JOHN KING USA 7PM (CLEAN)
19:08:59:28 JKUSA: Weiner Panel 07491521 - clean air 06/01/2011 Topic: Weiner and crisis communication. Chris Lehane Former Special Asst. Counsel to Pres. Clinton Crisis Communications Expert Terry Ho ...
News Clip: Crisis Center
Video footage from the KXAS-TV/NBC station in Fort Worth, Texas, to accompany a news story.
U.S. CHECKS VESSELS OUTBOUND WITH MISSILES (CUBAN MISSILES)
Cuba - Caribbean. <br/> <br/>American commentary, transcript on file. <br/> <br/>LS. & MLS. Aerial views cargo ships at sea in Caribbean, they are Soviet ships taking missiles etc. back to Russia from Cuba. The large crates can be seen tied to the decks. CU. Pilot of US. Naval spotter plane at control while flying over Caribbean. CU. Radio operator in aircraft reporting back to base. <br/> <br/>(Comb. F.G.)
CHILES TOURS EOC (07/31/1996)
STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS WILL BE TRACKING THE NEXT BIG STORM FROM THE COMFORT OF A BRAND NEW STATE OF THE ART FACILITY. GOVERNOR LAWTON CHILES IS TOURING THE NEW DIGS TODAY ...
DN-LB-720 Beta SP
MISC. RECONNAISSANCE DURING CUBAN CRISIS
CHINA CRISIS
LEE CHEUK YAN COVER FOOTAGE / AUDIO CHANNEL TWO FOR KOPPEL COMMUNICATIONS / KCI
GDP Financial and economic data concept cityscape aerial view
GDP Financial and economic data concept cityscape aerial view
Interview with Ted Kennedy
Interview with Ted Kennedy in his Senate Office in March/April 1989 where he is asked about offering amnesty to draft dodgers OKAY. WELL I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU, IN THE '72 SENATE HEARINGS ON AMNESTY THAT YOU CHAIRED, YOU ASKED THE FOLLOWING RHETORICAL QUESTIONS. HOW, SOME ASKED, CAN AMNESTY BE OFFERED TO THOSE WHO FLED WHEN OTHERS FOUGHT? BUT OTHERS ASSERT, HOW CAN AMNESTY NOT BE OFFERED TO THOSE WHO RIGHT ABOUT THIS WAR BEFORE THE REST OF US? l'M WONDERING WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT THOSE QUESTIONS IN THE INTERVENING 17 YEARS, IF YOU'VE REACHED ANY CONCLUSIONS? Well, the conclusions that I've reached after a number of years just reinforced. my feelings and beliefs at that time. That was that the young people that left as a matter of conscience, both those prior to the time or the draft, and at that time the draft was grossly unfair, or those that even went to Vietnam and perhaps came to the conclusion as a matter of conscience that it was an unjust war. We're following a very important tradition In our society and that is to at times of a moral crisis, exercising a conscience and refusing to be a part of a system that perpetuates illegality or gross injustice. And civil disobedience has been a part of our tradition and in the early 1960s, with the civil rights movement, it was rekindled as a matter which many young people were involved in. And then in the course of the war, it was rekindled again by those that refused to be a part of a system in the United States that had an unfair, was supporting an unjust war-. And I have a good deal of admiration for the courage of those individuals. They played a very important role, I think, in accelerating the time when the United States finally did end the war, although it certainly wasn't perceived to be a popular step at the time, or even an understandable policy question to grant some reprieve, some amnesty, for those who left the United States as a matter of conscience because they believed, that the war was unjust. To a very real extent, they understood that it was an unjust war before the politicians did. So rather than being condemned, their action should be recognized as a positive contribution to the whole debate and discussion on the war in Vietnam. And they ought to have a sense of satisfaction that they helped bring the war to an end sooner. , , EVEN THOUGH THEY LEFT THE COUNTRY, DIDN'T THAT PLACE THEM OUTSIDE OF THE TRADITION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND .•• Well, in the fact that civil disobedience took place here, it was a different expression but they certainly recognized that it was something that their roots being here, their parents, their friends, it had an important impact in the, in the American political history. And that was not insignificant. SO WHAT WOULD YOU SAY WAS THE LEGACY OP THIS EXODUS OP PEOPLE DURING VIETNAM? Well, as I look back on it, they saw that the war was unjust prior to the time that military commander saw it, and that politicians were really willing to recognize .. And they made a contribution, 1 believe, in bringing the war to an earlier end. I mean there ware many who were involved in bringing that war to an earlier end, but they certainly had their place in history. OKAY. IM WONDERING WHAT MOTIVATED YOU TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP ON T!IIS ISSUE AND HOLD THE '72 HEARINGS ON AMNESTY. WHAT WERE TIIE POLITICAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THAT DECISION FOR YOU? 6:25 - Well, there were very few political benefits. I approached the issue as someone who believed that the draft system was chronically unfair. It was poor people fighting rich men's wars. The combination of deferments and other provisions of the draft law were very unjust and very inequitable. I conducted hearings in 1969 on the draft issue and you couldn't come to a real studyof the whole draft issue without facing the issue of amnesty and its implications. And then again conducted them in 1972 and then following President Ford's partial amnesty in 1974. The mail was running about twenty-to-one against any form of amnesty. And in the course of those hearings that were very widely covered by the media; you had parents who lost boys in Vietnam that were extremely harsh in their criticism of those that had left the United States as a matter of conscience. And then you had parents who had lost boys in Vietnam and who understood the injustice of that war, who respected the decision of those who as a matter of conscience went to Canada. and you had these parents sitting right next to each other. Both parents, the series of parents that spoke on that question exhibited the same kinds of emotions, the same kind of feelings, the same kind of love for their children. And so across the communication to the American people is that this issue, really it was a matter of conscience. And I think people had a better understanding of what was really involved. They hadn't really thought about it. And even though as a result of that hearing, there wasn't a real break in the national opposition to amnesty, there was a very important softening of the opposition. And I felt myself during the course of those hearings that there was really, the healing process was really beginning. It was just a feeling, but I believe that it was there. And I think although we were unable to pass any legislation, we never would have had the votes for it. And I think probably have been beaten sufficiently badly that any president might have been extremely reluctant to take any executive action. But there was no question there was a deepening of understanding of the real principles involved. And I like to believe with that understanding, we saw the partial amnesty of President Ford and then the further actions of President Carter In 1977. l'M WONDERING, GIVEN THAT OPPOSITION, THAT LETTERS WERE RUNNNG 20-TO-l YOU SAID AGAINST IT, WHY PRESIDENT CARTER DIDN'T DECIDE TO GO WITH AMNESTY Well, he certainly deserved credit. The atmosphere in '77 again was different from where it was even in 1974. There was a real desire to try and bring some healing to the society that had really been very much torn apart in the course of the whole Vietnam war. The incremental step of '74 and then the intitial step in '77, although I give credit to President Ford and to President Carter for taking the actions that they did. They deserve credit. DO YOU FEEL, OR I SHOULD SAY, WERE YOU SATISFIED THEN WITH THE RESULTS OF YOUR HEARINGS IN '72 AND '74? Well, I was. We're legislators and being members of the United States senate, we oversee legislation that's passed in time. But we're, also part of our function is to try and inform the American people, too, and the education process, both for ourselves as well as the American public. And I think the American public had a better understanding. I'd like to hope that we made some contribution in that area. And I think although we didn't pass the legislation, that we were able to encourage the process which really had to be with the executive, certainly at that period of time WHAT DID YOU THINK OF THE WAR RESISTERS IN GENERAL, OR THE PEOPLE THAT WENT TO CANADA? DID YOU HAVE A PARTICULAR OPINION OF THEIR MOTIVATIONS THEN AND HAS YOUR OPINION CHANGED? No. l think that the, someone who was opposed to the war in 1967 and certainly on, a number of these individuals went there prior to that period in time. I think probably my view of them may have changed from the time that there was a general kind of support for the war and when we saw how unjust the war was. And then thought about the issue subsequently. I suppose my view of the, both the issue and those individuals changed in 1967 when my own understanding and awareness of the war had changed very very dramatically. IF YOU HAD BEEN A YOUNG MAN. Oh, l don1t know. It depends whether I suppose, whether it was prior to the time, 1967, or afterwards. It would have so happened that I probably would have been not affected because I would have had the educational deferments and the other deferments that were available. I think that that may very well have been the circumstances. SO YOU WOULDN'T HAVE HAD TO HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THAT POSITION. Most people that followed that particular track that I did in terms of college, and law school, and then marriage didn't serve. THERE WAS ONE THING THAT WAS ALWAYS SURPRISED ME WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT UNDER THE JOHNSON AND NIXON ADMINISTRATIONS, DIDN'T SEEM TO PUT A LOT OF PRESSURE TO CLOSE THE DOOR. The only other thing I might mention is that I was in the army prior to that in any event. I UNDERSTAND. HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. Yes. I WAS WONDERING IF YOU HAD ANY THOUGHTS WHY THE·UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THOSE DAYS DIDN'T PUT PRESSURE ON CANADA TO CLOSE THE BORDER TO THESE PEOPLE. Well, Canada of course has fought with the United States in its wars, close valued ally with many shared values and principles and friendships, associations. And I think there was probably a recognition that the Canadians would be making their own independent judgment as I think clearly they would have. And they have value In recognizing men and women of conscience in its own tradition. I think the presidents were smart enough to understand that they would make their own judgment and probably didn't want to face that independent decision perhaps.. I would think that's my conclusion. OKAY. THERE WAS ONE QUESTION I DIDN'T ••• EARLIER THAT STRIKES ME, AND THAT IS THAT PRESIDENT JOHN KENNEDY SAID ASK NOT WHAT YOUR COUNTRY CAN DO FOR YOU, ASK WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR YOUR COUNTRY. THAT HAD A TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE ON THAT GENERATION IN THE SIXTIES. AND THEN THESE PEOPLE WERE PLACED IN A POSITION WHERE SO MANY, AS YOU'RE SAYING, FOR REASONS OF CONSCIENCE, DECIDED EVEN TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY. ISN'T THERE A CONTRADICTION BETWEEN PEOPLE WANTING TO ASK NOT WHAT YOU KNOW, THEIR COUNTRY CAN DO FOR THEM, BUT TO GIVE, SACRIFICE FOR THEIR COUNTRY. AND ON THE OTHER HAND, END UP IN A POSITION OF .CONSCIENCE TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY. HOW DO THESE THINGS RIG
Reporting AIDS Patients to Their Workplace
After well-liked teacher Normand Bergeron dies from AIDs, various health officials state that the health department is not obligated to report those afflicted with the disease to their workplace.
Radar and communications operations aboard USS Essex (CVA-9) aircraft carrier, during Lebanon crisis, in 1958.
Aboard the USS Essex (CVA-9) in the Mediterranean Sea, off Lebanon, during the crisis in 1958. Radar men on watch monitoring scopes. U.S. Navy sailors aboard ship speak into mikes of their headsets. Room is dimly lit. Teletype machines operation in the communication's center. Two junior officers and an enlisted man walk into the room, look at the message received and tear the message from the machine. They leave quickly. Location: Mediterranean Sea. Date: July 1958.
1970s NEWS
WASHINGTON TRIP (GILLIGAN). REPORTERS INTERVIEW GOVERNOR JOHN J. GILLIGAN. FRUSTRATED BECAUSE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WON'T COMMUNICATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ENERGY CRISIS. GAS RATIONING.
The Man Who Might Have Been: An Inquiry into the Life and Death of Herbert Norman
Black and white newsreel with sound titled "Suez Crisis Eased by Conference": PAN of British military vehicles being stockpiled, MCU of British soldiers talking on the radio, various shots of tanks in the streets and cannons being loaded onto ships. MS of Indian ambassador getting off plane in Cairo.
L'Equipe du Soir of December 17, 2024: guest Olivier LETANG (EDS).
CLINTON - HAITI CRISIS
00:00:00:15 'In the wake of disasters like this, people do get desperate. If you have a starving baby in your arms, you are going to try to find food wherever you can. So we're moving as quickly as possible. Once we can get communications up so we can tell people where to go, what kind of help they can expect, we'll be able to better manage the crisis. (0:26) /
CRISIS IN THE CONGO - REEL 1
Congo. <br/> <br/>LS. Three high angle shots of Leopoldville - the area where the white Belgians stay. M.S. of the Ghana Airways plane which was put at the disposal of Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba by the Ghana Government. Various shots as Hon. Krobo Edusie, Ghana's Minister of Transport and Communication, and Mr. Kwaku Boateng, Minister of Information & Broadcasting paid a visit to the Ghana Army in Leopoldville. They had some discussions with them. LS. MS. CU. Various shots of Hon Edusei and Hon Boateng at the Head Quarters of the Ghana Army in Leopoldville. They walk towards the Ghana flag and have discussions with Captain Aquah of the Ghana Army. CU. Hon Krobo Edusei. CU. Hon Kwaku Boateng. LS. of the River Congo. MLS. The Ghana delegates having a discussion at the residence of the Ghana Ambassador in Leopoldville. CU. Hon. Krobo Edusei. CU. H/E Mr. Djin Ghana's Ambassador in the Congo. CU. Hon Kwaku Boateng. H/E Nana Nketsia, Adviser to Ghana Govt. on Cultural affairs. Various street scenes in Leopoldville. Various shots of Congolese women in Leopoldville Good CUs. Congolese types. <br/> <br/>(Mute. Lav)
CUBAN MISSILES 25TH ANNIVERSARY / WNT
INTV/W MCGEORGE BUNDY, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION. 00:01:07:00 ms of bundy who talks about the cuban missile crisis. he talks about the channels of communication that were available between the us and the soviet union to end the crisis. he discusses the role of reporter john scali in ending the crisis. 00:12:57:24 he says communication between the us and the soviet union is difficult. CI: PERSONALITIES: BUNDY, MCGEORGE. PERSONALITIES: SCALI, JOHN (ABOUT). US RELATIONS: USSR.
Chrstopher - Newser
WARREN CHRISTOPHER SAYS THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS-- THE GORE CAMP IS IN FACT FOLLOWING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
VTM-61AZ Beta SP; DN-RLB-131 Beta SP
APOLLO 13: HOUSTON, WE'VE GOT A PROBLEM
News Clip: Crisis Center
Video footage from the KXAS-TV/NBC station in Fort Worth, Texas, to accompany a news story.
Office laptop, face and black man stress, burnout and frustrated with project, research disaster or report mistake. Headache, night or African person with online data crisis, bad news or fail
Office laptop, face and black man stress, burnout and frustrated with project problem, research disaster or report mistake. Computer, night or African person with online data crisis, bad news or fail
1960s NEWS
A L Russell, Security Administrator of Standard Oil. Iron Mountain - Atomic Storage Corp. Interior shots of this massive fallout shelter. INTERVIEW: A L Russell 33:03 In 1963, we took a study to see whether we were up to date and determined that a underground facility for emergency operating would be more in keeping with present circumstances. And after a survey we developed our facility which you saw and Iron Mountain. Announcer 33:25 Iron Mountain is located 125 miles from New York City driving time two and a half hours. Mr. Russell described standard oil's facilities. A L Russell 33:35 Our criteria said that a facility should have a possibility of low Fallout effects or it should give us adequate shielding from any fallout effects. And we believe that Iron Mountain meets these requirements. We do not refer to this as Fallout Shelter, but as an emergency operating center. I might say that it has its own independent inside power, water and other facilities. We would propose to follow as what's referred to as a DEF CON, the fence condition notices where we would take a few people on an early warning, a few more at an additional warning and we would fully manage our staff at an appropriate warning period. I'm reliably informed that there was DEF CON notices during the Cuban crisis. And I would say that this is a type of situation I think would cause us to take a hard look at putting in at least our preliminary Manning. We believe that to be realistic. We have to keep in step with the government and this is the way we're informed they are going to man their counterparts to our emergency center. We have approximately 90,000 square feet in Iron Mountain. And this provides us an opportunity or capability for emergency operating gives us a stamp of approval. optimally 60 of our operating personnel and our management, along with necessary office staff, with their families to come underground and to help the company carry out their coordination and work during emergencies. We think maybe we're one of the few or one of the first to include family members. And this was done after a great deal of thought to assure ourselves of having responsive people that could do the job. This provides sleeping accommodations for these people. To the extent possible and family units have small bedrooms, we have a few dormitories for those who are there alone, we have a capability for feeding, hopefully keeping them at an efficient state. During this period, we have food for 200 people for 30 days, which we believe is more than a period of time, we would need to be underground. Actually, our friends in government, both the Office of Civil Defense, the Office of Emergency Planning, and other agencies have indicated probably 14 to 15 days would be a maximum that we would have a fallout hazard severe enough to keep us underground. Communications obviously is one of the points that we have the greatest need for because to be responsive to government requirements. During these periods we must be able to communicate, we're continually trying to improve our communications capabilities with our far flung worldwide organization.
74132 1970s U.S. NAVY RECRUITING FILM "SEAS OF TOMORROW"
Created in the 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War, "Seas of Tomorrow" presents the Navy during a time of shrinking budgets and shrinking public resolve about funding the U.S. military. The film showcases the Soviet Navy and how it is building strength around the world. The Navy at this moment appeared in crisis, and efforts were made to change various regimens and conditions within the Navy, from improving housing to increased liberty, to allowing more flexible communications between officers and men. The film is set to a jazzy score and shows this newer, kinder, more sensitive Navy that is "doing more with less" as something viable, powerful and -- lean and mean. <p><p>Contains footage of Soviet ships, nuclear submarines including SSBN Polaris submarines and Poseidon missile boats, the proposed Trident submarines, the 688 attack submarines, and radical new ships such as the missile patrol escort vessel, hovercrafts / surface effect ships (forerunners of the LCAC vessels) and more. <p><p>We encourage viewers to add comments and, especially, to provide additional information about our videos by adding a comment! See something interesting? Tell people what it is and what they can see by writing something for example like: "01:00:12:00 -- President Roosevelt is seen meeting with Winston Churchill at the Quebec Conference."<p><p>This film is part of the Periscope Film LLC archive, one of the largest historic military, transportation, and aviation stock footage collections in the USA. Entirely film backed, this material is available for licensing in 24p HD and 2k. For more information visit http://www.PeriscopeFilm.com
Catapult crew hooks bridle to aircraft aboard USS Essex (CVA-9) in Mediterranean Sea off Lebanon during 1958 crisis.
Operations aboard USS Essex (CVA-9) during the Lebanon crisis, in 1958. View beneath wing of an aircraft on catapult, as the catapult crew hooks bridle to aircraft. Officer leaves the ship's message center. Hatchway leads into message center. Two junior officers in the communication center. Teletype machines printing out messages aboard ship. Views beneath wing of jet as one of the catapult crew hooks it up to the catapult. Location: Vietnam. Date: July 1958.