and I mean that not pejoratively of the hostage rescue team drove you to say we it's now or never, so 10:55 let's do it, they did not characterize it as fatigue, they characterized it as a need to retrain in terms of the skills and they characterized it as a de munition in terms of skills of judgment of being on the frontline for 51 days. And it was that discussion and the recognition that if I waited 10 days, he might carry out what he had threatened to do on March the second, and we would be far less prepared to deal with that than if we did it under our own terms. Mr. Hyde, 11:29 your time has expired. Mr. Scott, you're recognized for five minutes. 11:32 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, looking at the board, I think there's some things that need to be clarified. I have before me a statement, a document from the administration of William J. Clinton in 1993. And I'd like to quote some parts of it in reference to one and so. Okay, date of April 19 1993. The question is, Mr. President, did you authorize the move on waco this morning, sir, his response? I was aware of it. I think the Attorney General made the decision and I think we, I should refer all questions to her and the FBI. In response to a further question, I want to refer you to talk to the Attorney General and the FBI. I knew it was going to be done with the decisions were entirely there as all tactical, Mr. Chairman, I point this out because the time of this is 10:58am in the middle of the raid, so of course, any tactical questions should not be responded to by the president at a press conference in Washington, but by the Attorney General, and the FBI on the scene. Later the next day, April 20. We have a quote on page 461. I was informed of the plan to end the siege, I discussed it with Attorney General Reno, I asked questions I thought were appropriate for me to ask, and then told her to do what she thought was right, and to take full responsibility for the implementation of the decision. Attorney General Reno, is that an accurate? As far as you can remember, what happened? The President was asked in the middle of the siege and deferred questions to you. And that's what's kind of up there. But as soon as the siege was over, he took the responsibility that everyone on the administration has agreed that he did. 13:28 I just I think this is is one of the most curious issues to come in here. Because I think the President of the United States did absolutely right. He was asked, he asked to be informed of a person whom he had not nominated, as, as attorney general to be kept informed. He knew that he would be informed of plans changed. We informed him, he did not intervene in law enforcement issues except to ask good questions, and to make sure that we had explored every opportunity to resolve the matter peacefully, he was concerned, he left the tactical decisions to us. And I just want the American people to understand how important it is if the President of the United States is going to be involved in and taking operational responsibility for law enforcement actions that's just inconsistent with what we should be doing in this country to to provide for an appropriate balance where Congress and the executive conduct the policy decisions, the operation decisions, but law enforcement is done without regard to interference from the outside and he just did the right thing. And it has been puzzling to me, because some people say the President didn't take enough responsibility. And then during the course of these hearings, other people have said he exercised too much responsibility. I think he did just right. 14:54 And was it would it have been appropriate for him to ask answer technical questions in the earliest days Just the siege itself. 15:01 If I had heard that he was doing that I would have been on the phone telling him to please please, please don't say anything while we had a very sensitive operation underway. 15:10 Thank you, Attorney General. On another subject, the reaction of some of the divisions and other incidences that have occurred have led some to believe that there are groups of Americans that have lost confidence in law enforcement. Senator Bradley last week mentioned the case of an African American law student in Los Angeles who was stopped for no apparent reason handcuffed, but subsequently released. You are aware of other indignities that many of our law abiding citizens suffer if they happen to fit a drug courier profile, where innocent people who happen to fit a demographic profile have stopped to be searched, law abiding citizens and some gun who own legal firearms, or to feel that secure that law enforcement personnel will not stop them and search them or invade their homes. Historically, the only defense that we've had against this has been law abiding citizen law against the only defense and law abiding citizens have against these illegal searches, has been the exclusionary rule which provides that the results of an illegal search cannot be used in a trial. Law enforcement officers therefore have no incentive to make illegal searches no incentive to invade the homes of law abiding citizens, because even if they found something they couldn't use it a trial during these hearings. We've heard from law enforcement officers who have said that they can enforce the law without breaking the law. We've heard the head of the ATF say that he is a strong supporter of the exclusionary rule. And we heard the former director of the FBI said that if there are any problems in complying with the rigors of the exclusionary rule that the standards of law enforcement should be enhanced, not important standards of the law diminished to accommodate law enforcement, law enforcement personnel. He specifically criticized excusing so called good faith, illegal searches. In spite of the strong support for the exclusionary rule, we've also received testimony that the watered down Exclusionary Rule is made it has not been the strong protector for innocent people that it traditionally has. So my question Attorney General Reno, in light of the strong support, we've heard for the exclusionary rule, including high ranking career law enforcement personnel, can we get the support of the administration for the strongest enforcement of the exclusionary rule so that law abiding citizens can have appropriate confidence they will not be stopped and searched or have their homes invaded, when they have committed no crimes? As 17:50 a prosecutor for a number of years, and now as Attorney General, I support the exclusionary rule wholeheartedly. I had the opportunity to serve on a committee of the American Bar Association that addressed the issue. And the exclusionary rule in the eyes of law enforcement has been a very helpful tool in terms of ensuring professionalism and appropriate regard for the Constitution. Thank you. Mr. Schad. Your time has expired. Mr. clinger? You're recognized for five minutes. 18:17 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Attorney General Reno, for being here today to discuss these very serious issues. I just have a couple of comments and then a question. I think with returning to the question about the use of the tank, I can appreciate the statement that the tank was used as a defensive means of protecting agents who were involved in that raid. But I think you would agree that if you were on the inside of the compound looking out, you might not have had quite such a benign view of that tank, nor would you have been aware that the tank was was not armed that in fact, it was it was it would look like a very, very menacing, I think threatening piece of equipment coming at us. I think it really depends on your perspective as to as to the tank. Obviously, one of the reasons for these hearings, is because the credibility, the effectiveness of law enforcement, federal law enforcement has been called into question by a number of events. And I think, obviously, one of the purpose of these hearings is to try to identify those areas that need to be changed, corrected. Reform, in order to restore credibility in federal law enforcement. I think that is the mission that we are all we all can share. I think largely these criticisms and level of the ATF but there have been some to to the FBI as well, and most recently the question of the credibility of the report that was done with regard to the Ruby Ridge situation and I just would ask you, upfront, General, Reno, because there has been serious questions raised about that report and about the activities of the people doing the investigation, and is now being reinvestigated. Do you anticipate that that report It will be forthcoming soon. That is the RE evaluation of the events that will be rich. 20:04 With respect to your first issue about the tanks and the menacing quality. Those tanks had been around. People knew about the tanks. I think they were very accustomed to the tanks at that point. And in the early morning, as I think Mr. Sage has told the committee's Biron sage, specifically announced that there was going to be an insertion of gas that they would not be fired on that they had an opportunity to come out that they could come out peacefully, where they would go, how they would come out, they were given an opportunity to come out they were not fired on. And I think that it's clear that in those situations where they have killed four law enforcement agents where they have wounded 15, that to expose FBI agents to danger unnecessarily would just be wrong. I think it provided the proper balance. With respect to Ruby Ridge, we have conducted an extensive investigation that is still ongoing. The local prosecutors and state statutes made statutes may differ from federal statutes has asked for the opportunity to pursue the matter without us commenting on it. And as soon as I am able to consistent with his investigation, in consistent with the ongoing investigation, and want to do everything I can that's proper under the federal privacy laws to make the information available. 21:29 You don't at this point have an end date in view as to when this might No, sir. I don't. Okay. I'm gonna have a little different perspective on what what we're doing here. But because I think one of the charges we have in the government reform and oversight committee, is how we can in fact reform government, how we can downsize government, how we can make it more efficient and more effective. So I want to talk to you a little bit about the organization structure, the nation's law enforcement agencies, because that has been called into question and as I say, their credibility has been under attack. We've heard testimony that while the ATF was conducting what was turned out to be the largest law enforcement raid in the nation's history, their boss, who would be Treasury Secretary Lloyd Benson, was in Europe at a g7 meeting, and I am not in any way criticizing him for doing what his primary responsibility is, which is to as the Treasury Secretary being at those meetings, but I think it does make me wonder why the federal government's police force, which is very highly visible is located at the Department of Treasury, I don't think that it's necessarily a very high item priority item with the secretary treasurer. I don't think it should be I mean, and therefore, I think the question arises, you know, is that a proper place for the nation's police department to be? I also remember early suggestions by the national performance review that some law enforcement agencies should be consolidated, and that the recommendation was then rejected. My question is this have the events at Ruby Ridge and Waco and the two years that have transpired since those events, given you any thoughts about the reorganization organizing of the federal law enforcement agencies, it just seems to me that, particularly ATF perhaps has not received the close supervision in the Department of Treasury, which has given rise to the charge that it's a rogue elephant of law enforcement, wouldn't it be better to have that really under the purview of the department that 23:20 is most intimately involved with law enforcement and 23:22 with the federal judicial system, as 23:25 as you will recall, not only is I mean, Treasury has two very fine law enforcement agencies, both customs and ATF. One of the things that I resolved when I came to Washington was to try to avoid turf battles. I didn't come to Washington to take over other people's territories, I came to Washington to work together to make sure that we coordinated as thoroughly as we possibly could, and that there were steps to be taken within the Department of Justice. We develop the office of investigative agency policy that has taken some giant strides with Director free and administrator Constantine's leadership in bringing the Justice Department agencies together in close coordination. And I'm very proud of that effort. But we've reached beyond that. And we have worked with the Treasury Department, having meetings and working together on matters of mutual concern so that there is coordination and that is the way that I have proceeded Mr. clinger, your time has expired. Mr. Lantos, you're recognized for five minutes. 24:27 Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by saying Madam Attorney General, that you exude a degree of sincerity and decency and competence and compassion. That makes all of us very proud to have you as our Attorney General. You are a terrific role model for millions of young women who aspire to public service. I have taken it upon myself to try to give both the events and this set of hearings, some degree of historical perspective. And over the course of the last few days, it's become increasingly clear to me that the historical parallel to Waco is, of course, Jonestown, a charismatic criminal deranged cult leader, causing the nightmarish death, in this case, through self immolation of a large number of American citizens. But I also think it's important that we look at the hearings in historical perspective, because hearings are a very important part of this Congress. So when the Congress, every time we hold a set of hearings, we ourselves are on trial. So what is the verdict with respect to the hearings, and it's a mixed verdict. I want to pay tribute to Chairman McCollum for the degree of objectivity and fairness with which he conducted his portion of the hearings. And I want to pay tribute to him for being man enough to state the obvious facts I quote from I believe yesterday, was Chairman McCollum, who said he believes the hearings should close the book, on speculation about how the fire was started. And I'm quoting him directly, it seems very apparent to me the fire was started inside that compound by the video once and quote, this is a responsible, intelligent and obviously factually accurate comment. But I must say that, in part, these hearings are eerily reminiscent of the McCarthy hearings of the 1950s that some of us are old enough to remember. Senator Joseph McCarthy usually would call a press conference prior to his hearings, to inform the press in advance about what would be established in the hearings. And the press dutifully reported. Senator McCarthy's claims when the actual hearings were held, the witnesses did not say what Senator McCarthy said they would say or what he wanted them to say. But the press had already reported his charges. Now, it seems to me that in a number of instances, we have had very significant parallels to the McCarthy hearings. Contrary to Chairman McCallum's conclusion, I believe a day or two ago or other Chairman stated, and I quote, We killed over 80 people, while we presumably meaning the government, it is not the government that did it. It is Koresh that did it. Now, I think it's extremely important, as Congress attempts to rebuild its reputation that all of us in this body act with a degree of responsibility. In this connection, I asked unanimous consent to place in the record a letter from the distinguished judge the White House Counsel, the MCBA to Mr. Zelie, which states in the opening paragraph I am writing in response to your comments on meet the press regarding the President's involvement in events at Waco. Your comments were nothing short of irresponsible intent on creating a story without any news and alleging a scandal without any basis. Madam Attorney General, I will be grateful without Without objection, it will be yours for a second response. 28:38 I would like to finish asking my question. 28:43 I don't desire to embarrass ministers. lf I'm gonna 28:47 object to this chairman. I think it's my time. Objection has been heard. I'm sorry. May I finish? My question may finish your question. Thank you. Madam Attorney General, would you draw your view of the historic parallel between Jonestown and Waco. 29:10 Each situation is going to be different congressman. In one situation, it may be one group and another it may be somebody with particular ideas. We have got to learn from each experience and one of the steps that the FBI has taken is to try to develop and in the process of composing his critical incident response group, the capacity to learn from Jonestown to learn from Waco, so that we build on our experience to do everything we can to avoid such a tragedy for the future. Thank you very much. At this time, your time has expired. Mr. Schiff, you're recognized for five minutes. Thank 29:51 you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Attorney General, I'd like to ask you first you've now been here for some time this morning. If you in any way felt treated unfairly at the TAG:
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