House Energy Hearing with Tony Hayward / Switched / 1600-1700
The Oversight Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce committee meets to hear from Tony Hayward, the CEO of BP
16:00:00 IT'S THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE AND I KNOW YOU KEEP USING THAT TERM
16:00:02 AND IT COMES BACK TO WHAT HAUNTS YOU, BUT I AM CURIOUS ABOUT
16:00:06 BLOWOUT PREVENTERS AND THE DIFFERENCE, AND I WAS NOTICING
16:00:11 MY STAFF AS THEY GAVE US INFORMATION.
16:00:14 YOU HAVE A 10,000 POUND PER SQUARE INCH BLOWOUT PREVENTER,
16:00:19 SHALLOW WATER, 10,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH.
16:00:24 DEEPWATER, 10,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH.
16:00:28 NOW I'M NOT AN EXPERT. WHY?
16:00:31 WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE AS YOU GO INTO DEPTH?
16:00:33 WHY A GREATER CAPACITY? BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE OF
16:00:37 THE RESERVOIRS THAT WE'RE DRILLING.
16:00:39 WHICH THEN LEADS ME TO A LOGICAL -- WHAT DO YOU THINK
16:00:42 YOU'RE DEALING WITH AT THAT DEPTH?
16:00:45 WE KNOW -- AS FAR AS POUNDS PER SQUARE
16:00:48 INCH? WE KNOW THAT WE'RE DEALING
16:00:51 WITH A RESERVOIR WITH THE PRESSURE OF AROUND BETWEEN
16:00:56 11,000 AND 12,000 POUNDS PER INCH AND WE HAVE A BLOWOUT
16:01:00 PREVENTER RATED FOR 15,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH.
16:01:03 I BELIEVE THAT'S CORRECT. OKAY.
16:01:05 CAMERON -- I DON'T KNOW IF IT'S CAMERON THAT BUILDS THESE
16:01:10 BLOWOUT PREVENTERS. THAT'S A COMPANY THAT SOMEONE
16:01:12 TOLD ME THAT'S -- AND THEY'RE WORKING ON A 20,000 POUND PER
16:01:17 SQUARE INCH PREVENTER. YOU'RE AWARE OF THAT?
16:01:19 I AM, YES. AND THEY ACTUALLY SAID THIS,
16:01:23 WHILE THERE'S MUCH DISCUSSION AND AN ONGOING EFFORT TO PROVIDE
16:01:26 GUIDANCE FOR EQUIPMENT GREATER THAN 15,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE
16:01:30 INCH, IN THE INTEREST OF EXPEDIENCY, IT WAS DECIDED
16:01:35 WITHIN CAMERON TO APPLY CURRENT DESIGN CODES AND PRACTICES.
16:01:40 THE 20,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH EVO BLOWOUT PREVENTER WAS
16:01:46 DESIGN, TESTED AND QUALIFIED FOR API AND I'M NOT SURE WHAT ALL OF
16:01:50 THAT MEANS. MEANING BASICALLY, BUT FOR THE
16:01:52 SAKE OF EXPEDIENCY DOES CONCERN ME.
16:01:55 WHY ARE YOU ALL LOOKING AT 20,000 POUNDS PER SQUARE INCH
16:01:59 WHEN YOU BELIEVE WHAT YOU ALREADY HAVE AT 15,000 EXCEEDS
16:02:03 WHAT YOU REALLY -- IS REQUIRED? I'M NOT CERTAIN, BUT I THINK
16:02:09 THAT'S REFERRING TO THE BLOWOUT PREVENTERS FOR RESERVOIRS WITH
16:02:13 EVEN GREATER PRESSURE. I DO BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE
16:02:16 MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO COME FROM THIS INCIDENT IS THE
16:02:21 REQUIREMENT FOR THE INDUSTRY TO STEP BACK AND REDESIGN THE FAIL
16:02:26 SAFE MECHANISM IT USES TO PREVENT ACCIDENTS.
16:02:29 WE NEED A FUNDAMENTAL REDESIGN OF THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER.
16:02:34 IT'S SOMETHING THAT BP IS GOING TO TAKE A VERY ACTIVE ROLE IN.
16:02:38 WE'VE ALREADY BEGUN THAT PROCESS WITH A NUMBER OF ACADEMIC
16:02:45 INSTITUTIONS AND A NUMBER OF CONTRACTORS IN THE INDUSTRY.
16:02:49 AND I THANK THE GENTLEMAN FOR HIS PATIENCE.
16:02:51 MR. HAYWARD, WE USUALLY SAY BETTER LATE THAN NEVER, BUT NOT
16:02:55 THIS TIME. I YIELD BACK.
16:02:57 MR. GONZALEZ, BEFORE MR. ENSLEY.
16:03:05 HE SUBMITTED A CD AND A RESOLUTION FROM THE STATE
16:03:11 SENATE. HE WILL PROVIDE COPIES FOR THE
16:03:13 RECORD AND UNANIMOUS CONSENT WILL BE MADE PART OF THE
16:03:17 QUESTIONING AND WILL BE MADE PART OF THE RECORD WITHIN TEN
16:03:19 DAYS. WITHOUT OBJECTION.
16:03:20 SO ORDERED. MR. HENSLEY, QUESTIONS,
16:03:22 PLEASE. THANK YOU.
16:03:23 MR. HAYWARD, SOMETHING YOU SAID EARLIER WAS REALLY QUITE
16:03:29 ASTOUNDING TO ME. YOU SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
16:03:32 TO DATE THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY DECISION MADE BASED ON COST,
16:03:37 THAT NO DECISION HIS BEEN MADE IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE COST, AND
16:03:41 I WANT TO GO THROUGH THIS BECAUSE THERE'S SOMETHING I
16:03:44 THINK IS QUITE PIVOTAL THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION.
16:03:47 THE FACTS ARE CLEAR THAT YOU HIRED HALLIBURTON TO GIVE ADVICE
16:03:52 ON THIS. MR. GAGLIANO DID ANALYSIS AND
16:03:56 CONCLUDED YOU NEEDED 21 CENTRALIZERS TO MAKE SURE THAT
16:03:59 THIS RIG WAS SAFE AND JUST TO RELIEF ANY DOUBT AS TO WHY
16:04:03 THAT'S IMPORTANT, THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE RECOMMENDED
16:04:07 PRACTICE 65 SAYS, QUOTE, IF CASING IS NOT CENTRALIZED IT MAY
16:04:12 LAY NEAR OR AGAINST THE BORE HOLE WALL, AND IT IS NOT, IF
16:04:24 CASING IS POORLY CENTRALIZED. THIS RELIES ON BYPASSED MUD
16:04:29 CHANNELS AND INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ZONAL ISOLATION, CLOSED
16:04:32 QUOTE. THE EXPERT SAID YOU NEED 21.
16:04:34 THEN, AND IF WE CAN PUT UP THE FIRST SLIDE, A BP EMPLOYEE
16:04:38 ESSENTIALLY WROTE TO THAT EXPERT AND SAID WE ONLY HAVE SIX, AND
16:04:41 WE DON'T HAVE TIME TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM.
16:04:46 THE TIME TO BRITISH PETROLEUM WAS MONEY.
16:04:48 THIS RIG WAS 45 DAYS LATE. IT COST YOU $500,000 A DAY AND
16:04:53 PEOPLE'S OBVIOUS ATTENTION WERE ABOUT TIME WHICH MEANT MONEY.
16:04:55 SO WHAT HAPPENED THEN? WELL, ANOTHER BRITISH PETROLEUM
16:05:02 PERSON SENT A MEMO SAYING WE REALLY NEEDED TO FOLLOW THE
16:05:05 MODEL HERE. HE KICKED IT UP TO MR. GUIDE.
16:05:08 IF WE COULD HAVE THE SECOND SLIDE, MR. GUIDE CAME BACK AND
16:05:12 SAID I DON'T LIKE THE FACT THAT THIS WILL TAKE TEN HOURS TO DO,
16:05:15 EVEN THOUGH ANOTHER BRITISH PETROLEUM PERSON SAID WE'LL FLY
16:05:18 15 THINGS IN. THEY CAN BE HERE TOMORROW
16:05:22 MORNING. MR. GUIDE SAID I DON'T LIKE THE
16:05:24 TEN HOURS, AND IT DIDN'T HAPPEN, AND THEN THE NEXT RESPONSE FROM
16:05:30 BRITISH PETROLEUM, NEXT SLIDE PLEASE WAS FROM AN E-MAIL FROM
16:05:36 MR. COKALAS REPRIMANDING ANOTHER BP PERSON FROM SAYING EVEN
16:05:41 THOUGH THE HOLE IS PERFECTLY STRAIGHT, EVEN INTENTION WILL
16:05:46 NOT SEEK THE PERFECT TENSION OF THE HOLE MEANING YOU'VE GOT TO
16:05:50 HAVE THE RIGHT CENTRALIZER, AND HE WENT ON TO SAY THIS.
16:05:53 WHO CARES? IT'S DONE.
16:05:55 END OF STORY. WE'LL PROBABLY BE FINE AND WE'LL
16:05:58 GET A GOOD CEMENT JOB. WHAT HAPPENED THEN THAT'S NOT
16:06:00 QUITE THE END OF THE STORY. MR. GAGLIANO RAN FURTHER
16:06:05 COMPUTER MODELS AND HE CONCLUDED, AND THIS IS HARD TO
16:06:09 READ, BUT I'LL READ IT. HE CONCLUDED THAT THIS WELL IS
16:06:13 CONSIDERED TO HAVE A SEVERE AND SEVERE IS ALL CAPITALIZED IN HIS
16:06:19 MEMO, GAS FLOW PROBLEM. NOW, IT'S VERY CLEAR TO ME
16:06:23 READING THIS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT, IN FACT, DECISIONS WERE
16:06:28 MADE BECAUSE OF COST, BECAUSE PEOPLE DIDN'T WANT TO WAIT TO
16:06:32 GET THE CENTRALIZERS TO GET WHAT IS NEEDED TO SAFELY DO THIS JOB.
16:06:37 SO YOUR STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT COSTS LED TO
16:06:41 SHORTCUTS JUST DOESN'T RING TRUE WITH ME.
16:06:43 ISN'T IT PRETTY CLEAR THAT THERE WERE COST DECISIONS MADE THAT
16:06:51 HAD SUB-OPTIMAL, AT BEST, NUMBER OF CENTRALIZERS IN PLACEMENT IN
16:06:54 THIS WELL? IT WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT,
16:07:03 BUT I GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT UNTIL WE'VE UNDERSTOOD ALL OF
16:07:07 THE THINGS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACCIDENT, IT'S NOT EASY TO
16:07:14 SAY. WHAT I WOULD SAY, IF THERE IS
16:07:18 EVIDENCE, THAT COSTS WERE PUT AHEAD OF SAFETY.
16:07:22 I WOULD BOTH BE DEEPLY DISTURBED AND WE WOULD TAKE ACTION.
16:07:27 LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT THAT ACTION.
16:07:29 EVERYONE IN THE ROOM KNOWS ROADING THESE E-MAILS.
16:07:32 ARE YOU GOING TO CALL THE EMPLOYEES INVOLVED WHEN YOU
16:07:35 LEAVE THIS MEETING AND SAY, BECAUSE YOU'RE DRILLING IN
16:07:38 PLACES ALL OVER THE WORLD RIGHT NOW.
16:07:40 THIS IS AN ONGOING OPERATION AND TELL THEM THEY'VE GOT TO CHANGE
16:07:44 THEIR ATTITUDE. ARE YOU GOING TO TAKE ACTION
16:07:46 BASED ON THESE E-MAILS TODAY? WE WILL TAKE ACTION BASED ON
16:07:50 OUR INVESTIGATION WHICH PUTS ALL OF THIS TOGETHER AND AS IT
16:07:57 UNVEILS CLEAR CONCLUSIONS, WE WILL TAKE ACTION ON THEM.
16:08:00 LET ME SUGGEST ANOTHER ACTION.
16:08:04 WE ASKED BRITISH PETROLEUM WHAT IT SPENT ON RESEARCH AND
16:08:08 DEVELOPMENT REGARDING SAFER OFFSHORE DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES.
16:08:13 YOU GAVE US THE NUMBER. IT WAS ABOUT $10 MILLION A YEAR.
16:08:17 THAT REPRESENTS .0033%. .0033% OF BRITISH PETROLEUM
16:08:27 REVENUES. THAT DOESN'T SOUND LIKE AN
16:08:29 ADEQUATE PRIORITIZATION. HOW DOES IT COMPARE TO YOUR
16:08:32 COMPENSATION? IN WHAT RESPECT?
16:08:39 BRITISH PETROLEUM IS INVESTING ABOUT $10 MILLION A
16:08:43 YEAR IN SAFER DRILLING TECHNOLOGY.
16:08:46 HOW DOES THAT $10 MILLION A YEAR COMPARE TO YOUR COMPENSATION
16:08:50 NEXT YEAR, FOR INSTANCE? MY COMPENSATION LAST YEAR WAS
16:08:53 $6 MILLION. FORBES REPORTS THAT AT $33.
16:08:59 IS THERE A MISUNDERSTANDING? STOCK OPTIONS DON'T COUNT?
16:09:02 MY COMPENSATION LAST YEAR I THINK WAS RECORDED AT $6
16:09:06 MILLION. DO YOU THINK.
16:09:07 DO YOU THINK BRITISH PETROLEUM OUGHT TO MAKE A LARGER
16:09:11 INVESTMENT OF SIGNIFICANT GROSS REVENUES IN DEVELOPING SAFER
16:09:14 DRILLING TECHNOLOGY AND DO YOU THINK YOU OWE THAT TO THE
16:09:16 AMERICAN PEOPLE AT THIS POINT? TO BE HONEST, YES.
16:09:19 AND WE UNDOUBTEDLY WILL DO THAT ON THE BACK OF THIS ACCIDENT.
16:09:22 WE HOPE THAT THAT WILL BE EXPEDITIOUS AND SUCCESSFUL.
16:09:25 THANK YOU. THANK YOU, MR. HENSLEY.
16:09:33 QUESTIONS PLEASE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
16:09:37 I APPRECIATE IT. MR. HAYWARD, HOW MANY DEEP WATER
16:09:41 OPERATIONS DO YOU ALL HAVE, BP, AROUND THE WORLD?
16:09:44 HOW MANY RIGS THAT YOU OPERATE? I DON'T KNOW THE PRECISE
16:09:48 NUMBER, BUT IT'S PROBABLY THE ORDER OF 15 OR SO.
16:09:51 15 OR SO. IS THERE -- ONE OF THE THINGS
16:09:57 I'VE RUN INTO AND MR. SCOLESE ALLUDED TO IT, WE'VE HAD OVER
16:10:06 100 REQUESTS FOR SUBMISSIONS, PRODUCTS, IDEAS, CONSENTS AND
16:10:10 WAYS TO CAP THE WELLS, ET CETERA, ET CETERA.
16:10:15 BASICALLY AND, OF COURSE, BECAUSE OF ETHICS WE CAN'T AND
16:10:18 WON'T GO IN AND MAKE ANYBODY MEET WITH ANYBODY.
16:10:21 SO WE JUST REFER THEM IN TO THEM.
16:10:23 THE BEST I CAN TELL IS THAT MAYBE THREE OUT OF THE 600 PLUS
16:10:28 HAVE RECEIVED AN, MAIL E-MAIL BACK, THANK YOU FOR YOUR
16:10:36 SUBMISSION. THANK YOU FOR ANYTHING ELSE.
16:10:38 THERE SEEMS TO BE A CLOSED LOOP OF VENDORS THAT YOU'RE DEALING
16:10:43 WITH WHICH MY FRUSTRATION IS THAT THE HOLE IS STILL WIDE OPEN
16:10:49 AND WHEN THIS ACCIDENT FIRST OCCURRED EVERYONE SAID WE'LL
16:10:56 TAKE WHATEVER IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS.
16:10:59 WHATEVER, THE COFFERDAM AND THE TOP HAT, WHATEVER.
16:11:05 I'VE SEEN SOME PEOPLE THAT CALLED ME AND WE REFERRED THEM
16:11:08 IN AND THEY'VE NEVER HEARD ONCE FROM YOUR COMPANY.
16:11:13 IF YOU WERE NOT A VENDOR WITH US BEFORE THIS OCCURRED AND THEN
16:11:16 WE'RE NOT DEALING WITH YOU OR ARE YOU GOING TO ONLY THE
16:11:19 VENDORS AND ALLOWING THEM TO SELECT WHO THEY'RE GOING TO DEAL
16:11:22 WITH? AND MY REASON FOR THIS IS
16:11:23 BECAUSE IF THERE ARE GOOD IDEAS OUT THERE WHY ISN'T SOMEBODY
16:11:29 LOOKING AT THEM IN. WE ARE TRYING VERY HARD TO
16:11:31 ENGAGE WITH EVERYONE WHO HAS A GOOD IDEA.
16:11:35 WE HAVE BEEN, QUITE FRANKLY, INUNDATED WITH HUNDREDS OF
16:11:38 THOUSANDS. AND I KNOW THIS TREMENDOUS
16:11:41 AMOUNT. I KNOW THE FIRST ONE THAT I SAW
16:11:45 WAS WRAPPED HANGING IN THE CARTONS.
16:11:51 I UNDERSTAND THAT. THOSE ARE EASY TO GO THROUGH!
16:11:54 LET ME SHIFT ANOTHER GEAR. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THIS
16:11:59 ADMINISTRATION'S MORATORIUM IS A RESULT OF THE TRAGEDY THAT
16:12:03 OCCURRED ON DEEPWATER HORIZON? THE FACT THAT THEY PUT IT IN WAS
16:12:08 STRICTLY BECAUSE OF WHAT WENT WRONG IN DEEP WATER!
16:12:15 I DON'T KNOW THAT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT'S THE CASE AND I
16:12:17 THINK IT'S PROBABLY THE RIGHT THING TO DO UNTIL SUCH TIME AS
16:12:21 WE HAVE GREATER CLARITY. WELL, YOU KNOW, AND I AGREE
16:12:27 WITH THAT, AND I DON'T AGREE WITH THE MORATORIUM.
16:12:31 AS I'VE EXPRESSED TO MY FRIENDS IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT FOR US IN
16:12:38 LOUISIANA TO STAND IN OIL AND SAY WE'LL TAKE MORE OIL, BUT
16:12:42 IT'S BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMY AND IT'S BECAUSE OF THE JOBS.
16:12:44 WE'VE SUPPORTED, I'VE SUPPORTED THE INDUSTRY AND I'VE SUPPORTED
16:12:48 THE PEOPLE, BUT IT MAKES SENSE THAT BP BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY
16:12:54 OF THE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP ASSOCIATED WITH THIS MORATORIUM.
16:13:01 I THINK YOU ALL PUT 100 MILLION ASIDE FOR LOST JOBS.
16:13:06 I AM TOLD IN A GIVEN MONTH, AND I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS JUST
16:13:12 LOUISIANA, OR OFFSHORE, BUT IT'S ABOUT 350 MILLION A MONTH IN
16:13:18 WAGES. ARE YOU AND YOUR COMPANY GOING
16:13:19 TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY AND MAKE SURE THAT THESE COMPANIES THAT
16:13:26 FOLD UP, OR THESE COMPANIES THAT HAVE FINANCIAL HARDSHIPS AND IN
16:13:31 PARTICULAR THEIR EMPLOYEES THAT THEY'LL START LAYING OFF WILL BE
16:13:35 COMPENSATED IN SOME WAY? WE'VE MADE THE CONTRIBUTION,
16:13:38 HAVING BEEN ASKED TO BY THE GOVERNMENT TO A FUND WHICH WILL
16:13:43 BE PART OF THE FUNDING FOR THAT ISSUE.
16:13:46 DO YOU THINK 100 MILLION IS ADEQUATE AND YOU'VE BEEN IN THE
16:13:49 OIL BUSINESS FOR QUITE A WHILE. THOSE ARE GOOD-PAYING JOBS,
16:13:53 THAT'S WHY WE WANT TO KEEP THEM, BUT DO YOU THINK THAT
16:14:00 CONTRIBUTION IS ADEQUATE? POOH WE'VE MADE A CONTRIBUTION
16:14:04 AND SET ASIDE $20 BILLION FOR CLAIMS.
16:14:08 I'M CONCERNED ALSO WITH THEM. MRS. RASHTO AND MRS. KEMP MET
16:14:15 THE OTHER DAY, VERY BRAVE WOMEN ESPECIALLY SO SOON AFTER THE
16:14:19 DEATHS OF THEIR SPOUSES, AND, YOU KNOW, AFTER HEARING MISS
16:14:27 RASHTO AND MISS KEMP, I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MAYBE YOUR
16:14:32 RESPONSE. MISS RASHTO'S HUSBAND TOLD HER
16:14:34 ABOUT THE PROBLEMS ON THE RIG AND THAT THE WELL WAS LOSING A
16:14:37 LOT OF MUD. THAT'S A DETAIL THAT MAY NOT
16:14:40 HAVE COME OUT OR COME TO YOUR ATTENTION, BUT IS WELL KNOWN
16:14:44 AMONG THE WORKERS ON THE RIGS THAT IS A SIGN OF THE PROBLEM.
16:14:47 SHE WANTS TO KNOW AND SHE ASKED US A QUESTION AT THE HEARING IS,
16:14:53 WHY YOUR COMPANY WASN'T WORKING HARDER TO FIX THE PROBLEMS ON
16:14:57 THE WEEK IN THE WEEKS BEFORE IT EXPLODED.
16:14:59 WHY WASN'T YOUR COMPANY PREPARED FOR A BLOWOUT?
16:15:03 I THINK, AS I'VE SAID ALL ALONG TODAY.
16:15:06 WE WANT TO UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED SUCH THAT WE CAN
16:15:10 TAKE THE RIGHT ACTIONS GOING FORWARD, AND I'M NOT AWARE OF
16:15:16 THAT THAT THE -- WHAT YOU JUST RAISED, BUT THE INVESTIGATION
16:15:22 WILL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE MULTIPLE INVESTIGATIONS --
16:15:26 THE INVESTIGATION, EXCUSE ME. THE INVESTIGATIONS ARE NOT GOING
16:15:30 TO BRING BACK THOSE 11 MEN TO THEIR KIDS.
16:15:37 NOT ONLY WERE THESE WOMEN CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR COMPANY'S
16:15:41 PREPAREDNESS. THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR
16:15:43 COMPANY'S VALUES. THEY WANTED RIGS TO BE KEPT SAFE
16:15:46 AND THEY WERE TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR NOT
16:15:49 PROTECTIONING YOUR HUSBAND. MRS. KEMP ASKED WHY MONEY IS
16:15:51 MORE IMPORTANT THAN SOMEONE'S LIFE AND SO I GUESS ON BEHALF OF
16:15:55 MISS KEMP, HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THAT?
16:15:58 IT ISN'T. IT ABSOLUTELY IS NOT.
16:16:01 AS I HAVE MADE CLEAR SINCE I'VE BEEN IN THIS ROLE, IT'S
16:16:04 SOMETHING I'VE BELIEVED IN FOR A VERY LONG TIME AND PRIORITY FOR
16:16:09 EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THESE OPERATIONS IS SAFETY.
16:16:13 THAT DOESN'T COME BEFORE ANYTHING, NOT ANYTHING.
16:16:19 IT'S SOMETHING THEY BELIEVE IN PERSONALLY AND VERY
16:16:22 PASSIONATELY. THE WOMEN TALKED ABOUT IN THEIR
16:16:24 TESTIMONY -- I'M SORRY. I'VE GONE OVER MY TIME.
16:16:26 FINISH YOUR QUESTION. YES, SIR.
16:16:28 THE WOMEN TALKED ABOUT IN THEIR TESTIMONY THAT THEIR HUSBANDS
16:16:34 WORKED FOR THE DRILLING RIG COMPANY FOR TRANSOCEAN AND THAT
16:16:38 THEY PUSHED SAFETY, THEY PUSHED SAFETY, THEY PUSHED SAFETY, BUT
16:16:44 IN DISCUSSIONS IN WEEKS PRIOR TO THE EXPLOSION THEIR HUSBANDS
16:16:51 TALKED ABOUT BP WAVING AND SAYING KEEP GOING, KEEP DOING.
16:16:58 I MEAN, I'VE HEARD GROWING UP IN SOUTH LOUISIANA ABOUT THE
16:17:06 TWO-PUSH OR THE WILL DRILL INFORMANT AND COMPANY GUYS
16:17:09 GETTING INTO FISTFIGHTS. WAS THERE ANY INCIDENTS TO YOUR
16:17:13 KNOWLEDGE OR HAVE YOU DISCOVERED THAT THERE WAS A DIRECT ORDER
16:17:17 GIVE KNOW BY BP THAT SAYS KEEP GOING.
16:17:21 I DON'T CARE WHAT'S GOING WRONG? I HAVE NOT SEEN ANY EVIDENCE
16:17:24 OF THAT WHATSOEVER, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE OPERATION ON
16:17:29 THE RIG IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT AND IN THAT DAY
16:17:36 WAS CARRIED OUT BECAUSE EVERYONE AGREED ON THE RIG TO MOVE
16:17:40 FORWARD. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
16:17:43 THANK YOU. MR. CASTER FOR QUESTIONS,
16:17:44 PLEASE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
16:17:49 MR. HAYWARD, I WOULD LIKE TO START OUT BY EXPRESSING THE
16:17:53 ANGER AND FRUSTRATION OF THE HARD-WORKING PEOPLE OF MY HOME
16:17:58 STATE OF FLORIDA AT THE CATASTROPHE B PERK HAS RENDERED
16:18:03 UPON OUR STATE AND ALL OF THE SMALL BUSINESSES, THE FISHERMEN
16:18:07 AND THE MOM AND POP HOTEL OWNERS.
16:18:11 YOU KNOW, WE WERE JUST COMING OUT OF THE MOST SEVERE RECESSION
16:18:14 IN OUR LIFETIME THAT HAPPENED IN 2007.
16:18:16 THINGS WERE GETTING A LOT BETTER.
16:18:18 SO THIS IS LIKE A SUCKER PUNCH TO THE GUT TO LEARN THAT TRAGEDY
16:18:25 IS A RESULT OF BP ELEVATING PROFITS, CONSIDERATIONS OVER
16:18:35 SAFETY. FOR A DECADE, MANY IN FLORIDA
16:18:37 HAVE OPPOSED THIS DRUMBEAT TO BRING THE OIL RIGS CLOSER TO OUR
16:18:41 BEACHES. OVER TIME WE HAVEN'T
16:18:44 INDUSTRIALIZED OUR COASTLINE LIKE OTHER STATES.
16:18:46 WE RELY ON TOURISM AND CLEAN BEACHES AND CLEAN WATER AND WE
16:18:52 REALLY FOUGHT IT OFF, EVEN IN THE FACE OF VERY WELL-PAID
16:18:56 LOBBYING CAMPAIGNS AND AD CAMPAIGNS WITH REPRESENTATIONS
16:19:03 THAT THIS IS SAFE. THIS IS SAFE TECHNOLOGY, WHETHER
16:19:06 IT'S IN DEEP WATER OR IN SHALLOW WATER.
16:19:09 SO MR. HAYWARD, I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND HOW BP EITHER WAS SO
16:19:13 UNPREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A BLOWOUT, OR IGNORED THE
16:19:18 RISKS BECAUSE ACCORDING TO THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
16:19:22 STUDY CONDUCTED IN 2007, 126 BLOWOUTS HAVE OCCURRED AT
16:19:28 OFFSHORE DRILLING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF IN
16:19:37 1971. IT CREATED A DISASTER THAT
16:19:39 FLOWED CONTINUOUSLY FOR 290 DAYS.
16:19:43 MR. HAYWARD, YOU'VE SAID THAT THE CHANCES OF A BLOWOUT AND
16:19:47 EXPLOSION LIKE THE ONE THAT SANK THE DEEPWATER HORIZON RIG WERE
16:19:52 ONE IN A MILLION, BUT OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN
16:19:56 126 BLOWOUTS IN THE U.S. WATERS ALONE.
16:20:00 THAT'S ROUGHLY THREE BLOWOUTS PER YEAR.
16:20:03 HOW -- HOW COULD AN AVERAGE OF THREE BLOWOUTS EVERY SINGLE YEAR
16:20:07 FOR THE PAST 40 YEARS NOT HAVE REGISTERED AS MORE THAN ONE IN A
16:20:13 MILLION CHANCE RISK FOR YOUR COMPANY?
16:20:16 WITH RESPECT, CONGRESSMAN, I THINK WHAT I SAID WAS THE
16:20:21 INTEGRITY RATING OF THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER WAS OF THE ORDER OF 10
16:20:26 TO THE MINUS 5 AND 10 TO THE MINUS 6.
16:20:28 THAT IS TO SAY THAT IT WAS DESIGNED TO FAIL BETWEEN 1 IN
16:20:35 100,000 AND ONE IN A MILLION TIMES.
16:20:37 AND THAT'S AN ACCEPTABLE RISK?
16:20:39 IT IS THE RISK THAT BP AND THE INDUSTRY MORE BROADLY USE TO
16:20:47 ASSESS THE FAIL SAFE MECHANISM CALLED THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER.
16:20:51 I KNOW YOU RELY ON THE BLOOE BLOWOUT PREVENTERS AND YOU SAY
16:20:56 THEY'RE FAIL SAFE, BUT THEY'RE NOT FAIL SAFE AT ALL IN WHAT
16:21:00 WE'VE DISCOVERED THROUGH THE COMMITTEE'S EXAMINATION AND THE
16:21:04 STATISTICS HERE. THIS COMMITTEE HAS REVIEWED THE
16:21:07 OIL RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE GULF OF MEXICO AND NOT ONE TIME IN
16:21:11 THE 582-PAGE PLAN DOES BP LAY OUT A METHOD TO REPLACE THE
16:21:18 GUSHER AFTER A BLOWOUT HAS OCCURRED AND YOUR COMPANY
16:21:22 CONDUCTED A PLANNING AFTER A SUBSEA BLOWOUT WASN'T EVEN A
16:21:27 POSSIBILITY. IN A RECENT INTERVIEW IN "THE
16:21:31 FINANCIAL TIMES," YOU ADMITTED THAT WE DID NOT HAVE THE TOOLS
16:21:37 YOU'D WANT IN A TOOL KIT. MY SIMPLE QUESTION IS WHY NOT?
16:21:42 WHY WEREN'T YOU PREPARED? WHY DID YOU ELEVATE PROFITS OVER
16:21:46 SAFETY? I DON'T BELIEVE WE ELEVATED
16:21:48 PROFITS OVER SAFETY. WHAT I WAS REFERRING TO IN THAT
16:21:51 ARTICLE WAS A VERY COMPLICATED ENGINEERING PROBLEM WE WERE
16:21:56 FACED WITH AFTER THE RIG SANK AND ATTACHED TO ITS RISER.
16:22:00 WE HAD A WELL, A WISER AND THE RIG ON THE FLOOR AND WE DIDN'T
16:22:05 HAVE THE EQUIPMENT INSTANTLY AVAILABLE TO CUT THE RISER AND
16:22:08 TO CUT OFF THE TOP OF THE RISER AND FIND A WAY TO INTERVENE ON
16:22:13 THE WELL HEAD AND THAT IS INDEED TRUE.
16:22:15 MR. HAYWARD, FOR YEARS BIG OIL COMPANIES AND YOUR ALLIES
16:22:21 HAVE CLAIMED THAT DRILLING IS SAFE AND YOU WANT TO COME CLOSER
16:22:25 TO FLORIDA BEACHES AND YOU SAY IT'S SAFE, DEEPER AND SHALLOW
16:22:31 THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND WE'VE HEARD
16:22:34 OVER AND OVER AGAIN OVER THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS, OH, THIS
16:22:37 IS COMPLEX AND THIS IS DANGEROUS.
16:22:40 IT'S DANGEROUS TO DRILL MILES BELOW THE OCEAN AND BP OFFICIALS
16:22:43 HAVE SAID IT'S LIKE OPERATING IN OUTER SPACE AND GIVEN THE
16:22:51 DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLEXITIES IN WHAT YOU KNEW ABOUT THE RISKS, I
16:22:55 CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY YOU WOULD ASSUME THAT NOTHING COULD GO
16:22:58 WRONG. SO I'M -- THE DOUBLE SPEAK IS
16:23:03 RATHER TIRESOME. I'M DISMAY AND DISHEARTENED BY
16:23:08 WHAT HAS HAPPENED, AND THE ELEVATION OF PROFITS OVER
16:23:10 SAFETY, AND I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THIS DISASTER WILL MOTIVATE US
16:23:16 TO REASSESS OUR PRIORITIES AND IMPLEMENT A CLEAN ENERGY POLICY
16:23:20 FOR THIS COUNTRY. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
16:23:24 THAT CONCLUDES QUESTIONS FROM EVERYBODY OF THE COMMITTEE.
16:23:27 THERE'S A FEW MORE QUESTIONS. THERE ARE A COUPLE OF MEMBERS
16:23:32 THAT HAVE A COUPLE OF FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS SO WE'LL GO A QUICK
16:23:35 SECOND ROUND, IF WE MAY. CHAIRMAN WAXMAN, IF YOU WOULD
16:23:38 LIKE TO BEGIN? THANK YOU VERY MUCH, MR.
16:23:43 CHAIRMAN. MR. HAYWARD, YOU SAID YOUR
16:23:44 PRIORITY AND YOUR TOP FOCUS IS ON SAFETY AND YOU FEEL VERY
16:23:47 PASSIONATE ABOUT IT, EXCEPT FOR YOUR STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT, I
16:23:51 SEE AS YOU'VE SAID OVER AND OVER AGAIN TODAY, NO EVIDENCE OF
16:23:58 THAT. THE YOU AND OTHER SENIOR
16:24:04 OFFICIALS SEEMED OBLIVIOUS TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON RIG.
16:24:07 YOU WEREN'T FOLLOWING THE PROGRESS OF THE WELL AND YOU
16:24:10 WEREN'T AWARE OF THE RISKS BEING TAKEN.
16:24:13 IN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS YOU SAID THAT YOUR TOP OFFICIALS UNDER
16:24:20 YOU, MR. ENGLISH AND MR. SUTTLES.
16:24:24 YOU WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY WOULD BE FOLLOWING THE
16:24:28 HAPPENINGS ON THE RIG, BUT YOU WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THEY'D
16:24:31 BEEN FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DRILLING RIG.
16:24:34 SO WHO WAS FOLLOWING THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DRILLING RIG?
16:24:37 YOU SAID THERE WERE PEOPLE THERE WHO WERE THE EXPERTS IN THEIR
16:24:42 FIELD. I -- I JUST FIND IT SHOCKING
16:24:48 THAT WHEN THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF A MISTAKE ON A
16:24:51 DEEP WATER RIG ARE SO ENORMOUS AND YOU HAVE SUCH A HIGH,
16:24:57 PASSIONATE COMMITMENT TO SAFETY THAT YOU SEEM SO REMOVED, I
16:25:00 THINK OPERATING A DEEP WATER ENVIRONMENT IS LIKE OPERATING IN
16:25:04 OUTER SPACE AND YET YOU SEEM TO THINK THAT ALL IS GOING TO BE
16:25:08 TAKEN CARE OF IN TIME. NOW YOU SAID THERE'S A TEAM, THE
16:25:15 BEST MINDS IN THE WORLD LOOKING ON HOW TO STOP THE OIL SPILL.
16:25:18 WHERE ARE THE BEST MINDS IN YOUR COMPANY PAYING ATTENTION BEFORE
16:25:24 THE SPILL? YOU WERE OBLIVIOUS AND SO WERE
16:25:26 OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THIS WAS A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE IN
16:25:31 MANAGEMENT. LET ME ASK YOU THAT.
16:25:32 DO YOU THINK THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE IN
16:25:34 MANAGEMENT NOT TO KNOW IN. I THINK, AS I'VE SAID.
16:25:40 WE MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT THE FOCUS THE COMPANY IS ON SAFETY.
16:25:43 WHAT MANAGEMENT CAN DO IS ENSURE THAT THE RIGHT PEOPLE WITH THE
16:25:46 RIGHT SKILLS ARE IN PLACE. THE RIGHT SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES
16:25:50 ARE IN PLACE AND THE RIGHT PRIORITIES ARE IN PLACE AND THE
16:25:54 RIGHT INVESTMENT IS AVAILABLE TO ENSURE THAT THE PLANT THAT WE
16:25:58 ARE OPERATING HAS INTEGRITY. SO YOU FELT CONFIDENT THAT
16:26:03 THE PEOPLE THAT WERE MAKING THESE DECISIONS AND WE WENT
16:26:06 THROUGH FIVE IN OUR LETTER TO YOU AND MANY MEMBERS ASKED YOU
16:26:09 ABOUT THESE DECISIONS THAT THE RIGHT PEOPLE WERE MAKING THOSE
16:26:12 DECISIONS? I BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHT
16:26:13 PEOPLE WERE MAKING THOSE DECISIONS.
16:26:15 AND YOU HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY DIDN'T MAKE THE RIGHT
16:26:17 DECISION. THAT SEEMS TO BE YOUR POSITION
16:26:20 TODAY. IS THAT RIGHT? INVESTIGATION IT'S PREMATURE TO
16:26:24 DRAW CONCLUSIONS TO WHAT WAS AND WAS NOT THE RIGHT DECISION.
16:26:28 OKAY. IT'S PREMATURE.
16:26:31 WHAT INVESTIGATION OR INVESTIGATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE
16:26:32 TO DETERMINE THESE FACTS? THERE IS THE BP
16:26:36 INVESTIGATION, THERE'S A MARINE BOARD INVESTIGATION AND THE
16:26:40 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION. AND ARE YOU GOING TO BE
16:26:43 COOPERATING WITH ALL OF THEM? WE ARE, AS WE HAVE, MR.
16:26:46 CHAIRMAN, COOPERATED WITH YOUR COMMITTEE.
16:26:48 WELL, I QUESTION HOW COOPERATIVE YOU'VE BEEN WITH OUR
16:26:51 COMMITTEE BECAUSE I'VE HEARD VERY LITTLE ANSWERS TO THE
16:26:54 QUESTIONS FROM YOU TODAY TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY OUR
16:27:03 C COLLEAGUES.
16:27:04 WHEN YOU WERE ASKED WHETHER BP MADE A WELL DESIGN, YOU SAID YOU
16:27:06 HAVEN'T REACHED A CONCLUSION YET.
16:27:09 WHEN MR. DINGLE ASKED WHETHER COSTS WERE A FACTOR, YOU SAID
16:27:12 YOU DIDN'T KNOW BECAUSE YOU WEREN'T THERE AND MR. DOYLE
16:27:14 ASKED YOU WHO MADE THE WELL DESIGN DECISIONS, YOU SAID YOU
16:27:18 DIDN'T KNOW. OUR COMMITTEE IS DOING AN
16:27:21 INVESTIGATION. NOW THE REASON WE'RE DOING AN
16:27:23 INVESTIGATION IS WE WANT TO KNOW HOW THIS HAPPENED SO THAT WE CAN
16:27:28 MAKE CHANGES IN THE LAW AND THE PROCEDURES IF WE'RE GOING TO
16:27:32 ALLOW FURTHER DRILLING. DON'T YOU THINK YOU OUGHT TO BE
16:27:36 MORE FORTHCOMING WITH US? WE WILL BE AS FORTHCOMING AS
16:27:39 WE CAN BE, MR. CHAIRMAN. GIVE ME THE TIME HORIZON FOR
16:27:42 YOUR INVESTIGATION. WHEN WILL YOU HAVE THAT
16:27:45 COMPLETED? YOU'VE HAD 60 DAYS TO DO IT.
16:27:48 IS IT GOING ON NOW? IT'S ONGOING AND WE WANT TO
16:27:50 HAVE ACCESS TO ALL OF THE EVIDENCE BEFORE WE MAKE FINAL
16:27:56 DETERMINATIONS, BUT AS WE HAVE MADE VERY CLEAR.
16:27:59 GIVE ME AN ESTIMATE TO WHEN THAT WILL BE CONCLUDED.
16:28:01 ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THIS IS THE BLOWOUT
16:28:06 PREVENTER. IT RERE MAINS ON THE SEA BED AND
16:28:08 IT NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED. SO WE'LL PUT THAT ASIDE.
16:28:12 HOW ABOUT THE OTHER DECISIONS BEFORE THE EXPLOSION ABOUT THE
16:28:16 CASING? ABOUT THE CENTERING OF THE WELL?
16:28:18 ABOUT ALL OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED?
16:28:22 HAVE YOU REEZ GOOD TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS THAT YOU COULD SHARE
16:28:25 WITH US? AS WE SHARED WITH YOU
16:28:29 RECENTLY, WE'VE IDENTIFIED SEVEN AREAS, AREAS OF FOCUS IN OUR
16:28:35 INVESTIGATION AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO SHARE OUR
16:28:39 UNDERSTANDING AND OUR THINKING WITH YOU AS THAT DEVELOPS.
16:28:41 MR. HENSLEY ASKED YOU IF THERE WAS ANY ACTION THAT
16:28:47 APPEARED -- IF THERE WAS ANY ACTION TO SAVE MONEY AND YOU
16:28:51 SAID THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT.
16:28:53 I CAN'T BELIEVE YOU SAID THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT.
16:28:57 THERE'S EVIDENCE YOU WANT TO KNOW MORE ABOUT IT, BUT THERE'S
16:29:00 CERTAINLY EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT, ISN'T THERE?
16:29:04 THE DECISION THAT WAS TAKEN BY THE PEOPLE AT THE TIME, AND
16:29:10 SOME OF THEM IN -- SITTING HERE TODAY APPEAR THEY MAY HAVE BEEN,
16:29:16 BUT IT'S NOT CLEAR. WELL EVIDENCE IS NOT
16:29:20 CONCLUSIVE, BUT THERE'S EVIDENCE.
16:29:22 THE DECISION, FOR EXAMPLE, TO RUN A LONG STRING VERSUS A LINER
16:29:29 WAS, AS IT SHOWS IN THE DOCUMENT THAT YOU HIGHLIGHTED TO ME, A
16:29:34 DECISION TO DO WITH THE LONG-TERM INTEGRITY OF THE WELL.
16:29:39 THERE'S EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE MAY POINT IN A CERTAIN
16:29:44 DIRECTION. THERE MAY BE EVIDENCE THAT
16:29:48 POINTS IN ANOTHER DIRECTION. YOU REACH A CONCLUSION BASED ON
16:29:53 THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE.
16:29:55 THAT'S NOT TO SAY THERE ISN'T EVIDENCE WHEN WE HAVE THE CLEAR
16:29:58 EXAMPLES. LET ME ASK YOU THIS.
16:30:00 YOU CAN'T GIVE US A TIME FOR WHEN THIS INVESTIGATION IS GOING
16:30:03 TO BE COMPLETE SO WE'RE RELYING ON YOU TO DO YOUR OWN
16:30:09 INVESTIGATION. WHY SHOULD WE RELY ON YOU TO DO
16:30:11 YOUR OWN INVESTIGATION? I DON'T THINK YOU HAVE A
16:30:13 TERRIFIC RECORD OF RELIABILITY THAT SHOULD GIVE US COMFORT TO
16:30:16 HAVE US STEP BACK AND JUST WAIT TO GET ANSWERS FROM YOU UNTIL
16:30:21 YOU'VE DONE YOUR OWN INVESTIGATION.
16:30:23 WHY SHOULD WE RELY ON THAT IN. WE'RE CLEARLY NOT THE ONLY
16:30:26 PEOPLE DOING AN INVESTIGATION? THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE DOING
16:30:29 INVESTIGATIONS. ALL I HAVE COMMIT SIDE THAT OUR
16:30:32 INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS WE WILL SHARE WITH YOU ALL OF OUR
16:30:37 FINDINGS AND ALL OF THE DATA AND ALL OF THE INFORMATION.
16:30:39 WELL, LET ME JUST SAY IN CONCLUSION, WE DELAYED THIS
16:30:43 HEARING TODAY SO YOU COULD BE PREPARED TO ANSWER OUR
16:30:47 QUESTIONS. WE SENT YOU OUR QUESTIONS IN
16:30:50 ADVANCE. YOU'VE CONSISTENTLY DUCKED AND
16:30:53 EVADED OUR QUESTIONS. THERE MUST BE SOME REASON THAT
16:30:56 YOU THINK THIS APPROACH MAKES SENSE AND YOUR E VAGSZ WILL MAKE
16:30:59 OUR JOB MORE DIFFICULT AND IT WILL IMPEDE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF
16:31:01 WHAT WENT WRONG AND WILL MAKE IT HARDER IT DRAFT APPROPRIATE
16:31:05 REFORMS. I THINK THAT'S REGRETTABLE AND
16:31:08 AN UNFORTUNATE REPORT FOR YOU TO TAKE ON THE COMMITTEE OF THE
16:31:12 UNITED STATES' CONGRESS AND I LOOK FORWARD TO SEE WHEN YOU
16:31:14 COME UP WITH, BUT WE'LL GET EVIDENCE, AND I WOULD LIKE YOU
16:31:18 TO SUBMIT FOR THE RECORD THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO
16:31:21 MADE THOSE DECISION IN EACH OF THE AREAS THAT WERE UNDER
16:31:24 DISCUSSION IN THE LETTER WE SENT YOU.
16:31:26 WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO DO THAT? WE'LL MAKE THAT AVAILABLE TO
16:31:29 YOU. THANK YOU.
16:31:30 AS WE HAVE MADE EVERYTHING TO MY KNOWLEDGE, AVAILABLE TO YOU.
16:31:35 AND MAYBE THEY'LL HAVE SOME ANSWERS THEY COULD SHARE WITH
16:31:38 US. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
16:31:39 THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. BARTON FOR QUESTIONS?
16:31:44 THANK YOU, CHAIRMAN STUPAK. WE'RE ABOUT TO FINISH UP THIS
16:31:49 HEARING. WE DOPPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE
16:31:57 IN LISTENING TO THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE.
16:31:59 WHAT ONE OR TWO RECOMMENDATIONS ARE YOU PREPARED TO GIVE ABOUT
16:32:03 WHAT WE COULD DO TO PREVENT A FUTURE ACCIDENT OF THIS TYPE NOW
16:32:08 THAT YOU KNOW WHAT YOU KNOW AND YOU'VE LISTENED TO WHAT THE
16:32:11 CONGRESS KNOWS HERE TODAY. ARE THERE ONE OR TWO THINGS THAT
16:32:16 YOU WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST FOR CONSIDERATION TO PREVENT AN
16:32:19 ACCIDENT OF THIS TYPE FROM HAPPENING IN THE FUTURE?
16:32:23 I BELIEVE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE IS TO TAKE THE
16:32:29 FAIL SAFE MECHANISM CALLED THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER AND DESIGN IT
16:32:33 SO THAT IT'S GENUINELY FAIL SAFE.
16:32:35 THE REALITY IN ALL INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS IS THAT THEY ARE
16:32:39 ALWAYS A COMBINATION OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE AND HUMAN
16:32:44 JUDGMENT AND THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO HAVE IN PLACE A
16:32:47 SYSTEM THAT IS GENUINELY FAIL SAFE AND IT IS CLEAR, BASED ON
16:32:54 OUR EXPERIENCE OF THIS ACCIDENT THAT THE CURRENT DESIGN BASIS OF
16:33:01 THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER BEING USED IN THE DEEP WATER, NOT JUST IN
16:33:04 THIS CASE, BUT ACROSS THE WORLD IS NOT AS FAIL SAFE AS WE
16:33:08 BELIEVED IT TO BE, AND I BELIEVE THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT LESSON
16:33:12 THAT THE INDUSTRY NEEDS TO GRASP ALONG WITH THE RELEVANT
16:33:16 REGULATORY AGENCIES. MUCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE
16:33:23 COMPLEXITY AND THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH DRILLING THESE
16:33:28 DEEP WELLS. WOULD YOU CARE TO -- I'VE ASKED
16:33:32 SOME OF YOUR SUBORDINATES TO GIVE US SOME SORT OF ASSESSMENT
16:33:37 OF THE POTENTIAL SIZE OF THIS PARTICULAR FIELD OF THIS
16:33:42 PARTICULAR WELL. I'VE ASKED THE TEXAS RAILROAD
16:33:45 COMMISSION AND THE TEXAS U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY WHAT THE
16:33:50 LARGEST ONSHORE OIL WELL IN TEXAS IN ITS HISTORY OF OVER 100
16:33:55 YEARS HAS BEEN, AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INITIAL
16:34:03 DISCOVERY OF SPINDLE TOP IN 1901 WE CAN'T FIND THE ONSHORE TEXAS
16:34:08 WHICH HAS BEEN THE NUMBER ONE OIL-PRODUCING STATE IN THE
16:34:11 COUNTRY FOR OVER 100 YEARS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW YEARS IN
16:34:15 ALASKA AT PRUDHOE BAY AT ITS PEAK, THAT FLOWED AT 50,000
16:34:22 BARRELS A DAY, AND THE LATEST ESTIMATES ARE THAT THIS WELL IN
16:34:29 THIS CONDITION COULD BE FLOWING AS MUCH AS 50,000 BARRELS A DAY.
16:34:32 IF YOU EXTRAPOLATE THAT ON AN ANNUAL BASIS, THAT -- THAT'S
16:34:39 OVER 1100 MILLION BARRELS OF OIL A YEAR.
16:34:43 SO COULD YOU GIVE US SOME ASSESSMENT OF WHY BP AND OTHER
16:34:48 COMPANIES GO TO SUCH EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES TO DRILL
16:34:51 IN THESE AREAS? WHAT IS IT THAT YOU THINK YOU
16:34:55 FOUND OR WERE HOPING TO FIND BENEATH THE GULF OF MEXICO?
16:34:58 IN THE INSTANCE OF THIS WELL, WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCOVERY
16:35:06 WAS OF THE ORDER OF 50 MILLION BARRELS.
16:35:09 50 MILLION? 50 MILLION BARRELS.
16:35:11 THAT'S THE ESTIMATE OF THE DISCOVERY OF THE SIZE OF THE
16:35:14 DISCOVERY THAT THIS WELL MADE. SO IF YOU -- AT THE RATE IT'S
16:35:18 FLOWING IT OUGHT TO PETER OUT FAIRLY QUICKLY.
16:35:24 50,000 BARRELS A DAY IS 50,000 BARRELS A WEEK WHICH IS 3.5
16:35:29 MILLION IN TEN WEEKS WHICH IS 35 MILLION IN 100 WEEKS.
16:35:37 SO IT -- -- IT WOULD -- I WAS TOLD IT WAS ON THE ORDER OR
16:35:42 MAGNITUDE THAT IT WAS 500 MILLION BARRELS.
16:35:45 THAT'S NOT CORRECT, CONGRESSMAN.
16:35:47 THIS IS A DISCOVERY BASED ON THE CLEARLY ON THE WELL AND THE
16:35:52 SEISMIC INFORMATION WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO US.
16:35:55 IT'S JUST THAT THE EXTREME PRESSURE.
16:35:58 IT COULDN'T FLOW AT THIS RATE IN FULL PRODUCTION.
16:36:02 IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT? THAT'S CORRECT.
16:36:05 WOULD YOU CARE TO TELL US WHAT IT WOULD FLOW AT?
16:36:08 WHAT YOU WOULD HAVE EXPECTED IT TO FLOW AT PER DAY?
16:36:10 I THINK AS A PRODUCING WELL, PROPERLY COMPLETED WIELD EXPECT
16:36:17 IT TO BE PERHAPS BETWEEN 15 AND 25,000 BARRELS PER DAY.
16:36:21 OKAY. AND LASTLY, WITH THE MORATORIUM
16:36:26 THAT'S CURRENTLY IN EXISTENCE IN THE GULF OF MEXICO FROM THE DEEP
16:36:31 AREAS OF THE SIX-MONTH MORATORIUM, I KNOW YOU HAD TO DO
16:36:36 EVERYTHING, AND WE WANT YOU TO STOP THIS SPILL AND CLEAN IT UP,
16:36:40 BUT THERE ARE OTHER AREAS THAT COULD BE EXPLORED.
16:36:45 WHAT OTHER AREAS MIGHT BP GO TO INSTEAD OF IN THE GULF OF
16:36:50 MEXICO? WELL, WE HAVE DEEP WATER
16:36:56 DRILLING EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OPERATIONS IN A LARGE
16:36:59 NUMBER OF LOCATIONS AROUND THE WORLD, IN WEST AFRICA, BRAZIL,
16:37:05 EGYPT, TO NAME THE THREE AS WELL AS THE UK AND THE NORTH SEA.
16:37:10 SO YOU WOULD -- YOU WOULD FOCUS ON THOSE AREAS IF THIS
16:37:13 MORATORIUM CONTINUES? WE ARE FOCUSED TODAY ON THE
16:37:19 RELIEF WELL. I UNDERSTAND, AND YOU SHAB.
16:37:23 YOU BETTER BE. I HAVEN'T THOUGHT, FRANKLY,
16:37:26 BEYOND DEALING WITH THE RELIEF WELLS IN TERMS OF THEIR ACTIVITY
16:37:30 IN THE GULF OF MEXICO. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
16:37:33 THANK YOU, MR. MARTIN. MR. HAYWARD, THE LINE OF
16:37:38 QUESTIONING THROUGHOUT THE DAY YOU REFERRED TO THE BLOWOUT
16:37:41 PREVENTER. MR. GONZALEZ WHEN HE ASKED YOU
16:37:43 QUESTIONS AND MR. BARTON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ON THERE, BACK ON
16:37:46 JUNE 4th YOU WROTE AN EDITORIAL TO "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL"
16:37:52 PERTAINING TO THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER.
16:37:54 YOU STATED WE IN THE INDUSTRY HAVE HAD GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE
16:37:58 BLOWOUT PREVENTER AS THE FAIL SAFE PIECE OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT
16:38:03 ON THIS OCCASION IT FAILED WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES.
16:38:06 YOU STILL BELIEVE THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
16:38:09 THE ULTIMATE IN FAIL SAFE? I BELIEVE SO.
16:38:12 EITHER A BLOWOUT PREVENTER OR SOME SIMILAR MECHANISM.
16:38:16 WELL, I'M A LITTLE SURPRISED BY YOUR COMMENTS BECAUSE THE
16:38:19 COMMITTEE RECEIVED THE DOCUMENTS AND YOU HAVE THE DOCUMENT FINDER
16:38:22 RIGHT THERE AND YOU MAY WANT TO REFER TO IT THAT EVALUATED THE
16:38:26 BLOWOUT PREVENTER USED ON DEEP WATER HORIZON RIG.
16:38:30 THE DOCUMENT IS TABBED NUMBER 14 RIGHT THERE AND WE PUT IT UP ON
16:38:33 THE SCREEN. IN 2001, WHEN TRANSOCEAN BOUGHT
16:38:37 THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER, I WANT TO SHOW YOU THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
16:38:41 IN WHICH BP PARTICIPATED WITH IT IN THIS REVIEW, AND IT SAYS
16:38:48 ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS PERSONNEL IDENTIFIED 260 FAILURE
16:38:53 MODES. YOU SEE WHERE IT SAYS THAT
16:38:55 TOWARDS ABOUT THE TOP THIRD OF IT?
16:38:58 OKAY. SO BP ENGINEERS, YOUR
16:39:00 ENGINEERS HELPED TO IDENTIFY THE 260 FAILURE MODES SO HOW CAN YOU
16:39:04 WRITE AND HOW CAN YOU TAF, BUT HOW CAN YOU WRITE IN THE WALL
16:39:09 STREET JOURNAL THAT YOU THOUGHT IT WAS THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE
16:39:12 WHEN YOUR OWN ENGINEERS EXAMINED THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER FOUND 260
16:39:17 FAILURE MODES IN IT. HOW COULD YOU SAY IT'S THE
16:39:21 ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE? HAVEN'T SEEN THIS DOCUMENT
16:39:24 PREVIOUSLY. I APOLOGIZE FOR THAT, BUT I
16:39:26 HAVEN'T? NOW KNOWING THERE'S 260 FAIL
16:39:29 SAFE MODES IN THIS BLOWOUT PREVENTER THAT WAS ON DEEPWATER
16:39:33 HORIZON, IT NEVER WAS THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE, WAS IT?
16:39:35 THE BLOW OUT PREVENTER IS DESIGNED TOON THE ULTIMATE FAIL
16:39:38 SAFE, THAT IS ITS DESIGN BASES. IT'S THE BASIS ON WHICH THE
16:39:43 INDUSTRY HAS OPERATED FOR IN 30 YEARS IN DEEP WATER.
16:39:46 LET ME ASK YOU THIS, AS THE CEO, WHY THEN WOULD YOUR COMPANY
16:39:52 CHANGE THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER FAIL SAFE MEK METHODS OR
16:39:59 MECHANISM, FOR INSTANCE, WE FOUND OTHER THINGS THAT SHOWED
16:40:02 THAT THIS BLOW OUT PREVENTER WAS NOT FAIL SAFE UPON AT OUR FIRST
16:40:07 HEARING, MAY 12th I READ THAT THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER HAD BEEN
16:40:12 MODIFIED IN WAYS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND THAT IT
16:40:15 WOULD RPT WORK. ONE MOD IF I KAGD, FOR INSTANCE,
16:40:18 WAS TO REMOVE THE IMPORTANT VARIABLE RAM AND REPLACED IT
16:40:22 WITH THE TEST RAMP THAT MADE IT INEFFECTIVE IN CASE OF AN
16:40:26 EMERGENCY. AT OUR HEARING, I ASKED MR.
16:40:29 McKAY, THE PRESIDENT OF BP AMERICA ABOUT THESE MOD IF I
16:40:33 KAGDS. HE TESTIFIED UNDER OATH.
16:40:35 HE TOOK THE OATH ANY HE SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT MODIFICATIONS.
16:40:38 WE'VE SINCE LEARNED THAT BP APPROVED MOD IF I KAGDS DESPITE
16:40:42 BEING WARNED THAT IT WOULD REDUCE THE SAFETY OF THE BLOWOUT
16:40:46 PREVENTER. I WOULD LIKE TO DISPLAY IT AGAIN
16:40:48 AND THIS IS TAB NUMBER TEN RIGHT IN THE BOOK RIGHT THERE.
16:40:51 HERE'S A LETTER FROM 2004 FROM TRANSOCEAN SENT TO BP THAT BP
16:40:55 SIGNED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AND IT SAYS, BP ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE
16:41:00 CONVERSION AND THE CONVERSION YOU ASKED FOR, THE CONVERSION
16:41:03 WILL REDUCE THE BUILT-IN REDUNDANCY OF THE BOP THEREBY
16:41:08 POTENTIALLY UNCREASING THE CONTRACTOR'S RISK PROFILE.
16:41:12 SO -- WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? BP, THAT YOU REDUCE THE
16:41:18 BUILDOUT -- YOU REDUCE THE BUILT-IN REDUNDANCY TO INCREASE
16:41:23 YOUR RISK. YOU ASKED FOR MODIFICATIONS
16:41:26 WHICH LIMITED THE REDUNDANCY AND INCREASED YOUR RISK, RIGHT?
16:41:32 BP DID. AGAIN, I HAVEN'T SEEN THIS
16:41:33 DOCUMENT PREVIOUSLY. WHAT I DO KNOW THERE WERE
16:41:36 MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER.
16:41:39 IN PARTICULAR, A TEST BORE RAM WAS ADDED.
16:41:44 IT WAS NOT A SUBTRACTION. IT WAS AN ADDITION TO THE
16:41:47 BLOWOUT PREVENTER IS MY UNDERSTANDING.
16:41:50 HERE'S OUR PROBLEM. THIS IS THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE.
16:41:53 WE FIND OUT IT'S MODIFIED AND WE ASKED YOUR REPRESENTATIVE AND
16:41:57 MR. McKAY AND HE SAYS NO, NO. WE GET DOCUMENTS SHOWING BP
16:42:01 ASKED FOR IT. BP WAS WARNED THAT THE ULTIMATE
16:42:04 FAIL SAFE SYSTEM, THE WAY BP WANTED IT AND MODIFIED WILL
16:42:07 INCREASE THE RISK OF A PROBLEM, AND THAT'S THE ONE WE HAVE HERE
16:42:11 IN DEEPWATER HORIZON. SO HOW CAN WE WRITE AN
16:42:14 EDITORIAL? YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS
16:42:16 HERE. HOW CAN WE WRITE AN EDITORIAL
16:42:18 SAYING THIS IS THE ULTIMATE SYSTEM AND EVEN YOUR OWN
16:42:21 ENGINEERS SAY THERE ARE 260 DIFFERENT WAYS IT CAN FAIL AND
16:42:23 THEN YOU ADD MORE TO IT. GO AHEAD.
16:42:28 THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER IS DESIGNED TO BE THE FAIL SAFE
16:42:32 MECHANISM IN THE INDUSTRY. CORRECT.
16:42:34 THAT HAS BEEN THE CASE SINCE -- SINCE THE BLOWOUT
16:42:38 PREVENTERS WERE CREATED. BUT YOU'RE THE CEO AND YOU'VE
16:42:42 BEEN HEAD OF EXPLORATION AND DRILLING AND ALL THIS.
16:42:44 DOES IT MAKE SENSE TO YOU THAT THIS IS THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE
16:42:47 SYSTEM WHEN THERE ARE 260 DIFFERENT WAYS IT CAN GO WRONG,
16:42:51 PLUS YOUR COMPANY MODIFIES IT WHICH INCREASES THE RISK OF
16:42:55 THINGS GOING WRONG? THE FACT IS THAT IT IS THE
16:42:58 ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE MECHANISM. LET ME ASK YOU THIS.
16:43:01 IN NOVEMBER, OKAY, THIS WELL YOU STARTED DRILLING IT LAST FALL,
16:43:07 THE MACONDO WELL LAST FALL USING THE RIG.
16:43:11 IT WAS HARMED. IT WAS DAMAGED IN THE HURRICANE.
16:43:13 SO YOU REPLACED IT WITH DEEPWATER HORIZON.
16:43:16 IN NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR, TRANSOCEAN PULLED OUT THE
16:43:20 BLOWOUT PREVENTER FROM THE OCEAN FLOW BECAUSE ITS SHEAR RAMS
16:43:25 WEREN'T WORKING. THE LOWER AN YOU WILL AR WOULD
16:43:30 NOT CLOSE AND THE UPPER AN NEWELL AR WAS NOT IN A
16:43:36 WELL-CONTROLLED EVENT. WE KNOW BP WAS AWARE OF THIS
16:43:38 BECAUSE TRANSOCEAN AND IT'S DOCUMENT NUMBER 12 IN OUR BINDER
16:43:41 REFLECTS CONFERENCE CALLS ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WITH BP WITH THE
16:43:45 BLOWOUT PREVENTER. TRANSOCEAN ESTIMATES THAT THE
16:43:50 ESTIMATED IS A CONSERVATIVE TEN DAYS AT 444,111 PER DAY OR $4.4
16:44:00 MILLION AS IT'S SHOWN. SO HOW CAN YOU SAY BLOWOUT
16:44:04 PREVENTERS ARE FAIL SAFE DEVICES WHEN THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER THAT
16:44:07 YOU WERE USING IN NOVEMBER HAD TO BE REMOVED BECAUSE OF
16:44:11 MALFUNCTION? OF COURSE, THE ANSWER IS THEY
16:44:13 ARE THE FAIL SAFE MECHANISM AND WHEN PROBLEMS ARE IDENTIFIED
16:44:18 WITH THEM THEY'RE EXERCISED AND I BELIEVE THAT IS WHAT HAD TAKEN
16:44:22 PLACE. BUT, YOU KNOW -- YOU CAN'T
16:44:27 HAVE IT BOTH WAYS HERE. THIS ACCIDENT OCCURS.
16:44:30 YOU HAVE A BLOWOUT PREVENTER THAT YOU KNOW HAD 260 DIFFERENT
16:44:34 ERRORS IN IT AND YOU MODIFY IT AND YOU PULL IT IN NOVEMBER 2009
16:44:38 AND YOU SEE ALL KINDS OF PROBLEMS.
16:44:42 THIS HAPPENED HAPPENS. YOU WRITE THIS EDITORIAL IN THE
16:44:44 WALL STREET JOURNAL SAYING IT'S NOT OUR FAULT.
16:44:47 IT'S MECHANICAL. YOU SAID EARLIER AND THIS
16:44:49 ACCIDENT IS BECAUSE OF MECHANICAL FAILURE IN HUMAN
16:44:53 ERROR. IT SEEMS WE HAVE MORE HUMAN
16:44:55 ERROR THAN MECHANICAL BECAUSE THE MECHANICAL SAFEGUARD WASN'T
16:45:01 THE ULTIMATE FAIL SAFE. THEY CAN FAIL IN MANY WAYS AND
16:45:03 THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT WENT WRONG HERE AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT
16:45:07 HAPPENED ON THE 20th, CORRECT? WHAT IS CLEAR IS THE ULTIMATE
16:45:12 FAIL SAFE FAILED TO OPERATE IN THIS CASE.
16:45:14 THAT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. WHY WOULD A COMPANY LIKE BP
16:45:18 WHEN DOING THE DEEP WATER DRILLING MODIFY THE FAIL SAFE IF
16:45:21 IT'S SUPPOSED TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND OUR
16:45:24 ENVIRONMENT, WHY WOULD YOU MODIFY IT AND INCREASE THE RISK
16:45:27 OF PROBLEMS? YOU MODIFIED IT AND THE
16:45:31 CONTRACTOR WARNED YOU ABOUT MODIFYING IT AND YOU STILL DID
16:45:35 IT. THAT'S THE PROBLEM WE'RE HAVING.
16:45:36 AS I SAID, THE BLOWOUT PREVENTER IS THE FAIL SAFE
16:45:40 MECHANISM. IT'S DESIGNED TO BE EXACTLY
16:45:41 THAT. QUESTIONS, MR. BRIDGES?
16:45:47 THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. MR. HAYWARD, IT'S BEEN A LONG
16:45:50 DAY. YOU SAID EARLIER, IF I RECALL
16:45:54 CORRECTLY, THAT EVERYONE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION IN THE CULTURE OF
16:45:59 SAFETY WOULD NOT ONLY HAD THE RIGHT TO CURTAIL OPERATIONS, BUT
16:46:04 THE OBLIGATION IF THEY SAW SOMETHING GOING ON THAT WAS NOT
16:46:08 SAFE, IS THAT CORRECT? THAT'S CORRECT.
16:46:10 AND IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SIDE
16:46:15 AND I DON'T REMEMBER WHO ASKED IT, YOU ALSO MADE THE ASSERTION
16:46:18 THAT THE RIGHT PEOPLE WERE MAKING THE DECISIONS ON THE RIG.
16:46:22 DID I HEAR THAT CORRECTLY? BELIEVE THAT IS THE CASE.
16:46:24 WHO IS DONALD VEDRIN? HE'S THE -- HE'S THE WELL
16:46:31 SITE LEADER ON ONE -- ONE OF THE WELL SITE LEADERS ON THE
16:46:37 DEEPWATER HORIZON. HE WAS REFERRED TO IN A "WALL
16:46:41 STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE" AS THE COMPANY MAN ON THE DEEPWATER
16:46:46 HORIZON ON THE DAY OF THE BLOWOUT, CORRECT?
16:46:48 THAT'S CORRECT, YES. I DON'T KNOW IF YOU'RE
16:46:50 FAMILIAR WITH THE ARTICLE IN "THE WALL STREET JOURNAL" AND
16:46:54 THIS WAS MAY 27th, I BELIEVE, THEY TALKED ABOUT A SKIRMISH
16:46:57 BETWEEN SOME OF THE TRANSOCEAN FOLKS AND THE CHIEF ENGINEER OR
16:47:01 CHIEF MECHANIC ON THE DEEPWATER HORIZON AND THE RIG'S TOP
16:47:06 MANAGER, JIMMY HERALD, ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THAT DISCUSSION
16:47:11 THAT APPARENTLY WAS QUITE A HEATED DISCUSSION.
16:47:15 I THINK MR. GONZALEZES WAS ACTUALLY THE ONE THAT BROUGHT IT
16:47:18 UP. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING,
16:47:21 CONGRESSMAN, THAT THAT ACCOUNT HAS BEEN CONTRADICTED UNDER OATH
16:47:25 ON THE MARINE BOARD INVESTIGATION AND THAT THERE WAS
16:47:27 NO DEBATE OR SKIRMISH OR ANY OTHER HEATED DISCUSSION.
16:47:33 THAT IS WHAT I CAN'T RECALL EXACTLY WHO IT WAS, BUT UNDER
16:47:36 OATH, AT THE MARINE BOARD INVESTIGATION, I BELIEVE IT WAS
16:47:40 THE TRANSOCEAN THAT TESTIFIED THAT THERE WAS NO EITHER HEATED
16:47:44 DISCUSSION OR DEBATE OR ANYTHING ELSE.
16:47:47 THAT WOULD BE THE TOOL PUSHER?
16:47:49 I BELIEVE THAT'S THE CASE. IT WASN'T DEWEY RIVET BECAUSE
16:47:54 HE DIED IN THE ACCIDENT AND HE WAS ONE OF THE OTHER WITNESSES
16:47:58 TO THE ALTERCATION. WELL, YOU KNOW, IF THIS OCCURRED
16:48:05 EVEN IF IT ONLY PARTIALLY OCCURRED IT SEEMS THAT THERE WAS
16:48:09 ENOUGH DISCUSSION THAT SOMEONE SAID WAIT, LET'S NOT GO FORWARD
16:48:14 BECAUSE SOME OF OUR NUMBER FEEL IT'S UNSAFE AND AGAIN, YOU SAID
16:48:17 THAT THE MAN WOULD HAVE THE OBLIGATION, NOT JUST THE RIGHT
16:48:20 TO SAY LET'S HALT. HE'D HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO SAY,
16:48:24 WELL, LET'S GET EVERYONE ON THE SAME PAGE WITH THIS.
16:48:26 AM I WRONG TO ASSUME THAT? YOU ARE NOT WRONG, AND I
16:48:30 THINK YOU CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THEY ALL BELIEVE THAT IT WAS RIGHT TO
16:48:32 PROCEED. ARE WE EVER GOING TO GET A
16:48:35 CHANCE TO TALK TO MR. VEDRIN? WOULD BP MAKE HIM AVAILABLE TO
16:48:43 OUR COMMITTEE? IF YOU CALL HIM, OF COURSE.
16:48:46 LET ME ASK YOU ANOTHER QUESTION.
16:48:47 YOU SAID IN RESPONSE TO SOME INFORMATION THAT CAME UP THAT
16:48:50 THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT BP WAS FOCUSING ON THE COST OF
16:48:58 DRILLING AND MARCH 2010 STRATEGY PRESENTATION YOU STATED THAT WE
16:49:05 ADDED EXPLORATION RESOURCES EFFICIENTLY AND OUR COST WAS
16:49:08 $1.40 PER BARREL IN 2009. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR
16:49:11 TRACK RECORD OVER THE LAST FIVE YEARS OF HAVING THE LOWEST
16:49:15 DISCOVERY COSTS IN THE INDUSTRY. CERTAINLY THAT WOULD BE ENVIABLE
16:49:19 EXCEPT IN A CULTURE OF SAFETY, I MEAN, I MIGHT SPEND $1.45 OR
16:49:26 $1.47 INSTEAD OF THEIR 1.40 IF IT MEANT THAT IT WAS A SAFE
16:49:31 PROCEDURE. SO WAS MAINTAINING THE LOWEST
16:49:33 COST DISCOVERY IN THE INDUSTRY POSSIBLY A FACTOR IN THE
16:49:37 DECISION MAKING ON THIS WELL? NONE WHATSOEVER.
16:49:40 THAT METRIC IS CREATED BY DECIDING THE HOLLUMS OF BARRELS
16:49:48 DISCOVERED BY THE COST AND WHAT IT TALKS TO IS WHAT WE
16:49:55 DISCOVERED AND NOT ANYTHING TO DO WITH COSTS.
16:49:57 WELL, BUT IT DOES HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH COSTS.
16:50:01 IT'S BEEN REPORTED THAT COMPLETION OF THE MANCODO WELL
16:50:13 WAS RUNNING BEHIND SCHEDULE. IT WAS RUNNING BEHIND
16:50:14 SCHEDULE. HOW FAR BEHIND SCHEDULE?
16:50:16 I DON'T KNOW THE NUMBER. WHAT DOES IT COST?
16:50:19 PROBABLY $1 MILLION A DAY OR THERE ABOUTS.
16:50:24 EACH A COUPLE A DAY IS A COST DRIVER ON THAT $1.40 A BARREL
16:50:29 MINIMAL DISCOVERY COST IN THE INDUSTRY.
16:50:31 WITH RESPECT, CONGRESSMAN, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS
16:50:35 THAT ACTUALLY WE MADE A DISCOVERY AND WE WANTED TO
16:50:38 SECURE IT IN THE PROPER WAY AND THAT WAS GOING TO BE A FAR
16:50:41 BIGGER DRIVER OF ANYTHING, ANY VALUE THAT THE COMPANY IS GOING
16:50:45 TO CREATE THAN CREATE THAN THE COSTS OF THE OPERATION.
16:50:47 I DON'T DISAGREE -- I DON'T DISAGREE WITH THAT, BUT OH, HOW
16:50:51 I WISH THAT HAD BEEN THE CASE, AS WE'RE, HEARING AFTER HEARING
16:50:57 AND THE DARN THING IS STILL BUBBLING DOWN AT THE BOTTOM OF
16:51:00 THE GULF. THAT DOESN'T SEEM TO BE
16:51:02 ACCURATE. IS YOUR OWN INVESTIGATION
16:51:04 LOOKING AT THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT COST DRIVERS WERE AN
16:51:09 ISSUE IN THE PROBLEMS THAT WERE CREATED?
16:51:12 OUR INVESTIGATION IS COVERING EVERYTHING.
16:51:17 SO IT WASN'T ON YOUR LIST BUT NEVERTHELESS, IT WILL BE
16:51:20 INCLUDED IN YOUR -- WELL, MY LIST IS THE -- THE
16:51:26 EARLY FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION IN TERMS OF THE
16:51:29 KEY AREAS TO FOCUS ON. AREAS AROUND CEMENT, CASING,
16:51:40 INTEGRAL PROCEDURES. I GOT IT.
16:51:42 WHEN YOU SAID YOUR INVESTIGATION WAS PROCEEDING WITHOUT PRIVILEGE
16:51:45 EARLY ON IN THE HEARING TODAY IT WOULD ALSO COVER ISSUES OF
16:51:48 WHETHER OR NOT COST DRIVERS WERE AN ISSUE IN CREATING THE
16:51:51 PROBLEM? IT WILL COVER EVERYTHING.
16:51:54 THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I JUST ECHO WHAT MR. SCALISE
16:52:03 SAID EARLIER. PEOPLE HAVE CALL WITH IDEAS
16:52:06 THOUSAND FIX THE GULF. I WISH YOU'D OPEN UP AN 800
16:52:10 NUMBER AND TAKE THESE THINGS AND VENT THEM AND LISTEN TO WHAT
16:52:13 PEOPLE ARE SAYING. AMERICANS ARE TERRIBLY,
16:52:16 THEY'RE -- WE HAVE A LOT OF ENG N
16:52:24 INGENUITY AND PEOPLE ARE WATCHING, WHAT EVERYONE'S
16:52:27 COMMUTER SCREEN SHOWED, IT'S DRIVING PEOPLE CRAZY TO WATCH
16:52:30 THAT BUBBLING IN THE GULF. PEOPLE ARE COMING TO US WITH
16:52:33 SOLUTIONS IN RESPECT NEEDS TO BE A CENTRAL LOCATION.
16:52:36 I DON'T CARE WHETHER IT'S YOU, DR. CHU, BUT SOMEBODY NEEDS TO
16:52:40 BE VETTING THESE THINGS AND IF THERE IS A REASONABLE OUT THERE,
16:52:44 PUT IT TO WORK. THANK YOU.
16:52:47 MR. MARKEY FOR QUESTIONS. THANK YOU.
16:52:51 MR. HAYWARD, IS THE MOST OPTIMISTIC DAY FOR COMPLETION
16:52:55 STILL AUGUST? THAT IS CURRENT TIME TABLE.
16:52:58 IS AUGUST ALSO THE EARLIEST DATE THE LEAK CAN BE STOPPED?
16:53:02 OR WILL IT TAKE MORE TIME AFTER THE RELIEF WELL IS COMPLETE
16:53:06 BEFORE THE FLOW OF OIL IS PERMANENTLY HALTEDED?
16:53:09 THE RELIEF OIL WILL HALT PERMANENTLY THE FLOW.
16:53:14 MR. HAYWARD IN 2009, AND INDEPENDENT FIRM THAT BP HIRED
16:53:19 TO SERVE AS ITS OMBUDSMAN ED HEADED BY JUDGE STANLEY,
16:53:27 SUBSTANTIATED BP WAS VIOLATING ITS OWN POLICIES BY NOT HAVING
16:53:29 COMPLETED ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS ONBOARD ANOTHER BP RIG OPERATING
16:53:36 IN THE GULF OF MEXICO. THE BP ATLANTIS, WHEN IT BEGAN
16:53:42 OPERATING IN 2007. ONE BP OFFICIAL WARNED THAT THE
16:53:46 ABSENCE OF THE SAFETY DOCUMENTS COULD LEAD TO CATASTROPHIC
16:53:50 OPERATOR ERROR. LET ME READ TO YOU FROM AN
16:53:54 INTERNAL BP E-MAIL. AND THIS GOES FROM BARRY DUFF,
16:54:00 BP EMPLOYEE, TO OTHER ENGINEERS AT BP.
16:54:04 HERE WRAP HE SAID -- HE SAID, THE P AND IDs FOR SUB C
16:54:11 ARE NOT COMPLETE AND NOT APPROVED OR HANDED OBER TO
16:54:14 OPERATIONS. THE CURRENT PROCEDURES ARE OUT
16:54:17 OF DATE. THE RISK IN TURNING OVER
16:54:21 DRAWINGS TO THE PEOPLE OUT ON THE RIG RUNNING THE ATLANTIS
16:54:26 THAT ARE NOT COMPLETE ARE, NUMBER ONE, THE OPERATOR, THE BP
16:54:30 OPERATOR, WILL ASSUME THE DRAWINGS ARE ACCURATE AND
16:54:34 UP-TO-DATE. THIS COULD LEAD TO CATASTROPHIC
16:54:38 OPERATOR ERRORS DUE TO THEIR ASSUMING THE DRAWING IS CORRECT.
16:54:42 TURNING OVER INCOMPLETE DRAWINGS TO THE OPERATOR, THE BP R
16:54:45 OPERATOR, FOR THEIR USE IS A FUNDAMENTAL VIOLATION OF BASIC
16:54:52 DOCUMENT CONTROL. HAVING THE PROJECT DOCUMENT
16:54:55 CONTROL PERSON TURN OVER DRAWINGS THAT ARE NOT COMPLETE
16:54:59 PLACES THE ONUS ON HER, THAT THEY ARE THE MOST CURRENT
16:55:03 VERSION CURRENTLY THERE ARE HUNDREDS IF NOT THOUSANDS OF SUB
16:55:08 C DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NEVER BEEN FINALIZED, YET THE FACILITIES
16:55:14 HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER. MR. HAYWARD, BP'S MANAGING
16:55:20 ATTORNEY STATED TO THE ASSOCIATED PRESS ON MAY 15th OF
16:55:23 THIS YEAR THAT BP HAS REVIEWED THE ALLEGATIONS AND FOUND THEM
16:55:27 TO BE UNSUBSTANTIATED. MR. HAYWARD, WERE ALL OF THE
16:55:32 ENGINEERING DOCUMENTS AND DRAWINGS NECESSARY TO OPERATE
16:55:35 THE ATLANTIS RIG SAFELY AND FULLY COMPLETED BEFORE THE
16:55:42 ATLANTIS RIG BEGAN OPERATING IN THE GULF OF MEXICO?
16:55:44 WHEN THIS ISSUE EMERGED, WE CONDUCTED A FULL INVESTIGATION,
16:55:47 AND DETERMINED THAT ALL OF THE DRAWINGS THAT WERE NECESSARY TO
16:55:53 START UP THE OPERATION WERE AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE STARTING
16:55:57 UP THE OPERATION AT THE TIME THE OPERATION STARTED UP.
16:56:00 MR. HAYWARD, MR. DUFF WAS RELIEVED OF HIS DUTIES IN THE
16:56:06 MIDDLE OF AUGUST OF 2008. A NEW PERSON WAS PUT IN CHARGE
16:56:11 AS A RESULT. HIS NAME IS KEN ABBOTT.
16:56:15 KEN ABBOTT HAS BEEN TESTIFYING ALL DAY IN WASHINGTON ACROSS THE
16:56:18 STREET IN THE NATURAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE.
16:56:21 SHEA WHISTLE-BLOWER. HE GOT FIRED SIX MONTHS AFTER HE
16:56:29 REPLACED MR. DUFF BECAUSE HE RAISED THE VERY SAME CONCERNS,
16:56:32 THAT THERE WAS NOT PROPER DOCUMENTATION ON THE BP
16:56:35 ATLANTIS. HE WAS FIRED.
16:56:41 EVEN THOUGH HE RAISED ISSUES THAT OBVIOUSLY HAVE A LOT OF
16:56:46 RESEMBLANCE TO THE KIND OF ATTENTION TO THE SAFETY
16:56:51 PROTOCOLS THAT WERE PART EVER THE BP HORIZON RIG.
16:56:54 IS IT PART OF YOUR POLICY, MR. HAYWARD, TO FIRE EMPLOYEES WHO
16:57:02 RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF YOUR RIGS?
16:57:04 NO, IT IS NOT. WELL, MR. HAYWARD, I'M AFRAID
16:57:09 THAT THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED TO MR. ABBOTT.
16:57:12 BECAUSE NOT ONLY WAS HE FIRED, BUT TWO WEEKS LATER, THEY PUT
16:57:16 OUT, AND WAS TOLD THAT HE WAS JUST PART OF A FORCE REDUCTION,
16:57:20 BUT YOUR COMPANY THEN PUT OUT AN ADVERTISEMENT TO HIRE SOMEONE,
16:57:24 TO REPLACE HIM ON THAT JOB. EARLIER YOU SAID ALL OF THE
16:57:30 OTHER BP WELLS IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, THAT HAD BEEN COMPLETED
16:57:36 ARE SECURE AND ARE SAFE TO OPERATE.
16:57:39 DO YOU STILL STAND BY THAT? I DO.
16:57:42 NOW, DO YOU KNOW THAT JUDGE SPORKIN SAID THAT IT IS NOT TRUE
16:57:47 THAT THE DOCUMENTS WERE COMPLETED WHEN HE SUBSTANTIATED
16:57:52 MR. ABBOTT'S ALLEGATIONS? SO HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THAT,
16:57:56 IF YOU HIRE AN OMBUDSMAN, HE'S A FORMER FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
16:58:00 JUDGE, HE COMES IN. HE DOES THE EVALUATION AND HE
16:58:05 SUBSTANTIATES THE WHISTLE-BLOWER'S ALLEGATIONS.
16:58:07 HOW DO YOU IN ANY WAY JUSTIFY THEN FIRING THE PERSON WHO
16:58:13 ACTUALLY BROUGHT THESE ISSUES TO YOUR ATTENTION?
16:58:16 AS I SAID, THE INVESTIGATION CONCLUDED THAT THE DRAWINGS
16:58:21 NECESSARY FOR START-UP WERE ON THE ATLANTIS FACILITY JUST
16:58:29 LOOKING AT OUR OMBUDSMAN IS INVESTIGATING THE ISSUE OF
16:58:33 UNFAIR DISMISSAL, WHICH IS QUITE APPROPRIATE.
16:58:36 WELL, I ASK FOR TO YOU PROVIDE A COPY OF THE
16:58:40 INVESTIGATION, WHICH YOU'RE CONDUCTING, MR. HAYWARD.
16:58:44 FOR THE RECORD. WE CAN DO THAT.
16:58:45 OKAY. WE WILL PUT THAT IN THE RECORD.
16:58:47 I THINK, MR. HAYWARD, THAT THE ONLY THING WORSE THAN ONE BP RIG
16:58:55 AT THE BOTTOM OF THE OCEAN IN THE GULF OF MEXICO WOULD BE TWO
16:58:59 BP RIGS AT THE BOTTOM