BASEBALL OWNERS MEET
00:00:00:00 - rx17 baseball owners meeting peter chernin--fox news corp. chase carey --fox news corp. bob graziano --executive V.P., dodgers bud selig --acting baseball commissioner dr. gene buding -- ...
CG BOAT CHASE (1998)
THIS HIGH SEAS CHASE WENT DOWN UNDER THE COVER OF DARKNESS. THE U.S. COAST GUARD CHARGING A BOAT AND TAKING PRISONERS. AGENTS SPOTTED THE FISHING BOAT ABOUT 30 MILES SOUTH OF THE BAHAMAS ON COURSE FOR FLORIDA. IMMIGRANT SMUGGLERS AND THEIR HUMAN CARGO BOUND FOR FLORIDA. COAST GUARD SAYS 21 ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS WERE ABOARD TRYING TO MAKE IT TO SOUTH FLORIDA.
King snake enters gopher burrow at night, Florida
King snake enters gopher burrow at night, Florida (Core Number: NBRY047S)
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE ON MSNBC P1
[REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE ON MSNBC P1] [BOCA RATON, FLA USA] FTG OF REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FORMER MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR MITT ROMNEY / FTG OF REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FORMER ARKANSAS GOVERNOR MIKE HUCKABEE / FTG OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FORMER NEW YORK CITY MAYOR RUDY GIULIANI / FTG OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE REPRESENTATIVE RON PAUL (R-TEX) / FTG OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-ARIZ) 21:00:22 >> THE FOLLOWING IS A MSNBC 21:00:26 SPECIAL PRESENTATION. >> ...SERVING A DIVERSE AND 21:00:38 GROWING STUDENT BODY. THE UNIVERSITY OPENED THE DOORS 21:00:40 BACK IN 1964 WITH PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON ON HAND FOR THE 21:00:46 DEDICATION. 21:00:47 >> FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY. >> TONIGHT, THE REPUBLICANS TAKE 21:00:50 CENTER STAGE, FOR 36 YEARS, NO ONE HAS WON A REPUBLICAN 21:00:54 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION WITHOUT FIRST WINNING IN FLORIDA. 21:01:00 WITH THE FLORIDA FIVE DAYS AWAY, THE DEBATE AMONG THE 21:01:05 REPUBLICAN CONTENDERS FOR PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. 21:01:44 >>> GOOD EVENING, WELCOME TO THE REPUBLICAN DEBATE. 21:01:48 THERE ARE A FEW PEOPLE WE WANT TO THANK ON THE OUTSET. 21:01:51 WE DO SO ON BEHALF OF EVERYONE ON OUR STAGE. 21:01:54 THANKS TO LEADERSHIP, FLORIDA. THE FLORIDA PRESS ASSOCIATION, 21:01:57 FLORIDA PUBLIC BROADCASTING, AND THANKS TO OUR WONDERFUL HOSTS 21:02:01 HERE AT FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN 21:02:06 MAKING THIS EVENING POSSIBLE AND A SUCCESS. 21:02:08 >>> BEFORE WE BEGIN, A QUICK REVIEW OF THE RULES WE'RE GOING 21:02:13 TO TRY TO FOLLOW. BEGINNING WITH A WORD ABOUT 21:02:15 TIME. THE DEBATES RUN TWO HOURS, 21:02:19 TONIGHT'S DEBATE WILL BE LIMITED TO 90 MINUTES' DURATION. 21:02:23 THE CANDIDATES WILL HAVE 90 SECONDS TO RESPOND TO OUR 21:02:26 QUESTIONS, A SERIES OF LIGHTS WILL WARN THEM. 21:02:28 TIME IS RUNNING OUT. 30 SECONDS OF REBUTTAL TIME MAY 21:02:32 BE GRANTED TO A CANDIDATE AT THE DISCRETION OF THE MODERATOR 21:02:35 DURING ONE OF OUR SEGMENTS TONIGHT, THE CANDIDATES HAVE 21:02:39 BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE ONE QUESTION TO BE ASKED OF ONE OF 21:02:42 THEIR OPPONENTS OF THEIR CHOOSING. 21:02:45 JOIN ME IN THE QUESTIONING TONIGHT. 21:02:48 MY PARTNER, THE WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF, THE MODERATOR OF 21:02:51 "MEET THE PRESS" ON NBC, TIM RUSSERT, AND REPRESENTING THE 21:02:55 FLORIDA PRESS ASSOCIATION, PAUL TASH, THE EDITOR AND CHAIRMAN OF 21:03:01 "THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES." WELCOME TO YOU ALL. 21:03:04 THANKS FOR BEING HERE. LET'S BEGIN. 21:03:07 GOVERNOR ROMNEY, LET'S BEGIN WITH YOU. 21:03:09 THE PRESIDENT JUST TODAY SIGNED OFF ON AN ECONOMIC STIMULUS PLAN 21:03:13 THAT WOULD SEND OUT 116 MILLION CHECKS TO AMERICAN HOMES. 21:03:17 THE PLAN IS SOMEWHAT CONTRARY TO YOURS PROVIDING LOTS OF SHORT 21:03:21 TERM STIMULUS TO INDIVIDUALS. YOUR PLAN, AS YOU KNOW, FOCUSES 21:03:25 AS MUCH ON THE LONG TERM AS THE SHORT TERM. 21:03:27 ARE YOU DISAPPOINTED THAT YOUR RECIPE FOR THE ECONOMY WAS NOT 21:03:32 EMBRACED BY THE PRESIDENT AND AS THE FOLLOW-UP, WILL YOU NOW 21:03:37 EMBRACE THIS PLAN? >> GREAT DEAL AS EFFECTIVE IN 21:03:39 THIS PLAN. WISH I WENT FURTHER. 21:03:42 WHAT'S EFFECTIVE IS YOU GIVE MONEY BACK TO THE CONSUMERS AND 21:03:45 GIVEN THE FACT THAT 2/3 OF THE ECONOMY IS A CONSUMER ECONOMY 21:03:48 GETTING MONEY BACK TO THE HANDS OF OUR CITIZENS, PAYING A LOT 21:03:52 FOR GASOLINE, HEATING OIL. MAKING ENDS MEET MADE A LOT OF 21:03:58 SENSE TO ME. MINE IS CONSERVATIVE. 21:04:00 I HAVE A SAVINGS PLAN FOR INDIVIDUALS THAT ALLOWS THE 21:04:04 FOLKS MAKING UNDER $200,000 A YEAR TO SAVE THE MONEY TAX-FREE, 21:04:08 NO INTEREST, DIVIDENDS, OR CAPITAL GAINS, I CAN GET TO THAT 21:04:13 LATER. BUT THE FIRST START IS THE FIRST 21:04:16 START WHEN WE GO FURTHER. SECOND, CORPORATE SUPPORT AND 21:04:20 HELPING CORPORATIONS HAVE MORE INCENTIVE. 21:04:23 THAT HE ALSO DOES. I DO IT MORE AGGRESSIVE BY 21:04:26 RUNNING OFF A LARGER AMOUNT OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, GETTING 21:04:30 COMPANIES TO FRANKLY BUY MORE STUFF SO AS THEY DO SO, OTHER 21:04:33 COMPANIES WILL HIRE PEOPLE. IF YOU WANT TO TURN AN ECONOMY 21:04:36 AROUND, THE KEY THING IS TO GROW JOBS, NOT JUST TO GET CHECKS IN 21:04:40 THE HANDS OF CONSUMERS, IT'S THE CONSUMERS BUYING THINGS THAT 21:04:43 CREATES JOBS. IT'S COMPANIES BUYING THINGS TO 21:04:45 CREATE JOBS. AND FINALLY, THE LAST LEG IS 21:04:47 WITH REGARDS TO HELPING THE FHA TAKE ON A BROADER ARRAY OF HOMES 21:04:51 THAT ARE IN TROUBLE, HOMEOWNERS THAT ARE IN TROUBLE. 21:04:54 THAT'S REALLY VERY IMPORTANT. I'M APPRECIATIVE OF THE FACT 21:04:56 THAT THE PRESIDENT TOOK THAT STEP. 21:04:58 WE REALLY IS ACROSS THE COUNTRY A -- A HOUSING CRISIS, A 21:05:02 MORTGAGE CRISIS THAT SEEMS TO HAVE SPILLED OUT ON THE ENTIRE 21:05:05 ECONOMY. AND THE EFFECT OF THIS, OF 21:05:07 COURSE, IS TO PUT A LOT OF PAIN AGAINST A LOT OF PEOPLE. 21:05:10 SO, HELPING REVERSE THE HOUSING CRISIS AND EXPANDING THE FHA 21:05:18 LOAN REQUIREMENTS -- EXCUSE ME, IF YOU WILL, LOOSENING THE 21:05:21 REQUIREMENTS AND EXPANDING THE ABILITY FOR THE FHA TO MAKE A 21:05:24 BIG DIFFERENCE. THAT IS SOMETHING I SUPPORT. 21:05:26 AND I LOOK FORWARD TO TAKING IT FURTHER. 21:05:29 >> TIME IS UP, GOVERNOR, SENATOR McCAIN, WOULD YOU SUPPORT THE 21:05:32 PART OF THIS THAT DOES NOT MAKE THE BUSH TAX CUTS PERMANENT AND 21:05:36 AS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE SENATE ON THE STATE, WILL YOU VOTE FOR 21:05:39 THIS COMPROMISE? >> YES, I WILL. 21:05:41 I'M DISAPPOINTED BECAUSE I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE MAKE 21:05:44 THE BUSH TAX CUTS PERMANENT. I VOTED TO MAKE THEM PERMANENT 21:05:46 TWICE ALREADY. IF WE DON'T MAKE THE TAX CUTS 21:06:05 PERMANENT, THEY WILL HAVE WHAT AMOUNTS TO A TAX INCREASE. 21:06:08 I APPLAUD THE EFFORTS AND THE PATH WITH WHICH WE ARE MOVING. 21:06:14 BUT I WOULD MAKE SURE THAT NOT ONLY THE TAX CUTS ARE MADE PERM 21:06:17 NEGLIGENT, BUT WE CUT CORPORATE INCOME TAXES KEEPING BUSINESSES 21:06:22 HERE AND CREATE JOBS HERE. WE PAID THE HIGHEST CORPORATE 21:06:27 INCOME TAX OF ANY NATION IN THE WORLD EXCEPT FOR JAPAN. 21:06:30 I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT THAT NO PORK BARREL 21:06:33 PROJECTS BE ADDED AS THIS BILL WINS THIS WAY THROUGH THE 21:06:37 VARIOUS COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS. I WORRY ABOUT THAT. 21:06:40 I WORRY WE'RE GOING TO ADD PORK BARREL PROJECTS. 21:06:44 I'M GLAD TO SEE WE'RE GOING TO ALLOW PEOPLE TO EXPENSIVE? 21:06:47 NEW INVESTMENTS AND EQUIPMENT SO THEY CAN WRITE THEM OFF IN A 21:06:49 VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. BUT I REALLY THINK THAT WE HAVE 21:06:55 TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE RATE CUTS BY BERNANKE ARE A GOOD 21:07:00 BEGINNING. APPARENTLY THE MARKETS HAVE 21:07:01 STABILIZE A LITTLE BIT. BUT WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO CUT 21:07:04 TAX RATES IN AMERICA. AND WE ALSO HAVE TO ENCOURAGE 21:07:09 SAVINGS. BECAUSE IF WE DON'T RESTRAIN 21:07:12 SPENDING, IF WE DON'T RESTRAIN SPENDING, THEN WE'RE GOING END 21:07:15 UP IN THE SAME POSITION THAT WE WERE IN EARLIER. 21:07:18 AND THAT'S WHERE THE ECONOMY THAT HAS VERY SERIOUS PHYSICAL 21:07:22 DIFFICULTIES. >> SENATOR, TIME IS OUT. 21:07:24 MAYOR GIULIANI, YOU IN THE PAST SUPPORTED A WIDE ARRAY OF TAX 21:07:28 CUTS. DO YOU THINK IT'S A MISTAKE 21:07:30 THEY'RE NOT IN THIS PACKAGE? >> IT'S PACKAGED FOR WHAT IT 21:07:34 DOES IS OKAY. I WOULD SUPPORT IT. 21:07:36 IT DOESN'T GO FAR ENOUGH. IN THE FACE OF WHAT'S BEEN GOING 21:07:40 ON, OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN, WE SHOULD BE 21:07:43 VERY AGGRESSIVE. CONGRESSMAN DRIER AND SENATOR 21:07:46 BOND INTRODUCED LEGISLATION YESTERDAY, MY TAX PACKAGE. 21:07:50 THE LARGEST TAX REDUCTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY. 21:07:53 THE BUSH TAX CUTS, MAKE THEM PERMANENT, REDUCE THE CORPORATE 21:07:57 TAX, THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX, REDUCE THE TAXES ON THOSE THINGS 21:08:00 THAT WOULD ALLOW BUSINESS TO SEE AMERICA AS MORE COMPETITIVE. 21:08:04 AND, YOU ALMOST DON'T HAVE A DISTINCTION ANY LONGER BETWEEN 21:08:08 TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT IN THE KIND OF AN ECONOMY THAT WE LIVE 21:08:10 IN. LOOK AT IT THIS WAY -- WE'RE A 21:08:14 COMPETITIVE ECONOMY. WE'RE COMPETING WITH THE REST OF 21:08:15 THE WORLD. IF AMERICA OVERTAXES, IF AMERICA 21:08:20 OVERSPENDS, IF AMERICA OVER REGULATES, AMERICA OVERSUES, 21:08:24 THEN BUSINESS AND JOBS AND MONEY GO ELSEWHERE. 21:08:26 AND WE'RE DOING ALL FOUR OF THOSE THINGS. 21:08:29 SO SENATOR McCAIN IS RIGHT. WE NEED TO PUT AS MUCH EMPHASIS 21:08:33 ON REDUCING SPENDING. THIS HAS TO BE A PERMANENT 21:08:35 PACKAGE. SO I HOPE THAT THIS IS THE 21:08:38 BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WHERE WHAT WILL HAPPEN IS MAJOR TAX 21:08:42 REDUCTIONS, MAJOR REDUCTIONS IN SPENDING ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, A 21:08:45 REAL ANALYSIS OF OUR REGULATIONS. 21:08:48 JUST HOW MUCH BUSINESS ARE WE RUNNING OUT OF THE UNITED STATES 21:08:56 BECAUSE OF THE EXCESSES OF SARBANES OXLEY. 21:08:58 A YEAR AGO, LONDON WOULD PASS NEW YORK AS THE FINANCIAL 21:09:02 CAPITAL OF THE WORLD. AS A NEW YORKER, THAT WAS 21:09:05 TROUBLING TO ME. AS AN AMERICAN, IT SHOULD BE 21:09:07 TROUBLING TO EVERYONE. >> MR. MAYOR, THE TIME IS UP. 21:09:10 THE QUESTIONING CONTINUES WITH MR. RUSSERT. 21:09:13 >>> NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE WAR IN IRAQ A DOMINANT ISSUE IN THE 21:09:16 CAMPAIGN UNTIL A FEW WEEKS AGO. NOW THE ECONOMY HAS TAKEN HOLD. 21:09:19 IF YOU ASK ANY OF THE VOTERS, IT 'S THE ECONOMY. 21:09:23 YOU HAVE SAID REPEATEDLY, QUOTE, I KNOW A LOT LESS ABOUT 21:09:26 ECONOMICS THAN I DO ABOUT MILITARY OR FOREIGN POLICY 21:09:29 ISSUES. I NEED TO BE EDUCATED. 21:09:31 IS IT A PROBLEM FOR THE CAMPAIGN THAT THE ECONOMY IS THE MOST 21:09:35 IMPORTANT ISSUE, ONE BY YOUR OWN ACKNOWLEDGMENT YOU'RE NOT WELL 21:09:39 VERSED ON. >> I DON'T KNOW WHERE YOU GOT 21:09:41 THAT QUOTE FROM. I'M VERY WELL VERSED IN 21:09:44 ECONOMICS. I WAS AT THE REAGAN REVOLUTION. 21:09:46 I WAS THERE WHEN WE ENACTED THE FIRST -- OR JUST AFTER WE 21:09:50 ENACTED THE FIRST TAX CUTS AND THE RESTRAINTS ON SPENDING. 21:09:54 AS -- CHAIRMAN OF THE CONGRESS COMMITTEE IN 1987 THAT 21:10:01 ADDRESSES EVERY ECONOMIC ISSUE THAT AFFECTS THE UNITED STATES 21:10:03 OF AMERICA. I'M WELL VERSED ON ECONOMICS. 21:10:05 THAT'S WHY I HAVE THE SUPPORT OF PEOPLE LIKE JACK KEMP, PEOPLE 21:10:09 LIKE PHIL GRAMM, PEOPLE LIKE WARREN RUDMAN, PEOPLE LIKE DOUG 21:10:14 HOLSAKEN, PEOPLE LIKE MARTY FELTSTEIN. 21:10:17 I HAVE A STRONG TEAM AROUND ME THAT RESPECT MY VIEWS AND MY 21:10:20 VISION. WHY "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL" IN 21:10:22 A SURVEY OF ECONOMISTS RECENTLY THAT THE MAJORITY OF ECONOMISTS 21:10:26 THOUGHT THAT I COULD HANDLE THE NATION'S ECONOMY BEST. 21:10:30 AND I HAVE BEEN A CONSISTENT FIGHTER TO RESTRAINT SPENDING 21:10:34 AND TO CUT TAXES. AND MY CREDENTIALS, MY 21:10:37 EXPERIENCE, MY KNOWLEDGE OF THESE ECONOMIC ISSUES, I THINK, 21:10:40 ARE EXTENSIVE AND I WOULD MATCH THEM AGAINST ANYBODY WHO'S 21:10:44 RUNNING. >> YOU ALL HAVE DESCRIBED 21:10:47 YOURSELVES AS TAX CUTTERS. YET, IN YOUR RECORDS, THERE ARE 21:10:51 SHORTCOMINGS ON THAT ISSUE. GOVERNOR HUCKABEE, ARE YOU 21:10:54 COMFORTABLE WITH THE FACT THAT GOVERNOR ROMNEY RAISED FEES 21:10:58 A QUARTER OF A MILLION DOLLARS AS GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS. 21:11:01 DO YOU TRUST HIM AS A TAX CUTTER? 21:11:03 >> IT WILL BE MORE DO THE VOTERS TRUST HIM? 21:11:06 DO THEY TRUST ME? I KNOW THIS -- I BALANCED THE 21:11:08 BUDGET EVERY YEAR I WAS GOVERNOR. 21:11:11 I LEFT A SURPLUS OF $850 MILLION COMING FROM THE DEFICIT OF $200 21:11:14 MILLION. I SIGNED THE FIRST OF BROAD 21:11:19 BASED TAX CUTS. AND I KNOW I MADE TAX CUTS THAT 21:11:23 IMPACTED FAMILIES BY ELIMINATING THE MARRIAGE PENALTY, DOUBLING 21:11:27 THE CHILD CARE TAX CREDIT, RAISING THE INCOME LEVEL WHICH 21:11:30 PEOPLE PAID THEIR INCOME TAX. BUT LET ME SPEAK TO THE HEART OF 21:11:34 WHAT I THINK AMERICANS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT, THE ECONOMY. 21:11:36 AND FRANKLY IN TALKING ABOUT THE STIMULUS PACKAGE. 21:11:39 ONE OF THE CONCERNS THAT I HAVE IS THAT WE'LL PROBABLY END UP 21:11:43 BORROWING THIS $150 BILLION FROM THE CHINESE. 21:11:45 AND WHEN WE GET THE REBATE CHECKS, MOST PEOPLE ARE GOING TO 21:11:48 BUY STUFF THAT'S IMPORTED FROM CHINA. 21:11:50 I HAVE TO WONDER WHOSE ECONOMY IS STIMULATED THE MOST BY THE 21:11:54 PACKAGE. AND I'M GRATEFUL THAT SOMETHING 21:11:56 IS BEING DONE. THEY CAN ALL AT LEAST 21:11:58 ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT'S GOOD TO SEE THE CONGRESS WORKING WITH 21:12:00 THE PRESIDENT TO DO SOMETHING. BUT IF WE'RE GOING TO SPEND $150 21:12:06 BILLION, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT MAYBE WE ADD TWO LANES OF 21:12:09 HIGHWAY FROM BANGOR ALL THE WAY TO MIAMI ON I-95, A THIRD OF THE 21:12:14 UNITED STATES POPULATION LIVES WITHIN 100 MILES OF THAT. 21:12:17 THIS NATION'S INFRASTRUCTURE IS FALLING APART. 21:12:20 AND IF WE BUILT THOSE LANES OF HIGHWAYS WITH AMERICAN LABOR, 21:12:24 AMERICAN STEEL, AMERICAN CONCRETE, I BELIEVE IT WOULD DO 21:12:28 MORE TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY. AND I SAY THAT IS BECAUSE WHEN 21:12:31 WE WERE GOING THROUGH A RECESSION IN MY STATE, WE WERE 21:12:33 IN THE MIDDLE OF A $1 BILLION HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM 21:12:37 THAT BROUGHT ABOUT 40,000 JOBS AND BROUGHT $1 MILLION OF 21:12:41 CAPITAL IN TO THE ECONOMY. THAT'S A LONG-TERM STIMULUS 21:12:44 PACKAGE THAT I THINK WOULD HAVE MORE IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN LONG 21:12:47 TERM FUTURE AND IT WOULD KEEP SOCIAL CAPITAL FROM BEING 21:12:51 WASTED, FUEL WASTED, A LOT OF PEOPLE IN FLORIDA SIT AROUND IN 21:12:54 TRAFFIC EVERY DAY, NEVER GETTING TO THEIR KIDS' DANCE RECITALS OR 21:12:58 SOCCER GAMES BECAUSE THEY'RE STUCK IN TRAFFIC. 21:13:00 AND WE'VE DONE NOTHING ABOUT IT. >> GOVERNOR ROMNEY. 21:13:04 YOU CRITICIZE SENATOR McCAIN FOR OPPOSING THE FIRST TWO BUSH TAX 21:13:08 CUTS. YOU CRITICIZED MAYOR GIULIANI 21:13:11 FOR GOING TO COURT FOR TRYING TO OBTAIN A COMMUTER TAX ON THE 21:13:14 PEOPLE COMING TO NEW YORK. DO YOU TRUST SENATOR McCAIN AND 21:13:18 MAYOR GIULIANI ON THE ISSUE OF BEING TAX CUTTERS? 21:13:22 >> I TRUST THESE TWO GENTLEMEN AND RESPECT THEM GREATLY. 21:13:25 WE HAVE DIFFERING VIEWS AND OVER TIME OUR RECORD ON TAXES 21:13:30 DIFFERENT. ALL OF US WANT TO SEE TAXES 21:13:32 BROUGHT DOWN AND SPENDING BROUGHT DOWN. 21:13:33 I HAVE A SOUND RECORD OF DOING THAT. 21:13:35 I CAME TO A STATE THAT FACED AN EXTRAORDINARY SERIES OF 21:13:39 CHALLENGES. MASSACHUSETTS WAS IN A DITCH. 21:13:40 WE HAD ABOUT A $3 BILLION BUDGET SHORTFALL. 21:13:44 EVERYBODY THOUGHT WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TO RAISE TAXES TO SOLVE 21:13:46 THE PROBLEM. I WENT TO WORK TO GET 21:13:48 MASSACHUSETTS BACK ON TRACK, WORKING WITH DEMOCRATS ACROSS 21:13:52 THE AISLE. WE WERE ABLE TO DO THAT WITHOUT 21:13:54 RAISING TAXES. THAT WAS CRITICAL. 21:13:55 IT SAID TO THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY, YOU DON'T HAVE TO 21:13:58 WORRY ABOUT TAX-ACHUSSETS COME BACK AGAIN. 21:14:02 YOU'RE GOING TO SEE US LIVING WITHIN THE MEANS. 21:14:05 WE BALANCED THE BUDGET, WE PUT IN PLACE A SURPLUS OF $2 BILLION 21:14:09 TO MAKE SURE WE HAD THE KIND OF RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE NEEDED 21:14:12 IF IT WERE A RAINY DAY. I ALSO SUPPORT THE BUSH TAX 21:14:16 CUTS. SENATOR McCAIN VOTED AGAINST 21:14:17 THEM ORIGINALLY. NOW HE BELIEVES THEY SHOULD BE 21:14:20 MADE PERMANENT. I'M GLAD HE AGREES THEY SHOULD 21:14:23 BE MADE PERMANENT. HE SHOULD HAVE VOTED FOR THEM 21:14:26 FOR THE FIRST TIME AROUND. THAT'S JUST A DIFFERENCE OF 21:14:29 VIEWPOINT. THE BUSH TAX CUTS HELP TO GET 21:14:31 OUR ECONOMY GOING AGAIN WHEN WE FACED THE LAST TOUGH TIMES. 21:14:34 AND THAT'S WHY RIGHT NOW AS WE FACE TOUGH TIMES, WE NEED TO 21:14:38 HAVE SOMEBODY TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU WILL HAS THE PRIVATE 21:14:41 SECTOR, THE BUSINESS WORLD, THE ECONOMY IN THEIR DNA. 21:14:43 I DO. I SPENT MY LIFE IN THE PRIVATE 21:14:46 SECTOR. I KNOW HOW JOBS COME AND I KNOW 21:14:48 HOW THEY GO AND I'LL MAKE SURE WE CREATE MORE GOOD JOBS FOR 21:14:51 THIS NATION. AND ONE WAY TO DO THAT IS TO 21:14:53 HOLD DOWN TAXES. AND MAKE THOSE TAX CUTS 21:14:56 PERMANENT. >> SENATOR McCAIN, GOVERNOR 21:14:58 ROMNEY EVOKED YOUR NAME. DO YOU BELIEVE GOVERNOR ROMNEY 21:15:02 RAISING FEES $250 MILLION IS EQUIVALENT TO PAYING TAXES. 21:15:08 >> I'M SURE TO THE PEOPLE WHO HAD TO PAY IT DID, I WOULD 21:15:11 IMAGINE. BUT, LOOK, I VOTED -- I VOTED ON 21:15:13 THE TAX CUTS BECAUSE I KNEW THAT UNLESS WE HAD SPENDING UNDER 21:15:18 CONTROL, WE WERE GOING TO FACE A DISASTER. 21:15:20 WE LET SPENDING GET COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTROL. 21:15:24 OF COURSE THOSE TAX CUTS HAVE TO REMAIN PERMANENT. 21:15:27 OTHERWISE PEOPLE EXPERIENCING A TAX INCREASE. 21:15:29 WE LET SPENDING GET OUT OF CONTROL. 21:15:32 WE REPUBLICANS LOST AN ELECTION. WE LOST AN ELECTION BECAUSE OF 21:15:35 THE BRIDGE TO NOWHERE. AND THE FACT THAT WE PRESIDED 21:15:39 OVER THE BIGGEST INCREASE IN AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT IN A 21:15:43 SENSE OF GREAT SOCIETY, WE LET IT GET OUT OF CONTROL. 21:15:46 AND THE FACT IS THAT IF WE HAD HAD THE SPENDING RESTRAINTS THAT 21:15:50 I PROPOSED, WE WOULD BE TALKING ABOUT MORE TAX CUTS TODAY. 21:15:54 MORE TAX CUTS THAT TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON OUR BASE WAS 21:15:57 ERODED. I WILL RESTORE THAT TRUST AND 21:16:00 CONFIDENCE BECAUSE I WILL RESTRAIN SPENDING ALONG WITH 21:16:02 FURTHER TAX CUTS AND I'M VERY PROUD OF MY RECORD. 21:16:10 IF YOU LOOK AT THOSE ORGANIZATIONS, GREAT PEOPLE, THE 21:16:14 CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECONOMY. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MY 21:16:18 RECORD IS VERY, VERY HIGH WITH A CONSISTENT RECORD OF BEING A 21:16:21 FISCAL CONSERVATIVE, A RECORD THAT I'M PROUD OF. 21:16:24 >> TIME. >> I'M GOING TO STOP THE PORK 21:16:26 BARREL SPENDING AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO HAVE ANYMORE BRIDGES TO 21:16:29 NOWHERE. >> TIME IS UP. 21:16:31 >>> CONGRESSMAN PAUL, YOU OFTEN HAVE A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THESE 21:16:35 ISSUES. SO I'LL ASK A VASTLY DIFFERENT 21:16:37 QUESTION. SHOULD GOVERNMENT IN YOUR VIEW 21:16:39 HAVE ANY ROLE AT ALL IN STIMULATING THE ECONOMY LIKE 21:16:42 THIS? >> INDIRECTLY, THEY SHOULD 21:16:44 STIMULATE IT BY INTERFERING IN THE MARKET RATE OF INTEREST. 21:16:47 THAT'S WHERE OUR BASIC PROBLEM COMES FROM. 21:16:49 AND WHEN YOU DO THAT, YOU GET IN THESE PROBLEMS AND EVERYBODY 21:16:52 WANTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY PRINTING MORE MONEY AND SPENDING 21:16:55 MORE MONEY AND ASKING THE FEDERAL RESERVE TO, YOU KNOW, 21:16:58 LOWER INTEREST RATES. THAT MAKES THE PROBLEM THAT MUCH 21:17:00 WORSE. THE GOVERNMENT DOES HAVE A 21:17:02 RESPONSIBILITY. BUT IT'S SUPPOSED TO LOWER 21:17:05 TAXES, GET RID OF REGULATION, AND DIVIDE THE MONETARY POLICY 21:17:10 THAT MAKES SOME SENSE. BUT, TO CONTINUE TO SAY THAT WE 21:17:14 JUST APPROPRIATE MORE MONEY, WHICH IS MORE DEFICIT, THEN 21:17:18 EXPECT US EITHER TO BORROW IT OR EXPECT THE FEDERAL RESERVE TO 21:17:21 MONETIZE IT, IT MAKES OUR PROBLEMS WORSE. 21:17:24 LOOK WHAT'S HAPPENING TODAY. THE DOLLAR IS CRASHING. 21:17:28 WHY -- WHY AND TIM THERE SUGGESTS THAT WE THINK OF THE 21:17:32 ECONOMY, BUT NOT IN FOREIGN POLICY. 21:17:33 YOU CAN'T DO THAT. THEY'RE ONE IN THE SAME. 21:17:36 THAT'S WHERE ALL OF THE MONEY IS GOING. 21:17:38 WE'RE SPENDING NEARLY $1 TRILLION A YEAR OVERSEAS 21:17:42 MAINTAINING THE EMPIRE. AND THEN, NEVER BEEN A WAR 21:17:44 FOUGHT WITHOUT INFLATION AND DESTRUCTION AND DEVALUATION OF A 21:17:48 CURRENCY. IN THIS -- THIS IS WHAT WE'RE 21:17:50 DOING TODAY TO OURSELVES IS WE'RE LITERALLY SPENDING 21:17:54 OURSELVES INTO OBLIVION. BUT NOBODY HERE SUGGESTED THAT 21:18:01 WE CUT -- WE DON'T HAVE TO. WE DON'T HAVE TO CUT ANYTHING 21:18:03 HERE AT HOME. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THINGS 21:18:06 FROZEN, MASSIVE TAX CUTS, WE NEED DEREGULATION. 21:18:09 I WAS ONE OF THREE PEOPLE VOTING AGAINST SARBANES OXLEY. 21:18:12 I KNEW THAT WOULD BE A PROBLEM. SIT A PROBLEM TO THE FINANCIAL 21:18:15 MARKETS. THIS IS THE KIND OF THING WE 21:18:17 NEED. WE NEED THE GOVERNMENT OUT OF 21:18:18 THE WAY, SOUND MONEY, LOW TAXES, LESS REGULATION IN A SENSIBLE 21:18:22 POLICY WHERE WE'RE NOT WASTING MONEY OVERSEAS. 21:18:25 >> CONGRESSMAN, THANK YOU. RUE GIULIANI. 21:18:29 A STORY OUT OF THE NEWS. MANY BIG BRAND NAME BANKS IN 21:18:32 THIS COUNTRY, MERRILL LYNCH, CITIGROUP, TWO OF THEM GONE 21:18:40 OVERSEAS HAT IN HAND LOOKING FOR THE CASH INFUSIONS UP TO $20 21:18:43 BILLION LITERALLY TO STAY AFLOAT, LOOKING FOR MONEY FROM 21:18:47 GOVERNMENTS OF ABU DHABI, JAPAN, KOREA, SAUDI PRINCE ALAWEID 21:18:54 WHOSE MONEY YOU TURNED AWAY IN NEW YORK AFTER 9/11. 21:18:59 I KNOW YOU KNOW A LOT OF THESE PEOPLE, WALL STREET FIRMS, THE 21:19:02 BIG NEW YORK BANKS. EVEN THOUGH IT'S MONEY TO STAY 21:19:05 AFLOAT, FUNDAMENTALLY UN-AMERICAN IN WHAT'S GOING ON? 21:19:08 >> FIRST OF ALL, LET'S DISTINGUISH IT FROM THE 21:19:11 PRESENTATION OF THE $10 MILLION CHECK. 21:19:13 THAT WAS A DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCE. 21:19:15 THE PRINCE CAME TO GROUND ZERO AT THE REQUEST OF THE WHITE 21:19:18 HOUSE. I TOOK HIM THERE TO SHOW THEM 21:19:20 THE DEVASTATION. I THINK IN PART TO SEE HOW MUCH 21:19:24 OF AN ALLIANCE WE COULD GET AND HOW MUCH EMPATHY WE COULD GET 21:19:28 AND HOW MUCH SUPPORT WE COULD GET. 21:19:30 HE PRESENTED ME WITH A $10 MILLION CHECK FOR THE TWIN 21:19:33 TOWERS FUND. AND I TOOK IT. 21:19:35 AND THEN, AN HOUR OR SO LATER HE -- I FOUND OUT HE ISSUED A 21:19:40 PRESS RELEASE ATTACKING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SAYING THAT 21:19:43 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL IS ONE OF THE 21:19:46 CAUSES OF IT. AND I GAVE HIM THE CHECK BACK. 21:19:49 BECAUSE I FELT THAT -- AND SO DID THE PEOPLE THAT ADVISED ME, 21:19:52 THEY THOUGHT OF IT AS FRAUD MONEY. 21:19:55 THAT'S A DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCE THAN AN INVESTMENT IN A PRIVATE 21:19:58 INSTITUTION. AMERICA IS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY. 21:20:00 THAT'S WHAT WE ARE. THAT'S WHERE WE ARE. 21:20:02 AND WE HAVE TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT INVESTMENTS TO MAKE SURE THEY'RE 21:20:06 HONEST, TO MAKE SURE THEY'RE TRANSPARENT. 21:20:09 TO MAKE SURE THERE'S NO OTHER HIDDEN MOTIVATION BEHIND IT. 21:20:13 WE ARE ENGAGED IN GLOBAL ECONOMY. 21:20:15 WHEN THE COUNTRIES INVEST IN THE UNITED STATES, THERE'S A MUTUAL 21:20:20 INTEREST THAT'S DEVELOPED THAT'S HELPFUL TO US. 21:20:23 REMEMBER BACK IN THE '80s, ALL OF THE DISCUSSION AND WORRY 21:20:26 ABOUT JAPANESE INVESTMENT. THEY BOUGHT YOUR BUILDING. 21:20:29 >> RIGHT. >> YEAH. 21:20:30 >> IT WAS A BIG WORRY THAT IT WAS GOING TO BECOME A JAPANESE 21:20:35 BUILDING AND IT ALL CHANGED. WHAT HAPPENED? 21:20:38 IT ALL WORKED ITS WAY IN TO THE ECONOMY. 21:20:40 THE JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES BECAME CLOSER FRIENDS. 21:20:43 THEY'RE ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES NOW. 21:20:46 I'M IN FAVOR OF TRADE AND I'M PRETTY MUCH IN FAVOR OF FREE 21:20:50 TRADE. YOU HAVE TO BE CAREFUL WHEN YOU 21:20:52 HAVE INVESTMENTS LIKE THIS THAT THERE'S NO ALTERING YOUR MOTIVE. 21:20:56 IF THERE ISN'T, THIS IS A GOOD THING. 21:20:58 WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT WE'RE SELLING TO THEM. 21:21:00 WE SHOULD BE AGGRESSIVE ABOUT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. 21:21:03 THE AMERICANS SHOULD BE THINKING ABOUT HOW MUCH WE COULD SELL TO 21:21:06 THE REST OF THE WORLD AND HOW MUCH CAN WE INVEST IN THEM AS 21:21:09 THEY'RE IN FACT IN US. >> TIME UP. 21:21:12 >>> "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL" AND NBC NEWS ASKED PEOPLE ACROSS 21:21:16 THE COUNTRY -- WHICH PARTY WOULD BE BETTER IN DEALING WITH THE 21:21:19 ECONOMY. THE DEMOCRATS HAD AN 18-POINT 21:21:22 ADVANTAGE. WITH THAT IN MIND, AND LOOKING 21:21:24 AT THE RECORD OVER THE LAST SEVEN YEARS, THE UNEMPLOYMENT 21:21:27 RATE IN 2001 WAS 4.2, IT'S NOW 5.0. 21:21:31 THE DEBT WAS 5.7 TRILLION, IT'S NOW 9.2 TRILLION. 21:21:37 A $261 BILLION SURPLUS, NOW A $250 BILLION DEFICIT. 21:21:42 GAS WAS $1 MONTH -- $1.47 A GALLON, NOW $2.03. 21:21:51 WHY SHOULD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CONTINUE WITH A REPUBLICAN IN 21:21:54 THE WHITE HOUSE. SENATOR McCAIN? 21:21:56 >> YOU CAN BE SURE IF YOU WATCH THE DEMOCRATIC DEBATES THAT THEY 21:21:59 WILL INCREASE SPENDING, THEY WILL INCREASE TAXES, THEY WILL 21:22:03 EXPAND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT, AND THEY WILL CONTINUE THE 21:22:07 SPENDING SPREE WHICH TO A LARGE DEGREE, THE REPUBLICANS HAVE 21:22:09 GREATER RESPONSIBILITY. I'LL GIVE YOU SOME STRAIGHT 21:22:12 TALK. AND WE -- THEY WILL NOT RESTORE 21:22:18 STABILITY OF THE ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS WHICH ARE BECOMING MORE 21:22:22 AND MORE UNFUNDABLE IN THEIR LIABILITIES IN THE FUTURE. 21:22:27 THE DEMOCRATS HAVE ALREADY RUN AND TOLD US THAT THEY WILL 21:22:30 INCREASE TAXES AND INCREASE SPENDING. 21:22:33 LOOK, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SIGNED INTO LAW 21:22:34 TWO YEARS IN A ROW PORK BARREL LADEN BILLS -- $35 BILLION WORTH 21:22:40 OF PORK. WORTH OF MARKED PROJECTS 21:22:44 WHICH ARE OUTRAGEOUS. WE COULD HAVE GLITCH $1,000 TAX 21:22:48 CREDIT TO EVERY CHILD IN AMERICA FOR THAT $35 BILLION. 21:22:52 INSTEAD, WE CHOSE A BRIDGE TO NOWHERE. 21:22:54 I WILL, AS PRESIDENT, VETO EVERY ONE OF THE BIG SPENDING BILLS. 21:22:58 I WILL IMPOSE SOME FISCAL DISCIPLINE. 21:23:01 THERE IS NOTHING THAT ANYTHING THAT THE DEMOCRATS HAVE SAID, 21:23:03 EXCEPT THAT I HAVE SEEN EXCEPT TAX AND TAX, SPEND AND SPEND, 21:23:08 ELECT, AND ELECT. WE WILL CLEAN UP OUR ACT, AND WE 21:23:10 WILL REGAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS BEING 21:23:14 CAREFUL STEWARDS OF OUR TAX DOLLARS AND WE WILL FIX THIS 21:23:17 PROBLEM WITH HAVING TO BORROW MONEY FROM CHINA BECAUSE THEN WE 21:23:20 WILL BALANCE OUR BUDGET JUST LIKE EVERY GOVERNOR IN AMERICA 21:23:23 HAS BEEN REQUIRED TO DO AS WELL. >> GOVERNOR HUCKABEE, GEORGE 21:23:27 BUSH HAS BEEN PRESIDENT SINCE 2001. 21:23:28 THE REPUBLICANS CONTROLLED CONGRESS FOR MOST OF THOSE 21:23:31 YEARS, LOSING CONTROL IN 2006. WITH THIS ECONOMIC SCORECARD, 21:23:35 WHY SHOULD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KEEP THE REPUBLICANS IN CHARGE? 21:23:39 >> WELL, TIM, LET ME REMIND YOU. I WASN'T IN WASHINGTON DURING 21:23:43 ALL OF THIS TIME. THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS THEY 21:23:46 SHOULD GIVE ME A CHANCE. I WASN'T THERE MESSING THIS UP. 21:23:49 >> YOU DO THINK PRESIDENT BUSH AND THE REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS 21:23:53 DID NOT MEASURE UP? >> I DON'T THINK YOU CAN BLAME 21:23:56 ALL OF THIS ON PRESIDENT BUSH. I THINK THE PRESIDENT ALSO HAS 21:23:58 DONE I THINK A FINE JOB OF MAKING SURE THE FOCUS OF THE 21:24:02 WHITE HOUSE WAS ALSO KEEPING US SAFE. 21:24:04 BUT LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC ISSUES. A FEW MONTHS AGO, WE WERE ALL IN 21:24:09 DEARBORN, MICHIGAN, YOUR NETWORK WAS THE SPONSOR, CNBC AND MSNBC, 21:24:13 EVERY ONE OF US WERE ASKED, HOW'S THE ECONOMY DOING? 21:24:15 EVERY ONE OF MY COLLEAGUES SAID IT'S DOING GREAT. 21:24:18 THEY GAVE ALL THE NUMBERS. WHEN THEY CAME TO ME, PEOPLE 21:24:22 ACTED LIKE I WAS THE ONLY GUY AT THE U.N. WITHOUT A HEADSET THAT 21:24:26 NIGHT. BUT I WAS THE ONLY GUY ON THE 21:24:28 STAGE THAT SAID -- IT MAY BE DOING GREAT IF YOU'RE AT THE 21:24:30 TOP. BUT IF YOU TALK TO THE PEOPLE AT 21:24:32 THE BOTTOM OF THE ECONOMY, THE PEOPLE WHO ARE HANDLING THE 21:24:36 BAGS, PEOPLE WHO ARE SERVING THE FOOD, YOU'D GET A DIFFERENT 21:24:40 PICTURE BECAUSE THEIR HEALTH CARE COSTS ARE UP, COSTS TO 21:24:43 EDUCATE THEIR CHILDREN ARE UP. THE COST OF THEIR FUEL HAS WAY 21:24:46 OUTSTRIPPED ANY WAGE INCREASE THEY HAD. 21:24:48 NOW, OFTEN WE HEAR PEOPLE TALK ABOUT TRICKLE-DOWN ECONOMICS. 21:24:51 IF YOU HAVE A WONDERFUL SURGE IN THE ECONOMY, THAT EVENTUALLY 21:24:55 WORKS ITS WAY DOWN TO ALL SECTORS. 21:24:58 BUT THERE'S ANOTHER ISSUE TOO. THERE'S A TRICKLE UP IMPACT WHEN 21:25:02 THE ECONOMY BEGINS TO GO SOUR. AND IF YOU PAY ATTENTION TO THE 21:25:06 PEOPLE WHO ARE THE SINGLE MOMS AND THE WORKING PEOPLE WHO 21:25:09 BARELY GET FROM PAYCHECK TO PAYCHECK, YOU FIND OUT MONTHS IN 21:25:13 ADVANCE THAT THIS ECONOMY WAS HEADED FOR A DOWNWARD TURN. 21:25:16 THAT'S WHAT I THINK PEOPLE NEED IN THE PRESIDENT, IS SOMEBODY 21:25:19 WHO UNDERSTANDS IT TOTALITY OF THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND NOT JUST 21:25:22 THE FOLKS AT THE TOP. >> GOVERNOR ROMNEY, HIGHER 21:25:26 DEFICITS, HIGHER DEBT, HIGHER UNEMPLOYMENT. 21:25:28 HIGHER GAS PRICES. IS THAT THE KIND OF REPUBLICAN 21:25:30 RECORD THAT YOU WANT TO RUN ON? >> I'M NOT GOING TO RUN ON THAT 21:25:34 RECORD, I TELL YOU THAT. I CAN RUN ON MY OWN RECORD. 21:25:37 I CAN RUN ON MY RECORD OF HAVING BEEN IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR 21:25:40 25 YEARS, MY RECORD FOR HELPING ON MASSACHUSETTS. 21:25:47 HELP RUN AWAY FROM THAT ACCOMPLISHMENT. 21:25:50 >> YOU RUN AWAY FROM THIS RECORD? 21:25:51 >> WASHINGTON IS FUNDAMENTALLY BROKEN. 21:25:54 WASHINGTON MADE PROMISES TO US IN THE LAST DECADE THAT THEY 21:25:57 HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO FULFILL. THEY SOLVE THE PROBLEM IN SOCIAL 21:26:02 SECURITY. THEY HAVEN'T. 21:26:05 REIGN IN SPENDING. THEY SAID THEY'RE GOING TO CUT 21:26:08 SPENDING, EAR MARKS, THE MENTALITY IN WASHINGTON. 21:26:12 EVERY YEAR, MORE AND MORE MONEY GOES IN. 21:26:14 THEY WOULD LIVE BY HIGH ETHICS, THEY HAVEN'T. 21:26:17 THEY SAID THEY WOULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, 21:26:19 THEY HAVEN'T. THEY SAID THEY'D START OFF WITH 21:26:22 THE FOREIGN OILS. THEY HAVEN'T. 21:26:24 HERB SHOE AFTER ISSUES RAISED OVER THE LAST COUPLE OF THREE 21:26:28 DECADES SPOKEN ABOUT, WASHINGTON HAS FAILED TO DELIVER IT. 21:26:31 >> BOTH PARTIES? >> BOTH PARTIES. 21:26:33 CLANG HAVE TO BEGIN WITH US IN OUR PARTY. 21:26:36 WE ARE THE PARTY OF FISCAL R 21:26:40 RESPONSIBILITY. AND WHEN REPUBLICANS ACT LIKE 21:26:41 DEMOCRATS, AMERICA LOSES. YOU'VE SEEN THAT IN THE LAST 21:26:43 SEVERAL YEARS. WE'RE GOING HAVE TO MAKE SURE WE 21:26:45 REIGN IN SPENDING. IT'S NOT JUST -- WE ALL AGREE, 21:26:48 THE EAR MARKS OF THE PORK BARREL SPENDING AND THE BRIDGE TO 21:26:51 NOWHERE, THAT'S AN EASY ONE TO TAKE A SHOT AT. 21:26:53 BUT THE BIG ONE IS ENTITLEMENTS AND REINING IN ENTITLEMENT 21:26:59 COSTS. AND HOW ARE WE GOING TO BRING 21:27:01 DOWN TAXATION. WE HAVE THE HIGHEST TAX RATE 21:27:03 NEXT TO JAPAN IN THE WORLD. THAT HURTS IT ECONOMY. 21:27:06 WHAT YOU'RE SEEING IN THE WEAKENING DOLLAR, IN THE 21:27:08 DECLINING STOCK MARKET, IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES COMING HERE TO 21:27:11 BUY IN OUR BANKS, YOU SEE AN UNDERGROUND -- THE FOUNDATION OF 21:27:14 OUR ECONOMY BEING SHAKE TWIN FACT THAT WE HAVEN'T BEEN DOING 21:27:17 THE JOB THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE IN WASHINGTON AND I'M GOING TO 21:27:19 WASHINGTON TO CHANGE WASHINGTON. >> GOVERNOR ROMNEY, THE TIME IS 21:27:25 UP. YOU'RE THE ONLY ONE ON THIS. 21:27:33 >> THE ECONOMY OF NEW YORK A VERY, VERY BAD SHAPE. 21:27:37 TREMENDOUS DEFICITS. 300,000 JOBS GONE. 21:27:40 WE TURNED THAT AROUND. CUT UNEMPLOYMENT BY A HALF, 21:27:45 BROUGHT IN NEW JOBS, CUT TAXES BY 17%. 21:27:48 AND WE DID IT BASED ON GROWTH PRINCIPLES -- EXACTLY THE 21:27:52 PRINCIPLES THAT ARE IN THE GROWTH PACKAGE THAT WAS 21:27:55 INTRODUCE IN CONGRESS YESTERDAY WHICH THEY SAID WAS THE BEST 21:27:59 STIMULUS FOR GROWTH THEY'VE SEEN IN A LONG TIME. 21:28:01 I'VE HAD THE EXPERIENCE TO DO THIS IN THE 17th LARGEST ECONOMY 21:28:04 IN THE WORLD. AND I CAN DO IT FOR THE COUNTRY. 21:28:06 >> MAYOR, THANK YOU. CONGRESSMAN PAUL, PLEASE TAKE 30 21:28:09 SECONDS OF YOUR OWN. >> WELL -- WE HAVE TO RUN ON THE 21:28:20 OLD-FASHIONED REPUBLICAN PROGRAM. 21:28:21 I'M THE TAXPAYERS' BEST FRIEND. I NEVER VOTED FOR A TAX INCREASE 21:28:26 AND VOTED FOR THE LEAST AMOUNT OF SPENDING. 21:28:28 SO I'M NOT PART OF THAT CROWD. WE NEED TO REINSTATE REPUBLICAN 21:28:33 P PRINCIPLES. 21:28:34 WE HAVE DRIFTED A LONG WAY FROM THAT. 21:28:35 THAT IS BECAUSE OF ALL OF THE PROGRAMS. 21:28:44 I WAS WAVING THE FLAG -- SLOW UP, SLOW UP. 21:28:47 HERE WE ARE AT THE VERGE OF BANKRUPTCY. 21:28:50 WE'RE IN THE NEW ERA, WITH THE DOLLAR, OUR ECONOMY, AND THE 21:28:52 WORLD ECONOMY, THIS IS A NEW ERROR. 21:28:55 >> TIME IS UP. AS PROMISED, OUR COLLEAGUE, PAUL 21:28:58 TASHA, THE EDITOR FOR THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES HAS BEEN 21:29:01 PATIENT WITH US. WE'LL GO TO SOME OF THE 21:29:04 QUESTIONS SENT IN LOCALLY FOR THE CANDIDATES. 21:29:07 PAUL. >> SENATOR McCAIN, THIS QUESTION 21:29:10 COMES TO US FROM FLORIDA. OUR MILITARY LEADERS TELL US 21:29:14 THAT THE ARMY IS ON THE VERGE OF BREAKING AND THE ECONOMIC 21:29:18 EXPERTS TELL US THAT WE CANNOT SUSTAIN OUR ECONOMY THROUGH THE 21:29:23 DEFICIT SPENDING. BOTH TELL US WE CANNOT SUSTAIN 21:29:26 OUR PRESENT EFFORT IN IRAQ. HOW CAN WE DO THIS BOTH 21:29:40 MILITARILY AND ECONOMICALLY. PLEASE, NO GENERALITIES. 21:29:43 >> I KNOW OF NO MILITARY LEADER INCLUDING GENERAL PETRAEUS THAT 21:29:48 WE CAN'T SUSTAIN OUR EFFORT IN IRAQ. 21:29:50 YOU'RE WRONG. WE'RE SUCCEEDING. 21:29:52 BACK DOWN TO PREVIOUS LEVELS AND WE WILL BE ABLE TO WITHDRAW 21:29:56 TROOPS OVER TIME IF WE SUCCEED. IF WE DO WHAT SENATOR CLINTON 21:29:59 SAID WHAT SHE WANTED TO DO NIGHT BEFORE LAST AND WAVE THE WHITE 21:30:03 FLAG OF SURRENDER AND SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL, WE WILL HAVE 21:30:06 EXPENSIVE? S. 21:30:08 AMERICAN BLOOD AND TREASURE AND CADE WILL HAVE ONE. 21:30:11 WE ARE SUCCEEDING IN IRAQ. AND EVERY INDICATOR IS THAT AND 21:30:15 WE WILL REDUCE CASUALTIES AND GRADUALLY ELIMINATE THEM. 21:30:21 ANYBODY WHO DOESN'T UNDERSTAND IT'S NOT AMERICAN PRESENCE, IT'S 21:30:25 AMERICAN CASUALTIES. AMERICAN TROOPS ALL OVER THE 21:30:27 WORLD TODAY, AND NOBODY COMPLAINS ABOUT IT. 21:30:29 WE'RE DEFENDING FREEDOM. THAT'S ONE OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF 21:30:33 BEING THE WORLD SUPERPOWER. I'M PROUD TO BE THE ONLY ONE ON 21:30:37 THIS STAGE THAT SAID WE HAVE TO ABANDON THE RUMSFELD STRATEGY 21:30:41 AND ADOPT THE STRATEGY THAT'S SUCCEEDING. 21:30:45 THAT'S HAPPENING. IT'S THE ONLY ONE THAT SAID 21:30:48 THAT. IT IS SUCCEEDING. 21:30:50 WE WILL REDUCE THE COSTS AND HAVE A STABLE MIDDLE EAST WHERE 21:30:53 THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE. 21:30:55 I'M SO PROUD THAT THE JOBS THAT THE MEN AND WOMEN IN THE 21:30:58 MILITARY ARE DOING THERE. AND THEY DON'T WANT US TO RAISE 21:31:01 THE WHITE FLAG OF SURRENDER LIKE SENATOR CLINTON DOES. 21:31:04 THEY KNOW THEY CAN WIN. AND THE MESSAGE TO YOU AND TO ME 21:31:06 IS LET US WIN. >> SENATOR McCAIN -- THANK YOU. 21:31:10 GOVERNOR ROMNEY -- RETIRED FOUR-STAR U.S. GENERAL, BARRY 21:31:15 McCAFFREY IS BACK FROM ONE OF THE MANY TRIPS TO IRAQ AND HAS 21:31:18 WRITTEN A REPORT, AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT ON HIS 21:31:22 FINDINGS. THIS SENTENCE STOOD OUT. 21:31:23 THE U.S. ARMY IS TOO SMALL AND POORLY RESOURCED TO CONTINUE 21:31:29 SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ AND 21:31:32 AFGHANISTAN AT THE CURRENT LEVEL. 21:31:33 THE QUESTION GOVERNOR IS HOW DO YOU DOUBLE THE SIZE OF IT FROM 21:31:37 400,000 TO 800,000 AS THE GENERAL RECOMMENDS IN HERE 21:31:40 WITHOUT A DRAFT? >> TAKE IT AT 1.5 MILLION. 21:31:54 1.6 MILLION. WE FOUND WE'RE LOSING ENROLLEES 21:31:57 FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD AT 6%. THE LEGISLATURE AND I GOT 21:32:01 TOGETHER AND PASSED THE WELCOME HOME BILL. 21:32:03 WE SAID IF YOU SIGN UP FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD, WE'LL PAY FOR 21:32:07 YOUR ENTIRE EDUCATION FOR FOUR YEARS, WE PUT IN OTHER BENEFITS, 21:32:11 LIFE INSURANCE AND OTHER FEATURES. 21:32:13 THE RESULT IS THE ENROLLMENTS WENT UP 30% THE NEXT YEAR. 21:32:16 IF YOU WANT MORE PEOPLE TO SIGN UP FOR THE MILITARY, WE HAVE TO 21:32:19 IMPROVE THE DEAL. AND FRANKLY, THE G.I.. BILL HAS 21:32:23 GOTTEN OLD. WE NEED TO UPDATE THE FUNDING 21:32:25 LEVEL SO THE YOUNG PEOPLE WHO GET IN THE MILITARY GET A FULL 21:32:29 RIDE WHEN THEY GO HOME AND GO TO COLLEGE. 21:32:32 LET'S STEP BACK AND TALK ABOUT WHAT WE SAW IN THE DEMOCRATIC 21:32:35 DEBATE WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT THE COMMITMENT THAT NEEDS TO BE MADE 21:32:37 TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. IT IS UNTHINKABLE THAT THE 21:32:41 DEMOCRATS WOULD HAVE SAID AT THAT DEBATE WHEN THEY WERE ASKED 21:32:44 WHAT'S MORE IMPORTANT TO YOU WHEN WE GET OUT AND IF THEY WIN. 21:32:47 THEY WOULDN'T ANSWER DIRECTLY. WITH EACH OF THE ANSWERS, IT WAS 21:32:50 CLEAR, GETTING OUT IS THEIR ONLY OBJECTIVE. 21:32:53 JUST GET OUT AS FAST AS YOU CAN, REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES. 21:32:56 THAT'S SIMPLY WRONG. WE CANNOT TURN IRAQ OVER TO E 21:33:01 CADE -- AL QAEDA AND HAVE AL QAEDA HAVE A SAFE HAVEN FOR 21:33:06 WHICH THEY CAN RECRUIT PEOPLE TO CARRY OUT BOMBINGS, ATTACK 21:33:11 COUNTRY AND OUR FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD. 21:33:12 THAT'S WHY I WILL NOT WALK AWAY FROM IRAQ UNTIL WE'VE BEEN 21:33:17 SUCCESSFUL. ONE MORE THING -- WHAT AN 21:33:19 AUDACIOUS AND ARROGANT THING FOR THE DEMOCRATS TO SAY AS HILLARY 21:33:24 CLINTON DID THAT THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE BY THE PROGRESS OF 21:33:27 THE INSURGENCY BY VIRTUE OF THEM TRYING TO PULL OUT SO QUICKLY. 21:33:31 THE SUCCESS THE COURAGE AND BLOOD OF OUR MEN AND WOMEN AND 21:33:35 GENERAL PETRAEUS AND BUSH AND NOT TO HILLARY CLINTON. 21:33:43 >> "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL"/NBC NEWS POLL TODAY, THE HIGHEST 21:33:49 PERCENTAGE EVER IN AMERICANS -- 6 IN 10 SAID THAT THE REMOVAL OF 21:33:53 SADDAM HUSSEIN IN POWER WAS NOT WORTH THE PRICE WE HAVE PAID IN 21:33:58 BLOOD. EVERY DEMOCRATIC -- EXCUSE ME, 21:34:00 EXCUSE ME, PLEASE. THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE WILL GO 21:34:03 TO THE COUNTRY AND SAY -- THE WAR IN IRAQ IS A BAD IDEA. 21:34:08 NOT WORTH THE PRICE IN BLOOD AND TREASURE. 21:34:10 AND WE SHOULD GET OUT. NOW, EACH OF YOU TO TAKE 30 21:34:14 SECONDS, WILL YOU GO TO THE COUNTRY, SENATOR McCAIN, AND 21:34:17 SAY, THE WAR WAS A GOOD IDEA? WORTH THE PRICE IN BLOOD AND 21:34:21 TREASURE? AND WE WILL STAY. 21:34:23 OOH. >> IT WAS WORTH GETTING RID OF 21:34:25 SADDAM HUSSEIN. HE HAD USED WEAPONS OF MASS 21:34:29 DESTRUCTION AND IT WAS CLEAR HE WAS HELP BENT ON ACQUIRING THEM. 21:34:33 THE PROBLEM WAS NO INVASION OF IRAQ. 21:34:35 THE PROBLEM WAS THE MISHANDLING OF IRAQ BY NEARLY FOUR YEARS BY 21:34:39 RUMSFELD. AGAIN, I RAILED AGAINST THAT, I 21:34:40 WAS CRITICIZED BY REPUBLICANS. THERE WERE OTHERS THAT CALLED 21:34:44 FOR A SECRET WITHDRAWAL. THE WAR IN IRAQ IS JUSTIFIED 21:34:49 BECAUSE OF THE THREAT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. 21:34:52 IT WAS THE MISHANDLING OF THE WAR. 21:34:54 NOW WE'RE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. NOW WE'RE SUCCEEDING. 21:34:59 IF WE WITHDRAWAL AND WE HAVE TO GET OUT OF THERE, I GUARANTEE 21:35:02 YOU, AL QAEDA WILL BE TRUMPETING TO THE WORLD THAT 21:35:05 THEY HAVE DEFEATED THE UNITED STATES. 21:35:07 >> MY QUESTION -- >> MY ANSWER -- 21:35:09 >> WAS THE WAR A GOOD IDEA WORTH THE PRICE OF BLOOD AND TREASURE. 21:35:14 >> IT WAS A GOOD IDEA. IT WAS NOT WORTH THE FAILURES 21:35:17 THAT HAPPENED. IT IS WORTH IT AT THE END OF THE 21:35:20 DAY, WE WILL HAVE PEACE AND SUCCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 21:35:23 AND OUR MEN AND WOMEN WILL RETURN AND RETURN WITH HONOR AND 21:35:25 THEY WON'T HAVE TO GO BACK AND FIGHT AL QAEDA THERE. 21:35:30 >> WAS THE WAR A GOOD IDEA AND WORTH THE PRICE OF BLOOD AND 21:35:33 TREASURE? >> THAT'S VERY INTERESTING YOU 21:35:35 PUT THAT QUESTION WITH THE POLL. WHEN THE POLLS WERE 6 AND 7 OUT 21:35:40 OF 10 AMERICANS THINKING IT WAS A GOOD IDEA, HILLARY CLINTON WAS 21:35:44 IN FAVOR OF THE WAR. NOW THAT THE POLLS ARE 6 AND 7 21:35:49 OUT OF 10, HILLARY CLINTON IS AGAINST THE WAR. 21:35:52 >> WHAT DO YOU THINK? >> I WAS FOR IT WHEN 6 OUT OF 10 21:35:57 ARE FOR IT, 6 OUT OF 10 AGAINST IT. 21:36:00 AMERICA HAS TO SUCCEED IN IRAQ. AND THE GOAL IN IRAQ IS THE IRAQ 21:36:05 THAT'S STABLE AND THE ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES. 21:36:07 AND TO BE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, YOU HAVE TO BE 21:36:10 ABLE TO READ POLLS, BUT YOU CAN'T HAVE THEM PUSH YOU AROUND. 21:36:13 >> CONGRESSMAN PAUL, WAS THE WAR A GOOD IDEA WORTH THE BLOOD IN 21:36:16 TREASURE THAT WE'VE SPENT? >> IT WAS A VERY BAD IDEA AND IT 21:36:19 WASN'T WORTH IT. THE AL QAEDA WERE NOT THERE THEN, 21:36:29 THERE NOW. NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 21:36:32 NOTHING TO DO WITH 9/11, NO AGGRESSION. 21:36:36 THIS DECISION ON POLICY WAS MADE IN 1998 UNDER THE PREVIOUS 21:36:39 ADMINISTRATION BECAUSE THEY CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM 21:36:42 HUSSEIN. IT WASN'T WORTH IT. 21:36:44 IT'S A SAD STORY. WE STARTED THAT WAR AND WE 21:36:46 SHOULD NEVER BE A COUNTRY THAT STARTS WAR NEEDLESSLY. 21:36:50 >> GOFF HUCKABEE? WAS THE WAR A GOOD IDEA WORTH 21:36:53 THE COST OF BLOOD AND TREASURE? >> I SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT 21:36:55 WHEN HE LED US IN TO THIS, AS DID THE DEMOCRATS. 21:36:58 AND I THINK WE OWE HIM NOT A LOT OF SCORN -- WE OWE HIM OR THANKS 21:37:03 THAT HE HAD THE COURAGE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS A 21:37:06 POTENTIAL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND RATHER THAN WAIT 21:37:10 UNTIL WE HAD ANOTHER ATTACK, HE WENT AND MADE SURE THAT IT 21:37:14 WASN'T GOING TO HAPPEN FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN. 21:37:18 NOW EVERYBODY CAN LOOK BACK AND SAY, WE DIDN'T FIND THE WEAPONS. 21:37:22 DOESN'T MEAN THAT THEY WEREN'T THERE, DIDN'T FIND EVERY EASTER 21:37:26 EGG, DOESN'T MEAN IT WASN'T PLANTED. 21:37:28 MY POINT WAS, WHEN THE PRESIDENT ENACTED, THIS COUNTRY WAS UNITE 21:37:31 IN BELIEVING THAT IT'S A NECESSARY THING TO DO. 21:37:33 IT'S EASY TO SECOND GUESS A PRESIDENT. 21:37:36 WHOEVER IS ELECTED WILL BE SECOND GUESSED TOO. 21:37:39 WE HAVE THE COURAGE AND RESOLVE ONCE WE COMMIT TO SOMETHING TO 21:37:42 MAKE SURE WE DON'T BACK AWAY JUST BECAUSE THE POLLS SAY WE 21:37:46 SHOULD. >> GOVERNOR ROMNEY, WAS THE WAR 21:37:48 IN IRAQ WORTH THE IDEA OF BLOOD AND TREASURE? 21:37:51 >> THE RIGHT DECISION TO GO TO IRAQ. 21:37:54 I SUPPORTED IT AT THE TIME, I SUPPORT IT NOW. 21:37:56 IT WAS NOT WELL MANAGED AFTER THE TAKEDOWN OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 21:37:59 AND HIS MILITARY. THAT WAS DONE BRILLIANTLY. 21:38:03 EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESS. THE YEARS TO FOLLOWED, WE WERE 21:38:07 UNDER MANAGED, UNDER PREPARED, UNDER PLANNED, UNDERSTAFFED AND 21:38:12 THE PHASE WE HAVE NOW. THE PLAN THAT GENERAL BUSH AND 21:38:15 GENERAL PETRAEUS PUT TOGETHER IS WORKING. 21:38:17 IT'S CHANGING LIVES THERE. AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT'S 21:38:20 MAKING SURE THAT AL QAEDA AND NO OTHER GROUP LIKE THEM IS 21:38:24 BECOMING A SUPERPOWER IF YOU WILL IN THE COMMUNITIES. 21:38:26 AND HAVING A SAFE HAVEN FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST 21:38:31 US. CRITICAL FOR US. 21:38:32 WHEN THEY THINK OF DEBATING THE DEMOCRATS, THEY MAY TALK ABOUT 21:38:35 WHAT HAPPEN IN THE BEGINNING. THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IS WHAT 21:38:38 DO WE DO NOW? THEIR RUN AND RETREAT REGARDLESS 21:38:41 OF THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE A REAL PROBLEM FOR THEM WHEN THEY 21:38:44 FACE A DEBATE WITH A REPUBLICAN ON THE STAGE. 21:38:46 >> THANKS, TIME IS UP. WE GO TO A BREAK. 21:38:49 TWO QUICK NOTES, WE ASKED MEMBERS OF THE AUDIENCE PRIOR TO 21:38:54 GOING ON THE AIR NOT TO APPLAUD AND NO OUTBURSTS OF ANY KIND. 21:38:58 WE NEED TO REPEAT THAT REQUEST. WE HAVE EMBEDDED IN TONIGHT'S 21:39:02 BROADCAST TWO SHORT COMMERCIAL BREAKS TO GET EVERYONE IN HERE A 21:39:05 BREAK. WE'LL TAKE THE FIRST OF THOSE 21:39:06 NOW. WHEN WE COME BACK IN THE NEXT 21:39:08 SEGMENT, THE CANDIDATES WILL ASK EACH OTHER THE QUESTIONS. COMMERCIAL 21:41:20 >>> WE ARE BACK IN BOCA RATON, 21:42:53 FLORIDA. WE JUST NOW HAVE A QUORUM BACK 21:42:55 ON STAGE. THE CANDIDATES ARE ASSEMBLED. 21:42:58 WE'RE GOING BEGIN THE SECOND SEGMENT OF TONIGHT'S DEBATE 21:43:01 WHERE THE CANDIDATES CAN ASK THE FELLOW CANDIDATE OF THEIR CHOICE 21:43:05 A QUESTION. THE ANSWER FALLS IN TO THE 21:43:10 90-SECOND CATEGORY IN THE EXCHANGE IS THAT THE REBUTTAL IS 21:43:17 REQUIRED, MODERATOR'S DISCRETION FOR 30 SECONDS. 21:43:19 START THIS ROUND WITH GOVERNOR ROMNEY. 21:43:22 >>> I THINK GOVERNOR HUCKABEE RAISE ADD GOOD QUESTION WHEN HE 21:43:25 SPOKE ABOUT CHINA AND THE IMPACT OF CHINA. 21:43:27 WHAT YOU'RE SEEING IN THE WORLD AS THE EMERGENCE OF ASIA OCCURS 21:43:31 THAT THE DEMAND FOR MORE OIL AROUND THE WORLD IS DRIVING 21:43:35 PRICES HIGH. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPLYING TO US 21:43:37 TODAY, TOYS, CHRISTMAS TREE ORNAMENTS, FOOD, THEY WANT TO MAKE 21:43:42 JUMBO JETS AND PATENTS FOR VARIOUS MEDICINES AND SOFTWARE. 21:43:46 THEY CAN BE A MUCH TOUGHER COMPETITION, COMPETITOR IS, THAN 21:43:50 WE HAVE SEEN FROM EUROPE IN A LONG TIME. 21:43:51 THE QUESTION IS HOW ARE WE GOING TO MAKE SURE AS WE COMPETE WITH 21:43:55 CHINA -- GOING TO ADDRESS THIS TO MAYOR GIULIANI, AS WE 21:44:00 COMPETE, HOW DO WE MAKE SURE THAT TRADE IS ON LEVELS OF 21:44:03 PLAYING FIELD. HOW DO WE MAKE SURE THAT CHINA 21:44:06 STABILIZES THE WORLD, BUT WE PROTECT AMERICAN INDUSTRIES AND 21:44:11 JOBS AND DO NOT CAUSE A DEPARTURE OF JOBS IN THIS 21:44:14 COUNTRY. WHAT KIND OF RELATIONS DO WE 21:44:15 NEED TO HAVE WITH CHINA ECONOMICALLY? 21:44:18 WHAT KINDS OF THINGS DO YOU THINK YOU CAN DO TO MAKE SURE 21:44:21 THE TRADE IS DONE ON A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD AND WHERE AMERICAN 21:44:25 INDUSTRIES ARE STRENGTHENED AND NOT PUT IN JEOPARDY BY VIRTUE OF 21:44:29 THE GROWTH IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. 21:44:31 >> I TOLD YOU BEFORE I WOULDN'T ANSWER YOUR QUESTION -- I WILL. 21:44:36 WE WERE KIDDING AROUND -- WHO WAS GOING TO ASK WHOM. 21:44:39 BUT THE REALITY IS THAT CHINA IS A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICA 21:44:43 AND A GREAT CAUTION FOR AMERICA -- BOTH. 21:44:45 IT'S A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO ENGAGE, ENGAGE IN TRADE, MORE 21:44:50 AMERICA ENGAGES IN TRADE, THE MORE WE GET TO KNOW A COUNTRY, 21:44:53 THE LESS LIKELY WE ARE TO HAVE MILITARY HOSTILITIES. 21:44:56 I THINK WE SHOULD BE WORKING WITH CHINA TO TRY TO PUSH DOWN 21:44:59 SOME OF THESE BARRIERS, PROTECTION FOR INTELLECTUAL 21:45:03 PROPERTY, RULE OF LAW, THE ABILITY TO SUE IN CHINA SO YOU 21:45:06 CAN BE PROTECTED IF YOU'RE DOING BUSINESS THERE. 21:45:08 WE'VE GOT TO BE VERY CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT WE IMPORT FROM CHINA 21:45:13 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SAFETY AND SECURITY, NOT AS MUCH FROM 21:45:17 THE POINT OF VIEW AT THE ECONOMY. 21:45:20 THE RISE OF CHINA IS A WONDERFUL OPPORTUNITY. 21:45:22 30 MILLION PEOPLE COMING OUT OF POVERTY IN CHINA EVERY YEAR. 21:45:26 TO ME, THAT'S 20 OR 30 MILLION MORE PEOPLE THAT WE CAN BE 21:45:30 SELLING THINGS TO. WE SHOULD BE THINKING LIKE 21:45:34 AGGRESSIVE ENTREPRENEURIAL AMERICANS. 21:45:36 WHAT CAN WE SELL? ENERGY INDEPENDENT. 21:45:39 THEY NEED IT MORE THAN BEDO. WE CAN SELL THEM HEALTH 21:45:42 PROCESSES, INFORMATION PROCESSES. 21:45:44 THEY'RE IN A LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT HERE THAT HERE WE'RE 21:45:46 IN A HIGHER LEVEL DEVELOPMENT. THEY NEED TO BUY WHAT WE HAVE. 21:45:51 AND I BELIEVE THERE'S A MILITARY ASPECT TO IT AS WELL. 21:45:54 WE SHOULD INCREASE THE SIDE OF OUR MILITARY SUBSTANTIALLY TO 21:45:58 OVERCOME THE DAMAGE THAT BILL CLINTON DID WITH THE PEACE 21:46:01 DIVIDEND, BECAUSE WHEN THE TWO OF YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT THE 21:46:04 MILITARY, WHAT I WANTED TO JUMP IN AND SAY WAS, A LOT OF THE 21:46:07 CAUSE OF THIS WAS BILL CLINTON'S PEACE DIVIDEND IN WHICH HE CUT 21:46:10 THE MILITARY 25% AND 30%. WE'VE NEVER REDONE OR MADE UP 21:46:15 FOR THAT DAMAGE. WE HAVE TO DO THAT. 21:46:18 >> TIME. >> MR. MAYOR? 21:46:20 A REMINDER TO OUR CANDIDATES -- NUMBER ONE, THESE ARE QUESTIONS 21:46:23 TO EACH OTHER, AND NUMBER TWO, PLEASE USE THE BLIPGING LIGHT AS 21:46:27 YOUR GUIDE TO WHEN TIME IS UP. SENATOR McCAIN, YOUR TURN TO ASK 21:46:32 A QUESTION OF ONE OF YOUR COLLEAGUES? 21:46:34 >> GOVERNOR HUCKABEE -- YOU HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE 21:46:38 STRONGEST AND MOST PERSUASIVE OPPONENTS OF THE SO-CALLED FAIR 21:46:40 TAX. AND IT IS, I MUST TELL YOU, 21:46:47 EVERY TOWN HALL MEETING I HAVE, THERE'S SOMEBODY THAT SHOWS UP 21:46:50 WITH A T-SHIRT ON AND THERE'S ENORMOUS GROUND SWELL FOR IT. 21:46:56 HOW DO YOU ANSWER THE CRITICISM THAT THE FLAT OUT JUST SALES TAX 21:47:04 WOULDN'T CAUSE LOWER AMERICANS MORE OF THE PAIN OF THE BURDEN 21:47:08 OF RUNNING ON OUR GOVERNMENT AND PAYING FOR ITS OPERATIONS. 21:47:15 HOW DO YOU RESPOND FOR THAT PARTICULAR CRITICISM OF IT. 21:47:20 AND ALSO HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THE RESIDENTS THAT THIS PROPOSAL 21:47:24 HAS GOTTEN THROUGH THE NATION? >>> THE PEOPLE LOVE TO SEE THE 21:47:38 IRS ABOLISHED. AS DR. PHIL WOULD SAY -- WE'VE 21:47:41 HAD IT SINCE 1913, HOW IS THAT WORKING OUT? 21:47:45 WE'RE PENALIZED FOR THE PRODUCTIVITY. 21:47:47 THE HARDER YOU WORK, THE MORE YOU EARN, THE MORE THE IRS AND 21:47:50 GOVERNMENT WANTS YOU. THE FAIR TAX SAYS WE WANT YOU TO 21:47:54 EARN, SAVE, BUY THINGS AND SELL THINGS AND MAKE A PROFIT. 21:47:57 THE REPUBLICANS SHOULD EMBRACE THE FAIR TAX AS DID DEMOCRATS, 21:48:01 STOPS THIS NONSENSE AND GOES TO THE IDEA THAT WE SHOULD 21:48:04 ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO WORK AND TO GET SOMETHING FOR IT. 21:48:07 ON THE BOTTOM END OF THE SPECTRUM -- HERE'S THE THING -- 21:48:10 PEOPLE HAVE NEVER READ THE ENTIRE FAIR TAX. 21:48:12 BECAUSE WHEN I FIRST HEARD ABOUT THE FAIR TAX, THE CONSUMPTION 21:48:16 TAX, QUITE FRANKLY, IT SOUNDS LIKE IT'S REGRESSIVE AND 21:48:20 OPPRESSIVE TO THE POOR. THEY COME OUT BEST OF ALL 21:48:24 BECAUSE OF THE REBATE IN WHICH EVERY AMERICAN EACH MONTH IS 21:48:29 GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF FAIR TAX BACK TO THE LEVEL OF POVERTY. 21:48:34 EVERYONE GETS IT. IT UNTAXES THE POOR, UNTAXES THE 21:48:38 ELDERLY. MAKES SURE WE DON'T END UP 21:48:40 PAYING TAXES ON GROCERIES, MEDICINE, AND THE BASIC 21:48:44 NECESSITIES OF LIFE. FOR EACH THIRD OF THE ECONOMY, 21:48:46 THERE'S A BENEFIT, 14% OF BENEFIT AT THE BOTTOM, THE 21:48:50 MIDDLE, 7%. THE TOP END OF THE ECONOMY END 21:48:52 UP WITH A 5% BENEFIT. EVERYBODY GETS IN THE ECONOMY. 21:48:56 NO MORE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY -- DRUG DEALERS, PROSTITUTES, PIMPS, 21:49:01 GAMBLERS -- NON REPUBLICANS -- ALL OF THOSE PEOPLE OUT THERE 21:49:06 WILL BE PAYING TAXES NOBODY IS WORKING UNDER THE TABLE. 21:49:08 SO NOW YOU HAVE A BROAD BASE IN WHICH YOU'RE RECEIVING THE 21:49:11 MONEY, AND IT'S A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TRANSPARENT TAX SYSTEM 21:49:14 AS OPPOSED TO THE ONE NOW WHERE ABOUT 22% OF OUR PRODUCTS WE 21:49:19 BUY -- THE TAX IS HIDDEN INTO IT, CORPORATIONS DON'T PAY TAX. 21:49:24 THEY BUILD THAT COST IN, PASS IT ON TO THE CONSUMER. 21:49:27 WHAT'S KILLING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IS THAT EMBEDDED TAX AND 21:49:30 THE INVISIBILITY OF THE TAX. THAT'S WHY I SUPPORT THE FAIR 21:49:33 TAX. I WANT TO PUT THE IRS OUT OF 21:49:35 BUSINESS. >> THERE'S A REAL ISSUE OF 21:49:38 E ENFORCEABILITY. 21:49:40 THE CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE SAY 93% OF AMERICANS IN EFFECT PAY 21:49:43 LESS THAN 15% TAX RIGHT NOW. YOU'RE IMPOSING A 30% SALES TAX. 21:49:48 HOW DOES THAT HELP THE 93% OF AMERICANS WHO ARE PAYING 15% OR 21:49:52 LESS RIGHT NOW? >> WELL, FIRST OF ALL, TIM, 21:49:55 23% -- IF WE WERE TO BREAK EVEN. AND THEY'RE NOT SAYING 15%. 21:50:00 THAT'S IN THE VISIBLE TAX IN TERM TOFLS TAKEOUT FROM THEIR 21:50:04 CHECKS. WHEN YOU INCLUDE THE BUILT-IN 21:50:06 TAX, THE EMBEDDED TAX IN THE PRODUCTS WE BUY, THAT 21:50:09 CORPORATIONS BUILD IN, THE AVERAGE AMERICAN IS PAYING 33% 21:50:12 IN HIS OR HER TAXES. THE AVERAGE AMERICAN IS WORKING 21:50:14 THROUGH THE MONTH OF MAY JUST TO PAY OFF THE GOVERNMENT. 21:50:21 IT WOULD BE A DRA MEATIC DIFFERENCE IF THEY GOT TO CHOOSE 21:50:25 THE TAXES WHICH THEY DO UNDER THE TAX. 21:50:27 THERE'S GOT TO BE A BETTER SYSTEM. 21:50:29 THE ONE WE HAVE NOW IS BROKEN. IT'S CHASED JOBS. 21:50:33 WE HAVE $12 TRILLION OF WORKING CAPITAL MOVED OFFSHORE BECAUSE 21:50:36 OUR TAX SYSTEM HAS CHASED IT AWAY. 21:50:39 >> TIME FOR THE REBUTTAL IS UP. CONGRESSMAN PAUL, A QUESTION FOR 21:50:42 ONE OF YOUR COLLEAGUES ON STAGE. >> MY QUESTION IS FOR SENATOR 21:50:44 McCAIN. >> IT HAS TO DO WITH THE 21:51:00 FINANCIAL FAIR MARKETS. WHAT'S YOUR OPINION? 21:51:03 WOULD YOU GET RID OF THIS GROUP? AND IF YOU KEPT THE GROUP, WOULD 21:51:09 YOU MAKE SURE WE WOULD SEE SOME SUNLIGHT AND KNOW WHAT THEY WERE 21:51:13 DOING AND HOW THEY WERE BEING INVOLVED IN OUR MARKETS? 21:51:15 >> OBVIOUSLY, WE LIKE TO SEE MORE SUNSHINE. 21:51:19 BUT I, AS PRESIDENT AS EVERY OTHER PRESIDENT RELY ON 21:51:27 SECRETARY OF TREASURY, ON MY COUNSEL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, 21:51:30 THE HEAD OF THAT. I WOULD RELY ON THE CIRCLE THAT 21:51:33 I HAVE DEVELOPED OVER MANY YEARS OF PEOPLE LIKE JACK KEMP, PHIL 21:51:38 GRAMM, WARREN RUDDMAN, PETE PETERSON, AND THE CONCORD GROUP. 21:51:48 I HAVE A PROCESS OF LEADERSHIP THAT IS SORT OF AN INCLUSIVE ONE 21:51:54 THAT I HAVE DEVELOPED A CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES AND PEOPLE WHO 21:51:58 ARE SUPPORTERS AND FRIENDS OF MINE WHOM I WORKED WITH FOR 21:52:02 MANY, MANY YEARS. >> YOU GET RID OF THIS GROUP. 21:52:04 >> IN 1982, PHIL GRAMM AND WARREN RUDDMAN AND GRAHAM AND 21:52:09 ALL THOSE PEOPLE GOT THE FIRST REAL TAX CUTS DONE -- THE REAL 21:52:13 FIRST RESTRAINTS IN TAXES. I WAS THERE. 21:52:14 YOU WERE THERE. I RELY ON THOSE PEOPLE TO A MUCH 21:52:22 LARGER DEGREE THAN ANY FORMAL ORGANIZATION. 21:52:25 ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY IS ONE OF THE KEY AND 21:52:27 IMPORTANT POSTS THAT I WOULD HAVE. 21:52:28 >> SENATOR, THANK YOU. GOVERNOR HUCKABEE? 21:52:32 >>> I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A QUESTION THAT CAME UP DURING 21:52:36 YOUR INTERVIEW WITH TIM RUSSERT ON "MEET THE PRESS." 21:52:41 THE SECOND AMENDMENT. YOU INDICATED YOU SUPPORTED THE 21:52:44 SECOND AMENDMENT. ON THAT INTERVIEW, YOU INDICATED 21:52:47 YOU SUPPORTED A BAND ON SO-CALLED ASSAULT WEAPONS AND 21:52:52 SUPPORT BRADY. FOR MANY OF US WHO ARE STRONG 21:52:55 ADHERENCE TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT, IT'S NOT CONSISTENT 21:52:57 TO SAY YOU EAR FOR BRADY AND SO-CALLED ASSAULT GUN BAN, BUT 21:53:01 SUPPORT OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT BECAUSE WE SEE THAT'S A DENIAL 21:53:04 OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT. I WOULD APPRECIATE SOME 21:53:06 CLARIFICATION -- DO YOU SUPPORT BRADY? 21:53:08 DO YOU SUPPORT THE ASSAULT WEAPON BAND? 21:53:11 AND YOUR POSITION ON EXACTLY WHAT RESTRICTIONS GOVERNMENT 21:53:16 SHOULD PUT ON SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 21:53:18 >> I DO SUPPORT THE SECOND AMENDMENT. 21:53:20 AND I BELIEVE THIS IS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF CITIZENS AND 21:53:23 NOT A RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT. AND I HOPE THE SUPREME COURT 21:53:26 REACHES THAT SAME CONCLUSION. I ALSO LIKE THE PRESIDENT WOULD 21:53:30 HAVE SIGNED THE ASSAULT WEAPON BAN THAT CAME TO HIS DESK. 21:53:34 I SAID I WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THAT AND SIGNED A SIMILAR BILL 21:53:37 IN OUR STATE. A BILL WORKED OUT BETWEEN PRO 21:53:40 GUN LOBBY AND ANTI-LOBBY INDIVIDUALS. 21:53:44 BOTH OF THEM CAME TOGETHER AND FOUND A WAY TO FIND RELAXATION 21:53:49 IN LICENSING REQUIREMENTS AND FIND PEOPLE WHO HAVE TO HAVE 21:53:52 GUNS FOR THEIR OWN LEGAL PURPOSES. 21:53:54 WE SIGNED THAT IN MASSACHUSETTS AND I SAID I WOULD SUPPORT THAT AT A 21:53:59 FEDERAL LEVEL JUST AS THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD. 21:54:01 HE DID NOT PASS IT AS THE FEDERAL LEVEL. 21:54:03 I BELIEVE WE DO NOT NEED NEW LEGISLATION. 21:54:06 I DO NOT SUPPORT ANY LEGISLATION OF AN ASSAULT NATURE OR 21:54:10 INCLUDING THAT IN THE SEMIAUTOMATIC WEAPONS. 21:54:12 WE HAVE LAWS IN PLACE THAT IF THEY'RE IMPLEMENTED AND ENFORCED 21:54:16 WILL PROVIDE THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 21:54:18 I DO NOT SUPPORT ANY NEW LEGISLATION AND I DO SUPPORT THE 21:54:21 RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO BEAR ARMS, WHETHER FOR HUNTING 21:54:24 PURPOSES OR FOR PROTECTION PURPOSES OR ANY OTHER REASON. 21:54:29 THAT'S THE RIGHT THAT PEOPLE HAVE. 21:54:31 >> MAYOR GIULIANI, A QUESTION FOR ONE OF THE CANDIDATES? 21:54:34 >> A QUESTION FOR GOVERNOR ROMNEY. 21:54:36 GOVERNOR, PEOPLE IN FLORIDA, AS YOU KNOW, TRAVELING BACK AND 21:54:39 FORTH ACROSS THE STATE AS I HAVE ARE GETING REAL DIFFICULTY IN 21:54:47 GETTING PROPERTY INSURANCE. SOME CAN'T AFFORD IT, SOME CAN'T 21:54:50 GET IT AT ALL. ADDED TO THE OTHER BURDENS, NOW 21:54:54 IN OUR ECONOMY, THIS IS A DIFFICULT BURDEN. 21:54:56 SENATOR McCAIN SAID HE DOES NOT SUPPORT A NATIONAL CATASTROPHIC 21:55:00 FUND. I DO. 21:55:01 I BELIEVE IT'S NECESSARY. I BELIEVE IT CAN BE DONE IN A 21:55:04 WAY THAT'S RESPONSIBLE AND IN A WAY THAT ULTIMATELY WOULD COST 21:55:07 THE GOVERNMENT LESS MONEY. SENATOR McCAIN BELIEVES THAT 21:55:11 FEMA SHOULD ANSWER THIS. >> WHO'S ANSWERING THIS 21:55:15 QUESTION? >> YOU CAN ANSWER IT TOO, JOHN. 21:55:17 >> THANK YOU. >> NOW, YOU SAID THAT YOU WOULD 21:55:30 GET FAIR ADVICE. DO YOU COME TO A POSITION ON 21:55:33 THIS? DO YOU HAVE A POSITION ON THE 21:55:35 NATIONAL CATASTROPHIC FUND. YES, NO, AND THE QUALIFICATIONS? 21:55:40 >> THE ANSWER IS YES. I DO SUPPORT NATIONAL 21:55:43 CATASTROPHIC EFFORT TO MAKE SURE PEOPLE GET HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE 21:55:47 TO PROTECT AGAINST FLOOD OR HOUR CAIN OR OTHER NATURAL DISASTER 21:55:52 OR MAN MADE DISASTER. WE HAD THE PROBLEM NOT JUST IN 21:55:55 FLORIDA BUT THE PROBLEM IN MASSACHUSETTS, THE POOR FOLKS 21:55:57 THAT ARE SNOW BIRDS THAT GO FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO FLORIDA IN BOTH 21:56:02 STATES BECAUSE PEOPLE WHO LIVE ACROSS THE COASTLINE ACROSS THE 21:56:05 ATLANTIC HAVE THE SAME PROBLEM -- GETTING HOMEOWNERS 21:56:08 INSURANCE IS OFTENTIMES ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. 21:56:10 YOU HAVE TO DO, AS YOU INDICATED, WE HAVE TO WORK 21:56:13 TOGETHER TO GET A PROGRAM THAT GETS PEOPLE IN HIGH-RISK AREAS 21:56:18 INSURED. NOT IN FAVOR OF SAYING THAT THE 21:56:20 PEOPLE IN IOWA SHOULD HAVE TO SUBSIDIZE THE PEOPLE OF 21:56:23 MASSACHUSETTS OR FLORIDA. THAT DOESN'T MAKE A LOT OF 21:56:25 SENSE. BUT TO HAVE THE STATES IN 21:56:27 HIGH-RISK AREAS COME TOGETHER AND SAY, HOW DO WE ORGANIZE AN 21:56:30 EFFORT ON A NATIONAL BASIS THAT DEALS WITH THE DIFFERENCES 21:56:35 BETWEEN DIFFERENT STATES AND THE DIFFERENT RISKS THEY FACE AND 21:56:39 THE BACKSTOP BEHIND THE PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRY. 21:56:41 THAT MAKES A LOT OF SENSE. AND THAT'S SOMETHING WHICH I -- 21:56:44 FRANKLY, I TOOK ON TOUGH PROBLEMS LIKE THAT IN HEALTH 21:56:47 INSURANCE. PEOPLE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE 21:56:49 TO GET EVERYBODY HEALTH INSURANCE. 21:56:50 AND I GOT A GROUP OF PEOPLE TOGETHER FROM THE INDUSTRY, FROM 21:56:53 GOVERNMENT, FROM ACADEMICS, WE CAME TOGETHER, WE FOUND A WAY TO 21:56:57 GET EVERYBODY INSURED WITH PRIVATE FREE MARKET HEALTH 21:57:00 INSURANCE. AND I WANT TO DO THE SAME THING 21:57:02 WITH REGARDS -- >> IN THAT CASE, YOU USE 21:57:05 MANDATES AND NOT IN FAVOR OF MANDATE IFS FOR COUNTRY? 21:57:08 >> THAT'S A WHOLE DIFFERENT QUESTION. 21:57:10 WE'LL COME BACK AND TALK ABOUT OUR HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN. 21:57:13 I DO SUPPORT AN EFFORT TO GET EVERYBODY SOME FORM OF 21:57:17 CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE, A PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 21:57:21 BETWEEN PRIVATE INSURANCE INDUSTRIES AND THE GOVERNMENT. 21:57:24 I'LL BRING TOGETHER THE GOVERNORS OF ALL 50 STATES AS 21:57:26 WELL AS LEADERSHIP IN WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS INDUSTRY 21:57:29 REPRESENTATIVES THAT SAY, WHAT'S THE RIGHT WAY TO FASHION THIS 21:57:32 THAT MAKES IT MOST SENSE FOR THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA. 21:57:34 >> TIME IS UP. SENATOR McCAIN. 21:57:36 I DID HEAR YOUR NAME IN THAT QUESTION. 21:57:37 YOU WANT TO TAKE 30 SECONDS FOR REBUTTAL, PLEASE? 21:57:40 >> FRANKLY, IT TAKES MORE THAN 30 SECONDS. 21:57:43 BUT, LOOK THIS, IS A TERRIBLE PROBLEM. 21:57:45 NOT ONLY HERE IN FLORIDA, BUT ACROSS THE STATES THAT ARE 21:57:48 SUBJECT TO HURRICANES AND AS MORE AND MORE VIOLENT WEATHER 21:57:52 PATTERNS TAKE PLACE, PEOPLE'S HOMES ARE MORE AND MORE 21:57:56 J JEOPARDIZED. 21:57:57 WE'VE GOT TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. WE'VE GOT TO ADDRESS IT 21:58:00 REGIONALLY. WE'VE GOT TO ADDRESS WIT THE 21:58:03 GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE WORKING WITH THE FEDERAL 21:58:06 GOVERNMENT TO HAVE INSURANCE INL CREASING THE RISK POOL. 21:58:09 WE CAN INFORM INSURANCE. WE CAN -- THERE'S SO MANY THINGS 21:58:13 WE CAN DO. WE HAVE TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER AND 21:58:16 FIGURE IT OUT. THE BILL THAT PASSED THROUGH THE 21:58:18 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WAS $200 BILLION, NO INSURANCE 21:58:23 REFORM WHATSOEVER ASSOCIATED WITH IT. 21:58:24 NO WAY TO PAY FOR IT. THAT BURDEN IS SHARED BY 21:58:27 EVERYBODY. WE -- WE CAN SIT DOWN TOGETHER. 21:58:30 I CALL THE REGULATORS, THE GOVERNORS, AND THE LEGISLATORS 21:58:34 TOGETHER AND WE WILL WORK TOGETHER AND WE WILL PROVIDE 21:58:37 EVERY AMERICAN THAT'S IN JEOPARDY, PARTICULARLY OF 21:58:40 HURRICANES AS THE WAY TO HAVE THE INSURANCE THAT THEY NEED AND 21:58:43 DESERVE. I'M CONFIDENCE WE CAN DO IT 21:58:45 TOGETHER WORKING WITH THE INSURANCE COMPANIES, NOT SETTING 21:58:49 UP ANOTHER HUGE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY. 21:58:52 $200 BILLION WHICH STILL NOBODY HAS SAID HOW YOU'RE GOING TO PAY 21:58:55 FOR IT. >> I HAVE A FOLLOWUP ON A 21:58:59 POTENTIAL CATASTROPHE. FLORIDA HAS 1200 MILES OF 21:59:04 BEAUTIFUL COAST THAT CAN BE THREATENED BY CLIMATE CHANGE, 21:59:08 GLOBAL WARMING IN A MAJOR WAY AS THE POP... 22:00:00 SAUDI ARABIA. I PREFER INCENTIVES FOR THE NEW 22:00:04 INDUSTRIES. SAME THING IS TRUE OF BIO FUELS. 22:00:06 WE SHOULD EXPAND BIO FUELS THE WAY BRAZIL HAS DONE, WIND, 22:00:12 SOLAR, WE SHOULD EXPAND LIQUID NATURAL GAS. 22:00:15 PUTTING THE MAN ON THE MOON THE WAY WE DID BACK IN THE '50s AND 22:00:20 60s, IT SHOULD BE A MAJOR NATIONAL PROJECT TO BE ENERGY 22:00:24 INDEPENDENT. IT'S THE BEST WAY, THE VERY BEST 22:00:27 WAY TO PROTECT AGAINST GLOBAL WARMING. 22:00:29 THINK ABOUT THIS. IF WE DID EVERYTHING WE COULD, 22:00:32 WE PUT ALL THOSE CAPS ON, ALL THESE NEGATIVE INCENTIVES ON, WE 22:00:36 COULD CRUSH AMERICAN INDUSTRY AND CHINA AND INDIA WOULD BE 22:00:40 SENDING OUT MORE GREENHOUSE GASES THAN WE COULD EVER MATCH. 22:00:43 YOU'VE GOT TO SOLVE IT AS A WORLD PROBLEM. 22:00:45 YOU CAN'T SOLVE IT JUST IN THE UNITED STATES. 22:00:47 IT NEEDS NEW INDUSTRIES, NEW IDEAS. 22:00:49 THEY'RE THERE, NEED TO BE SUPPORTED. 22:00:51 YOU HAVE TO DO THIS IN POSITIVE WAY, NOT A NEGATIVE WAYNE. 22:00:54 >> SENATOR McCAIN YOU ARE IN FAVOR OF MANDATORY CAPS. 22:00:57 >> NO. I'M IN FAVOR OF CAP AND TRADE. 22:01:00 JOE LIEBERMAN AND I, ONE OF MY FAVORITE DEMOCRATS AND I HAVE 22:01:04 PROPOSED -- WE DID THE SAME THING WITH ACID RAIN. 22:01:07 THEY'RE DOING IT IN EUROPE NOW, ALTHOUGH NOT VERY WELL. 22:01:11 WHAT WE'RE SAYING IS LOOK, IF YOU CAN REDUCE YOUR GREENHOUSE 22:01:15 GAS EMISSIONS, YOU'LL EARN A CREDIT. 22:01:17 IF SOMEBODY ELSE IS GOING TO INCREASE THEIR'S, YOU CAN SELL 22:01:20 IT TO THEM. MEANWHILE WE HAVE A GRADUAL 22:01:23 REDUCTION IN THE GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS. 22:01:26 WE NEED AN AGREEMENT THAT INCLUDES INDIA AN CHINA. 22:01:28 WE CANNOT BE DEPENDENT ON $400 BILLION A YEAR PAYING FOR 22:01:35 FOREIGN OIL. CLIMATE CHANGE IN MY VIEW IS 22:01:37 REAL, CAN AFFECT STATES LIKE FLORIDA DRAMATICALLY BECAUSE I 22:01:40 THINK IT HAS TO DO WITH VIOLENT WEATHER CHANGES AS WELL. 22:01:43 BUT I AM CONFIDENT, I AM CONFIDENT AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 22:01:48 AND THE EMBRACE OF GREEN TECHNOLOGIES, MANY OF THE THINGS 22:01:51 THAT RUDY JUST TALKED ABOUT AND NUCLEAR POWER BEING ONE OF THEM, 22:01:55 WE CAN REDUCE THESE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS. 22:01:58 AND SUPPOSE THAT WE ARE WRONG AND THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS 22:02:01 CLIMATE CHANGE AND WE HAND OUR KIDS A CLEANER WORLD. 22:02:04 BUT SUPPOSE WE ARE RIGHT AND DO NOTHING. 22:02:06 I THINK THAT'S A CHALLENGE FOR AMERICA. 22:02:08 WE CAN MEET IT. >> TIME IS UP. 22:02:10 SENATOR, TIME IS UP, IN FACT, FOR THIS SEGMENT. 22:02:12 WE'LL TAKE ONE MORE BREAK WHEN WE COME BACK. 22:02:14 THAT WILL TAKE US THE REST OF THE WAY TONIGHT WITH THE 22:02:17 REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FROM PRESIDENT FROM BOCA RATON, 22:02:20 FLORIDA. COMMERCIALS 22:05:54 >>> WE ARE BACK IN BOCA RATON, 22:06:12 FLORIDA, TONIGHT. OUR FINAL SEGMENT WILL BE GOING 22:06:15 THE REST OF THE WAY IN OUR 90-MINUTE DEBATE TONIGHT AMONG 22:06:19 THE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES FOR THE NOMINATION. 22:06:21 TO RESUME THE QUESTIONING, WE'LL GO TO YOU MAY YOUR GIULIANI. 22:06:24 SAY WHAT YOU WILL ABOUT POLLS AND THEIR ACCURACY THESE DAYS. 22:06:28 OUR LATEST NBC NEWS-"WALL STREET JOURNAL" POLL SHOWS YOU HAVING 22:06:31 GONE IN THE SPACE OF TEN MONTHS FROM A POSITIVE RATING OF 58% TO 22:06:37 YOUR CURRENT LOW OF 29% TODAY. AND IF YOU CAST ASIDE THE POLLS, 22:06:41 YOUR LAST THREE FINISHES HAVE BEEN SIXTH, FOURTH AND SIXTH. 22:06:45 WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO YOUR CAMPAIGN? 22:06:48 >> THIS HAS BECOME A VERY COMPETITIVE RACE. 22:06:50 AND I ALWAYS EXPECTED IT WOULD BE A VERY COMPETITIVE RACE. 22:06:54 AND I BELIEVE I'M GOING TO HAVE THE SAME FATE THAT THE NEW YORK 22:06:58 GIANTS HAD LAST WEEK. AND WE'RE GOING TO COME FROM 22:07:00 BEHIND AND SURPRISE EVERYONE. WE HAVE THEM ALL LULLED INTO A 22:07:05 VERY FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY NOW. 22:07:11 [ LAUGHTER ] WHEN MITT ROMNEY ASKED ME A 22:07:12 QUESTION, NOTICE HE ASKED ME A VERY NICE QUESTION. 22:07:15 SO I THINK I LULLED HIM INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY. 22:07:21 AND WE ARE GOING TO COME FROM BEHIND. 22:07:26 WE'RE GOING TO WIN HERE IN FLORIDA. 22:07:27 AND IF YOU LOOK AT THE RACES COMING UP AFTER THAT, I THINK 22:07:29 WE'RE IN GOOD SHAPE. THESE ARE TERRIFIC CANDIDATES 22:07:31 RUNNING VERY GOOD RACES. I ALWAYS EXPECTED IT WOULD BE 22:07:35 VERY, VERY CLOSE. AS IT ALL GETS DOWN TO IT, 22:07:38 EVERYONE IS GOING TO HAVE A CHANCE. 22:07:39 AND I THINK WE'LL DO VERY WELL IN FLORIDA AND VERY WELL ON 22:07:42 FEBRUARY 5th. I BELIEVE I'LL GET THE 22:07:45 NOMINATION. >> SENATOR McCAIN, NEXT 22:07:46 QUESTION, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH OUR FRIEND STEVE SKULLY, YOUR 22:07:52 MOTHER WHO HAS COME UP IN THE CAMPAIGN AT THE AGE OF 95, YOUR 22:07:57 MOTHER ROBERTA SAID THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IS GOING TO 22:08:00 HOLD ITS NOSE AND PICK YOU, HER SON, AS THE NOMINEE. 22:08:06 IN ALL SERIOUSNESS, AND MOMS GET A SPECIAL EXEMPTION, IT'S A 22:08:13 NOTABLE QUOTE BECAUSE SHE EXPRESSES A VIEW YOU HEAR AROUND 22:08:16 THE GOP BECAUSE YOU HAVEN'T VOTED WITH YOUR PARTY ON SOME 22:08:19 CORE STANCES LIKE TAXES AND JUDGES AND IMMIGRATION AND 22:08:22 CAMPAIGN REFORM. HOW DO YOU EXPECT TO UNITE A 22:08:25 PARTY BEHIND YOU? >> IN ALL DUE RESPECT, I LOVE 22:08:29 THE WAY YOU THROW ALL THOSE TOGETHER. 22:08:30 I'M SO PROUD OF MY RECORD ON JUDGES, THAT THOSE OF US WHO GOT 22:08:34 TOGETHER AND GOT JUSTICE ALITO AND SO MANY JUDGES TOGETHER, AND 22:08:39 I WON'T GO LIST BY LIST THERE, POINT BY POINT. 22:08:43 BUT LOOK, I WON THE MAJORITY OF REPUBLICAN VOTE IN BOTH NEW 22:08:49 HAMPSHIRE AND SOUTH CAROLINA. MOST CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS' 22:08:53 MAJOR CONCERN THE THREAT OF RADICAL ISLAMIC EXTREMISM. 22:08:57 I'M MAKING MY CASE THAT I CAN MAKE AMERICA SAFE AND SAFER, I 22:09:02 CAN RESTORE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE AND I CAN MAKE THE NEEDED 22:09:05 CHANGES TO HAVE THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR ECONOMY WHICH ARE STILL 22:09:10 STRONG BRING US THROUGH THESE DIFFICULT TIMES. 22:09:12 A CONSERVATIVE REPUBLICANS ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT CLIMATE 22:09:15 CHANGE, THAT WE JUST MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THEIR BELIEF AND 22:09:18 THEIR STEWARDSHIP OF THIS PLANET AND OUR STEWARDSHIP. 22:09:21 THERE'S MANY PEOPLE WHO ARE CONCERNED AND HAVE A PRIORITY 22:09:24 THAT THE INDEPENDENTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THEY KNOW THAT 22:09:26 I KNOW HOW TO KEEP ISRAEL INDEPENDENT AS WELL. 22:09:30 SO I'M PROUD OF THE BROAD BASE OF SUPPORT. 22:09:34 I WILL CONTINUE TO WORK IN EVERY WAY TO SHOW PEOPLE THAT I HAVE A 22:09:38 VERY, VERY CONSERVATIVE RECORD. I'M PROUD TO BE A CONSERVATIVE. 22:09:43 BUT THERE ARE TIMES LIKE WHEN RUMSFELD'S STRATEGY WAS GOING 22:09:48 WRONG, I WAS CRITICIZED BY REPUBLICANS. 22:09:50 WHEN I OPPOSED THE BRIDGE TO NOWHERE, THAT WAS A REPUBLICAN 22:09:54 POLICY. WHEN I WENT OFF JACK ABOUT BRAM 22:09:58 OFF, THERE WERE PEOPLE WHO WERE REPUBLICANS THAT SUFFERED FROM 22:10:00 THAT. WHEN I SAVED THE STACKS PAIRS $6 22:10:05 MILLION IN A BOGUS TANKER DEAL, THAT WAS A REPUBLICAN DEAL 22:10:08 THERE. THERE ARE TIMES -- AND THE 22:10:10 REASON I HAVE SUCH STRONG SUPPORT AMONGST INDEPENDENTS, IS 22:10:13 BECAUSE THEY KNOW I'LL PUT MY COUNTRY ABOVE MY PARTY EVERY 22:10:16 SINGLE TIME. I'M PROUD TO BE A CONSERVATIVE. 22:10:18 >> SENATOR, THANK YOU. TIM. 22:10:22 >> GOVERNOR ROMNEY, IT HAS BECOME APPARENT OVER THE LAST 22:10:24 FEW WEEKS, IF HILLARY CLINTON IS THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE, SHE'LL 22:10:27 BE RUNNING AS A TEAM WITH HER HUSBAND. 22:10:30 SPECIFICALLY HOW WOULD YOU RUN AGAINST HILLARY AND BILL CLINTON 22:10:35 IN NOVEMBER? >> I FRANKLY CAN'T WAIT BECAUSE 22:10:38 THE IDEA OF BILL CLINTON BACK IN THE WHITE HOUSE WITH NOTHING TO 22:10:41 DO IS SOMETHING I CAN'T IMAGINE. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAN'T 22:10:46 IMAGINE. >> WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? 22:10:47 >> I JUST THINK THAT WE WANT TO HAVE A PRESIDENT, NOT A TEAM OF 22:10:51 HUSBAND AND WIFE THINKING THEY'RE GOING TO RUN THE 22:10:53 COUNTRY. INSTEAD, YOU WANT TO ELECT A 22:10:55 PRESIDENT -- I'M NOT GOING TO RUN ON THE BASIS OF BILL 22:10:59 CLINTON, IF HILLARY CLINTON IS THE NOMINEE, IT'S GOING TO BE 22:11:01 HILLARY CLINTON. IT'S GOING TO BE HER POSITION 22:11:03 AND HER POSTURES ON A WHOLE SERIES OF ISSUES. 22:11:07 FRANKLY, SHE IS SO OUT OF STEP WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON 22:11:09 EVERYTHING FROM TAXES. SHE WANTS TO RAISE TAXES. 22:11:12 SHE HAS A PLAN FOR HEALTHCARE. HER HEALTHCARE PLAN QUITE SIMPLY 22:11:14 IS ONE WHICH SAYS, LOOK, WE'RE GOING TO GIVE HEALTH INSURANCE 22:11:17 TO EVERYBODY BY THE GOVERNMENT. IT'S GOING TO COST $110 BILLION 22:11:22 MORE. EVERY SINGLE YEAR, TRILLION PLUS 22:11:25 DOLLARS OVER TEN YEARS. HER APPROACH TO THE WAR IN IRAQ, 22:11:29 JUST GET OUT AS FAST AS YOU CAN. DON'T EVEN THINK ABOUT THE 22:11:33 SACRIFICE THAT'S BEEN MADE OR THE NEED TO KEEP AL QAEDA FROM 22:11:36 ESTABLISHING SAFE HAVENS. SHE'S EXACTLY WHAT'S WRONG IN 22:11:39 WASHINGTON. I SAID BEFORE WASHINGTON IS 22:11:41 BROKEN. SHE IS WASHINGTON TO THE CORE. 22:11:42 SHE'S BEEN THERE TOO LONG. BILL CLINTON HAS BEEN THERE TOO 22:11:46 LONG. THE LAST THING AMERICA NEEDS IS 22:11:48 SENDING THE CLINTONS BACK TO WASHINGTON. 22:11:50 SENDING THE SAME PEOPLE BACK TO WASHINGTON EXPECTING A DIFFERENT 22:11:52 RESULT IS NOT GOING TO GET AMERICA ON TRACK. 22:11:55 I'M GOING TO MAKE SURE WE STRENGTHEN THIS COUNTRY AND DO 22:11:57 IT THE OLD-FASHIONED REPUBLICAN WAY, THE RONALD REAGAN WAY OF 22:12:04 PULLING TOGETHER ECONOMIC CONSERVATIVES, SOCIAL 22:12:07 CONSERVATIVES AND FOREIGN POLICY NATIONAL DEFENSE CONSERVATIVES. 22:12:09 I SPEAK TO THOSE THREE GROUPS. I'LL PULL THEM TOGETHER. 22:12:12 THAT'S HOW WE'LL WIN THE ELECTION AND KEEP THE COUNTRY 22:12:15 STRONG AND VIBRANT. >> ANOTHER QUICK QUESTION. 22:12:17 PEOPLE OBSERVING THIS RACE IN FLORIDA HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT 22:12:20 AMAZED BY THE NUMBER OF TELEVISION ADS YOU'VE BEEN 22:12:24 RUNNING. CAN YOU TELL THE VOTERS OF 22:12:25 FLORIDA AND REPUBLICANS ACROSS THE COUNTRY HOW MUCH OF YOUR OWN 22:12:28 MONEY HAVE YOU SPENT ON THIS RACE SO FAR? 22:12:32 >> IN FLORIDA? WE'LL REPORT THAT ON THE 31st OF 22:12:35 JANUARY AS REQUIRED BY LAW AND PROBABLY NOT A MINUTE EARLIER. 22:12:38 YOU'LL JUST HAVE TO WAIT, TIM. >> WHY NOT TELL THE VOTERS OF 22:12:41 FLORIDA AND ACROSS THE COUNTRY HOW MUCH OF YOU OWN WEALTH 22:12:45 YOU'RE SPENDING SO THEY CAN MAKE A JUDGMENT AND FACTOR THAT INTO 22:12:48 THEIR OWN DECISION? >> I'M NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE 22:12:51 VOTERS. I'M MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THE 22:12:52 OTHER GUYS ON THIS STAGE. WE HAVE SOME EXIT 22:12:55 INFORMATION. WE MAKE SURE WE USE FOR OUR OWN 22:12:57 BENEFIT. I CAN TELL YOU THIS, ... MORE 22:13:01 MONEY THAN ANY OTHER REPUBLICAN MONEY IN THIS RACE, RAISED MORE. 22:13:04 FRIENDS OF MINE HAVE COME TOGETHER, PEOPLE I KNEW IN HIGH 22:13:08 SCHOOL AND RAISED MONEY. I'VE MADE A VERY SUBSTANTIAL 22:13:13 CONTRIBUTION. NOT AS MUCH AS THE GOVERNOR OF 22:13:15 NEW JERSEY, NOT AS MUCH AS STEVE FORBES DID. 22:13:20 CERTAINLY NOT AS MAYOR BLOOMBERG IN HIS RACE. 22:13:22 I CAN'T IMAGINE HAVING GONE TO MY FRIENDS AND ASKED THEM TO DO 22:13:25 WHAT THEY'VE DONE, GOING OUT AND RAISING MONEY IN MY BEHALF 22:13:29 WITHOUT SAYING I'M GOING TO PUT SOME OF MY CONTRIBUTIONS BEHIND 22:13:32 THIS EFFORT AS WELL. FRANKLY, I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT. 22:13:35 ONE THING IS REAL CLEAR, GIVEN A CONTRIBUTION I MADE IN THIS 22:13:38 RACE, I KNOW I OWE NO ONE ANYTHING. 22:13:41 I DON'T HAVE SOME GROUP THERE THAT I HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION 22:13:43 TO THAT RAISED MONEY FOR ME. I BY FAR AND THE BIGGEST 22:13:47 CONTRIBUTOR TO MY OWN CAMPAIGN. PEOPLE CAN COUNT ON THE FACT 22:13:50 THAT THERE'S NOBODY THAT CAN CALL ME AND SAY, YOU OWE ME. 22:13:54 THEY DON'T. I'M IN THIS RACE BECAUSE I WANT 22:13:56 TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE FOR AMERICA. 22:13:58 >> ANY CRITICISM THAT YOU'RE TRYING TO BUY THE STATE OF 22:14:01 FLORIDA? >> THIS IS ALWAYS RAISED ANY 22:14:03 TIME SOMEONE MAKES A CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN 22:14:04 CAMPAIGN. THE ANSWER IS I CARE DEEPLY 22:14:08 ABOUT THIS. I'VE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND ABLE TO 22:14:10 SAVE ENOUGH MONEY. I'M USING THAT MONEY IN A 22:14:13 CAMPAIGN FOR PRESIDENCY TO TRY TO CHANGE THIS COUNTRY. 22:14:15 I'M CONCERNED ABOUT THE AMERICA MY KIDS WILL INHERIT AND THEIR 22:14:19 KIDS WILL INHERIT AND THE KIDS OF THE ENTIRE NATION WILL 22:14:23 INHERIT. I WANT TO MAKE SURE WE HAVE A 22:14:25 STRONG AND VIBRANT NATION. I HAPPEN TO THINK AT A TIME LIKE 22:14:28 THIS WE NEED SOMEONE WHO'S LIFE HAS BEEN IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 22:14:31 WHO KNOWS HOW AMERICA WORKS, NOT JUST HOW WASHINGTON WORKS. 22:14:34 FOR THAT REASON I'M GIVING IT MY ALL. 22:14:36 >> GOVERNOR, WE'VE GOT AN NBC NEWS "WALL STREET JOURNAL" POLL 22:14:40 COMING OUT IN THE MORNING THAT SAYS AMONG OTHER THINGS, 44% OF 22:14:44 RESPONDENTS SAY A MORMON PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE A DIFFICULT 22:14:48 TIME UNITING THE COUNTRY. I KNOW YOU'VE ANSWERED SIMILAR 22:14:51 QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT YOU WERE ABLE TO DO WITH THE CATHOLIC 22:14:54 VOTE IN MASSACHUSETTS. BUT 44% NATIONALLY IS A LARGE
UNITED STATES SENATE 13:00 - 14:00
THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON RESUMES IN THE SENATE WITH PRESENTATION FROM THE HOUSE MANAGERS. FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL REGISTER: TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer. ______ PRAYER The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer: Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all through our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure of wisdom for the women and men of this Senate as they act as jurors in this impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's refuge and strength in triumphs and troubles, prosperity and problems. Now, dear Father, help us through this difficult time. As You guided the Senators to unity in matters of procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in a spirit of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial days to come. Bless the distinguished Chief Justice as he presides over this trial. We commit to You all that is said and done and ultimately decided. In Your holy Name. Amen. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation. The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as follows: Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the majority leader. Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Installing Equipment And Furniture in the Senate Chamber Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for installing equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and ask that it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for the impeachment trial. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is considered and agreed to. The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows: S. Res. 17 Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements raised by the impeachment trial of a President of the United States, the Sergeant at Arms shall install appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives and counsel to the President in their presentations to the Senate during all times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief Justice of the United States presiding. Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to in the first section is as follows: (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers from the House of Representatives and counsel for the President which shall be placed in the well of the Senate. (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel to the President. Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this resolution shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that provides the least practicable disruption to Senate proceedings. Privilege of the Floor Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent floor privileges be granted to the individuals listed on the document I send to the desk, during the closed impeachment proceedings of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. The document follows. Floor Privileges During Closed Session David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader. Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader. Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader. Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Andrea La Rue, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip. Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader. Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader. Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel. Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel. Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms. Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms. David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary. Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary. Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian. Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian. Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk. Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk. David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk. Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter. Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter. Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter. Joel Breitner, Official Reporter. Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter. Paul Nelson, Official Reporter. Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter. Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter. Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter. Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk. Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland. Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate document all documents filed by the parties together with other materials for the convenience of all Senators. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series of unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the consideration of the Senate. In addition to these matters, I would like to state for the information of all Senators that, pursuant to S. Res. 16, the evidentiary record on which the parties' presentations over the next days will be based was filed by the House managers yesterday and was distributed to all Senators through their offices. These materials are now being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate documents. The initial documents of the record have been printed and are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of the rest of the volumes of the record is completed over the next few days, they will also be placed on the Senators desks for their convenience. THE JOURNAL The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the proceedings of the trial are approved to date. The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the Senate Journal the following documents: The precept, issued on January 8, 1999; The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the receipt of summons, dated January 8, 1999. The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the Senate Journal the following documents, which were received by the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 16, 106th Congress, first session: The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against him on January 7, 1999, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999; The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999; The trial brief filed by the President, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; The replication of the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999. Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed in the Congressional Record. The documents follow: The United States of America, ss: The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms, United States Senate, greeting: You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with William Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if not, to leave at his usual place of abode, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least 2 days before the answer day mentioned in the said writ of summons. Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the day for answering mentioned in the said writ of summons. Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States. Attest: Gary Sisco, Secretary of the Senate. ____ The United States of America, ss: The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, greeting: Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, in the words following: ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors. Article I ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that: ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Article II ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding. ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme included one or more of the following acts: ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading. ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that proceeding. ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against him. ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to him. ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that judge. ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness. ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive to the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.'' And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeable to law and justice. You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore hereby summoned to file with the Secretary of the United States Senate, S-220 The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an answer to the said articles of impeachment no later than noon on the 11th day of January, 1999, and therefore to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises according to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hereof you are not to fail. Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States. Attest: Gary Sisco, Secretary of the Senate. ____ The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept, addressed to me, were duly served upon the said William Jefferson Clinton, by my delivering true and attested copies of the same to Charles Ruff, at the White House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at 5:27 p.m. Attest: James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms. Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms. Dated: January 8, 1999. Witnesseth: Gary Sisco, Secretary, United States Senate. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, in response to the summons of the Senate of the United States, answers the accusations made by the House of Representatives of the United States in the two Articles of Impeachment it has exhibited to the Senate as follows: Preamble The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or Misdemeanors The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper. But Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to the level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by the Founding Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standard applied throughout our Nation's history. Accordingly, the Articles of Impeachment should be dismissed. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice The President denies each and every material allegation of the two Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in this answer. Article I President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Factual Responses to Article I Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers the following factual responses to the allegations in Article I: (1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before the grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to admit his improper intimate relationship with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated by Article I, which accuses the President of lying about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky. The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to the grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters . . . did involve inappropriate intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand jury how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He also described to the grand jury how he had attempted to testify in the deposition in the Jones case months earlier without having to acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he ultimately admitted to the grand jury--that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The statement was offered at the beginning of his testimony to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the Office of Independent Counsel to obtain necessary information without unduly dwelling on the salacious details of the relationship. The President's statement was followed by almost four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his statement was in any respect perjurious, false and misleading, the President denies it. The President also denies that the statement was in any way an attempt to thwart the investigation. The President states, as he did during his grand jury testimony, that he engaged in improper physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The President was truthful when he testified before the grand jury that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood that term to be defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning of him in that deposition. The President further denies that his other statements to the grand jury about the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were perjurious, false, and misleading. (2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he testified about statements he had made in the Jones deposition There is a second myth about the President's testimony before the grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted his entire Jones deposition testimony in the grand jury. The President was not asked to and did not broadly restate or reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony. Instead, in the grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers he gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury about statements he made in the Jones deposition. The President stated to the grand jury that he did not attempt to be helpful to or assist the lawyers in the Jones deposition in their quest for information about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Accordingly, the full, underlying Jones deposition is not before the Senate. Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an article of impeachment based on the President's deposition in the Jones case. The House managers should not be allowed to prosecute before the Senate an article of impeachment which the full House has rejected. (3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about ``statements he allowed his attorney to make'' during the Jones deposition The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements his attorney made during the Jones deposition. The President was truthful when he explained to the grand jury his understanding of certain statements made by his lawyer, Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The President also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the attorneys and Judge Wright. (4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury concerning alleged efforts ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article II, the President denies that he attempted to influence the testimony of any witness or to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. Thus, the President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements before the grand jury when he testified about these matters. First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional Standard for Conviction and Removal For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional standard for conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President and should be dismissed. Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction and Removal Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. It alleges that the President provided the grand jury with ``perjurious, false, and misleading testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four subject areas. But it fails to identify any specific statement by the President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. The House has left the Senate and the President to guess at what it had in mind. One of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a person has a right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair warning, no one can prepare the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and the Constitution also mandate adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the vote they must make. Without a definite and specific identification of false statements, a trial becomes a moving target for the accused. In addition, the American people deserve to know upon what specific statements the President is being judged, given the gravity and effect of these proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national election. Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and should fail. Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One Article Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple instances of alleged perjurious, false and misleading statements in one article. The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule XXIII provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading testimony in ``one or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very real possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators were in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. Put simply, the structure of Article I presents the possibility that the President could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted if separate votes were taken on each allegedly perjurious statement. For example, it would be possible for the President to be convicted and removed from office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the four categories in Article I would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict and remove. By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article I should fail. Factual Responses to Article II Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers the following factual responses to the allegations in Article II: (1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading'' The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, the only witness cited in support of this allegation, denies this allegation as well. Her testimony and proffered statements are clear and unmistakable: ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .'' ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky asked him whether she might be able to avoid testifying the Jones case because she knew nothing about Ms. Jones or the case. The President further states that he told her he believed other witnesses had executed affidavits, and there was a chance they would not have to testify. The President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a limited but truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones case. (2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony of and when called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case. The testimony and proffered statements of Monica Lewinsky, the only witness cited in support of this allegation, are clear and unmistakable: [N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .'' ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have talked about what to do to conceal their relationship from others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a witness in any legal proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and statements support the President's recollection. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the possibility that she and the President ever had discussions about denying the relationship after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky also stated that ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to say about their relationship] is specific relation to the Jones matter,'' and that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of any deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.'' (3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence'' in the Jones case The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or supported any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in the Jones case, including any gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. The President states that he gave numerous gifts to Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997. The President states that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired as to what to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he had given her, to which the President responded that she would have to turn over whatever she had. The President states that he was unconcerned about having given her gifts and, in fact, that he gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1997. The President denies that he ever asked his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie told prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly thereafter that it was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her about retrieving gifts. (4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or sought to prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case. The President states that he discussed with Ms. Lewinsky her desire to obtain a job in New York months before she was listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations more than a month before she was identified as a possible witness. The President also states that he believes that Ms. Lewinsky raised with him, again before she was ever listed as a possible witness in the Jones case, the prospect of having Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms. Lewinsky corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was aware that Mr. Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain employment in New York. The President denies that any of these efforts had any connection whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's status as a possible or actual witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's denial when she testified, ``I was never promised a job for my silence.'' (5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements concerning Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to a Federal judge during the Jones deposition. The President denies that he was focusing his attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange between his attorney and Judge Wright. (6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony'' The President denies that he obstructed justice or endeavored in any way to influence any potential testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. The President states that he spoke with Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998. The President testified that, in that conversation, he was trying to find out what the facts were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether his own recollection was correct about certain aspects of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she felt no pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's statements and no pressure ``to agree with [her] boss.'' The President denies knowing or believing that Ms. Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time of this conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness lists proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton states that, after the Independent Counsel investigation became public, when Ms. Currie was scheduled to testify, he told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.'' (7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides The President denies that he obstructed justice when he misled his aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the days immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days following the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he misled his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation to conceal the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He sought to avoid disclosing his personal wrongdoing to protect his family and himself from hurt and public embarrassment. The President profoundly regrets his actions, and he has apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation. The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose or any intent to influence the ongoing grand jury proceedings. First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional Standard for Conviction and Removal For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article II does not meet the constitutional standard for convicting and removing a duly elected President from office and should be dismissed. Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction and Removal Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. Article II alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice'' in both the Jones case and the grand jury investigation. But it provides little or no concrete information about the specific acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise impeded the administration of justice. As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to Article I, one of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a person has the right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair warning, no one can mount the defense to which every person is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he is able to confront those charges and defend himself. Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and should fail. Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One Article For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense to Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges multiple instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which makes it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandates that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article II should fail. Respectfully submitted, David E. Kendall, Nicole K. Seligman, Emmet T. Flood, Max Stier, Glen Donath, Alicia Marti, Williams & Connolly, 725 12th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. Charles F. C. Ruff, Gregory B. Craig, Bruce R. Lindsey, Cheryl D. Mills, Lanny A. Breuer, Office of the White House Counsel, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20502. Submitted: January 11, 1999. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully submits to the United States Senate its Brief in connection with the Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. Summary The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury and false and misleading testimony and statements under oath before a federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in a course of conduct or scheme to delay and obstruct justice (Article II). The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a unified whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges. Perjury and False Statements Under Oath President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified falsely under oath when he appeared before a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Although what follows is not exhaustive, some of the more overt examples will serve to illustrate. At the very outset, the President read a prepared statement, which itself contained totally false assertions and other clearly misleading information. The President relied on his statement nineteen times in his testimony when questioned about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. President Clinton falsely testified that he was not paying attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at the Jones deposition. He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. Lewinsky did not fall within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that was given at his deposition. He falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully at his deposition concerning, among other subjects, whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky to turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed. He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie after his deposition. He falsely testified that he was truthful to his aides when he gave accounts of his relationship, which accounts were subsequently disseminated to the media and the grand jury. Obstruction of Justice The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both the Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he undertook a continuing and concerted plan to tamper with witnesses and prospective witnesses for the purpose of causing those witnesses to provide false and misleading testimony. Examples abound: The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story to conceal their relationship, and the President suggested that she employ that story if subpoenaed in the Jones case. The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide an affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he knew that the affidavit would need to be false to accomplish its purpose. The President knowingly and willfully allowed his attorney to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it for the purpose of obstructing justice in the Jones case. The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she provide a false account of how she received her job at the Pentagon. The President attempted to influence the expected testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with a false account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky. The President provided several of his top aides with elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that those aides would convey the false information to the public and to the grand jury. When he did this, he knew that those aides would likely be called to testify, while he was declining several invitations to testify. By this action, he obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury. The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the Jones case, and thereby delayed and obstructed justice. The President and his representatives orchestrated a campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect adversely her credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted to obstruct justice both in the Jones case and the grand jury. The President lied repeatedly under oath in his disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice in that case. The President's lies and misleading statements under oath at the grand jury were calculated to, and did obstruct, delay and prevent the due administration of justice by that body. The President employed the power of his office to procure a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false affidavit by causing his friend to exert extraordinary efforts for that purpose. The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern of obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending over a period of several months, and having the effect of seriously compromising the integrity of the entire judicial system. The effect of the President's misconduct has been devastating in several respects. (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law enforcement officer to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's rights as a citizen to due process and the equal protection of the laws, though he had sworn to protect those rights. (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading statements and deceit, he has seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of the Office of President and thereby the honor and integrity of the United States. (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering has affected the truth seeking process which is the foundation of our legal system. (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he has attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government. The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred state offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and removal from office of President William Jefferson Clinton. The Articles charge that the President has committed perjury before a federal grand jury and that he obstructed justice in a federal civil rights action. The Senate's own precedents establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants conviction and removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of justice under mines the judicial system in the same fashion that perjury does, and it also warrants conviction and removal. Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments for perjury set the standard here. Finally, the Senate's own precedents further establish that the President's crimes need not arise directly out of his official duties. Two of the three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for perjury that had nothing to do with their official duties. Introduction This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate generally of the evidence that the Managers intend to product, if permitted, and of the applicable legal principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively all of the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every witness and document that the Managers would produce in the course of the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline for the use of the Senate in reviewing and assessing the evidence as it is set forth at trial--it is not, and is not intended to be a substitute for a trial at which all of the relevant facts will be developed. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998) The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with high crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One alleges that President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice'' in that he willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a federal civil rights action brought against him.'' Both Articles are now before the Senate of the United States for trial as provided by the Constitution of the United States. The Office of President represents to the American people and to the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of all, the honor and integrity that makes us a great nation and an example for the world. Because all eyes are focused upon that high office, the character and credibility of any temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to the domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, serious breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely influence the reputation of the United States. This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about multiple obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, and witness tampering--all committed or orchestrated by the President of the United States. Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it is important to place the events in the proper context. If this were only about private sex we would not now be before the Senate. But the manner in which the Lewinsky relationship arose and continued is important because it is illustrative of the character of the President and the decisions he made. Background Monica Lewinsky, a 22 year old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during the government shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 730) Prior to their first intimate encounter, she had never even spoken with the President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton flirted with each other. (Id.) The President of the United States of America then invited this unknown young intern into a private area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited her back later and when she returned, the two engaged in the first of many acts of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732) Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. Lewinsky were seen, she was bringing papers to the President. That story was totally false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p. 34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1314) The only papers she brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her duties or those of the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 774-775) After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the Pentagon, her frequent visits to the President were disguised as visits to Betty Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are important, because they play a vital role in the later perjuries and obstructions. Encounters Over the term of their relationship the following significant matters occurred: 1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least twenty-one occasions; 2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, excluding phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 1997; 3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least seventeen of which involved phone sex; 4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and, 5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. Referral, App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111) These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for all of the events that followed. The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, though relevant, need not be detailed either in this document or through witness testimony. It is necessary, though, briefly to outline that evidence, because it will demonstrate that the President repeatedly lied about that sexual relationship in his deposition, before the grand jury, and in his responses to the Judiciary Committee's questions. He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky merely performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn grand jury testimony of three of her friends and the statements by two professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her relationship. (O.I.C. Referral, H. Doc. 105-310, pgs. 138-140) While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is much more offensive for the President to expect the Senate to believe that in 1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky was so limited that it did not fall within his narrow interpretation of a definition of ``sexual relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not even conceive his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his grand jury appearance. How To View the Evidence We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is essential to avoid considering each event in isolation, and then treating it separately. Events and words that may seem innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on a sinister, or even criminal connotation when observed in the context of the whole plot. For example, everyone agrees that Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie; nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1161) When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, in the context of the other evidence, another picture emerges. Of course no one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what was expected of her. Similarly, nobody promised her a job, but once she signed the false affidavit, she got one. The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of conduct is such as to affect adversely the Office of the President and also upon the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive to the Rule of Law and Constitutional government. The Beginning The events that form the basis of these charges actually began in late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the winter of 1997 and the first month of 1998. The event culminated when the President of the United States appeared before a federal grand jury, raised his right hand to God and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. december 5-6, 1997 On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty Currie if the President could see her the next day, Saturday, but Ms. Currie said that the President was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that Friday, Ms. Lewinsky spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas party. (ML 7/ 31/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 108; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 828) The Witness List Is Received That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of potential witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC- 00000128; 849-DC-00000121-37; Referral, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 88) The list included Monica Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did not find out that her name was on the list until the President told her ten days later, on December 17. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 121-123; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay is significant. Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the President at the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President terminating their relationship. (ML- 55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts for the President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, Ms. Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and one of them told her that the President was not with his lawyers, as she thought, but rather, he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2907- 2908; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98 GJ, p. 27; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie told the Secret Service watch commander that the President was so upset about the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H. Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3356-3357). The Telephone Conversations At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged Bruce Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC- 00000862; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, while she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and the President spoke by phone. The President was very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that no one had every treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-14; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to the grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and considered it inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 537). Nevertheless, in a sudden change of mood, he invited her to visit him at the White House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 834) Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time that day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 827-DC-00000018) Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry'' with her during their recent telephone conversation, he was ``sweet'' and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-15; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would talk to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-16; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836) The Discussions With the Secret Service The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the Secret Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if they kept quiet about the Lewinsky incident, there would be no disciplinary action. (Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery 7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President personally told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 3353) Deputy Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that he knew of no other time in his fourteen years of service at the White House where the President raised a performance issue with a member of the Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., pgs. 40-41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his conversation with the President, Captain Purdie told a number of officers that they should not discuss the Lewinsky incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3343; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3114) When the President was before the grand jury and questioned about his statements to the Secret Service regarding this incident, the President testified, ``I don't remember what I said and I don't remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 534) When confronted with Captain Purdie's testimony, the President testified, ``I don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I have no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 543) The President's Knowledge of the Witness List President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that evening, Saturday, December 6, during a meeting with his lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535- 536) He stood by this answer in response to Request Number 16 submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18). The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left the White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to Bruce Lindsey, at the meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the Jones witness list faxed to Mr. Bennett the previous night. (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2419) (Exhibit 15) However, during his deposition, the President testified that he had heard about the witness list before he saw it. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 70) In other words, if the President testified truthfully in his deposition, then he knew about the witness list before the 5 p.m. meeting. It is valid to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a witness list prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that Saturday afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it prompted him to give the unique instruction to a Secret Service watch commander to use ``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which the watch commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32- 33; H.Doc. 105-315, pgs. 3360-3361) The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high profile job in New York since the previous July. She was not having much success despite the President's promise to help. In early November, Betty Currie arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan who was supposed to help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592) On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. Jordan (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No action followed; no job interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts with Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that he made no effort to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so unimportant to him that he ``had no recollection of an early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was not a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) (Chart R) Nothing happened throughout the month of November, because Mr. Jordan was either gone or would not return Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 825-826) During the December 6 meeting with the President, she mentioned that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. Jordan and that it did not seem he had done anything to help her. The President responded by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something to that effect. (ML 8/6/ 98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met the President the next day, December 7, but the meeting was unrelated to Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805, 1810) The December 11, 1997 Activity The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually procure employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and gave her a list of contact names. The two also discussed the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840) That meeting Mr. Jordan remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1798) Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1800-1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the President to give him a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. Jordan and the President were now very interested in helping Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 95; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807) Significance of December 11, 1997 This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered on December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any state or federal employee with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to have sexual relations. The President knew that it would be politically and legally expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica Lewinsky. And the President knew that that relationship would be fostered by finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was accomplished through enlisting the help of Vernon Jordan. December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, Monica Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the President of the United States. The President said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two things: one was that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident; secondly, the President said that he ``had some more bad news,'' that he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and her name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) The President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be subpoenaed, [she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that [she] had received the subpoena.'' (Id.) Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if subpoenaed. The President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to be false and misleading to accomplish the desired result. The President's ``Suggestion'' Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for Monica Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He did not specifically tell her to lie. What he did say is ``you know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) In order to understand the significance of this statement, it is necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously structured in order to deceive those who protected and worked with the President. Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited the President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, `here are your letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would answer, `Okay that's good.' '' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left White House employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775) Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she would always deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The President would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of encouragement. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 1078) So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on December 17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the President brought up the misleading stories, she understood that the two would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception. The President's Intention It became clear that the President had no intention of making his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public affair. And he would use lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not be known. It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked the President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m., he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . . . it is quite possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/ 17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 567) And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565) Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' lawyers were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. Lewinsky could file a false affidavit, but it might not work. It was absolutely essential that both parties told the same story. He knew that he would lie if asked about Ms. Lewinsky, and he wanted to make certain that she would lie also. That is why the President of the United States called a twenty- four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning. The Evidence Mounts But the President had an additional problem. It was not enough that he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the relationship. The evidence was beginning to accumulate. Because of the emerging evidence, the President found it necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time, the evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts, that the President and Monica Lewinsky were spending a significant amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. It was no longer expedient simply to refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'', ``stalker'', ``clutch'', or ``home wrecker'' as the White House first attempted to do. The unassailable facts were forcing the President to acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he still had the opportunity to establish a non-sexual explanation for their meetings, since his DNA had not yet been identified on Monica Lewinsky's blue dress. Need for the Cover Story Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along with the cover story in order to provide an innocent, intimate-free explanation for their frequent meetings. And that innocent explanation came in the form of ``document deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with Betty Currie.'' Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 17, 1998, he used the exact same cover stories that had been utilized by Ms. Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent with any future Lewinsky testimony while still maintaining his defense in the Jones lawsuit. In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was ever alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . She--it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, exchange a few words and go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-53) Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. Lewinsky's frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President did not hesitate to mention Betty Currie in his answers, for example: And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after [the pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] but my secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/ 17/98 Dep., p. 58) Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky? A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. She came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68) December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in a deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the Jones case. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) (Charts F and G) Extremely distraught, she immediately called the President's closest friend, Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President previously told her to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died and she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 848, 849) Vernon Jordan's Role Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she arrived shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. Around this time, Mr. Jordan called the President and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1) During the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as ``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1716), she talked about her infatuation with the President. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan decided that he would call a lawyer for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726) Mr. Jordan Informs the President That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed his conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely important because the President, in his deposition, did not recall that meeting. Mr. Jordan told the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her fascination with the President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the President would leave the First Lady. He also asked the President if he had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc 105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition: Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case? A. I don't think so. Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case? A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I want to be as accurate as I can. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69) In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial that Mr. Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when given more specific facts, he admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the subpoena on the night of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. . . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, the President testified in the grand jury that he was trying to remember who told him first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that was not the question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one considers the nature of the conversation between the President and Mr. Jordan, the suggestion that it would be forgotten defies common sense. December 28, 1997 December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence shows that the President made false and misleading statements to the federal court, the federal grand jury and the Congress of the United States about the events on that date. (Chart J) It is also a date on which he obstructed justice. The President's Account The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he invited Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 33; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that he ``probably'' gave Ms. Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts on other occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks later, the President forgot that he had given any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not tolerate someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that answer is unreasonable under the circumstances. He also knew that, under those circumstances, his answer in the deposition could not be believed. When asked in the grand jury why he was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms. Lewinsky so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the deposition, the President put forth an obviously contrived explanation. ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not that I don't recall whether I had given them.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503) Response to Committee Requests The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 to the House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. (Exhibit 18) He was not asked in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked, ``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a witness to insert unstated premises or mental reservations into the question to make his answer technically true, if factually false. The essence of lying is in deception, not in words. The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves that his explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee is also false. The President would have us believe that he was able to analyze questions as they were being asked, and pick up such things as verb tense in an attempt to make his statements at least literally true. But when he was asked a simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it. Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted explanation is reasonable or true. Testimony Concerning Gifts The President was asked in the deposition if Monica Lewinsky ever gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 77) This is also false testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He answered this question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee by saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not support the President's position. An answer that baldly understates a numerical fact in response to a specific quantitative inquiry can be deemed technically true but actually false. For example, a witness is testifying falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had also gone five times. So too, when the President answered once or twice in the face of evidence that Ms. Lewinsky was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying. (Chart C) Concealment of Gifts On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct justice and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. She recalled telling the President that the subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused her concern. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872) The President told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe to Betty. The President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L) Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about this incident, but says that ``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. (Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) The Cell Phone Record There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie called from her cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms. Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves conclusively that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several hours after she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) The facts prove that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts. Ms. Currie's Later Actions That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If Ms. Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, Ms. Currie would logically ask the reason for such a transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was giving her a box of gifts from the President yet she did not tell the President of this strange request. She simply took the gifts and placed them under her bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 114; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582) The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 and 25 from the House Committee that he was not concerned about the gifts. (Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he recalled telling Monica that if the Jones lawyers request gifts, she should turn them over. The President testified that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena asked for gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494- 495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would he give Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she never questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but keep this private'' and that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 886) The only logical inference is that the gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship--even in the face of a federal subpoena. The President's Deposition Testimony Furthermore, the President, at various times in his deposition, seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 in order to obstruct the administration of justice. First, he was asked: ``Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in this case?'' The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68) He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . .,'' he said. he then added that he may have joked to her that the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this testimony, but the President also directly contradicted himself before the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and that they had a ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.'' (WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this conversation about her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks before his deposition. Again, his version is not reasonable. January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to execute a false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content that when she asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen fifteen of them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his information from discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan generally about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be certain the mission was accomplished. Additional Presidential Advice In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with her lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 192; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some hard questions about how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) After the meeting, she called Betty Currie and said that she wanted to speak to the President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President discussed the issue of how she would answer under oath if asked about how she got her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) The President told her: ``Well, you could always say that the people in Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and misleading. Vernon Jordan's New Role The President was also kept advised as to the contents of the Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to look at the Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 194-195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents and agreed to delete a paragraph inserted by Mr. Carter which might open a line of questions concerning whether she had been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he had nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/ 98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, that he spoke with the President after conferring with Ms. Lewinsky about the changes made to her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/ 98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827) Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 924-925) (Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4) Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified the President that she signed an affidavit denying a sexual relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1739) Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for Ms. Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/ 98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's job search from early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews and Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1829) Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928- 929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was called by MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given more interviews the next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 929) After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 210; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan to tell him, he passed the good news on to Betty Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called the President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P) The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job-- since July according to the President's lawyers--Vernon Jordan made the critical call to a CEO the day after the false Affidavit was signed. Mr. Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a job recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a very talented attorney from Akin Gump; (3) a Harvard business school graduate; and (4) Monica Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1747) Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. Lewinsky's qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals previously recommended by Mr. Jordan. Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. Lewinsky worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/ 98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59) and that she did not like her Pentagon job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point during this process you wondered about her qualifications for employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1707) Yet, when he called Mr. Perelman the day after she signed the Affidavit, he referred to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that she had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 37-38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a disturbing story about the President leaving the First Lady, and how the President was not spending enough time with her. Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan pause in making the recommendation, especially after Monica was subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1725) The Importance of the False Affidavit Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, through his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition ``. . . there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape of form with President Clinton. . . .'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President stated specifically that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before the grand jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 473) Paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states: ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship.'' Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on January 6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being alone with the President. She showed a copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon Jordan, who called the President and told him that she had signed it. (VJ, 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) The Rush To File the Affidavit For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding questions by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it had to be filed with the Court and provided to the President's attorneys in time for his deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out if he had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/ 98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 15, the President's attorneys called her attorney twice. When they finally reached him, they requested a copy of the Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on time?'' (Carter 6/ 18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123, H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of its contents and used it powerfully in the deposition. Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on January 15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on Saturday, January 17. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424) (Exhibit 5) He finished the Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition in the early morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The President's lawyers left him another message on January 16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.'' (Carter 6/18/ 98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court to support his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in the deposition, and thereby obstruct justice. The Newsweek Inquiry On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty Currie and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her by courier. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie than called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The President was out of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky back, and asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with Bruce Lindsey and Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. Currie testified that she spoke immediately to Mr. Lindsey about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath By the time the President concluded his deposition on January 17, he knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who had personal knowledge was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky created, and that he used himself during the deposition, were now in jeopardy. It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky, but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the relationship from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she come in the following day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday night. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart S) Sometime in the early morning hours of January 18, 1998, the President learned of a news report concerning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 142- 143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14) The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., there were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the President. (Exhibit 7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) He told her that he had just been deposed and that the attorneys asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then made a series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T) (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right? (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right? (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? (4) You could see and hear everything, right? (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked whether she believed that the President wished her to agree with the statements: Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he stated [these five points] and the demeanor that he was using at the time that he stated it to you--that he wished you to agree with that statement? A. I can't speak for him, but---- Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these [previous] meetings in the last several days that that is how you took it. A. [Nodding.] Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President made to you, ``You remember I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' Was that also a statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you to agree with that? A. Correct. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559) Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not necessarily feel pressured by the President, she did state that she felt the President was seeking her agreement (or disagreement) with those statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669) Was This Obstruction of Justice? The President essentially admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true. Consequently, he had painted himself into a legal corner. Understanding the seriousness of the President ``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the argument has been made that those statements to her could not constitute obstruction because she had not been subpoenaed, and the President did not know that she was a potential witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law and the facts. The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if he urges or persuades a prospective witness to give false testimony. Neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time of the offense, nor must he or she actually give testimony at a later time.'' United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing, e.g., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 1981)). Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the President clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate him, as his testimony demonstrates. The President claims that he called Ms. Currie into work on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But the President knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had told the truth during his deposition the day before, then he would have no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his demeanor, and the blatant lies that he suggested clearly prove that the President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was looking for corroboration for his false cover-up, and that is why he coached her. January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 p.m., the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica Lewinsky began. (Chart S) between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms. Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie agreed to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 216; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms. Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/ 98 GJ, p. 160; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 702) January 19, the Search Continues The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to work diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. and 8:41 a.m., she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called the President at 8:43 a.m. and said that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-162; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky into calling back. That may have been the President's idea, since Ms. Currie had just spoken with him. The President was obviously quite concerned because he called Betty Currie only six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different tact, sending the message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the President's suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. Lewinsky to call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 165; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's recollection of why she was calling was again fuzzy. She said at one point that she believes the President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and she thought she was calling just to tell her that her name came up in the deposition. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed; of course her name came up in the deposition. There was obviously another and more important reason the President needed to get in touch with her. Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who then joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four minutes, from 10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White House three times, paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House. Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan then made feverish attempts to reach the President or someone at the White House to tell them the bad news, as represented by the six calls between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to relay this information to the White House because ``[t]he President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was ``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, pgs. 45-46; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan then called Mr. Carter back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they had already talked about. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104- 316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached the President at 5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired. (VJ 6/ 9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970) The Reason for the Urgent Search This activity shows how important it was for the President of the United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom she was talking. Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. Lewinsky. The President had just completed a deposition in which he provided false and misleading testimony about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, and he was losing control over her. The President never got complete control over her again. Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of false grand jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some salient examples of false statements are described below. When judging the statements made and the answers given, it is vital to recall that the President spent literally days preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his attorney were fully aware that the testimony would center around his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony in the Jones case. Grand Jury Testimony On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the United States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow citizens and took an oath to tell the complete truth. The President proceeded to equivocate and engage in legalistic fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony was calculated to mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct its process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He set the tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a witness can tell the truth, lie or assert his privileges against self incrimination. (Chart Y) President Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was permitted to read a statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9) The President's Prepared Statement That statement itself is demonstrably false in many particulars. President Clinton claims that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' Notice he did not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three ``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual contact with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year old intern at the time. The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three visits alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they engaged in sexual conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's ruling, this evidence was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual harassment claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11, 1997, p. 3) The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 deposition.'' That assertion is patently false. It is directly contradicted by the corroborated testimony of Monica Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32; H.Doc. 311, p. 1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357, 1358) Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in ``sexual relations'' as the President understood the term to be defined at his deposition and as any reasonable person would have understood the term to have been defined. Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's conduct during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits did constitute ``sexual relations'' as he understood the term to be defined at his deposition. Before the grand jury, the President admitted that directly touching or kissing another person's breast, or directly touching another person's genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 94-95; H.Doc 105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President maintained that he did not engage in such conduct. (Id.) These statements are contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and the testimony of numerous individuals with whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky repeated and unilaterally performed acts on the President while he tailored his conduct to fit a contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' which he had not contemplated at the time of the acts, defies common sense. Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in the grand jury until after his deposition had concluded. This is demonstrated by the substantial evidence revealing the President's state of mind during his deposition testimony. First, the President continuously denied at his deposition any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe that he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship, including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/ 98 Dep., p. 78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. Lewinsky had ever given him gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) Second, the President testified that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely true'' when, even by his current reading of the definition, it is absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White House produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating flatly that the President's definition of ``sexual relations'' included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the President made statements to staff members soon after the deposition, saying that he did not have sexual relations, including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/98 GJ, pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to tell people she and the President had an affair when he rebuffed her sexual advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth, President Clinton's Answer filed in Federal District Court in response to Paula Jones' First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of Defendant William Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, para. 39) Sixth, in President Clinton's sworn Answers to Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11, as amended, he flatly denied that he had sexual relations with any federal employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat silently while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, represented to the court that there was no sex of any kind or in any manner between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54) This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state of mind at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in technically or legally accurate answers, but in categorically denying anything improper. His grand jury testimony about his state of mind during the deposition is false. Reasons for the False Testimony The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect himself from embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the affair. Before his grand jury testimony, the President's semen had been identified by laboratory tests on Ms. Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an ``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, In fact, when he testified before the grand jury, he was only hours away from admitting the affair on national television. Embarrassment was inevitable. But, if he truthfully admitted the details of his encounters with Ms. Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be acknowledging that he lied under oath during his deposition when he claimed that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, he chose to lie, not to protect his family or the dignity of his office, but to protect himself from criminal liability for his perjury in the Jones case. Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 9; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much more troubling. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship with the President began with flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky showing the President her underwear. (ML 7/30/98 Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky candidly admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295) Reason for the Falsity The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, was not an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to a particular question. It was carefully drafted testimony which the President read and relied upon throughout his deposition. The President attempted to use the statement to foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on nineteen separate occasions. Yet, this prepared testimony, which along with other testimony provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually contradicts his sworn deposition testimony. Contrary Deposition Testimony In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. Lewinsky were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to make this admission in his deposition in the Jones case. During the deposition, the following exchange occurred: Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky together alone in the Oval Office? A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on the weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring me things on the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I don't have any specific recollections of what the issues were, what was going on, but when the Congress is there, we're working all the time, and typically I would do some work on One of the days of the weekends in the afternoon. Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then, that you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of that ever happening? A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was working there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought it to me, she was the only person there. That's possible. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53) After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President was given an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange followed: Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone together in any room in the White House? A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend. That's--I have a general memory of that. Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those meetings? A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't remember. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53) Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he testified truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, in part, the basis for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he certainly was along with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, as the President conceded in his prepared grand jury statement. In other words, the President's assertion before the grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he testified truthfully in his deposition, in inconsistent. Yet, to this day, both the President and his attorneys have insisted that he did not lie at his deposition and that he did not lie when he swore under oath that he did not lie at his deposition. In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his deposition. All of those lies are incorporated in Article I, Item 2. Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury concerning false and misleading statements his attorney Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright at the President's deposition. In one statement, while objecting to questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 53-54) When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett responded, ``In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis added) When asked before the grand jury about his statement to Judge Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p. 476) He added, ``I didn't pay much attention to this conversation, which is why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) Finally, ``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed me by.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 29; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 481) This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. Jones' attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which continued while Ms. Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he did not want the truth to be known. Of course, when Ms. Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the deposition, particularly in connection with sex, the President is going to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. Bennett's representations are eliminated by watching the videotape of the President's deposition. The videotape shows the President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to Judge Wright. False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury perjury regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and his efforts to impede discovery in the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit. These lies are perhaps the most troubling, as the President used them in an attempt to conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office. For example, the President testified before the grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He stated, ``And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.) This testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and common sense. Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she discussed with the President the subpoena's request for her to produce gifts, including a hat pin. She told the President that it concerned her, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 871) and he said that it ``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe to Betty. But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms. Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 872) Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky on her cellular phone and said, ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875) Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she remembers is that Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) She later conceded that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A telephone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie did call her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. Lewinsky's meeting with the President. The only logical reason Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from the President is that the President told her to do so. He would not have given this instruction if he wished the gifts to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys. Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie The President again testified falsely when he told the grand jury that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made a series of statements to Ms. Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that she met with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, and he proceeded to make these statements to her: (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right? (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right? (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? (4) You could see and hear everything, right? (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements than questions, and that, as far as she understood, the President wanted her to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/ 98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) The President was asked specifically about these statements before the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he was ``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He added that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was about what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 506) and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's explanation is contrived and false. A person does not refresh his recollection by firing declarative sentences dressed up as leading questions to his secretary. If the President was seeking information, he would have asked Ms. Currie what she recalled. Additionally, a person does not refresh his recollection by asking questions concerning factual scenarios of which the listener was unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener knew were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always there when Ms. Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, acknowledged during her grand jury testimony that Ms. Lewinsky could have visited the President at the White House when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 65-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that there were several occasions when the President and Ms. Lewinsky were in the Oval Office or study area without anyone else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105- 316, pgs. 552-553) More importantly, the President admitted in his statement to the grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105- 311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his own admission, his statement to Ms. Currie about never being alone with Ms. Lewinsky was false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie certainly could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or not. The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury testimony. During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, he ensured everyone, including Ms. Currie, was excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why would someone refresh his recollection by making a false statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is obvious--he would not. Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was ``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently explaining that he made these statements because he did not have time to listen to answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 508) But, if he was in such a hurry, why did the President not ask Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on the telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate explanation as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 minutes with Ms. Currie on January 18 to get her version of the events. In fact, Ms. Currie testified that she first met the President on January 18 while he was on the White House putting green, and he told her to go into the office and he would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, why did he repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560- 561) The reason for these statements had nothing to do with time constraints or refreshing recollection; he had just finished lying during the Jones deposition about these issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary. Testimony About Influencing Aides Not only did the President lie about his attempts to influence Ms. Currie's testimony, but he lied about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top aides. Among the President's lies to his aides, described in detail later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky did not perform oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him while he rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then disseminated to the media and attributed to White House sources. They were also disseminated to the grand jury. When the president was asked about these lies before the grand jury, he testified: ``And so I said to them things that were true about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I never would have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course. ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter further. So I said things that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558) To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must believe that many of the President's top aides engaged in a concerted effort to lie to the grand jury in order to incriminate him at the risk of subjecting themselves to a perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative of the President's character that he never felt any compunction in exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he could conceal his own perjuries. Simply put, such a conspiracy did not exist. The above are merely highlights of the President's grand jury perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In order to keep these lies in perspective, three facts must be remembered. First, before the grand jury, the President was not lying to cover up an affair and protect himself from embarrassment, as concealing the affair was now impossible. Second, the President could no longer argue that the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent Counsel and the grand jury had mandates to explore them. Third, he cannot claim to have been surprised or unprepared for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before the grand jury, as he spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses to such questions. The President's Method Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to give the appearance of being candid, when actually his intent was the opposite. In addition, throughout the testimony, whenever the President was asked a specific question that could not be answered directly without either admitting the truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said, ``I rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those lies in ``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg. 139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591) The House Committee's Request In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its inquiry to an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives submitted to the President 81 requests to admit or deny specific facts relevant to this investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although, for the most part, the questions could have been answered with a simple ``admit'' or ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. When he did answer, he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct the due proceedings of the Committee. The President Repeats His Falsities Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a lack of memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable memory, for his amazing ability to recall details. In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to ``White House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior testimony and that of others. He answered several of the requests by merely restating the same deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury. We will point out several false statements in this Brief. In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive and misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct the efforts of the House Committee. They had the effect of seriously hampering its ability to inquire and to ascertain the truth. The President has, therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry and an investigation before the Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the Judicial Branch of our constitutional system of government. The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office of President was marshaled to destroy the character and reputation of Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been ill-used by the President. As soon as her name surfaced, the campaign began to muzzle any possible testimony, and to attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted effort to obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked. When the President testified at his deposition that he had no sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with Monica Lewinsky, he felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only other witness was on board. She had furnished a false affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he realized from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were taped conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he had to develop a new story, and he did. In addition, he recounted that story to White House aides who passed it on to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct that tribunal too. On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post published a story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones' Lawyers.'' The White House learned the substance of the Post story on the evening of January 20, 1998. Mr. Bennett's Remark After the President learned of the existence of the story, he made a series of telephone calls. At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the Washington Post stating: ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added, ``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.'' Additional Calls After that conversation, the President had a half hour conversation with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey. At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke to her for 20 minutes. He then called Bruce Lindsey again. At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan. After that, the President again conversed with Bruce Lindsey. This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which the President would soon inflict upon top White House aides and advisors. The President's Statements to Staff ERSKINE BOWLES On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with Whie House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two deputies, John Podesta and Sylvia Matthews. Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 9:00 a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's immediate words as he and two others entered the Oval Office: And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said to the American people. He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual relationships with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. And when the facts come out, you'll understand.'' (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the President made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded: I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I don't know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever they are, you ought to get them out. And you ought to get them out rignt now.'' (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) When counsel asked whether the President responded to Bowles' suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded: I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree with me. (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) John Podesta January 21, 1998 Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the President on the morning of January 21, 1998. He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval Office that morning: A. And we started off meeting--we didn't-- I don't think we said anything. And I think the President directed this specifically to Mr. Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not true.'' Q. What else did he say? A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship with her, and that he never asked anybody to lie. (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310) January 23, 1998 Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another discussion with the President: ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working on this draft and he said to me that he never had sex with her, and that--and that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.'' Then Podesta testified as follows: Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more specific than sex, than the word ``sex.'' A. Yes, he was more specific than that. Q. Okay, share that with us. A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate. Of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever---- Q. Okay. A. That they had not had oral sex. (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) (Exhibit V) sidney blumenthal Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called Sidney Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note how the President's lies become more elaborate and pronounced when he has time to concoct this newest line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and Mr. Podesta, he simply denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to Mr. Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his defense strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the aggressor; (2) he launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her as a ``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent victim being attacked by the forces of evil. Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 4, 1998 testimony: (Chart U) And it was at this point that he gave his account of what had happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'' She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker anymore. (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal moments later: And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon. And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.'' (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to describe the President's manner and demeanor during the exchange. Q. In response to my question how you responded to the President's story about a threat or discussion about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally the nature of your response to the President? A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him. (Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 192-193) BETTY CURRIE When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she could not recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with the President on Tuesday, January 20, or Wednesday, January 21. But she did state that on one of those days, the President summoned her back to his office. At that time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It was at that meeting that the President made a series of statements to Ms. Currie, to some of which she could not possibly have known the answers. (e.g. ``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70- 75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the same tone and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday session. Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 Int., p. 8; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 536) Motive for Lies to Staff It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 557-557) In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He said that he was ``sensitive about not exchanging information because I knew I was a potential witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn, gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to base any decisions. Win, Win, Win President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all- costs strategy calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by Richard ``Dick'' Morris to the federal grand jury. Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President: ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the various other things.' '' (Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929) Morris recalls the following exchange: Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' meaning the voters. WJC: Well, we just have to win, then. (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930) The President, of course, cannot recall this statement, (Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71) The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the public, and hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998: Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker? (The Plain Dealer) Again: ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. Charles Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played with a full deck in her other experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer) From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30: ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in which the president was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.'' (NBC News) From another ``source'' on February 1: ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as `the stalker.' '' And on February 4: ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as `infatuated' with the president, `star struck' and even `a stalker'.'' (Buffalo News) Finally, on January 31: ``One White House aide called reporters to offer information about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was her nickname--`The Stalker.' '' ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, and was `A little bit weird.' '' ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.'' ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the `troubled' product of divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three famous opera singers.'' ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup of the same coffee to `surprise him.' '' (Toronto Sun) This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his deportment in the highest office in the land. On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury. He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides (Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called before the grand jury. Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you? WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about it. Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that? WJC. No. Q. And you've told us that you---- WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I meant by it when they started this deposition. Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it might have been misleading. Is that correct? WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do was to give them something they could--that would be true, even if misleading in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other words. (WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560) As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The President stated that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual relations'' to be literally true because he was only referring to intercourse. However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' The President told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman. Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, ``Talking Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This ``Talking Points'' document outlines proposed questions that the President may be asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The ``Talking Points'' purport to state the President's view of sexual relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. (Exhibit 17) The ``Talking Points'' state as follows: Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual relationship? A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' discussion of what constitutes a sexual relationship. Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual relationship? A. Of course it would. The President's own talking points refute the President's ``literal truth'' argument. Effect of the President's Conduct Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's deportment affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity and honor of the country. Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he is required to take an oath to ``Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol, raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.`` The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.'' Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously right violations by someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test. As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates that right to a full and fair trial, which, in turn, means the right to call and question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she actually get? None of the above. On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' Paula Jones ``has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.`` In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to information regarding state or federal employees with whom the President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. The President's Answer stated: ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the case, it would have been deprived of critical information. That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve, protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the ``sanctity of an oath'' means to the President. The Effect on the Office of President Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States? Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is, of necessity, devastating. The Effect on the System Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath. Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of them, the system itself will implode. That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that they should not be charged because their motives may have been to protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports; i.e., betting on college football games. Disregard of the Rule of Law Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law. Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will collapse altogether. Effect on the Judicial Branch The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth- seeking process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies, half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative Branch. Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely destructive. The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office. Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties. Precedents In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History of Impeachment Hearings before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'') Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon, it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with the exercise of the judges' judicial powers. Judge Nixon In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge Nixon's. Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again denied his involvement before that grand jury. After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case with the prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had ``nothing whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild case.'' The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03. The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable offense: ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial oath?'' House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the question even more directly: ``There are basically two questions before you in connection with this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on the bench.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As Senator Carl Levin explained: ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon and remove him from office.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin). Judge Hastings Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for, among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr. William Borders to ``fix'' cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of which were for lying under oath at his trial. The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable: ``It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes, the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from public office.'' The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings: ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that we demand of everyone else.'' 134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers). Judge Claiborne In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for making false statements under penalties of perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result, he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206 (a). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal income tax filings were not impeachable was never even seriously considered. As the House Managers explained: ``[T]he constitutional issues raised by the first two Articles of Impeachment [concerning the filing of false tax returns] are readily resolved. The Constitution provides that Judge Claiborne may be impeached and convicted for ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article II, Section 4. The willful making or subscribing of a false statement on a tax return is a felony offense under the laws of the United States. The commission of such a felony is a proper basis for Judge Clairborne's impeachment and conviction in the Senate.'' Proceedngs of the United States Senate Impeachment Trial of Judge Harry E. Clairborne, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 40 (1986) (Claiborne Proceedings'') (emphases added). House Manager Rodino, in his oral argument to the Senate, emphatically made the same point: ``Honor in the eyes of the American people lies in public officials who respect the law, not in those who violate the trust that has been given to them when they are trusted with public office. Judge Harry E. Claiborne has, sad to say, undermined the integrity of the judicial branch of Government. To restore that integrity and to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, Judge Claiborne must be convicted on the fourth Article of Impeachment [that of reducing confidence in the integrity of the judiciary].'' 132 Cong. Rec. S15,481 (1986) (Statement of Rep. Rodino). The Senate agreed. Telling are the words of then-Senator Albert Gore, Jr. In voting to convict Judge Claiborne and remove him from office: ``The conclusion is inescapable that Clairborne filed false income tax returns and that he did so willfully rather than negligently. . . . Given the circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Senate to fulfill its constitutional responsibility and strip this man of his title. An individual who has knowingly falsified tax returns has no business receiving a salary derived from the tax dollars of honest citizens. More importantly, an individual quality of such reprehensible conduct ought not be permitted to exercise the awesome powers which the Constitution entrusts to the Federal Judiciary.'' Claiborne Proceedings, S. Doc. No. 99-48, at 372 (1986). Application to the President To avoid the conclusive force of these recent precedents-- and in particular the exact precedent supporting impeachment for, conviction, and removal for perjury--the only recourse for the President's defenders is to argue that a high crime or misdemeanor for a judge is not necessarily a high crime or misdemeanor for the President. The arguments advanced in support of this dubious proposition do not withstand serious scrutiny. See generally Cooper Testimony, at 193. The Constitution provides that Article III judges ``shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, U.S. Const. Art. III, 1. Thus, these arguments suggest that judges are impeachable for ``misbehavior'' while other federal officials are only impeachable for treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors. The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in the 1990s both issued reports rejecting these arguments. In 1974, the staff of the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a report which included the following conclusion: ``Does Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which states that judges `shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,' limit the relevance of the ten impeachments of judges with respect to presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by some? It does not. The argument is that `good behavior' implies an additional ground for impeachment of judges not applicable to other civil officers. However, the only impeachment provision discussed in the Convention and included in the Constitution is Article II, Section 4, which by its expressed terms, applies to all civil officers, including judges, and defines impeachment offenses as `Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' '' Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment (Comm. Print 1974) (``1974 Staff Report'') at 17. The National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal came to the same conclusion. The Commission concluded that ``the most plausible reading of the phrase `during good Behavior' is that it means tenure for life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on the assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only through impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 17-18 (1993) (footnote omitted). The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also argues against different impeachment standards for federal judges and presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to dismiss the articles of impeachment against him for failure to state impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was that ``[t]he standard for impeachment of a judge is different than that for other officers'' and that the Constitution limited ``removal of the judiciary to acts involving misconduct related to discharge of office.'' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment on the Grounds They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter cited as ``Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1986) (hereinafter cited as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings''). Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the term `good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is totally misplaced and virtually all commentators agree that that is directed to affirming the life tenure of judges during good behavior. It is not to set them down, differently, as judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. at 81-82. He further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any support for the notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II of the Constitution.'' Id. at 81. The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the Senate was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained therein because it later voted to convict Judge Claiborne. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus rejected the claim that the standard of impeachable offenses was different for judges than for presidents. Moreover, even assuming that presidential high crimes and misdemeanors could be different from judicial ones, surely the President ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than judges. In the course of the 1980s judicial impeachments, Congress emphasized unequivocally that the removal from office of federal judges guilty of crimes indistinguishable from those currently charged against the President was essential to the preservation of the rule of law. If the perjury of just one judge so undermines the rule of law as to make it intolerable that he remain in office, then how much more so does perjury committed by the President of the United States, who alone is charged with the duty ``to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' See generally, Cooper Testimony at 194) It is just as devastating to our system of government when a President commits perjury. As the House Judiciary Committee stated in justifying an article of impeachment against President Nixon, the President not only has ``the obligation that every citizen has to live under the law,'' but in addition has the duty ``not merely to live by the law but to see that law faithfully applied.'' Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974). The Constitution provides that he ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 3. When a President, as chief law enforcement officer of the United States, commits perjury, he violates this constitutional oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the notion that we are a nation ruled by laws and not men. Perjury and Obstruction Are as Serious as Bribery Further evidence that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal comes directly from the text of the Constitution. Because the Constitution specifically mentions bribery, no one can dispute that it is an impeachable offense. U.S. Const., art. II, Sec. 4. Because the constitutional language does not limit the term, we must take it to mean all forms of bribery. Our statutes specifically criminalize bribery of witnesses with the intent to influence their testimony in judicial proceedings. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b)(3) & (4), (c)(2) & (3). See also 18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 (general obstruction of justice statute), 1512 (witness tampering statute). Indeed, in a criminal case, the efforts to provide Ms. Lewinsky with job assistance in return for submitting a false affidavit charged in the Articles might easily have been charged under these statutes. No one could reasonably argue that the President's bribing a witness to provide false testimony--even in a private lawsuit--does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense. The plain language of the Constitution indicates that it is. Having established that point, the rest is easy. Bribing a witness is illegal because it leads to false testimony that in turn undermines the ability of the judicial system to reach just results. Thus, among other things, the Framers clearly intended impeachment to protect the judicial system from these kinds of attacks. Perjury and obstruction of justice are illegal for exactly the same reason, and they accomplish exactly the same ends through slightly different means. Simple logic establishes that perjury and obstruction of justice--even in a private lawsuit--are exactly the types of other high crimes and misdemeanors that are of the same magnitude as bribery. High Crimes and Misdemeanors Although Congress has never adopted a fixed definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' much of the background and history of the impeachment process contradicts the President's claim that these offenses are private and therefore do not warrant conviction and removal. Two reports prepared in 1974 on the background and history of impeachment are particularly helpful in evaluating the President's defense. Both reports support the conclusion that the facts in this case compel the conviction and removal of President Clinton. Many have commented on the report on ``Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment'' prepared in February 1974 by the staff of the Nixon impeachment inquiry. The general principles concerning grounds for impeachment set forth in that report indicate that perjury and obstruction of justice are impeachable offenses. Consider this key language from the staff report describing the type of conduct which gives rise to impeachment: ``The emphasis has been on the significant effects of the conduct--undermining the integrity of office, disregard of constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of power, abuse of the governmental process, adverse impact on the system of government.'' 1974 Staff Report at 26 (emphasis added). Perjury and obstruction of justice clearly ``undermine the integrity of office.'' They unavoidably erode respect for the office of the President. Such offenses obviously involve ``disregard of [the President's] constitutional duties and oath of office.'' Moreover, these offenses have a direct and serious ``adverse impact on the system of government.'' Obstruction of justice is by definition an assault on the due administration of justice--a core function of our system of government. The thoughtful report on ``The Law of Presidential Impeachment'' prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in January of 1974 also places a great deal of emphasis on the corrosive impact of presidential misconduct on the integrity of office: It is our conclusion, in summary, that the grounds for ``impeachment are not limited to or synonymous with crimes . . . Rather, we believe that acts which undermine the integrity of government are appropriate grounds whether or not they happen to constitute offenses under the general criminal law. In our view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of government may be found in acts which constitute corruption in, or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may also be found in acts which, without directly affecting governmental processes, undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of executive and judicial officers that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free society.'' Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, (1974) at 161 (emphasis added). The commission of perjury and obstruction of justice by a President are acts that without doubt ``undermine that degree of public confidence in the probity of the [the President] that is essential to the effectiveness of government in a free society.'' Such acts inevitably subvert the respect for law which is essential to the well-being of our constitutional system. That the President's perjury and obstruction do not directly involve his official conduct does not diminish their significance. The record is clear that federal officials have been impeached for reasons other than official misconduct. As set forth above, two recent impeachments of federal judges are compelling examples. In 1989, Judge Walter Nixon was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury before a federal grand jury. Judge Nixon's perjury involved his efforts to fix a state case for the son of a business partner--a matter in which he had no official role. In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for making false statements under penalty of perjury on his income tax returns. That misconduct had nothing to do with his official responsibilities. Nothing in the text, structure, or history of the Constitution suggests that officials are subject to impeachment only for official misconduct. Perjury and obstruction of justice--even regarding a private matter--are offenses that substantially affect the President's official duties because they are grossly incompatible with his preeminent duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' Regardless of their genesis, perjury and obstruction of justice are acts of public misconduct--they cannot be dismissed as understandable or trivial. Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters; they are crimes against the system of justice, for which impeachment, conviction, and removal are appropriate. The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings affirms that conclusion. Representative Hamilton Fish, the ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and one of the House managers in the Senate trial, stated that ``[i]mpeachable conduct does not have to occur in the course of the performance of an officer's official duties. Evidence of misconduct, misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be justified upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of public office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 132 Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986). Judge Claiborne's unsuccessful motion that the Senate dismiss the articles of impeachment for failure to state impeachable offenses provides additional evidence that personal misconduct can justify impeachment. One of the arguments his attorney made for the motion was that ``there is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge Claiborne in any way was related to misbehavior in his official function as a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 77, Statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar Goodman). (See also Claiborne Motion, at 3) Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed murder, mayhem, rape, or perhaps espionage in his private life, could not be removed from office by the U.S. Senate.'' (Senate Claiborne Hearings, at 81) Kastenmeier's response was repeated by the House of Representatives in its pleading opposing Claiborne's motion to dismiss. (Opposition to Claiborne Motion at 2) The Senate did not vote on Judge Claiborne's motion, but it later voted to convict him. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). The Senate thus agreed with the House that private improprieties could be, and were in this instance, impeachable offenses. The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it relates to a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's official duties--a judge's personal tax returns--is an impeachable offense. Judge Nixon's false statements were also in regard to a matter distinct from his official duties. In short, the Senate's own precedents establish that misconduct need not be in one's official capacity to warrant removal. Conclusion This is a defining moment for the Presidency as an institution, because if the President is not convicted as a consequence of the conduct that has been portrayed, then no House of Representatives will ever be able to impeach again and no Senate will ever convict. The bar will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to be concerned. Experts pointed to the fact that the House refused to impeach President Nixon for lying on an income tax return. Can you imagine a future President, faced with possible impeachment, pointing to the perjuries, lies, obstructions, and tampering with witnesses by the current occupant of the office as not rising to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors? If this is not enough, what is? How far can the standard be lowered without completely compromising the credibility of the office for all time? Dated: January 11, 1999. ____ APPENDIX [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton Appendix to Trial Memorandum of the Managers Appointed by the U.S. House of Representatives The United States House of Representatives Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Bill McCollum, George W. Gekas, Charles T. Canady, Stephen E. Buyer, Ed Bryant, Steve Chabot, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, Chris Cannon, James E. Rogan, Lindsey O. Graham. Managers on the Part of the House ____ Table of Contents charts A. The President's Contacts Alone With Lewinsky B. The President's Telephone Contacts With Lewinsky C. Lewinsky's Gifts to The President D. The President's Gifts to Lewinsky E. 12/5/97 Facsimile Transmission of Witness List in Jones v. Clinton F. The December 19, 1997 Subpoena to Lewinsky in Jones v. Clinton G. December 19, 1997 Activities Following Lewinsky's Receipt of Subpoena H. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 10 in Jones v. Clinton I. The President's December 23, 1997 Response to Interrogatory No. 11 in Jones v. Clinton J. December 28, 1997, The President's Final Meeting With Lewinsky and Concealment of Gifts K. Currie's Cell Phone Records for 12/28/97 L. The President's Statements About Concealing Gifts M. Lewinsky's Draft Affidavit N. Lewinsky Final Affidavit dated January 7, 1998 Paragraph 8, Jones v. Clinton O. Filing Lewinsky's Affidavit and Motion to Quash (1/14/ 98-1/17/98) P. Mission Accomplished: Lewinsky Signs Her Affidavit and Is Hired By Revlon in New York (1/5/98-1/9/98) Q. The President's Involvement With Lewinsky's Job Search R. Jordan's Testimony About His Pre-Witness List Job Search Efforts S. Activity Following The President's Deposition (1/17/98- 1/1998) T. The President's Statements to Currie 1/18/98 U. The President's Denial of Sexual Relations V. The President's 1/21/98 Denial of Sexual Relations to Blumenthal, Podesta and Morris W. The White House 1/24/98 ``Talking Points'' X. The President's Claims That He Was Truthful With Aides Y. The Three Options of a Grand Jury Witness Z. The President's Grand Jury ``Statement'' ____ [Chart A] THE PRESIDENT'S CONTACTS ALONE WITH LEWINSKY Lewinsky White House Employee (7/95-4/96) 1995 11/15/95 (Wed): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in Oval Office study and hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter) 11/17/95 (Fri): The President meets alone twice with Lewinsky in The President's private bathroom outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 12/5/95 (Tues): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office and study. (No Sexual Encounter) 12/31/95 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office and Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 1996 1/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the bathroom outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 1/21/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway outside the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 2/4/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study and in the adjacent hallway. (Sexual Encounter) 2/19/96 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office. (No Sexual Encounter) 3/31/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in hallway outside the Oval Office. (Sexual Encounter) 4/7/96 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the hallway outside the Oval Office study and in the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 1997 2/28/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office private bathroom. (Sexual Encounter) 3/29/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 5/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office dining room, study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter) 7/4/97 (Fri): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study and hallway. (No Sexual Encounter) 7/14/97 (Mon): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in Heinreich's office. (No Sexual Encounter) 7/24/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter) 8/16/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (Sexual Encounter) 10/11/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter) 11/13/97 (Thurs): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter) 12/6/97 (Sat): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter) 12/28/97 (Sun): The President meets alone with Lewinsky in the Oval Office study. (No Sexual Encounter) ____ [Chart B] THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONTACTS WITH LEWINSKY 1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--first call to ML's home. 1/7/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at office. 1/15 or 1/16/96 (Mon or Tue): Conversation, approx. 12:30 a.m.--ML at home.* Approx. 1/28/96 (Sun): Caller ID on ML's office phone indicated POTUS call. 1/30/96 (Tues): Conversation--during middle of workday at ML's office. 2/4/96 (Sun): Conversations--ML at office--multiple calls. 2/7 or 2/8/96 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--ML at home. 2/8 or 2/9/96 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--ML at home.* 2/19/96 (Mon): Conversation--ML at home. Approx. 2/28 2/28 or 3/5/96: Conversation--approx. 20 min.-- after chance meeting in hallway--ML at home. 3/26/96 (Tues): Conversation--approx. 11 a.m.--ML at office. 3/29/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 8 p.m.-- invitation to movie. 3/31/96: Conversation--ML at office--approx. 1 p.m.--Pres. ill. 4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation----ML at home. 4/7/96 (Easter Sunday): Conversation--ML at home--why ML left. 4/12/96 (Fri): Conversation--ML at home--daytime. 4/12 or 4/13/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home--after midnight. 4/22/96 (Mon): Conversations--job talk--ML at home. 4/29 or 4/30/96 (Mon or Tues): Message--after 6:30 a.m. 5/2/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home.* 5/6/96 (Mon): Possible phone call. 5/16/96 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home. 5/21/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.* 5/31/96 (Fri): Message. 6/5/96 (Wed): Conversation--ML at home--early evening. 6/23/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.* 7/5 or 7/6/96 (Fri or Sat): Conversation--ML at home.* 7/19/96 (Fri): Conversation--6:30 a.m.--ML at home.* 7/28/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home. 8/4/96 (Sun): Conversation--ML at home.* 8/24/96 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home.* 9/5/96 (Thur): Conversation--Pres. In Fla--ML at home.* 9/10/96 (Tues): Message. 9/30/96 (Mon): Conversation.* 10/22/96 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home.* 10/23 or 10/24/96 (early am): Conversation--ML at home. 12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--approx. 10-15 min.--ML at home. 12/2/96 (Mon): Conversation--later that evening--ML at home-- approx. 10:30 p.m.--Pres fell asleep.* 12/18/96 (Wed): Conversation--approx. 5 min.--10:30 p.m.--ML at home. 12/30/96 (Mon): Message. 1/12/97 (Sun): Conversation--job talk--ML at home.* 2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--ML at home--mid-day--11:30-12:00. 2/8/97 (Sat): Conversation--job talk--1:30 or 2:00 p.m.--ML at home.* 3/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--three minutes--ML at work. 4/26/97 (Sat): Conversation--late afternoon--20 min.--ML at home. 5/17/97 (Sat): Conversations--multiple calls. 5/18/97 (Sun): Conversations--multiple calls. 7/15/97 (Tues): Conversation--ML at home. 8/1/97 (Fri): Conversation. 9/30/97 (Tues): Conversation.* 10/9 or 10/10/97 (Thur or Fri): Conversation--long, from 2 or 2:30 a.m. until 3:30 or 4:00 a.m.--job talk--argument-- ML at home. 10/23/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--end b/c HRC. 10/30/97 (Thur): Conversation--ML at home--interview prep. 11/12/97 (Wed): Conversation--discuss re: ML visit.* 12/6/97 (Sat): Conversation--approx. 30 min--ML at home. 12/17/ or 12/18/97 (Wed or Thur): Conversation--b/t 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.--ML at home--witness list. 1/5/98 (Mon): Conversation. *Conversation that involved and may have involved phone sex. [Chart C] LEWINSKY GIFTS TO THE PRESIDENT 10/24/95: Lewinsky (before the sexual relationship began) gives her first gift to The President of a matted poem given by her and other White House interns to commemorate ``National Boss' Day''. It is the only gift the President sent to the archives instead of keeping. 11/20/95: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie. 3/31/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Hugo Boss Tie. Christmas 1996: Lewinsky gives The President a Sherlock Homes game and a glow in the dark frog. Before 8/16/96: Lewinsky gives The President a Zegna necktie and a t-shirt from Bosnia. Early 1997: Lewinsky gives The President Oy Ve, a small golf book, golf balls, golf tees, and a plastic pocket frog. 3/97: Lewinsky gives The President a care package after he injured his leg including a metal magnet with The Presidential seal for his crutches, a license plate with ``Bill'' for his wheelchair, and knee pads with The Presidential seal. 3/29/97: Lewinsky gives The President her personal copy of Vox, a book about phone sex, a penny medallion with the heart cut out, a framed Valentine's Day ad, and a replacement for the Hugo Boss tie that had the bottom cut off. 5/24/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Banana Republic casual shirt and a puzzle on gold mysteries. 7/14/97: Lewinsky gives The President a wooden B, with a frog in it from Budapest. Before 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President The Notebook. 8/16/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique book on Peter the Great, the card game ``Royalty'', and a book, Disease and Misrepresentation. 10/21/97 or 10/22/97: Lewinsky gives The President a Calvin Klein tie, and pair of sunglasses. 10/97: Lewinsky gives The President a package Before filled with Halloween-related items, such as a Halloween pumpkin lapel pin, a wooden letter opener with a frog on the handle, and a plastic pumpkin filled with candy. 11/13/97: Lewinsky gives The President an antique paperweight that depicted the White House. 12/6/97: Lewinsky gives The President Our Patriotic President: His Life in Pictures, Anecdotes, Sayings, Principles and Biography; an antique standing cigar holder; a Starbucks Santa Monica mug; a Hugs and Kisses box; and a tie from London. 12/28/97: Lewinsky gives The President a hand-painted Easter Egg and ``gummy boobs'' from Urban Outfitters. 1/4/98: Lewinsky gives Currie a package with her final gift to The President containing a book entitled The Presidents of the United States and a love note inspired by the movie Titanic. ____ [Chart D] THE PRESIDENT'S GIFTS TO LEWINSKY 12/5/95: The President gives Lewinsky an autographed photo of himself wearing the Zenga necktie she gave him.* 2/4/96: The President gives Lewinsky a signed ``State of the Union'' Address.* 3/31/96: The President gives Lewinsky cigars. 2/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky a hat pin*, ``Davidoff'' cigars, and the book the Leaves of Grass by Walt Whitman as belated Christmas gifts. The President gives Lewinsky a gold brooch.* The President gives Lewinsky an Annie Lennox compact disk. The President gives Lewinsky a cigar. 7/24/97: The President gives Lewinsky an antique flower pin in a wooden box, a porcelain object d'art, and a signed photograph of the President and Lewinsky.* Early 9/97: The President brings Lewinsky several Black Dog items, including a baseball cap*, 2 T-shirts*, a hat and a dress.* 12/28/97: The President gives Lewinsky the largest number of gifts including: 1. a large Rockettes blanket,* 2. a pin of the New York skyline,* 3. a marblelike bear's head from Vancouver,* 4. a pair of sunglasses,* 5. a small box of cherry chocolates, 6. a canvas bag from the Black Dog,* 7. a stuffed animal wearing a T-shirt from the Black Dog.* (*Denotes those items Lewinsky produced to the OIC on 7/29/ 98). ____ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.000 [Chart F] LEWINSKY SUBPOENA Jones v. Clinton December 19, 1997 The Jones v. Clinton subpoena to Lewinsky called for: (1) Her testimony on January 23, 1998 at 9:30 a.m.; (2) Production of ``each and every gift including but not limited to, any and all dresses, accessories, and jewelry, and/or hat pins given to you by, or on behalf of, Defendant Clinton;'' and (3) ``Every document constituting or containing communications between you and Defendant Clinton, including letters, cards, notes, memoranda and all telephone records.'' ____ [Chart G] DECEMBER 19, 1997 (Friday) Lewinsky is Served with a Subpoena in Jones v. Clinton 1:47-1:48 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan's office. 3:00-4:00 p.m.: Lewinsky is served with a subpoena in Jones v. Clinton. --: Lewinsky telephones Jordan immediately about subpoena. 3:51-3:52 p.m.: Jordan telephones The President and talks to Debra Schiff. 4:17-4:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Social Office. 4:47 p.m.: Lewinsky meets Jordan and requests that Jordan notify The President about her subpoena. 5:01-5:05 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan; Jordan notifies The President about Lewinsky's subpoena. 5:06 p.m.: Jordan telephones attorney Carter to represent Lewinsky. Later that Evening: The President meets alone with Jordan at the White House. ____ [Chart H] DECEMBER 23, 1997 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 10 Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name, address, and telephone number of each and every individual (other than Hillary Rodham Clinton) whom you had sexual relations when you held any of the following positions: a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas; b. Governor of the State of Arkansas; c. President of the United States. (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present involving state or federal employees.) Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (as modified by direction of the Court): None. ____ [Chart I] DECEMBER 23, 1997 Jones v. Clinton Interrogatory No. 11 Interrogratory No. 11: Please state the name, address, and telephone number of each and every individual (other than Hillary Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual relations, when you held any of the following positions: a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas; b. Governor of the State of Arkansas; c. President of the United States. (Court modifies scope to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present involving state or federal employees.) Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 11 (as modified by direction of the Court): None. ____ [Chart J] DECEMBER 28, 1997 (Sunday) The President's Final Meeting with Lewinsky and The Concealment of the Gifts to Lewinsky 8:16 a.m.: Lewinsky meets The President at the White House at Currie's direction. The President gives Lewinsky numerous gifts. The President and Lewinsky discuss the subpoena, calling for, among other things, the hat pin. The President acknowledges ``that sort of bothered [him] too.'' Lewinsky states to The President: ``Maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty [Currie].'' 3:32 p.m.: Currie telephones Lewinsky at home from Currie's cell phone. ``I understand you have something to give me.'' or ``The President said you have something to give me.'' Later that Day: Currie picks up gifts from Lewinsky. ____ [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TS14JA99.001 [Chart L] THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT CONCEALING GIFTS 12/28/97 ``[Lewinsky]: And then at some point I said to him [The President], `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.''--(Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 152) ____ [Chart M] AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE # 1. My name is Jane Doe # . I am 24 years old and I currently reside at 700 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20037. 2. On December 19, 1997, I was served with a subpoena from the plaintiff to give a deposition and to produce documents in the lawsuit filed by Paula Corbin Jones against President William Jefferson Clinton and Danny Ferguson. 3. I can not fathom any reason that the plaintiff would seek information from me for her case. 4. I have never met Ms. Jones, nor do I have any information regarding the events she alleges occurred at the Excelsior Hotel on May 8, 1991 or any other information concerning any of the allegations in her case. 5. I worked at the White House in the summer of 1995 as a White House intern. Beginning in December, 1995, I worked in the Office of Legislative Affairs as a staff assistant for correspondence. In April, 1996, I accepted a job as assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense. I maintained that job until December 26, 1997. I am currently unemployed but seeking a new job. 6. In the course of my employment at the White House, I met President Clinton on several occasions. I do not recall ever being alone with the President, although it is possible that while working in the White House Office of Legislative Affairs I may have presented him with a letter for his signature while no one else was present. This would have lasted only a matter of minutes. 7. I have the utmost respect for the President who has always behaved appropriately in my presence. 8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a sexual relationship with the President, was offered employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The occasions that I saw the President, with crowds of other people, after I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996 related to official receptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were other people present on all of these occasions. 9. Since I do not possess any information that could possibly be relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to admissible evidence in this case, I asked my attorney to provide this affidavit to plaintiff's counsel. Requiring my deposition in this matter would cause unwarranted attorney's fees and costs, disruption of my life, especially since I am looking for employment, and constitute an invasion of my right to privacy. I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Monica S. Lewinsky. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ss: Monica S. Lewinsky, being first duly sworn on oath according to law, deposes and says that she has read the foregoing Affidavit of Jane Doe # by her subscribed, that the matters stated herein are true to the best of her information, knowledge and belief. Monica S. Lewinsky. Subscribed and sworn to before me this ______ day of __________, 1998. __________________________ Notary Public, D.C. My Commission expires: ________ ____ [Chart N] FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF JANE DOE #6 [LEWINSKY] 1/7/98 8. I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. I do not know of any other person who had a sexual relationship with the President, was offered employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, or was denied employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship. The occasions that I saw the President after I left my employment at the White House in April, 1996, were official receptions, formal functions or events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was working at the time. There were other people present on those occasions. ____ [Chart O] LEWINSKY'S AFFIDAVIT GETS FILED (1/14/98-1/17/98) January 14, 1998 (Wednesday) 7:45 p.m.: Bennett's firm (Sexton) leaves Carter telephone message. --: Carter faxes signed affidavit to Bennett's firm. January 15, 1998 (Thursday) 9:17 a.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message. 12:59 p.m.: Sexton leaves Carter telephone message. --: Currie called by Newsweek. --: Lewinsky drives Currie to meet Jordan. --: Sexton telephones Carter: ``STILL ON TIME?'' --: Carter telephones Court Clerk for Saturday (1/17/98) Filing of Affidavit and motion to quash. January 16, 1998 (Friday) 2 a.m. (Approx.): Carter completes motion to quash Lewinsky's deposition. Carter sends by overnight mail motion to quash and affidavit to Bennett's firm and to the Court. 11:30 a.m.: Sexton message to Carter: ``Please call.'' January 17, 1998 (Saturday) --: Lewinsky Affidavit is submitted to the Court. --: The President is deposed. ____ [Chart P] MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: LEWINSKY SIGNS AFFIDAVIT AND GETS A NEW YORK JOB (1/5/98-1/9/98) January 5, 1998 Lewinsky meets with attorney Carter for an hour; Carter drafts an Affidavit for Lewinsky in an attempt to avert her deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton scheduled for January 23, 1998. Lewinsky telephones Currie stating that she needs to speak to the President about an important matter; specifically that she was anxious about something she needed to sign--an Affidavit. The President returns Lewinsky's call; Lewinsky mentions the Affidavit she'd be signing; Lewinsky offers to show the Affidavit to The President who states that he doesn't need to see it because he has already seen about fifteen others. january 6, 1998 11:32 a.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter.'' Lewinsky meets Carter and receives draft Affidavit. 2:08-2:10 p.m.: Jordan calls Lewinsky. Lewinsky delivers draft Affidavit to Jordan. 3:14 p.m.: Carter again pages Lewinsky: ``Frank Carter at [telephone number] will see you tomorrow morning at 10:00 in my office.'' 3:26-3:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter. 3:38 p.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich, Deputy Assistant to The President. 3:48 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky. 3:49 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky to discuss draft Affidavit. Both agree to delete implication that she had been alone with The President. 4:19-4:32 p.m.: The President telephones Jordan. 4:32 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter. 4:34-4:37 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Carter. 5:15-5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House. 9:26-9:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter. 10:00 a.m.: Lewinsky signs false Affidavit at Carter's Office. --: Lewinsky delivers signed Affidavit to Jordan. 11:58 a.m.-12:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House. 5:46-5:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House (Hernreich's Office). 6:50-6:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House and tells The President that Lewinsky signed an Affidavit. january 8, 1998 9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House Counsel's Office. 9:21 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House. --: Lewinsky interviews in New York at MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. (MFH) 11:50-11:51 a.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan. 3:09-3:10 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan. 4:48-4:53 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan and advises that the New York MFH Interview went ``Very Poorly.'' 4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ronald Perelman in New York, CEO of Revlon (subsidiary of MFH) ``to make things happen . . . if they could happen.'' 4:56 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky stating, ``I'm doing the best I can to help you out.'' 6:39 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House Counsel's Office (Cheryl Mills), possibly about Lewinsky. Evening: Revlon in New York telephones Lewinsky to set up a follow-up interview. 9:02-9:03 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan about Revlon interview in New York. january 9, 1998 --: Lewinsky interviews in New York with Senior V.P. Seidman of MacAndrews & Forbes and two Revlon individuals. Lewinsky offered Revlon job in New York and accepts. 1:29 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan. 4:14 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan to say that Revlon offered her a job in New York. Jordan notifies Currie: ``Mission Accomplished'' and requests she tell The President. Jordan notifies The President of Lewinsky's New York job offer. The President replies ``Thank you very much.'' 4:37 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Carter. 5:04 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan. 5:05 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie. 5:08 p.m.: The President telephones Currie. 5:09-5:11 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Jordan. 5:12 p.m.: Currie telephones The President. 5:18-5:20 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lewinsky. 5:21-5:26 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie. ____ [Chart Q] THE PRESIDENT'S INVOLVEMENT WITH LEWINSKY JOB SEARCH ``Q Why are you trying to tell someone at the White House that this has happened [Carter had been fired]? [Jordan]: Thought they had a right to know. Q Why? [Jordan]: The President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job. I got her a lawyer. The Drudge Report is out and she has new counsel. I thought that was information that they ought to have . . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/ 9/98 Tr. 45-46) ``Q Why did you think the President needed to know that Frank Carter had been replaced? [Jordan]: Information. He knew that I had gotten her a job, he knew that I had gotten her a lawyer. Information. He was interested in this matter. He is the source of it coming to my attention in the first place . . . .'' (Jordan Grand Jury 6/9/98 Tr. 58-59) ____ [Chart R] JORDAN'S PRE-WITNESS LIST JOB SEARCH EFFORTS ``[Jordan]: I have no recollection of an early November meeting with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. I have absolutely no recollection of it and I have no record of it.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 3/3/98 Tr. 50) * * * * * ``Q Is it fair to say that back in November getting Monica Lewinsky a job on any fast pace was not any priority of yours? [Jordan]: I think that's fair to say.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/ 5/98 Tr. 76) * * * * * ``[Lewinsky]: [Referring to 12/6/97 meeting with the President]. I think I said that . . . I was supposed to get in touch with Mr. Jordan the previous week and that things did not work out and that nothing had really happened yet [on the job front]. Q Did the President say what he was going to do? [Lewinsky]: I think he said he would--you know, this was not sort of typical of him, to sort of say, `Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it.' '' (Lewinsky Grand Jury 8/6/98 Tr. 115-116) * * * * * ``Q But what is also clear is that as of this date, December 11th, you are clear that at that point you had made a decision that you would try to make some calls to help get her a job. [Jordan]: There is no question about that.'' (Jordan Grand Jury 5/5/98 Tr. 95) [Chart S] January 17, 1998 Saturday 4:00 p.m. (approx): THE PRESIDENT finishes testifying under oath in Jones v. Clinton, et al. 5:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones White House. 5:38 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home. 7:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home but does not speak with her. 702: p.m.: THE PRESIDENT places a call to Jordan's office. 7:13 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks her to meet with him on Sunday. January 18, 1998 Sunday 6:11 a.m.: Drudge Report Released. --: The President learns of the Drudge Report and [Tripp] tapes. 11:49 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House. 12:30 p.m.: Jordan has lunch with Bruce Lindsey. Lindsey informs Jordan about the Drudge Report and [Tripp] tapes. 12:50 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home. 1:11 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home. 2:15 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House. 2:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones THE PRESIDENT. 5:00 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT meets with Currie, concerning his contacts with Lewinsky. 5:12 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.'' 6:22 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.'' 7:06 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.'' 7:19 p.m.: Jordan telephones Cheryl Mills, White House Counsel's Office. 8:28 p.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Call Kay.'' 10:09 p.m.: Lewinsky telephones Currie at home. 11:02 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home and asks if she reached Lewinsky. January 19, 1998 Monday--Martin Luther King Day 7:02 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home at 8:00 this morning.'' 8:08 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay .'' 8:33 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home.'' 8:37 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kay at home. It's a social call. Thank you.'' 8:41 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Kay is at home. Please call.'' 8:43 a.m.: Currie telephones The President from home to say she has been unable to reach Lewinsky. 8:44 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Kate re: family emergency.'' 8:50 a.m. THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home. 8:51 a.m.: Currie pages Lewinsky: ``Msg. From Kay. Please call, have good news.'' 8:56 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at home. 10:29 a.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from his office. 10:35 a.m.: Jordan telephones Nancy Hernreich at the White House. 10:36 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at [number redacted].'' 10:44 a.m.: Jordan telephones Erskine Bowles at the White House. 10:53 a.m.: Jordan telephones Carter. 10:58 a.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office. 11:04 a.m.: Jordan telephones Bruce Lindsey at the White House. 11:16 a.m.: Jordan pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Mr. Jordan at [number redacted].'' 11:17 a.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey at the White House. 12:31 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a cellular phone. --:Jordan lunches with Carter. 1:45 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Currie at home. 2:29 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House from a celluar phone. 2:44 p.m.: Jordan enters the White House and over the course of an hour meets with THE PRESIDENT, Erskine Bowles, Bruce Lindsay, Cheryl Mills, Charles Ruff, Rahm Emanuel and others. 2:46 p.m.: Carter pages Lewinsky: ``Please call Frank Carter at [number redacted].'' 4:51 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home. 4:53 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at home. 4:54 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter at his office. Carter informs Jordan that Lewinsky has replaced Carter with a new attorney. 4:58 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's Office. 4:59 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's Office. 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's Office. 5:00 p.m.: Jordan telephones Ruff, White House Counsel's Office. 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's Office. 5:05 p.m.: Jordan again telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's Office. 5:05 p.m.: Jordan telephones the White House. 5:09 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's Office. 5:14 p.m.: Jordan telephones Carter concerning his termination as Lewinsky's attorney. 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Lindsey, White House Counsel's Office. 5:22 p.m.: Jordan telephones Mills, White House Counsel's Office. 5:55 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home. 5:56 p.m.: THE PRESIDENT telephones Jordan at his office; Jordan informs The President that Carter was fired. 6:04 p.m.: Jordan telephones Currie at home. 6:26 p.m.: Jordan telephones Stephen Goodin, an aide to THE PRESIDENT. ____ [Chart T] THE PRESIDENT'S POST-DEPOSITION STATEMENTS TO CURRIE 1/18/98 ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?'' ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?'' ``You could see and hear everything, right?'' ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''--(Currie Grand Jury 7/22/98 Tr. 6-7; Currie Grand Jury 1/27/98 Tr. 70-75) ____ [Chart U] THE PRESIDENT'S DENIALS 1/21/98 ``And it was at that point that he gave his account of what had happened to me [sic] and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, `Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' He rebuffed her. He said, `I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.' She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/4/98 Tr. 49) ``And he said, `I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon.' And I said to him, I said, `When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone? He said, `Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.'''--(Blumenthal Grand Jury 6/ 4/98 Tr. 50) ____ [Chart V] ``Q. Okay. Share that with us. A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever-- Q. Okay. A--that they had not had oral sex''--(John Podesta Grand Jury 6/16/98 Tr. 92) * * * * * ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to forgive you [The President] for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the various other things.'''--(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 10, 12, 20) * * * * * ``And I said, `They're just not ready for it,' meaning the voters.' And he [The President] said, `Well, we just have to win, then.'''--(Dick Morris Grand Jury 8/18/98 Tr. 30) ____ [Chart W] ``TALKING POINTS'' * January 24, 1998 * * * * * ``Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual relationship?'' ``A: Of course it would.'' * * * * * * Produced by the White House pursuant to OIC Subpoena. ____ [Chart X] THE PRESIDENT CLAIMS HE WAS TRUTHFUL WITH AIDES [President]: And so I said to them things that were true about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I would never have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course. But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter further. So I said things that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.--(The President Grand Jury 8/17/98 Tr. 106) ____ [Chart Y] GRAND JURY WITNESSES A person testifying before a federal grand jury has three options under the law: (1) To obey the oath and testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; (2) To lie; (3) To assert the Fifth Amendment or another legally recognized privilege. ____ [Chart Z] PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GRAND JURY TESTIMONY ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate contact. These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter. I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions. While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters. I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my statement.'' ____ Table of Contents Exhibits Telephone records (1) Summary chart, 12/19/97 (2) Currie Cell phone records, 12/28/97 (3) Summary chart, 1/6/98 (4) Summary chart, 1/7/98 (5) Summary chart, 1/15/98-1/16/98 (6) Summary chart, 1/17/98 (7) Summary chart, 1/18/98 (8) Summary chart, 1/19/98 Court Documents (9) Jones v. Clinton. Jan. 29, 1998 District Court Order regarding discovery (10) President Clinton's Answer to First Amended Complaint. Jones v. Clinton (11) In re: Sealed Case, Nos. 98-3053 & 3059, U.S. court of Appels, District of Columbia (12) Jane Doe #6 (Lewinsky) Affidavit filed in Jones v. Clinton (13) ``Sexual Relations'' definition Miscellaneous (14) 1/18/98 Drudge Report (15) Jones' attorneys fax cover sheet of witness list to Bennett (16) White House ``Talking Points,'' January 24, 1998 (17) LA Times 1/25/98 Article regarding White House ``Talking Points'' (18) Response of William J. Clinton to Judiciary Committee Questions (19) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 138 L. 16-23 (From GJ Tape 2) (20) President Clinton Grand Jury Tr. 100 L. 20-25, Tr. 105 L. 19-25, Tr. 106 L. 1-12 (From GJ Tape 3) (21) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 75 L. 2-8, Tr. 76 L. 24-25, Tr. 77 L. 1-2, (From Dep. Tape 1) (22) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 52 L. 18-25, Tr. 53 L. 1-9, 10-18, Tr. 58 L. 22-25, Tr. 59 L. 1-3, 7-16, 17-20 (From Dep. Tape 3) (23) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 78 L. 4-23, (From Dep. Tape 4) (24) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 53 L. 22-25, Tr. 54 L. 1-7, 20-25, Tr. 55 L. 1-3 (From Dep. Tape 5) (25) President Clinton Deposition Tr. 204 L. 5-14, (From Dep. 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Impeachment] In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON David E. Kendall Charles F.C. Ruff Nicole K. Seligman Gregory B. Craig Emmet T. Flood Bruce R. Lindsey Max Stier Cheryl D. Mills Glen Donath Lanny A. Breuer Alicia L. Marti Office of the White House Counsel Williams & Connolly The White House 725 12th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20502 Washington, D.C. 20005 January 13, 1999. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been Satisfied B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice C. Compound Charges and Vagueness II. BACKGROUND A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End B. The Paula Jones Litigation C. The President's Grand Jury Testimony About Ms. Lewinsky D. Proceedings in the House of Representatives III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND BURDEN OF PROOF FOR DECISION A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of High Crimes and Misdemeanors 1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged 2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an Intentionally High Standard for Removal b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government 3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton 4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are Not Present a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations Would Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and to Our Government of Separated Powers 5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong B. The Standard of Proof IV. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE I A. Applicable Law B. Structure of the Allegations C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article I 1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky 2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the Jones case 3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements of his attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition 4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case V. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED ON ARTICLE II A. Applicable Law B. Structure of the Allegations C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II 1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading'' 2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation 3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''-- gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the President's Actions 4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment offer d. Conclusion 5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit 6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony'' 7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides VI. THE STRUCTURAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE ARTICLES PRECLUDE A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND VOTE A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in Specificity 1. The Structure of Article I 2. The Structure of Article II B. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate the Constitutional Requirement That Two-Thirds of the Senate Reach Agreement that Specific Wrongdoing Has Been Proven 1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence Requirement b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single Accusation C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations 1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges 2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak Clearly and Intelligibly VII. THE NEED FOR DISCOVERY VIII. CONCLUSION TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON I. Introduction Twenty-six months ago, more than 90 million Americans left their homes and work places to travel to schools, church halls and other civic centers to elect a President of the United States. And on January 20, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton was sworn in to serve a second term of office for four years. The Senate, in receipt of Articles of Impeachment from the House of Representatives, is now gathered in trial to consider whether that decision should be set aside for the remaining two years of the President's term. It is a power contemplated and authorized by the Framers of the Constitution, but never before employed in our nation's history. The gravity of what is at stake--the democratic choice of the American people--and the solemnity of the proceedings dictate that a decision to remove the President from office should follow only from the most serious of circumstances and should be done in conformity with Constitutional standards and in the interest of the Nation and its people. The Articles of Impeachment that have been exhibited to the Senate fall far short of what the Founding Fathers had in mind when they placed in the hands of the Congress the power to impeach and remove a President from office. They fall far short of what the American people demand be shown and proven before their democratic choice is reversed. And they even fall far short of what a prudent prosecutor would require before presenting a case to a judge or jury. Take away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-flying rhetoric that has accompanied them, and we see clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from office because he: used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe the frequency of his improper intimate contacts with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. There were, according to the House Managers, eleven such contacts over the course of approximately 500 days. Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United States be removed from office because he used the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe eleven events over some 500 days? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do. used the word ``occasional'' to describe the frequency of inappropriate telephone conversations between he and Monica Lewinsky. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in between ten and fifteen such conversations spanning a 23-month period. Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United States be removed from office because he used the word ``occasional'' to describe up to 15 telephone calls over a 23-month period? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do. said the improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began in early 1996, while she recalls that it began in November 1995. And he said the contact did not include touching certain parts of her body, while she said it did. Should the will of the people be overruled and the President of the United States be removed from office because two people have a [[Page S192]] different recollection of the details of a wrongful relationship--which the President has admitted? That is what the House of Representatives asks the Senate to do. The Articles of Impeachment are not limited to the examples cited above, but the other allegations of wrongdoing are similarly unconvincing. There is the charge that the President unlawfully obstructed justice by allegedly trying to find a job for Monica Lewinsky in exchange for her silence about their relationship. This charge is made despite the fact that no one involved in the effort to find work for Ms. Lewinsky--including Ms. Lewinsky herself--testifies that there was any connection between the job search and the affidavit. Indeed, the basis for that allegation, Ms. Lewinsky's statements to Ms. Tripp, was expressly repudiated by Ms. Lewinsky under oath. There is also the charge that the President conspired to obstruct justice by arranging for Ms. Lewinsky to hide gifts that he had given her, even though the facts and the testimony contain no evidence that he did so. In fact, the evidence shows that the President gave her new gifts on the very day that the articles allege he conspired to conceal his gifts to her. In the final analysis, the House is asking the Senate to remove the President because he had a wrongful relationship and sought to keep the existence of that relationship private. Nothing said in this Trial Memorandum is intended to excuse the President's actions. By his own admission, he is guilty of personal failings. As he has publicly stated, ``I don't think there is a fancy way to say that I have sinned.'' He has misled his family, his friends, his staff, and the Nation about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He hoped to avoid exposure of personal wrongdoing so as to protect his family and himself and to avoid public embarrassment. He has acknowledged that his actions were wrong. By the same token, these actions must not be mischaracterized into a wholly groundless excuse for removing the President from the office to which he was twice elected by the American people. The allegations in the articles and the argument in the House Managers' Trial Memorandum do not begin to satisfy the stringent showing required by our Founding Fathers to remove a duly elected President from office, either as a matter of fact or law. a. the constitutional standard for impeachment has not been satisfied There is strong agreement among constitutional and legal scholars and historians that the substance of the articles does not amount to impeachable offenses. On November 6, 1998, 430 Constitutional law professors wrote: ``Did President Clinton commit `high Crimes and Misdemeanors' warranting impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that the misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . . does not cross the threshold. . . . [I]t is clear that Members of Congress could violate their constitutional responsibilities if they sought to impeach and remove the President for misconduct, even criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high constitutional standard required for impeachment.'' On October 28, 1998, more than 400 historians issued a joint statement warning that because impeachment had traditionally been reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power, impeachment of the President based on the facts alleged in the OIC Referral would set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward, they will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of caprices of any Congress. The Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our great national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the inevitable challenges of the future.'' We address why the charges in the two articles do not rise to the level of `high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' in Section III, Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof. B. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice Article I alleges perjury before a federal grand jury. Article II alleges obstruction of justice. Both perjury and obstruction of justice are statutory crimes. In rebutting the allegations contained in the articles of impeachment, this brief refers to the facts as well as to laws, legal principles, court decisions, procedural safeguards, and the Constitution itself. Those who seek to remove the President speak of the ``rule of law.'' Among the most fundamental rules of law are the principles that those who accuse have the burden of proof, and those who are accused have the right to defend themselves by relying on the law, established procedures, and the Constitution. These principles are not ``legalisms'' but rather the very essence of the ``rule of law'' that distinguishes our Nation from others. We respond, in detail, to those allegations whose substance we can decipher in Section IV, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I, and in Section V, The President Should Be Acquitted on Article II. C. Compound Charges and Vagueness If there were any doubt that the House of Representatives has utterly failed in its constitutional responsibility to the Senate and to the President, that doubt vanishes upon reading the Trial Memorandum submitted by the House Managers. Having proferred two articles of impeachment, each of which unconstitutionally combines multiple offenses and fails to give even minimally adequate notice of the charges it encompasses, the House--three days before the Managers are to open their case--is still expanding, not refining, the scope of those articles. In further violation of the most basic constitutional principles, their brief advances, merely as ``examples,'' nineteen conclusory allegations--eight of perjury under Article I and eleven of obstruction of justice under Article II, some of which have never appeared before, even in the Report submitted by the Judiciary Committee (``Committee Report''), much less in the Office of Independent Counsel (``OIC'') Referral or in the articles themselves.\1\ If the target the Managers present to the Senate and to the President is still moving now, what can the President expect in the coming days? Is there any point at which the President will be given the right accorded a defendant in the most minor criminal case--to know with certainty the charges against which he must defend? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ For example, the House managers add a charge that the President engaged in ``legalistic hair splitting [in his response to the 81 questions] in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct'' the Committee. This charge was specifically rejected by the full House of Representatives when it rejected Article IV. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Senate, we know, fully appreciates these concerns and has, in past proceedings, dealt appropriately with articles far less flawed than these. The constitutional concerns raised by the House's action are addressed in Section VI, The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a Constitutionally Sound Vote. II. Background A. The Whitewater Investigative Dead-End The Lewinsky investigation emerged in January 1998 from the long-running Whitewater investigation. On August 5, 1994, the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Court Circuit appointed Kenneth W. Starr as Independent Counsel to conduct an investigation centering on two Arkansas entities, Whitewater Development Company, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association. In the spring of 1997, OIC investigators, without any expansion of jurisdiction, interviewed Arkansas state troopers who had once been assigned to the Governor's security detail, and ``[t]he troopers said Starr's investigators asked about 12 to 15 women by name, including Paula Corbin Jones. . . .'' Woodward & Schmidt, ``Starr Probes Clinton Personal Life,'' The Washington Post (June 25, 1997) at A1 (emphasis added). ``The nature of the questioning marks a sharp departure from previous avenues of inquiry in the three-year old investigation. . . . Until now, . . . what has become a wide-ranging investigation of many aspects of Clinton's governorship has largely steered clear of questions about Clinton's relationships with women. . . .'' \2\ One of the most striking aspects of this new phase of the Whitewater investigation was the extent to which it focused on the Jones case. One of the troopers interviewed declared, ``[t]hey asked me about Paula Jones, all kinds of questions about Paula Jones, whether I saw Clinton and Paula together and how many times.'' \3--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Ibid. Trooper Roger Perry, a 21-year veteran of the Arkansas state police, stated that he ``was asked about the most intimate details of Clinton's life: `I was left with the impression that they wanted me to show he was a womanizer. . . . All they wanted to talk about was women.' '' Ibid. (Ellipsis in original). \3\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In his November 19, 1998, testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Starr conceded that his agents had conducted these interrogations and acknowledged that at that time, he had not sought expansion of his jurisdiction from either the Special Division or the Attorney General.\4\ Mr. Starr contended that these inquiries were somehow relevant to his Whitewater investigation: ``we were, in fact interviewing, as good prosecutors, good investigators do, individuals who would have information that may be relevant to our inquiry about the President's involvement in Whitewater, in Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan and the like.''\5\ It seems irrefutable, however, that the OIC was in fact engaged in an unauthorized attempt to gather embarrassing information about the President--information wholly unrelated to Whitewater or Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan, but potentially relevant to the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Transcript of November 19, 1998 House Judiciary Committee Hearing at 377-378. \5\ Ibid. at 378. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. The Paula Jones Litigation The Paula Jones lawsuit made certain allegations about events she said had occurred three years earlier, in 1991, when the President was Governor of Arkansas. Discovery in the case had been stayed until the Supreme Court's decision on May 27, 1997, denying the President temporary immunity from suit.\6\ Shortly thereafter, Ms. Jones' legal team began a public relations offensive against the President, headed by Ms. Jones' new spokesperson, Mr. Susan Carpenter-McMillan, and her new counsel affiliated with the conservation Rutherford Institute.\7\ ``I will [[Page S193]] never deny that when I first heard about this case I said, ``Okay, good. We're gonna get that little slimeball,' said Ms. Carpenter-McMillan.''\8\ While Ms. Jones' previous attorneys, Messrs. Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata, had largely avoided the media, as the Jones civil suit increasingly became a partisan vehicle to try to damage the President, public personal attacks became the order of the day.\9\ As is now well known, this effort led ultimately to the Jones lawyers being permitted to subpoena various women, to discover the nature of their relationship, if any, with the President, allegedly for the purpose of determining whether they had information relevant to the sexual harassment charge. Among these women was Ms. Lewinsky. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). \7\ Ms. Jones was described as having ``accepted financial support of a Virginia conservative group,'' which intended to ``raise $100,000 or more on Jones's behalf, although the money will go for expenses and not legal fees.'' ``Jones Acquires New Lawyers and Backing,'' The Washington Post (October 2, 1998) at A1. Jones' new law firm, the Dallas- based Radar, Campbell, Fisher and Pyke, had ``represented conservatives in antiabortion cases and other causes.'' Ibid. See also Dallas Lawyers Agree to Take on Paula Jones' Case-- Their Small Firm Has Ties to Conservative Advocacy Group,'' The Los Angeles Times (Oct. 2, 1997) (Rutherford Institute a ``conservative advocacy group.''). \8\ ``Cause Celebre: An Antiabortion Activist Makes Herself the Unofficial Mouthpiece for Paula Jones.'' The Washington Post (July 23, 1998) at C1. Ms. Carpenter-McMillan, ``a cause-oriented, self-defined conservative feminist''', described her role as `flaming the White House'' and declared ```Unless Clinton wants to be terribly embarrassed, he'd better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody that comes out and testifies against Paula better have the past of a Mother Teresa, because our investigators will investigate their morality.''' ``Paula Jones' Team Not All About Teamwork,'' USA Today (Sept. 29, 1997) at 4A. \9\ After Ms. Jones' new team had been in action for three months, one journalist commented: ``In six years of public controversy over Clinton's personal life, what is striking in some ways is how little the debate changes. As in the beginning, many conservatives nurture the hope that the past will be Clinton's undoing. Jone's adviser, Susan Carpenter- McMillan, acknowledged on NBC's `Meet the Press' yesterday that her first reaction when she first heard Jone's claims about Clinton was, ``Good, we're going to get that little slime ball.'' (Harris, ``Jones Case Tests Political Paradox,'' The Washington Post (Jan. 19, 1998) at A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In January 1998, Mr. Linda Tripp notified the OIC of certain information she believed she had about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case. At that time, the OIC investigation began to intrude formally into the Jones case: the OIC met with Ms. Tripp through the week of January 12, and with her cooperation taped Ms. Lewinsky discussing the Jones case and the President. Ms. Tripp also informed the OIC that she had been surreptitiously taping conversations with Ms. Lewinsky in violation of Maryland law, and in exchange for her cooperation, the OIC promised Ms. Tripp immunity from federal prosecution, and assistance in protecting her from state prosecution.\10\ On Friday, January 16, after Ms. Tripp wore a body wire and had taped conversations with Ms. Lewinsky for the OIC, the OIC received jurisdiction from the Attorney General and formalized an immunity agreement with Ms. Tripp in writing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United States House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 595(C), H. Doc. 105-316 (hereinafter ``Supp.'') at 3758-3759, 4371-4373 (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 28, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The President's deposition in the Jones case was scheduled to take place the next day, on Saturday, January 17. As we now know, Ms. Tripp met with and briefed the lawyers for Ms. Jones the night before the deposition on her perception of the relationship between Ms. Lewinsky and the President-- doing so based on confidences Ms. Lewinsky had entrusted to her.\11\ She was permitted to do so even though she has been acting all week at the behest of the OIC and was dependent on the OIC to use its best efforts to protect her from state prosecution. At the deposition the next day, the President was asked numerous questions about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky by lawyers who already knew the answers. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ Baker, ``Linda Tripp Briefed Jones Team on Tapes: Meeting Occurred Before Clinton Deposition,'' The Washington Post (Feb. 14, 1998) at A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Jones case, of course, was not about Ms. Lewinsky. She was a peripheral player and, since her relationship with the President was concededly consensual, irrelevant to Ms. Jones' case. Shortly after the President's deposition, Chief Judge Wright ruled that evidence pertaining to Ms. Lewinsky would not be admissible at the Jones trial because ``it is not essential to the core issues in this case.'' \12\ The Court also ruled that, given the allegations at issue in the Jones case, the Lewinsky evidence ``might be inadmissible as extrinsic evidence'' under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it involved merely the ``specific instances of conduct'' of a witness.\13--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ Order, at 2, Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.) (Jan. 29, 1998). \13\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On April 1, 1998, the Court ruled that Ms. Jones had no case and granted summary judgment for the President. Although Judge Wright ``viewed the record in the light most favorable to [Ms. Jones] and [gave] her the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences,'' \14\ the Court ruled that, as a matter of law, she simply had no case against President Clinton, both because ``there is no genuine issue as to any material fact'' and because President Clinton was ``entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'' Id. at 11-12. After reviewing all the proffered evidence, the Court ruled that ``the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for'' Ms. Jones. Id. at 39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \14\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290 (E.D. Ark.), Memorandum Opinion and Order (April 1, 1998), at 3 n.3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- c. the president's grand jury testimony about ms. lewinsky On August 17, 1998, the President voluntarily testified to the grand jury and specifically acknowledged that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky involving ``improper intimate contact,'' and that he `'engaged in conduct that was wrong.'' App. at 461.\15\ He described how the relationship began and how he had ended it early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He stated to the grand jury ``it's an embarrassing and personally painful thing, the truth about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky,'' App. at 533, and told the grand jurors, ``I take full responsibility for it. It wasn't her fault, it was mine.'' App. at 589-90. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \15\ Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 595(c), H. Doc. 105-311 (hereinafter ``App.'') at 461 (House Judiciary Committee) (Sept. 18, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The President also explained how he had tried to navigate the deposition in the Jones case months earlier without admitting what he admitted to the grand jury--that he had been engaged in an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Id. a 530-531. He further testified that the ``inappropriate encounters'' with Ms. Lewinsky had ended, at his insistence, in early 1997. He declined to describe, because of considerations of personal privacy and institutional dignity, certain specifics about his conduct with Ms. Lewinsky,\16\ but he indicated his willingness to answer,\17\ and he did answer, the other questions put to him about his relationship with her. No one who watched the videotape of this grand jury testimony had any doubt that the President admitted to having had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters.'' App. at 461. \17\ ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations,' as I understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 461. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. proceedings in the house of representatives On September 9, 1998, Mr. Starr transmitted a Referral to the House of Representatives that alleged eleven acts by the President related to the Lewinsky matter that, in the opinion of the OIC, ``may constitute grounds for an impeachment.'' \18\ The allegations fell into three broad categories: lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, Section 595(c), at 1 (House Judiciary Committee) (printed September 11, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The House Judiciary held a total of four hearings and called but one witness: Kenneth W. Starr. The Committee allowed the President's lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses who testified that the facts, as alleged, did not constitute an impeachable offense, did not reveal an abuse of power, and would not support a case for perjury or obstruction of justice that any reasonable prosecutor would bring. White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on behalf of the President, which is incorporated into this Trial Memorandum by reference.\19--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Also incorporated by reference into this Trial Memorandum are the four prior submissions of the President to the House of Representatives: Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral of Office of Independent Counsel (September 11, 1998) (73 pages); Initial Response to Referral of Office of Independent Counsel (September 12, 1998) (42 pages); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment (October 2, 1998) (30 pages); Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the House Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives (December 8, 1998) (184 pages). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 11 and 12, the Judiciary Committee voted essentially along party lines to approve four articles of impeachment. Republicans defeated the alternative resolution of censure offered by certain Committee Democrats. Almost immediately after censure failed in the Committee, the House Republican leadership declared publicly that no censure proposal would be considered by the full House when it considered the articles of impeachment.\20--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ See Baker & Eilperin, ``GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to Debate Censure in House: Panel Votes Final, Trimmed Article of Impeachment,'' The Washington Post (Dec. 13, 1998) at A1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 19, 1998, voting essentially on party lines, the House of Representatives approved two articles of impeachment: Article I, which alleged perjury before the grand jury, passed by a vote of 228 to 206 and Article III, which alleged obstruction of justice, passed by a vote of 221 to 212. The full House defeated two other Articles: Article II, which alleged that the President committed perjury in his civil deposition, and Article IV, which alleged abuse of power. Consideration of a censure resolution was blocked, even though members of both parties had expressed a desire to vote on such an option. From beginning to end the House process was both partisan and unfair. Consider: The House released the entire OIC Referral to the public without ever reading it, reviewing it, editing it, or allowing the President's counsel to review it; [[Page S194]] The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee said he had ``no interest in not working in a bipartisan way''; \21--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ Associated Press (March 25, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Chairman also pledged a process the American people would conclude was fair; \22--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ ``This whole proceeding will fall on its face if it's not perceived by the American people to be fair.'' Financial Times (Sept. 12, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Speaker-Designate of the House endorsed a vote of conscience on a motion to censure;\23--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ ``The next House Speaker, Robert Livingston, said the coming impeachment debate should allow lawmakers to make a choice between ousting President Clinton and imposing a lesser penalty such as censure. The Louisiana Republican said the House can't duck a vote on articles of impeachment if reported next month by its Judiciary Committee. But an `alternative measure is possible' he said, and the GOP leadership should `let everybody have a chance to vote on the option of their choice.' '' Wall Street Journal (Nov. 23, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Members of the House were shown secret ``evidence'' in order to influence their vote--evidence which the President's counsel still has not been able to review. III. The Constitutional Standard and Burden of Proof for Decision A. The Offenses Alleged Do Not Meet the Constitutional Standard of High Crimes and Misdemeanors 1. The Senate Has a Constitutional Duty to Confront the Question Whether Impeachable Offenses Have Been Alleged It is the solemn duty of the Senate to consider the question whether the articles state an impeachable offense.\24\ That Constitutional question has not, in the words of one House Manager, ``already been resolved by the House.'' \25\ To the contrary, that question now awaits the Senate's measured consideration and independent judgment. Indeed, throughout our history, resolving this question has been an essential part of the Senate's constitutional obligation to ``try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. Art. Sec. 3, cl.7. In the words of John Logan, a House Manager in the 1868 proceedings: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ In the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, the President's counsel answered (to at least one article) that the matters alleged ``do not charge or allege the commission of any act whatever by this respondent, in his office of President of the United States, nor the omission by this respondent of any act of official obligation or duty in his office of President of the United States.'' 1 Trial of Andrew Johnson (1868) (``TAJ'') 53. \25\ See Statement of Rep. Bill McCollum: ``[A]re these impeachable offenses, which I think has already been resolved by the House. I think constitutionally that's our job to do.'' Fox News Sunday (January 3, 1999). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``It is the rule that all questions of law or fact are to be decided, in these proceedings, by the final vote upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is also the rule, that in determining this general issue senators must consider the sufficiency or insufficiency in law or in fact of every article of accusation.''\26--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ Closing argument of Manager John H. Logan, 2 TAJ 18 (emphasis added). See also Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Impeachment Issues at 25-26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (``Because the Senate acts as both judge and jury in an impeachment trial, the Senate's conviction on a particular article of impeachment reflects the Senate's judgment not only that the accused engaged in the misconduct underlying the article but also that the article stated an impeachable offense''). We respectfully suggest that the articles exhibited here do not state wrongdoing that constitutes impeachable offenses under our Constitution. 2. The Constitution Requires a High Standard of Proof of ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for Removal a. The Constitutional Text and Structure Set an Intentionally High Standard for Removal The Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Constitution, Art. II, section 4. The charges fail to meet the high standard that the Framers established.\27--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ For a more complete discussion of the Standards for Impeachment, please see Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the House Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives at 24-43 (December 8, 1998); Memorandum Regarding Standards of Impeachment (October 2, 1998); and Impeachment of William Jefferson, President of the United States, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary to Accompany H. Res. 611, H. Rpt. 105-830, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 332-39 (citing Minority Report). References to pages 2-203 of the Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Committee Report.'' References to pages 329-406 of the Committee Report will be cited hereinafter as ``Minority Report.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The syntax of the Constitutional standard ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' (emphasis added) strongly suggests, by the interpretive principle noscitur a sociis,28 that, to be impeachable offenses, high crimes and misdemeanors must be of the seriousness of ``Treason'' and ``Bribery.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ `` `It is known from its associates' . . . the meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words.'' Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (4th ed. 1968). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Our Constitutional structure reaffirms that the standard must be a very high one. Ours is a Constitution of separated powers. In that Constitution, the President does not serve at the will of Congress, but as the directly elected,\29\ solitary head of the Executive Branch. The Constitution reflects a judgment that a strong Executive, executing the law independently of legislative will, is a necessary protection for a free people. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Of course, that election takes place through the mediating activity of the Electoral College. See U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 2-3 and Amend. XII. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- These elementary facts of constitutional structure underscore the need for a very high standard for impeachment. The House Managers, in their Brief, suggest that the failure to remove the President would raise the standard for impeachment higher than the Framers intended. They say that if the Senate does not remove the President, ``The bar will be so high that only a convicted felon or a traitor will need to be concerned.'' But that standard is just a modified version of the plain language of Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, which says a President can only be impeached and removed for ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The Framers wanted a high bar. It was not the intention of the Framers that the President should be subject to the will of the dominant legislative party. As Alexander Hamilton said in a warning against the politicization of impeachment: ``There will always be the greater danger that the decision will be regulated more by comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.'' Federalist 65. Our system of government does not permit Congress to unseat the President merely because it disagrees with his behavior or his policies. The Framers' decisive rejection of parliamentary government is one reason they caused the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' to appear in the Constitution itself. They chose to specify those categories of offenses subject to the impeachment power, rather than leave that judgment to the unfettered whim of the legislature. Any just and proper impeachment process must be reasonably viewed by the public as arising from one of those rare cases when the Legislature is compelled to stand in for all the people and remove a President whose continuation in office threatens grave harm to the Republic. Indeed, it is not exaggeration to say--as a group of more than 400 leading historians and constitutional scholars publicly stated--that removal on these articles would ``mangle the system of checks and balances that is our chief safeguard against abuses of public power.'' \30\ Removal of the President on these grounds would defy the constitutional presumption that the removal power rests with the people in elections, and it would do incalculable damage to the institution of the Presidency. If ``successful,'' removal here ``will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.'' \31--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution (Oct. 28, 1998) (``Statement of Historians''); see also Schmitt, ``Scholars and Historians Assail Clinton Impeachment Inquiry,'' The New York Times (Oct. 19, 1998) at A18. \31\ Statement of Historians. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Framers made the President the sole nationally elected public official (together with the Vice-President), responsible to all the people. Therefore, when articles of impeachment have been exhibited, the Senate confronts this inescapable question: is the alleged misconduct so profoundly serious, so malevolent to our Constitutional system, that it justifies undoing the people's decision? Is the wrong alleged of a sort that not only demands removal of the President before the ordinary electoral cycle can do its work, but also justifies the national trauma that accompanies the impeachment trial process itself? The wrongdoing alleged here does not remotely meet that standard. b. The Framers Believed that Impeachment and Removal Were Appropriate Only for Offenses Against the System of Government ``[H]igh Crimes and Misdemeanors'' refers to nothing short of Presidential actions that are ``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \32\ Impeachment was never intended to be a remedy for private wrongs. It was intended to be a method of removing a President whose continued presence in the Office would cause grave danger to the Nation and our Constitutional system of government.\33\ Thus, ``in all but the most extreme instances, impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office, not private misconduct unrelated to public office.'' \34--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ George Mason, 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 550 (Rev. ed. 1966). \33\ As the 1975 Watergate staff report concluded ``Impeachment is the first step in remedial process--removal from office and possible disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain constitutional government. . . . In an impeachment proceeding a President is called to account for abusing powers that only a President possesses.'' Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1974) (``Nixon Impeachment Inquiry''). \34\ Minority Report at 337. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Impeachment was designed to be a means of redressing wrongful public conduct. As scholar and Justice James Wilson wrote, ``our President . . . is amendable to [the laws] in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment.'' \35\ As such, impeachment is limited to certain forms of wrongdoing. Alexander [[Page S195]] Hamilton described the subject of the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction as ``those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself.'' 36 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \35\ 2 Elliot, The Debate in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 480 (reprint of 2d ed.) \36\ The Federalist No. 65 at 331 (Gary Wills ed. 1982). As one of the most respected of the early commentators explained, the impeachment ``power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to the society in its political character.'' Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Sec. 744. (reprint of 1st ed. 1833). The Framers ``intended that a president be removable from office for the commission of great offenses against the Constitution.'' \37\ Impeachment therefore addresses public wrongdoing, whether denominated a ``political crime [ ] against the state,'' \38\ or ``an act of malfeasance or abuse of office,'' \39\ or a ``great offense [ ] against the federal government.'' \40\ Ordinary civil and criminal wrongs can be addressed through ordinary judicial processes. And ordinary political wrongs can be addressed at the ballot box and by public opinion. Impeachment is reserved for the most serious public misconduct, those aggravated abuses of executive power that, given the President's four-year term, might otherwise go unchecked. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ John Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 94 (1978). \38\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment 61 (1973). \39\ Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707, 724 (1987/1988). \40\ Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1989). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. Past Precedents Confirm that Allegations of Dishonesty Do Not Alone State Impeachable Offenses Because impeachment of a President nullifies the popular will of the people, as evidence by an election, it must be used with great circumspection. As applicable precedents establish, it should not be used to punish private misconduct. a. The Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon Five articles of impeachment were proposed against then- President Nixon by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in 1974. Three were approved and two were not. The approved articles alleged official wrongdoing. Article I charged President Nixon with ``using the powers of his high office [to] engage [ ] . . . in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct'' the Watergate investigation.\41\ Article II described the President as engaging in ``repeated and continuing abuse of the powers of the Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle of the rule of law in our system of government'' thereby ``us[ing] his power as President to violate the Constitution and the law of the land.'' \42\ Article III charged the President with refusing to comply with Judiciary Committee subpoenas in frustration of a power necessary to ``preserve the integrity of the impeachment process itself and the ability of Congress to act as the ultimate safeguard against improper Presidential conduct.'' \43--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \41\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess, H. Rep. 93-1305 (Aug. 20, 1974) (hereinafter ``Nixon Report'') at 133. \42\ Nixon Report at 180. \43\ Id. 212-13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On article not approved by the House Judiciary Committee charged that President Nixon both ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' \44\ The President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,\45\ and there was reason to believe that the underlying facts would have supported a criminal prosecution against President Nixon himself.\46--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \44\ Id. at 220. The President was alleged to have failed to report certain income, to have taken improper tax deductions, and to have manufactured (either personally or through his agents) false documents to support the deductions taken. \45\ Given the underlying facts, that act might have provided the basis for multiple criminal charges; conviction on, for example, the tax evasion charge, could have subjected President Nixon to a 5-year prison term. \46\ See Nixon Report at 344 (``the Committee was told by a criminal fraud tax expert that on the evidence presented to the Committee, if the President were an ordinary taxpayer, the government would seek to send him to jail'') (Statement of Additional Views of Mr. Mezvinsky, et al.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Specifying the applicable standard for impeachment, the majority staff concluded that ``[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of the president office.'' \47--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Nixon Impeachment Inquiry at 26 (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- And the minority views of many Republican members were in substantial agreement: ``the framers . . . were concerned with preserving the government from being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man. . . . [I]t is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the President should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system of government established by the Constitution.'' \48--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ Nixon Report at 364-365 (Minority Views of Messrs. Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, Maraziti and Latta). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The legal principle that impeachable offenses required misconduct dangerous to our system of government provided one basis for the Committee's rejection of the fraudulent-tax- return charge. As Congressman Hogan (R-Md.) put the matter, the Constitution's phrase ``high crime signified a crime against the system of government, not merely a serious crime,''\49\ As noted, the tax-fraud charge, involving an act which did not demonstrate public misconduct, was rejected by an overwhelming (and bipartisan) 26-12 margin.\50--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ Id. (quoting with approval conclusion of Nixon Impeachment Inquiry). \50\ Nixon Report at 220. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. The Financial Misdealing Allegation Against Alexander Hamilton In 1792, Congress investigated Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton for alleged financial misdealings with a convicted swindler. Hamilton had made payments to the swindler and had urged his wife (Hamilton's paramour) to burn incriminating correspondence. Members of Congress investigated the matter and it came to the attention of President Washington and future Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. This private matter was not deemed worthy of removing Mr. Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury.\51\ Even when it eventually became public, it was no barrier to Hamilton's appointment to high position in the United States Army. Although not insignificant, Hamilton's behavior was essentially private. It was certain not regarded as impeachable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ See generally Rosenfeld, ``Founding Fathers Didn't Flinch,'' The Los Angeles Times (September 18, 1980). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. The Views of Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars Confirm that Impeachable Offenses Are not Present a. No Impeachable Offense Has Been Stated Here There is strong agreement among consititutional scholars and historians that the articles do not charge impeachable offenses. As Professor Michael Gerhardt summarized in his recent testimony before a subcommitte of the House of Representatives, there is ``widespread recognition [of] a paradigmatic case for impeachment.''\52\ In such a case, ``there must be a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable official and the latter's official duties.''\53--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \52\ Statement of Professor Michael J. Gerhardt Before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee Regarding the Background and History of Impeachment (November 9, 1998) at 13 (``Subcommittee Hearings''). \53\Ibid. (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is no such nexus here. Indeed the allegations are so far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself. As the more than 400 prominent historians and constitutional scholars warned in their public statement: ``[t]he theory of impeachment underlying these efforts is unprecedented in our history . . . [and is] are extremely ominous for the future of our political insitutions. If carried forward, [the current processes] will leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at the mercy as never before of the caprices of any Congress.\54--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ Statement of Historians. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Similarly, in a letter to the House of Representatives, an extraordinary group of 430 legal scholars argued together that these offenses, even if proven true, did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense.\55\ The gist of these scholarly objections is that the alleged wrongdoing is insufficiently connected to the exercise of public office. Because the articles charge wrongdoing of an essentially private nature, any harm such behavior poses is too removed from our system of government to justify unseating the President. Numerous scholars, opining long before the current controversy, have emphasized the necessary connection of impeachable wrongs to threats against the state itself. They have found that impeachment should be reserved for: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ See Letter of 430 Law Professors to Messrs. Gingrich, Gephardt, Hyde and Conyers (released Nov. 6, 1998). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``offenses against the government'';\56--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \56\ Labovitx, Presidential Impeachment at 26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``political crime against the state''; \57--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ Berger, Impeachment at 61. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``serious assaults on the integrity of the processes of government''; \58--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ Charles L. Black, Jr. Impeachment: A Handbook 38-39 (1974). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``wrongdoing convincingly established [and] so egregious that [the President's] continuation in office is intolerable'';\59--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \59\ Labovitz Presidential Impeachment at 110. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``malfeasance or abuse of office,''\60\ bearing a ``functional relationship'' to public office; \61--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ Rotunda, 76 Ky. L.J. at 726. \61\ Ibid. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``great offense[s] against the federal government''; \62--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \62\ Gerhardt, 68 Tex. L. Rev. at 85. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``acts which, like treason and bribery, undermine the integrity of government.'' 63 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ Committee on Federal Legislation of the Bar Ass'n of the City of New York, The Law of Presidential Impeachment 18 (1974). The articles contain nothing approximating that level of wrongdoing. Indeed the House Managers themselves acknowledge that ``the President's [alleged] perjury and obstruction [[Page S196]] do not directly involve his official conduct.'' 64 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ House Br. at 109. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. To Make Impeachable Offenses of These Allegations would Forever Lower the Bar in a Way Inimical to the Presidency and to Our Government of Separated powers These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual misbehavior. These kinds of wrongs are simply not subjects fit for impeachment. To remove a President on this basis would lower the impeachment bar to an unprecedented level and create a devastating precedent. As Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., addressing this problem, has testified: ``Lowering the bar for impeachment creates a novel . . . revolutionary theory of impeachment, [and] . . . would send us on an adventure with ominous implications for the separation of powers that the Constitution established as the basis of our political order. It would permanently weaken the Presidency.'' 65 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Arthur Schlesinger, Tr. at 2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The lowering of the bar that Professor Schlesinger described must stop here. Professor Jack Rakove made a similar point when he stated that ``Impeachment [is] a remedy to be deployed only in . . . unequivocal cases where . . . the insult to the constitutional system is grave.'' 66 Indeed, he said, there ``would have to be a high degree of consensus on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in both Houses to proceed.'' 67 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ Subcommittee Hearings (Written Statement of Professor Jack Rakove at 4). \67\ Subcommittee Hearings (Oral Testimony of Professor Rakove). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Bipartisan consensus was, of course, utterly lacking in the House of Representatives. No civil officer--no President, no judge, no cabinet member--has ever been impeached by so narrow a margin as supported the articles exhibited here.68 The closeness and partisan division of the vote reflect the constitutionally dubious nature of the charges. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ The present articles were approved by margins of 228-206 (Article I) and 221-212 (Article II). All prior resolutions were approved by substantially wider margins in the House of Representatives. See Impeachments of the following civil officers: Judge John Pickering (1803) (45-8; Justice Samuel Chase (1804) (73-32; Judge James Peck (1830) 143-49; Judge West Humphreys (1862) (no vote available, but resolution of impeachment voted ``without division,'' see 3 Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2386); President Andrew Johnson (1868) (128-47; Judge James Belknap (1876) (unanimous); Judge Charles Swayne (1903) (unanimous); Judge Robert Archbald (1912) (223-1); Judge George English (1925) (306-62); Judge Harold Louderback (1932) (183--143); Judge Halsted Ritter (1933) (181-146); Judge Harry Claiborne (1986) (406-0); Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. (1988) (417-0); Judge Alcee L. Hastings (1988) (413-3). The impeachment resolution against Senator William Bount in 1797 was by voice vote and so no specific count was recorded. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When articles are based on sexual wrongdoing, and when they have passed only by the narrowest, partisan margin, the future of our constitutional politics is in the balance. The very stability of our Constitutional government may depend upon the Senate's response to these articles. Nothing about this case justifies removal of a twice-elected President, because no ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are alleged. 5. Comparisons to Impeachment of Judges Are Wrong The House Managers suggest that perjury per se is an impeachable offense because (1) several federal judges have been impeached and removed for perjury, and (2) those precedents control this case. See House Br. at 95-105. That notion is erroneous. It is blind both to the qualitative differences among different allegations of perjury and the very basic differences between federal judges and the President. First, the impeachment and removal of a Federal judge, while a very solemn task, implicates very different considerations than the impeachment of a president. Federal judges are appointed without public approval and enjoy life tenure without public accountability. Consequently, they hold their offices under our Constitution only ``during good behavior.'' Under our system, impeachment is the only way to remove a Federal judge from office--even a Federal judge sitting in jail.69 By contrast, a president is elected by the Nation to a term, limited to a specified number of years, and he faces accountability in the form of elections. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ Former House Judiciary Committee Chairman Peter Rodino, during a recent judicial impeachment proceeding, cogently explained the unique position that Federal judges hold in our Constitutional system: ``The judges of our Federal courts occupy a unique position of trust and responsibility in our government: They are the only members of any branch that hold their office for life; they are purposely insulated from the immediate pressures and shifting currents of the body politic. But with the special prerogative of judicial independence comes the most exacting standard of public and private conduct . . . The high standard of behavior for judges is inscribed in article III of the Constitution, which provides that judges ``shall hold offices during good behavior. . . .'' (132 Cong. Rec. H4712 (July 22, 1986) (impeachment of Judge Harry E. Claiborne) (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Second, whether an allegedly perjurious statement rises to the level of an impeachable offense depends necessarily on the particulars of that statement, and the relation of those statements to the fulfillment of official responsibilities. In the impeachment of Judge Harry Claiborne, the accused had been convicted of filing false income tax returns.\70\ As a judge, Claiborne was charged with the responsibility of hearing tax-evasion cases. Once convicted, he simply could not perform his official functions because his personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an arbiter of others' oaths. His wrongdoing bore a direct connection to the performance of his judicial tasks. The inquiry into President Nixon disclosed similar wrongdoing, but the House Judiciary Committee refused to approve an article of impeachment against the President on that basis. The case of Judge Walter Nixon is similar. He was convicted of making perjurious statements concerning his intervention in a judicial proceeding, which is to say, employing the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage for a party.\71\ Although the proceeding at issue was not in his court, his use of the judicial office for the private gain of a party to a judicial proceeding directly implicated his official functions. Finally, Judge Alcee Hastings was impeached and removed for making perjurious statements at his trial for conspiring to fix cases in his own court.\72\ As with Judges Claiborne and Nixon, Judge Hastings' perjurious statements were immediately and incurably detrimental to the performance of his official duties. The allegations against the President, which (as the Managers acknowledge) ``do not directly involve his official conduct,'' House Br. at 109, simply do not involve wrongdoing of gravity sufficient to foreclose effective performance of the Presidential office. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \70\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-48 at 291-98 (1986) (``Claiborne Proceedings''). \71\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 at 430-440 (1989) (``Judge Nixon Proceedings''). \72\ See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 (1989). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Impeachment scholar John Labovitz, writing of the judicial impeachment cases predating Watergate, observed that: ``For both legal and practical reasons, th[e] [judicial impeachment] cases did not necessarily affect the grounds for impeachment of a president. The practical reason was that it seemed inappropriate to determine the fate of an elected chief executive on the basis of law developed in proceedings directed at petty misconduct by obscure judges. The legal reason was that the Constitution provides that judges serve during good behavior. . . . [T]he [good behavior] clause made a difference in judicial impeachments, confounding the application of these cases to presidential impeachment''.\73 \73\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment at 92-93 (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus, the judicial precedents relied upon by the House Managers have only ``limited force when applied to the impeachment of a President.''\74--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \74\ Office of Senate Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Impeachment Issues at 26 (Oct. 7, 1988) (summarizing view of some commentators). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The most telling rejoinder to the House's argument comes from President Ford. His definition of impeachable offenses, offered as a congressman in 1970 in connection with an effort to impeach Associate Justice William O. Douglas--that it is, in essence, ``whatever the majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be''--has been cited. Almost never noted is the more important aspect of then-Congressman Ford's statement--that, in contrast to the life-tenure of judges, because presidents can be removed by the electorate, ``to remove them in midterm . . . would indeed require crimes of the magnitude of treason and bribery.''\75--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ 116 Cong. Rec. 11912, 11913, (1970). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. the standard of proof Beyond the question of what constitutes an impeachable offense, each Senator must confront the question of what standard the evidence must meet to justify a vote of ``guilty.'' The Senate has, of course, addressed this issue before--most recently in the trials of Judge Claiborne and Judge Hastings. We recognize that the Senate chose in the Claiborne proceedings, and reaffirmed in the Hastings trial, not to impose itself any single standard of proof but, rather, to leave that judgment to the conscience of each senator. Many Senators here today were present for the debate on this issue and chose a standard by which to test the evidence. For many Senators, however, the issue is a new one. And none previously has had to face the issue in the special context of a Presidential impeachment. We argued before the House Judiciary Committee that it must treat a vote to impeach as, in effect, a vote to remove the President from office and that a decision of such moment ought not to be based on anything less than ``clear and convincing'' evidence. That standard is higher than the ``preponderance of the evidence'' test applicable to the ordinary civil case but lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt test applicable to a criminal case. Nonetheless, we felt that the clear and convincing standard was consistent with the grave responsibility of triggering a process that might result in the removal of a president. In fact, it had been the standard agreed upon by both Watergate Committee majority and minority counsel (as well as counsel for President Nixon) twenty-four years ago. Certainly no lesser standard should be applied in the Senate. Indeed, we submit that the gravity of the decision the Senate must [[Page S197]] reach should lead each Senator to go further and ask whether the House has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Both lawyers and laymen too often treat the standard of proof as meaningless legal jargon with no application to the real world of difficult decisions. But it is much more than that. In our system of justice, it is the guidepost that shows the way through the labyrinth of conflicting evidence. It tells the factfinder to look within and ask: ``Would I make the most important decisions of my life based on the degree of certainty I have about these facts?'' In the unique legal-political setting of an impeachment trial, it protects against partisan overreaching, and it assures the public that this grave decision has been made with care. In sum, it is a disciplining force to carry into the deliberations. This point is given added weight by the language of the Constitution. Article I, section 3, clause 6 of the United States Constitution gives to the Senate ``the Power to try all Impeachments. . . . and no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.'' (Emphasis added.) Use of the words ``try'' and ``convicted'' strongly suggests that an impeachment trial is akin to a criminal proceeding and that the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of criminal proceedings should be used. This position was enunciated in the Minority Views contained in the Report of the House Judiciary Committee on the impeachment proceedings against President Nixon (H.Rep. 93-1305 at 377-381) and has been espoused as the correct standard by such Senators as Robert Taft, Jr., Sam Ervin, Strom Thurmond and John Stennis.\76--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \76\ Claiborne Proceedings at 106-107. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even if the clear and convincing standard nonetheless is appropriate for judicial impeachments, it does not follow that it should be applied where the Presidency itself is at stake. With judges, the Senate must balance its concern for the independence of the judiciary against the recognition that, because judges hold life-time tenure, impeachment is the only available means to protect the public against those who are corrupt. On the other hand, when a President is on trial, the balance to be struck is quite different. Here the Senate is asked, in effect, to overturn the results of an election held two years ago in which the American people selected the head of one of the three coordinate branches of government. It is asked to take this action in circumstances where there is no suggestion of corruption or misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's term, when once again the people will judge who they wish to lead them. In this setting, the evidence should be tested by the most stringent standard we know--proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Only then can the American people be confident that this most serious of constitutional decisions has been given the careful consideration it deserves. IV. The President Should Be Acquitted on Article I The evidence does not support the allegations of Article I. a. applicable law Article I alleges perjury, along with false and misleading statements, before a federal grand jury. Perjury is a statutory crime that is set forth in the United States Code at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623.\77\ Before an accused may be found guilty of perjury before a grand jury, a prosecutor most prove all elements of the offense. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \77\ Section 1623 provides in relevant part: ``(a) Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information . . . knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'' (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a) (1994)). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the criminal law context, Sec. 1623 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the following elements: that an accused (1) while under oath (2) knowingly (3) made a false statement as to (4) material facts. The ``materiality'' element is fundamental: it means that testimony given to a grand jury may be found perjurious only if it had a tendency to influence, impede, or hamper the grand jury's investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1419 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1997). If an answer provided to a grand jury has no impact on the grand jury's investigation, or if it relates to a subject that the grand jury is not considering, it is incapable as a matter of law of being perjurious. Thus, alleged false testimony concerning details that a grand jury is not investigating cannot as a matter of law constitute perjury, since such testimony by definition is immaterial. See, e.g., United States v. Lasater, 535 F.2d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 1976) (where defendant admitted signing letter and testified to its purpose, his denial of actually writing letter was not material to grand jury investigation and was incapable of supporting perjury charge); United States v. Pyle, 156 F.2d 852, 856 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (details such as whether defendant ``paid the rent on her Washington apartment, as she testified that she did'' were ``not pertinent to the issue being tried;'' therefore, ``the false statement attributed to [defendant] was in no way material in the case in which she made it and did not constitute perjury within the meaning of the statute.'') In other words, mere falsity--even knowing falsity--is not perjury if the statement at issue is not ``material'' to the matter under consideration. An additional ``element'' of perjury prosecutions, at least as a matter of prosecutorial practice, is that a perjury conviction cannot rest solely on the testimony of one witness. In United States v. Weiler, 323 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1945), the Supreme Court observed that the ``special rule which bars conviction for perjury solely upon the evidence of a single witness is deeply rooted in past centuries.'' While Sec. 1623 does not literally incorporate the so-called ``two- witness'' rule, the case law makes clear that perjury prosecutions under this statute require a high degree of proof, and that prosecutors should not, as a matter of reason and practicality, try to bring perjury prosecutions based solely on the testimony of a single witness. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, perjury cases should not rest merely upon ``an oath against an oath.'' Id. at 609. Indeed, that is exactly the point that experienced former federal prosecutors made to the House Judiciary Committee. A panel of former federal prosecutors, some Republican, testified that they would not charge perjury based upon the facts in this case. For example, Mr. Thomas Sullivan, a former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, told the Committee that ``the evidence set out in the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal case by a responsible federal prosecutor.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998); see generally Minority Report at 340-47. As Mr. Sullivan emphasized, ``because perjury and obstruction charges often arise from private dealings with few observers, the courts have required either two witnesses who testified directly to the facts establishing the crime, or, if only one witness testifies to the facts constituting the alleged perjury, that there be substantial corroborating proof to establish guilt.'' See Transcript of ``Prosecutorial Standards for Obstruction of Justice and Perjury'' Hearing (Dec. 9, 1998). The other prosecutors on the panel agreed. Mr. Richard J. Davis, who served as an Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York and as a Task Force Leader for the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, testified that ``it is virtually unheard of to bring a perjury prosecution based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people.'' Id. A review of the perjury alleged here thus requires both careful scrutiny of the materiality of any alleged falsehood and vigilance against conviction merely on an ``oath against an oath.'' Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609. b. structure of the allegations Article I charges that the President committed perjury when he testified before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. It alleges he ``willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.'' As noted above, the article does not provide guidance on the particular statements alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. But by reference to the different views in the House Committee Report, the presentation of House Majority Counsel David Schippers, the OIC Referral, and the Trial Memorandum of the House Managers, we have attempted to identify certain statements from which members of the House might have chosen. Subpart (1) alleges that the President committed perjury before the grand jury about the details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--including apparently such insignificant matters as mis-remembering the precise month on which certain inappropriate physical contact started, understating as ``occasional'' his infrequent inappropriate physical and telephone contacts with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months, characterizing their relationship as starting as a friendship, and touching Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways and for certain purposes during their intimate encounters. Subpart (2) of Article I alleges that the President made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he testified about certain responses he had given in the Jones civil deposition. The House Managers erroneously suggest that in the grand jury President Clinton was asked about and reaffirmed his entire deposition testimony, including his deposition testimony about whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See House Br. at 2, 60. That is demonstrably false. Those statements that the President did in fact make in the grand jury, by way of explaining his deposition testimony, were truthful. Moreover, to the extent this subpart repeats allegations of Article II of the original proposed articles of impeachment, the full House of Representatives has explicitly considered and specifically rejected those charges, and their consideration would violate the impeachment procedures mandated by the Constitution. Subparts (3) and (4) allege that the President lied in the grand jury when he testified about certain activities in late 1997 and early [[Page S198]] 1998. They are based on statements about conduct that the House Managers claim constitutes obstruction of justice under Article II and in many respects track Article II. Compare Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge) and compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II (3), (6), (7) (obstructing justice when he (3) ``engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence,'' i.e., gifts; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty Currie; (7) ``made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses''). These perjury allegations are without merit both because the obstruction charges upon which they are based are wrong and because the statements that President Clinton made in the grand jury about these charges are true. Because of the close parallel, and for sake of brevity in this submission, we have dealt comprehensively with these overlapping allegations in the next section addressing Article II (obstruction of justice), and address them only briefly in this section. c. response to the particular allegations in article i The president testified truthfully before the grand jury. There must be no mistake about what the President said. He admitted to the grand jury that he had engaged in an inappropriate intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky over a period of many months. He admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He admitted to the grand jury that he had mislead his family, his friends and staff, and the entire Nation about the nature of that relationship. No one who heard the President's August 17 speech or watched the President's videotaped grand jury testimony had any doubt that he had admitted to an ongoing physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The article makes general allegations about his testimony but does not specify alleged false statements, so direct rebuttal is impossible. In light of this uncertainty, we set forth below responses to the allegations that have been made by the House Managers, the House Committee, and the OIC, even though they were not adopted in the article, in an effort to try to respond comprehensively to the charges. 1. The President denies that he made materially false or misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky (a) Early in his grand jury testimony, the President specifically acknowleded that he had had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that involved ``improper intimate contact.'' App. at 461. He described how the relationship began and how it ended early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. In response to the first question about Ms. Lewinsky, the President read the following statement: ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate contact. ``These inappropriate encounteres ended, at my insistence, in early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter. ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct, and I take full responsibility for my actions. ``While I will provide the grand jury whatever other information I can, because of privacy considerations affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, this is all I will say about the specifics of these particular matters. ``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term `sexual relations', as I understood it to be denied at my January 17th, 1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of witnesses.'' App. at 460-62. The President occasionally referred back to this statement--but only when asked very specific questions about his physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and he otherwise responded fully to four hours of interrogation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, his answers in the civil deposition, and his conduct surrounding the Jones deposition. The articles are silent on precisely what statements the President made about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that were allegedly perjurious. But between the House Brief and the Committee Report, both drafted by the Managers, it appears there are three aspects of this prepared statement that are alleged to be false and misleading because Ms. Lewinsky's recollection differs--albeit with respect to certain very specific, utterly immaterial matters: first, when the President admitted that inappropriate conduct occurred ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because in the Managers' view, the first instance of inappropriate conduct apparently occurred a few months prior to ``early 1996,'' see House Br. at 53; second, when the President admitted to inappropriate conduct ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997,'' he allegedly committed perjury because, according to the House Committee, there were eleven total sexual encounters and the term ``on certain occasions'' implied something other than eleven. see Committee Report at 34; and third, when the President admitted that he ``had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included sexual banter,'' he allegedly committed perjury because, according to the House Committee (although not Ms. Lewinsky), seventeen conversations may have included sexually explicit conversation, ibid. Apart from the fact that the record itself refutes some of the allegations (for example, seven of the seventeen calls were only ``possible,'' according even to the OIC, App. at 116-26, and Ms. Lewinsky recalled fewer than seventeen, App. at 744), simply to state them is to reveal their utter immateriality. \78--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ Even the OIC Referral did not allege perjury based on these latter two theories and mentioned the first only briefly. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The President categorically denies that his prepared statement was perjurious, false and misleading in any respect. He offered his written statement to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the OIC to obtain the information it needed without unduly dwelling on the salacious details of his relationship. It preceded almost four hours of follow-up questions about the relationship. It is utterly remarkable that the Managers now find fault even with the President's very painful public admission of inappropriate conduct. In any event, the charges are totally without merit. The Committee Report takes issue with the terms ``on certain occasions'' and ``occasional,'' but neither phrase implies a definite or maximum number. ``On certain occasions''--the phrase introducing discussion of the physical contacts--has virtually no meaning other than ``it sometimes happened.'' It is unfathomable what objective interpretation the Majority gives to this phrase to suggest that it could be false. An attack on the phrase ``occasional''--the phrase introducing discussion of the inappropriate telephone contacts--is little different. Dictionaries define ``occasional'' to mean ``occurring at irregular or infrequent intervals'' or ``now and then.'' \79\ It is a measure of the Committee Report's extraordinary overreaching to suggest that the eleven occasions of intimate contact alleged by the House Majority over well more than a year did not occur, by any objective reading, ``on certain occasions.'' And since even the OIC Referral acknowledges that the inappropriate telephone contact occurred not ``at least 17 times'' (as the Committee Report and the Managers suggest, Committee Report at 8; House Br. at 11) but between 10 and 15 times over a 23-month period,\80\ ``occasional'' would surely seem not just a reasonable description but the correct one. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \79\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) p. 803; see also Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary (1988) p. 812 (``occurring from time to time; infrequent''); Chambers English Dictionary (1988 ed.) p. 992 (``occurring infrequently, irregularly, now and then''); The American Heritage Dictionary (2d Coll. ed.) (``occurring from time to time''); Webster's New World Dictionary (3d Coll. ed.) p. 937 (``of irregular occurrence; happening now and then; infrequent''). \80\ The OIC chart of contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and the President identifies ten phone conversations ``including phone sex'' and seven phone conversations ``possibly'' including phone sex. App. at 116-26. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Finally, these squabbles are utterly immaterial. Even if the President and Ms. Lewinsky disagreed as to the precise number of such encounters, it is of no consequence whatsoever to anything, given his admission of their relationship. This is precisely the kind of disagreement that the law does not intend to capture as perjury. The date of the first intimate encounter is also totally immaterial. Having acknowledged the relationship, the President had no conceivable motive to misstate the date on which it began. The Managers assert that the President committed perjury when he testified about when the relationship began, but they offer no rationale for why he would have done so.\81\ The President had already made a painful admission. Any misstatement about when the intimate relationship began (if there was a misstatement) cannot justify a charge of perjury, let alone the removal of the President from office. As Chairman Hyde himself stated in reference to this latter allegation, ``It doesn't strike me as a terribly [[Page S199]] serious count.'' Remarks of Chairman Hyde at Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ The Committee Report did not adopt the baseless surmise of the OIC Referral, i.e., that the President lied about the starting date of his relationship because Ms. Lewinsky was still an intern at the time, whereas she later became a paid employee. For good reason. The only support offered by the Referral for this conjecture is a comment Ms. Lewinsky attributes to the President in which he purportedly said that her pink ``intern pass'' ``might be a problem.'' Referral at 149-50. But even Ms. Lewinsky indicated that the President was not referring to her intern status, but rather was noting that, as an intern with a pink ``intern pass,'' she had only limited access to the West Wing of the White House. App. at 1567 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98). Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky had in fact become an employee by late 1995, so even under the OIC theory the President could have acknowledged such intimate contact in 1995. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- (b) The Managers also assert that the President lied when, after admitting that he had an inappropriate sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he maintained that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky in a manner that met the definition used in the Jones deposition. See House Br. at 54. The President admits that he engaged in appropriate physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky, but has testified that he did not engage in activity that met the convoluted and truncated definition he was presented in the Jones deposition.\82--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \82\ At the deposition, the Jones attorneys presented a broad, three-part definition of the term ``sexual relations'' to be used by them in the questioning. Judge Wright ruled that two parts of the definition were ``too broad'' and eliminated them. Dep. at 22. The President, therefore, was presented with the following definition (as he understood it to have been amended by the Court): Definition of Sexual Relations-- For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in ``sexual relations'' when the person knowingly engages in or causes-- (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; (2) contact between any part of the person's body or an object and the genitals and anus of another person; or (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the person and any part of another person's body. ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either directly or through clothing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- It is important to note that this Jones definition was not of the President's making. It was one provided to him by the Jones' lawyers for their questioning of him. Under that definition, oral sex performed by Ms. Lewinsky on the President would not constitute sexual relations, while touching certain areas of Ms. Lewinsky's body with the intent to arouse her would meet the definition. The President testified in the grand jury that believed that oral sex performed on him fell outside the Jones definition. App. at 544.\83\ As strange as this may sound, a totally reasonable reading of the definition supports that conclusion, as many commentators have agreed.\84--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \83\ The Managers erroneously suggest that the President's explanation of his understanding of the Jones deposition definition of ``sexual relations'' is a recent fabrication rather than an accurate account of his view at the time of the deposition. House Br. at 54-55. To support this contention, the Managers, among other meritless arguments, point to a document produced by the White House entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating that oral sex would constitute a sexual relationship for the President. Id. at 55. This document, however, was not created, reviewed or approved by the President and did not represent his views. It is irrelevant to the issue at hand for the additional reason that it does not speak by its own terms to the meaning of the contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' used in the Jones deposition. \84\ See, e.g., Perjury Hearing of December 1, 1998 (Statement of Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg at 2) (``That definition defined certain forms of sexual contact as sexual relations but, for reasons known only to the Jones lawyers, limited the definition to contact with any person for the purpose of gratification.''); MSNBC Internight, August 12, 1998 (Cynthia Alksne) (``[W]hen the definition finally was put before the president, it did not include the receipt of oral sex''); ``DeLay Urges a Wait For Starr's Report,'' The Washington Times (August 31, 1998) (``The definition of sexual relations, used by lawyers for Paula Jones when they questioned the president, was loosely worded and may not have included oral sex''); ``Legally Accurate,'' The National Law Journal (August 31, 1998) (``Given the narrowness of the court-approved definition in [the Jones] case, Mr. Clinton indeed may not have perjured himself back then if, say, he received oral sex but did not reciprocate sexually''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about immaterial details concerning an acknowledged wrongful relationship. 2. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about testimony he gave in the Jones case First, it is important to understand that the allegation of Article I that the President ``willfully provided false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in'' the Jones deposition is premised on a misunderstanding of the President's grand jury testimony. The President was not asked to, and he did not, reaffirm his entire Jones deposition testimony during his grand jury appearance. For example, contrary to popular myth and the undocumented assertion of the House Managers, House Br. at 2, the President was never even asked in the grand jury about his answer to the deposition question whether he and Ms. Lewinsky had been ``together alone in the Oval Office.'' Dep. at 52-53,\85\ and he therefore neither reaffirmed it nor even addressed it. In fact, in the grand jury he was asked only about a small handful of his answers in the deposition. As is demonstrated below, his explanation of these answers were not reaffirmations or in any respect evasive or misleading--they were completely truthful, and they do not support a perjury allegation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \85\ The only questions the OIC asked the President about being alone with Ms. Lewinsky did not reference the deposition at all. Instead, the OIC asked the President to elaborate on his acknowledgement in his prepared statement before the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, App. at 481, and to explain why he made a statement, ``I was never alone with her'' to Ms. Currie on January 18th. See, e.g., App. at 583. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The extent to which this allegation of the House Majority misses the mark is dramatically apparent when it is compared with the OIC's Referral. The OIC did not charge that the President's statements about his prior deposition testimony were perjurious (apart from the charge discussed above concerning the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky).\86\ See OIC Ref. at 145. It would be remarkable to contemplate charges beyond those brought by the OIC, particularly in the context of a perjury claim where the OIC chose what to ask the President and itself conducted the grand jury session. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ Specifically, the Referral alleges that the President lied when he testified (1) that ``he believed that oral sex was not covered by any of the terms and definitions for sexual activity used at the Jones deposition''; (2) that their physical contact was more limited than Ms. Lewinsky's testimony suggests; and (3) that their intimate relationship began in early 1996 and not late 1995. Id. at 148-49. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The House Managers point to a single statement made by President Clinton in the grand jury to justify their contention that every statement from his civil deposition is now fair game. House Br. at 60. Specifically, the House Managers rely on President Clinton's explanation in the grand jury of his state of mind during the Jones deposition: ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mine field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.'' App. at 532. In addition to being a true statement of his belief as to his legal position, this single remark plainly was not intended as and was not a broad reaffirmation of the accuracy of all the statements the President made during the Jones deposition. Indeed, given that he told the grand jury that he had an intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky during which he was alone with her, no one who heard the grand jury testimony could have understood it to be the unequivocal reaffirmation that is alleged. The Managers charge that the President did not really mean it when he told the grand jury how he was trying to be literally truthful in the Jones deposition without providing information about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President had endeavored to navigate the deposition without having to make embarrassing admissions about his inappropriate, albeit consensual, relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. And to do this, the President walked as close to the line between (a) truthful but evasive or non-responsive testimony and (b) false testimony as he could without crossing it. He sought, as he explained to the grand jury, to give answers that were literally accurate, even if, as a result, they were evasive and thus misleading. We repeat: what is at issue here is not the underlying statements made by the President in the deposition, but the President's explanations in the grand jury of his effort to walk a fine line. Anyone who reads or watches that deposition knows the President was in fact trying to do precisely what he has admitted--to give the lawyers grudging, unresponsive or even misleading answers without actually lying. However successful or unsuccessful he might have been, there is no evidence that controverts the fact that this was indeed the President's intention. An examination of the statements that the President actually did make in the grand jury about his deposition testimony further demonstrates the lack of merit in this article. In the grand jury, the President only was asked about three areas of his deposition testimony that were covered in the failed impeachment article alleging perjury in the civil deposition.\87\ The first topic was the nature of any intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky and has already been addressed above. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \87\ The proposed article of impeachment alleging perjury in the civil deposition, like the two that are before the Senate, did not identity any specific instances of false testimony, but we have made our comparison with the Committee Report's elaboration of the deposition perjury article as it undoubtedly represents the largest universe of alleged perjurious statements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The second topic was the President's testimony about his knowledge of gifts he exchanged with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President had the following exchange with the OIC: Q: When you testified in the Paula Jones case, this was only two and a half weeks after you had given her these six gifts, you were asked, at page 75 in your deposition, lines 2 through 5, ``Well, have you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?'' And you answered, ``I don't recall.'' And you were correct. You pointed out that you actually asked them, for prompting, ``Do you know what they were?'' A: I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not that I don't recall whether I had given them. And then if you see, they did give me these specifics, and I gave them quite a good explanation here. I remembered very clearly what the facts were about The Black Dog. . . . App. at 502-03. The President's explanation that he could not recall the exact gifts that he had given Ms. Lewinsky and that he affirmatively sought prompting from the Jones lawyers is entirely consistent with his deposition testimony. This record plainly does not support a charge of perjury. The third and last topic was the President's deposition testimony that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement denying having a sexual relationship with the President was correct: Q: And you indicated that it [Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit statement that she had no sexual relationship with him] was absolutely correct. A: I did. . . . I believe at the time that she filled out this affidavit, if she believed that [[Page S200]] the definition of sexual relationship was two people having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe that this is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it. . . . App. at 473. The President's grand jury testimony was truthful. As Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp discussed long before any of this matter was public, this was in fact Ms. Lewinsky's definition of ``sex'' and apparently the President's as well. See Supp. at 2664 (10/3/97 Tape); see also App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). There is no evidence whatever that the President did not believe this definition of sexual relations, and his belief finds support in dictionary definitions, the courts and commentators.\88\ Moreover, the record establishes that Ms. Lewinsky shared this view.\89\ Since the President's grand jury testimony about his understanding is corroborated both by dictionaries and by his prior statements to Ms. Lewinsky, it simply cannot be labeled ``wrong'' or, more seriously, ``perjurious.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ As one court has stated, ``[i]n common parlance the terms `sexual intercourse' and `sexual relations' are often used interchangeably.'' J.Y. v. D.A, 381 N.E.2d 1270, 1273 (Ind. App. 1978). Dictionary definitions make the same point: Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st ed. 1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;'' Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 1996) at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; coitus;'' Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) at 1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``coitus;'' Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560, defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1996) at 1775, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual intercourse; coitus.'' \89\ Ms. Lewinsky took the position early on that her contact with the President did not constitute ``sex'' and reaffirmed that position even after she had received immunity and began cooperating with the OIC. For example, in one of the conversations surreptitiously taped by Ms. Tripp, Ms. Lewinsky explained to Ms. Tripp that she ``didn't have sex'' with the President because ``[h]aving sex is having intercourse.'' Supp. at 2664; see also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stated that Ms. Lewinsky had said that the President and she ``didn't have sex''). Ms. Lewinsky reaffirmed this position even after receiving immunity, stating in an FBI interview that ``her use of the term `having sex' means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). Likewise, in her original proffer to the OIC, she wrote, ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the `sexual relationship' because she could justify to herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The President did not testify falsely and perjuriously in the grand jury about his civil deposition testimony. 3. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements of his attorney to Judge Wright during the Jones deposition It is remarkable that Article I contains allegations such as this one that even the OIC, which conducted the President's grand jury appearance, chose not to include in the Referral (presumably because there was no ``substantial and credible information'' to support the claim). Subpart (3) appears to allege that the President lied in his grand jury testimony when he characterized his state of mind in his civil deposition as his lawyer described the Lewinsky affidavit as meaning ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form.'' Dep. at 53-54. Specifically, the House Managers appear to base their perjury claim on President Clinton's grand jury statement that ``I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was saying.'' House Br. at 62. The House Brief takes issue with President Clinton's statement that he was ``not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange'' because, it alleges, the ``videotape [of the deposition] shows the President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to Judge Wright.'' Ibid. While it is true that the videotape shows the President staring in what is presumably Mr. Bennett's direction, there is no evidence whatsoever that he was indeed ``paying close attention'' to the lengthy exchange. Notably absent from the videotape is any action on the part of the President that could be read as affirming Mr. Bennett's statement, such as a nod of the head, or any other activity that could be used to distinguish between a fixed stare and true attention to the complicated sparring of counsel. The President was a witness in a difficult and complex deposition and, as he testified, he was ``focussing on [his] answers to the questions.'' App. at 477. It is a safe bet that the common law has never seen a perjury charge based on so little.\90--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ This allegation is nearly identical to the allegation of Article II(5), and, for the sake of brevity, it is addressed at greater length in the response to Article II, below. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he denied attempting ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case The general language of the final proviso of Article I, according to the House Managers, is meant to signify a wide range of allegations, see House Br. at 60-69, although none were thought sufficiently credible to be included in the OIC Referral. These allegations were not even included in the summary of the Starr evidence presented to the Committee on October 5, 1998, by House Majority Counsel Schippers. They are nothing more than an effort to inflate the perjury allegations by converting every statement that the President made about the subject matter of Article II into a new count for perjury. As the discussion of Article II establishes, the President did not attempt to obstruct justice. Thus, his explanations of his statements in the grand jury were truthful. The House Brief asserts that the President committed perjury with respect to three areas of his grand jury testimony about the obstruction allegations. These claims are addressed thoroughly in the next section along with the corresponding Article II obstruction claims, and they are addressed in a short form here. The first claim is that the President committed perjury ``when he testified before the grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should provide them.'' House Br. at 63. The House Managers contest the truthfulness of this statement by asserting that the President was responsible for Ms. Lewinsky's transfer of gifts to Ms. Currie in late December. In other words, if the obstruction claim is true, they allege, this statement is not true. As is laid out in greater detail in the next section, the House Manager's view of this matter ignores a wealth of evidence establishing that the idea to conceal some of the gifts she had received originated with, and was executed by, Ms. Lewinsky. See e.g., Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/ 98); App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); see also App. at 1481 (``LEWINSKY . . . suggested to the President that Betty Currie hold the gifts'') (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98). Second, the House Managers contend that the President provided perjurious testimony when he explained to the grand jury that he was trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he spoke with Betty Currie on January 18, 1998 about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. House Br. at 65. The House Managers completely ignore the numerous statements that Ms. Currie makes in her testimony that support the President's assertion that he was merely trying to gather information. for example, Ms. Currie stated in her first interview with the OIC that ``Clinton then mentioned some of the questions he was asked at his deposition. Currie advised the way Clinton phrased the queries, they were both statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/ 24/98). Ms. Currie's final grand jury testimony on this issue also supports the President' explanation of his questioning: Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those statements? A: None whatsoever. Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about what he was doing? A: At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking. Q: That was your impression that he wanted you to say-- because he would end each of the statements with ``Right?,'' with a question. A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would say ``Right'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.'' Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not true? A: Correct. Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss? A: None. Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (emphasis added). Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's assertion that he was looking for information as a result of his deposition. There is no basis to doubt the President's explanation that his expectation of a media onslaught prompted the conversation. See App. at 583. Indeed, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the only two participants in this conversation--conceivably supports the inference that he had any other intent. The House Managers' contention that the President's explanation to the grand jury was perjurious totally disregards the testimony of the only two witnesses with first-hand knowledge and has no basis in fact or in the evidence. Finally, the House Managers contend that President Clinton ``lied about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top aides.'' House Br. at 68. The basis for this charge appears to be the President's testimony that, although he said misleading things to his aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, he tried to say things that were true. Id. at 69. Once again, the record does not even approach a case for perjury. The President acknowledged that he misled; he tried, however, not to lie. It is a mystery how the Managers could try to disprove this simple statement of intent. V. The President Should be Acquitted on Article II The evidence does not support the allegations of Article II. a. applicable law Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a statutory crime that is set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, the ``Omnibus Obstruction Provision.'' In the criminal law context, Sec. 1503 requires proof of the following elements: (1) that [[Page S201]] there existed a pending judicial proceeding; (2) that the accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) that the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989). False statements alone cannot sustain a conviction under Sec. 1503. See United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990).\91--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \91\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 covers witness tampering. It is clear that the allegations in Article II could not satisfy the elements of Sec. 1512. That provision requires proof that a defendant knowingly engaged in intimidation, physical force, threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt persuasion with intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or cause any person to withhold objects or documents from an official proceeding. It is clear from the case law that ``misleading conduct'' as contemplated by Sec. 1512 does not cover scenarios where an accused urged a witness to give false testimony without resorting to coercive or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction under Sec. 1512 because ``there is simply no support for the argument that [defendant] did anything other than ask the witnesses to lie''); United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (``Since the only allegation in the indictment as to the means by which [defendant] induced [a witness] to withhold testimony was that [the defendant] misled [the witness], and since the evidence failed totally to support any inference that [the witness] was, or even could have been, misled, the conduct proven by the government was not within the terms of Sec. 1512.''). Deceit is thus the gravamen of an obstruction of justice charge that is predicated on witness tampering. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Structure of the Allegations Article II exhibited by the House of Representatives alleges that the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony'' in the Jones case. The Article alleges that the President did so by engaging in ``one or more of the following acts'': the President (1) corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit . . . that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading''; (2) ``corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in the Jones case; (3) ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed'' in the Jones case, namely gifts given by him to Ms. Lewinsky; (4) ``intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky between December 7, 1997 and January 14, 1998, ``in order to corruptly prevent [her] truthful testimony'' in the Jones case; (5) ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements'' to Judge Susan Webber Wright at the Jones deposition; (6) ``related a false and misleading account of events'' involving Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a ``potential witness'' in the Jones case, ``in order to corruptly influence'' her testimony; and (7) made false and misleading statements to certain members of his staff who were ``potential'' grand jury witnesses, in order to corruptly influence their testimony. As noted above, this article essentially duplicates some of the perjury allegations of Article I (4): Article II alleges particular acts of obstruction while Article I (4) alleges that the President lied in the grand jury when he discussed those allegations.\92\ Both sets of allegations are unsupported. Our discussion here of the details of these charges will, as well, serve in part as our response to the allegations in Article I (4). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \92\ Compare Article I (4) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``corrupt efforts to influence testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'') with Article II (1)-(3), (6) (obstructing justice when he (1) ``encouraged witness . . . to execute a [false] sworn affidavit''; (2) ``encouraged a witness . . . to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony''; (3) ``engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''; (6) ``corruptly influence[d] the testimony'' of Betty Currie). Compare also Article I (3) (perjury in the grand jury concerning alleged ``prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge'') with Article II (5) (obstructing justice by ``allow[ing] his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- C. Response to the Particular Allegations in Article II 1. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading'' Article II (1) alleges that the President ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.'' The House Managers allege that during a December 17 phone conversation, Ms. Lewinsky asked the President what she could do if she were subpoenaed in the Jones case and that the President responded, ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' House Br. at 22. This admitted statement by the President of totally lawful conduct is the Managers' entire factual basis for the allegation in Article II (1). The Managers do not allege that the President ever suggested to Ms. Lewinsky she should file a false affidavit or otherwise told her what to say in the affidavit. Indeed they could not, because Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and forcefully denied any such suggestions: ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer). ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/ 20/98). ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie. . . .'' App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). In an attempt to compensate for the total lack of evidence supporting their theory,\93\ the Managers offer their view that ``both parties knew the affidavit would have to be false and misleading in order to accomplish the desired result.'' House Br. at 22; see also Committee Report at 65 (the President ``knew [the affidavit] would have to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid testifying''). But there is no evidence to support such bald conjecture, and in fact the opposite is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and the President testified that, given the particular claims in the Jones case, they thought a truthful, limited affidavit might establish that Ms. Lewinsky had nothing relevant to offer. The President explained to the grand jury why he believed that Ms. Lewinsky would execute a truthful but limited affidavit that would have established that she was not relevant to the Jones case:\94--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \93\ The myth that the President told Ms. Lewinsky to lie in her affidavit springs not from the evidence but from the surreptitiously recorded Tripp tapes. But as Ms. Lewinsky explained to the grand jury, many of the statements she made to Ms. Tripp--including on this subject--were not true: ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). \94\ Indeed, the Committee Report alleges without support that the President lied to the grand jury when he indicated his belief that Ms. Lewinsky could indeed have filed a truthful but limited affidavit that might have gotten her out of testifying in the Jones case. Article I (4). This claim fails for the reasons discussed in the text. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``But I'm just telling you that it's certainly true what she says here, that we didn't have--there was no employment, no benefit in exchange, there was nothing having to do with sexual harassment. And if she defined sexual relationship in the way I think most Americans do, meaning intercourse, then she told the truth.'' App. at 474. ``You know, I believed then, I believe now, that Monica Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit of what Linda Tripp did to her, would have given her a chance not to be a witness in this case.'' App. at 521. ``I believed then, I believe today, that she could execute an affidavit which, under reasonable circumstances with fair-minded, nonpolitically-oriented people, would result in her being relieved of the burden to be put through the kind of testimony that, thanks to Linda Tripp's work with you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have been put through. I don't think that's dishonest. I don't think that's illegal.'' App. at 529. ``But I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable that she could have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have disclosed the embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had, which had been over for many, many months by the time this incident occurred.'' App. at 568-69. ``I've already told you that I felt strongly that she could issue, that she could execute an affidavit that would be factually truthful, that might get her out of having to testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.'' App. at 571. The Jones case involved allegations of a nonconsensual sexual solicitation. Ms. Lewinsky's relationship with the President was consensual, and she knew nothing about the factual allegations of the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky similarly recognized that an affidavit need not be false in order to accomplish the purpose of avoiding a deposition: LEWINSKY told TRIPP that the purpose of the affidavit was to avoid being deposed. LEWINSKY advised that one does this by giving a portion of the whole story, so the attorneys do not think you have anything of relevance to their case. App. at 1420 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added). LEWINSKY advised the goal of an affidavit is to be as benign as possible, so as to avoid being deposed. App. at 1421 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (emphasis added). I thought that signing an affidavit could range from anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being deposed and so that that could range from anywhere between maybe just somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of a relationship. App. at 842 (Lewinsky GJ 8/ 6/98) (emphasis added). The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky must have known that the President wanted her to lie because he never told her to fully detail their relationship in her affidavit and because an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship would have been damaging to him in the Jones case. Committee Report at 65. The Managers wisely appear to have abandoned [[Page S202]] this argument.\95\ Ms. Lewinsky plainly was under no obligation to volunteer to the Jones lawyers every last detail about her relationship with the President--and the failure of the President to instruct her to do so is neither wrong nor an obstruction of justice. A limited, truthful affidavit might have established that Ms. Lewinsky was not relevant to the Jones case. The suggestion that perhaps Ms. Lewinsky could submit an affidavit in lieu of a deposition, as the President knew other potential deponents in the Jones case had attempted to do, in order to avoid the expense, burden, and humiliation of testifying in the Jones case was entirely proper. The notion that the President of the United States could face removal from office not because he told Monica Lewinsky to lie, or encouraged her to do so, but because he did not affirmatively instruct her to disclose every detail of their relationship to the Jones lawyers is simply not supportable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \95\ The Committee Report argued that Ms. Lewinsky ``contextually understood that the President wanted her to lie'' because he never told her to file an affidavit fully detailing the ``true nature'' of their relationship. Committee Report at 65. The only support cited for this ``contextual understanding'' obstruction theory advanced by the Committee Report was a reference back to the OIC Referral. The OIC Referral, in turn, advanced the same theory, citing only the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky that, while the President never encouraged her to lie, he remained silent about what she should do or say, and by such silence, ``I knew what that meant.'' App. at 954 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (cited in Referral at 174). It is extraordinary that the President of the United States could face removal from office not because he told Ms. Lewinsky to lie, or said anything of the sort, but instead because he stayed silent--and Ms. Lewinsky thought she ``knew what that meant.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Moreover, there is significant evidence in the record that, at the time she executed the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky honestly believed that her denial of a sexual relationship was accurate given what she believed to be the definition of a ``sexual relationship'': ``I never even came close to sleeping with [the President] . . . We didn't have sex . . . Having sex is having intercourse. That's how most people would--'' Supp. at 2664 (Lewinsky-Tripp tape 10/3/97).\96--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \96\ A friend of Ms. Lewinsky's also testified that, based on her close relationship with her, she believed that Ms. Lewinsky did not lie in her affidavit based on her understanding that when Ms. Lewinsky referred to ``sex'' she meant intercourse. Supp. at 4597 (6/23/98 grand jury testimony of Ms. Dale Young). See also Supp. at 1066 (grand jury testimony of Ms. Neysa Erbland stating that Ms. Lewinsky had said that the President and she ``didn't have sex''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ``Ms. L[ewinsky] was comfortable signing the affidavit with regard to the sexual relationship because she could justify to herself that she and the Pres[ident] did not have sexual intercourse.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer). ``Lewinsky said that her use of the term `having sex' means having intercourse. . . .'' App. at 1558 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/19/98). The allegation contained in Article II(1) is totally unsupported by evidence. It is the product of a baseless hypothesis, and it should be rejected. 2. The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation Article II (2) alleges that the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give false testimony if and when she was called to testify personally in the Jones litigation. Again, Ms. Lewinsky repeatedly denied that anyone told her or encouraged her to lie: ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' App. at 718 (2/1/98 Proffer). ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/ 20/98). ``Neither the President nor Jordan ever told Lewinsky that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie. . . . App. at 1400 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). ``I think I told [Linda Tripp] that--you know at various times the President and Mr. Jordan had told me I have to lie. That wasn't true.'' App. at 942 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). The Managers allege that the President called Ms. Lewinsky on December 17 to inform her that she had been listed as a potential witness in the Jones case, and that during this conversation, he ``sort of said, `You know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.' '' House Br. at 22; App. at 843 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/ 98). Other than the fact that Ms. Lewinsky recalls this statement being made in the same conversation in which she learned that her name was on the Jones witness list, the Managers cite no evidence whatsoever that supports their claim that the President encouraged her to make such statements ``if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case.'' They claim simply that Ms. Lewinsky had discussed such explanations for her visits with the President in the past. Unremarkably, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been concerned about concealing their improper relationship from others while it was ongoing. Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and proffered statements undercut their case: When asked what should be said if anyone questioned Ms. Lewinsky about her being with the President, he said she should say she was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left the WH). There is truth to both of these statements. . . . [This] occurred prior to the subpoena in the Paula Jones case. App. at 709 and 718 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added). After Ms. Lewinsky was informed, by the Pres[ident], that she was identified as a possible witness in the Jones case, the Pres[ident] and Ms. L[ewinsky] discussed what she should do. The President told her he was not sure she would be subpoenaed, but in the event that she was, she should contact Ms. Currie. When asked what to do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres[ident] suggested she could sign an affidavit to try to satisfy their inquiry and not be deposed. In general, Ms. L[ewinsky] should say she visited the WH to see Ms. Currie and, on occasion when working at the WH, she brought him letters when no one else was around. Neither of those statements untrue. App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added). To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky]'s memory, she does not believe they discussed the content of any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date. App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (emphasis added). LEWINSKY advised, though they did not discuss the issue in specific relation to the JONES matter, she and CLINTON had discussed what to say when asked about LEWINSKY's visits to the White House. App. at 1466 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/ 31/98) (emphasis added). Ms. Lewinsky's statements indicate that she asked the President what to say if ``anyone'' asked about her visits, that the President said ``in general'' she could give such an explanation, and that they ``did not discuss the issue in specific relation to the Jones matter.'' This is consistent with the President's testimony that he and Ms. Lewinsky ``might have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in the past,'' although he had no specific memory of that conversation. App. at 569. The President also stated in his grand jury testimony that he did not recall saying anything like that in connection with Ms. Lewinsky's testimony in the Jones case: Q. And in that conversation, or in any conversation in which you informed her she was on the witness list, did you tell her, you know, you can always say that you were coming to see Betty or bringing me letters? Did you tell her anything like that? A. I don't remember. She was coming to see Betty. I can tell you this. I absolutely never asked her to lie. App. at 568. Ms. Lewinsky does not testify that this discussion was had in reference to testimony she may or may not have been called to give personally, and the Managers' implication is directly contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's statement that she and the President did not discuss her deposition testimony in that conversation. See App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``To the best of Ms. L[ewinsky's] memory, she does not believe they discussed [in the December 17 conversation] the content of any deposition that Ms. L[ewinsky] might be involved in at a later date.''). In support of this allegation, the Managers also cite Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she told the President she would deny the relationship and that the President made some encouraging comment. House Br. at 23. Ms. Lewinsky never stated that she told the President any such thing on December 17, or at any other time after she had been identified as a witness. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that that discussion did not take place after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case: Q: It is possible that you also had these discussions [about denying the relationship] after you learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case? A: I don't believe so. No. Q: Can you exclude that possibility? A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it would be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that would show me different, but I--it was 2:30 in the--I mean, the conversation I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 17th, which was---- Q: The telephone call. A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so. App. at 1119-20 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added). Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky has stated several times that neither of these so-called ``cover stories'' was untrue. In her handwritten proffer, Ms. Lewinsky stated that she asked the President what to say if anyone asked her about her visits to the Oval Office and he said that she could say ``she was bringing him letters (when she worked in Legislative Affairs) or visiting Betty Currie (after she left the White House).'' App. at 709 (Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer). Ms. Lewinsky expressly stated: ``There is truth to both of these statements.'' Id. (emphasis added); see also App. at 712 (2/1/98 Proffer) (``[n]either of those statements [was] untrue.'') (emphasis added). Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand jury that she did in fact bring papers to the President and that on some occasions, she visited the Oval Office only to see Ms. Currie: Q: Did you actually bring [the President] papers at all? A: Yes. Q: All right. Tell us a little about that. A: It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of letters. . . . [[Page S203]] App. at 774-75 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). ``I saw Betty on every time that I was there . . . most of the time my purpose was to see the President, but there were some times when I did just go see Betty but the President wasn't in the office.'' App. at 775 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The Managers assert that those stories were misleading. House Br. at 23; see also Committee Report at 66 (delivering documents to the President was a ``ruse that had no legitimate business purpose.''). In other words, while the so-called ``cover stories'' were literally true, such explanations might have been misleading. But literal truth is a critical issue in perjury and obstruction cases, as is Ms. Lewinsky's belief that the statements were, in fact, literally true. The allegation contained in Article II (2) is unsupported by the evidence and should be rejected. 3. The President denies that he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence''-- gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky--in the Jones case This allegation charges that the President participated in a scheme to conceal certain gifts he had given to Monica Lewinsky. It apparently centers on two events allegedly occurring in December 1997: (a) a conversation between the President and Ms. Lewinsky in which the two allegedly discussed the gifts the President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and (b) Ms. Currie's receipt of a box of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and storage of them under her bed. The evidence does not support the charge. a. Ms. Lewinsky's December 28 Meeting with the President Monica Lewinsky met with the President on December 28, 1997, sometime shortly after 8:00 a.m. to pick up Christmas presents. App. at 868 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). According to Ms. Lewinsky, she raised the subject of gifts she had received from the President in relation to the Jones subpoena, and this was the first and only time that this subject arose. App. at 1130 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1338 (Lewinsky Depo. 8/26/98). The House Trial Brief and the Committee Report quote one version of Ms. Lewinsky's description of that December 28 conversation: ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I-- maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' App. at 872 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/ 98). In fairness, the Senate should be aware that Ms. Lewinsky has addressed this crucial exchange with prosecutors on at least ten different occasions, which we lay out in the margin for review.\97\ The accounts varied--in some Ms. Lewinsky essentially recalled that the President gave no response, but the House Managers, like the Committee Report and the OIC Referral, cite only the account most favorable to their case, failing even to take note of the other inconsistent recollections. But the important fact about Ms. Lewinsky's various descriptions of this conversation is that, at the very most, the President stated ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about it'' when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of the gifts. Even by the account most unfavorable to the President, the record is clear and unambiguous that the President never initiated any discussion about the gifts nor did he tell or even suggest to Ms. Lewinsky that she should conceal the gifts. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \97\ Those statements, from earliest to latest in time: 1. Proffer (2/1/98): ``Ms. L then asked if she should put away (outside her home) the gifts he had given her or, maybe, give them so someone else.'' App. at 715. 2. FBI 302 (7/27/98): ``LEWINSKY expressed her concern about the gifts that the President had given LEWINSKY and specifically the hat pin that had been subpoenaed by PAULA JONES. The President seemed to know what the JONES subpoena called for in advance and did not seem surprised about the hat pin. The President asked LEWINSKY is she had told anyone about the hat pin and LEWINSKY denied that she had, but may have said that she gave some of the gifts to FRANK CARTER. . . . LEWINSKY asked the President if she should give the gifts to someone and the President replied `I don't know.' '' App. at 1395. 3. FBI 302 (8/1/98): ``LEWINSKY said that she was concerned about the gifts that the President had given her and suggested to the President that BETTY CURRIE hold the gifts. The President said something like, `I don't know,' or `I'll think about it.' The President did not tell LEWINSKY what to do with the gifts at that time.'' App. at 1481. 4. Grand Jury (8/6/98): ``[A]t some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' App. at 872. 5. FBI 302 (8/13/97): ``During their December 28, 1997 meeting, CLINTON did not specifically mention which gifts to get rid of.'' App. at 1549. 6. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``It was December 28th and I was there to get my Christmas gifts from him. . . And we spent maybe about five minutes or so, not very long, talking about the case. And I said to him, `Well, do you think' . . . And at one point, I said, `Well do you think I should--' I don't think I said `get rid of,' I said, `But do you think I should put away or maybe give to Betty or give someone the gifts?' And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something like, `I don't know,' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.'' App. at 1121-22. 7. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name [at the December 28 meeting during which gifts were supposedly discussed] or did the President bring up Betty's name? THE WITNESS: I think I brought it up. The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. . .'' App. at 1122. 8. Grand Jury (8/20/98): ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed concern, the President really didn't say anything.'' App. at 1126. 9. FBI 302 (8/24/98): ``LEWINSKY advised that CLINTON was sitting in the rocking chair in the Study. LEWINSKY asked CLINTON what she should do with the gifts CLINTON had given her and he either did not respond or responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566. 10. FBI 302 (9/3/98): ``On December 28, 1997, in a conversation between LEWINSKY and the President, the hat pin given to Lewinsky by the President was specifically discussed. They also discussed the general subject of the gifts the President had given Lewinsky. However, they did not discuss other specific gifts called for by the PAULA JONES subpoena. LEWINSKY got the impression that the President knew what was on the subpoena.'' App. at 1590. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Indeed, on several occasions, Ms. Lewinsky's accounts of the President's reaction depict the President as not even acknowledging her suggestion. Among those versions, ignored by the Committee Report and the Managers, are the following: ``And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something like, `I don't know,''' or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added). ``[The President] either did not respond or responded `I don't know.' LEWINSKY is not sure exactly what was said, but she is certain that whatever CLINTON said, she did not have a clear image in her mind of what to do next.'' App. at 1566 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/24/98) (emphasis added). ``The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name, because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it . . .'' App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added). ``A JUROR: You had said that the President had called you initially to come get your Christmas gift, you had gone there, you had a talk, et cetera, and there was no--you expressed concern, the President didn't really say anything.'' App. at 1126 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (emphasis added).\98--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \98\ Here a grand juror is restating Ms. Lewinsky's earlier testimony, with which Ms. Lewinsky appeared to agree (she did not dispute the accuracy of the grand juror's recapitulation). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus, the evidence establishes that there was essentially no discussion of gifts. That December 28 meeting provides no evidence of any ``scheme . . . designed to . . . conceal the existence'' of any gifts. b. Ms. Currie's Supposed Involvement in Concealing Gifts Because the record is devoid of any evidence of obstruction by the President at his December 28 meeting with Monica Lewinsky, Article II (3) necessarily depends on the added assumption that, after the December 28 meeting, the President must have instructed his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, thereby consummating the obstruction of justice. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the record is devoid of any direct evidence that the President discussed this subject with Ms. Currie. At most, it conflicted on the question of whether Ms. Currie or Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift retrieval. We begin with what is certain. The record is undisputed that Ms. Currie picked up a box containing gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and placed them under her bed at home. The primary factual dispute, therefore, is which of the two initiated the pick-up. According to the logic of the Committee Report, if Ms. Currie initiated the retrieval, she must have been so instructed by the President. Committee Report at 69 (``there is no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the President''). But the facts are otherwise. Both Ms. Currie and the President have denied ever having any such conversation wherein the President instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. App. at 502 (President Clinton GJ 8/ 17/98); Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). In other words, the only two parties who could have direct knowledge of such an instruction by the President have denied it took place. In the face of this direct evidence that the President did not ask Ms. Currie to pick up these gifts, the Committee Report's obstruction theory hinges on the inference that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky and must have done so at the direction of the President. To be sure, Ms. Lewinsky has stated on several occasions that Ms. Currie initiated a call to her to inquire about retrieving something. The Managers and the Committee Report cited the following passage from Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony: Q: What did [Betty Currie] say? A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something to give me.'' Along those lines. . . . Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The President says you have something for me,'' what did you understand her to mean? A: The gifts. App. at 874 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). See also App. at 715 (2/1/ 98 Proffer) (``Ms. Currie called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres. had told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her.''). [[Page S204]] However, Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged that it was she who first raised the prospect of Ms. Currie's involvement in holding the gifts: A JUROR: Now, did you bring up Betty's name or did the President bring up Betty's name? [MS. LEWINSKY]: I think I brought it up. The President wouldn't have brought up Betty's name because he really didn't--he really didn't discuss it. App. at 1122 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). And contrary to the Committee Report's suggestion that Lewinsky's memory of these events has been ``consistent and unequivocal'' and she has ``recited the same facts in February, July, and August,'' Committee Report at 69, Ms. Lewinsky herself acknowledged at her last grand jury appearance that her memory of the crucial conversation is less than crystal clear: A JUROR: . . . Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the President had told her to call? [MS. LEWINSKY]: Right now. I don't. I don't remember. . . . App. at 1141 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98). Moreover, Ms. Currie has repeatedly and unvaryingly stated that it was Ms. Lewinsky who contacted Ms. Currie about the gifts, not the other way around. A few examples include: ``LEWINSKY called CURRIE and advised she had to return all gifts CLINTON had given LEWINSKY as there was talk going around about the gifts.'' Supp. at 531 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98); ``Monica said she was getting concerned, and she wanted to give me the stuff the President had given her--or give me a box of stuff. It was a box of stuff.'' Supp. at 557 (Currie GJ 1/27/98); Q: . . . Just tell us for a moment how this issue first arose and what you did about it and what Ms. Lewinsky told you. A: The best I remember it first arose with a conversation. I don't know if it was over the telephone or in person. I don't know. She asked me if I would pick up a box. She said Isikoff had been inquiring about gifts.'' Supp. at 582 (Currie GJ 5/6/98); ``The best I remember she said that she wanted me to hold these gifts--hold this--she may have said gifts, I'm sure she said gifts, box of gifts--I don't remember--because people were asking questions. And I said, `Fine.' '' Supp. at 581 (Currie GJ 5/6/98); ``The best I remember is Monica calls me and asks me if she can give me some gifts, if I'd pick up some gifts for her.'' Supp. at 706 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). The Committee Report attempts to portray Ms. Currie's memory as faulty on the key issue of whether Ms. Lewinsky initiated the gift retrieval by unfairly referencing Ms. Currie's answer to a completely different question. Ms. Currie was asked whether she had discussed with the President Ms. Lewinsky's ``turning over to [her]'' the gift he had given her. Ms. Currie indicated that she could remember no such occasion. ``If Monica said [Ms. Currie] talked to the President about it,'' she was then asked, ``would that not be true?'' Then, only on the limited question of whether Ms. Currie ever talked to the President about the gifts--wholly separate from the issue of who made the initial contact--did Ms. Currie courteously defer, ``Then she may remember better than I. I don't remember.'' Supp. at 584 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ironically, it is the substance of this very allegation-- regarding conversations between Ms. Currie and the President--that Ms. Lewinsky told the grand jury she could not recall. (In later testimony, referring to a conversation she had with the President on January 21, Ms. Currie testified that she was ``sure'' that she did not discuss the fact that she had a box of Ms. Lewinsky's belongings under her bed. Supp. at 705 (Currie GJ 7/22/98).) To support its theory that Ms. Currie initiated a call to Ms. Lewinsky, the House Managers place great reliance on a cell phone record of Ms. Currie, calling it ``key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong'' and which ``conclusively proves'' that ``the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts.'' House Br. at 33. There is record of a one-minute call on December 28, 1998 from Ms. Currie's cell phone to Ms. Lewinsky's home at 3:32 p.m. Even assuming Ms. Lewinsky is correct that Ms. Currie picked up the gifts on December 28, her own testimony refutes the possibility that the Managers' mysterious 3:32 p.m. telephone call could have been the initial contact by Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts. To the contrary, the timing and duration of the call strongly suggest just the opposite. It is undisputed that Ms. Lewinsky entered the White House on the morning of December 28 at 8:16 a.m. App. at 111 (White House entry records). While no exit time for Ms. Lewinsky was recorded because she inadvertently left her visitor badge in the White House, she has testified that the visit lasted around an hour. App. at 870-72 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). Consistent with this timing, records also indicate that the President left the Oval Office at 9:52 a.m., thus placing Ms. Lewinsky's exit around 9:30 to 9:45 a.m. App. at 111. Ms. Lewinsky has indicated on several occasions that her discussion with Betty Currie occurred just ``several hours'' after she left. App. at 875 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); App. at 1395 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Ms. Lewinsky three times placed the timing of the actual gift exchange with Ms. Currie ``at about 2:00 p.m.'' App at 1127 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98); App. at 1396 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98); App. at 1482 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/1/98). This, in light of undisputed documentary evidence and Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony, it becomes clear that the 3:32 p.m. telephone record relied upon by the Committee Report in fact is unlikely to reflect a call placed to initiate the pick-up. Apart from this conspicuous timing defect, there is another, independent reason to conclude that the 3:32 p.m. telephone call could not have been the conversation Ms. Lewinsky describes. The 3:32 p.m. call is documented to have lasted no longer than one minute, and because such calls are rounded up to the nearest minute, it quite conceivably could have been much shorter in duration. It is difficult to imagine that the conversation reflected in Ms. Lewinsky's statements could have taken place in less than one minute. Both Ms. Currie and Ms. Lewinsky have described the various matters that were discussed in their initial conversation: not only was this the first time the topic of returning gifts was discussed, which quite likely generated some discussion between the two, but they also had to discuss and arrange a convenient plan for Ms. Currie to make the pick- up.99 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \99\ The OIC Referral, which took great pains to point out every allegedly incriminating piece of evidence, made no reference to this telephone record, perhaps because the OIC knew it tended not to corroborate Ms. Lewinsky's time line. In its place, the Referral rested its corroboration hopes in the following bizarre analysis: ``More generally, the person making the extra effort (in this case, Ms. Currie) is ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' Referral at 170. Wisely, the House Managers chose not to pursue this groundless speculation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- What, then, to make of this call so heavily relied upon by the House Managers? The record is replete with references that Ms. Currie and Ms. Lewinsky communicated very frequently, especially during this December 1997-January 1998 time period. See, e.g., Supp. at 554 (Currie GJ 1/27/98) (many calls around Christmas-time). They often called or paged each other to discuss a host of topics, including Ms. Lewinsky's pending job search, Ms. Currie's mother's illness, and her contacts with Mr. Jordan. There is simply no reason to believe this call was anything other than one of the many calls and exchanges of pages that these two shared during the period. c. The Obstruction-by-Gift-Concealment Charge Is at Odds With the President's Actions Ultimately, and irrespective of the absence of evidence implicating the President in Ms. Lewinsky's gift concealment, the charge fails because it is inconsistent with other events of the very same day. There is absolutely no dispute that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky numerous additional gifts during their December 28 meeting. It must therefore be assumed that on the very day the President and Ms. Lewinsky were conspiring to hide the gifts he had already given to her, the President added to the pile. No stretch of logic will support such an outlandish theory. From the beginning, this inherent contradiction has puzzled investigators. If there were a plot to conceal these gifts, why did the President give Ms. Lewinsky several more gifts at the very moment the concealment plan was allegedly hatched? The House Managers OIC prosecutors, grand jurors, and even Ms. Lewinsky hopelessly searched for an answer to that essential question: Q: Although, Ms. Lewinsky, I think what is sort of--it seems a little odd and, I guess really the grand jurors wanted your impression of it, was on the same day that you're discussing basically getting the gifts to Betty to conceal them, he's giving you a new set of gifts. A: You know, I have come recently to look at that as sort of a strange situation, I think, in the course of the past few weeks. . . . App. at 887-88 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (emphasis added). See House Br. at 34. The Committee Report fails to resolve this significant flaw in its theory.100 The report admits that Ms. Lewinsky ``can't answer'' why the President would in one breath give her gifts and in the next hatch a plan to take them back. But it cites only to Ms. Lewinsky's understanding of the relationship's pattern of concealment and how she contemplated it must apply to the gifts. It creates the erroneous impression that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky instructions to conceal the gifts in the December 28 meeting by quoting her testimony that ``from everything he said to me'' she would conceal the gifts. But we know that Ms. Lewinsky has [[Page S205]] repeatedly testified that no such discussion ever occurred. Her reliance on ``everything he said to me'' must, therefore, reflect her own plan to implement discussions the two had had about concealing the relationship long before her role in the Jones litigation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \100\ Incredibly, not only does the Committee Report fail to offer a sensible answer to this perplexity, but without any factual or logical support it accuses the President of lying to the grand jury when he testified that he was not particularly concerned about the gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky and thus had no compunction about giving her additional gifts on December 28. Article I (4). For whatever reason, neither the Committee Report nor the OIC Referral acknowledges the most reasonable explanation for these events: as the President has testified repeatedly, he was not concerned about the gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky. ``I was never hung up about this gift issue. Maybe it's because I have a different experience. But, you know, the President gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe more. I have always given a lot of gifts to people, especially if they give me gifts. And this was no big deal to me.'' App. at 495. ``this gift business . . . didn't bother me.'' App. at 496. ``I wasn't troubled by this gift issue.'' App. at 497. ``I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have always been given gifts. I do not think there is anything improper about a man giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving a man a gift, that necessarily connotes an improper relationship. So, it didn't bother me.'' App. at 498. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- What this passage confirms is that Ms. Lewinsky had very much in her mind that she would do what she could to conceal the relationship--a modus operandi she herself acknowledged well pre-dated the Jones litigation. That she took such steps does not mean that the President knew of or participated in them. Indeed, it appears that the entire gift-concealment plan arose not from any plan suggested by the President-- which the Committee Report so desperately struggles to maintain--but rather more innocently from the actions of a young woman taking steps she thought were best.\101--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \101\ As the President has stated about this potentiality, ``I didn't then, I don't now see this [the gifts] as a problem. And if she thought it was a problem, I think it--it must have been from a, really a misapprehension of the circumstances. I certainly never encouraged her not to, to comply lawfully with a subpoena.'' App. at 497-98 (emphasis added.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In any event, the record evidence is abundantly clear that the President has not obstructed justice by any plan or scheme to conceal gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky, and logic and reason fully undercut any such theory. 4. The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York in an effort to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case Again, in the absence of specifics in Article II itself, we look to the Committee Report for guidance on the actual charges. The Committee Report would like to portray this claim in as sinister a light as possible, and it alleges that the President of the United States employed his close friend Vernon Jordan to get Monica Lewinsky a job in New York to influence her testimony or perhaps get her away from the Jones lawyers. To reach this conclusion, and without the benefit of a single piece of direct evidence to support the charge, it ignores the direct testimony of several witnesses, assigns diabolical purposes to a series of innocuous events, and then claims that ``[i]t is logical to infer from this chain of events'' that the job efforts ``were motivated to influence the testimony of'' Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 71. Again, the evidence contradicts the inferences the Committee Report strives to draw. Ms. Lewinsky's New York job search began on her own initiative long before her involvement in the Jones case. By her own forceful testimony, her job search had no connection to the Jones case. Mr. Jordan agreed to help Ms. Lewinsky not at the direction of the President but upon the request of Betty Currie, Mr. Jordan's long-time friend. And bizarrely, the idea to involve Mr. Jordan (which arose well before Ms. Lewinsky became a possible Jones witness) came not from the President but apparently emanated from Ms. Tripp. In short, the facts directly frustrate the House Majority's theory.\102--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \102\ This allegation has gone through several iterations. As initially referred to the House of Representatives, the charge was that the President ``help[ed] Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job in New York at a time when she would have been a witness against him'' in the Jones case. OIC Referral at 181. Faced with the significant evidence that Ms. Lewinsky's job efforts had originated long before she became involved in the Jones case and were in fact entirely unrelated to the Jones case, the Judiciary Committee Majority was forced to recraft this claim. Instead of implying a complete connection between the job search and the Jones ligitation, the article now oddly charges that the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance'' for Ms. Lewinsky ``at a time when the truthful testimony of [Ms. Lewinsky] would have been harmful to him,'' Article II (5) (emphasis added)-- thereby admitting that the initial effort was motivated by appropriate concerns. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- a. The Complete Absence of Direct Evidence Supporting This Charge It is hard to overstate the importance of the fact that--by the House Managers', the Committee Report's and the OIC's own admission--there is not one single piece of direct evidence to support this charge. Not one. Indeed, just the contrary is true. Both Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan have repeatedly testified that there was never an explicit or implicit agreement, suggestion, or implication that Ms. Lewinsky would be rewarded with a job for her silence or false testimony. One need look no further than their own testimony: Lewsinky: ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' App. at 1161 (Lewinsky GJ 8/ 20/98); ``There was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, or anyone else that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones affidavit before getting a job in New York. LEWINSKY never demanded a job from Jordan in exchange for a favorable affidavit. Nether the President nor JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY that she had to lie.'' App. at 1398 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/27/98). Jordan: ``As far as I was concerned, [the job and the affidavit] were two very separate matters.'' Supp. at 1737 (Jordan GJ 3/5/98). ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no''--in response to the question whether the job search and the affidavit were in any way connected. Supp. at 1827 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\103--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \103\ The only person who suggested any such quid pro quo was Ms. Tripp, who repeatedly urged Ms. Lewinsky to demand such linkage. App. at 1493 (Lewinsky FBI 302 8/2/98 (``TRIPP told LEWINSKY not to sign the affidavit until LEWINSKY had a job.''). To appease Linda Tripp's repeated demands on this point, Ms. Lewinsky ultimately told Ms. Tripp that she had told Mr. Jordan she wouldn't sign the affidavit until she had a job. But as she later emphasized to the grand jury, ``That was definitely a lie, based on something Linda had made me promise her on January 9th.'' App. at 1134 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/ 98). This is the direct evidence. The House Managers' circumstantial ``chain of events'' case, House Br. 39-41, cannot overcome the hurdle the direct evidence presents. b. Background of Ms. Lewinsky's New York Job Search By its terms, Article II(4) would have the Senate evaluate Ms. Lewinsky's job search by considering only the circumstances ``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1977.'' Article II(4). Although barely mentioned in the Committee Report's ``explanation'' of Article II(4), the significant events occurring before December 7, 1997 cannot simply be ignored because they are inconsistent with the Majority's theory. Without reciting every detail, the undisputed record establishes that the following facts occurred long before Ms. Lewinsky was involved in the Jones case: First, Ms. Lewinsky had contemplated looking for a job in New York as early as July 1997. App. at 1414 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/29/98) (July 3 letter ``first time [Lewinsky] mentioned the possibility of moving to New York''); App. at 787-788 (On July 4, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky wrote the President a letter describing her interest in a job ``in New York at the United Nations''); Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had been searching for a highly paid job in New York since the previous July.'') She conveyed that prospect to a friend on September 2, 1997. App. at 2811 (Lewinsky e-mail). Second, in early October, at the request of Ms. Currie, then-Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta asked U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson to consider Ms. Lewinsky for a position at the U.N. Supp. at 3404 (Richardson GJ 4/3/98). Ms. Currie testified that she was acting on her own in this effort. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Third, around October 6, Ms. Tripp told Ms. Lewinsky that an acquaintance in the White House reported that it was unlikely Ms. Lewinsky would ever be re-employed at the White House. After this disclosure, Ms. Lewinsky ``was mostly resolved to look for a job in the private sector in New York.'' App. at 1543-44 (Lewinsky FBI 302) 8/13/98; see also App. at 1460 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98) (remarks by the Linda Tripp acquaintance were the ``straw that broke the camel's back''). Fourth, sometime prior to October 9, 1997, Ms. Tripp and Ms. Lewinsky discussed the prospect of enlisting Mr. Vernon Jordan to assist Ms. Lewinsky in obtaining a private sector job in New York. App. at 822-24 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98); see also App. at 1079 (Lewinsky GJ 8/20/98) (``I don't remember . . . if [enlisting Jordan] was my idea or Linda's idea. And I know that that came up in discussions with her, I believe, before I discussed it with the President''). On either October 9 or 11, Ms. Lewinsky conveyed to the President this idea of asking Mr. Jordan for assistance. Id. Fifth, in mid-October, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky purchased a book on jobs in New York. App. at 1462 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky completed and sent to Betty Currie at the White House a packet of jobs-related materials on October 15 or 16. Supp. at 735 (Lewinsky Tripp tape of 10/15/97 conversation). Sixth, on October 31, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed for a position with Ambassador Bill Richardson at the United Nations in New York. Ambassador Richardson was ``impressed'' with Ms. Lewinsky and, on November 3, offered her a position, which she ultimately rejected. Supp. at 3411 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3731 (Sutphen GJ 5/27/98). Ms. Currie informed the President that Ms. Lewinsky had received a job offer at the U.N. Supp. at 592 (Currie GJ 5/6/98). Ambassador Richardson never spoke to the President or Mr. Jordan about Ms. Lewinsky, and he testified emphatically and repeatedly that no one pressured him to hire her. Supp. at 3422-23 (Richardson GJ 4/30/98); Supp. at 3418 (same); Supp. at 3429 (same). Seventh, as of late October or November, Ms. Lewinsky had told Mr. Kenneth Bacon, her boss at the Pentagon, that she wanted to leave the Pentagon and move to New York. In a series of conversations, she enlisted his assistance in obtaining a private sector job in New York. Supp. at 11 (Kenneth Bacon FBI 302 2/26/98). In response, Mr. Bacon contacted Howard Paster, CEO of the public relations firm Hill & Knowlton about Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Eighth, in November, Ms. Lewinsky gave notice to the Pentagon that she would be leaving her Pentagon job at year's end. Supp. at 116 (Clifford Bernath GJ 5/21/98). Ninth, Ms. Lewinsky apparently had a preliminary meeting with Mr. Jordan on November 5, 1997 to discuss her job search. During this twenty-minute meeting, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan discussed a list of potential employers she had compiled. App. at 1464-65 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In that meeting, Ms. Lewinsky never informed Mr. Jordan of any time constraints on her need for job assistance. Supp. at 2647 (Lewinsky-Tripp Tape of 11/8/97 conversation). Mr. Jordan had to leave town the next day. App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 Form 7/31/98). Ms. Lewinsky had a follow-up telephone conversation with Mr. Jordan around Thanksgiving wherein he advised her that he was ``working on her job search'' and instructed [[Page S206]] her to call him again ``around the first week of December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98); see also App. at 825 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98) (``And so Betty arranged for me to speak with [Jordan] again and I spoke with him when I was in Los Angeles before--right before Thanksgiving.'') \104\ Inexplicably, the Committee Report, the presentation by its chief counsel, and the Starr Referral all choose to ignore this key piece of testimony--that contact resumed in early December because Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan agreed (in November) that it would. See Committee Report at 10 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no further contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time [early November to mid December].''); Schippers Dec. 10, 1998 Presentation at 38 (``Vernon Jordan, who, by the way, had done nothing from early November to mid-December.''); Referral at 182 (``Ms. Lewinsky had no contact with . . . Mr. Jordan for another month [after November 5].''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \104\ Mr. Jordan was then out of the country from the day after Thanksgiving until December 4. Supp. at 1804 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In sum, the record is clear that Ms. Lewinsky decided on her own to seek a job in New York many months before her involvement in the Jones case. She had asked her Pentagon boss to help, as well as Ms. Currie, who arranged indirectly for Ms. Lewinsky to interview with Ambassador Richardson at the United Nations. Mr. Jordan became involved in the job search at the request of Ms. Currie (apparently at the suggestion of Ms. Tripp) and, notwithstanding his travels in November, Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98), kept in contact with Ms. Lewinsky with plans to reconvene early in December. c. The Committee Report's Circumstantial Case Article II ignores this background and merely alleges that efforts to aid Ms. Lewinsky's job search ``intensified and succeeded'' in December 1997. While not adopted in the article, the House Brief, the Committee Report, and the accompanying final presentation by Majority Counsel Schippers offer some guidance as to the meaning of the actual charge. They cite three events--Mr. Jordan's December 11 meeting with Ms. Lewinsky to discuss job prospects in New York, Ms. Lewinsky's execution of her Jones affidavit, and her receipt of a job--in an effort to portray Ms. Lewinsky's job search as sinister. But the full record easily dispels any suggestion that there were any obstructive or improper acts. (1) Monica Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Vernon Jordan The House Managers and the Committee Report suggest that Mr. Jordan took action on Ms. Lewinsky's job search request only after, and because, Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list on December 5 and only after, and because, Judge Wright ordered the President to answer certain questions about ``other women'' on December 11. See House Br. at 21. Consider the Committee Report portrayal: ``[T]he effort to obtain a job for Monica Lewinsky in New York intensified after the President learned, on December 6, 1997, that Monica Lewinsky was listed on the witness list for the case Jones v. Clinton.\105--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \105\ Committee Report at 70. That portrayal flatly contradicts the Committee Report's earlier statement that on December 6 ``there was still no urgency to help Lewinsky.'' Committee Report at 10-11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon Jordan at the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan on December 11 to discuss specific job contacts in New York. Mr. Jordan then made calls to certain New York companies on Ms. Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan telephoned President Clinton to keep him informed of the efforts to get Ms. Lewinsky a job.'' Committee Report at 70. ``Something happened that changed the priority assigned to the job search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered President Clinton to provide information regarding any state or federal employee with whom he had, proposed, or sought sexual relations. To keep Ms. Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical importance.'' Committee Report at 11. The unmistakable intention of this narrative is to suggest that, after the President learned Ms. Lewinsky's name was on the witness list on December 6, he (1) contacted Mr. Jordan on December 7 to engage his assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, and only then did Mr. Jordan agree to meet with Ms. Lewinsky, and further, that (2) Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 11 and took concrete steps to help Ms. Lewinsky only after and as a result of Judge Wright's December 11 order. Both suggestions are demonstrably false. The President had nothing to do with arranging the December 11 meeting between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky. As the record indicates, after receiving a request from Ms. Currie on December 5 that he meet with Ms. Lewinsky, and telling Ms. Currie to have Ms. Lewinsky call him, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan on December 8. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). As noted above, that call had been presaged by a conversation between Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky around Thanksgiving in which Jordan told her ``he was working on her job search'' and asked her to contact him again ``around the first week of December.'' App. at 1465 (Lewinsky FBI 302 7/31/98). In the December 8 call, the two arranged for Ms. Lewinsky to come to Mr. Jordan's office on December 11; on the same day, Ms. Lewinsky sent Mr. Jordan via courier a copy of her resume. Supp. at 1705 (Jordan GJ 3/3/98). At the time of that contact, Mr. Jordan did not even know that Ms. Lewinsky knew President Clinton. Id. In the intervening period before Ms. Lewinsky's December 11 meeting with Mr. Jordan, the President met with Mr. Jordan on December 7. As the Committee Report acknowledges, that meeting had nothing to do with Ms. Lewinsky. Committee Report at 11. Yet the House Managers' Brief, like the Committee Report before it, states that ``the sudden interest [in helping Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job] was inspired by a court order entered on December 11, 1997'' in the Jones case.\106\ House Br. at 21. No evidence supports that supposition. The December 11 meeting had been scheduled on December 8. Neither the OIC Referral nor the Committee Report nor the Managers' Brief cites any evidence that the President or Mr. Jordan had any knowledge of the contents of that Order at the time of the December 11 meeting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \106\ That Order authorized Paula Jones' attorneys to obtain discovery relating to certain government employees ``with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to have sexual relations.'' House Br. at 21. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky shortly after 1:00 p.m. on December 11. Supp. at 1863 (Akin Gump visitor log); Supp. at 1809 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). In anticipation of that meeting, Mr. Jordan had made several calls to prospective employers about Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98). Mr. Jordan spoke about Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. Peter Georgescu of Young & Rubicam at 9:45 a.m. that morning, and with Mr. Richard Halperin of Revlon around 1:00 p.m., immediately before meeting with Ms. Lewinsky. Supp. at 1807-09 (Jordan GJ 5/5/ 98). Again, there is no evidence that any of this occurred after Mr. Jordan learned of Judge Wright's order. Although the Committee Report claims that a heightened sense of urgency attached in December which ``intensified'' the job search efforts, it ignores the sworn testimony of Mr. Jordan denying any such intensification: ``Oh, no. I do not recall any heightened sense of urgency [in December]. What I do recall is that I dealt with it when I had time to do it.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 5/5/98).\107--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \107\ Mr. Jordan explained that not much activity occurred in November because ``I was traveling.'' Supp. at 1811 (Jordan GJ 9/5/98). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ``heightened urgency'' theory also is undermined by the simple fact that Mr. Jordan indisputably placed no pressure on any company to give Ms. Lewinsky a job and suggested no date by which Ms. Lewinsky had to be hired. The first person Mr. Jordan contacted, Mr. Georgescu of Young & Rubicam/ Burson-Marsteller, told investigators that Mr. Jordan did not engage in a ``sales pitch'' for Lewinsky. Supp. at 1222 (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). Mr. Georgescu told Mr. Jordan that the company ``would take a look at [Ms. Lewinsky] in the usual way,'' Supp. at 1219 (Georgescu FBI 302 1/29/98), and that once the initial interview was set up, Ms. Lewinsky would be ``on [her] own from that point.'' Supp. at 1222 (Georgescu FBI 302 3/25/98). The executive who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky at Burson-Marsteller stated that Ms. Lewinsky's recruitment process went ``by the book'' and, ``while somewhat accelerated,'' the process ``went through the normal steps.'' Supp. at 111 (Berk FBI 302 3/31/98). At American Express, Mr. Jordan contacted Ms. Ursula Fairbairn, who stated that Mr. Jordan exerted ``no . . . pressure'' to hire Lewinsky. Supp. at 1087 (Fairbairn FBI 302 2/4/98). Indeed, she considered it ``not unusual for board members'' like Mr. Jordan to recommend talented people for employment and noted that Mr. Jordan had recently recommended another person just a few months earlier. Id. The person who interviewed Ms. Lewinsky stated that he felt ``absolutely no pressure'' to hire her and indeed told her she did not have the qualifications necessary for the position. Supp. at 3521 (Schick FBI 302 1/29/98). Perhaps most telling of the absence of pressure applied by Mr. Jordan is the fact that neither Young & Rubicam/Burson- Marsteller or American Express offered Ms. Lewinsky a job. Similarly, at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon, where Ms. Lewinsky ultimately was offered a job (see below), Mr. Jordan initially contacted Mr. Halperin, who has stated that it was not unusual for Mr. Jordan to make an employment recommendation. Supp. at 1281 (Halperin FBI 302 1/26/98). Moreover, he emphasized that Mr. Jordan did not ``ask [him] to work on any particular timetable,'' Supp. at 1294 (Halperin GJ 4/23/98), and that ``there was no implied time constraint or requirement for fast action.'' Supp. at 1286 (Halperin FBI 3/27/98.) (2) The January job interviews and the Revlon employment offer The Committee Report attempts to conflate separate and unrelated acts--the signing of the affidavit and the Revlon job offer--to sustain its otherwise unsustainable obstruction theory. The Committee Report's description of these events is deftly misleading: ``The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false affidavit. She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to President Clinton that it had been signed and another mission had been accomplished. [[Page S207]] On January 8, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged by Mr. Jordan with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. The interview went poorly. Afterwards, Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing from early November to mid-December, then called the chief executive officer of MacAndrews & Forbes, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. That evening, MacAndrews & Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told her that she would be given more interviews the next morning. The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for signing the false affidavit. After a series of interviews with MacAndrews & Forbes personnel, she was informally offered a job. Committee Report at 18 (citations omitted). By this portrayal, the Committee Report suggests two conclusions: first, that Ms. Lewinsky was ``reward[ed]'' with a job for her signing of the affidavit; second, that the only reason Ms. Lewinsky was given a second interview and ultimately hired at Revlon was Mr. Jordan's intervention with Mr. Perelman. Once again, both conclusions are demonstrably false. Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky have testified under oath that there was no causal connection between the job search and the affidavit. The only person to draw (or, actually, recommend) any such linkage was Ms. Tripp. The factual record easily debunks the second insinuation--that Ms. Lewinsky was hired as a direct result of Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman. One fact is virtually dispositive: the Revlon executive who scheduled Ms. Lewinsky's January 9 interview and decided to hire her that same day never even knew about Mr. Jordan's call to Mr. Perelman, or any interest Mr. Perelman might have in Ms. Lewinsky, and thus could not have been acting in furtherance of such a plan. Ms. Lewinsky initially interviewed with Mr. Halperin of MacAndrews & Forbes (Revlon's parent company) on December 18, 1997. (Mr. Jordan had spoken with Mr. Halperin on December 11.) Prior to interviewing Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin forwarded a copy of her resume to Mr. Jaymie Durnan, also of MacAndrews & Forbes, for his consideration. Supp. at 1286-87 (Halperin FBI 302 3/27/98). Following his interview of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Halperin thought that she would likely be ``shipped to Revlon'' for consideration. Id. Mr. Durnan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume from Mr. Halperin in mid-December and, after reviewing it, decided to interview Ms. Lewinsky after the first of the year. (He was going on vocation the last two weeks of December). Supp. at 1053 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). When he returned from vacation, his assistant scheduled an interview with Ms. Lewinsky for January 7, 1998, but, because of scheduling problems, he rescheduled the interview for the next day, January 8, 1998. Supp. at 1049 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Durnan's decision to interview Ms. Lewinsky was made independently of the decision by Mr. Halperin to interview her. Indeed, only when Mr. Durnan interviewed Ms. Lewinsky in January did he discover that she had had a December interview with Mr. Halperin. Id. It was this interview with Mr. Durnan that Ms. Lewinsky later described as having gone poorly in her view. App. at 926 (Lewinsky GJ 8/6/98). The House Managers (``[t]he interview went poorly,'' House Br. at 38), the Committee Report (``The interview went poorly'', id. at 21), and the OIC Referral (``The interview went poorly,'' id. at 184) all emphasize only Ms. Lewinsky's impression of the job interview--for obvious reasons: it tends to heighten the supposed relevance of the Jordan call to Mr. Perelman. In other words, under this theory, Ms. Lewinsky had no prospect of a job at MacAndrews & Forbes/Revlon until Mr. Jordan resurrected her chances with Mr. Perelman. Unfortunately, like so much other ``evidence'' in the obstruction case, the facts do not bear out this sinister theory. Mr. Durnan had no similar impression that his interview with Ms. Lewinsky had gone ``poorly.'' In fact, just the opposite was true: he was ``impressed'' with Ms. Lewinsky and thought that she would ``fit in'' with MacAndrews & Forbes but ``there was nothing available at that time which suited her interests.'' Supp. at 1054 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Durnan therefore decided to forward Ms. Lewinsky's resume to Ms. Allyn Seidman of Revlon. After the interview, he called Ms. Seidman and left her a voicemail message about his interview with Ms. Lewinsky and explained that, while there was no current opening at MacAndrews & Forbes, ``perhaps there was something available at Revlon.'' Id. In the meantime, Mr. Jordan had called Mr. Perelman about Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Perelman described this conversation as ``very low key and casual.'' Supp. at 3273 (Perelman FBI 302 1/26/98). Mr. Jordan ``made no specific requests and did not request'' him ``to intervene''; nonetheless, Mr. Perelman agreed to ``look into it.'' Id. Later that day, Mr. Durnan spoke to Mr. Perelman, who mentioned that he had received a call from Mr. Jordan about a job candidate. Mr. Perelman told Mr. Durnan ``let's see what we can do,'' Supp. at 3276 (Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98), but Mr. Durnan never concluded that hiring Ms. Lewinsky was ``mandatory.'' Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Mr. Perelman later called Mr. Jordan and said they would do what they could; Mr. Jordan expressed no urgency to Mr. Perelman. Supp. at 3276 (Perelman FBI 302 3/27/98). By the time Mr. Durnan had discussed Ms. Lewinsky with Mr. Perelman, he had already forwarded her resume to Ms. Seidman at Revlon. Supp. at 1049-50 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). After speaking with Mr. Perelman, Mr. Durnan spoke with Ms. Seidman, following up on the voicemail message he had left earlier that day. Supp. at 1055 (Durnan FBI 302 3/27/98). Upon speaking to Ms. Seidman about Ms. Lewinsky, however, Mr. Durnan did not tell Ms. Seidman that CEO Perelman has expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky. Id. Rather, he simply said that if she liked Ms. Lewinsky, she should hire her. Supp. at 1050 (Durnan FBI 302 1/26/98). For her part, Ms. Seidman has testified that she had no idea that Mr. Perelman had expressed interest in Ms. Lewinsky: Q: Did [Mr. Durnan] indicate to you that he had spoken to anyone else within MacAndrews or Revlon about Monica Lewinsky? A: Not that I recall, no. Q: Do you have knowledge as to whether or not Mr. Perelman spoke with anyone either on the MacAndrews & Forbes side or the Revlon side about Monica Lewinsky? A: No. Supp. at 3642 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). Rather, Ms. Seidman's consideration of Ms. Lewinsky proceeded on the merits. Indeed, as a result of the interview, Ms. Seidman concluded that Ms. Lewinsky was ``bright, articulate and polished,'' Supp. at 3635 (Seidman FBI 302 1/26/98), and ``a talented, enthusiastic, bright young woman'' who would be a ``good fit in [her] department.'' Supp. at 3643 (Seidman Depo. 4/23/98). She decided after the interview to hire Ms. Lewinsky, and thereafter called Mr. Durnan ``and told him I thought she was great,'' Id. In sum, Ms. Seidman made the decision to grant an interview and hire Ms. Lewinsky on the merits. She did not even know that Mr. Perelman had expressed any interest in Ms. Lewinsky or that Mr. Jordan had spoken to Mr. Perelman the day before. As amply demonstrated, the House Managers' Jordan-Perelman intervention theory just doesn't hold water. d. Conclusion From the preceding discussion of the factual record, two conclusions are inescapable. First, there is simply no direct evidence to support the job-for-silence obstruction theory. From her initial proffer to the last minutes of her grand jury appearance, the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky has been clear and consistent: she was never asked or encouraged to lie or promised a job for her silence or for a favorable affidavit. Mr. Jordan has been equally unequivocal on this point. Second, the ``chain of events'' circumstantial case upon which this obstruction allegation must rest falls apart after inspection of the full evidentiary record. Ms. Lewinsky's job search began on her own volition and long before she was ever a witness in the Jones case. Mr. Jordan's assistance originated with a request from Ms. Currie, which had no connection to events in the Jones litigation. No pressure was applied to anyone at any time. And Ms. Lewinsky's ultimate hiring had absolutely no connection to her signing of the affidavit in the Jones case. Viewed on this unambiguous record, the job-search allegations are plainly unsupportable. 5. The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit Article II (5) charges that the President engaged in an obstruction of justice because he ``did not say anything'' during his Jones deposition when his attorney cited the Lewinsky affidavit to Judge Wright and stated that ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape, or form.'' Committee Report at 72. The rationale underlying this charge of obstruction of justice hinges on an odd combination of a bizarrely heightened legal obligation, a disregard of the actual record testimony, and a good does of amateur psychology. This claim is factually and legally baseless. The law, of course, imposes no obligation on a client to monitor every statement and representation made by his or her lawyer. Particularly in the confines of an ongoing civil deposition, where clients are routinely counseled to focus on the questions posed of them and their responses and ignore all distractions, it is totally inappropriate to try to remove a President from office because of a statement by his attorney. Indeed, the President forcefully explained to the grand jury that he was not focusing on the exchange between lawyers but instead concentrating on his own testimony: ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he was saying. I was thinking, I was ready to get on with my testimony here and they were having these constant discussions all through the deposition.'' App. at 476; ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was focusing on my own testimony.'' App. at 510; ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges between the lawyers all that carefully.'' App. at 510; ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made that statement that I was concentrating on the exact words he used.'' App. at 511; ``When I was in there, I didn't think about my lawyers. I was, frankly, thinking about myself and my testimony and trying to answer the questions.'' App. at 512; ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on. I was waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I was [[Page S208]] worried about my own testimony.'' App. at 513. The Committee Report ignores the President's repeated and consistent description of his state of mind during the deposition exchange. Instead, the Committee Report and majority counsel's final presentation undertake a novel exercise in video psychology, claiming that by studying the President's facial expressions and by noting that he was ``looking in Mr. Bennett's direction' during the exchange, it necessarily follows that the President was in fact listening to and concentrating on every single word uttered by his attorney \108\ and knowingly made a decision not to correct his attorney. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \108\ It is upon this same fanciful methodology that the Committee Report premises the allegation of Article I (3) that the President lied to the grand jury in providing these responses. Citing the President's oft-criticized response about Mr. Bennett's use of the present tense in his statement ``there is no sex of any'' (``It depends on what the meaning of the word `is' is.'' App. at 510), the Committee Report claims that such parsing contradicts the President's claim that he was not paying close attention to the exchange. But contrary to the Committee Report's suggestion, the President's response to this question did not purport to describe the President's contemporaneous thinking at the deposition, but rather only in retrospect whether he agreed with the questioner that it was ``an utterly false statement.'' Id. The President later emphasized that he ``wasn't trying to give . . . a cute answer'' in his earlier explanation, but rather only that the average person thinking in the present tense would likely consider that Mr. Bennett's statement was accurate since the relationship had ended long ago. App. at 513. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The futility of such an exercise is manifest. It is especially unsettling when set against the President's adamant denials that he harbored any contemporaneous or meaningful realization of his attorney's colloquy with the Judge. The theory is factually flimsy, legally unfounded, and should be rejected. 6. The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony'' There is no dispute that the President met with his secretary, Ms. Currie, on the day after his Jones deposition and discussed questions he had been asked about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers cast this conversation in the most sinister light possible and alleges that the President attempted to influence the testimony of a ``witness'' by pressuring Ms. Currie to agree with an inaccurate version of facts about Ms. Lewinsky. The Managers claim that ``the President essentially admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true.'' House Br. at 47. That is totally false. The President admitted nothing of the sort and the Managers cite nothing in support. The President has adamantly denied that he had any intention to influence Ms. Currie's recollection of events or her testimony in any manner. The absence of any such intention is further fortified by the undisputed factual record establishing that to the President's knowledge, Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones litigation at the time of the conversation. And critically, Ms. Currie testified that, during the conversation, she did not perceive any pressure ``whatsoever'' to agree with any statement made by the President. The President's actions could not as a matter of law support this allegation. To obstruct a proceeding or tamper with a witness, there must be both a known proceeding and a known witness. In the proceeding that the President certainly knew about--the Jones case--Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor prospective witness. As for the only proceeding in which Ms. Currie ultimately became a witness--the OIC investigation--no one asserts the President could have known it existed at that time. At the time of the January 18 conversation.\109\ Ms. Currie was not a witness in the Jones case, as even Mr. Starr acknowledged: ``The evidence is not that she was on the witness list, and we have never said that she was.'' Transcript of November 19, 1998 Testimony at 192. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \109\ Ms. Currie remembers a second conversation similar in substance a few days after the January 18 discussion, but still in advance of the public disclosure of this matter on January 21, 1998. Supp. at 561 (Currie GJ 1/27/98). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nor was there any reason to suspect Ms. Currie would play any role in the Jones case. The discovery period was, at the time of this conversation, in its final days, and a deposition of Ms. Currie scheduled and completed within that deadline would have been highly unlikely. Just as the President could not have intended to influence the testimony of ``witness'' Betty Currie because she was neither an actual nor a prospective witness, so too is it equally clear that the President never pressured Ms. Currie to alter her recollection. Such lack of real or perceived pressure also fatally undercuts this charge. Despite the prosecutor's best efforts to coax Ms. Currie into saying she was pressured to agree with the President's statements, Ms. Currie adamantly denied any such pressure. As she testified: Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel pressured when he told you those statements? A: None whatsoever. Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about what he was doing? A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking. * * * * * Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say-- because he would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', with a question. A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would say ``Right'' and I could have said. ``Wrong.'' Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true or not true? A: Correct. Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss? A: None. Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). Ms. Currie explained that she felt no pressure because she basically agreed with the President's statements: Q: You testified with respect to the statements as the President made them, and, in particular, the four statements that we've already discussed. You felt at the time that they were technically accurate? Is that a fair assessment of your testimony? A: That's a fair assessment. Q: But you suggested that at the time. Have you changed your opinion about it in retrospect? A: I have not changed my opinion, no. Supp. at 667 (Currie GJ 7/22/98); see also Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98) (``Currie advised that she responded ``right'' to each of the statements because as far as she knew, the statements were basically right.''); Supp. at 665 (Currie GJ 7/22/98) (``I said `Right' to him because I thought they were correct, `Right, you were never really alone with Monica, right' ''). What, then, to make of this conversation if there was no effort to influence Ms. Currie's testimony? Well, to understand fully the dynamic, one must remove the memory of all that has transpired since January 21 and place oneself in the President's position after the Jones deposition. The President had just faced unexpectedly detailed questions about Ms. Lewinsky. The questions addressed, at times, minute details and at other times contained bizarre inaccuracies about the relationship. As the President candidly admitted in his grand jury testimony, he had long thought the day would come when his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would become public: ``I formed an opinion early in 1996, once I got into this unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when it stopped, which I knew I'd have to do and which I should have done long before I did, that she would talk about it. Not because Monica Lewinsky is a bad person. She's basically a good girl. She's a good young woman with a good heart and a good mind. . . . But I knew that the minute there was no longer any contact, she would talk about this. She would have to. She couldn't help it. It was, it was part of her psyche.'' App. at 575-76 (emphasis added). Now, with the questioning about Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case and the publication of the first internet report article about Ms. Lewinsky, the President knew that a media storm was about to erupt. And erupt it did. So it was hardly surprising that the President reached out to Ms. Currie at this time. He was trying to gather all available information and assess the political and personal consequences that this revelation would soon have. Though he did not confide fully in Ms. Currie, he knew Ms. Currie was Ms. Lewinsky's main contact and thus could have additional relevant information to help him assess and respond to the impending media scrutiny. As the President testified: ``I do not remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie or when. I don't. I can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I first heard about this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was. I remember that I was highly agitated, understandably, I think.'' App. at 593. And further, ``[W]hat I was trying to determine was whether my recollection was right and that she was always in the office complex when Monica was there. . . . I thought what would happen is that it would break in the press, and I was trying to get the facts down.'' App. at 507-08 (emphasis added). As the President concluded: ``I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I could.'' App. at 508. Ms. Currie's grand jury testimony confirms the President's ``agitated'' state of mind and information-gathering purpose for the discussion. She testified that the President appeared, in her words, to be ``shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.'' Supp. at 668 (Currie GJ 7/22/98). She described the President's remarks as ``both statements and questions at the same time.'' Supp. at 534 (Currie FBI 302 1/24/98). Finally, the inference that the President intended to influence Ms. Currie's testimony before she ever became a witness is firmly undercut by the advice the President gave to her when she ultimately did become a witness in the OIC investigation: ``And then I remember when I knew she was going to have to testify to the grand jury, and I, I felt terrible because she had been through this loss of her sister, this horrible accident Christmas that killed her [[Page S209]] brother, and her mother was in the hospital. I was trying to do--to make her understand that I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to the grand jury. And if her memory was different than mine, it was fine, just go in there and tell them what she thought. So, that's all I remember.'' App. at 593; see also App. at 508 (``I think Ms. Currie would also testify that I explicitly told her, once I realized you were involved in the Jones case--you, the Office of Independent Counsel--and that she might have to be called as a witness, that she should just go in there and tell the truth, tell what she knew, and be perfectly truthful.'').\110--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \110\ Only groundless speculation and unfounded inferences support the Committee Report's mirror allegation of Article I (4) that the President lied to the grand jury when he described his motivation in discussing these matters with Ms. Currie. That allegation should be rejected for the same reasons discussed more fully in the text of this section. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In sum, neither the testimony of Ms. Currie nor that of the President--the only two participants in this conversation-- supports the inference that the conversation had an insidious purpose. The undisputed evidence shows that Ms. Currie was neither an actual nor contemplated witness in the Jones case. And when Ms. Currie did ultimately become a witness in the Starr investigation, the President told her to tell the truth, which she did. 7. The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides This final allegation of Article II should be rejected out of hand. The President has admitted misleading his family, his staff, and the Nation about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he has expressed his profound regret for such conduct. But this Article asserts that the President should be impeached and removed from office because he failed to be candid with his friends and aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. These allegedly impeachable denials took place in the immediate aftermath of the Lewinsky publicity--at the very time the President was denying any improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in nearly identical terms on national television. Having made this announcement to the whole country on television, it is simply absurd to believe that he was somehow attempting corruptly to influence the testimony of aides when he told them virtually the same thing at the same time.\111\ Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the President spoke with these individuals regarding the allegations because of the longstanding professional and personal relationships he shared with them and the corresponding responsibility he felt to address their concerns once the allegations were aired. The Managers point to no evidence--for there is none--that the President spoke to these individuals for any other reason, and certainly not that he spoke with them intending to obstruct any proceeding.\112\ They simply assert that since he knew there was an investigation, his intent had to be that they relate his remarks to the investigators and grand jurors. House Br. at 80. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \111\ As the Supreme Court has held, to constitute obstruction of justice such actions must be taken `'with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings.'' United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 592, 599 (1995). \112\ The Committee Reports's allegation under Article I (4) that the President committed perjury before the grand jury when, in the course of admitting that he misled his close aides, he stated that he endeavored to say to his aides ``things that were true,'' App. at 557-60, without disclosing the full nature of the relationship is simply bizarre. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- However, there is no allegation that the President attempted to influence these aides' testimony about their own personal knowledge or observations. Nor is there any evidence that the President knew any of these aides would ultimately be witnesses in the grand jury when he spoke with them. None was under subpoena at the time the denials took place and none had any independent knowledge of any sexual activity between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, the only evidence these witnesses could offer on this score was the hearsay repetition of the same public denials that the members of the grand jury likely heard on their home television sets. Under the strained theory of this article, every person who heard the President's public denial could have been called to the grand jury to create still additional obstructions of justice. To bolster this otherwise unsupportable charge, the Managers point to an excerpt of the President's testimony wherein he acknowledged that, to the extent he shared with anyone any details of the facts of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, they could conceivably be called before the grand jury--which for the sake of his friends the President wanted to avoid: ``I think I was quite careful what I said after [January 21]. I may have said something to all of these people to that effect [denying an improper relationship], but I'll also-- whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you information that could get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about this.'' App. at 647. The point was not that the President believed these people would be witnesses and so decided to mislead them, but rather that he decided to provide as little information as possible (consistent with his perceived obligation to address their legitimate concerns) in order to keep them from becoming witnesses solely because of what he told them. In conclusion, this Article fails as a matter of law and as a matter of common sense. It should be soundly rejected. VI. The Structural Deficiencies of the Articles Preclude a Constitutionally Sound Vote The Constitution prescribes a strict and exacting standard for the removal of a popularly elected President. Because each of the two articles charges multiple unspecified wrongs, each is unconstitutionally flawed in two independent respects. First, by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. Since Senate Rules require that an entire article be voted as a unit, sixty-seven Senators could conceivably vote to convict while in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed--for example, they could completely disagree on what statement they believe is false--in direct violation of the Constitutional requirements of ``Concurrence'' and due process. Second, by charging perjury without identifying a single allegedly perjurious statement, and charging obstruction of justice without identifying a single allegedly obstructive action by the President, the House of Representatives has failed to inform the Senate either of the statements it agreed were perjurious (if it agreed), or of the actual conduct by the President that it agreed constituted obstruction of justice (again, if it agreed). The result is that the President does not have the most basic notice of the charges against him required by due process and fundamental fairness. He is not in a position to defend against anything other than a moving target. The guesswork involved even in identifying the charges to be addressed in this Trial Memorandum highlights just how flawed the articles are.\113--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \113\ The House Managers cannot constitutionally unbundle the charges in the articles or provide the missing specifics. This is because the Constitution provides that only the House of Representatives can amend articles of impeachment, and judicial precedent demonstrates that unduly vague indictments cannot be cured by a prosecutor providing a bill of particulars. Only the charging body--here, the House--can particularize an impermissibly vague charge. Indeed, Senate precedent confirms that the entire House must grant particulars when articles of impeachment are not sufficiently specific for a fair trial. During the 1933 impeachment trial of Judge Harold Louderback, counsel for the Judge filed a motion to make the original Article V, the omnibus or ``catchall'' article, more definite. 77 Cong Rec. 1852, 1854 (1933). The House Managers unanimously consented to the motion, which they considered to be akin to a motion for a bill of particulars, and the full House amended Article V to provide the requested specifics. Id. Thereafter, the Clerk of the House informed the Senate that the House had adopted an amendment to Article V. Id. Judge Louderback was then tried on the amended article. Judge Louderback was subsequently acquitted on all five articles. Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Report by Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Appendix B at 55 (Feb. 1974). The power to define and approve articles of impeachment is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the House of Representatives. U.S. Const. Art I, Sec. 2, cl. 5. It follows that any alteration of an Article of Impeachment can be performed only by the House. The House cannot delegate (and has not delegated) to the Managers the authority to amend or alter the Articles, and Senate precedent demonstrates that only the House (not the Managers unilaterally) can effect an amendment to articles of impeachment. Case law is consistent with this precedent. When indictments are unconstitutionally vague, they cannot be cured by a prosecutor's provision of a bill of particulars, because only the charging body can elaborate upon vague charges. As the Supreme Court noted in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 771 (1962): ``It is argued that any deficiency in the indictments in these cases could have been cured by bills of particulars. But it is a settled rule that a bill of particular cannot save an invalid indictment . . . To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury. . . .'' See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 214, 216 (1960) quoting Ex Parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887) (``If it lies within the province of a court to charging part to an indictment to suit its own notions of what it ought to have been or what they grand jury would probably have made it if their attention had been called to suggested changes, the great importance which the common law attaches to an indictment by a grand jury . . . may be frittered away until its value is almost destroyed.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The result is a pair of articles whose structure does not permit a constitutionally sound vote to convict. If they were counts in an indictment, these articles would not survive a motion to dismiss. Under the unique circumstances of an impeachment trial, they should fail: A. The Articles Are Both Unfairly Complex and Lacking in Specificity A cursory review of the articles demonstrates that they each allege multiple and unspecified acts of wrongdoing. 1. The Structure of Article I Article I accuses the President of numerous different wrongful actions. The introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and defend the [[Page S210]] Constitution; (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; (iii) willfully corrupting and manipulating the judicial process; and (iv) impeding the administration of justice. The second paragraph charges the President with (a) perjurious, (b) false, and (c) misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four different subject areas: (1) the nature and details of this relationship with a subordinate government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a federal judge in that action; (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. The third paragraph alleges that, as a consequence of the foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States: undermined the integrity of his office; brought disrepute on the Presidency; betrayed his trust as President; and acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice. It is imperative to note that although Article I alleges ``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony concerning ``one or more'' of four general subject areas, it does not identify the particular sworn statements by the President that were allegedly ``perjurious,'' (and therefore potentially illegal), or ``false'' or ``misleading'' (and therefore not unlawful). In fact, contrary to the most basic rules of fairness and due process, Article I does not identify a single specific statement that is at issue. In sum, Article I appears to charge the President with four general forms of wrongdoing (violations of two oaths, manipulation of legal process, impeding justice), involving three (perjurious, false, misleading) distinct types of statements, concerning different subjects (relationship to Ms. Lewinsky, prior deposition testimony, prior statements of his attorney, obstruction of justice),\114\ resulting in four species of harms either to the Presidency (undermining its integrity, bringing it into disrepute) or to the people (acting in a manner subversive of the rule of law and to the manifest injury of the people). And it alleges all of this without identifying a single, specific perjurious, false or misleading statement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \114\ It appears that each of these topic areas includes various, unspecified allegedly perjurious, false and misleading statements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Absent a clear statement of which statements are alleged to have been perjurious, and which specific acts are alleged to have been undertaken with the purpose of obstructing the administration of justice, it is impossible to prepare a defense. It is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence that an accused must be afforded notice of the specific charges against which he must defend. Neither the Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel, nor the Committee Report of the Judiciary Committee, nor the House Managers' Trial Memorandum was adopted by the House, and none of them can provide the necessary particulars. It is impossible to know whether the different statements and acts charged in the Referral, or the Report, or the Trial Memorandum, or all, or none, are what the House had in mind when it passed the Articles. 2. The Structure of Article II Article II accuses the President of a variety of wrongful acts. The introductory paragraph charges the President with (i) violating his constitutional oath faithfully to execute his office and defend the Constitution and (ii) violating his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed by (iii) preventing, obstructing and impeding the administration of justice by engaging (personally and through subordinates and agents) in a scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action. The second paragraph specifies the various ways in which the violations in the first paragraph are said to have occurred. It states that the harm was effectuated by ``means'' that are not expressly defined or delimited, but rather are said to include ``one or more'' of seven ``acts'' attributed to the President: (1) corruptly encouraging a witness to execute a perjurious, false and misleading affidavit; (2) corruptly encouraging a witness to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if called to testify; (3) corruptly engaging in, encouraging or supporting a scheme to conceal evidence; (4) intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness at a time when that witness's truthful testimony would have been harmful; (5) allowing his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a federal judge in order to prevent relevant questioning; (6) relating a false and misleading account of events to a potential witness in a civil rights action in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that person; (7) making false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence their testimony and causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. The third paragraph alleges that, as a result of the foregoing, the President has, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States: undermined the integrity of his office; brought disrepute on the Presidency; betrayed his trust as President; and acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice. As with the first article, Article II does not set forth a single specific act alleged to have been performed by the President. Instead, it alleges general ``encourage[ment]'' to execute a false affidavit, provide misleading testimony, and conceal subpoenaed evidence. This Article also includes general allegations that the President undertook to ``corruptly influence'' and/or ``corruptly prevent'' the testimony of potential witnesses and that he ``engaged in . . . or supported'' a scheme to conceal evidence. Again, the Senate and the President have been left to guess at the charges (if any) actually agreed upon by the House. b. conviction on these articles would violate the constitutional requirement that two-thirds of the senate reach agreement that specific wrongdoing has been proven 1. The Articles Bundle Together Disparate Allegations in Violation of the Constitution's Requirements of Concurrence and Due Process a. The Articles Violate the Constitution's Two-Thirds Concurrence Requirement Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted [on articles of impeachment] without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 6. The Constitution's requirement is plain. These must be ``Concurrence,'' which is to say genuine, reliably manifested, agreement, among those voting to convict. Both the committing of this task to the Senate and the two-thirds requirement are important constitutional safeguards reflecting the Framers' intent that conviction not come easily. Conviction demands real and objectively verifiable agreement among a substantial supermajority. Indeed, the two-thirds supermajority requirement is a crucial constitutional safeguard. Supermajority provisions are constitutional exceptions \115\ to the presumption that decisions by legislative bodies shall be made by majority rule.\116\ These exceptions serve exceptional ends. The two- thirds concurrence rule serves the indispensable purpose of protecting the people who chose the President by election. By giving a ``veto'' to a minority of Senators, the Framers sought to ensure the rights of an electoral majority--and to safeguard the people in their choice of Executive. Only the Senate and only the requirement of a two-thirds concurrence could provide that assurance. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \115\ See e.g., U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7, cl. 2 (two thirds vote required to override Presidential veto); U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2, cl. 2 (two thirds required for ratification of treaties); U.S. Const. Art. V (two thirds required to propose constitutional amendments); U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5, cl. 2 (two thirds required to expel members of Congress). \116\ Madison referred to majority voting as ``the fundamental principal of free government.'' Federalist No. 58 at 248 (G. Wills ed. 1982). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ``Concurrence'' required is agreement that the charges stated in specific articles have in fact been proved, and the language of those articles is therefore critical. Since the House of Representatives is vested with the ``sole Power of Impeachment,'' U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5, the form of those articles cannot be altered by the Senate. And Rule XXIII of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials (``Senate Rules'') provides that ``[a]n article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' It follows that each Senator may vote on an article only in its totality. By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading testimony in any ``one or more'' of four topic areas. But that prospect creates the very real possibility that ``conviction'' could occur even though fewer than two-thirds of the Senators actually agree that any particular false statement was made.\117\ Put differently, the article's structure presents the possibility that the President could be convicted on Article I even though he would have been acquitted if separate votes were taken on individual allegedly perjurious statements. To illustrate the point, consider that it would be possible for conviction to result even with as few as seventeen Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because seventeen votes for one statement in each of four categories would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict. The problem is even worse if Senators agree that there is a single perjurious statement but completely disagree as to which statement within the 176 pages of transcript they believe is perjurious. Such an outcome would plainly violate the Constitution's requirement that there be conviction only when a two-thirds majority agrees. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \117\ There remains the additional problem that the articles allege not specific perjurious statements, but perjury within a topic area. Perjury as to a category (rather than as to specific statements) is an incomprehensible notion. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The very same flaw renders Article II unconstitutional as well. That Article alleges a [[Page S211]] scheme of wrongdoing effected through ``means'' including ``one or more'' of seven factually and logically discrete ``acts.'' That compound structure is fraught with the potential to confuse. For example, the Article alleges both concealment of gifts on December 28, 1997, and false statements to aides in late January 1998. These two allegations involve completely different types of behavior. They are alleged to have occurred in different months. They involved different persons. And they are alleged to have obstructed justice in different legal proceedings. In light of Senate Rule XXIII's prohibition on dividing articles, the combination of such patently different types of alleged wrongdoing in a single article creates the manifest possibility that votes for conviction on this article would not reflect any two-third agreement whatsoever. The extraordinary problem posed by such compound articles is well-recognized and was illustrated by the proceedings in the impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon. Article III of the Nixon proceedings, like the articles here, was phrased in the disjunctive and charged multiple false statements as grounds for impeachment. Judge Nixon moved to dismiss Article III on a number of grounds, including on the basis of its compound structure.\118\ Although that motion was defeated in the full Senate by a vote of 34-63,\119\ the 34 Senators who voted to dismiss were a sufficient number to block conviction on Article III. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \118\ See Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 257, 281-84 (1989). \119\ Judge Nixon Proceedings at 430-32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Judge Nixon (although convicted on the first two articles) was ultimately acquitted on Article III by a vote of 57 (guilty) to 40 (not guilty).\120\ Senator Biden, who voted not guilty on the article, stated that the structure of the article made it ``possible . . . for Judge Nixon to be convicted under article III even though two-thirds of the members present did not agree that he made any one of the false statements.'' \121\ Senator Murkowski concurred: ``I don't appreciate the omnibus nature of article III, and I agree with the argument that the article could easily be used to convict Judge Nixon by less than the super majority vote required by the Constitution.'' Id. at 464.\122\ And Senator Dole stated that ``Article III is redundant, complex and unnecessarily confusing. . . . It alleges that Judge Nixon committed five different offenses in connection with each of fourteen separate events, a total of seventy charges. . . . [I]t was virtually impossible for Judge Nixon and his attorney's to prepare an adequate defense.'' \123--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \120\ Id. at 435-36. \121\ Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., id. at 459. \122\ See also Statement of Senator Bailey, Impeachment of Judge Harold Louderback, 77 Cong. Rec. 4238 (May 26, 1933) (respondent should be tried on individual articles and not on all of them assembled into one article). \123\ Statement of Senator Robert Dole, Judge Nixon Proceedings at 457. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In his written statement filed after the voting was completed, Senator Kohl pointed out the dangers posed by combining multiple accusations in a single article: ``Article III is phrased in the disjunctive. It says that Judge Nixon concealed his conversations through `one or more' of 14 false statements. ``This wording presents a variety of problems. First of all, it means that Judge Nixon can be convicted even if two thirds of the Senate does not agree on which of his particular statements were false. . . . ``The House is telling us that it's OK to convict Judge Nixon on Article III even if we have different visions of what he did wrong. But that's not fair to Judge Nixon, to the Senate, or to the American people. Let's say we do convict on Article III. The American people--to say nothing of history-- would never know exactly which of Judge Nixon's statements were regarded as untrue. They'd have to guess. What's more, this ambiguity would prevent us from being totally accountable to the voters for our decision.'' \124 \124\ Statement of Senator Herbert H. Kohl, id. at 449 (emphasis added). Senator Kohl did not believe that the constitutional question concerning two-thirds concurrence had to be answered in the Judge Nixon proceedings because he believed that the bundling problem created an unfairness (in effect, a due process violation) that precluded conviction. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As noted, the Senate acquitted Judge Nixon on the omnibus article--very possible because of the constitutional and related due process and fairness concerns articulated by Senator Kohl and others.\125--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \125\ See also Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment: Modern Precedents, Report by the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 12 (1998) (discussing Sen. Kohl's position). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The constitutional problems identified by those Senators are significant when a single federal judge (one of roughly 1000) is impeached. But when the Chief Executive and sole head of one entire branch of our government stands accused, those infirmities are momentous. Fairness and the appearance of fairness require that the basis for any action this body might take be clear and specific. The Constitution clearly forbids conviction unless two thirds of the Senate concurs in a judgment. Any such judgment would be meaningless in the absence of a finding that specific, identifiable, wrongful conduct has in fact occurred. No such conclusion is possible under either article as drafted. b. Conviction on the Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections that Forbid Compound Charges in a Single Accusation Even apart from the Constitution's clear requirement of ``Concurrence'' in Article I, section 3, the fundamental principles of fairness and due process that underlie our Constitution and permeate our procedural and substantive law compel the same outcome. In particular, the requirement that there be genuine agreement by the deciding body before an accused is denied life, liberty or property is a cornerstone of our jurisprudence.\126--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \126\ Judicial precedent is persuasive here on these due process and fairness questions. Indeed, in prior impeachment trials, the Senate has been guided by decisions of the courts, because they reflect cumulative wisdom concerning fairness and the search for justice. During the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Senator Specter stated: ``[T]he impeachment process relies in significant measure on decisions of the court and the opinion of judges . . . [T]he decisions and interpretations of the courts should be highly instructive to us. In our system of Government, it has been the courts that through the years have been called upon to construe, define and apply the provisions of our Constitution. Their decisions reflect our values and our evolving notions of justice . . . Although we are a branch of Government coequal with the judiciary, and by the Constitution vested with the `sole' power to try impeachments, I believe that the words and reasoning of judges who have struggled with the meaning and application of the Constitution and its provisions ought to be given great heed because that jurisprudence embodies the values of fairness and justice that ought to be the polestar of our own determinations.'' (S. Doc. 101-18, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. at 740-41.) (As Senator Specter observed, judicial rules have been developed and refined over the years to assure that court proceedings are fair, and that an accused is assured the necessary tools to prepare a proper defense, including proper notice. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- While in the federal criminal context due process requires that there be genuine agreement among the entire jury, see United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 470 (7th Cir. 1998), Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality), in the impeachment context, that requirement of genuine agreement must be expressed by a two-thirds supermajority. But the underlying due process principles is the same in both settings. This basic principle is bottomed on two fundamental notions: (1) that there be genuine agreement--mutuality of understanding--among those voting to convict, and (2) that the unanimous verdict be understood (by the accused and by the public) to have been the product of genuine agreement. This principle is given shape in the criminal law in the well-recognized prohibition on ``duplicitous'' charges. ``Duplicity is the joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate offenses.'' United States v. UCO Oil, 546 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir. 1976.) In the law of criminal pleading, a single count that charges two or more separate offenses is duplicitous. See United States v. Parker, 991 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hawkes, 753 F.2d 355, 357 (4th Cir. 1985).\127\ A duplicitous charge in an indictment violates the due process principle that ``the requisite specificity of the charge may not be compromised by the joining of separate offenses.'' Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 633 (1991) (plurality). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \127\ See also Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8(a): ``Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar charter or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.'' (emphasis added). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- More specifically, a duplicitous charge poses the acute danger of conviction by a less-than-unanimous jury; some jurors may find the defendant guilty of one charge but not guilty of a second, while other jurors find him guilty of a second charge but not the first. See United States v. Saleh, 875 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 871 (4th Cir. 1979); Bins v. United States, 331 F.2d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 1964).\128\ Our federal system of justice simply does not permit conviction by less than unanimous agreement concerning a single, identified charge. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (conviction requires unanimous agreement as to particular statements); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 929 (5th Cir. 1991) (reversal required where no instruction was given to ensure that all jurors concur in conclusion that at least one particular statement was false); see also United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (right to unanimous verdict violated by instruction authorizing conviction if jury found defendant committed any one of six acts proscribed by statute).\129\ The protection against conviction by less than full agreement by the factfinders is enshrined in Rule 31(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which dictates that ``[t]he verdict shall be unanimous.'' \130--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \128\ Each of the four categories charged here actually comprises multiple allegedly perjurious statements. Thus, the dangers of duplicitousness are increased exponentially. \129\ The Supreme Court has stated that ``[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.'' Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (same). \130\ That rule gives expression to a criminal defendant's due process right to a unanimous verdict. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.2d 458, 4771 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the Constitution does not tolerate the risk of a less than unanimous verdict in the criminal setting, ``where the complexity of a case or other factors create the potential for confusion as to the [[Page S212]] legal theory or factual basis which sustains a defendant's conviction, a specific unanimity instruction is required.'' United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987)). Such instructions are required where the government charges several criminal acts, any of which alone could have supported the offense charged, because of the need to provide sufficient guidance to assure that all members of the jury were unanimous on the same act or acts of illegality. Id. at 88. As the Seventh Circuit recently concluded in a case alleging multiple false statements, ``the jury should have been advised that in order to have convicted [the defendant], they had to unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made.'' Fawley, 137 F.2d at 470. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus, where the charging instrument alleges multiple types of wrongdoing, the unanimity requirement ``means more than a conclusory agreement that the defendant has violated the statute in question; there is a requirement of substantial agreement as to the principal factual elements underlying a specified offense.'' United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). Accordingly, although there need not be unanimity as to every bit of underlying evidence, due process ``does require unanimous agreement as to the nature of the defendant's violation, not simply that a violation has occurred.'' McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 n.5 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Such agreement is necessary to fulfill the demands of fairness and rationality that inform the requirement of due process. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 637.\131--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \131\ In our federal criminal process, a duplicitous pleading problem may sometimes be cured by instructions to the jury requiring unanimous agreement on a single statement, see Fawley, supra, but that option is not present here. Not only do the Senate Rules not provide for the equivalent of jury instructions, they expressly rule out the prospect of subdividing an article of impeachment for purposes of voting. See Senate Impeachment Rule XXIII. Nor is the duplicitousness problem presented here cured by any specific enumeration of elements necessary to be found by the factfinder. See, e.g., Santarpio v. United States, 560 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1977) (duplicitous charge harmless because indictments adequately set out the elements of the federal crime; appellants were not misled or prejudiced). Article I does not enumerate specific elements to be found by the factfinder. To the contrary, the Article combines multiple types of wrong, allegedly performed by different types of statements, the different types occurring in multiple subject matter areas, and all having a range of allegedly harmful effects. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Where multiple accusations are combined in a single charge, neither the accused nor the factfinder can know precisely what that charge means. When the factfinder body cannot agree upon the meaning of the charge, it cannot reach genuine agreement that conviction is warranted. These structural deficiencies preclude a constitutionally sound vote on the articles. C. Conviction on These Articles Would Violate Due Process Protections Prohibiting Vague and Nonspecific Accusations 1. The Law of Due Process Forbids Vague and Nonspecific Charges Impermissibly vague indictments must be dismissed, because they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' United States v. Russell, 369 U.S. 749, 764 (1962) (internal quotation omitted). In Russell, the indictment at issue failed to specify the subject matter about which the defendant had allegedly refused to answer questions before a Congressional subcommittee. Instead, the indictment stated only that the questions to which the answers were refused ``were pertinent to the question then under inquiry'' by the Subcommittee. Id. at 752. The Court held that because the indictment did not provide sufficient specificity, it was unduly vague and therefore had to be dismissed. Id. at 773. The Supreme Court explained that dismissal is the only appropriate remedy for an unduly vague indictment, because only the charging body can elaborate upon vague charges: ``To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to secure. For a defendant could then be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grant jury which indicted him. This underlying principle is reflected by the settled rule in the federal courts that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury . . .'' Id. at 771. See also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 216 (1960); see also United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (perjury count too vague to be valid cannot be cured even by bill of particulars); United States v. Tonelli, 557 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1978) (vacating perjury conviction where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the precise falsehood[s] alleged' ''). Under the relevant case law, the two exhibited Articles present paradigmatic examples of charges drafted too vaguely to enable the accused to meet the accusations fairly. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court stated that ``[i]t is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offence, whether it be at common law or by statute, includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offence in the same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the species--it must descend to particulars.'' United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875). The Court has more recently emphasized the fundamental ``vice'' of nonspecific indictments: that they ``fail[] to sufficiently apprise the defendant `of what he must be prepared to meet.' '' Russell, 369 U.S. at 764. The Supreme Court emphasized in Russell that specificity is important not only for the defendant, who needs particulars to prepare a defense, but also for the decision-maker, ``so it may decide whether [the facts] are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.'' Id. at 768 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). An unspecific indictment creates a ``moving target'' for the defendant exposing the defendant to a risk of surprise through a change in the prosecutor's theory. ``It enables his conviction to rest on one point and the affirmance of the conviction to rest on another. It gives the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the gaps of proof by surmise and conjecture.'' Russell, 369 U.S. at 766. Ultimately, an unspecific indictment creates a risk that ``a defendant could . . . be convicted on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him.'' Id. at 770. 2. The Allegations of Both Articles Are Unconstitutionally Vague Article I alleges that in his August 17, 1998 grand jury testimony, President Clinton provided ``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony to the grand jury concerning ``one or more'' of four subject areas. Article I does not, however, set forth a single specific statement by the President upon which its various allegations are predicated. The Article haphazardly intermingles alleged criminal conduct with totally lawful conduct, and its abstract generalizations provide no guidance as to actual alleged perjurious statements. Aritcle I thus violates the most fundamental requirement of perjury indictments. It is fatally vague in three distinct respects: (1) it does not identify any statements that form the basis of its allegations,\132\ (2) it therefore does not specify which of the President's statements to the grand jury were allegedly ``perjurious,'' which were allegedly ``false,'' and which were allegedly ``misleading,'' and (3) it does not even specify the subject matter of any alleged perjurious statement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \132\ One of the cardinal rules of perjury cases is that ``[a] conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623 may not stand where the indictment fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis of its falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine its verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality of those falsehoods.'' United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977). Courts have vacated convictions for perjury in instances where ``the indictment . . . did not `set forth the precise falsehood(s) alleged.'' Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 200. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The first defect is fatal, because it is axiomatic that if the precise perjurious statements are not identified in the indictment, a defendant cannot possibly prepare his defense properly. See, e.g., Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977). Indeed, in past impeachment trails in the Senate where articles of impeachment alleged the making of false statements, the false statements were specified in the Articles. For example, in the impeachment trial of Alcee L. Hastings, Articles of Impeachment II-XIV specified the exact statements that formed the bases of the false statement allegations against Judge Hastings.\133\ Similarly, in the impeachment trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., Articles of Impeachment I-III specified the exact statements that formed the bases of their false statement allegations.\134\ In this case, Article I falls far short of specificity standards provided in previous impeachment trials in the Senate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \133\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess., S. Doc. 101-18 at 4-7 (1989). See, e.g., Id. at 2 (Article II alleging that the false statement was ``that Judge Hastings and Wiliam Borders, of Washington, D.C., never made any agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in United States v. Romano, a case tried before Judge Hastings''). \134\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22 at 430-32 (1989). See, e.g., Id., at 432 (Article I alleging that the false statement was ``Forrest County District Attorney Paul Holmes never discussed the Drew Fairchild case with Judge Nixon.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- As to the second vagueness defect, there is a significant legal difference between, on the one hand, statements under oath which are ``perjurious,'' and those, on the other hand, which are simply ``false'' or misleading.'' Only the former could form the basis of a criminal charge. The Supreme Court has emphatically held that ``misleading'' statements alone cannot form the basis of a prejury charge. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), the Court held that literally true statements are by definition non-perjurious, and ``it is no answer to say that here the jury found that [the defendant] intended to mislead his examiner,'' since ``[a] jury should not be permitted to enage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer. . . was intended to mislead or divert the examiner.'' Id. at 358-60 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that ``the perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statue invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner so long as the witness speakes the literal truth.'' Id. Thus, specification of the exact statements alleged to be prejurious is required, because ``to hold otherwise would permit the trial jury to inject its inferences into the grand jury's indictment, and would allow defendants to be convicted for immaterial falsehoods or for `intent to mislead' or `perjury by implication,' which Bronston specifically prohibited.'' Slawik, 538 F.2d at 83-84 (emphasis added). Thus, if the House meant that certain statements were misleading but literally truthful, they might be subject to a [[Page S213]] motion to dismiss on the ground that the offense was not impeachable. The same is true for allegedly ``false'' answers, because it is clear that mere ``false'' answers given under oath, without more, are not criminal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the statute proscribing perjury before a federal grand jury, requires additional elements beyond falsity, including the defendant's specific intent to testify falsely and the statement's materiality to the proceeding. A defense to a perjury charge is therefore tied directly to the specific statement alleged to have been perjurious. Did the defendant know the particular answer was false? Was it material? \135--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \135\ Not surprisingly, courts have specifically held that because of these additional elements (the lack of which may undermine a perjury prosecution), a defendant must know exactly which statements are alleged to form the basis of a perjury indictment to test whether the requisite elements are present. See, e.g., United States v. Lattimore, 215 F.2d 847, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (``The accused is entitled under the Constitution to be advised as to every element in respect to which it is necessary for him to prepare a defense''). For example, because of the intent requirement, one potential defense to a perjury prosecution is that the question to which the allegedly perjurious statement was addressed was fundamentally ambiguous, as courts have held that fundamentally ambiguous questions cannot as a matter of law produce perjurious answers. See, e.g., Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 199; United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967). A separate defense to a perjury prosecution is that the statement alleged to have been perjurious was not material to the proceeding. Thus, ``false'' statements alone are not perjurious if they were not material to the proceeding. By not specifying which statements are alleged to be ``false'' or ``misleading,'' Article I precludes the President from preparing a materiality defense, and it also fails to distinguish allegedly criminal conduct from purely lawful conduct. As one court explained, ``It is to be observed that * * * it is not sufficient to constitute the offense that the oath shall be merely false, but that it must be false in some `material matter.' Applying that definition to the facts stated in either count of this indictment, and it would seem that there is an entire lack in any essential sense to disclose that the particulars as to which the oath is alleged to have been false were material in the essential sense required for purposes of an indictment for this offense.'' (United States v. Cameron, 282 F. 684, 692 (D. Ariz. 1922).). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Article I's third vagueness defect is that it does not specify the subject matter of the alleged perjurious statements. Instead, it simply alleges that the unspecified statements by the President to the grand jury were concerning ``one or more'' of four enumerated areas. The ``one or more'' language underscores the reality that the President--and, critically, the Senate--cannot possibly know what the House majority had in mind, since it may have failed even to agree on the subject matter of the alleged perjury. The paramount importance of this issue may be seen by reference to court decisions holding that a jury has to ``unanimously agree that a particular statement contained in the indictment was falsely made.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added); see also discussion of unanimity requirement in Section VI.B, supra. Article II is also unconstitutionally vague. It alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice * * * in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up and conceal'' unspecified evidence and testimony in the Jones case. It sets forth seven instances in which the President allegedly ``encouraged'' false testimony or the concealment of evidence, or ``corruptly influenced'' or ``corruptly prevented'' various other testimony, also unspecified. In fact, not only does Article II fail to identify a single specific act performed by the President in this alleged scheme to obstruct justice, it does not even identify the ``potential witnesses'' whose testimony the President allegedly sought to ``corruptly influence.'' The President cannot properly defend against Article II without knowing, at a minimum, which specific acts of obstruction and/or concealment he is alleged to have performed, and which ``potential witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to influence. For example, it is clear that, in order to violate the federal omnibus obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, an accuser must prove that there was a pending judicial proceeding, that the defendant knew of the proceeding, and that the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 729 F. Supp. 1380, 1383-84 (D.D.C. 1990). Without knowing which ``potential witnesses'' he is alleged to have attempted to influence, and the precise manner in which he is alleged to have attempted to obstruct justice, the President cannot prepare a defense that would address the elements of the offense with which he has been charged--that he had no intent to obstruct, that there was no pending proceeding, or that the person involved was not a potential witness. It follows that the requisite vote of two-thirds of the Senate required by the Constitution cannot possibly be obtained if there are no specific statements whatsoever alleged to be perjurious, false or misleading in Article I or no specific acts of obstruction alleged in Article II. Different Senators might decide that different statements or different acts were unlawful without any concurrence by two- thirds of the Senate as to any particular statement or act. Such a scenario is antithetical to the Constitution's due process guarantee of notice of specific and definite charges and it threatens conviction upon vague and uncertain grounds. As currently framed, neither Article I nor Article II provides a sufficient basis for the President to prepare a defense to the unspecified charges upon which the Senate may vote, or an adequate basis for actual adjudication. D. The Senate's Judgment Will Be Final and That Judgment Must Speak Clearly and Intelligibly An American impeachment trial is not a parliamentary inquiry into fitness for office. It is not a vote of no confidence. It is not a mechanism whereby a legislative majority may oust a President from a rival party on political grounds. To the contrary, because the President has a limited term of office and can be turned out in the course of ordinary electoral processes, a Presidential impeachment trial is a constitutional measure of last resort designed to protect the Republic. This Senate is therefore vested with an extremely grave Constitutional task: a decision whether to remove the President for the protection of the people themselves. In the Senate's hands there rests not only the fate of one man, but the integrity of our Constitution and our democratic process. Fidelity to the Constitution and fidelity to the electorate must converge in the impeachment trial vote. If the Senate is to give meaning to the Constitution's command, any vote on removal must be a vote on one or more specifically and separately identified ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as set forth in properly drafted impeachment articles approved by the House. If the people are to have their twice-elected President removed by an act of the Senate, that act must be intelligible. It must be explainable and justifiable to the people who first chose the President and then chose him again. The Senate must ensure that it has satisfied the Constitution's requirement of a genuine two-thirds concurrence that specific, identified wrongdoing has been proven. The Senate must also assure the people, through the sole collective act the Senate is required to take, that its decision has a readily discernible and unequivocal meaning. As matters stand, the Senate will vote on two highly complex Articles of Impeachment. Its vote will not be shaped by narrowing instructions. Its rules preclude a vote on divisible parts of the articles. There will be no judicial review, no correction of error, and no possibility of retrial. The Senate's decision will be as conclusive as any known to our law--judicially, politically, historically, and most literally, irrevocable. Under such circumstances, the Senate's judgment must speak clearly and intelligibly. That cannot happen if the Senate votes for conviction on these articles. Their compound structure and lack of specificity make genuine agreement as to specific wrongs impossible, and those factors completely prevent the electorate from understanding why the Senate as a whole voted as it did. As formulated, these articles satisfy neither the plain requirement of the Constitution nor the rightful expectations of the American people. The articles cannot support a constitutionally sound vote for conviction. VII. The Need for Discovery The Senate need not address the issue of discovery at this time, but because the issue may arise at a later date, it is appropriate to remark here on its present status. Senate Resolution 16 provides that the record for purposes of the presentation by the House Managers and the President is the public record established in the House of Representatives.\136\ Since this record was created by the House itself and is ostensibly the basis for the House's impeachment vote, and because this evidence has been publicly identified and available for scrutiny, comment, and rebuttal, it is both logical and fair that this be the basis for any action by the Senate. Moreover, Senate Resolution 16 explicitly prohibits the President and the House Managers from filing at this time any ``motions to subpoena witnesses or to present any evidence not in the record.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \136\ S. Res. 16 defined the record for the presentations as ``those publicly available materials that have been submitted to or produced by the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives or House Judiciary Committee pursuant to House Resolutions 525 and 581.'' --------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the event, however, that the Senate should later decide, pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, to allow the House Managers to expand the record in some way, our position should be absolutely clear. At such time, the President would have an urgent need for the discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these proceedings has he been able to subpoena documents or summon and cross- examine witnesses. He would need to use the compulsory process authorized by Senate Impeachment Rules V and VI\137\ to obtain documentary evidence and witness depositions. While the President has access to some of the grand jury transcripts and FBI interview memoranda of witnesses called by the OIC, the President's own lawyers were not entitled to be present when these witnesses were examined. The grand jury has historically been the engine of the prosecution, and it was used in that fashion in this case. The OIC sought discovery of evidence with the single goal of documenting facts that it believed were prejudicial to the President. It did not examine witnesses with a view toward establishing there was no justification for impeachment; it did not follow up obvious leads when they might result in evidence helpful to the President; and it did not seek out and document exculpatory evidence. It did not undertake to disclose exculpatory information it might have identified. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \137\ Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials (Senate Manual 99-2, as revised by S. Res. 479 (Aug. 16, 1986)). There is ample precedent for liberal discovery in Senate impeachment trials. For example, in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, the Senate issued numerous orders addressing a range of pretrial issues over several months including: requiring the parties to provide witness lists along with a description of the general nature of the testimony that was expected from each witness months in advance of the scheduled evidentiary hearing; requiring the House Managers to turn over exculpatory materials, certain prior statements of witnesses, and documents and other tangible evidence they intended to introduce into evidence; --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page S214]] requiring the production from the House Managers of other documents in the interest of allowing the Senate to develop ``a record that fully illuminates the matters that it must consider in rendering a judgment;'' setting a briefing schedule for stipulations of facts and documents; setting a number of pretrial conferences; designating a date for final pretrial statements; and permitting a number of pre-trial depositions. Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, Hearings Before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. at 281, 286-87, 342-43, 606-07, 740. The need for discovery in this case is in fact greater than in prior impeachment proceedings. In all other impeachment trials, there were either substantive investigations by the House or prior judicial proceedings in which the accused had a full opportunity to develop the evidentiary record and cross-examine witnesses. See Id. at 163-64 (pretrial memorandum of Judge Hastings). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nor did the House of Representatives afford the President any discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be helpful in his defense. Indeed, the House called no fact witnesses at all, and at the few depositions it conducted, counsel for the President were excluded. Moreover, the House made available only a selected portion of the evidence it received from the OIC. While it published five volumes of the OIC materials (two volumes of appendices and three volumes of supplements), it withheld a great amount of evidence, and it denied counsel for the President access to this material. It is unclear what the criterion was for selecting evidence to include in the published volumes, but there does not appear to have been an attempt to include all evidence that may have been relevant to the President's defense. The President has not had access to a great deal of evidence in the possession of (for example) the House of Representatives and the OIC which may be exculpatory or relevant to the credibility of witnesses on whom the OIC and the House Managers rely. Should the Senate decide to authorize the House Managers to call witnesses or expand the record, the President would be faced with a critical need for the discovery of evidence useful to his defense--evidence which would routinely be available to any civil litigant involved in a garden-variety automobile accident case. The House Managers have had in their possession or had access at the OIC to significant amounts of non-public evidence, and they have frequently stated their intention to make use of such evidence. Obviously, in order to defend against such tactics, counsel for the President are entitled to discovery and a fair opportunity to test the veracity and reliability of this ``evidence,'' using compulsory process as necessary to obtain testimony and documents. Trial by surprise obviously has no place in the Senate of the United States where the issues in the balance is the removal of the one political leader who, with the Vice-President, is elected by all the citizens of this country.\138--------------------------------------------------------------------------- \138\ In another context, the Supreme Court has observed that ``the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information from which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial.'' Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473 (1973). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The need for discovery does not turn on the number of witnesses the House Managers may be authorized to depose.\139\ If the House Managers call a single witness, that will initiate a process that leaves the President potentially unprepared and unable to defend adequately without proper discovery. The sequence of discovery is critical. The President first needs to obtain and review relevant documentary evidence not now in his possession. He then needs to be able to depose potentially helpful witnesses, whose identity may only emerge from the documents and from the depositions themselves. Obviously, he also needs to depose potential witnesses identified by the House Managers. Only at that point will the President be able intelligently to designate his own trial witnesses. This is both a logical procedure and one which is the product of long experience designed to maximize the search for truth and minimize unfair surprise. There is no conceivable reason it should not be followed here--if the evidentiary record is opened. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \139\ It is not sufficient that counsel for the President have the right to depose the witnesses called by the Managers, essential as that right is. The testimony of a single witness may have to be refuted indirectly, circumstantially, or by a number of witnesses; it is often necessary to depose several witnesses in order to identify the one or two best. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Indeed, it is simply impossible to ascertain how a witness designated by the House Managers could fairly be rebutted without a full examination of the available evidence. It is also the case that many sorts of helpful evidence and testimony emerge in the discovery process that may at first blush appear irrelevant or tangential. In any event, the normal adversarial process is the best guarantor of the truth. The President needs discovery here not simply to obtain evidence to present a trial but also in order to make an informed judgment about what to introduce in response to the Managers' expanded case. The President's counsel must be able to make a properly knowledgeable decision about what evidence may be relevant and helpful to the President's defense, both in cross-examination and during the President's own case. The consequences of an impeachment trial are immeasurably grave: The removal of a twice-elected President. Particularly given what is at stake, fundamental fairness dictates that the President be given at least the same right as an ordinary litigant to obtain evidence necessary for his defense, particularly when a great deal of that evidence is presently in the hands of his accusers, the OIC and the House Managers. The Senate has wisely elected to proceed on the public record established by the House of Representatives, and this provides a wholly adequate basis for Senate decision-making. In the event the Senate should choose to expand this record, affording the President adequate discovery is absolutely essential. VIII. Conclusion As the Senate considers these Articles of Impeachment and listens to the arguments, individual Senators are standing in the place of the Framers of the Constitution, who prayed that the power of impeachment and removal of a President would be invoked only in the gravest of circumstances, when the stability of our system of government hung in the balance--to protect the Republic itself from efforts to subvert our Constitutional system. The Senate has an obligation to turn away an unwise and unwarranted misuse of the awesome power of impeachment. If the Senate removes this President for a wrongful relationship he hoped to keep private, for what will the House ask the Senate to remove the next President, and the next? Our Framers wisely gave us a constitutional system of checks and balances, with three co-equal branches. Removing this President on these facts would substantially alter the delicate constitutional balance, and move us closer to a quasi-parliamentary system, in which the President is elected to office by the choice of people, but continues in office only at the pleasure of Congress. In weighing the evidence and assessing the facts, we ask that Senators consider not only the intent of the Framers but also the will and interests of the people. It is the citizens of these United States who will be affected by and stand in judgment of this process. It is not simply the President--but the vote the American people rendered in schools, church halls and other civic centers all across the land twenty-six months ago--that is hanging in the balance. Respectfully submitted. David E. Kendall Charles F.C. Ruff Nicole K. Seligman Gregory B. Craig Emmet T. Flood Bruce R. Lindsey Max Stier Cheryl D. Mills Alicia L. Marti Lanny A. Breuer Williams & Connolly Office of the White House Counsel 725 12th Street, N.W. The White House Washington, D.C. 20005 Washington, D.C. 20502 January 13, 1999. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton REPLICATION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT The House of Representatives, through its Managers and counsel, replies to the Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to the Articles of Impeachment (``Answer''), as follows: Preamble The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in the Preamble to the Answer, including the sections entitled ``The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or Misdemeanors'' and ``The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice.'' With respect to the allegations in the Preamble, the House of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in Articles I and II is true and that Articles I and II properly state impeachable offenses, are not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. Article I The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in the Answer to Article I that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article I, the House of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in Article I is true and that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. [[Page S215]] First Affirmative Defense to Article I The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article I warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton. Second Affirmative Defense to Article I The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that Article I is not unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him. Third Affirmative Defense to Article I The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article I properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that Article I does not charge multiple offenses in one article. Article II The House of Representatives denies each and every allegation in the Answer to Article II that denies the acts, knowledge, intent, or wrongful conduct charged against President William Jefferson Clinton. With respect to the allegations in the Answer to Article II, the House of Representatives further states that each and every allegation in Article II is true and that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. First Affirmative Defense to Article II The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that the offense stated in Article II warrants the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton. Second Affirmative Defense to Article II The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that Article II is not unconstitutionally vague, and it provides President William Jefferson Clinton adequate notice of the offense charged against him. Third Affirmative Defense to Article II The House of Representatives denies each and every material allegation in this purported defense. The House of Representatives further states that Article II properly states an impeachable offense, is not subject to a motion to dismiss, and should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment. The House of Representatives further states that Article II does not charge multiple offenses in one article. Conclusion of the House of Representatives The House of Representatives further states that it denies each and every material allegation of the Answer not specifically admitted in this Replication. By providing this Replication to the Answer, the House of Representatives waives none of its rights in this proceeding. Wherefore, the House of Representatives states that both of the Articles of Impeachment warrant the conviction, removal from office, and disqualification from holding further office of President William Jefferson Clinton. Both of the Articles should be considered and adjudicated by the Senate. Respectfully submitted, The United States House of Representatives. Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Bill McCollum, George W. Gekas, Charles T. Canady, Stephen E. Buyer, Ed Bryant, Steve Chabot, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, Chris Cannon, James E. Rogan, Lindsey O. Graham, Managers on the Part of the House. Thomas E. Mooney, General Counsel. David P. Schippers, Chief Investigative Counsel. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton REPLY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON I. Introduction The President's Trial Memorandum contains numerous factual inaccuracies and misstatements of the governing law and the Senate's precedents. These errors have largely been addressed in the Trial Memorandum of the House of Representatives filed with the Senate on January 11, 1999, and given the 24-hour period to file this reply, the House cannot possibly address them all here. The House of Representatives will address them further in its oral presentation to the Senate, and it reserves the right to address these matters further in the briefing of any relevant motions. However, President Clinton has raised some new issues in his Trial Memorandum, and the House of Representatives hereby replies to those issues. II. Facts The President's Trial Memorandum outlines what he claims are facts showing that he did not commit perjury before the grand jury and did not obstruct justice. The factual issues President Clinton raises are addressed in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House. A complete and impartial review of the evidence reveals that the President did in fact commit perjury before the grand jury and that he obstructed justice during the Jones litigation and the grand jury investigation as alleged in the articles of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives. The House believes a review of the complete record, including the full grand jury and deposition testimony of the key witnesses in this case, will establish that. The evidence which President Clinton claims demonstrates that he did not commit the offenses outlined in the Articles of Impeachment are cited in Sections IV and V of his Memorandum. Regarding Article I, President Clinton maintains that his testimony before the grand jury was entirely truthful. At the outset of his argument, he states that he told the truth about the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he insists that any false impressions that his deposition testimony might have created were remedied by his admission of ``improper intimate contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky. However, his subsequent testimony demonstrates that this admission is narrowly tailored to mean that Ms. Lewinsky had ``sexual relations'' with him, but he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her, as he understood the term to be defined. In other words, he admitted only what he knew could be conclusively established through scientific tests. He denied what the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, the testimony of a number of her confidantes, and common sense proves: that while she engaged in sexual relations with him, he engaged in sexual relations with her, regardless of how President Clinton attempts to redefine the term. Following this pattern, President Clinton discounts substantial evidence as well as common sense when he maintains that he testified truthfully in the grand jury about, among other things, his prior deposition testimony, his attorney's statements to Judge Wright during his deposition, and his intent in providing a series of false statements to his secretary after his deposition. Again, a complete review of the record and witness testimony reveals that President Clinton committed perjury numerous times in his grand jury testimony. In regard to Article II, President Clinton extracts numerous items of evidence from the record and analyzes them in isolation in an effort to provide innocent explanations for the substantial amount of circumstantial evidence proving his guilt. Yet when the record is viewed in its entirely, including the portions of President Clinton's deposition testimony concerning Ms. Lewinsky and his grant jury testimony, it demonstrates that President Clinton took a number of actions designed to prevent Paula Jones's attorneys, the federal district court, and a federal grand jury from learning the truth. These actions are described in detail in the Trial Memorandum of the House. To the extent that President Clinton's Trial Memorandum raises issues of credibility, those issues are best resolved by live testimony subject to cross-examination. The Senate, weighing the evidence in its entirety, will make an independent assessment of the facts as they are presented, and a detailed, point-by-point argument of these matters is best resolved on the Senate floor. The House is confident that a thorough factual analysis will not only refute President Clinton's contentions, but will prove the very serious charges contained in the articles. [[Page S216]] III. The Articles Properly State Removal Offenses A. The Offenses Alleged Are High Crimes And Misdemeanors 1. The Senate Has Never Exercised Its Power To Dismiss an Article of Impeachment Except When the Official Impeached Has Resigned The House acknowledges that the Senate has the power to dismiss an article of impeachment on the ground that it does not state a removable offense. Beyond that, however, President Clinton completely ignores the Senate's precedents concerning the use of that power. In the fifteen cases in which the House has forwarded articles of impeachment to the Senate, the Senate has never granted a dispositive motion to preclude a trial on the articles with one exception. In the 1926 case of Judge George English, the Senate granted a motion to adjourn after Judge English resigned from office making a trial moot on the issue of removal. See Impeachment of George W. English, U.S. District Judge, Eastern District of Illinois, 68 Cong. Rec. 347-48 (1926). The Senate also granted a motion to adjourn in the 1868 trial of President Andrew Johnson, but only after a full trial and votes to acquit on three articles. III Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives Sec. 2443. In addition, the Senate has never granted a motion to dismiss or strike an article of impeachment. However, in the 1936 case of Judge Halsted Ritter, the House managers themselves moved to strike two counts of a multi-count article to simplify the trial, and the motion was granted. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898-99 (April 3, 1936). However, the remainder of the article was fully considered, and Judge Ritter was convicted on that article. The House managers in the 1986 Judge Harry Claiborne case made the only motion for summary judgment in the history of impeachment. Hearings of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee (Judge Harry Claiborne), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1986). They did so on the basis that Judge Claiborne had already been convicted of the charges in a criminal trial. Id. The Senate postponed a decision on the motion and never ruled on it, but it ultimately convicted Judge Claiborne. In short, the Senate precedents firmly establish that the Senate has always fulfilled its responsibility to give a full and fair hearing to articles of impeachment voted by the House of Representatives. 2. The Constitutional Text Sets One Clear Standard for Removal a. There is Only One Impeachment Standard The Constitution sets one clear standard for impeachment, conviction, and removal from office: the commission of ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 4. The Senate has repeatedly determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor. Simple logic dictates that obstruction of justice which has the same effect as perjury and bribery of witnesses must also be a high crime and misdemeanor. Endless repetition of the claim that this standard is a high one does not change the standard. President Clinton claims that to remove him on these articles would permanently disfigure and diminish the Presidency and mangle the system of checks and balances. President's Trial Memorandum at 18. Quite the contrary, however, it is President Clinton's behavior as set forth in the articles that has had these effects. Essentially, President Clinton argues that the Presidency and the system of checks and balances can only be saved if we allow the President to commit felonies with impunity. To state that proposition is to refute it. Convicting him and thereby reaffirming that criminal behavior that strikes at the heart of the justice system will result in removal will serve to strengthen the Presidency, not weaken it. b. Impeachment and Removal Are Appropriate for High Crimes and Misdemeanors Regardless of Whether They Are Offenses Against the System of Government President Clinton argues that impeachment may only be used to redress wrongful public misconduct. The point is academic. Perjury and obstruction of justice as set forth in the articles are, by definition, public misconduct. See generally House Trial Memorandum at 107-12. Indeed, it is precisely their public nature that makes them offenses--acts that are not crimes when committed outside the judicial realm become crimes when they enter that realm. Lying to one's spouse about an extramarital affair, although immoral, is not a crime. Telling the same lie under oath in a judicial proceeding is a crime. Hiding gifts given to an adulterous lover to conceal the affair, although immoral, is not a crime. When those gifts become potential evidence in a judicial proceeding, the same act becomes a crime. One who has committed these kinds of crimes that corrupt the judicial system simply is not fit to serve as the nation's chief law enforcement officer. Apart from that, the notion that high crimes and misdemeanors encompass only public misconduct will not bear scrutiny. Numerous ``private'' crimes would obviously require the removal of a President. For example, if he killed his wife in a domestic dispute or molested a child, no one would seriously argue that he could not be removed. All of these acts violate the President's unique responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 3. President Clinton Cites Precedents That Do Not Apply Rather Than Relying on the Senate's Own Precedents Clearly Establishing Perjury as a Removable Offense a. President Clinton Continues To Misrepresent the Fraudulent Tax Return Allegation Against President Nixon In his trial memorandum, President Clinton argues that the failure in 1974 of the House Judiciary Committee to adopt an article of impeachment against President Nixon for tax fraud supports the claim that current charges against President Clinton do not rise to the level of impeachable and removable offenses. President's Trial Memorandum at 21. The President's lawyers acknowledge the charge in the article against President Nixon of ``knowingly and fraudulently failed to report certain income and claimed deductions [for 1969-72] on his Federal income tax returns which were not authorized by law.'' Id. The President's lawyers go on to state that ``[t]he President had signed his returns for those years under penalty of perjury,'' Id., trying to distinguish away the Claiborne impeachment and removal precedent from 1986, and by extension all the judicial impeachments from the 1980s which clearly establish perjury as an impeachable and removable offense. President Clinton's argument that a President was not and should not be impeached for tax fraud because it does not involve official conduct or abuse of presidential powers simply is unfounded based on the 1974 impeachment proceedings against President Nixon. Moreover, the fact that the President and his lawyers make this argument in defense of the President is telling. He effectively claims that a large scale tax cheat could be a viable chief executive. It is undisputed that the Judiciary Committee rejected the proposed tax fraud article against President Nixon by a vote of 26 to 12. A slim minority of Committee members stated the view that tax fraud would not be an impeachable offense. That minority view is illustrated by the comments of Rep. Waldie that in the tax fraud article there was ``not an abuse of power sufficient to warrant impeachment. . . .'' Debate on Article of Impeachment 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 548 (1974) (Statement of Rep. Waldie). Similar views were expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep. Mayne. Rep. Railsback took the position that there was ``a serious question,'' id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Railsback), whether misconduct of the President in connection with his taxes would be impeachable. Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based his opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that these charges may be reached in due course in the regular process of law.'' Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Thornton). Rep. Butler stated his view that the tax fraud article should be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound judgment would indicate that we not add this article to the trial burden we already have.'' Id. at 550 (Statement of Rep. Butler). The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of those who expressed a view in the debate in opposition to the tax fraud article based their opposition on the insufficiency of the evidence, and not on the view that tax fraud, if proven, would not be an impeachable offense. The comments of then-Rep. Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974 directly contradict the view that Mr. Owens has expressed in recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee. Although Mr. Owens in 1974 expressed his ``belief'' that President Nixon was guilty of misconduct in connection with his taxes, he clearly stated his conclusion that ``on the evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's offenses were not impeachable. Id. at 549 (Statement of Rep. Owens). Mr. Owens spoke of the need for ``hard evidence'' and discussed his unavailing efforts to obtain additional evidence that would tie ``the President to the fraudulent deed'' or that would otherwise ``close the inferential gap that has to be closed in order to charge the President.'' Id. He concluded his comments in the 1974 debate by urging the members of the Committee ``to reject this article . . . based on that lack of evidence.'' Id. In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee stated the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax fraud to support the article against President Nixon. Wiggins: ``fraud . . . is wholly unsupported in the evidence.'' Id. at 524 (Statement of Rep. Wiggins). McClory: ``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Id. at 531 (Statement of Rep. McClory). Sandman: ``There was absolutely no intent to defraud here.'' Id. at 532 (Statement of Rep. Sandman). Lott: ``mere mistakes or negligence by the President in filing his tax returns should clearly not be grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 533 (Statement of Rep. Lott). Maraziti: discussing absence of evidence of fraud. Id. at 534 (Statement of Rep. Maraziti). Dennis: ``no fraud has been found.'' Id. at 538 (Statement of Rep. Dennis). Cohen: questioning whether ``in fact there was criminal fraud involved.'' Id. at 548 (Statement of Rep. Cohen). Hungate: ``I think there is a case here but in my judgment I am having trouble deciding if it has as yet been made.'' Id. at 553 (statement of Rep. Hungate). Latta: only ``bad judgment and gross negligence.'' Id. at 554 (Statement of Rep. Latta). Fish: ``There is not to be found before us evidence that the President acted wilfully to evade his taxes.'' Id. at 556 (Statement of Rep. Fish). Moorhead: ``there is no [[Page S217]] showing that President Nixon in any way engaged in any fraud.'' Id. at 557 (Statement of Rep. Moorhead). The group of those who found the evidence insufficient included moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, as well as Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. McClory, all of whom supported the impeachment of President Nixon. In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert that the House Judiciary Committee in 1974 determined that tax fraud by the President would not be an impeachable offense. The failure of the Committee to adopt the tax fraud article against President Nixon simply does not support the claim of President Clinton's lawyers that the offenses charged against him do not rise to the level of impeachable offenses. In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made that tax fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient evidence--would be an impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who later served as chairman of the Committee, said: ``No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty to establish now that evidence of specific statutory crimes and constitutional violations by the President of the United States will subject all Presidents now and in the future to impeachment. * * * * * ``No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States from accountability for personal misdeeds any more than he is for official misdeeds. And I think that we on this Committee in our effort to fairly evaluate the President's activities must show the American people that all men are treated equally under the law.'' (Debate on Articles of Impeachment, 1974: Hearings of the Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 525, 554.) Professor Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large- scale tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' Charles Black, Impeachment: A Handbook, (Yale University Press, 1974) at 42. What is true of tax fraud is also true of a persistent pattern of perjury by the President. An incorrigible perjurer is not a viable chief magistrate. b. President Clinton Continues to Misrepresent The Allegations Against Alexander Hamilton. President Clinton continues to try to persuade the American public that the House of Representatives has impeached him for having an extramarital affair. See Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to the Articles of Impeachment at 1 (``The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper.'') (emphasis added). In doing so, the President's lawyers refer to an incident involving then Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton being blackmailed by the husband of a woman named Maria Reynolds with whom he was having an adulterous affair. However, the President's lawyers omit the relevant distinguishing facts even as they cast aspersions upon Alexander Hamilton: none of Hamilton's ``efforts'' to cover up his affair involved the violation of any laws, let alone felonies. Indeed, the fact of the matter is that Hamilton was the victim of the crime of extortion. Never did Hamilton raise his right hand to take a sacred oath and then willfully betray that oath and the rule of law to commit perjury. Never did Alexander Hamilton obstruct justice by tampering with witnesses, urging potential witnesses to sign false affidavits, or attempt to conceal evidence from a Federal criminal grand jury. Again, the significance of the distinctions are glaringly obvious: it is apparent from the Hamilton case that the Framers did not regard private sexual misconduct as an impeachable offense. It is also apparent that efforts to cover up such private behavior outside of a legal setting, including even paying hush money to induce someone to destroy documents, did not meet the standard. Neither Hamilton's high position, nor the fact that his payments to a securities swindler created an enormous appearance problem, were enough to implicate the standard. These wrongs were real, and they were not insubstantial, but to the Framers they were essentially private and therefore not impeachable. David Frum, ``Smearing Alexander Hamilton,'' The Weekly Standard (Oct. 19, 1998) at 14. But the Alexander Hamilton incident President Clinton cites actually clarifies the precise point at which personal misconduct becomes a public offense. Hamilton could keep his secret only by a betrayal of public responsibilities. Hamilton came to that point and, at immense personal cost, refused to cross the line. President Clinton came to that point and, fully understanding what he was doing, knowingly charged across the line. President Clinton's public acts of perjury and obstruction of justice transformed a personal misconduct into a public offense. 4. The Views of the Prominent Historians and Legal Scholars the President Cites Do Not Stand Up to Careful Scrutiny. It speaks volumes that the most distinguished of the 400 historians referred to in President Clinton's trial brief is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Professor Schlesinger had a different view of impeachment 25 years ago. President Clinton himself asserts that ``the allegations are so far removed from official wrongdoing that their assertion here threatens to weaken significantly the Presidency itself.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 24. However, Schlesinger has written that: ``The genius of impeachment lay in the fact that it could punish the man without the punishing the office. For, in the Presidency as elsewhere, power was ambiguous: the power to go good meant also the power to do harm, the power to serve the republic also the power to demand and defile it.'' (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, (Easton Press edit. 1973) (hereinafter ``Schlesinger'') at 415.) The statement of the 400 historians cited with approval in the President's trial memorandum makes the following statement: ``[t]he Framers explicitly reserved that step for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise of executive power.'' Statement of Historians in Defense of the Constitution, The New York Times (Oct. 30, 1998) at A15. The 400 historians then believe that commission of a murder or rape by the President of the United States in his personal capacity is not subject to the impeachment power of Article II, Section 4. President Clinton in his trial memorandum asserts that this case does not fit the paradigmatic case for impeachment. President's Trial Memorandum at 24. However, none of his predecessors ever faced overwhelming evidence of repeatedly lying under oath before a federal court and grand jury and otherwise seeking to obstruct justice to benefit himself-- directly contradicting his oath to ``take care that the laws are faithfully executed.'' But as former Attorney General Griffin Bell, who served under President Carter, said before the House Judiciary Committee recently, ``[a] President cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is breaking them.'' Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 203 (Comm. Print 1998) (Testimony of Judge Griffin B. Bell). President Clinton goes on to state that to make the offenses alleged against him impeachable and removable conduct ``would forever lower the bar in a way inimical to the Presidency and to our government of separated powers. These articles allege (1) sexual misbehavior, (2) statements about sexual misbehavior and (3) attempts to conceal the fact of sexual misbehavior.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26. While President Clinton and his able counsel would like to define the case this way, what is at issue in the articles of impeachment before the Senate is clear: perjury and obstruction of justice committed by the President of the United States in order to thwart a duly instituted civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit against him as well as a subsequent grand jury investigation. While the President may think such allegations would forever lower the bar in terms of the conduct we expect from our public officials, we must square his opinion and that of his lawyers with the fact that his Justice Department puts people in prison for similar conduct. While the President's brief again quotes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. for the proposition that we must not ``lower the bar,'' President's Trial Memorandum at 26, Schlesinger held a different view during the impeachment of President Nixon: ``If the Nixon White House escaped the legal consequences of its illegal behavior, why would future Presidents and their associates not suppose themselves entitled to do what the Nixon White House had done? Only condign punishment would restore popular faith in the Presidency and deter future Presidents from illegal conduct.'' (Schlesinger at 418.) 5. The President and Federal Judges are Impeached, Convicted, and Removed From Office Under the Same Standard President Clinton's argument that Presidents are held to a lower standard of behavior than federal judges completely misreads the Constitution and the Senate's precedents. See generally House Trial Brief at 101-06. The Constitution provides one standard for the impeachment, conviction, and removal from office of ``[t]the President, the Vice President, and all civil officers of the United States.'' U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 4. It is the commission of ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Id. The Senate has already determined that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the cases of Judge Nixon, Judge Hastings, and Judge Claiborne. President Clinton argues that the standard differs because judges have life tenure whereas Presidents are accountable to the voters at elections. That argument fails on several grounds. The differing tenures are set forth in the Constitution, and there is simply no textual support for the idea that they affect the impeachment standard at all. If electoral accountability were a sufficient means of remedying presidential misconduct, the framers would not have explicitly included the President in the impeachment clause. Finally, even if this argument were otherwise valid, it does not apply to President Clinton because he will never face the voters again. U.S. Const. amend. XXII. Indeed, all of the conduct charged in the Articles occurred after the 1996 election. Then President Clinton rejects the Senate's own precedents showing that perjury is a high crime and misdemeanor in the three judicial impeachments of the 1980s arguing that all of the lying involved there concerned the judges' official duties. That is true with respect to Judge Hastings, but completely false with respect to Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon. Judge Claiborne was [[Page S218]] impeached and convicted for lying on his income tax returns, an entirely personal matter. President Clinton tries to explain this away by saying: ``Once convicted, [Judge Claiborne] simply could not perform his official functions because his personal probity had been impaired such that he could not longer be an arbiter of others' oaths.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 29. The same is true of President Clinton. He ultimately directs the Department of Justice which must decide whether people are prosecuted for lying. If he has committed perjury and obstructed justice, how can he be the arbiter of other's oaths? As Professor Jonathan Turley put it: ``As Chief Executive the President stands as the ultimate authority over the Justice Department and the Administration's enforcement policies. It is unclear how prosecutors can legitimately threaten, let alone prosecute, citizens who have committed perjury or obstruction of justice under circumstances nearly identical to the President's. Such inherent conflict will be even greater in the military cases and the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.'' (Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 274 (Comm. Print 1998) (Testimony of Professor Jonathan Turley).) In the same vein, President Clinton claims that Judge Nixon ``employ[ed] the power and prestige of his office to obtain advantage for a party.'' President's Trial Brief at 29. In fact, Judge Nixon intervened in a state criminal case in which he had no official role. His ability to persuade the prosecutor to drop the case rested on his friendship with the state prosecutor--not his official position. President Clinton argues that it was Judge Nixon's intervention in a judicial proceeding that ties it to his official position. The same is true of President Clinton. He intervened in two judicial proceedings and his actions had the same effect as Judge Nixon's--to defeat a just result. As the person who ultimately directs the Justice Department--the federal government's prosecutorial authority--the President must follow his constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. U.S. Const. art II, Sec. 3. His special constitutional duty is at least as high, if not higher, than the judge's. Indeed, President Clinton acknowledged as much early in his Administration when controversy arose about the nomination of Zoe Baird and the potential nomination of Judge Kimba Wood to be Attorney General. Questions were raised about whether they had properly complied with laws relating to their hiring of household help. At that time, President Clinton said the Attorney General ``should be held to a higher standard than other Cabinet members on matters of this kind [i.e. strictly complying with the law].'' Remarks of President Clinton with Reporters Prior to a Meeting with Economic Advisers, February 8, 1993, 29 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 160. If the Attorney General is held to a higher standard of compliance with the law, then her superior, President Clinton, must be also. B. The Individual Consciences of Senators Determines the Burden of Proof in Impeachment Trials. The Constitution does not discuss the standard of proof for impeachment trials. It simply states that ``the Senate shall have the Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const., Art I, Sec. 3, clause 5. Because the Constitution is silent on the matter, it is appropriate to look at the past practice of the Senate. Historically, the Senate has never set a standard of proof for impeachment trials. ``In the final analysis the question is one which historically has been answered by individual Senators guided by their own consciences.'' Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Standard of Proof in Senate Impeachment Proceedings, Thomas B. Ripy, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division (January 7, 1999). President Clinton argues that the impeachment trial is similar to a criminal trial and that the appropriate standard should therefore be ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' That argument is not new: it has been made in the past, and the Senate has rejected it, as indeed, President Clinton acknowledges. He asserts, however, that the impeachment trial of a President should proceed under special procedures that do not apply to the trial of other civil officers. His arguments are unpersuasive. 1. The Senate has Never Adopted the Criminal Standard of ``Beyond a Reasonable Doubt'' or Any Other Standard of Proof for Impeachment Trials. The Senate has never adopted the standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' in any impeachment trial in U.S. history. In fact, the Senate has chosen not to impose a standard at all, preferring to leave to the conscience of each senator the decision of how best to judge the facts presented. In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, counsel for the respondent moved to designate ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the standard of proof for conviction. Gray & Reams, The Congressional Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5, Document 41, X (1987). The Senate overwhelmingly rejected the motion by a vote of 17-75. In the floor debate on the motion, House Manager Kastenmeier emphasized that the Senate has historically allowed each member to exercise his personal judgment in these cases. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986). The question of the appropriate standard of proof was also raised in the trial of Judge Alcee Hastings. In the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, Senator Rudman said in response to a question about the historical practice regarding the standard of proof that there has been no specific standard, ``you are not going to find it. It is what is in the mind of every Senator. . . . I think it is what everybody decides for themselves.'' Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge Alcee Hastings: Hearings before the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee (Part 1) 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-75, (discussion involving Senator Lieberman and Senator Rudman). 2. The Criminal Standard of Proof is Inappropriate for Impeachment Trials. President Clinton argues that an impeachment trial is akin to a criminal trial and that, therefore, the criminal standard should apply. That assertion is, of course, at direct odds with his apparent opposition to the presentation of evidence through witnesses, another normal criminal trial procedure. The Senate Rules Committee rejected this analogy in 1974, stating, ``an impeachment trial is not a criminal trial,'' and advocating a clear and convincing evidence standard. Executive Session Hearings, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, ``Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials'' 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (August 5-6, 1974). Indeed, it is undisputed that impeachable offenses need not be criminal offenses. See Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. at 14 (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998) (``Impeachable acts need not be criminal acts.'') Moreover, the result of conviction in an impeachment trial is removal from office, not punishment. As the House argued in the Claiborne trial, the reasonable standard was designed to protect criminal defendants who risked ``forfeitures of life, liberty and property'' (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949)). This standard is inappropriate here because the Constitution limits the consequences of a Senate impeachment trial to removal from office and disqualification from holding office in the future, explicitly preserving the option for a subsequent criminal trial in the courts. U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3, cl. 6. In addition, as the House argued in the Claiborne trial, the criminal standard is inappropriate because impeachment is, by its nature, a proceeding where the public interest weighs more heavily than the interest of the individual defendant. Gray & Reams, The Congressional Impeachment Process and the Judiciary: Documents and Materials on the Removal of Federal District Judge Harry E. Claiborne, Volume 5, Document 41, X (1987). During the course of the floor debate on this motion in the Claiborne trial, Representative Kastenmeier argued for the House that the use of the criminal standard was inappropriate where the public interest in removing corrupt officials was a significant factor. 132 Cong. Rec. S15489-S15490 (daily ed. October 7, 1986). 3. A President Who Is Impeached Should Not Receive Special Procedural Benefits That Do Not Apply in the Impeachment Trials of Other Civil Officers. President Clinton argues that he should be exempted from the weight of historical practice and precedent and be given a special rule on the standard of proof. This argument is based on fallacious assertions, the first of which is that different constitutional standards apply to the impeachment of judges and presidents. See above at 14-16 and House Trial Memorandum at 101-06. President Clinton also employs inflammatory rhetoric to suggest that a presidential impeachment trial ought to be treated differently, explaining that the criminal standard is needed because ``the Presidency itself is at stake'' and because conviction would ``overturn the results of an election.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 32-33. The presidency is, of course, not at stake, though the tenure of its current office holder may be. The 25th Amendment to the Constitution ensures that impeachment and removal of a President would not overturn an election because it is the elected Vice President who would replace the President not the losing presidential candidate. Finally, President Clinton argues that the evidence should be tested by the most stringent standard because ``there is no suggestion of corruption or misuse of office--or any other conduct that places our system of government at risk in the two remaining years of the President's term.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. While the President might be expected to argue that he did not act corruptly, he cannot credibly assert that ``there is no suggestion of corruption,'' because ``corrupt'' conduct is precisely what he is charged with in the articles of impeachment. Though not persuasive as an argument, this statement is significant in what it concedes-- that corruption is among the ``conduct that places our system of government at risk.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 33. Having acknowledged this, President Clinton cannot be heard to complain that the House has failed to charge him with conduct which rises to the level of an impeachable offense. [[Page S219]] IV. The Structure of the Articles is Proper and Sufficient a. the articles are not unconstitutionally vague President Clinton's trial memorandum argues that the two articles of impeachment are unfairly complex. To the contrary, the articles present the misdeeds of President Clinton and their consequences in as transparent and understandable a manner as possible. The first article of impeachment charges that President Clinton violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by willfully corrupting and manipulating the judicial process. He did this by providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a grand jury in regard to one or more of four matters. The deleterious consequences his actions had for the people of the United States are then described. The second article charges that President Clinton violated his enumerated constitutional responsibilities by a course of conduct that prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice. One or more of seven listed acts constitute the particulars of President Clinton's course of conduct. As in the first article, the deleterious consequences his actions had for the people of the United States are then described. To do as President Clinton requests would require separating out into a unique article of impeachment each possible combination of (a) a particular violation of his duties, (b) a particular wrongful act, and (c) a particular consequence of his actions. This would require 48 different articles in the case of the first article and 84 in the case of the second. Such a multiplicity of articles is not required and would assist no one. Of course, if the president had violated fewer presidential duties, committed fewer misdeeds, and been responsible for fewer harmful consequences to the American people, the articles could have been drafted more simply. The trial memorandum then makes the contention that the two articles of impeachment are impermissibly vague and lacking in specificity in that they do not meet the standards of a criminal indictment. This contention clearly misses the mark. Impeachment is a political and not a criminal proceeding, designed, as recognized by Justice Joseph Story, the Constitution's greatest nineteenth century interpreter, ``not . . . to punish an offender'' by threatening deprivation of his life or liberty, but to ``secure the state'' by ``divest[ing] him of his political capacity''. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) Sec. 803. Justice Story thus found the analogy to an indictment to be invalid: ``The articles . . . need not, and indeed do not, pursue the strict form and accuracy of an indictment. They are sometimes quite general in the form of the allegations; but always contain, or ought to contain, so much certainty, as to enable the party to put himself upon the proper defense, and also, in case of an acquittal, to avail himself of it, as a bar to another impeachment.'' (Id. at Sec. 806). In explaining the impeachment process to the citizens of New York in Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton stated in more general terms that impeachment ``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' The Federalist No. 65, at 398 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Can the president legitimately argue that he is unable to put on a proper defense? President Clinton has committed a great number of impeachable misdeeds. The House Judiciary Committee's committee report requires 20 pages just to list the most glaring instances of the president's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury and it requires 13 pages just to list the most glaring incidents in the president's course of conduct designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice. The House believes that President Clinton's attorneys have reviewed the committee report. They know exactly what he is being charged with, as is acknowledged in the president's trial memorandum. The memorandum states in its introduction that ``[t]ake away the elaborate trappings of the Articles and the high-flying rhetoric that accompanied them, and we see clearly that the House of Representatives asks the Senate to remove the President from office because he . . .'' President's Trial Memorandum at 2. In addition, in the House proceedings, the President filed three documents: a Preliminary Memorandum, an Initial Response, and a Submission by Counsel. The first two documents were printed together and ran to 57 pages. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel and Initial Response of the President of the United States to Referral of the Office of the Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Doc. No. 105- 317 (1998). The third was printed and ran to 404 pages. Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Ser. No. 16 1998). He was also given 30 hours to present his case before the House Committee on the Judiciary, during which he called numerous witnesses. The Committee repeatedly asked President Clinton to provide it with any exculpatory evidence, an offer which he never accepted. Now President Clinton's Trial Memorandum to the Senate runs to 130 pages. Clearly, President Clinton has not suffered from any lack of specificity in the articles of impeachment. If he had, he would have availed himself of the opportunity to file a motion for a bill of particulars. He had that opportunity on January 11, 1999, and he waived it. He should not now be heard to claim that he does not know what the charges are. Unlike the judicial impeachments of the 1980s, President Clinton has not committed a handful of specific misdeeds that can easily be listed in separate articles of impeachment. In order to encompass the whole melange of misdeeds that caused the House of Representatives to impeach President Clinton, the Judiciary Committee looked to the only analogous case--that of President Nixon. In 1974, the Committee was also faced with drafting articles of impeachment of a reasonable length against a president who had committed a long series of improper acts designed to achieve an illicit end. The first article of impeachment against President Nixon charged that in order to cover up an unlawful entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee and to delay, impede, and obstruct the consequent investigation (and for certain other purposes), he engaged in a series of acts such as ``making or causing to be made false or misleading statements to lawfully authorized investigative officers'', ``endeavoring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency'', and ``endeavoring to cause prospective defendants and individuals duly tried and convicted, to expect favored treatment and consideration to return for their silence or false testimony.'' Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). The article did not list each false or misleading statement, did not list each misuse of the CIA, and did not list each prospective defendant and what they were promised. In like fashion, the articles of impeachment against President Clinton charge him with providing perjurious, false, and misleading testimony concerning four subjects, such as an his relationship with a subordinate government employee, and engaging in a course of conduct designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of justice, such course including four generals acts such as an effort to secure job assistance for that employee. An argument can be made that the articles of impeachment against President Clinton were drafted with more specificity than those against President Nixon. Unless President Clinton is arguing that the Senate should have dismissed the first article of impeachment against President Nixon (had the president not resigned), he has little ground to complain about the articles against himself. In short, President Clinton knows exactly what the charges are, and the Senate should now require him to account for his behavior. B. The Articles Do Not Improperly Charge Multiple Offenses in One Article. President Clinton argues unpersuasively that the articles of impeachment are ``unconstitutionally flawed'' in two respects. First, he argues that ``by charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of two- thirds of the members.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 101. Second, he argues that the articles do not provide him ``the most basic notice of the charges against him required by due process and fundamental fairness.'' Id. Both arguments are factually deficient, ignore Senate precedent and procedure, and are constitutionally flawed. The articles of impeachment allege that the President made ``one or more'' ``perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury'' and committed ``one or more'' acts in which he obstructed justice. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998). The articles of impeachment are modeled after those adopted by the House Committee on the Judiciary against President Nixon and were drafted with the rules of the Senate in mind. Senate Rules specifically contemplate that the House may draft articles of impeachment in this manner and prior rulings of the Senate have held that such drafting is not deficient and will not sustain a motion to dismiss. In 1986, the United States Senate amended the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials. S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986). As part of the reform, Rules XXIII, which deals generally with voting the final question, was amended to clarify the articles of impeachment are not divisible. Rule XXIII provides in relevant part that: ``An article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial. Once voting has commenced on an article of impeachment, voting shall be continued until voting has been completed on all articles of impeachment unless the Senate adjourns for period not to exceed one day or adjourns sine die.'' The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, after thoroughly reviewing the impeachment rules, prior articles of impeachments, and prior Senate trials, decided that articles of impeachment should not be divisible. In drafting the amendment to Rule XXIII providing that articles of impeachment not be divided, the Senate was aware that the House may combine multiple counts [[Page S220]] of impeachable conduct in one article of impeachment. The Committee report explains the Senate's position: ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the divisions of an article into separate specifications is proposed to permit the most judicious and efficacious handling of the final question both as a general manner and, in particular, with respect to the form of the articles that proposed the impeachment of President Richard M. Nixon. The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of embodying an impeachable offense in an individual article but, in respect to the first and second of those articles, set out broadly based charges alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a recital of transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The wording of Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could be had thereunder if supported by ``one or more of the'' enumerated specifications. The general review of the Committee at that time was expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted specifications might ``be time consuming and confusing, and a matter which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will * * *.'' Accordingly, it was agreed to write into the proposed rules language which would allow each Senator to vote to convict under either the first or second articles if he were convinced that the person impeached was ``guilty'' or one or more of the enumerated specifications.'' Amending the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, Report of the Comm. on Rules and Administration, S. Rept. 99-401, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 8 (1986) (emphasis added). Because the Senate was aware that multiple specifications of impeachment conduct may be contained in an article of impeachment, the Senate's rules implicitly countenance such drafting. The issue regarding whether articles of impeachment are divisible is not new to the Senate. In fact, the Senate's Committee on Rules and Administration reviewed the Senate's impeachment procedures in 1974 to prepare for a possible trial of President Richard Nixon. The Committee passed the exact same language as the Committee did in 1986 prohibiting the division of an article of impeachment. Because President Nixon resigned, the full Senate never considered the amendments. Senator Jacob K. Javits of New York submitted a statement to the Committee in 1974 addressing the divisibility issue and advised that Rule XXIII be amended to prohibit the division of an article of impeachment. His comments, as follows, are instructive: ``Rule XXIII provides for the yeas and nays to be taken on each article separately but does not set any order for a vote when there are several articles. In the [President] Johnson trial, this was done by order of the Senate and several votes were taken on the order. This procedure, setting a vote for final consideration, should be stated in the rules. Also the rule is silent about the division of any article. In the Johnson trial a division was requested and the Chief Justice attempted to devise one, but could not, and the article as a whole was submitted for a vote to the Senate. I believe articles should not be divided because this raises a further question of whether a two-thirds vote is required on each part of an article and whether the House action on the construction of a particular article can be changed without further action by the House. Thus the rule should provide for no division of an article by the Senate.'' (Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials, Executive Session Hearings before the Comm. on Standing Rules and Administration, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 116 (August 5th and 6th, 1974) (emphasis added).) In addition to implicitly recognizing that articles of impeachment may contain multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the Senate has convicted a number of judges on such ``omnibus'' articles, including Judges Archbald, Ritter, and Claiborne. In the case of Judge Nixon, the Senate acquitted on the article, but refused to dismiss it. The most recent example, that of Judge Nixon in 1989, is instructive. Judge Walter L. Nixon filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Article III was duplicative, among other things. Senator Fowler, the chairman of the committee appointed to take evidence in the impeachment trial of Judge Nixon explained the reasons for denying Nixon's motion to refer the motion to dismiss to the full Senate: ``To the extent that the motion rests on the House's inclusion of fourteen distinct allegations of false statements in one article, we believe that Article III states an intelligible and adequately discrete charge of an impeachable offense by alleging that Judge Nixon concealed information concerning several conversations in which he had engaged by making ``one or more'' false statements to a grand jury. The House has substantial discretion in determining how to aggregate related alleged acts of misconduct in framing Articles of Impeachment and has historically frequently chosen to aggregate multiple factual allegations in a single impeachment article. The House's itemization of the fourteen particular statements whose knowing falsity it is alleging serves to give Judge Nixon fair notice of the contours of the charge against him without reducing the intelligibility of the article's essential accusation that Judge Nixon knowingly concealed material information from the government's law enforcement agents. Because the Committee believes that evidentiary proceedings may fairly be conducted on Article III as it is presently drafted, Judge Nixon's motion to refer his motion to dismiss Article III to the Senate at this time is denied.'' (135 Cong. Rec. 19635-36 (September 6, 1989).) The full Senate eventually rejected Judge Nixon's motion to dismiss by a vote of 34 to 63. Mr. Manager Cardin persuasively summed up the argument against the motion to dismiss as follows: ``Judge Nixon argues, in his brief, that you must find all 14 statements to be false to vote guilty on article III. But that is untrue. Read the article closely. The question posed by article III is, did Judge Nixon conceal information? Did he conceal information, first by one or more false or misleading statements in his interview, and then by one or more false and misleading statements in his grand jury testimony? ``You need not find all 14 statements to be false. The House is unanimously convinced that all 14 are complete and utter lies. We hope you will agree. But after considering the evidence, perhaps you will conclude that only 12 of the statements are false. It really does not matter. Just one intentionally false and misleading statement in the interview, or one in the grand jury, should be enough. Because if you conclude that Judge Nixon concealed information, whether by 1 false statement or 14, he should be removed from the bench. You should vote guilty on article III. ``And you need not necessarily agree on which statements are false, if you reach the conclusion that he concealed information. If two-thirds of the Senators present believe Judge Nixon lied, regardless of how each individual Senator reached that conclusion, he will properly be removed from office. * * * * * ``This is by no means unfair to Judge Nixon, for even if you might differ on which particular statements are lies, the bottom line is that two-thirds of you will have agreed that he concealed information, rendering him unfit for office. That is what the Constitution requires.'' (Id. at 26751.) Given the clear Senate precedent permitting articles of impeachment containing multiple specifications of impeachable offenses, the President's attack on the construction of the articles is an attack on Senate rules and precedent. The President's concerns, if assumed to be valid, could be addressed simply by permitting a division of the question. Under the standing rules of the Senate, any Senator may have the same divided if ``the question in debate contains several propositions.'' Senate Rule XV. A question is divisible if it contains two or more separate and distinct propositions. The Senate, however, has made an affirmative decision to dispense with the regular order which governs bills, resolutions, and amendments thereto, and instead adopted a different procedure not permitting the division of articles of impeachment. The Senate has not acted unconstitutionally in the past regarding prior impeachments, and is not on a course to do so in the trial of President Clinton. The claim that President Clinton is not on notice regarding the charges is ludicrous. The Lewinsky matter is arguably the most reported and scrutinized story of 1998 and possibly of 1999. The facts of the case are contained in numerous documents, statements, reports, and filings. Specifically, President Clinton has had the following documents, among others, containing the facts and specifics of the case: (1) Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United States Code, Section 595(c), H. Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998); (2) Investigatory Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary with Respect to its Impeachment Inquiry, H. Rept. 105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 7, 1998); (3) Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., H.R. Rept. 105-830 (Dec. 16, 1998); and (4) Trial Memorandum of the United States House of Representatives. If all of these reports and the thousands of pages of documents are not enough, President Clinton will have the opportunity to review the presentation of the Managers on the Part of the House for up to twenty- four hours. V. President Clinton Completely Misstates the Record as to the Discovery Procedures That Were Available to Him in the House of Representatives President Clinton's trial memorandum claimed to the Senate that, should it decide ``to allow the House managers to expand the record in some way . . . the President would have an urgent need for the discovery of relevant evidence, because at no point in these proceedings has been able to subpoena documents or summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' President's Trial Memorandum at 125 (emphasis added). The President also states that ``the House of Representatives [did not] afford the President any discovery mechanisms to secure evidence that might be helpful in his defense.'' Id. We will not address every discovery issue here since those issues will be resolved in the coming days; however, the Senate should know that these claims are absolutely false. In fact, the President's own brief refutes his claims. ``The Committee allowed the President's lawyers two days in which to present a defense. The White House presented four panels of distinguished expert witnesses. . . .'' White House Counsel Charles [[Page S221]] F.C. Ruff presented argument to the Committee on behalf of the President. . . .'' Id. at 13. The House Committee on the Judiciary repeatedly asked the President's attorneys to supply any exculpatory evidence to the Committee, both orally and in writing. They never did. When, at the last minute, the President's counsel requested witnesses, the Committee invited to testify every witness they requested. Aside from this, President Clinton nor his attorneys never asked to ``subpoena documents'' or ``summon or cross-examine witnesses.'' If President Clinton's argument is that the Committee did not provide his staff a stack of blank subpoenas, that is correct. However, neither the House of Representatives, nor the Senate, has the ability to ``turn over'' its constitutionally based subpoena power to the executive branch. President Clinton's attorneys never asked to do the things they now claim they never had the ability to do. In fact, when minority members of the Committee publicly asked that Judge Starr be called as a witness, Judge Starr was called. In fact, President Clinton's attorney and minority counsel questioned Judge Starr for over two hours. Every Member of the Committee questioned him for at least five minutes each. Judge Starr was a witness, and he was cross-examined by David Kendall, President Clinton's private attorney. President Clinton's claims are just not accurate. President Clinton's attorneys raise the issue of fairness. They are entitled to their own opinion about the House's proceedings, but they are not entitled to rewrite history. The truth is that the Committee's subpoena power could have been used to subpoena documents or witnesses on behalf of the President if they had so requested. They did not. All they requested, is that lawyers, law professors, and historians testify before the Committee. In short, President Clinton's statements about what happened in the House completely misstate what occurred. VI. Conclusion For the reasons stated herein and in the Trial Memorandum of the United States House of Representatives, the House respectfully submits that the articles properly state impeachable offenses, that the Senate should proceed to a full trial on the articles, and that after trial, the Senate should vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton, remove him from office, and disqualify him from holding further office. Respectfully submitted, The United States House of Representatives. Henry J. Hyde, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Bill McCollum, George W. Gekas, Charles T. Canady, Stephen E. Buyer, Ed Bryant, Steve Chabot, Bob Barr, Asa Hutchinson, Chris Cannon, James E. Rogan, Lindsey O. Graham, Managers on the Part of the House. Thomas E. Mooney, General Counsel. David P. Schippers, Chief Investigative Counsel. Dated: January 14, 1999. The CHIEF JUSTICE. I would like to inform Members of the Senate and the parties in this case of my need to stand on occasion to stretch my back. I have no intention that the proceedings should be in any way interrupted when I do so. The Presiding Officer notes the presence in the Senate Chamber of the managers on the part of the House of Representatives and counsel for the President of the United States. Pursuant to the provisions of Senate Resolution 16, the managers for the House of Representatives have 24 hours to make the presentation of their case. The Senate will now hear you. The Presiding Officer recognizes Mr. Manager Hyde to begin the presentation of the case for the House of Representatives. Mr. Manager HYDE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel for the President, and Senators. We are brought together on this solemn and historic occasion to perform important duties assigned to us by the Constitution. We want you to know how much we respect you and this institution and how grateful we are for your guidance and your cooperation. With your permission, we the managers of the House are here to set forth the evidence in support of two articles of impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. You are seated in this historic Chamber not to embark on some great legislative debate, which these stately walls have so often witnessed, but to listen to the evidence, as those who must sit in judgment. To guide you in this grave duty, you have taken an oath of impartiality. With the simple words ``I do,'' you have pledged to put aside personal bias and partisan interest and to do ``impartial justice.'' Your willingness to take up this calling has once again reminded the world of the unique brilliance of America's constitutional system of Government. We are here, Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, as advocates for the rule of law, for equal justice under the law and for the sanctity of the oath. The oath. In many ways the case you will consider in the coming days is about those two words ``I do,'' pronounced at two Presidential inaugurations by a person whose spoken words have singular importance to our Nation and to the great globe itself. More than 450 years ago, Sir Thomas More, former Lord Chancellor of England, was imprisoned in the Tower of London because he had, in the name of conscience, defied the absolute power of the King. As the playwright Robert Bolt tells it, More was visited by his family, who tried to persuade him to speak the words of the oath that would save his life, even while, in his mind and heart, he held firm to his conviction that the King was in error. More refused. As he told his daughter, Margaret, ``When a man takes an oath, Meg, he's holding his own self in his hands. Like water. And if he opens his fingers then--he needn't hope to find himself again . . .'' Sir Thomas More, the most brilliant lawyer of his generation, a scholar with an international reputation, the center of a warm and affectionate family life which he cherished, went to his death rather than take an oath in vain. Members of the Senate, what you do over the next few weeks will forever affect the meaning of those two words ``I do.'' You are now stewards of the oath. Its significance in public service and our cherished system of justice will never be the same after this. Depending on what you decide, it will either be strengthened in its power to achieve justice or it will go the way of so much of our moral infrastructure and become a mere convention, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. The House of Representatives has named myself and 12 other Members as Managers of its case. I have the honor of introducing those distinguished Members and explaining how we will make our initial presentation. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, will begin the presentation with an overview of the case. Representative Sensenbrenner is the ranking Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee, and has served for 20 years. In 1989, Representative Sensenbrenner was a House manager in the impeachment trial of Judge Walter L. Nixon who was convicted on two articles of impeachment for making false and misleading statements before a federal grand jury. Following Representative Sensenbrenner will be a team of managers who will make a presentation of the relevant facts of this case. From the very outset of this ordeal, there has been a great deal of speculation and misinformation about the facts. That has been unfortunate for everyone involved. We believe that a full presentation of the facts and the law by the House managers--will be helpful. Representative Ed Bryant, from Tennessee was a United States Attorney from the Western District of Tennessee. As a captain in the Army, Representative Bryant served in the Judge Advocate General Corps and taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Representative Bryant will explain the background of the events that led to the illegal actions of the President. Following Representative Bryant, Representative Asa Hutchinson from Arkansas will give a presentation of the factual basis for article II, obstruction of justice. Representative Hutchinson is a former United States Attorney for the Western District of Arkansas. Next, you will hear from Representative Jim Rogan of California. Representative Rogan is a former California State judge and Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney. Representative Rogan will give a presentation of the factual basis for article I, grand jury perjury. This should conclude our presentation for today. Tomorrow, Representative Bill McCollum of Florida will tie all of the facts together and give a factual summation. Representative McCollum is [[Page S222]] the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, a former Naval Reserve Commander and member of the Judge Advocate General Corps. Following the presentation of the facts, a team of managers will present the law of perjury and the law of obstruction of justice and how it applies to the articles of impeachment before you. While the Senate has made it clear that a crime is not essential to impeachment and removal from office, these managers will explain how egregious and criminal the conduct alleged in the articles of impeachment is. This team includes Representative George Gekas of Pennsylvania, Representative Steve Chabot of Ohio, Representative Bob Barr of Georgia, and Representative Chris Cannon of Utah. Representative Gekas is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law. And in 1989, Representative Gekas served as a manager of the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings who the Senate convicted on eight articles for making false and misleading statements under oath and one article of conspiracy to engage in a bribery. Representative Gekas is a former assistant district attorney. Representative Chabot serves on the Subcommittee on Crime and has experience as a criminal defense lawyer. Representative Barr is a former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, where he specialized in public corruption. He also has experience as a criminal defense attorney. Representative Cannon has had experience as the Deputy Associate Solicitor General of the Department of the Interior and as a practicing attorney. That should conclude our presentation for Friday. On Saturday, three managers will make a presentation on Constitutional law as it relates to this case. There has been a great deal of argument about whether the conduct alleged in the articles rises to the level of removable offenses. This team's analysis of the precedents of the Senate and application of the facts of this case will make it clear that the Senate has established the conduct alleged in the articles to be removable offenses. In this presentation you will hear from Representative Charles Canady of Florida, Representative Steve Buyer of Indiana and Representative Lindsey Graham of South Carolina. Representative Canady is the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution and one of the leading voices on constitutional law in the House. Representative Buyer served in the United States Army as a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps where he was assigned as Special Assistant to the United States Attorney in Virginia. He also served as a deputy to the Indiana Attorney General. Representative Graham served in the Air Force as a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps and as a South Carolina Assistant Attorney. Following the presentation of the facts, the law of perjury and obstruction of justice and constitutional law, Mr. Rogan and myself will give you a final summation and closing to our initial presentation. Mr. Sensenbrenner. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Mr. Manager Sensenbrenner is recognized. Mr. Manager SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished counsel to the President, and Senators, in his third annual message to Congress on December 7, 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt said: No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor. We are here today because President William Jefferson Clinton decided to put himself above the law, not once, not twice, but repeatedly. He put himself above the law when he engaged in a multifaceted scheme to obstruct justice during the Federal civil rights case of Paula Corbin Jones versus William Jefferson Clinton, et. al. He put himself above the law when he made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998. In both instances, he unlawfully attempted to prevent the judicial branch of Government--a coequal branch--from performing its constitutional duty to administer equal justice under law. The United States House of Representatives has determined that the President's false and misleading testimony to the grand jury and his obstruction of justice in the Jones lawsuit are high crimes and misdemeanors within the meaning of the Constitution. Should the Senate conduct a fair and impartial trial which allows each side to present its best case, then the American public can be confident that justice has been served, regardless of the outcome. We hear much about how important the rule of law is to our Nation and to our system of government. Some have commented this expression is trite. But, whether expressed by these three words, or others, the primacy of law over the rule of individuals is what distinguishes the United States from most other countries and why our Constitution is as alive today as it was 210 years ago. The Framers of the Constitution devised an elaborate system of checks and balances to ensure our liberties by making sure that no person, institution, or branch of Government became so powerful that a tyranny could ever be established in the United States of America. We are the trustees of that sacred legacy and whether the rule of law and faith in our Nation emerges stronger than ever, or are diminished irreparably, depends upon the collective decision of the message each Senator chooses to send forth in the days ahead. The evidence you will hear relates solely to the President's misconduct, which is contrary to his constitutional public responsibility to ensure the laws be faithfully executed. It is not about the President's affair with a subordinate employee, an affair that was both inappropriate and immoral. Mr. Clinton has recognized that this relationship was wrong. I give him credit for that. But he has not owned up to the false testimony, the stonewalling and legal hairsplitting, and obstructing the courts from finding the truth. In doing so, he has turned his affair into a public wrong. And for these actions, he must be held accountable through the only constitutional means the country has available--the difficult and painful process of impeachment. Impeachment is one of the checks the Framers gave to Congress to protect the American people from a corrupt or tyrannical executive or judicial branch of Government. Because the procedure is cumbersome and because a two-thirds vote in the Senate is required to remove an official following an impeachment trial, safeguards are there to stop Congress from increasing its powers at the expense-of the other two branches. The process is long. It is difficult. It is unpleasant. But, above all, it is necessary to maintain the public's trust in the conduct of their elected officials--elected officials, such as myself and yourselves, who through our oaths of office have a duty to follow the law, fulfill our constitutional responsibilities, and protect our Republic from public wrongdoing. The Framers of the Constitution envisioned a separate and distinct process in the House and in the Senate. They did not expect the House and Senate to conduct virtually identical proceedings with the only difference being that conviction in the Senate requires a two-thirds vote. That is why the Constitution reserves the sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives and the sole power to try all impeachments to the Senate. History demonstrates different processes were adopted to reflect very different roles. In the case of President Andrew Johnson, no hearings were held or witnesses called by the House on the President's decision to remove Secretary of War Stanton from office. The House first approved a general article of impeachment that simply stated that President Johnson was impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors. Five days later, a special House committee drew up specific articles. Eleven articles were passed by the House, all but two of which were based upon President Johnson's alleged violation of the Tenure of Office Act by his actions in removing Secretary of War Stanton. The trial was then conducted with witnesses in the Senate. In the case of President Nixon, the House Judiciary Committee passed three articles of impeachment based not upon their own investigation, but upon the evidence gathered by the Ervin Committee, the Patman Committee, the Joint Tax Committee and material from the special prosecutor and various court proceedings. Nine witnesses were called at the end of the impeachment inquiry, five of them at the request of the White House, and their testimony was not at the center of the impeachment articles. In the Judge Walter Nixon impeachment in 1989, a trial with live witnesses was held even after the Senate rejected by less than a two- thirds vote a defense motion to dismiss one article of impeachment on the grounds that it did not constitute an impeachable offense. The House managers submit witnesses are essential to give heightened credence to whatever judgment the Senate chooses to make on each of the articles of impeachment against President Clinton. The matter of how this proceeding will be conducted remains somewhat unsettled. Senate impeachment precedent has been to hold a trial. And, in every impeachment case, the Senate has heard from live witnesses. Should the President's counsel dispute the facts as laid out by the House of Representatives, the Senate will need to hear from live witnesses in order to reach a proper and fair judgment as to the truthful facts of this case. The House concluded the President made perjurious, false and misleading statements before the grand jury, which the House believes constitutes a high crime and misdemeanor. Our entire legal system is based upon the courts being able to find the truth. That's why witnesses must raise their right hand and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. That's why there are criminal penalties for perjury and making false statements under oath. The need for obtaining truthful testimony in court is so important that the Federal sentencing guidelines have the same penalties for perjury as for bribery. The Constitution specifically names bribery as an impeachable offense. Perjury is the twin brother of bribery. By making the penalty for perjury the same as that for bribery, Congress has acknowledged that both crimes are equally serious. It follows that perjury and making false statements under oath, which is a form of perjury, be considered among the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' the Framers intended to be grounds for impeachment. The three judicial impeachments of the 1980's were all about lies told by a federal judge. Judge Claiborne was removed from office for lying on his income tax returns. Judge Hastings was removed for lying under oath during a trial, and Judge Nixon was removed for making false statements to a grand jury. In each case, the Senate showed no leniency to judges who lie. Their misconduct was deemed impeachable and more than 2/3rds of the Senate voted to convict. If the Senate is convinced that President Clinton lied under oath and does not remove him from office, the wrong message is given to our courts, those who have business before them, and to the country as a whole. That terrible message is that we as a nation have set a lower standard for lying under oath for Presidents than for judges. Should not the leader of our country be held to at least as high a standard as the judges he appoints? Should not the President be obliged to tell the truth when under oath, just as every citizen must? Should not our laws be enforced equally? Your decision in this proceeding will answer these questions and set the standard of conduct of public officials in town halls and courtrooms everywhere and the Oval Office for generations. Justice is never served by the placing of any public official above the law. The framers rejected the British law of, ``The King can do no wrong'', when they wrote our basic law in 1787. Any law is only as good as its enforcement, and the enforcement of the law against the President was left to Congress through the impeachment process. A Senate conviction of the President in this matter will reaffirm the irrefutable fact that even the President of the United States has no license to lie under oath. Deceiving the courts is an offense against the public. It prevents the courts from administering justice and citizens from receiving justice. Every American has the right to go to court for redress of wrongs, as well as the right to a jury trial. The jury finds the facts. The citizens on the jury cannot correctly find the facts absent truthful testimony. That's why it's vital that the Senate protect the sanctity of the oath to obtain truthful testimony, not just during judicial proceedings but also during legislative proceedings as well. Witnesses before Congress, whether presidential nominees seeking Senate confirmation to high posts in the executive or judicial branches, federal agency heads testifying during investigative hearings, or witnesses at legislative hearings giving their opinions on bills are sworn to tell the truth. Eroding the oath to tell the truth means that Congress loses some of its ability to base its decisions upon truthful testimony. Lowering the standard of the truthfulness of sworn testimony will create a cancer that will keep the legislative branch from discharging its constitutional functions as well. Mr. Chief Justice, we are here today because William Jefferson Clinton decided to use all means possible--both legal and illegal--to subvert the truth about his conduct relevant to the federal civil rights suit brought against President Clinton by Mrs. Paula Jones. Defendants in civil lawsuits cannot pick and choose which laws and rules of procedure they will follow and which they will not. That's for the trial judge to decide, whether the defendant be President or pauper. In this case, a citizen claimed her civil rights were violated when she refused then Governor Clinton's advances and was subsequently harassed at work, denied merit pay raises, and finally forced to quit. The court ruled she had the right to obtain evidence showing other women including Miss Lewinsky, got jobs, promotions, and raises after submitting to Mr. Clinton, and whether other women suffered job detriments after refusing similar advances. When someone lies about an affair and tries to hide the fact, they violate the trust their spouse and family put in them. But when they lie about it during a legal proceeding and obstruct the parties from obtaining evidence, they prevent the courts from administering justice. That is an offense against the public, made even worse when a poor or powerless person seeks the protections of our civil rights from the rich or powerful. When an American citizen claims his or her civil rights have been violated, we must take those claims seriously. Our civil rights laws have remade our society for the better. The law gives the same protections to the child denied entry to a school or college based upon race as to an employee claiming discrimination at work. Once a hole is punched in civil rights protections for some, those protections are not worth as much for all. Many in the Senate have spent their lives advancing individual rights. Their successful efforts have made America a better place. In my opinion, this is no time to abandon that struggle--no matter the public mood or the political consequence. Some have said that the false testimony given by the President relating to sex should be excused, since as the argument goes, ``Everyone lies about sex.'' I would ask the Senate to stop to think about the consequences of adopting that attitude. Our sexual harassment laws would become unenforceable since every sexual harassment lawsuit is about sex, and much of domestic violence litigation is at least partly about sex. If defendants in these types of suits are allowed to lie about sex, justice cannot be done, and many victims, mostly women, will be denied justice. Mr. Chief Justice, the House has adopted two articles of impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. Each meets the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' and each is amply supported by the evidence. Article 1 impeaches the President for ``perjurious, false and misleading'' testimony during his August 17, 1998, appearance before a grand jury of the United States in four areas. First, the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate government employee. Second, prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a federal civil rights action brought against him. Third, prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a federal judge in that federal civil rights lawsuit. Fourth, his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. The evidence will clearly show that President Clinton's false testimony to the grand jury was not a single or isolated instance which could be excused as a mistake, but rather a comprehensive and calculated plan to prevent the grand jury from getting the accurate testimony in order to do its job. Furthermore, it is important to dispel the notion that the President's false testimony before the grand jury simply relates to details of the relationship between President Clinton and Miss Lewinsky. These charges only make up a small part of Article 1. The fact is, the evidence will show that President Clinton made numerous perjurious, false and misleading statements regarding his efforts to obstruct justice. Before describing what the evidence in support of Article 1 shows, it is also important to clearly demonstrate that the Senate has already decided that making false statements under oath to a federal grand jury is an impeachable offense. The last impeachment decided by the Senate, that of United States District Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, involved the Judge's making false statements under oath to a federal grand jury, precisely the same charges contained in Article 1 against President Clinton. Following an unanimous 417 to 0 vote in the House, the Senate conducted a full trial and removed Judge Nixon from office on the two articles charging false statements to a grand jury by votes of 89 to 8 and 78 to 19. The Senate was clear that the specific misconduct, that is, making false statements to a grand jury, which was the basis for the Judge's impeachment, warranted his removal from office and the Senate proceeded to do just that. These votes, a little more than nine years ago on November 3, 1989, set a clear standard that lying to a grand jury is grounds for removal from office. To set a different standard in this trial is to say that the standard for judicial truthfulness during grand jury testimony is higher than that of presidential truthfulness. That result would be absurd. The truth is the truth and a lie is a lie. There cannot be different levels of the truth for judges than for presidents. The President's perjurious, false and misleading statements regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began early in his grand jury testimony. These statements included parts of the prepared statement the President read at the beginning of his testimony. He referred or reverted to his statement at least 19 times during the course of his testimony. Further, the evidence will show the President made other false statements to the grand jury regarding the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at times when he did not refer to his prepared statement. Second, the evidence will show that the President piled perjury upon perjury when he provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in Ms. Paula Jones' case. On two occasions, the President testified to the grand jury that his deposition testimony was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and that he was required to give a complete answer to each question asked of him during the deposition. That means he brought to the grand jury his untruthful answers to questions at the deposition. Third, the evidence will show the President provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury regarding his attorney's use of an affidavit he knew to be false during the deposition in Ms. Paula Jones' case before Federal Judge Susan Webber Wright. The President denied that he even paid attention to Mr. Bennett's use of the affidavit. The evidence will show he made this denial because his failure to stop his attorney from utilizing a false affidavit at a deposition would constitute obstruction of justice. The evidence will also show the President did not admit that Mr. Bennett's statement was false because to do so would be to admit that he had perjured himself earlier that day during the grand jury testimony, as well as at the deposition. Fourth, the evidence will show that the President provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in Ms. Paula Jones' civil rights action. The evidence will show that these statements related to at least four areas: First, his false statements relating to gifts exchanged between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The subpoena served on Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones case required her to produce each and every gift she had received from the President. These gifts were not turned over as required by the subpoena, but ended up under Ms. Betty Currie's bed in a sealed container. The President denied under oath that he directed Ms. Currie to get the gifts, but the evidence will show that Ms. Currie did call Ms. Lewinsky about them and that there was no reason for her doing so unless directed by the President. Second, the President made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury regarding his knowledge that the Lewinsky affidavit submitted at the deposition was untrue. The evidence will show that the President testified falsely on this issue on at least three separate occasions during his grand jury testimony. He also provided false testimony on whether he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit. Third, the President made false and misleading statements to the grand jury by reciting a false account of the facts regarding his interactions with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie, who was a potential witness against him in Ms. Jones' case. The record reflects the President tried to coach Ms. Currie to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions should she be called as a witness. The evidence will show the President testified to the grand jury that he was trying to figure out what the facts were, but in reality the conversation with Ms. Currie consisted of a number of very false and misleading statements. Finally, the President made perjurious, false and misleading statements to aides regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. In his grand jury testimony, the President tried to have it both ways on this issue. He testified that his statements to aides were both true and misleading--true and misleading. The evidence will show that he met with four aides who would later be called to testify before the grand jury. They included Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. John Podesta, Mr. Erskine Bowles, and Mr. Harold Ickes. Each of them related to the grand jury the untruths they had been told by the President. I have recited this long catalogue of false statements to show that the President's false statements to the grand jury were neither few in number nor isolated, but rather pervaded his entire testimony. There can be no question that the President's false statements to the grand jury were material to the subject of the inquiry. Grand juries are utilized to obtain sworn testimony from witnesses to determine whether a crime has been committed. The Attorney General and the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed an independent counsel pursuant to law and added areas of inquiry because they believed there was evidence that the President may have committed crimes. Grand jury testimony relevant to the criminal probe is always material to the issue of whether someone has committed a crime. Based upon the precedent in the Judge Nixon impeachment, the law, the facts, and the evidence, if you find the President made perjurious, false and misleading statements under oath to the grand jury, I respectfully submit that your duty will be to find William Jefferson Clinton guilty with respect to article I and to remove him from office. Article II impeaches William Jefferson Clinton for preventing, obstructing and impeding the administration of justice in the Jones case by either directly or through subordinates and agents engaging in a scheme to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony relating to Ms. Jones' Federal civil rights action. As in the case of article I, the President's direct and indirect actions were not isolated mistakes, but were multifaceted actions specifically designed to prevent Ms. Paula Jones from having her day in court. While the Senate determined in the Judge Nixon trial that the making of false statements to a Federal grand jury warranted conviction and removal from office, no impeachment on an obstruction of justice charge has ever reached the Senate. Therefore, this article is a matter of first impression. However, the impeachment inquiry of the House Judiciary Committee into the conduct of President Richard Nixon, as well as the relevant Federal criminal statutes, clearly show President Clinton's actions to be within the definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' contained in the Constitution. The first article of impeachment against President Nixon approved by the Judiciary Committee charged Mr. Nixon with ``engag(ing) personally and through his subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful activities.'' The article charged that the implementation of the plan included nine separate areas of misconduct. Included among these were, one, making or causing to be made false and misleading statements to investigative officers and employees of the United States; two, withholding relevant and material evidence from such persons; three, approving, condoning, acquiescing in and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of false and misleading statements to such persons as well as in judicial and congressional proceedings. History shows us that President Nixon's resignation was the only act that prevented the Senate from voting on this article, and that the President's conviction and removal from office were all but certain. There are two sections of the Federal Criminal Code placing penalties on those who obstruct justice. Title 18, United States Code, section 1503, punishes ``(whoever * * * corruptly, or by threats or force * * * obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice.'' The courts have held that this section relates to pending judicial process, which can be a civil action. Ms. Jones' case fits that definition at the time of the President's actions as alleged in article II, as does the Office of Independent Counsel's investigation. Title 18, United States Code, section 1512, punishes, ``Whoever * * * corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to * * * influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding * * * (or) cause or induce any person to * * * withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object from an official proceeding * * *.'' The evidence will show that President Clinton's actions constituted obstruction of justice in seven specific instances as alleged in Article II. Paragraph one alleges that on or about December 17, 1997, the President encouraged Miss Lewinsky, who would be subpoenaed as a witness in Mrs. Jones' case two days later, to execute a sworn affidavit that he knew would be perjurious, false, and misleading. The evidence will show the President's actions violated both federal criminal obstruction statutes. Second, Article II alleges that on or about that same day, the President corruptly encouraged Miss Lewinsky to give perjurious, false, and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that proceeding. Miss Lewinsky, on the witness list at that time, could have been expected to be required to give live testimony in the Jones case and in fact she was subsequently subpoenaed for a deposition in that case. The evidence will show the President's actions violated both federal criminal obstruction statutes. Third, Article II alleges on or about December 28, 1997, the President corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence which had been subpoenaed in Mrs. Jones' civil rights case. He did so by asking Ms. Betty Currie to retrieve evidence from Miss Lewinsky that had been subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton. The evidence will show the President's actions violated the second federal criminal obstruction statute. Fourth, Article II alleges that beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, the President intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to Miss Lewinsky in order to corruptly prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case at a time when her truthful testimony would have been harmful to him. While Miss Lewinsky had sought employment in New York City long before the dates in question, helping her find a suitable job was clearly a low priority for the President and his associates until it became obvious she would become a witness in the Jones case. The evidence will clearly show an intensification of that effort after her name appeared on the witness list. This effort was ultimately successful and the evidence will show that the President's actions violated both federal obstruction statutes. Fifth, Article II alleges on January 17, 1998, the President corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to Judge Wright characterizing the Lewinsky affidavit in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. The President's attorney, Robert Bennett, subsequently acknowledged such false and misleading statements in a communication to Judge Wright. The evidence will show the President's actions clearly violate the second federal criminal obstruction statute. Sixth, Article II alleges that on or about January 18, 20, and 21, 1998, the President related a false and misleading account of events relevant to Mrs. Jones' civil rights suit to Ms. Betty Currie, a potential witness in the proceeding, in order to corruptly influence her testimony. The evidence will show that President Clinton attempted to influence the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie, his personal secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to possible questions that might be asked of her if called to testify in Mrs. Paula Jones' case. The President did this shortly after he had been deposed in the civil action. During the deposition, he frequently referred to Ms. Currie and it was logical that based upon his testimony, Ms. Currie would be called as a witness. The evidence will show that two hours after the completion of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie to ask her to come to the office the next day, which was a Sunday. When Ms. Currie testified to the grand jury, she acknowledged the President made a series of leading statements or questions and concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him. The evidence will show the President's actions violated both statutes, but most particularly section 1512. In United States v. Rodolitz 786 F2d 77 at 82 (2nd Cir 1986) cert. Den. 479 US 826 (1986), the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit said, The most obvious example of a sec. 1512 violation may be the situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that the witness believes the story and testify to it before the grand jury. If the President's actions do not fit this example, I'm at a loss to know what actions do. Seventh, and last, Article II alleges on or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, the President made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence this testimony of those witnesses. The articles further alleges these false and misleading statements were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. The evidence will show that these statements were made to presidential aides Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, Mr. Erskine Bowles, Mr. John Podesta and Mr. Harold Ickes. They all testified to the grand jury. By his own admission seven months later, on August 17, 1998, during his sworn grand jury testimony, the President said that he told a number of aides that he did not have an affair with Ms. Lewinsky and did not have sex with her. He told one aide, Mr. Sidney Blumenthal, that Miss Monica Lewinsky came on to him and he rebuffed her. President Clinton also admitted that he knew these aides might be called before the grand jury as witnesses. The evidence will show they were called; they related the President's false statements to the grand jury; and that by the time the President made his admission to the grand jury, the damage had already been done. This is a classic violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512. The seven specific, allegations of obstruction of justice contained in Article II were designed to prevent the judicial branch of government, a separate and coequal branch, from doing its work in Ms. Paula Jones' lawsuit. Based upon the allegation of Article 1 against President Nixon in 1974, as well as repeated and calculated violations of two key criminal obstruction statutes, William Jefferson Clinton committed an impeachable offense. In Article II, the evidence is conclusive that President Clinton put himself above the law in obstructing justice, not once, not just a few times, but as a part of a extensive scheme to prevent Ms. Jones from obtaining the evidence she thought she needed to prove her civil rights claims. Complying with the law is the duty of all parties
Osprey dives into surf, Miami Beach
Osprey dives into surf, Miami Beach (Core Number: NBRY047S)
Shooting Lawsuit (07/09/1998)
A man in the hostage standoff/chase involving Hank Carr is suing the city of Tampa for negligence.
Florida panther looks up and jumps, Florida
Florida panther looks up and jumps, Florida (Core Number: NBRY047S)
boat - chase (12/04/1998)
Last night the U-S Coast Guard tracked a boat suspected of illegal smuggling...but once authorities caught up with the boat, their search turned up nothing. Earlier, a Naval aircraft had spotted the boat traveling at a high rate of speed toward the Florida coastline coming from the Bahamas. Local coast guard officials were notified. They made contact with the boat by water and followed it into a marina near downtown Miami. Authorities did a full search of boat and nothing was found...and there were no charges against anyone. Coast Guard officials say the response was routine. They also say there was never any resistance from the boat.
UNITED STATES SENATE 13:00 - 14:00
TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Senate will convene as a Court of Impeachment. The Chaplain will offer a prayer. ______ PRAYER The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer: Almighty God, whose providential care has never varied all through our Nation's history, we ask You for a special measure of wisdom for the women and men of this Senate as they act as jurors in this impeachment trial. You have been our Nation's refuge and strength in triumphs and troubles, prosperity and problems. Now, dear Father, help us through this difficult time. As You guided the Senators to unity in matters of procedure, continue to make them one in their search for the truth and in their expression of justice. Keep them focused in a spirit of nonpartisan patriotism today and in the crucial days to come. Bless the distinguished Chief Justice as he presides over this trial. We commit to You all that is said and done and ultimately decided. In Your holy Name. Amen. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Sergeant at Arms will make the proclamation. The Sergeant at Arms, James W. Ziglar, made proclamation as follows: Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the Senate of the United States is sitting for the trial of the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The Presiding Officer recognizes the majority leader. Mr. LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. Installing Equipment And Furniture in the Senate Chamber Mr. LOTT. I send a resolution to the desk providing for installing equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber and ask that it be agreed to and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table. The CHIEF JUSTICE. The clerk will report the resolution by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 17), to authorize the installation of appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate Chamber for the impeachment trial. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the resolution is considered and agreed to. The resolution (S. Res. 17) was agreed to, as follows: S. Res. 17 Resolved, That in recognition of the unique requirements raised by the impeachment trial of a President of the United States, the Sergeant at Arms shall install appropriate equipment and furniture in the Senate chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives and counsel to the President in their presentations to the Senate during all times that the Senate is sitting for trial with the Chief Justice of the United States presiding. Sec. 2. The appropriate equipment and furniture referred to in the first section is as follows: (1) A lectern, a witness table and chair if required, and tables and chairs to accommodate an equal number of managers from the House of Representatives and counsel for the President which shall be placed in the well of the Senate. (2) Such equipment as may be required to permit the display of video, or audio evidence, including video monitors and microphones, which may be placed in the chamber for use by the managers from the House of Representatives or the counsel to the President. Sec. 3. All equipment and furniture authorized by this resolution shall be placed in the chamber in a manner that provides the least practicable disruption to Senate proceedings. Privilege of the Floor Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I now ask unanimous consent floor privileges be granted to the individuals listed on the document I send to the desk, during the closed impeachment proceedings of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. The document follows. Floor Privileges During Closed Session David Hoppe, Administrative Assistant, Majority Leader. Michael Wallace, Counsel, Majority Leader. Robert Wilkie, Counsel, Majority Leader. Bill Corr, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Robert Bauer, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Andrea La Rue, Counsel, Democratic Leader. Peter Arapis, Floor Manager, Democratic Whip. Kirk Matthew, Chief of Staff, Assistant Majority Leader. Stewart Verdery, Counsel, Assistant Majority Leader. Tom Griffith, Senate Legal Counsel. Morgan Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel. Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms. Bruce Kasold, Chief Counsel, Secretary & Sergeant at Arms. David Schiappa, Assistant Majority Secretary. Lula Davis, Assistant Minority Secretary. Alan Frumin, Assistant Parliamentarian. Kevin Kayes, Assistant Parliamentarian. Patrick Keating, Assistant Journal Clerk. Scott Sanborn, Assistant Journal Clerk. David Tinsley, Assistant Legislative Clerk. Ronald Kavulick, Chief Reporter. Jerald Linnell, Official Reporter. Raleigh Milton, Official Reporter. Joel Breitner, Official Reporter. Mary Jane McCarthy, Official Reporter. Paul Nelson, Official Reporter. Katie-Jane Teel, Official Reporter. Patrick Renzi, Official Reporter. Lee Brown, Staff Assistant, Official Reporter. Kathleen Alvarez, Bill Clerk. Simon Sargent, Staff Assistant to Sen. Cleland. Unanimous-Consent Agreement--Authority to Print Senate Documents Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to print as a Senate document all documents filed by the parties together with other materials for the convenience of all Senators. The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. LOTT. Mr. Chief Justice, I am about to submit a series of unanimous-consent agreements and a resolution for the consideration of the Senate. In addition to these matters, I would like to state for the information of all Senators that, pursuant to S. Res. 16, the evidentiary record on which the parties' presentations over the next days will be based was filed by the House managers yesterday and was distributed to all Senators through their offices. These materials are now being printed at the Government Printing Office as Senate documents. The initial documents of the record have been printed and are now at each Senator's desk. As the printing of the rest of the volumes of the record is completed over the next few days, they will also be placed on the Senators desks for their convenience. THE JOURNAL The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, the Journal of the proceedings of the trial are approved to date. The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the Senate Journal the following documents: The precept, issued on January 8, 1999; The writ of summons, issued on January 8, 1999; and the receipt of summons, dated January 8, 1999. The Presiding Officer submits to the Senate for printing in the Senate Journal the following documents, which were received by the Secretary of the Senate pursuant to Senate Resolution 16, 106th Congress, first session: The answer of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives against him on January 7, 1999, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999; The trial brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 11, 1999; The trial brief filed by the President, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; The replication of the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 13, 1999; and The rebuttal brief filed by the House of Representatives, received by the Secretary of the Senate on January 14, 1999. Without objection, the foregoing documents will be printed in the Congressional Record. The documents follow: The United States of America, ss: The Senate of the United States to James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms, United States Senate, greeting: You are hereby commanded to deliver to and leave with William Jefferson Clinton, if conveniently to be found, or if not, to leave at his usual place of abode, a true and attested copy of the within writ of summons, together with a like copy of this precept; and in whichsoever way you perform the service, let it be done at least 2 days before the answer day mentioned in the said writ of summons. Fail not, and make return of this writ of summons and precept, with your proceedings thereon indorsed, on or before the day for answering mentioned in the said writ of summons. Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States. Attest: Gary Sisco, Secretary of the Senate. ____ The United States of America, ss: The Senate of the United States to William Jefferson Clinton, greeting: Whereas the House of Representatives of the United States of America did, on the 7th day of January, 1999, exhibit to the Senate articles of impeachment against you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, in the words following: ``Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives of the United States of America in the name of itself and of the people of the United States of America, against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, in maintenance and support of its impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors. Article I ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that: ``On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action. ``In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Article II ``In his conduct while President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding. ``The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme included one or more of the following acts: ``(1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading. ``(2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that proceeding. ``(3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against him. ``(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to him. ``(5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that judge. ``(6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness. ``(7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading information. ``In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive to the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of the United States. ``Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.'' And demand that you, the said William Jefferson Clinton, should be put to answer the accusations as set forth in said articles, and that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments might be thereupon had as are agreeable to law and justice. You, the said William Jefferson Clinton, are therefore hereby summoned to file with the Secretary of the United States Senate, S-220 The Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20510, an answer to the said articles of impeachment no later than noon on the 11th day of January, 1999, and therefore to abide by, obey, and perform such orders, directions, and judgments as the Senate of the United States shall make in the premises according to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Hereof you are not to fail. Witness Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, at Washington, D.C., this 8th day of January, 1999, the two hundred and twenty-third year of the Independence of the United States. Attest: Gary Sisco, Secretary of the Senate. ____ The foregoing writ of summons, addressed to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and the foregoing precept, addressed to me, were duly served upon the said William Jefferson Clinton, by my delivering true and attested copies of the same to Charles Ruff, at the White House, on the 8th day of January, 1999, at 5:27 p.m. Attest: James W. Ziglar, Sergeant at Arms. Loretta Symms, Deputy Sergeant at Arms. Dated: January 8, 1999. Witnesseth: Gary Sisco, Secretary, United States Senate. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States ANSWER OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON TO THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, in response to the summons of the Senate of the United States, answers the accusations made by the House of Representatives of the United States in the two Articles of Impeachment it has exhibited to the Senate as follows: Preamble The Charges in the Articles Do Not Constitute High Crimes or Misdemeanors The charges in the two Articles of Impeachment do not permit the conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President. The President has acknowledged conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that was improper. But Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that the President shall be removed from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The charges in the articles do not rise to the level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as contemplated by the Founding Fathers, and they do not satisfy the rigorous constitutional standard applied throughout our Nation's history. Accordingly, the Articles of Impeachment should be dismissed. The President Did Not Commit Perjury or Obstruct Justice The President denies each and every material allegation of the two Articles of Impeachment not specifically admitted in this answer. Article I President Clinton denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements before the federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Factual Responses to Article I Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers the following factual responses to the allegations in Article I: (1) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Monica Lewinsky There is a myth about President Clinton's testimony before the grand jury. The myth is that the President failed to admit his improper intimate relationship with Ms. Monica Lewinsky. The myth is perpetuated by Article I, which accuses the President of lying about ``the nature and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky. The fact is that the President specifically acknowledged to the grand jury that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He said so, plainly and clearly: ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters . . . did involve inappropriate intimate contact.'' The President described to the grand jury how the relationship began and how it ended at his insistence early in 1997--long before any public attention or scrutiny. He also described to the grand jury how he had attempted to testify in the deposition in the Jones case months earlier without having to acknowledge to the Jones lawyers what he ultimately admitted to the grand jury--that he had an improper intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President read a prepared statement to the grand jury acknowledging his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The statement was offered at the beginning of his testimony to focus the questioning in a manner that would allow the Office of Independent Counsel to obtain necessary information without unduly dwelling on the salacious details of the relationship. The President's statement was followed by almost four hours of questioning. If it is charged that his statement was in any respect perjurious, false and misleading, the President denies it. The President also denies that the statement was in any way an attempt to thwart the investigation. The President states, as he did during his grand jury testimony, that he engaged in improper physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The President was truthful when he testified before the grand jury that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky as he understood that term to be defined by the Jones lawyers during their questioning of him in that deposition. The President further denies that his other statements to the grand jury about the nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were perjurious, false, and misleading. (2) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury when he testified about statements he had made in the Jones deposition There is a second myth about the President's testimony before the grand jury. The myth is that the President adopted his entire Jones deposition testimony in the grand jury. The President was not asked to and did not broadly restate or reaffirm his Jones deposition testimony. Instead, in the grand jury he discussed the bases for certain answers he gave. The President testified truthfully in the grand jury about statements he made in the Jones deposition. The President stated to the grand jury that he did not attempt to be helpful to or assist the lawyers in the Jones deposition in their quest for information about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He truthfully explained to the grand jury his efforts to answer the questions in the Jones deposition without disclosing his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Accordingly, the full, underlying Jones deposition is not before the Senate. Indeed, the House specifically considered and rejected an article of impeachment based on the President's deposition in the Jones case. The House managers should not be allowed to prosecute before the Senate an article of impeachment which the full House has rejected. (3) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about ``statements he allowed his attorney to make'' during the Jones deposition The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury about the statements his attorney made during the Jones deposition. The President was truthful when he explained to the grand jury his understanding of certain statements made by his lawyer, Robert Bennett, during the Jones deposition. The President also was truthful when he testified that he was not focusing on the prolonged and complicated exchange between the attorneys and Judge Wright. (4) The President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements to the grand jury concerning alleged efforts ``to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case For the reasons discussed more fully in response to Article II, the President denies that he attempted to influence the testimony of any witness or to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones case. Thus, the President denies that he made perjurious, false and misleading statements before the grand jury when he testified about these matters. First Affirmative Defense: Article I Does Not Meet the Constitutional Standard for Conviction and Removal For the same reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article I does not meet the rigorous constitutional standard for conviction and removal from office of a duly elected President and should be dismissed. Second Affirmative Defense: Article I Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction and Removal Article I is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. It alleges that the President provided the grand jury with ``perjurious, false, and misleading testimony'' concerning ``one or more'' of four subject areas. But it fails to identify any specific statement by the President that is alleged to be perjurious, false and misleading. The House has left the Senate and the President to guess at what it had in mind. One of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a person has a right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair warning, no one can prepare the defense to which every person is entitled. The law and the Constitution also mandate adequate notice to jurors so they may know the basis for the vote they must make. Without a definite and specific identification of false statements, a trial becomes a moving target for the accused. In addition, the American people deserve to know upon what specific statements the President is being judged, given the gravity and effect of these proceedings, namely nullifying the results of a national election. Article I sweeps broadly and fails to provide the required definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and should fail. Third Affirmative Defense: Article I Charges Multiple Offense in One Article Article I is fatally flawed because it charges multiple instances of alleged perjurious, false and misleading statements in one article. The Constitution provides that ``no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present,'' and Senate Rule XXIII provides that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' By the express terms of Article I, a Senator may vote for impeachment if he or she finds that there was perjurious, false and misleading testimony in ``one or more'' of four topic areas. This creates the very real possibility that conviction could occur even though Senators were in wide disagreement as to the alleged wrong committed. Put simply, the structure of Article I presents the possibility that the President could be convicted even though he would have been acquitted if separate votes were taken on each allegedly perjurious statement. For example, it would be possible for the President to be convicted and removed from office with as few as 17 Senators agreeing that any single statement was perjurious, because 17 votes for each of the four categories in Article I would yield 68 votes, one more than necessary to convict and remove. By charging multiple wrongs in one article, the House of Representatives has made it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandate that any conviction be by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article I should fail. Factual Responses to Article II Without waiving his affirmative defenses, President Clinton offers the following factual responses to the allegations in Article II: (1) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading'' The President denies that he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to execute a false affidavit in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky, the only witness cited in support of this allegation, denies this allegation as well. Her testimony and proffered statements are clear and unmistakable: ``[N]o one even asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .'' ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' The President states that, sometime in December 1997, Ms. Lewinsky asked him whether she might be able to avoid testifying the Jones case because she knew nothing about Ms. Jones or the case. The President further states that he told her he believed other witnesses had executed affidavits, and there was a chance they would not have to testify. The President denies that he ever asked, encouraged or suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit or lie. The President states that he believed that Ms. Lewinsky could have filed a limited but truthful affidavit that might have enabled her to avoid having to testify in the Jones case. (2) The President denies that on or about December 17, 1997, he ``corruptly encouraged'' Monica Lewinsky ``to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony of and when called to testify personally'' in the Jones litigation Again, the President denies that he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie if and when called to testify personally in the Jones case. The testimony and proffered statements of Monica Lewinsky, the only witness cited in support of this allegation, are clear and unmistakable: [N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed Lewinsky to say anything or to lie . . .'' ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' The President states that, prior to Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones case, he and Ms. Lewinsky might have talked about what to do to conceal their relationship from others. Ms. Lewinsky was not a witness in any legal proceeding at that time. Ms. Lewinsky's own testimony and statements support the President's recollection. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she ``pretty much can'' exclude the possibility that she and the President ever had discussions about denying the relationship after she learned she was a witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky also stated that ``they did not discuss the issue [of what to say about their relationship] is specific relation to the Jones matter,'' and that ``she does not believe they discussed the content of any deposition that [she] might be involved in at a later date.'' (3) The President denies that on or about December 28, 1997, he ``corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence'' in the Jones case The President denies that he engaged in, encouraged, or supported any scheme to conceal evidence from discovery in the Jones case, including any gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. The President states that he gave numerous gifts to Ms. Lewinsky prior to December 28, 1997. The President states that, sometime in December, Ms. Lewinsky inquired as to what to do if she were asked in the Jones case about the gifts he had given her, to which the President responded that she would have to turn over whatever she had. The President states that he was unconcerned about having given her gifts and, in fact, that he gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1997. The President denies that he ever asked his secretary, Ms. Betty Currie, to retrieve gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky, or that he ever asked, encouraged, or suggested that Ms. Lewinsky conceal the gifts. Ms. Currie told prosecutors as early as January 1998 and repeatedly thereafter that it was Ms. Lewinsky who had contacted her about retrieving gifts. (4) The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Monica Lewinsky's efforts to obtain a job in New York to ``corruptly prevent'' her ``truthful testimony'' in the Jones case The President denies that he obstructed justice in connection with Ms. Lewinsky's job search in New York or sought to prevent her truthful testimony in the Jones case. The President states that he discussed with Ms. Lewinsky her desire to obtain a job in New York months before she was listed as a potential witness in the Jones case. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky was offered a job in New York at the United Nations more than a month before she was identified as a possible witness. The President also states that he believes that Ms. Lewinsky raised with him, again before she was ever listed as a possible witness in the Jones case, the prospect of having Mr. Vernon Jordan assist in her job search. Ms. Lewinsky corroborates his recollection that it was her idea to ask for Mr. Jordan's help. The President also states that he was aware that Mr. Jordan was assisting Ms. Lewinsky to obtain employment in New York. The President denies that any of these efforts had any connection whatsoever to Ms. Lewinsky's status as a possible or actual witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky forcefully confirmed the President's denial when she testified, ``I was never promised a job for my silence.'' (5) The President denies that he ``corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge'' concerning Monica Lewinsky's affidavit The President denies that he corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements concerning Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to a Federal judge during the Jones deposition. The President denies that he was focusing his attention on the prolonged and complicated exchange between his attorney and Judge Wright. (6) The President denies that he obstructed justice by relating ``false and misleading statements'' to ``a potential witness,'' Betty Currie, ``in order to corruptly influence [her] testimony'' The President denies that he obstructed justice or endeavored in any way to influence any potential testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. The President states that he spoke with Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998. The President testified that, in that conversation, he was trying to find out what the facts were, what Ms. Currie's perception was, and whether his own recollection was correct about certain aspects of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified that she felt no pressure ``whatsoever'' from the President's statements and no pressure ``to agree with [her] boss.'' The President denies knowing or believing that Ms. Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time of this conversation. Ms. Currie had not been on any of the witness lists proffered by the Jones lawyers. President Clinton states that, after the Independent Counsel investigation became public, when Ms. Currie was scheduled to testify, he told Ms. Currie to ``tell the truth.'' (7) The President denies that he obstructed justice when he relayed allegedly ``false and misleading statements'' to his aides The President denies that he obstructed justice when he misled his aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in the days immediately following the public revelation of the Lewinsky investigation. The President acknowledges that, in the days following the January 21, 1998, Washington Post article, he misled his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation to conceal the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He sought to avoid disclosing his personal wrongdoing to protect his family and himself from hurt and public embarrassment. The President profoundly regrets his actions, and he has apologized to his family, his friends and staff, and the Nation. The President denies that he had any corrupt purpose or any intent to influence the ongoing grand jury proceedings. First Affirmative Defense: Article II Does Not Meet the Constitutional Standard for Conviction and Removal For the reasons set forth in the preamble of this answer, Article II does not meet the constitutional standard for convicting and removing a duly elected President from office and should be dismissed. Second Affirmative Defense: Article II Is Too Vague To Permit Conviction and Removal Article II is unconstitutionally vague. No reasonable person could know what specific charges are being leveled against the President. Article II alleges that the President ``obstructed and impeded the administration of justice'' in both the Jones case and the grand jury investigation. But it provides little or no concrete information about the specific acts in which the President is alleged to have engaged, or with whom, or when, that allegedly obstructed or otherwise impeded the administration of justice. As we set forth in the Second Affirmative Defense to Article I, one of the fundamental principles of our law and the Constitution is that a person has the right to know what specific charges he or she is facing. Without such fair warning, no one can mount the defense to which every person is entitled. Fundamental to due process is the right of the President to be adequately informed of the charges so that he is able to confront those charges and defend himself. Article II sweeps too broadly and provides too little definite and specific identification. Were it an indictment, it would be dismissed. As an article of impeachment, it is constitutionally defective and should fail. Third Affirmative Defense: Article II Charges Multiple Offenses in One Article For the reasons set forth in the Third Affirmative Defense to Article I, Article II is constitutionally defective because it charges multiple instances of alleged acts of obstruction in one article, which makes it impossible for the Senate to comply with the Constitutional mandates that any conviction be by the concurrence of the two-thirds of the members. Accordingly, Article II should fail. Respectfully submitted, David E. Kendall, Nicole K. Seligman, Emmet T. Flood, Max Stier, Glen Donath, Alicia Marti, Williams & Connolly, 725 12th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. Charles F. C. Ruff, Gregory B. Craig, Bruce R. Lindsey, Cheryl D. Mills, Lanny A. Breuer, Office of the White House Counsel, The White House, Washington, D.C. 20502. Submitted: January 11, 1999. ____ [In the Senate of the United States Sitting as a Court of Impeachment] In re Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton TRIAL MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Now comes the United States House of Representatives, by and through its duly authorized Managers, and respectfully submits to the United States Senate its Brief in connection with the Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States. Summary The President is charged in two Articles with: (1) Perjury and false and misleading testimony and statements under oath before a federal grand jury (Article I), and (2) engaging in a course of conduct or scheme to delay and obstruct justice (Article II). The evidence contained in the record, when viewed as a unified whole, overwhelmingly supports both charges. Perjury and False Statements Under Oath President Clinton deliberately and willfully testified falsely under oath when he appeared before a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Although what follows is not exhaustive, some of the more overt examples will serve to illustrate. At the very outset, the President read a prepared statement, which itself contained totally false assertions and other clearly misleading information. The President relied on his statement nineteen times in his testimony when questioned about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. President Clinton falsely testified that he was not paying attention when his lawyer employed Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit at the Jones deposition. He falsely claimed that his actions with Ms. Lewinsky did not fall within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that was given at his deposition. He falsely testified that he answered questions truthfully at his deposition concerning, among other subjects, whether he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He falsely testified that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky to turn over the gifts if she were subpoenaed. He falsely denied trying to influence Ms. Currie after his deposition. He falsely testified that he was truthful to his aides when he gave accounts of his relationship, which accounts were subsequently disseminated to the media and the grand jury. Obstruction of Justice The President engaged in an ongoing scheme to obstruct both the Jones civil case and the grand jury. Further, he undertook a continuing and concerted plan to tamper with witnesses and prospective witnesses for the purpose of causing those witnesses to provide false and misleading testimony. Examples abound: The President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story to conceal their relationship, and the President suggested that she employ that story if subpoenaed in the Jones case. The President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky provide an affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case, when he knew that the affidavit would need to be false to accomplish its purpose. The President knowingly and willfully allowed his attorney to file Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and to use it for the purpose of obstructing justice in the Jones case. The President suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she provide a false account of how she received her job at the Pentagon. The President attempted to influence the expected testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie, by providing her with a false account of his meetings with Ms. Lewinsky. The President provided several of his top aides with elaborate lies about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, so that those aides would convey the false information to the public and to the grand jury. When he did this, he knew that those aides would likely be called to testify, while he was declining several invitations to testify. By this action, he obstructed and delayed the operation of the grand jury. The President conspired with Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie to conceal evidence that he had been subpoenaed in the Jones case, and thereby delayed and obstructed justice. The President and his representatives orchestrated a campaign to discredit Ms. Lewinsky in order to affect adversely her credibility as a witness, and thereby attempted to obstruct justice both in the Jones case and the grand jury. The President lied repeatedly under oath in his disposition in the Jones case, and thereby obstructed justice in that case. The President's lies and misleading statements under oath at the grand jury were calculated to, and did obstruct, delay and prevent the due administration of justice by that body. The President employed the power of his office to procure a job for Ms. Lewinsky after she signed the false affidavit by causing his friend to exert extraordinary efforts for that purpose. The foregoing are merely accusations of an ongoing pattern of obstruction of justice, and witness tampering extending over a period of several months, and having the effect of seriously compromising the integrity of the entire judicial system. The effect of the President's misconduct has been devastating in several respects. (1) He violated repeatedly his oath to ``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' (2) He ignored his constitutional duty as chief law enforcement officer to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' (3) He deliberately and unlawfully obstructed Paula Jones's rights as a citizen to due process and the equal protection of the laws, though he had sworn to protect those rights. (4) By his pattern of lies under oath, misleading statements and deceit, he has seriously undermined the integrity and credibility of the Office of President and thereby the honor and integrity of the United States. (5) His pattern of perjuries, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering has affected the truth seeking process which is the foundation of our legal system. (6) By mounting an assault in the truth seeking process, he has attacked the entire Judicial Branch of government. The Articles of Impeachment that the House has preferred state offenses that warrant, if proved, the conviction and removal from office of President William Jefferson Clinton. The Articles charge that the President has committed perjury before a federal grand jury and that he obstructed justice in a federal civil rights action. The Senate's own precedents establish beyond doubt that perjury warrants conviction and removal. During the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed three federal judges for committing perjury. Obstruction of justice under mines the judicial system in the same fashion that perjury does, and it also warrants conviction and removal. Under our Constitution, judges are impeached under the same standard as Presidents--treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Thus, these judicial impeachments for perjury set the standard here. Finally, the Senate's own precedents further establish that the President's crimes need not arise directly out of his official duties. Two of the three judges removed in the 1980s were removed for perjury that had nothing to do with their official duties. Introduction This Brief is intended solely to advise the Senate generally of the evidence that the Managers intend to product, if permitted, and of the applicable legal principles. It is not intended to discuss exhaustively all of the evidence, nor does it necessarily include each and every witness and document that the Managers would produce in the course of the trial. This Brief, then, is merely an outline for the use of the Senate in reviewing and assessing the evidence as it is set forth at trial--it is not, and is not intended to be a substitute for a trial at which all of the relevant facts will be developed. H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1998) The House Impeachment Resolution charges the President with high crimes and misdemeanors in two Articles. Article One alleges that President Clinton ``willfully corrupted and manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice'' in that he willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. Article Two asserts that the President ``has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and engaged in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a federal civil rights action brought against him.'' Both Articles are now before the Senate of the United States for trial as provided by the Constitution of the United States. The Office of President represents to the American people and to the world, the strength, the philosophy and most of all, the honor and integrity that makes us a great nation and an example for the world. Because all eyes are focused upon that high office, the character and credibility of any temporary occupant of the Oval Office is vital to the domestic and foreign welfare of the citizens. Consequently, serious breaches of integrity and duty of necessity adversely influence the reputation of the United States. This case is not about sex or private conduct. It is about multiple obstructions of justice, perjury, false and misleading statements, and witness tampering--all committed or orchestrated by the President of the United States. Before addressing the President's lies and obstruction, it is important to place the events in the proper context. If this were only about private sex we would not now be before the Senate. But the manner in which the Lewinsky relationship arose and continued is important because it is illustrative of the character of the President and the decisions he made. Background Monica Lewinsky, a 22 year old intern, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 8; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 728) was working at the White House during the government shutdown in 1995. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 10; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 730) Prior to their first intimate encounter, she had never even spoken with the President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton flirted with each other. (Id.) The President of the United States of America then invited this unknown young intern into a private area off the Oval Office where he kissed her. He then invited her back later and when she returned, the two engaged in the first of many acts of inappropriate contact. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 732) Thereafter, the two concocted a cover story. If Ms. Lewinsky were seen, she was bringing papers to the President. That story was totally false. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774; 8/26/98 Dep., p. 34; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1314) The only papers she brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her duties or those of the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 54-55; H.Doc. 105-311, pp. 774-775) After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the White House to the Pentagon, her frequent visits to the President were disguised as visits to Betty Currie. (Id.) Those cover stories are important, because they play a vital role in the later perjuries and obstructions. Encounters Over the term of their relationship the following significant matters occurred: 1. Monica Lewinsky and the President were alone on at least twenty-one occasions; 2. They had at least eleven personal sexual encounters, excluding phone sex: Three in 1995, Five in 1996 and Three in 1997; 3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at least seventeen of which involved phone sex; 4. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky twenty presents; and, 5. Ms. Lewinsky gave the President forty presents (O.I.C. Referral, App., Tab E; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 104-111) These are the essential facts which form the backdrop for all of the events that followed. The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, though relevant, need not be detailed either in this document or through witness testimony. It is necessary, though, briefly to outline that evidence, because it will demonstrate that the President repeatedly lied about that sexual relationship in his deposition, before the grand jury, and in his responses to the Judiciary Committee's questions. He has consistently maintained that Ms. Lewinsky merely performed acts on him, while he never touched her in a sexual manner. This characterization not only directly contradicts Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, but it also contradicts the sworn grand jury testimony of three of her friends and the statements by two professional counselors with whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her relationship. (O.I.C. Referral, H. Doc. 105-310, pgs. 138-140) While his treatment of Ms. Lewinsky was offensive, it is much more offensive for the President to expect the Senate to believe that in 1995, 1996, and 1997, his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky was so limited that it did not fall within his narrow interpretation of a definition of ``sexual relations''. As later demonstrated, he did not even conceive his interpretation until 1998, while preparing for his grand jury appearance. How To View the Evidence We respectfully submit that the evidence and testimony must be viewed as a whole; it cannot be compartmentalized. It is essential to avoid considering each event in isolation, and then treating it separately. Events and words that may seem innocent or even exculpatory in a vacuum may well take on a sinister, or even criminal connotation when observed in the context of the whole plot. For example, everyone agrees that Monica Lewinsky testified ``No one ever told me to lie; nobody ever promised me a job.'' (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 105; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1161) When considered alone this would seem exculpatory. However, in the context of the other evidence, another picture emerges. Of course no one said. ``Now, Monica, you go in there and lie.'' They didn't have to. Ms. Lewinsky knew what was expected of her. Similarly, nobody promised her a job, but once she signed the false affidavit, she got one. The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of conduct is such as to affect adversely the Office of the President and also upon the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive to the Rule of Law and Constitutional government. The Beginning The events that form the basis of these charges actually began in late 1995. They reached a critical stage in the winter of 1997 and the first month of 1998. The event culminated when the President of the United States appeared before a federal grand jury, raised his right hand to God and swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. december 5-6, 1997 On Friday, December 5, 1997, Monica Lewinsky asked Betty Currie if the President could see her the next day, Saturday, but Ms. Currie said that the President was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 107-108; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 827-828) Later that Friday, Ms. Lewinsky spoke briefly to the President at a Christmas party. (ML 7/ 31/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1451; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 108; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 828) The Witness List Is Received That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of potential witnesses to the President's attorneys. (849-DC- 00000128; 849-DC-00000121-37; Referral, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 88) The list included Monica Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did not find out that her name was on the list until the President told her ten days later, on December 17. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 121-123; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 841-843) That delay is significant. Ms. Lewinsky's First Visit After her conversation with Ms. Currie and seeing the President at the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President terminating their relationship. (ML- 55-DC-0177); ML 7/31/98 Int., p. 2; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1452) The next morning, Saturday, December 6, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House to deliver the letter and some gifts for the President to Ms. Currie. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 108-109; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 828-829) When she arrived at the White House, Ms. Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service officers, and one of them told her that the President was not with his lawyers, as she thought, but rather, he was meeting with Eleanor Mondale. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 111; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 831; Mondale 7/16/98 Int., p. 1; H. Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2907- 2908; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2654) Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie from a pay phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 112-13; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 832-833; Currie 1/27/98 GJ, p. 27; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 553) After that phone call, Ms. Currie told the Secret Service watch commander that the President was so upset about the disclosure of his meeting with Ms. Mondale that he wanted somebody fired. (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 13, 18-19; H. Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3356-3357). The Telephone Conversations At 12:05 p.m., records demonstrate that Ms. Currie paged Bruce Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty ASAP.'' (964-DC- 00000862; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 2722) Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, while she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and the President spoke by phone. The President was very angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that no one had every treated him as poorly as she had. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-14; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-834) The President acknowledged to the grand jury that he was upset about Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and considered it inappropriate. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 537). Nevertheless, in a sudden change of mood, he invited her to visit him at the White House that afternoon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 114; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 834) Ms. Lewinsky's Second Visit Monica Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time that day and was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. (WAVES: 827-DC-00000018) Although, in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry'' with her during their recent telephone conversation, he was ``sweet'' and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 113-15; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 833-835). He also told her that he would talk to Vernon Jordan about her job situation. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 115-16; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 835-836) The Discussions With the Secret Service The President also suddenly changed his attitude toward the Secret Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if they kept quiet about the Lewinsky incident, there would be no disciplinary action. (Williams 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 25, 27-28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 4539; Chinery 7/23/98 GJ, p. 22-23; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 456). According to the Secret Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the President personally told him, ``I hope you use your discretion'' or ``I hope I can count on your discretion.'' (Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, p. 32; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3360; Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, p. 3; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 3353) Deputy Chief Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that he knew of no other time in his fourteen years of service at the White House where the President raised a performance issue with a member of the Secret Service uniformed division. (O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep., pgs. 40-41; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3168-3171) After his conversation with the President, Captain Purdie told a number of officers that they should not discuss the Lewinsky incident. (Porter 8/13/98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3343; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJ, pgs. 30-31, H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3114) When the President was before the grand jury and questioned about his statements to the Secret Service regarding this incident, the President testified, ``I don't remember what I said and I don't remember to whom I said it.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 86; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 534) When confronted with Captain Purdie's testimony, the President testified, ``I don't remember anything I said to him in that regard. I have no recollection of that whatever.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 91; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 543) The President's Knowledge of the Witness List President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that evening, Saturday, December 6, during a meeting with his lawyers. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 83-84; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 535- 536) He stood by this answer in response to Request Number 16 submitted by the Judiciary Committee. (Exhibit 18). The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left the White House. (WAVES: 1407-DC-00000005; Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 2418-19) According to Bruce Lindsey, at the meeting, Bob Bennett had a copy of the Jones witness list faxed to Mr. Bennett the previous night. (Lindsey 3/12/98 GJ, pgs. 65-67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2419) (Exhibit 15) However, during his deposition, the President testified that he had heard about the witness list before he saw it. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 70) In other words, if the President testified truthfully in his deposition, then he knew about the witness list before the 5 p.m. meeting. It is valid to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a witness list prompted the President's sudden and otherwise unexplained change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' that Saturday afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it prompted him to give the unique instruction to a Secret Service watch commander to use ``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's visit to the White House, which the watch commander interpreted as an instruction to refrain from discussing the incident. (Purdie 7/17/98 GJ, pgs. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 3351-3352; Purdie 7/23/98 GJ, pgs. 32- 33; H.Doc. 105-315, pgs. 3360-3361) The Job Search for Ms. Lewinsky Monica Lewinsky had been looking for a good paying and high profile job in New York since the previous July. She was not having much success despite the President's promise to help. In early November, Betty Currie arranged a meeting with Vernon Jordan who was supposed to help. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 592) On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for twenty minutes with Mr. Jordan (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pg. 104; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 824) No action followed; no job interviews were arranged and there were no further contacts with Mr. Jordan. It was obvious that he made no effort to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so unimportant to him that he ``had no recollection of an early November meeting'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pg. 50; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 1799) and that finding a job for Ms. Lewinsky was not a priority (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 76; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1804) (Chart R) Nothing happened throughout the month of November, because Mr. Jordan was either gone or would not return Monica's calls. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 105-106; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 825-826) During the December 6 meeting with the President, she mentioned that she had not been able to get in touch with Mr. Jordan and that it did not seem he had done anything to help her. The President responded by stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something to that effect. (ML 8/6/ 98 GJ, pgs. 115-116; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 836) There was obviously still no urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met the President the next day, December 7, but the meeting was unrelated to Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ. pgs. 83, 116; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1805, 1810) The December 11, 1997 Activity The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually procure employment took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and gave her a list of contact names. The two also discussed the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 119, 120; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 839-840) That meeting Mr. Jordan remembered. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1798) Vernon Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective employers. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 54, 62-63; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1800-1802) Later in the afternoon, he even called the President to give him a report on his job search efforts. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 64-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1802) Clearly, Mr. Jordan and the President were now very interested in helping Monica find a good job in New York. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 95; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1807) Significance of December 11, 1997 This sudden interest was inspired by a court order entered on December 11, 1997. On that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that Paula Jones was entitled to information regarding any state or federal employee with whom the President had sexual relations, proposed sexual relations, or sought to have sexual relations. The President knew that it would be politically and legally expedient to maintain an amicable relationship with Monica Lewinsky. And the President knew that that relationship would be fostered by finding Ms. Lewinsky a job. This was accomplished through enlisting the help of Vernon Jordan. December 17, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Learns of Witness List On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, Monica Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was the President of the United States. The President said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two things: one was that Betty Currie's brother had been killed in a car accident; secondly, the President said that he ``had some more bad news,'' that he had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and her name was on it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) The President told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be subpoenaed, [she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that [she] had received the subpoena.'' (Id.) Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if subpoenaed. The President responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' (Id.) Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to be false and misleading to accomplish the desired result. The President's ``Suggestion'' Then, the President had a very pointed suggestion for Monica Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He did not specifically tell her to lie. What he did say is ``you know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 843) In order to understand the significance of this statement, it is necessary to recall the ``cover stories'' that the President and Ms. Lewinsky had previously structured in order to deceive those who protected and worked with the President. Ms. Lewinsky said she would carry papers when she visited the President. When she saw him, she would say: ``Oh, gee, `here are your letters,' wink, wink, wink and he would answer, `Okay that's good.' '' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 774) After Ms. Lewinsky left White House employment, she would return to the Oval Office under the guise of visiting Betty Currie, not the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 55; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 775) Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised the President that she would always deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The President would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of encouragement. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 22; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 1078) So, when the President called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on December 17 to tell her she was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her of those prior ``cover stories.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the President brought up the misleading stories, she understood that the two would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception. The President's Intention It became clear that the President had no intention of making his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky a public affair. And he would use lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not be known. It is interesting to note that when the grand jury asked the President whether he remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m., he responded: ``No sir, I don't. But it would . . . it is quite possible that that happened. . . .'' (WJC 8/ 17/98 GJ, p. 115; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 567) And when he was asked whether he encouraged Monica Lewinsky to continue the cover stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the letters,'' he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that night.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 117; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 565) Six days earlier, he had become aware that Paula Jones' lawyers were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. Lewinsky could file a false affidavit, but it might not work. It was absolutely essential that both parties told the same story. He knew that he would lie if asked about Ms. Lewinsky, and he wanted to make certain that she would lie also. That is why the President of the United States called a twenty- four year old woman at 2:00 in the morning. The Evidence Mounts But the President had an additional problem. It was not enough that he (and Ms. Lewinsky) simply deny the relationship. The evidence was beginning to accumulate. Because of the emerging evidence, the President found it necessary to reevaluate his defense. By this time, the evidence was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts, that the President and Monica Lewinsky were spending a significant amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. It was no longer expedient simply to refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a ``groupie'', ``stalker'', ``clutch'', or ``home wrecker'' as the White House first attempted to do. The unassailable facts were forcing the President to acknowledge some type of relationship. But at this point, he still had the opportunity to establish a non-sexual explanation for their meetings, since his DNA had not yet been identified on Monica Lewinsky's blue dress. Need for the Cover Story Therefore, the President needed Monica Lewinsky to go along with the cover story in order to provide an innocent, intimate-free explanation for their frequent meetings. And that innocent explanation came in the form of ``document deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with Betty Currie.'' Significantly, when the President was deposed on January 17, 1998, he used the exact same cover stories that had been utilized by Ms. Lewinsky. In doing so, he stayed consistent with any future Lewinsky testimony while still maintaining his defense in the Jones lawsuit. In the President's deposition, he was asked whether he was ever alone with Monica Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . She--it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, exchange a few words and go, she was there.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 52-53) Additionally, when questions were posed regarding Ms. Lewinsky's frequent visits to the Oval Office, the President did not hesitate to mention Betty Currie in his answers, for example: And my recollection is that on a couple of occasions after [the pizza party meeting], she was there [in the oval office] but my secretary, Betty Currie, was there with her. (WJC 1/ 17/98 Dep., p. 58) Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky? A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. She came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68) December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky Is Subpoenaed On December 19, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in a deposition scheduled for January 23, 1998 in the Jones case. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 128; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 848) (Charts F and G) Extremely distraught, she immediately called the President's closest friend, Vernon Jordan. As noted Ms. Lewinsky testified that the President previously told her to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. She called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother recently died and she did not want to bother her. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 128-129; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 848, 849) Vernon Jordan's Role Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she arrived shortly before 5 p.m., still extremely distraught. Around this time, Mr. Jordan called the President and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 145; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1815) (Exhibit 1) During the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as ``disturbing'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 100; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1716), she talked about her infatuation with the President. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 150; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1724) Mr. Jordan decided that he would call a lawyer for her. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 161; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1726) Mr. Jordan Informs the President That evening, Mr. Jordan met with the President and relayed his conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are extremely important because the President, in his deposition, did not recall that meeting. Mr. Jordan told the President again that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her fascination with the President, and that Ms. Lewinsky had asked Mr. Jordan if he thought the President would leave the First Lady. He also asked the President if he had sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 169; H.Doc 105-3316, p. 1727) The President was asked at his deposition: Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case? A. I don't think so. Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in this case? A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she was, I think maybe that's the first person told me she was. I want to be as accurate as I can. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 68-69) In the grand jury, the President first repeated his denial that Mr. Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 491) Then, when given more specific facts, he admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke with Mr. Jordan about the subpoena on the night of December 19, but his ``memory is not clear. . . .'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 41-42; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 493-494) In an attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, the President testified in the grand jury that he was trying to remember who told him first. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 492-493) But that was not the question. So his answer was false and misleading. When one considers the nature of the conversation between the President and Mr. Jordan, the suggestion that it would be forgotten defies common sense. December 28, 1997 December 28, 1997 is a crucial date, because the evidence shows that the President made false and misleading statements to the federal court, the federal grand jury and the Congress of the United States about the events on that date. (Chart J) It is also a date on which he obstructed justice. The President's Account The President testified that it was ``possible'' that he invited Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for this visit. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 33; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 485) He admitted that he ``probably'' gave Ms. Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given her on that date, (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 35; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 487) and that he had given her gifts on other occasions. (WJC 8/6/98 GJ, p. 35) (Chart D) Among the many gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he said was a symbol of strength. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 176; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 896) Yet only two-and-a-half weeks later, the President forgot that he had given any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. As an attorney, the President knew that the law will not tolerate someone who says, ``I don't recall'' when that answer is unreasonable under the circumstances. He also knew that, under those circumstances, his answer in the deposition could not be believed. When asked in the grand jury why he was unable to remember, even though he had given Ms. Lewinsky so many gifts only two-and-a-half weeks before the deposition, the President put forth an obviously contrived explanation. ``I think what I meant there was I don't recall what they were, not that I don't recall whether I had given them.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 51; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 503) Response to Committee Requests The President adopted that same answer in Response No. 42 to the House Judiciary Committee's Requests For Admission. (Exhibit 18) He was not asked in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked, ``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not allow a witness to insert unstated premises or mental reservations into the question to make his answer technically true, if factually false. The essence of lying is in deception, not in words. The President's answer was false. The evidence also proves that his explanation to the grand jury and to the Committee is also false. The President would have us believe that he was able to analyze questions as they were being asked, and pick up such things as verb tense in an attempt to make his statements at least literally true. But when he was asked a simple, straightforward question, he did not understand it. Neither his answer in the deposition nor his attempted explanation is reasonable or true. Testimony Concerning Gifts The President was asked in the deposition if Monica Lewinsky ever gave him gifts. He responded, ``once or twice.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 77) This is also false testimony calculated to obstruct justice. He answered this question in his Response to the House Judiciary Committee by saying that he receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the precise number. (Exhibit 18) The law again does not support the President's position. An answer that baldly understates a numerical fact in response to a specific quantitative inquiry can be deemed technically true but actually false. For example, a witness is testifying falsely if he says he went to the store five times when in fact he had gone fifty, even though technically he had also gone five times. So too, when the President answered once or twice in the face of evidence that Ms. Lewinsky was frequently bringing gifts, he was lying. (Chart C) Concealment of Gifts On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct justice and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she discussed with the President the fact that she had been subpoenaed and that the subpoena called for her to produce gifts. She recalled telling the President that the subpoena requested a hat pin, and that caused her concern. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 151-152; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 871-872) The President told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she take the gifts somewhere, or give them to someone, maybe to Betty. The President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 152-153; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 872-873) (Chart L) Later that day, Ms. Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875) Ms. Currie has a fuzzy memory about this incident, but says that ``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. (Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) The Cell Phone Record There is key evidence that Ms. Currie's fuzzy recollection is wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. Currie called from her cell phone. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155) (Chart K, Exhibit 2) Ms. Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky and proves conclusively that Ms. Currie called Monica from her cell phone several hours after she had left the White House. Moreover, Ms. Currie herself later testified that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) The facts prove that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts. Ms. Currie's Later Actions That conclusion is buttressed by Ms. Currie's actions. If Ms. Lewinsky had placed the call requesting a gift exchange, Ms. Currie would logically ask the reason for such a transfer. Ms. Lewinsky was giving her a box of gifts from the President yet she did not tell the President of this strange request. She simply took the gifts and placed them under her bed without asking a single question. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 57-58; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 557; BC 5/6/98 GJ, pgs. 105-108, 114; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 581-582) The President stated in his Response to questions No. 24 and 25 from the House Committee that he was not concerned about the gifts. (Exhibit 18) In fact, he said that he recalled telling Monica that if the Jones lawyers request gifts, she should turn them over. The President testified that he is ``not sure'' if he knew the subpoena asked for gifts. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 42-43; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 494- 495) Would Monica Lewinsky and the President discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyers if Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena asked for gifts? On the other hand, if he knew the subpoena requested gifts, why would he give Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28? Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals the answer. She said that she never questioned ``that we were ever going to do anything but keep this private'' and that meant to take ``whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken'' to keep it quiet. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 166; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 886) The only logical inference is that the gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the relationship--even in the face of a federal subpoena. The President's Deposition Testimony Furthermore, the President, at various times in his deposition, seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 in order to obstruct the administration of justice. First, he was asked: ``Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in this case?'' The President answered flatly: ``No. I don't know if she had been.'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 68) He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . .,'' he said. he then added that he may have joked to her that the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he has ever spoken to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation than that about it. . . .'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 70) Not only does Monica Lewinsky directly contradict this testimony, but the President also directly contradicted himself before the grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said that he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a subpoena'' and that they had a ``conversation about the possibility of her testifying.'' (WJC 8/17/98 Dep., pgs. 35-36) Remember, he had this conversation about her testimony only two-and-a-half weeks before his deposition. Again, his version is not reasonable. January 5-9, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky Signs the Affidavit and Gets a Job The President knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to execute a false Affidavit. He was so certain of the content that when she asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he had seen fifteen of them. (ML 8/2/98 Int., p. 3; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1489) He got his information from discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan generally about the content of the Affidavit. Moreover, the President had suggested the Affidavit himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be certain the mission was accomplished. Additional Presidential Advice In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with her lawyer, Mr. Carter, to discuss the Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 192; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 912) Her lawyer asked her some hard questions about how she got her job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) After the meeting, she called Betty Currie and said that she wanted to speak to the President before she signed anything. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 195; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 915) Ms. Lewinsky and the President discussed the issue of how she would answer under oath if asked about how she got her job at the Pentagon. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) The President told her: ``Well, you could always say that the people in Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 197; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 917) That, too, is false and misleading. Vernon Jordan's New Role The President was also kept advised as to the contents of the Affidavit by Vernon Jordan. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 224; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) On January 6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the Affidavit from Mr. Carter's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 199; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 919) She delivered a copy to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) because she wanted Mr. Jordan to look at the Affidavit in the belief that if Vernon Jordan gave his imprimatur, the President would also approve. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 194-195; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 914, 915) (Chart M) Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents and agreed to delete a paragraph inserted by Mr. Carter which might open a line of questions concerning whether she had been alone with the President. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 200; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 920) (Exhibit 3) Mr. Jordan maintained that he had nothing to do with the details of the Affidavit. (VJ 3/5/ 98 GJ, p. 12; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1735) He admits, though, that he spoke with the President after conferring with Ms. Lewinsky about the changes made to her Affidavit. (VJ 5/5/ 98 GJ, p. 218; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1827) Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False Affidavit The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false Affidavit. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 204-205; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 924-925) (Chart N; Exhibit 12) She showed the executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) (Exhibit 4) Mr. Jordan, in turn, notified the President that she signed an affidavit denying a sexual relationship. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 26; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1739) Ms. Lewinsky Gets the Job On January 8, 1998, Mr. Jordan arranged an interview for Ms. Lewinsky with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. (ML 8/6/ 98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) The interview went poorly, so Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 206; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 926) Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing to assist Ms. Lewinsky's job search from early November to mid December, then called MacAndrews and Forbes CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things happen, if they could happen.'' (VJ 5/5/98 GJ, p. 231; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1829) Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to worry. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 208-209; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 928- 929) That evening, Ms. Lewinsky was called by MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given more interviews the next morning. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 209; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 929) After a series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, she was informally offered a job. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 210; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 930) When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan to tell him, he passed the good news on to Betty Currie stating, ``Mission Accomplished.'' (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 39; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1898). Later, Mr. Jordan called the President and told him personally. (VJ 5/28/98 GJ, p. 41; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1899) (Chart P) The Reason for Mr. Jordan's Unique Behavior After Ms. Lewinsky had spent months looking for a job-- since July according to the President's lawyers--Vernon Jordan made the critical call to a CEO the day after the false Affidavit was signed. Mr. Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a job recommendation. (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 11; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan, on the other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman to recommend for hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a very talented attorney from Akin Gump; (3) a Harvard business school graduate; and (4) Monica Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 58-59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1747) Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. Lewinsky's qualifications do not compare to those of the individuals previously recommended by Mr. Jordan. Vernon Jordan was well aware that people with whom Ms. Lewinsky worked at the White House did not like her (VJ 3/3/ 98 GJ, pgs. 43, 59) and that she did not like her Pentagon job. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 43-44; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1706, 1707) Mr. Jordan was asked if at ``any point during this process you wondered about her qualifications for employment?'' He answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to make.'' (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, p. 44; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1707) Yet, when he called Mr. Perelman the day after she signed the Affidavit, he referred to Ms. Lewinsky as a bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' (Perelman 4/23/98 Dep., p. 10; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3281) Mr. Jordan testified that she had been pressing him for a job and voicing unrealistic expectations concerning positions and salary. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 37-38; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1742) Moreover, she narrated a disturbing story about the President leaving the First Lady, and how the President was not spending enough time with her. Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan pause in making the recommendation, especially after Monica was subpoenaed. (VJ 3/3/98 GJ, pgs. 156-157; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1725) The Importance of the False Affidavit Monica Lewinsky's false Affidavit enabled the President, through his attorneys, to assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition ``. . . there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape of form with President Clinton. . . .'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) When questioned by his own attorney in the deposition, the President stated specifically that paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' (WJC, 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) The President later affirmed the truth of that statement when testifying before the grand jury. (WJC, 8/17/98 GJ, p. 20-21; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 473) Paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit states: ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the President, he did not propose that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual relationship.'' Significantly, Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft Affidavit on January 6, and signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being alone with the President. She showed a copy of the signed Affidavit to Vernon Jordan, who called the President and told him that she had signed it. (VJ, 3/5/98 GJ, pgs. 24-26; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 1728, 1739; VJ, 5/5/98 GJ, p. 222; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1828) The Rush To File the Affidavit For the affidavit to work for the President in precluding questions by the Jones attorneys concerning Ms. Lewinsky, it had to be filed with the Court and provided to the President's attorneys in time for his deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's lawyers called Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer and left a message, presumably to find out if he had filed the Affidavit with the Court. (Carrier 6/18/ 98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) (Chart O) On January 15, the President's attorneys called her attorney twice. When they finally reached him, they requested a copy of the Affidavit and asked him, ``Are we still on time?'' (Carter 6/ 18/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 423) Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer faxed a copy on the 15th. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 123, H.Doc. 105-316, p. 423) The President's counsel was aware of its contents and used it powerfully in the deposition. Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer called the court in Arkansas twice on January 15 to ensure that the Affidavit could be filed on Saturday, January 17. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, pgs. 124-125; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 423-424) (Exhibit 5) He finished the Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition in the early morning hours of January 16 and mailed it to the Court with the false Affidavit attached, for Saturday delivery. (Carter 6/18/98 GJ, p. 134; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) The President's lawyers left him another message on January 16, saying, ``You'll know what it's about.'' (Carter 6/18/ 98 GJ, p. 135; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 426) Obviously, the President needed that Affidavit to be filed with the Court to support his plans to mislead Ms. Jones' attorneys in the deposition, and thereby obstruct justice. The Newsweek Inquiry On January 15, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek called Betty Currie and asked her about Ms. Lewinsky sending gifts to her by courier. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 123; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584; ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 948) Ms. Currie than called Ms. Lewinsky and told her about it. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 228-229; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 948-949) The President was out of town, so later, Betty Currie called Ms. Lewinsky back, and asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 229; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 949; Currie 5/6/98 GJ, p. 130-131; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 585) Mr. Jordan advised her to speak with Bruce Lindsey and Mike McCurry. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 71) Ms. Currie testified that she spoke immediately to Mr. Lindsey about Isikoff's call. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 127; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) January 17, 1998, Deposition Aftermath By the time the President concluded his deposition on January 17, he knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who had personal knowledge was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover stories that he and Ms. Lewinsky created, and that he used himself during the deposition, were now in jeopardy. It became imperative that he not only contact Ms. Lewinsky, but that he obtain corroboration of his account of the relationship from his trusted secretary, Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night of the deposition, the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she come in the following day, Sunday. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 701 (Exhibit 6) Ms. Currie could not recall the President ever before calling her that late at home on a Saturday night. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) (Chart S) Sometime in the early morning hours of January 18, 1998, the President learned of a news report concerning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that day. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 142- 143; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 594-595) (Exhibit 14) The Tampering With the Witness, Betty Currie As the charts indicate, between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 p.m., there were three phone calls between Mr. Jordan and the President. (Exhibit 7) At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with the President. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 67; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 558) He told her that he had just been deposed and that the attorneys asked several questions about Monica Lewinsky. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 69-70; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) He then made a series of statements to Ms. Currie: (Chart T) (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right? (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right? (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? (4) You could see and hear everything, right? (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked whether she believed that the President wished her to agree with the statements: Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he stated [these five points] and the demeanor that he was using at the time that he stated it to you--that he wished you to agree with that statement? A. I can't speak for him, but---- Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these [previous] meetings in the last several days that that is how you took it. A. [Nodding.] Q. And you're nodding you head, ``yes,'' is that correct? A. That's correct. Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the President made to you, ``You remember I was never really alone with Monica, right?'' Was that also a statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you to agree with that? A. Correct. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, 559) Though Ms. Currie would later intimate that she did not necessarily feel pressured by the President, she did state that she felt the President was seeking her agreement (or disagreement) with those statements. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 27; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 669) Was This Obstruction of Justice? The President essentially admitted to making these statements when he knew they were not true. Consequently, he had painted himself into a legal corner. Understanding the seriousness of the President ``coaching'' Ms. Currie, the argument has been made that those statements to her could not constitute obstruction because she had not been subpoenaed, and the President did not know that she was a potential witness at the time. This argument is refuted by both the law and the facts. The United States Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and stated, ``[A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if he urges or persuades a prospective witness to give false testimony. Neither must the target be scheduled to testify at the time of the offense, nor must he or she actually give testimony at a later time.'' United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing, e.g., United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3rd Cir. 1981)). Of course Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and the President clearly wanted her to be deposed to corroborate him, as his testimony demonstrates. The President claims that he called Ms. Currie into work on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But the President knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and if he had told the truth during his deposition the day before, then he would have no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie knew. More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's reaction to his demeanor, and the blatant lies that he suggested clearly prove that the President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. Rather, he was looking for corroboration for his false cover-up, and that is why he coached her. January 18, the Search for Ms. Lewinsky Very soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 p.m., the flurry of telephone calls in search of Monica Lewinsky began. (Chart S) between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms. Lewinsky four times. ``Kay'' is a reference to a code name Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie agreed to when contacting one another. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 216; H.Doc. 105-311, pg. 936) At 11:02 p.m., the President called Ms. Currie at home to ask if she had reached Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/ 98 GJ, p. 160; H. Doc. 105-316, p. 702) January 19, the Search Continues The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to work diligently on behalf of the President. Between 7:02 a.m. and 8:41 a.m., she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. (Chart S) (Exhibit 8) After the 8:41 page, Ms. Currie called the President at 8:43 a.m. and said that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 161-162; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 703) One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she again paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time Ms. Currie's page stated ``Family Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. Lewinsky into calling back. That may have been the President's idea, since Ms. Currie had just spoken with him. The President was obviously quite concerned because he called Betty Currie only six minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 a.m., Ms. Currie tried a different tact, sending the message: ``Good news.'' Again, perhaps at the President's suggestion. If bad news does not get her to call, try good news. Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage Ms. Lewinsky to call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 165; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 704) Ms. Currie's recollection of why she was calling was again fuzzy. She said at one point that she believes the President asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and she thought she was calling just to tell her that her name came up in the deposition. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, p. 162; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 703) Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed; of course her name came up in the deposition. There was obviously another and more important reason the President needed to get in touch with her. Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky's Lawyers Join the Search At 8:56 a.m., the President telephoned Vernon Jordan, who then joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four minutes, from 10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White House three times, paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. Jordan, Ms. Lewinsky's attorney and individuals at the White House. Ms. Lewinsky Replaces Her Lawyer Later that afternoon, at 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter relayed that he had been told he no longer represented Ms. Lewinsky. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 141; H.Doc. 105- 316, p. 1771) Mr. Jordan then made feverish attempts to reach the President or someone at the White House to tell them the bad news, as represented by the six calls between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. Vernon Jordan said that he tried to relay this information to the White House because ``[t]he President asked me to get Monica Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was ``information that they ought to have.'' (VJ 6/9/98 GJ, pgs. 45-46; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1968) (Chart Q) Mr. Jordan then called Mr. Carter back at 5:14 p.m. to go over what they had already talked about. (VJ 3/5/98 GJ, p. 146; H.Doc. 104- 316, p. 1772) Mr. Jordan finally reached the President at 5:56 p.m. and told him that Mr. Carter had been fired. (VJ 6/ 9/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 1970) The Reason for the Urgent Search This activity shows how important it was for the President of the United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn to whom she was talking. Betty Currie was in charge of contacting Ms. Lewinsky. The President had just completed a deposition in which he provided false and misleading testimony about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was a co-conspirator in hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, and he was losing control over her. The President never got complete control over her again. Article I.--False and Misleading Statements to the Grand Jury Article I addresses the President's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the grand jury. Four categories of false grand jury testimony are listed in the Article. Some salient examples of false statements are described below. When judging the statements made and the answers given, it is vital to recall that the President spent literally days preparing his testimony with his lawyer. He and his attorney were fully aware that the testimony would center around his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and his deposition testimony in the Jones case. Grand Jury Testimony On August 17, after six invitations, the President of the United States appeared before a grand jury of his fellow citizens and took an oath to tell the complete truth. The President proceeded to equivocate and engage in legalistic fencing; he also lied. The entire testimony was calculated to mislead and deceive the grand jury and to obstruct its process, and eventually to deceive the American people. He set the tone at the very beginning. In the grand jury a witness can tell the truth, lie or assert his privileges against self incrimination. (Chart Y) President Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was permitted to read a statement. (Chart Z; WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 8-9) The President's Prepared Statement That statement itself is demonstrably false in many particulars. President Clinton claims that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 1997.'' Notice he did not mention 1995. There was a reason. On three ``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky said she engaged in sexual contact with the President. Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year old intern at the time. The President unlawfully attempted to conceal his three visits alone with Ms. Lewinsky in 1995 during which they engaged in sexual conduct. (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 27-28; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 747-748; ML 8/6/98 GJ, Ex. 7; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1251; Chart A) Under Judge Wright's ruling, this evidence was relevant and material to Paula Jones' sexual harassment claims. (Order, Judge Susan Webber Wright, December 11, 1997, p. 3) The President specifically and unequivocally states, ``[The encounters] did not constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17, 1998 deposition.'' That assertion is patently false. It is directly contradicted by the corroborated testimony of Monica Lewinsky. (See eg: ML 8/20/98 GJ, pgs. 31-32; H.Doc. 311, p. 1174; ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25, 30; H.Doc. 311, pgs. 1357, 1358) Evidence indicates that the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in ``sexual relations'' as the President understood the term to be defined at his deposition and as any reasonable person would have understood the term to have been defined. Contrary to his statement under oath, the President's conduct during the 1995 visits and numerous additional visits did constitute ``sexual relations'' as he understood the term to be defined at his deposition. Before the grand jury, the President admitted that directly touching or kissing another person's breast, or directly touching another person's genitalia with the intent to arouse, would be ``sexual relations'' as the term was defined. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 94-95; H.Doc 105-311, pgs. 546-547) However, the President maintained that he did not engage in such conduct. (Id.) These statements are contradicted by Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and the testimony of numerous individuals with whom she contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with the President. Moreover, the theory that Ms. Lewinsky repeated and unilaterally performed acts on the President while he tailored his conduct to fit a contorted definition of ``sexual relations'' which he had not contemplated at the time of the acts, defies common sense. Moreover, the President had not even formed the contorted interpretation of ``sexual relations'' which he asserted in the grand jury until after his deposition had concluded. This is demonstrated by the substantial evidence revealing the President's state of mind during his deposition testimony. First, the President continuously denied at his deposition any fact that would cause the Jones lawyers to believe that he and Ms. Lewinsky had any type of improper relationship, including a denial that they had a sexual affair, (WJC 1/17/ 98 Dep., p. 78) not recalling if they were ever alone, (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53, 59) and not recalling whether Ms. Lewinsky had ever given him gifts. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 75) Second, the President testified that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely true'' when, even by his current reading of the definition, it is absolutely false. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 204) Third, the White House produced a document entitled ``January 24, 1998 Talking Points,'' stating flatly that the President's definition of ``sexual relations'' included oral sex. (Chart W) Fourth, the President made statements to staff members soon after the deposition, saying that he did not have sexual relations, including oral sex, with Ms. Lewinsky, (Podesta 6/16/98 GJ, pg. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) and that she threatened to tell people she and the President had an affair when he rebuffed her sexual advances. (Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJ, p. 59; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) Fifth, President Clinton's Answer filed in Federal District Court in response to Paula Jones' First Amended Complaint states unequivocally that ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' (Answer of Defendant William Jefferson Clinton, December 17, 1997, p. 8, para. 39) Sixth, in President Clinton's sworn Answers to Interrogatories Numbers 10 and 11, as amended, he flatly denied that he had sexual relations with any federal employee. The President filed this Answer prior to his deposition. Finally, as described below, the President sat silently while his attorney, referring to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, represented to the court that there was no sex of any kind or in any manner between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pg. 54) This circumstantial evidence reveals the President's state of mind at the time of the deposition: his concern was not in technically or legally accurate answers, but in categorically denying anything improper. His grand jury testimony about his state of mind during the deposition is false. Reasons for the False Testimony The President did not lie to the grand jury to protect himself from embarrassment, as he could no longer deny the affair. Before his grand jury testimony, the President's semen had been identified by laboratory tests on Ms. Lewinsky's dress, and during his testimony, he admitted an ``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky, In fact, when he testified before the grand jury, he was only hours away from admitting the affair on national television. Embarrassment was inevitable. But, if he truthfully admitted the details of his encounters with Ms. Lewinsky to the grand jury, he would be acknowledging that he lied under oath during his deposition when he claimed that he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 78, 109, 204) Instead, he chose to lie, not to protect his family or the dignity of his office, but to protect himself from criminal liability for his perjury in the Jones case. Additional Falsity in the Prepared Statement The President's statement continued, ``I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this conduct [.]'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 9; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 461) The truth is much more troubling. As Ms. Lewinsky testified, her relationship with the President began with flirting, including Ms. Lewinsky showing the President her underwear. (ML 7/30/98 Int., p. 5; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1431) As Ms. Lewinsky candidly admitted, she was surprised that the President remembered her name after their first two sexual encounters. (ML 8/26/98 Dep., p. 25; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1295) Reason for the Falsity The President's prepared statement, fraught with untruths, was not an answer the President delivered extemporaneously to a particular question. It was carefully drafted testimony which the President read and relied upon throughout his deposition. The President attempted to use the statement to foreclose questioning on an incriminating topic on nineteen separate occasions. Yet, this prepared testimony, which along with other testimony provides the basis for Article I, Item 1, actually contradicts his sworn deposition testimony. Contrary Deposition Testimony In this statement, the President admits that he and Ms. Lewinsky were alone on a number of occasions. He refused to make this admission in his deposition in the Jones case. During the deposition, the following exchange occurred: Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking about Monica Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky together alone in the Oval Office? A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked in the legislative affairs office, they always had somebody there on the weekends. I typically work some on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring me things on the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in there, drop if off, exchange a few words and go, she was there. I don't have any specific recollections of what the issues were, what was going on, but when the Congress is there, we're working all the time, and typically I would do some work on One of the days of the weekends in the afternoon. Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was possible, then, that you were alone with her, but you have no specific recollection of that ever happening? A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, while she was working there, brought something to me and that at the time she brought it to me, she was the only person there. That's possible. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53) After telling this verbose lie under oath, the President was given an opportunity to correct himself. This exchange followed: Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone together in any room in the White House? A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that there is a, it is--I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend. That's--I have a general memory of that. Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of those meetings? A. No. You know, we just had conversation, I don't remember. (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 52-53) Before the grand jury, the President maintained that he testified truthfully at his deposition, a lie which provides, in part, the basis for Article I, Item 2. He stated, ``My goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 80; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 532) But contrary to his deposition testimony, he certainly was along with Ms. Lewinsky when she was not delivering papers, as the President conceded in his prepared grand jury statement. In other words, the President's assertion before the grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, but that he testified truthfully in his deposition, in inconsistent. Yet, to this day, both the President and his attorneys have insisted that he did not lie at his deposition and that he did not lie when he swore under oath that he did not lie at his deposition. In addition to his lie about not recalling being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, the President told numerous other lies at his deposition. All of those lies are incorporated in Article I, Item 2. Testimony Concerning the False Affidavit Article I, Item 3 charges the President with providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony before a federal grand jury concerning false and misleading statements his attorney Robert Bennett made to Judge Wright at the President's deposition. In one statement, while objecting to questions regarding Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Bennett misled the Court, perhaps knowingly, stating, ``Counsel [for Ms. Jones] is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., pgs. 53-54) When Judge Wright interrupted Mr. Bennett and expressed her concern that he might be coaching the President, Mr. Bennett responded, ``In preparation of the witness for this deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't know[.]'' (WJC 1/17/98 Dep., p. 54) (Emphasis added) When asked before the grand jury about his statement to Judge Wright, the President testified, ``I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he was saying,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-3131, p. 476) He added, ``I didn't pay much attention to this conversation, which is why, when you started asking me about this, I asked to see the deposition.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 24; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 477) Finally, ``I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed me by.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 29; H. Doc. 105-311, p. 481) This grand jury testimony defies common sense. During his deposition testimony, the President admittedly misled Ms. Jones' attorneys about his affair with Ms. Lewinsky, which continued while Ms. Jones' lawsuit was pending, because he did not want the truth to be known. Of course, when Ms. Lewinsky's name is mentioned during the deposition, particularly in connection with sex, the President is going to listen. Any doubts as to whether he listened to Mr. Bennett's representations are eliminated by watching the videotape of the President's deposition. The videotape shows the President looking directly at Mr. Bennett, paying close attention to his argument to Judge Wright. False Testimony Concerning Obstruction of Justice Article I, Item 4 concerns the President's grand jury perjury regarding his efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and his efforts to impede discovery in the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit. These lies are perhaps the most troubling, as the President used them in an attempt to conceal his criminal actions and the abuse of his office. For example, the President testified before the grand jury that he recalled telling Ms. Lewinsky that if Ms. Jones' lawyers requested the gifts exchanged between Ms. Lewinsky and the President, she should provide them. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 43; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 495) He stated, ``And I told her that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' (Id.) This testimony is false, as demonstrated by both Ms. Lewinsky's testimony and common sense. Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she discussed with the President the subpoena's request for her to produce gifts, including a hat pin. She told the President that it concerned her, (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 151; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 871) and he said that it ``bothered'' him too. (ML 8/20/98 GJ, p. 66; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 1122) Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she give the gifts to someone, maybe to Betty. But rather than instructing her to turn the gifts over to Ms. Jones' attorneys, the President replied, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, p. 152; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 872) Several hours later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky on her cellular phone and said, ``I understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you have something to give me.'' (ML 8/6/98 GJ, pgs. 154-155; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 874-875) Although Ms. Currie agrees that she picked up the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie testified that ``the best'' she remembers is that Ms. Lewinsky called her. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 105; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 581) She later conceded that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than hers on this point. (BC 5/6/98 GJ, p. 126; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 584) A telephone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky, revealing that Ms. Currie did call her from her cellular phone several hours after Ms. Lewinsky's meeting with the President. The only logical reason Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve gifts from the President is that the President told her to do so. He would not have given this instruction if he wished the gifts to be given to Ms. Jones' attorneys. Testimony Concerning Ms. Currie The President again testified falsely when he told the grand jury that he was simply trying to ``refresh'' his recollection when he made a series of statements to Ms. Currie the day after his deposition. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) Ms. Currie testified that she met with the President at about 5:00 P.M. on January 18, 1998, and he proceeded to make these statements to her: (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right? (2) You were always there when Monica was there, right? (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? (4) You could see and hear everything, right? (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70-75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) Ms. Currie testified that these were more like statements than questions, and that, as far as she understood, the President wanted her to agree with the statements. (BC 1/27/ 98 GJ, p. 74; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 559) The President was asked specifically about these statements before the grand jury. He did not deny them, but said that he was ``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 131; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 583) He added that he wanted to ``know what Betty's memory was about what she heard,'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 54; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 506) and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly as [he] could.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105- 311, p. 508) Logic demonstrates that the President's explanation is contrived and false. A person does not refresh his recollection by firing declarative sentences dressed up as leading questions to his secretary. If the President was seeking information, he would have asked Ms. Currie what she recalled. Additionally, a person does not refresh his recollection by asking questions concerning factual scenarios of which the listener was unaware, or worse, of which the declarant and the listener knew were false. How would Ms. Currie know if she was always there when Ms. Lewinsky was there? Ms. Currie, in fact, acknowledged during her grand jury testimony that Ms. Lewinsky could have visited the President at the White House when Ms. Currie was not there. (BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 65-66; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 679) Ms. Currie also testified that there were several occasions when the President and Ms. Lewinsky were in the Oval Office or study area without anyone else present. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 32-33, 36-38; H.Doc. 105- 316, pgs. 552-553) More importantly, the President admitted in his statement to the grand jury that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 9-10; H.Doc. 105- 311, pgs. 460-461) Thus, by his own admission, his statement to Ms. Currie about never being alone with Ms. Lewinsky was false. And if they were alone together, Ms. Currie certainly could not say whether the President touched Ms. Lewinsky or not. The statement about whether Ms. Currie could see and hear everything is also refuted by the President's own grand jury testimony. During his ``intimate'' encounters with Ms. Lewinsky, he ensured everyone, including Ms. Currie, was excluded. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 53; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 505) Why would someone refresh his recollection by making a false statement of fact to a subordinate? The answer is obvious--he would not. Lastly, the President stated in the grand jury that he was ``downloading'' information in a ``hurry,'' apparently explaining that he made these statements because he did not have time to listen to answers to open-ended questions. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 56; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 508) But, if he was in such a hurry, why did the President not ask Ms. Currie to refresh his recollection when he spoke with her on the telephone the previous evening? He also has no adequate explanation as to why he could not spend an extra five or 10 minutes with Ms. Currie on January 18 to get her version of the events. In fact, Ms. Currie testified that she first met the President on January 18 while he was on the White House putting green, and he told her to go into the office and he would be in in a few minutes. (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 67-70; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 558-559) And if he was in such a hurry, why did he repeat these statements to Ms. Currie a few days later? (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 80-81; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 560- 561) The reason for these statements had nothing to do with time constraints or refreshing recollection; he had just finished lying during the Jones deposition about these issues, and he needed corroboration from his secretary. Testimony About Influencing Aides Not only did the President lie about his attempts to influence Ms. Currie's testimony, but he lied about his attempts to influence the testimony of some of his top aides. Among the President's lies to his aides, described in detail later in this brief, were that Ms. Lewinsky did not perform oral sex on him, and that Ms. Lewinsky stalked him while he rejected her sexual demands. These lies were then disseminated to the media and attributed to White House sources. They were also disseminated to the grand jury. When the president was asked about these lies before the grand jury, he testified: ``And so I said to them things that were true about this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, I said, there's nothing going on between us. That was true. I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined it. That was true. And did I hope that I never would have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of course. ``But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate this matter further. So I said things that were true. They may have been misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.'' (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, p. 106; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 558) To accept this grand jury testimony as truth, one must believe that many of the President's top aides engaged in a concerted effort to lie to the grand jury in order to incriminate him at the risk of subjecting themselves to a perjury indictment. We suggest that it is illustrative of the President's character that he never felt any compunction in exposing others to false testimony charges, so long as he could conceal his own perjuries. Simply put, such a conspiracy did not exist. The above are merely highlights of the President's grand jury perjury, and there are numerous additional examples. In order to keep these lies in perspective, three facts must be remembered. First, before the grand jury, the President was not lying to cover up an affair and protect himself from embarrassment, as concealing the affair was now impossible. Second, the President could no longer argue that the facts surrounding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky were somehow irrelevant or immaterial, as the Office of Independent Counsel and the grand jury had mandates to explore them. Third, he cannot claim to have been surprised or unprepared for questions about Ms. Lewinsky before the grand jury, as he spent days with his lawyer, preparing responses to such questions. The President's Method Again, the President carefully crafted his statements to give the appearance of being candid, when actually his intent was the opposite. In addition, throughout the testimony, whenever the President was asked a specific question that could not be answered directly without either admitting the truth or giving an easily provable false answer, he said, ``I rely on my statement.'' 19 times he relied on this false and misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those lies in ``answering'' questions propounded to him. (See eg. WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pg. 139; H.Doc. 105-311, p. 591) The House Committee's Request In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring its inquiry to an expeditious end, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives submitted to the President 81 requests to admit or deny specific facts relevant to this investigation. (Exhibit 18) Although, for the most part, the questions could have been answered with a simple ``admit'' or ``deny,'' the President elected to follow the pattern of selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant untruths, artful distortions, outright lies, and half truths. When he did answer, he engaged in legalistic hair-splitting in an obvious attempt to skirt the whole truth and to deceive and obstruct the due proceedings of the Committee. The President Repeats His Falsities Thus, on at least 23 questions, the President professed a lack of memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable memory, for his amazing ability to recall details. In at least 15 answers, the President merely referred to ``White House Records.'' He also referred to his own prior testimony and that of others. He answered several of the requests by merely restating the same deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury. We will point out several false statements in this Brief. In addition, the half-truths, legalistic parsings, evasive and misleading answers were obviously calculated to obstruct the efforts of the House Committee. They had the effect of seriously hampering its ability to inquire and to ascertain the truth. The President has, therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry and an investigation before the Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the Judicial Branch of our constitutional system of government. The Early Attack on Ms. Lewinsky After his deposition, the power and prestige of the Office of President was marshaled to destroy the character and reputation of Monica Lewinsky, a young woman that had been ill-used by the President. As soon as her name surfaced, the campaign began to muzzle any possible testimony, and to attack the credibility of witnesses, in a concerted effort to obstruct the due administration of justice in a lawsuit filed by one female citizen of Arkansas. It almost worked. When the President testified at his deposition that he had no sexual relations, sexual affair or the like with Monica Lewinsky, he felt secure. Monica Lewinksy, the only other witness was on board. She had furnished a false affidavit also denying everything. Later, when he realized from the January 18, 1998, Drudge Report that there were taped conversations between Ms. Lewinsky and Linda Tripp, he had to develop a new story, and he did. In addition, he recounted that story to White House aides who passed it on to the grand jury in an effort to obstruct that tribunal too. On Wednesday, January 21, 1998, The Washington Post published a story entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones' Lawyers.'' The White House learned the substance of the Post story on the evening of January 20, 1998. Mr. Bennett's Remark After the President learned of the existence of the story, he made a series of telephone calls. At 12:08 a.m. he called his attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a conversation. The next morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the Washington Post stating: ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added, ``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.'' Additional Calls After that conversation, the President had a half hour conversation with White House counsel, Bruce Lindsey. At 1:16 a.m., the President called Betty Currie and spoke to her for 20 minutes. He then called Bruce Lindsey again. At 6:30 a.m. the President called Vernon Jordan. After that, the President again conversed with Bruce Lindsey. This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which the President would soon inflict upon top White House aides and advisors. The President's Statements to Staff ERSKINE BOWLES On the morning of January 21, 1998, the President met with Whie House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles, and his two deputies, John Podesta and Sylvia Matthews. Erskine Bowles recalled entering the President's office at 9:00 a.m. that morning. He then recounts the President's immediate words as he and two others entered the Oval Office: And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he said to the American people. He said, ``I want you to know I did not have sexual relationships with this woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. And when the facts come out, you'll understand.'' (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) After the President made that blanket denial, Mr. Bowles responded: I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts are. I don't know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. But whatever they are, you ought to get them out. And you ought to get them out rignt now.'' (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) When counsel asked whether the President responded to Bowles' suggestion that he tell the truth, Bowles responded: I don't think he made any response, but he didn't disagree with me. (Bowles, 4/2/98 GJ, p. 84; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 239) John Podesta January 21, 1998 Deputy Chief John Podesta also recalled a meeting with the President on the morning of January 21, 1998. He testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval Office that morning: A. And we started off meeting--we didn't-- I don't think we said anything. And I think the President directed this specifically to Mr. Bowles. He said, ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not true.'' Q. What else did he say? A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual relationship with her, and that he never asked anybody to lie. (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 85; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3310) January 23, 1998 Two days later, on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another discussion with the President: ``I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was working on this draft and he said to me that he never had sex with her, and that--and that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.'' Then Podesta testified as follows: Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more specific than sex, than the word ``sex.'' A. Yes, he was more specific than that. Q. Okay, share that with us. A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate. Of, you know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had sex with her in any way whatsoever---- Q. Okay. A. That they had not had oral sex. (Podesta, 6/16/98 GJ, p. 92; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3311) (Exhibit V) sidney blumenthal Later in the day on January 21, 1998, the President called Sidney Blumenthal to his office. It is interesting to note how the President's lies become more elaborate and pronounced when he has time to concoct this newest line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and Mr. Podesta, he simply denied the story. But, by the time he spoke to Mr. Blumenthal, the President has added three new angles to his defense strategy: (1) he now portrays Monica Lewinsky as the aggressor; (2) he launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her as a ``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent victim being attacked by the forces of evil. Note well this recollection by Mr. Blumenthal in his June 4, 1998 testimony: (Chart U) And it was at this point that he gave his account of what had happened to me and he said that Monica--and it came very fast. He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.'' She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker anymore. (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 49; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) And then consider what the President told Mr. Blumenthal moments later: And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I feel like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive force that is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth out. I feel like the character in the novel Darkness at Noon. And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.'' (Blumenthal, 6/4/98 GJ, p. 50; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 185) At one point, Mr. Blumenthal was asked by the grand jury to describe the President's manner and demeanor during the exchange. Q. In response to my question how you responded to the President's story about a threat or discussion about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally the nature of your response to the President? A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And I certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt story, he was pouring out his heart, and I believed him. (Blumenthal, 6/25/98 GJ, pgs. 16-17; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 192-193) BETTY CURRIE When Betty Currie testified before the grand jury, she could not recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with the President on Tuesday, January 20, or Wednesday, January 21. But she did state that on one of those days, the President summoned her back to his office. At that time, the President recapped their now-infamous Sunday afternoon post-deposition discussion in the Oval Office. It was at that meeting that the President made a series of statements to Ms. Currie, to some of which she could not possibly have known the answers. (e.g. ``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, right?'') (BC 1/27/98 GJ, pgs. 70- 75; H.Doc. 105-316, pgs. 559-560; BC 7/22/98 GJ, pgs. 6-7; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 664) When he spoke to her on January 20 or 21, he spoke in the same tone and demeanor that he used in his January 18 Sunday session. Ms. Currie stated that the President may have mentioned that she might be asked about Monica Lewinsky. (BC, 1/24/98 Int., p. 8; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 536) Motive for Lies to Staff It is abundantly clear that the President's assertions to staff were designed for dissemination to the American people. But it is more important to understand that the President intended his aides to relate that false story to investigators and grand jurors alike. We know that this is true for the following reasons: the Special Division had recently appointed the Office of Independent Counsel to investigate the Monica Lewinsky matter; the President realized that Jones' attorneys and investigators were investigating this matter; the Washington Post journalists and investigators were exposing the details of the Lewinsky affair; and, an investigation relating to perjury charges based on Presidential activities in the Oval Office would certainly lead to interviews with West Wing employees and high level staffers. Because the President would not appear before the grand jury, his version of events would be supplied by those staffers to whom he had lied. The President actually acknowledged that he knew his aides might be called before the grand jury. (WJC 8/17/98 GJ, pgs. 105-109; H.Doc. 105-311, pgs. 557-557) In addition, Mr. Podesta testified that he knew that he was likely to be a witness in the ongoing grand jury criminal investigation. He said that he was ``sensitive about not exchanging information because I knew I was a potential witness.'' (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) He also recalled that the President volunteered to provide information about Ms. Lewinsky to him even though Mr. Podesta had not asked for these details. (Podesta 6/23/98 GJ, p. 79; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 3332) In other words, the President's lies and deceptions to his White House aides, coupled with his steadfast refusal to testify had the effect of presenting a false account of events to investigators and grand jurors. The President's aides believed the President when he told them his contrived account. The aides' eventual testimony provided the President's calculated falsehoods to the grand jury which, in turn, gave the jurors an inaccurate and misleading set of facts upon which to base any decisions. Win, Win, Win President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all- costs strategy calculated to obstruct the administration of justice in the Jones case and in the grand jury. This is demonstrated in testimony presented by Richard ``Dick'' Morris to the federal grand jury. Mr. Morris, a former presidential advisor, testified that on January 21, 1998, he met President Clinton and they discussed the turbulent events of the day. The President again denied the accusations against him. After further discussions, they decided to have an overnight poll taken to determine if the American people would forgive the President for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When Mr. Morris received the results, he called the President: ``And I said, `They're just too shocked by this. It's just too new, it's too raw.' And I said, `And the problem is they're willing to forgive you for adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the various other things.' '' (Morris 8/18/98 GJ. p. 28; H.Doc. 105-316, p. 2929) Morris recalls the following exchange: Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for it.'' meaning the voters. WJC: Well, we just have to win, then. (Morris 8/18/98 GJ, p. 30; H.Doc. 105-216, p. 2930) The President, of course, cannot recall this statement, (Presidential Responses to Questions, Numbers 69, 70, and 71) The Plot to Discredit Monica Lewinsky In order to ``win,'' it was necessary to convince the public, and hopefully the grand jurors who read the newspapers, that Monica Lewinsky was unworthy of belief. If the account given by Ms. Lewinsky to Linda Tripp was believed, then there would emerge a tawdry affair in and near the Oval Office. Moreover, the President's own perjury and that of Monica Lewinsky would surface. To do this, the President employed the full power and credibility of the White House and its press corps to destroy the witness. Thus on January 29, 1998: Inside the White House, the debate goes on about the best way to destroy That Woman, as President Bill Clinton called Monica Lewinsky. Should they paint her as a friendly fantasist or a malicious stalker? (The Plain Dealer) Again: ``That poor child has serious emotional problems,'' Rep. Charles Rangel, Democrat of New York, said Tuesday night before the State of the Union. ``She's fantasizing. And I haven't heard that she played with a full deck in her other experiences.'' (The Plain Dealer) From Gene Lyons, an Arkansas columnist on January 30: ``But it's also very easy to take a mirror's eye view of this thing, look at this thing from a completely different direction and take the same evidence and posit a totally innocent relationship in which the president was, in a sense, the victim of someone rather like the woman who followed David Letterman around.'' (NBC News) From another ``source'' on February 1: ``Monica had become known at the White House, says one source, as `the stalker.' '' And on February 4: ``The media have reported that sources describe Lewinsky as `infatuated' with the president, `star struck' and even `a stalker'.'' (Buffalo News) Finally, on January 31: ``One White House aide called reporters to offer information about Monica Lewinsky's past, her weight problems and what the aide said was her nickname--`The Stalker.' '' ``Junior staff members, speaking on the condition that they not be identified, said she was known as a flirt, wore her skirts too short, and was `A little bit weird.' '' ``Little by little, ever since allegations of an affair between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Lewinsky surfaced 10 days ago, White House sources have waged a behind-the-scenes campaign to portray her as an untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.'' ``Just hours after the story broke, one White House source made unsolicited calls offering that Lewinsky was the `troubled' product of divorced parents and may have been following the footsteps of her mother, who wrote a tell-all book about the private lives of three famous opera singers.'' ``One story had Lewinsky following former Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos to Starbucks. After observing what kind of coffee he ordered, she showed up the next day at his secretary's desk with a cup of the same coffee to `surprise him.' '' (Toronto Sun) This sounds familiar because it is the exact tactic used to destroy the reputation and credibility of Paula Jones. The difference is that these false rumors were emanating from the White House, the bastion of the free world, to protect one man from being forced to answer for his deportment in the highest office in the land. On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the grand jury. He then was specifically asked whether he knew that his aides (Blumenthal, Bowles, Podesta and Currie) were likely to be called before the grand jury. Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew though, after January 21st when the Post article broke and said that Judge Starr was looking into this, you knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that they might be called into a grand jury, didn't you? WJC. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I said after that. I may have said something to all these people to that effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody asked me any details, I said, look, I don't want you to be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you information that would get you in trouble. I just wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people about it. Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie for a minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, after the story broke, after Judge Starr's involvement was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that? WJC. No. Q. And you've told us that you---- WJC. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told you what I meant by it when they started this deposition. Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, but that it might have been misleading. Is that correct? WJC. It must have been * * * So, what I was trying to do was to give them something they could--that would be true, even if misleading in the context of this deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost ludicrous suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or tried to suborn perjury, in other words. (WJC 8/17/97 GJ, pgs. 106-108; H. Doc. 105-311, pgs. 558-560) As the President testified before the grand jury, he maintained that he was being truthful with his aides. (Exhibit 20) He stated that when he spoke to them, he was very careful with his wording. The President stated that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual relations'' to be literally true because he was only referring to intercourse. However, recall that John Podesta said that the President denied sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' The President told Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman. Importantly, seven days after the President's grand jury appearance, the White House issued a document entitled, ``Talking Points January 24, 1998.'' (Chart W; Exhibit 16) This ``Talking Points'' document outlines proposed questions that the President may be asked. It also outlines suggested answers to those questions. The ``Talking Points'' purport to state the President's view of sexual relations and his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky. (Exhibit 17) The ``Talking Points'' state as follows: Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a sexual relationship? A. I can't believe we're on national television discussing this. I am not about to engage in an ``act-by-act'' discussion of what constitutes a sexual relationship. Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape indicating that the President does not believe oral sex is adultery. Would oral sex, to the President, constitute a sexual relationship? A. Of course it would. The President's own talking points refute the President's ``literal truth'' argument. Effect of the President's Conduct Some ``experts'' have questioned whether the President's deportment affects his office, the government of the United States or the dignity and honor of the country. Our founders decided in the Constitutional Convention that one of the duties imposed upon the President is to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' Furthermore, he is required to take an oath to ``Preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'' Twice this President stood on the steps of the Capitol, raised his right hand to God and repeated that oath. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall ``be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.`` The Seventh Amendment insures that in civil suits ``the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.'' Finally, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process of law and the equal protection of the laws. The Effect on Ms. Jones' Rights Paula Jones is an American citizen, just a single citizen who felt that she had suffered a legal wrong. More important, that legal wrong was based upon the Constitution of the United States. She claimed essentially that she was subjected to sexual harassment, which, in turn, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender. The case was not brought against just any citizen, but against the President of the United States, who was under a legal and moral obligation to preserve and protect Ms. Jones' rights. It is relatively simple to mouth high-minded platitudes and to prosecute vigorously right violations by someone else. It is, however, a test of courage, honor and integrity to enforce those rights against yourself. The President failed that test. As a citizen, Ms. Jones enjoyed an absolute constitutional right to petition the Judicial Branch of government to redress that wrong by filing a lawsuit in the United States District Court, which she did. At this point she became entitled to a trial by jury if she chose, due process of law and the equal protection of the laws no matter who the defendant was in her suit. Due process contemplates that right to a full and fair trial, which, in turn, means the right to call and question witnesses, to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to have her case decided by an unbiased and fully informed jury. What did she actually get? None of the above. On May 27, 1997, the United States Supreme Court ruled in a nine to zero decision that, ``like every other citizen,'' Paula Jones ``has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims.`` In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled on December 11, 1997, that Ms. Jones was entitled to information regarding state or federal employees with whom the President had sexual relations from May, 1986 to the present. Judge Wright had determined that the information was reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Six days after this ruling, the President filed an answer to Ms. Jones' Amended Complaint. The President's Answer stated: ``President Clinton denies that he engaged in any improper conduct with respect to plaintiff or any other woman.'' Ms. Jones' right to call and depose witnesses was thwarted by perjurious and misleading affidavits and motions; her right to elicit testimony from adverse witnesses was compromised by perjury and false and misleading statements under oath. As a result, had a jury tried the case, it would have been deprived of critical information. That result is bad enough, but it reaches constitutional proportions when denial of the civil rights is directed by the President of the United States who twice took an oath to preserve, protect and defend those rights. But we now know what the ``sanctity of an oath'' means to the President. The Effect on the Office of President Moreover, the President is the spokesman for the government and the people of the United States concerning both domestic and foreign matters. His honesty and integrity, therefore, directly influence the credibility of this country. When, as here, that spokesman is guilty of a continuing pattern of lies, misleading statements, and deceits over a long period of time, the believability of any of his pronouncements is seriously called into question. Indeed, how can anyone in or out of our country any longer believe anything he says? And what does that do to confidence in the honor and integrity of the United States? Make no mistake, the conduct of the President is inextricably bound to the welfare of the people of the United States. Not only does it affect economic and national defense, but even more directly, it affects the moral and law-abiding fibre of the commonwealth, without which no nation can survive. When, as here, that conduct involves a pattern of abuses of power, of perjury, of deceit, of obstruction of justice and of the Congress, and of other illegal activities, the resulting damage to the honor and respect due to the United States is, of necessity, devastating. The Effect on the System Again: there is no such thing as non-serious lying under oath. Every time a witness lies, that witness chips a stone from the foundation of our entire legal system. Likewise, every act of obstruction of justice, of witness tampering or of perjury adversely affects the judicial branch of government like a pebble tossed into a lake. You may not notice the effect at once, but you can be certain that the tranquility of that lake has been disturbed. And if enough pebbles are thrown into the water, the lake itself may disappear. So too with the truth-seeking process of the courts. Every unanswered and unpunished assault upon it has its lasting effect and given enough of them, the system itself will implode. That is why two women who testified before the Committee had been indicted, convicted and punished severely for false statements under oath in civil cases. And that is why only recently a federal grand jury in Chicago indicted four former college football players because they gave false testimony under oath to a grand jury. Nobody suggested that they should not be charged because their motives may have been to protect their careers and family. And nobody has suggested that the perjury was non-serious because it involved only lies about sports; i.e., betting on college football games. Disregard of the Rule of Law Apart from all else, the President's illegal actions constitute an attack upon and utter disregard for the truth, and for the rule of law. Much worse, they manifest an arrogant disdain not only for the rights of his fellow citizens, but also for the functions and the integrity of the other two co-equal branches of our constitutional system. One of the witnesses that appeared earlier likened the government of the United States to a three-legged stool. The analysis is apt, because the entire structure of our country rests upon three equal supports: the Legislative, the Judicial, and the Executive. Remove one of those supports, and the State will totter. Remove two and the structure will collapse altogether. Effect on the Judicial Branch The President mounted a direct assault upon the truth- seeking process which is the very essence and foundation of the Judicial Branch. Not content with that, though, Mr. Clinton renewed his lies, half-truths and obstruction to this Congress when he filed his answers to simple requests to admit or deny. In so doing, he also demonstrated his lack of respect for the constitutional functions of the Legislative Branch. Actions do not lose their public character merely because they may not directly affect the domestic and foreign functioning of the Executive Branch. Their significance must be examined for their effect on the functioning of the entire system of government. Viewed in that manner, the President's actions were both public and extremely destructive. The Conduct Charged Warrants Conviction and Removal The Articles state offenses that warrant the President's conviction and removal from office. The Senate's own precedents establish that perjury and obstruction warrant conviction and removal from office. Those same precedents establish that the perjury and obstruction need not have any direct connection to the officer's official duties. Precedents In the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed from office three federal judges for making perjurious statements. Background and History of Impeachment Hearings before the Subcomm. On the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 190-193 (Comm. Print 1998), (Testimony of Charles Cooper) (``Cooper Testimony'') Although able counsel represented each judge, none of them argued that perjury or making false statements are not impeachable offenses. Nor did a single Congressman or Senator, in any of the three impeachment proceedings, suggest that perjury does not constitute a high crime and misdemeanor. Finally, in the cases of Judge Claiborne and Judge Nixon, it was undisputed that the perjury was not committed in connection with the exercise of the judges' judicial powers. Judge Nixon In 1989, Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for committing perjury. Judge Nixon's offense stemmed from his grand jury testimony and statements to federal officers concerning his intervention in the state drug prosecution of Drew Fairchild, the son of Wiley Fairchild, a business partner of Judge Nixon's. Although Judge Nixon had no official role or function in Drew Fairchild's case (which was assigned to a state court judge), Wiley Fairchild had asked Judge Nixon to help out by speaking to the prosecutor. Judge Nixon did so, and the prosecutor, a long-time friend of Judge Nixon's, dropped the case. When the FBI and the Department of Justice interviewed Judge Nixon, he denied any involvement whatsoever. Subsequently, a federal grand jury was empaneled and Judge Nixon again denied his involvement before that grand jury. After a lengthy criminal prosecution, Judge Nixon was convicted on two counts of perjury before the grand jury and sentenced to five years in prison on each count. Not long thereafter, the House impeached Judge Nixon by a vote of 417 to 0. The first article of impeachment charged him with making the false or misleading statement to the grand jury that he could not ``recall'' discussing the Fairchild case with the prosecutor. The second article charged Nixon with making affirmative false or misleading statements to the grand jury that he had ``nothing whatsoever officially or unofficially to do with the Drew Fairchild case.'' The third article alleged that Judge Nixon made numerous false statements (not under oath) to federal investigators prior to his grand jury testimony. See 135 Cong. Rec. H1802-03. The House unanimously impeached Judge Nixon, and the House Managers' Report expressed no doubt that perjury is an impeachable offense: ``It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive to the legal process than lying from the witness stand. A judge who violates his testimonial oath and misleads a grand jury is clearly unfit to remain on the bench. If a judge's truthfulness cannot be guaranteed, if he sets less than the highest standard for candor, how can ordinary citizens who appear in court be expected to abide by their testimonial oath?'' House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 59 (1989). House Manager Sensenbrenner addressed the question even more directly: ``There are basically two questions before you in connection with this impeachment. First, does the conduct alleged in the three articles of impeachment state an impeachable offense? There is really no debate on this point. The articles allege misconduct that is criminal and wholly inconsistent with judicial integrity and the judicial oath. Everyone agrees that a judge who lies under oath, or who deceives Federal investigators by lying in an interview, is not fit to remain on the bench.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S14,497 (Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) The Senate agreed, overwhelmingly voting to convict Judge Nixon of perjury on the first two articles (89-8 and 78-19, respectively). As Senator Carl Levin explained: ``The record amply supports the finding in the criminal trial that Judge Nixon's statements to the grand jury were false and misleading and constituted perjury. Those are the statements cited in articles I and II and it is on those articles that I vote to convict Judge Nixon and remove him from office.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S14,637 (Statement of Sen. Levin). Judge Hastings Also in 1989, the House impeached Judge Alcee L. Hastings for, among other things, committing numerous acts of perjury. The Senate convicted him, and he was removed from office. Initially, Judge Hastings had been indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy stemming from his alleged bribery conspiracy with his friend Mr. William Borders to ``fix'' cases before Judge Hastings in exchange for cash payments from defendants. Mr. Borders was convicted, but, at his own trial, Judge Hastings took the stand and unequivocally denied any participation in a conspiracy with Mr. Borders. The jury acquitted Judge Hastings on all counts. Nevertheless, the House impeached Judge Hastings, approving seventeen articles of impeachment, fourteen of which were for lying under oath at his trial. The House voted 413 to 3 to impeach. The House Managers' Report left no doubt that perjury alone is impeachable: ``It is important to realize that each instance of false testimony charged in the false statement articles is more than enough reason to convict Judge Hastings and remove him from office. Even if the evidence were insufficient to prove that Judge Hastings was part of the conspiracy with William Borders, which the House in no way concedes, the fact that he lied under oath to assure his acquittal is conduct that cannot be tolerated of a United States District Judge. To bolster one's defense by lying to a jury is separate, independent corrupt conduct. For this reason alone, Judge Hastings should be removed from public office.'' The House of Representatives' Brief in Support of the Articles of Impeachment at 127-28 (1989). Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) also argued for the impeachment of Judge Hastings: ``[W]e can no more close our eyes to acts that constitute high crimes and misdemeanors when practiced by judges whose views we approve than we could against judges whose views we detested. It would be disloyal . . . to my oath of office at this late state of my career to attempt to set up a double standard for those who share my philosophy and for those who may oppose it. In order to be true to our principles, we must demand that all persons live up to the same high standards that we demand of everyone else.'' 134 Cong. Rec. H6184 (1988) (Statement of Rep. Conyers). Judge Claiborne In 1986, Judge Harry E. Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from office for making false statements under penalties of perjury. In particular, Judge Claiborne had filed false income tax returns in 1979 and 1980, grossly understating his income. As a result, he was convicted by a jury of two counts of willfully making a false statement on a federal tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206 (a). Subsequently, the House unanimously (406-0) approved four articles of impeachment. The proposition that Claiborne's perjurious personal income tax filings were not impeachable was never even serious