The Judiciary Committee and the Senate Caucus held a joint hearing to hear testimony about Asian crime gangs and their role in drug trafficking in the United States.

TAPE: EF01/0607 IN_TIME: 23:12:24 DURATION: 1:24 SOURCES: TVE RESTRICTIONS: DATELINE: Bunol - 22 August 2001 SHOTLIST: 1. Zoom in to packed street 2. Various of crowds and people spraying water hoses from a truck 3. Truck driving slowly through street with people throwing tomatoes from it 4. People on a pile of tomato puree 5. Various mid shots of street fighting 6. Various of truck dumping tomatoes and people pelting each other 7. Various of tomato fights 8. People throwing tomatoes from truck 9. Various of tomato fighting in street 10. Truck loaded with revellers 11. Various of tomato throwing STORYLINE: Tens of thousands of revellers are seeing red in Spain after being pelted with overripe fruit. An estimated 30-thousand party-goers - fuelled by wine and beer - hurled handfuls of juicy tomatoes as part of the annual La Tomatina fiesta. One hundred and thirty tons of plum tomatoes were trucked into the town of Bunol, and dumped on the streets to provide the ammunition for the world's largest food fight. The pulped fruit ran like rivers of blood down the streets as combatants, threw, squashed and rolled in the red stuff. The fiesta in Bunol, near to Valencia on the east coast, has become one of the country's most popular summer festivals. It also draws huge numbers of visitors from abroad. Local folklore says the festival - held at the end of August - started in the 1940s when kids started throwing their lunch at each other one day in a downtown square. The tradition was born after people met in the same place the following year and pelted passers-by. Water cannons mounted on trucks are used to give the revellers a good wash before they retire from battle.

Thirsty young girl (female age 10) drinking cold water a hot night.

1015 WH G7 US FRANCE PRESSER HOST TV SWITCHED FS25 75 SWITCHED PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP ATTENDS THE G-7 SUMMIT IN FRANCE DONALD TRUMP NEWS CONFERENCE W/ FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON. TRUMP THEN HOLDS INDIVIDUAL NEWS CONFERENCE AR: 16x9 10:33:00 TRUMP: Thank you very much. MACRON: Mr. President, Madam First Lady, ladies and gentlemen--ladies and gentlemen following this G7 meeting that we have just held and we have been discussing for two days now and I am going to report back to you but first of all I would like to thank President Trump and all of the heads of state in the government here for the extremely productive work and very productive discussions that we have had since Saturday evening together. There was a lot of nervousness at the outset, a lot of expectations, a lot of tensions and we heard about a lot of conflict and I can say that what we were really keen on was to convey a positive and joint message following our discussions, discussions on several topics. 10:34:15 We haven't negotiated a very long text as promised and you will get just a one page declaration that there will be a lot of different annexes to it but it is just one page, one page that covers some of the key items that were addressed. Now we have decided to hold this joint conference. I am going to give the floor to President Trump and of course President Trump and the first lady will then proceed with their own press conference to the American press where other discussions will take place but I just wanted to sum up the different items on which we have agreed and the topics on which we have made headway, biodiversity, digital (INAUDIBLE) economy amongst others. We wanted to hold this joint conference together because next year it is the United States of America that will host the G7 Summit and we are going to pass the baton onto President Trump. That is why we are here together and I just wanted to say that for the last two days we have worked a lot together on several common points. 10:35:32 While we have a lot of things in common but one thing we had in common with President Trump is they don't like to waste our time and we like to achieve concrete results and provide momentum to the work and as soon as President Trump arrived with the one to one lunch that we had together I think that there is a most productive and interesting conversations that we have had together and from that point onward we set the pace and kept the ball rolling to be as efficient as possible to the very end. There are a few things that are expected from both our countries. 10:36:15 As far as Iran is concerned President Trump and myself have had discussions in the last few weeks and particularly in the last couple of days and we agree that Iran needs to comply with its nuclear obligations and have responsible behavior in the Gulf and work with us. And there were two very clear things that matter to us. Iran should never have nuclear weapon and its situation should not threaten the stability of the region. France has taken a lot of different initiatives and I always informed President Trump on them to be able to get the technical means to move forward because the decisions that the U.S. has taken in the last few months have put a lot of pressure and have put us in the situation where it is indeed necessary to improve the security situation of the region. So we coordinated our efforts and we reached a decision to bring together the foreign ministers--Foreign Minister of Iran to have a meeting with the French Foreign Minister and a roadmap has sort of been set but nothing is absolutely set in stone and we will have to move ahead together to find an outcome. 10:37:30 This morning President Rouhani said that he was prepared to meet any political leader who in the interest of his country and that is what I had told Minister Zarif and this is what I mentioned to President Rouhani on the phone as well that if he would agree to a meeting with President Trump that my conviction was that an agreement can be met. We know the terms, we know the objectives but we have to just now sit around the table and make that happen. So I hope that in the next few weeks based on our discussions we will be able to achieve them. The meeting that we just mentioned between President Rouhani and President Trump, myself and the partners have a role to play in nuclear negotiations will also be fully involved in these negotiations. I think that this meeting is very important and the last few days have clarified the situation, a lot of messages have been conveyed, a lot of work has been done between our ministers. 10:38:35 We would like to thank our ministers who have been totally involved in these discussions and have set the stage for these discussions and for an agreement. Of course I want to be very cautious and very modest but I think that this is going to lead us to putting an end to escalation and reaching a suitable solution. The discussions that we had on Saturday afternoon and Saturday dinner have been very fruitful and our purpose is to ensure the stability of the region. The idea is to make sure that her aunt doesn't get the nuclear weapon and have more visibility in the long-term. 10:39:20 As far as trade is concerned we have also shared a lot of analysis and a lot of observations. Later on I will go into the details of that but I think we can say that our discussions have clarified what is legitimate and what the United States feels is an unfair situation. We have international rules that govern the international trade and in this one page document we said that it is very good to have a single organization that governs international trade but so far this selective body has not been very efficient in raising trade barriers. It has not been efficient enough in solving problems when they occurred. It has not been efficient enough in protecting the intellectual property of our industries. 10:40:10 Discussions are underway currently in particular between President Trump and President Xi and we have seen even that just the recent--very recent past that an agreement can't be reached. So we are going to reaffirm our desire to change the rules that govern international trade and revamp them so that no one is dealt with unfairly so that our workers are protected and so that the situation of the past is put to an end and this is something that we need to work on together. There was a lot of nervousness because of misunderstanding, because there is some very powerful economic players that have said what about these digital attacks that France has imposed. 10:41:06 Well, we have reached a very good agreement and once again to the solid work that has been done (INAUDIBLE) ministers has really helped us to make progress. In our economies we have very unfair situations where some players don't pay taxes so that there is unfair competition with other players and it is these large multinational players that don't pay taxes which leads to significant instability on the economic front. Is this fair? It is not fair. Of course we are pushing for international rules on this and at the European level ten (PH) countries France, Italy, even the UK is getting ready to do so has decided to do something at the national level but it is not against in a company in particular it is just to solve the problem. In fact a lot of French companies will also be impacted by this tax and some of you have probably heard me say a few months ago that this is only to find a solution and the aim ultimately is to find an agreement internationally by 2022 revamp international tax systems within the framework of the OECD to combat harmful trade practices which are also harmful to the U.S. economy and through this digital tax--on this digital tax, we worked a lot bilaterally as well and we have reached an agreement and to overcome the hurdles. 10:42:36 So we are going to work on a bilateral and multilateral basis to find a solution together. And today international tax exists on digital services France will do away with its national tax and everything that is already being paid under the French tax system will be reimbursed. 10:43:00 So the idea is that we need to find joint agreement in order to address joint international problems and the situation right now is very negative and the international tax system definitely needs to be modernized and I think will work together in a spiritual cooperation on this. As to Libya, Syria, North Korea, Hong Kong, you will see in the one page document that we have made considerable headway in the spirit of unity, and we have also done some significant work as far as the Amazon region is concerned. There--there has been relations with President Bolsonaro and we have taken a very ambitious initiative that President Pinera presented this morning after having discussed with all the heads of state and government of the region as we had wished and as President Trump had wished as well. 10:44:02 I don't want to go into the details, but I just want to highlight these few things that I just mentioned. I just wanted to say that we work together hand-in-hand with President Trump over these two days. And during this G7, I would like to thank all my colleagues in fact, for this. We have managed to reach convergence at unprecedented levels on several issues, and we're going to continue this work in the weeks and months to follow with a lot of energy and North Korea knows how strongly President Trump is committed to this issue. There is also the agreement with China and we're going to work hand-in-hand on all of the different issues. 10:44:47 I would like to thank you, President Trump, for your involvement in the last couple of days. I would like to thank your first lady who is by your side and who has been very active side-by-side with my own spouse. And she has honored us in our country. She knows how popular she is in our country. And President Trump will be hosting the G7 Summit next year, so I'm going to give him the floor so that he can tell us how you intend to organize the G7. And I will be there by your side with the same will and the same determination in the same desire for unity. Thank you. (APPLAUSE & HANDSHAKE) 10:45:30 TRUMP: Thank you very much. Well, I want to thank you very much. And I think more importantly than anything, I wanted to come up here to say that because the job that President Macron--and your wife, by the way, who is a great lady, Brigitte, I'd like to thank Brigitte. She has been spectacular, spent a tremendous amount of time with Melania and some of the folks who came in, some of the wives that came in and they had a great tour of the area, and it's a beautiful area. But I want to thank you very much, Mr. President, for the incredible job you did. This is a truly successful G7. There was tremendous unity. There was great unity. Sometimes I'd read a little bit of false reporting, and I will tell you there was. In fact, we were--we would have stayed for another hour. Nobody wanted to leave. We were accomplishing a lot, but I think more importantly, we were getting along very well. Seven countries, and it really was the G7. And you have been a spectacular leader on this. And I want to thank you and I want to thank the great country of France. Thank you very much. (APPLAUSE) MACRON: Thank you, my friend. TRUMP: --And with that, I think--oh, excuse me. I was--go ahead. Let's go. MACRON: No, no. I was--I just wanted to say we will take two questions-- TRUMP: --Okay-- MACRON: --On each sides. Afterwards, I will say goodbye to my friend, President Trump. I will leave the room in order for you to follow-up with 10:46:54 TRUMP: If you'd like, we could do to each and then we both leave the room. Would you prefer that or would you prefer--I just don't want to have the president of France standing here while I'm answering these absolutely wonderful questions, okay? (LAUGHTER) So why don't we start with a question for France? MACRON: Four questions about G7 and the U.S.-France relations. TRUMP: And Emmanuel is going to have his own press conference after this. MACRON: Exactly. TRUMP: So that'll be fine. Go ahead. To France, John. To France. 10:47:30 QUESTION: Thank you. Of course (INAUDIBLE). Mr. President Macron, China was not on the official agenda, but it was certainly a big part of the discussions here at the G7. Are you concerned that the trade war that exists now between the United States and China could harm the global economy? If you are, did you talk to President Trump about that and are you also at the same time concerned that if China's current trade practices go unchecked that a decade from now, we could be in a very terrible situation? 10:48:06 MACRON: On this subject, we obviously had lengthy discussions during the session on the world economy yesterday morning. On both subjects, the discussion is underway between China and the United States of America. Obviously, as we clearly see, create uncertainty, which disturb markets and investors and during the negotiations will create tensions, which is the case of any discussion. We saw this on different stock markets, which with which you are familiar. Now the question is to know what the result of these discussions will be, and that's why we considered that it was so important an agreement be found between the two greatest economic powers in the world. 10:49:00 President Trump clearly showed us his willingness to arrive at an agreement. We saw just a few hours ago the very positive and encouraging message that could be distilled from this. If we see the things are moving. Our deep wish is for an agreement to be found within the United States and China concerning trade because I think that would be something positive for everyone. Neither the United States nor China is economically or industrially naive. It has to be a balanced agreement that will be good for everyone, and we will be vigilant to see that it's whole good for the whole world. In that context, our different parameters will be taken on board, and that was one of the subjects of our discussion. What's bad for the world economy is uncertainty. And the quicker an agreement is arrived at, that quicker that uncertainty will dissipate. That's what we discussed yesterday, and that's the American president's wish. In terms of trade practices, I said this earlier, for me, the most effective way forward and the most strategic way forward in settling our trade relations with China is to develop trade, but also to ensure that that trade is part of international trade rules. 10:50:15 The problems we sometimes had, we're very familiar with this with the Chinese economy, is a major economy where there's been lots of investment from the United States, European countries, Canada, and Japan. The problem is respecting intellectual property, dealing with excess capacity, which sometimes unbalances some world markets, and the ability to deal rapidly with concepts we may have and with unfair situations. Now, we are obliged to see that when this type of trade happens outside of WTO rules, things don't work very well, and we are not properly protected. And when we follow WTO rules, the WTO rules as they presently exist haven't allowed us to be protected on the subjects. 10:51:06 So what we decided together yesterday morning was to accelerate with a very realistic agenda and to say we're going to change the rules of world trade so that everyone could have free and fair trade, balance trade, and the subjects which I just mentioned, which have sometimes been bad for our economies can be settled in an international framework, which we wish profoundly to change. And we and our different ministers in the different contexts that we are putting forward are going to share these political goals and, to my way of thinking, the way to deal with the practices you have mentioned, certainly, the positive agreements that will be arrived at and also the renewal of our international trade rules as we said yesterday morning. QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) are you satisfied with how far the proposed WTO reforms will go-- 10:51:55 TRUMP: --No-- QUESTION: --Because you have spoken--you have spoken to that, and second to that-- TRUMP: --We're getting there. I'll just answer that. We're getting there. QUESTION: Do you believe that China is sincere about what it said this morning-- TRUMP: --Yes-- QUESTION: --Or do you think that they are just trying to calm the markets and play for time? Because our sister network, the Fox Business network has been told by Chinese sources that they have no plans on going back to where they were in terms to the negotiations this spring on intellectual property, force technology transfers ownership. So-- TRUMP: --We'll see, John-- QUESTION: --Do you trust that they are sincere? 10:52:30 TRUMP: I do. I think they wanted to make a deal very badly. I think that was elevated last night very late in the night. I see an alert, or you would call it breaking news, and it was the vice chairman, we're not talking about somebody from China at a low level, the vice chairman of China came out that he wants to see a deal made, he wants it to be made under calm conditions using the word calm. I agree with him on that. And China has taken a very hard hit over the last number of months. You know, they've lost 3 million jobs. It'll soon be much more than 3 million jobs. Their chain is breaking. The chain is breaking up like nobody has seen before. And once that happens, it's very hard to put it back. You understand I think they want--very much want to make a deal and the longer they wait the harder it is to put it back if it can be put back at all. So I believe they want to do a deal. The tariffs have hit them very hard in a fairly short period of time they you United States will have collected over $100 billion in tariffs. 10:53:35 And I say it again, the reporters failed to--the media failed to acknowledge it but if we look at the goods coming in from China we are talking about China, not other countries. If you look at the goods they have a power that others don't have but that power is only good for so long. They have manipulated their currency, they have devalued their currency and they have put a lot of cash into the system and because of that the prices have not gone up or if they have gone up it has been very little because they want to keep people working. If the prices go up they are not going to be able to keep people working, they are not going to be able to compete. It is a brilliant market, it is a brilliant, brilliant market, the world market, a lot of markets are brilliant and frankly I think that China cannot--I don't know, maybe they can, maybe they can't. I don't think they can do that and I think they are very smart and I think President Xi is a great leader who happens to be a brilliant man and he can't lose 3 million jobs in a very short period of time and that is going to be magnified many times over and it is going to break down the Chinese system of trade and he can't do that. 10:54:40 So when you say do you think they want to, maybe they want to and may be they don't but I think they want to make a deal. I am not sure they have a choice and I don't say that as a threat. I don't think they have a choice. In the meantime the United States which has never collected $.10 from China will in a fairly short period of time be over $100 billion in tariffs. So I think they want to make a deal very badly. Go ahead. MACRON: Second question. 10:55:15 QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) Mr. President you have just declared that you created the conditions for a meeting between President Trump and President Rouhani. Does that mean that France for instance might be a mediator in that meeting and more concretely what did you discussed in terms of that possible agreement with Iran? Then a question for Mr. Trump. Are you ready to lift or to soften American sanctions on Iranian oil exports and would you be ready to meet President Rouhani? Thank you. 10:55:50 MACRON: On the first question the terms of the discussion are quite simple, and agreement was signed in 2015 on July 14. We call it the JCPOA and bad agreement set forth guarantees for the international community including these signatories of that agreement saying that Iran would no longer in rich uranium over a certain period of time. I am simplifying this but up to 2025 in exchange for reopening many economic sectors and massive investment largely made by the United States. That agreement had a twofold advantage, stability and security and also reopening economically speaking which was good for Iran. 10:56:40 This agreement also had drawbacks and shortcomings French negotiators in 2015 were the most determined and France was the country that hesitated most to sign this agreement because we considered we needed as many guarantees as possible. President Trump during his campaign made a commitment to those who voted for him to be more demanding and tougher because he considered that this agreement was insufficient which caused him to leave it. Today because of the sanctions made by President Trump the Iranian economy is having serious consequences and a serious slow down and that situation very clearly is the aspect--we might say the positive side of things from one standpoint it is creating pressure and therefore the necessary conditions to improve the terms of an agreement. On the other hand it is leading to reactions in Iran where saying well, we have signed this agreement but those who have signed it are not respecting its terms and so we are starting symbolically to enrich uranium and they risk that they are going to go further still and leave the JCPOA so given the two goals that we have where are we going with this? 10:57:52 We need to be sure that Iran will never get a nuclear weapon and that there will be no flareups in the region and so what we discussed very concretely was to see how we could improve very considerably or really in fact build a new nuclear agreement with Iran. President Trump was very clear saying that we would need a much longer time frame for it, that there needed to be surveillance of many more sites and this is how we can build a much further reaching agreement in terms of our security demands and on the other hand we need to convince the Iranians to go that direction and we can do that if we give them economic compensation of some form. If we make some movement in terms of lines of credit or reopening certain economic sectors. 10:58:44 I can't tell you today publicly more about this because anything I will tell you in detail will jeopardize the conversations we are going to have but this is basically what we are discussing on the basis of our initiative there is also a Japanese initiative I am talking in total transparency with the president but we agreed on a strategic goal and I want us to go further in this framework and to make proposals. At a given point in time there will have to be a meeting between the American and the Iranian presidents and I would wish that in the coming weeks such a meeting take place. France will play a role together with the other signatories who are our partners in the JCPOA but after that we will need to create the necessary conditions because we will have the necessary visibility for this agreement to be signed (INAUDIBLE) and for this meeting between the two presidents to take place. So I would rather talk about concert (INAUDIBLE) initiatives and exchanges rather than mediation because at the end of the day we have constant exchanges with President Trump. I share his goals. Sometimes we say we don't agree on methods but I want to get there. I want to have an agreement and I think there has been a true change. 10:59:54 This morning President Rouhani showed himself to be open to this meeting happening and President Trump has been saying for weeks that he is being demanding, he is being tough, he has put forward sanctions but I am ready to have a meeting to make a deal and I think that we are making progress. I want this meeting to happen and I want there to be an agreement between the United States and Iran and France will play the role it is meant to play together with the United Kingdom, with Germany and all of the other signatory powers and the pertinent members of the Security Council. 11:00:22 TRUMP: Iran is a country that is not the same country that it was 2 1/2 years ago when I came into office. Iran was the number one state of terror throughout the world. There were 18 sites of confliction. In my first week when I spoke with the folks at the Pentagon including lots of generals and lots of other military experts, 18 sites of confliction meaning 18 sites of big problems. Every one of them was backed by Iran or in some cases actually using Iranian soldiers but at a minimum Iranian wealth, much of it given in the ridiculous deal where they were given $150 billion plus $1.8 billion in cash and they use that money for some bad purposes. With that being said I think that Iran is a country of tremendous potential. 11:01:16 We are not looking for leadership change, we are not looking for that kind of change. This country has been through that many times before. That doesn't work. We are looking for no nuclear weapons, no ballistic missiles and a longer period of time. Mary simple. We can have it done in a very short period of time and I really believe that Iran can be a great nation, I would like to see that happen. But they can't have nuclear weapons. Okay? Thank you. QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) TRUMP: Excuse me? QUESTION: Would you agree to meet with (INAUDIBLE)? TRUMP: If these circumstances were correct or write I would certainly agree to that. But in the meantime they have to be good players. You understand what that means and they can't do what they were saying they were going to do because if they do that they are going to be met with really very violent force. We have no choice. So I think they are going to be good. I really think they would like to and by the way President Macron told me every step that he was making yesterday. A lot of you said he came in--he told me long before he came in what was happening. What was--I didn't think it was appropriate to meet yesterday, too soon and things have to be worked out first but President Macron told me exactly was happening, who was coming and what time they were coming, where they were going to meet and after the meeting he told me exactly what happens and I think he had a very positive meeting. 11:02:45 Prime Minister Abe of Japan also a large purchaser of oil from Iran he was also very much involved and he knows everybody there so he was very--make very positive force but I have to tell you the president has done an excellent job and we are going to see how it all turns out. Maybe it works, maybe it doesn't. I say it all of the time about everything. Maybe it works and maybe it doesn't but I will tell you what we made a ridiculously--we gave them $150 billion and $1.8 billion and we got nothing--we got (INAUDIBLE). And by the way, that agreement was so short term that it expires in a very short period of time. With the country, you don't make a deal that short. Countries last for long times, and you don't do a short-term deal especially when you're paying that kind of money. 11:03:35 So, I have the--I have good feelings about Iran. I have good feelings that it'll work. I know many Iranians living in New York City. I have many friends from Iran. They're incredible people, incredible people. So, the last thing I'd like to say is a big problem, but we have to do what we have to do, okay? Go ahead, please. No. No, no. For you--you first. Go ahead. No, no. Go ahead, yes. Yes. QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. President Macron did you--did you seek President Trump's permission before you invited Foreign Minister Zarif, or did you simply inform him that he was coming? MACRON: Thanks for this very precise question. (LAUGHTER) 11:04:20 But to be very clear and--we are part of the JCPOA. We decided to remain in it still. So, we are very much interested by the situation as a sovereign country. That's why we want the different parties to move. On the other side, as President Trump made it very clear over the summer, we never spoke on behalf all the countries. We just tried testing some solutions and to see if we can find an agreement with different countries. So, we took initiative this summer to make a proposal, a technical one. I got a reaction from Iran through President Zarif's visit on Friday--Friday morning in a Paris. After the discussion we had at the G7 dinner on a Saturday evening, I thought that it was very clear about where we can go together. So, the day after, I decided to invite, as France, Minister Zarif. 11:05:20 So, I informed--before making it, I informed President Trump that it was my idea not to involve the United States, not to say this is on behalf of you, of everybody, but to say, as France, I think it would be a good idea to ask him to go back and try to negotiate something separately. So, I did it on my own. I informed before making it President Trump. He was informed at each minute about the solution--the situation, sorry. And the idea for me was, in case of structural move and important move and appropriate solutions, perhaps to have meetings between ministers, not at President Trump's level, because President Trump's level is present (INAUDIBLE). So, this is my precise answer. This is a French initiative, but made by the clear information of the U.S. president before, information as well all of the--the three Europeans. And each time I informed President Trump, in order to monitor the situation and to appreciate together if something more was adopted. 11:06:38 TRUMP: I have to say, the JCPOA was a bad deal, should not have been entered into. A lot of things could've happened that would have been much different. They're allowed to test ballistic missiles. You're not allowed to go to various sites to check. And some of those sites are the most obvious sites for the creation or the making of nuclear weapons. And those things have to be changed, and other things have to be changed. And I will tell you I have very good feelings about it. I think that we're going to do something. It may not be immediately, but I think ultimately we're going to do something. As I said, Iran is a much different country than it was two and a half years ago. And we can get that back, and I'd encourage it. 11:07:27 I actually had friends years ago, many years ago. They were in the real estate business, and they were in Iran and they were building houses and building housing and building office buildings and apartment houses. And they did very well. They made a lot of money. And to this day--they are not exactly the youngest developers anymore, but they would tell you they were young when they were over there. They made a lot of money, and they loved the people and they loved what was going on. And it's a country with tremendous potential. I also say that, by the way, with respect to North Korea. Kim Jong-un, who I've got to know extremely well, the first lady has gotten to know Kim Jong-un and I think she'd agree with me, he is a man with a country that has tremendous potential. And you're in between China, Russia, and South Korea, people want to get to South Korea. They got to get there somehow. And if they're going to do anything other than essentially fly, they want to go through. So, railroads and everything else, so many things want to happen there. I think that North Korea has tremendous economic potential, and I think that Kim Jong-un sees that. He would be the leader, and I think he sees a tremendous potential that it's got. 11:08:44 With respect to Iran, same thing. Iran has incredible people. An incredible country, potentially, a location that's a little rough neighborhood, but eventually it's going to be a beautiful neighborhood. I think that it's going to be--I think it's going to work out. And I really believe that those countries that went into the original deal that more and more are agreeing with what I did. But I think those countries are going to be saying thank you someday. I hope they're going to be saying it, including France, including the president because I think we did the right thing. I know we did the right thing, if for no other reason. It's just too short. It's almost expiring, if you think about it. And somebody said, well, you'll go and make an extension. No, no. They're great negotiators. Look at what they did to get the deal. Look at what they did to John Kerry and to President Obama. Look what happened, where they're bringing planeloads of cash, planeloads, big planes, 757s, Boeing 757s coming in loaded up with cash. What kind of a deal is that? So, I think a lot of good things are going to happen. 11:09:56 And I just want to say this because I've spoken a lot with the president this last two and a half days. We've never had a better relationship. We had a lunch that lasted for quite a while that many of you got to see. It was the two of us, no staff, no anything. He wasn't trying to impress his people. I wasn't trying to impress his people. We were just trying to impress each other. And I'll tell you what, it was the best period of time we've ever had and we accomplished a lot. I don't mean just, gee whiz, wasn't that nice? He's a very capable man. He's doing a great job for France. He did an incredible job for the G7. And I just want to thank you. And you go ahead to your news conference and--very special. This was a very special, very unified two and a half days, and I want to thank you for it. Thank you. MACRON: Thank you. (APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Thank you (INAUDIBLE). Thank you, my friend. 11:11:02 MACRON: Thank you. I will leave the floor and the press conference to President Trump. And I will in the end--wait for the end of your own press conference. (UNTRANSLATED) QUESTION: Well, I don't want to give anything away, but we saw your wife, the first lady, during a glass of French wine yesterday. So, can you perhaps give up on your threats to put sanctions on French wine? Because if we understood correctly, you have arrived at an agreement on taxing digital firms. Could you confirm that there has been an agreement between you and France on taxing digital firms? TRUMP: I confirm that the first lady loved your French wine, okay? (LAUGHTER) All right? She loved your French wine. So, thank you very much. That's fine. You're good. MACRON: Thank you. TRUMP: Thank you, everyone. 11:12:02 MACRON: Merci a vous. I will wait for the end of this press conference to have the press conference of the presidency. I will leave the floor with you. Thank you. Thank you. TRUMP: Good job. She's worse than you are. I can't-- (LAUGHTER) I can't believe it, Jonathan. TRUMP: Thank you. Please sit down. QUESTION: You've recently-- TRUMP: --Thank you very much. 11:12:48 QUESTION: You've recently been saying that China wants a deal, but you're not necessarily ready for a deal and you like the tariff revenue that is coming in. Are you now ready to make a deal? TRUMP: Only if it's a fair deal and a good deal for the United States. Otherwise, I will not make a deal. We have billions and billions coming in, and I think we're going to get there. I do. I believe it more strongly now that I would have believed it a while ago. We're going to get there and we're going to have a really--we're going to have a fair deal. But remember this, say fair, China has been taking out of this country 500 plus billion dollars a year for many, many years. Many, many years. It was time to stop. 11:13:28 As a private person, I used to talk about it. It's one of the reasons I'm president. And we are in a great position. Our country is doing well, our unemployment numbers are the lowest they've been in over 50 years, our unemployment numbers for African--African-American, Asian, for Hispanic are the best they've ever been. Historic numbers. We are in a very strong position. Our consumers are strong. Walmart just announced numbers that were, I mean, mind-boggling numbers. That's a great poll right there. That's the ultimate poll, how are the retailers doing and how are certain--certain companies doing? So we're doing very well, and I think that--I think we're going to make a deal with China, and I think will probably, eventually were going to make a deal with Iran too. QUESTION: Why are you optimistic they'll change their behavior? TRUMP: It's not a question of behavior. I think they wanted to make a deal and I think they should make a deal. And I think if they don't make a deal, it's going to be very bad for China. And I very much appreciate the fact that they came out last night, very late last night, and they said, you know, they want to make a deal. They want it to be under calm circumstances with a little it was a little different kind of a statement. I thought it was a beautiful statement. I thought indicated a lot. Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you. TRUMP: Here we go. 11:14:45 QUESTION: I actually have a question for you on next year's G7 Summit, but can I just clarify something you said? You mentioned earlier today-- TRUMP: --One question. QUESTION: Well, let me do the clarification, and then I'll get to the question. TRUMP: No, no, no. QUESTION: You talk about polls-- TRUMP: --One question-- QUESTION: --Polls with China and a breaking news alert. I'm trying to understand what specifically you heard from China. And on next year's G7, you alluded today, dropped several hints about Miami about Doral at hosting next year's G7 at your property. What reassurances, if any, can you give the American people that you are not looking to profit off the presidency? 11:15:10 TRUMP: Well, I'll tell you what I've spent, and I think I will in a combination of loss an opportunity, probably it'll cost me from $3 to $5 billion to be president. And the only thing I care about is this country. I couldn't care less. Otherwise, and between opportunity, not doing I wouldn't have done it. People have asked me what do you think it costs? And between opportunity, not doing things, I used to get a lot of money to make speeches, now I give speeches all the time. You know what I get? Zippo. And that's good. And I did a lot of great jobs and great deals that I don't do anymore. I don't want to do them because the deals I'm making are great deals for the country, and that's, to me, much more important. Doral happens to be within Miami. It's a city. It's a wonderful place. It's a very, very successful area of Florida. It's very importantly only five minutes from the airport. The airport is right next door. It's a big international airport, one of the biggest in the world. Everybody that's coming, all of these people with all of their big entourages come. It's set up so--and by the way, my people look at 12 sites, all good, but some were 2 hours from an airport, some were 4 hours from--I mean, they were so far away. Some didn't allow this, or they didn't allow that. 11:16:22 With Doral, we have a series of magnificent buildings, we call them bungalows, they each hold from 50 to 70 very luxurious rooms with magnificent room views. We have credible conference rooms, incredible restaurants, it's like--it's like such a natural. We wouldn't even have to do the work that they did here, and they've done a beautiful job. They've really done a beautiful job. And what we have also is Miami and we have many hundreds of acres so that, in terms of parking, in terms of all of the things that you need. The ballrooms are among the biggest in Florida, and the best. It's brand-new and they want--my people wanted it. From my standpoint, I'm not going to make any money. In my opinion, I'm not going to make any money. I don't want to make money. I don't care about making money. If I wanted to make money, I wouldn't worry about $3 billion to $5 billion, because that's what's--I mean, at some point, I'm going to detail that, and we'll show. But I think it's just a great place to be. I think having it in Miami is fantastic, really fantastic. 11:17:29 Having it at that particular place, because of the way it's set up, each country can have their own villa or their own bungalow. And the bungalows, when I say, they have a lot of units in them. So I think it just works out well. And when my people came back, they took tours, they went to different places, I won't mention places, but you'll have a list because they're going to give a presentation on them fairly soon, they went to places all over the country and they came back and they said this is where we'd like to be. Now, we had military people doing it, we had Secret Service people doing it. We had people that really understand what it's about. It's not about me. It's about getting the right location. I think it's very important. Jonathan? QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) boost your own brand? TRUMP: No. Not at all. Go ahead, Jonathan. 11:18:10 KARL: Thank you, Mr. President. President Macron said he'd like to see talks between you and President Rouhani within weeks. Does that sound realistic to you? Could you see yourself-- TRUMP: --I think that's-- KARL: --In talks with Iranians within weeks? TRUMP: Well, I don't know the gentleman. I think that--I think I know him a little bit just by watching over the last number of years what's happened. I'll tell you one thing, he's a great negotiator. But he--I think he's going to want to meet. I think Iran wants to get this situation straightened out. Now, is that based on fact or based on gut? That's based on gut. But they want to get that situation straightened out, Jonathan. And they are really hurting badly. Their inflation, as you know, because I saw you reporting on it, their inflation is through the roof. Their economy has tanked entirely. The sanctions are absolutely hurting them horribly. I don't want to see that. I don't want to see that. They're great people. I don't want to see that, but we can't let them have a nuclear weapon. Can't let it happen. So I think that there's a really good chance that we would be. Jeff, please. 11:19:11 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Another follow-up from what the president of France said, he said that there might be a need for compensation to Iran. Would you, given all of the criticism you've made of the JC POA and the money that they got, be open to giving Iran compensation-- TRUMP: --No-- QUESTION: --If it met some of the criteria that you have? TRUMP: No. What he's talking in terms of compensation is they are out of money, and they meet--may need a short-term letter of credit or loan. No, we're not paying them. We don't pay. But they may need some money to get them over a very rough patch. And if they do need money, certainly--and we'd be secured by oil, which to me is great security. And they have a lot of oil, but it's secured by oil. So we are really talking about a letter of credit type facility. QUESTION: For the U.S. or from all the countries involved? TRUMP: It would be from numerous countries. It would be numerous countries. And it comes back. It would be--it would expire. It would be paid back immediately and very quickly. Yes, go ahead, please. Go ahead. Yes. QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Noet Oema (PH) with the (INAUDIBLE)-- TRUMP: --Good-- QUESTION: --Japanese newspaper. Now-- TRUMP: --Just left-- QUESTION: --Now the-- TRUMP: --Your prime minister, Abe. Good man. Great man. QUESTION: Okay. And the--now U.S. and Japan have an agreement in principle, which is has had a tremendous trade deal for the United States. So-- TRUMP: --And for Japan, both. QUESTION: Yes. So are you still considering imposing section 232 tariffs on Japan's older exports to the United States on national security grounds? 11:20:53 TRUMP: Not at this moment, no. Not at this moment. Well, it's one of the reasons we made the deal, but no, not at this moment. It's something I could do at a later date if I wanted to, but we're not looking at that. We just want to be treated fairly. You know, Japan has had a tremendous trade surplus with the United States for many, many years, long before I came here. And I'll tell you something, we are transforming our country. We are taking these horrible, one-sided, foolish, very dumb, stupid, if you'd like to use that word, because it's so descriptive, we are taking these trade deals that are so bad and we are making good, solid deals out of them. And that's transforming our country. That's--that will be transformative and very exciting, I think, for our country. Very, very exciting. Please, go ahead. Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. TRUMP: Well, I didn't actually say you. I said the woman behind you. So why don't we do her first. You've been asking a lot of questions all day long. QUESTION: Thanks, Mr. President. Yamiche (PH)-- TRUMP: --You can't say I don't give you access, right? Go ahead. 11:22:00 QUESTION: Thanks, Mr. President. Yamiche with PBS News Hour. Why do you think it's appropriate to invite Russia to the G7 even that they've meddled in the 2016 election? And are you worried that if Russia does come to the G7 that it might hurt you politically because it's only going to be a couple of months before the 2020 election? I don't care politically. I really don't. A little people a lot of people don't understand this. I ran one election and I won. It happened to be for president. I don't care politically. I'm going to run another election. I think I'm winning on polls that we see. Whether I win or not, I have to do the right thing. So I don't do things for political reasons. These are good, probably not, maybe it is. I mean, a lot of people are smart. A lot of people say having Russia, which is a power--having them inside the room is better than having them outside the room. By the way there were numerous people during the G7 that felt that way and we didn't take a vote or anything but we did discuss it. My inclination is to say yes, they should be in. They were really it was say President Obama--I am not blaming him but a lot of bad things happened with President Putin and President Obama. 11:23:03 One of the things that happened was as you know what happened with a very big area a very, very big and important area in the Middle East where the red line was drawn and then President Obama decided that he was not going to do anything about it. You can draw red lines in the sand--you just can't do it and the other was in Ukraine having to do with a certain section of Ukraine that you know very well where it was sort of taken away from President Obama--not taken away from President Trump, taken away from President Obama. President Obama was not happy that this happened because it was embarrassing to him, right? It was very embarrassing to him and he wanted (INAUDIBLE) Russia to be out of the--what was called the G8 and that was his determination. He was outsmarted by Putin. He was outsmarted. President Putin outsmarted President Obama. Wait a minute. And I can understand how President Obama would feel. He wasn't happy and (INAUDIBLE) for that reason. 11:24:05 Now I am only thinking about the world and I am thinking about this country in terms of the G7, whether it is G7, GA. I think it would be better to have Russia inside the tent than outside the tent. Do we live--by the way, yes we live either way. Is it politically popular for me to say that? Possibly not. I think a lot of people would agree with me frankly but possibly not. I do nothing for politics. I know a lot of you aren't--you are going to smile at that. I do nothing for politics. I do what is right and people like what I do and but I just do what is right. If I wanted to go strictly by politics I would probably pull that and possibly I would say gee, I don't want--I don't want Russia in but I really think it's good for security of the world, it is good for the economics of the world. Remember they are building a big pipeline in Europe going right up to Germany and I said to Angela who I had a great relationship with but I said you pay Russia billions of dollars and then we defend you from Russia. And I say how does that work? QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) misleading statement that Russia outsmarted President Obama-- TRUMP: Well, he did. QUESTION: What other countries have said that the reason why Russia was kicked out was very clearly because they annexed Crimea. Why keep repeating what some people would see as a clear lie? 11:25:19 TRUMP: Well, it was annexed during president--I know you like President Obama but it was annexed during President Obama's term. If it was annexed during my term I would say sorry, folks. I made a mistake. Sorry folks. President Obama was helping the Ukraine. Crimea was annexed during his term. Now it's a very big area--a very important area. Russia has its submarine. That is where they do their submarine work and that is where they dock large and powerful submarines but not as powerful as ours and not as large as ours but they have their submarines and President Obama was pure and simply outsmarted. They took Crimea during his term. That was not a good thing. It could have been stopped, it could have been stopped with the right whatever, it could have been stopped but President Obama was unable to stop it and it's too bad. Go ahead. QUESTION: President, as the G7 host next year you are allowed to invite other countries to come, even though they are not necessarily part of the overall group. Would you consider inviting Vladimir Putin under those circumstances? 11:26:31 TRUMP: I don't know that he would accept and those are tough circumstances. He was a part of G8 and all of the sudden he is not out or he's not in. So I think, John, that's a pretty tough thing for him. You know he is a proud person. Would I invite him? I would certainly invite him. Whether or not he could come psychologically I think that's a tough thing for him to do. You have a GA, now it's a G7 and you invite the person that was thrown out really by President Obama and really because he got outsmarted. President Obama pure and simple and don't forget it was not just Crimea. It was the red line in the sand and Obama said never violate the red line in the sand and then they went ahead and they killed many children with gas. It was terrible and he did nothing about it. I did but I was there years later. I did something about it but I was there late. Go ahead. 11:27:30 QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Can you help us understand the timeline on the China calls? Were you referring to the statement by the vice (INAUDIBLE)? TRUMP: Well, we have had many calls (AUDIO GAP) Secretary Mnuchin is here and you have had many calls over the last 24 hours but certainly over the last 48 hours we have had many calls, not just one. This isn't one and these are high-level calls. They want to make a deal and by the way I think a deal is going to be made but they want to make a deal. QUESTION: So the Chinese are saying that there weren't in the particular-- TRUMP: The Chinese are not saying that. Excuse me. Let--let me explain something. The vice-chairman of China--make do you get higher than that other than President Xi? The vice president, the vice chairman it is like the vice president, the vice-chairman made the statement that he wants to make a deal and he wants to see a calm atmosphere. He wants it all to happen. That says that they are--I don't have to talk of it. You know you folks were reporting before we can't find any phone call. He released a statement, I didn't really sick, he released a statement. QUESTION: But there were phone calls, sir? Mr. President, there were phone calls? TRUMP: Numerous calls. QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) 11:28:38 TRUMP: And not only with Steve, there were calls with other people, too. Just so you understand, China wants to make a deal. Now whether or not we make a deal it has got to be a great deal for us. You know and I told this to President Xi who I really respect, I really do. I have great respect and I like him to and he is a tough guy but I have a lot of feeling for President Xi very outstanding in so many ways but I told him very strongly I said look, you are (INAUDIBLE) up here and you are making $500 billion a year and stealing our intellectual property. We are way down on the floor, lower than the floor. You have got to make a 50-50 deal. This has to be a deal that is better for us and if it is not better let's not do business together. I don't want to do business. Forget about tariffs for a second, we are taking in tremendous amounts of money to get that I don't want to do business. 11:29:33 Now when I raise and he raises, I raise and he raised--we can never catch up. We have to balance our trading relationship at least two and the extent and they were unwilling to do that and we will never have a deal if that happens but it's going to happen because they have to have a deal. And as far as phone calls are concerned Secretary of the Treasury and other people have been receiving many calls--not receiving, back and forth, many calls. China wants to make a deal and if we can we will make a deal, we will see. Go ahead. QUESTION: Mr. President if I could ask you a little bit about your China strategy-- TRUMP: Yeah. QUESTION: President Macron talked a little bit about instability and the worry in the market sand around the globe about instability one of the things that that comes from as--as you talk-- TRUMP: Are you talking about global economic instability? QUESTION: Right, but--but-- TRUMP: I don't consider it instability but that's (INAUDIBLE). QUESTION: One of the things that it comes from is the back and forth in the changing statements from your elf so that-- TRUMP: Sorry. It is the way I negotiate. QUESTION: So my question is is that a strategy? Is it a strategy to call President Xi an enemy one day and then say-- TRUMP: Yeah-- QUESTION: --the relations are very good the next day? TRUMP: No, no, no. QUESTION: And then you know it has gone back and-- 11:30:40 TRUMP: It is the way I negotiate. It has done very well for me over the years and it is doing even better for the country. QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about-- TRUMP: And I do think--and I do think that look, here is the story. I hear people say just make a deal, make a deal, they don't have the guts and they don't have the wisdom to know that you can't continue to go on where a country is taking $500 billion, not million, $500 billion with a be out every single year, $500 billion. You just can't do that. Somebody had to do this. This should have been done by President Obama, it should have been done and by Sleepy Joe. It should have been done by other people. It should have been done by Bush, it should have been done by Clinton. Double (PH) Bush. It should have been done. I am doing it. Let me tell you something else. North Korea should have been done a long time ago. I am doing it. I am doing a lot of things that I shouldn't have to be doing. Please. Go ahead, please. 11:31:52 QUESTION: Beth Rigby, Sky News. President Trump you have met our new Prime Minister Boris Johnson yesterday. TRUMP: Yes. QUESTION: You said he was the right man for the job on Brexit. TRUMP: I believe that. QUESTION: Do you think Theresa May was the wrong woman and do you think that Boris Johnson can actually get a deal with the EU for October 31? TRUMP: Well, Theresa wasn't able to do the deal. I gave her my ideas as to doing it very early on and you possibly know what they are but I would have done that, she chose to do it her way and that didn't work out so well. I think she is a very, very good person and a good woman and I really believe that Boris Johnson would be a great Prime Minister. You know we like each other and we had a great 2 1/2 days. 11:32:43 I have been waiting for him to be prime minister for about six years. I told him what took you so long. I think he is going to be a great Prime Minister and especially after spending a lot of intense time with him over the last couple of days. He's really a--he is very smart and he is very strong and he is very enthusiastic. And you know what else? He loves your country. He really loves your country. That came out maybe more than anything else. Yeah, please. QUESTION: Vicky Young, BBC News. President Trump, Boris Johnson is a very keen on a trade deal with the USA. You sound keen on it too. Some of his critics though are worried that you're going to do over the UK in that deal-- TRUMP: --No, no-- QUESTION: --To protect Russia and China. 11:33:24 TRUMP: I love the UK. I own great property in the UK. I love the UK. I have no idea how my property is doing because I don't care. But I own Turnberry, and I own in Aberdeen and I own in Ireland, as you know, Doonbeg and great stuff. And I'll be honest with you. I think--I think that--I think he's going to just do a great job as prime minister. You know, it takes a lot. It's so many different elements to being a great prime minister. And you needed him. I just think his time is right. This is the right time for Boris. This is the right time for Boris. Yeah. Please go ahead. Go ahead, right here. Say who you're with, please. Yeah? QUESTION: Rob Peston from ITV in the UK as well. You've obviously had a good few days with President Macron, who you appear to be doing business with-- TRUMP: --Right-- QUESTION: --To use your favorite expression. After Brexit, who do you think will be your more important relationship, President Macron, France and the EU, or Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? 11:34:30 TRUMP: I think we're going to have just--look, France is a great nation. It's being run--a lot of things are happening. You know, it's not easy, what he's doing. He's changing certain ways. It's a very hard thing to do. I won't get into it. I'm going to let him sell his ideas, but a lot of people don't disagree with his ideas. But it's a very hard thing to do. If you're a great citizen of France, you love your country but you want to do the way you've been doing it for a long time, but maybe that's not working and maybe they have to do what he has to do. I think he's going to do a fantastic job, but it's very tough for him. I know how tough it is for him. He's been having a hard time. And nobody would have an easy time. But I do believe he's doing the right thing. And Boris is different. It's a different kind of a deal. Boris has to try and do something with Brexit. It's very tough. I deal with the EU. The EU is--that's a very, very strong group of people. They have their ideas and they're not easy to deal with, I will tell you. 11:35:27 We're very close to making a deal, by the way, with the EU. I have to say this. We made a great deal with Japan, and we are very close to may be making a deal with the EU because they don't want tariffs. It's very simple. They don't want to tax cars. Mercedes-Benz, BMW, they don't need a 20 percent or a 25 percent tax. But we're very close. I think we're going to make a deal with the EU without having to go that route. I may have to go that route, but maybe not. We're going to have a deal, a really fair deal. But the EU is another one. We've been losing $180 billion a year for many years. That's a lot of money. How much can you take out of the piggy bank, right? QUESTION: But the--which alliance will be more important, with the EU or with Britain? TRUMP: Both. I don't want to say which. Look, I think that--I think that the--I think we have been with--I guess I would start out by saying England, right? You know, I asked Boris, where's England? What's happening with England? They don't use it too much anymore. We talked about it. It was very interesting. But the United Kingdom is a great, incredible place. It's an incredible nation. And it's, you know, been one of our tremendous allies. And another one happens to be Australia. He was here also, Scott. He is fantastic. In fact we're honoring him and Australia at the White House in a very short period of time. But I think that--excuse me? QUESTION: Will you visit Australia? 11:36:50 TRUMP: At some point I will, yeah. At some point I will, also Germany. Angela asked me to visit Germany. We're going there--going there too. So, I just think they're very different. And they're going to be going at it for a little while, but ultimately probably it works out. They may have to get out. They may not make a deal. The European Union is very tough to make deals with, very, very tough. Just ask Teresa May. QUESTION: Mr. President? TRUMP: Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Sigel (PH) with the Associated Press. I was hoping that you could clarify. Last year, you left the summit in Canada feuding with the summit host. This year things to be--seem to be a little bit different. You're talking about unity. You had a hug with President Macron on the stage. What is different? And also, as President Macron said, he's passing you the baton now of leading this multilateral institution. You ran on the platform of America first. What is your now-- TRUMP: --I understand-- QUESTION: --Now that you have a mandate from the international community, what are you going to do with it? 11:37:45 TRUMP: Well, we actually had a very good meeting. I had it out with one or two people where we disagreed in terms of concept. But we actually had a pretty good meeting last year. I would say that this was a big step above in terms of unity, in terms of agreement. We have really great agreement on the lot of very important subjects. But last year was good also. I mean, last year was good also. I think last year might have been a little bit underrated, you know? Go ahead, please. QUESTION: And in terms of the G7 presidency-- TRUMP: --Go ahead-- QUESTION: --What do you want to do with it? What was--what's your agenda now? TRUMP: Well, we're going to do something hopefully special. We're going to build on what we have now. We built on something really good. We're going to be going in with some great unity. We really did. We--if there was any word for this particular meeting of seven a very important countries, it was unity. I think most important of all we got along great. We got along great. QUESTION: Mr. President, to follow up on China-- QUESTION: --Can I ask you a question, sir? TRUMP: Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'm Chi Li Chung (PH) with the Shanghai Media Group. You just mentioned that Chinese Vice Premier Liu He said to China is willing to resolve this issue through calm negotiations. 11:38:52 TRUMP: No, I didn't say it. He did. QUESTION: Yes. TRUMP: Yeah. QUESTION: And will the U.S. negotiate in the same manner? TRUMP: Yes. True. QUESTION: And also, the other--the other question-- TRUMP: --That was--that was an easy answer. (LAUGHTER) QUESTION: So, the U.S. will negotiate in the same manner with-- TRUMP: --Absolutely. Great respect for China, great respect for the leadership of China, absolutely. QUESTION: --And also, the other question is that you say you definitely will invite Putin to join in next year's summit. TRUMP: I haven't said that. But I think that having President Putin in what was the G8--he was a member of the G8. And I heard he was a--a good member of the G8. Having him in I think is more of an advantage. I think it's a positive for the world. I think it's a positive for Russia. I think it's a big positive for Russia. And it's something the group is discussing. They are discussing it. QUESTION: But just a few hours ago-- TRUMP: --People feel very much like me, many people. What? QUESTION: But just a few hours ago, Russian foreign minister is saying that it's not their foreign policy pursuit to return G-8. What's your reaction on that? 11:40:00 TRUMP: Well, you know, we'll see. I know one thing. If they were invited back, I think they'd be there. If they weren't, that's okay too. I just think they'd be better inside than outside, I mean, as I said before. I really do. I think they'd be an asset. I think it would be a good thing. You know, some of the things--we were going in the room, and yesterday in particular we were discussing four or five matters. And Russia was literally involved in all of those four or five matters. And a few of the people looked up and said, you know, why aren't they here talking to us about it? And like what are we going to do now, go home, take it easy for a day, although I'm not doing that. I don't take it easy. But what are we going--we're going to go home and start calling them at the end of the week and say, hey, how about this? Could have been in the room. We had numerous things that we were just going to see, right, numerous. We had a lot of things that we were discussing. And it would have been very easy if Russia was in the room. If he was in the room, we could have some of those things. Now they're just in limbo. But I have to say, with all of that, very little in limbo. But somebody will speak to him about some things. And frankly, they're not very complicated, but it would be easier if they were in the room, okay? QUESTION: Thank you so much. TRUMP: Josh, go ahead. Josh? 11:41:06 QUESTION: Mr. President, there was a--significant talk at the summit about climate change. I know in the past you've proffered some skepticism of the science and climate change. What do you think the world should be doing about climate change? And do you still harbor that skepticism? TRUMP: I feel that the United States has tremendous wealth. The wealth is under its feet. I have made that well, live in. We will soon be one of the--we will soon be export--in fact, were actually doing it now, exporting. But we are now the number one energy producer in the world, and soon it will be by far with a couple of pipelines that have not been able to get approved for many, many years. It will have a huge impact. I was able to get ANWR in Alaska. It could be the largest site in the world for oil and gas. I was able to get ANWR approved. Ronald Reagan was unable to do it. Nobody was able to do it. They've been trying to do it since before Ronald Reagan. I got it approved. 11:42:02 We're the number one energy producer in the world. Soon it will be by far the number one. It's a tremendous wealth. And LNG is being sought after all over Europe and all over the world, and we have more of it than anybody else. And I'm not going to lose that well. I'm not going to lose it on--on dreams, on windmills, which frankly aren't working too well. I'm not going to lose it. So, Josh, in a nutshell, I want the cleanest water on earth. I want the cleanest air on earth. And that's what we're doing. 11:42:41 And I'm an environmentalist. You--a lot of people don't understand that. I have done more environmental impacts statements probably than anybody that's--I guess I can say definitely, because I have done many, many, many of them, more than anybody that's ever been President or Vice President or anything even close to President. And I think I know more about the environment than most people. I want clean air. I want clean water. I want a wealthy country. I want a spectacular country with the jobs, with pensions, with so many things, and that's what we're getting. So I want to be very careful. QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) 11:43:15 TRUMP: --At the same time--at the same time--at the same time--you weren't called. At the same time, it's very important to me, very important to me. We have to maintain this incredible--this incredible place that we've all built. We've come a much richer country, and that's a good thing, not a bad thing, because that great wealth allows us to take care of people. We can take care of people we couldn't have taken care of in the past because of the great wealth. We can't let that wealth be taken away. Clean air, clean water. Thank you very much, everybody. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you very much.

1015 WH G7 US FRANCE PRESSER STIX FS24 74 HOST TV HB2 STIX PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP ATTENDS THE G-7 SUMMIT IN FRANCE DONALD TRUMP NEWS CONFERENCE W/ FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON. TRUMP THEN HOLDS INDIVIDUAL NEWS CONFERENCE AR: 16x9 10:33:00 TRUMP: Thank you very much. MACRON: Mr. President, Madam First Lady, ladies and gentlemen--ladies and gentlemen following this G7 meeting that we have just held and we have been discussing for two days now and I am going to report back to you but first of all I would like to thank President Trump and all of the heads of state in the government here for the extremely productive work and very productive discussions that we have had since Saturday evening together. There was a lot of nervousness at the outset, a lot of expectations, a lot of tensions and we heard about a lot of conflict and I can say that what we were really keen on was to convey a positive and joint message following our discussions, discussions on several topics. 10:34:15 We haven't negotiated a very long text as promised and you will get just a one page declaration that there will be a lot of different annexes to it but it is just one page, one page that covers some of the key items that were addressed. Now we have decided to hold this joint conference. I am going to give the floor to President Trump and of course President Trump and the first lady will then proceed with their own press conference to the American press where other discussions will take place but I just wanted to sum up the different items on which we have agreed and the topics on which we have made headway, biodiversity, digital (INAUDIBLE) economy amongst others. We wanted to hold this joint conference together because next year it is the United States of America that will host the G7 Summit and we are going to pass the baton onto President Trump. That is why we are here together and I just wanted to say that for the last two days we have worked a lot together on several common points. 10:35:32 While we have a lot of things in common but one thing we had in common with President Trump is they don't like to waste our time and we like to achieve concrete results and provide momentum to the work and as soon as President Trump arrived with the one to one lunch that we had together I think that there is a most productive and interesting conversations that we have had together and from that point onward we set the pace and kept the ball rolling to be as efficient as possible to the very end. There are a few things that are expected from both our countries. 10:36:15 As far as Iran is concerned President Trump and myself have had discussions in the last few weeks and particularly in the last couple of days and we agree that Iran needs to comply with its nuclear obligations and have responsible behavior in the Gulf and work with us. And there were two very clear things that matter to us. Iran should never have nuclear weapon and its situation should not threaten the stability of the region. France has taken a lot of different initiatives and I always informed President Trump on them to be able to get the technical means to move forward because the decisions that the U.S. has taken in the last few months have put a lot of pressure and have put us in the situation where it is indeed necessary to improve the security situation of the region. So we coordinated our efforts and we reached a decision to bring together the foreign ministers--Foreign Minister of Iran to have a meeting with the French Foreign Minister and a roadmap has sort of been set but nothing is absolutely set in stone and we will have to move ahead together to find an outcome. 10:37:30 This morning President Rouhani said that he was prepared to meet any political leader who in the interest of his country and that is what I had told Minister Zarif and this is what I mentioned to President Rouhani on the phone as well that if he would agree to a meeting with President Trump that my conviction was that an agreement can be met. We know the terms, we know the objectives but we have to just now sit around the table and make that happen. So I hope that in the next few weeks based on our discussions we will be able to achieve them. The meeting that we just mentioned between President Rouhani and President Trump, myself and the partners have a role to play in nuclear negotiations will also be fully involved in these negotiations. I think that this meeting is very important and the last few days have clarified the situation, a lot of messages have been conveyed, a lot of work has been done between our ministers. 10:38:35 We would like to thank our ministers who have been totally involved in these discussions and have set the stage for these discussions and for an agreement. Of course I want to be very cautious and very modest but I think that this is going to lead us to putting an end to escalation and reaching a suitable solution. The discussions that we had on Saturday afternoon and Saturday dinner have been very fruitful and our purpose is to ensure the stability of the region. The idea is to make sure that her aunt doesn't get the nuclear weapon and have more visibility in the long-term. 10:39:20 As far as trade is concerned we have also shared a lot of analysis and a lot of observations. Later on I will go into the details of that but I think we can say that our discussions have clarified what is legitimate and what the United States feels is an unfair situation. We have international rules that govern the international trade and in this one page document we said that it is very good to have a single organization that governs international trade but so far this selective body has not been very efficient in raising trade barriers. It has not been efficient enough in solving problems when they occurred. It has not been efficient enough in protecting the intellectual property of our industries. 10:40:10 Discussions are underway currently in particular between President Trump and President Xi and we have seen even that just the recent--very recent past that an agreement can't be reached. So we are going to reaffirm our desire to change the rules that govern international trade and revamp them so that no one is dealt with unfairly so that our workers are protected and so that the situation of the past is put to an end and this is something that we need to work on together. There was a lot of nervousness because of misunderstanding, because there is some very powerful economic players that have said what about these digital attacks that France has imposed. 10:41:06 Well, we have reached a very good agreement and once again to the solid work that has been done (INAUDIBLE) ministers has really helped us to make progress. In our economies we have very unfair situations where some players don't pay taxes so that there is unfair competition with other players and it is these large multinational players that don't pay taxes which leads to significant instability on the economic front. Is this fair? It is not fair. Of course we are pushing for international rules on this and at the European level ten (PH) countries France, Italy, even the UK is getting ready to do so has decided to do something at the national level but it is not against in a company in particular it is just to solve the problem. In fact a lot of French companies will also be impacted by this tax and some of you have probably heard me say a few months ago that this is only to find a solution and the aim ultimately is to find an agreement internationally by 2022 revamp international tax systems within the framework of the OECD to combat harmful trade practices which are also harmful to the U.S. economy and through this digital tax--on this digital tax, we worked a lot bilaterally as well and we have reached an agreement and to overcome the hurdles. 10:42:36 So we are going to work on a bilateral and multilateral basis to find a solution together. And today international tax exists on digital services France will do away with its national tax and everything that is already being paid under the French tax system will be reimbursed. 10:43:00 So the idea is that we need to find joint agreement in order to address joint international problems and the situation right now is very negative and the international tax system definitely needs to be modernized and I think will work together in a spiritual cooperation on this. As to Libya, Syria, North Korea, Hong Kong, you will see in the one page document that we have made considerable headway in the spirit of unity, and we have also done some significant work as far as the Amazon region is concerned. There--there has been relations with President Bolsonaro and we have taken a very ambitious initiative that President Pinera presented this morning after having discussed with all the heads of state and government of the region as we had wished and as President Trump had wished as well. 10:44:02 I don't want to go into the details, but I just want to highlight these few things that I just mentioned. I just wanted to say that we work together hand-in-hand with President Trump over these two days. And during this G7, I would like to thank all my colleagues in fact, for this. We have managed to reach convergence at unprecedented levels on several issues, and we're going to continue this work in the weeks and months to follow with a lot of energy and North Korea knows how strongly President Trump is committed to this issue. There is also the agreement with China and we're going to work hand-in-hand on all of the different issues. 10:44:47 I would like to thank you, President Trump, for your involvement in the last couple of days. I would like to thank your first lady who is by your side and who has been very active side-by-side with my own spouse. And she has honored us in our country. She knows how popular she is in our country. And President Trump will be hosting the G7 Summit next year, so I'm going to give him the floor so that he can tell us how you intend to organize the G7. And I will be there by your side with the same will and the same determination in the same desire for unity. Thank you. (APPLAUSE & HANDSHAKE) 10:45:30 TRUMP: Thank you very much. Well, I want to thank you very much. And I think more importantly than anything, I wanted to come up here to say that because the job that President Macron--and your wife, by the way, who is a great lady, Brigitte, I'd like to thank Brigitte. She has been spectacular, spent a tremendous amount of time with Melania and some of the folks who came in, some of the wives that came in and they had a great tour of the area, and it's a beautiful area. But I want to thank you very much, Mr. President, for the incredible job you did. This is a truly successful G7. There was tremendous unity. There was great unity. Sometimes I'd read a little bit of false reporting, and I will tell you there was. In fact, we were--we would have stayed for another hour. Nobody wanted to leave. We were accomplishing a lot, but I think more importantly, we were getting along very well. Seven countries, and it really was the G7. And you have been a spectacular leader on this. And I want to thank you and I want to thank the great country of France. Thank you very much. (APPLAUSE) MACRON: Thank you, my friend. TRUMP: --And with that, I think--oh, excuse me. I was--go ahead. Let's go. MACRON: No, no. I was--I just wanted to say we will take two questions-- TRUMP: --Okay-- MACRON: --On each sides. Afterwards, I will say goodbye to my friend, President Trump. I will leave the room in order for you to follow-up with 10:46:54 TRUMP: If you'd like, we could do to each and then we both leave the room. Would you prefer that or would you prefer--I just don't want to have the president of France standing here while I'm answering these absolutely wonderful questions, okay? (LAUGHTER) So why don't we start with a question for France? MACRON: Four questions about G7 and the U.S.-France relations. TRUMP: And Emmanuel is going to have his own press conference after this. MACRON: Exactly. TRUMP: So that'll be fine. Go ahead. To France, John. To France. 10:47:30 QUESTION: Thank you. Of course (INAUDIBLE). Mr. President Macron, China was not on the official agenda, but it was certainly a big part of the discussions here at the G7. Are you concerned that the trade war that exists now between the United States and China could harm the global economy? If you are, did you talk to President Trump about that and are you also at the same time concerned that if China's current trade practices go unchecked that a decade from now, we could be in a very terrible situation? 10:48:06 MACRON: On this subject, we obviously had lengthy discussions during the session on the world economy yesterday morning. On both subjects, the discussion is underway between China and the United States of America. Obviously, as we clearly see, create uncertainty, which disturb markets and investors and during the negotiations will create tensions, which is the case of any discussion. We saw this on different stock markets, which with which you are familiar. Now the question is to know what the result of these discussions will be, and that's why we considered that it was so important an agreement be found between the two greatest economic powers in the world. 10:49:00 President Trump clearly showed us his willingness to arrive at an agreement. We saw just a few hours ago the very positive and encouraging message that could be distilled from this. If we see the things are moving. Our deep wish is for an agreement to be found within the United States and China concerning trade because I think that would be something positive for everyone. Neither the United States nor China is economically or industrially naive. It has to be a balanced agreement that will be good for everyone, and we will be vigilant to see that it's whole good for the whole world. In that context, our different parameters will be taken on board, and that was one of the subjects of our discussion. What's bad for the world economy is uncertainty. And the quicker an agreement is arrived at, that quicker that uncertainty will dissipate. That's what we discussed yesterday, and that's the American president's wish. In terms of trade practices, I said this earlier, for me, the most effective way forward and the most strategic way forward in settling our trade relations with China is to develop trade, but also to ensure that that trade is part of international trade rules. 10:50:15 The problems we sometimes had, we're very familiar with this with the Chinese economy, is a major economy where there's been lots of investment from the United States, European countries, Canada, and Japan. The problem is respecting intellectual property, dealing with excess capacity, which sometimes unbalances some world markets, and the ability to deal rapidly with concepts we may have and with unfair situations. Now, we are obliged to see that when this type of trade happens outside of WTO rules, things don't work very well, and we are not properly protected. And when we follow WTO rules, the WTO rules as they presently exist haven't allowed us to be protected on the subjects. 10:51:06 So what we decided together yesterday morning was to accelerate with a very realistic agenda and to say we're going to change the rules of world trade so that everyone could have free and fair trade, balance trade, and the subjects which I just mentioned, which have sometimes been bad for our economies can be settled in an international framework, which we wish profoundly to change. And we and our different ministers in the different contexts that we are putting forward are going to share these political goals and, to my way of thinking, the way to deal with the practices you have mentioned, certainly, the positive agreements that will be arrived at and also the renewal of our international trade rules as we said yesterday morning. QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) are you satisfied with how far the proposed WTO reforms will go-- 10:51:55 TRUMP: --No-- QUESTION: --Because you have spoken--you have spoken to that, and second to that-- TRUMP: --We're getting there. I'll just answer that. We're getting there. QUESTION: Do you believe that China is sincere about what it said this morning-- TRUMP: --Yes-- QUESTION: --Or do you think that they are just trying to calm the markets and play for time? Because our sister network, the Fox Business network has been told by Chinese sources that they have no plans on going back to where they were in terms to the negotiations this spring on intellectual property, force technology transfers ownership. So-- TRUMP: --We'll see, John-- QUESTION: --Do you trust that they are sincere? 10:52:30 TRUMP: I do. I think they wanted to make a deal very badly. I think that was elevated last night very late in the night. I see an alert, or you would call it breaking news, and it was the vice chairman, we're not talking about somebody from China at a low level, the vice chairman of China came out that he wants to see a deal made, he wants it to be made under calm conditions using the word calm. I agree with him on that. And China has taken a very hard hit over the last number of months. You know, they've lost 3 million jobs. It'll soon be much more than 3 million jobs. Their chain is breaking. The chain is breaking up like nobody has seen before. And once that happens, it's very hard to put it back. You understand I think they want--very much want to make a deal and the longer they wait the harder it is to put it back if it can be put back at all. So I believe they want to do a deal. The tariffs have hit them very hard in a fairly short period of time they you United States will have collected over $100 billion in tariffs. 10:53:35 And I say it again, the reporters failed to--the media failed to acknowledge it but if we look at the goods coming in from China we are talking about China, not other countries. If you look at the goods they have a power that others don't have but that power is only good for so long. They have manipulated their currency, they have devalued their currency and they have put a lot of cash into the system and because of that the prices have not gone up or if they have gone up it has been very little because they want to keep people working. If the prices go up they are not going to be able to keep people working, they are not going to be able to compete. It is a brilliant market, it is a brilliant, brilliant market, the world market, a lot of markets are brilliant and frankly I think that China cannot--I don't know, maybe they can, maybe they can't. I don't think they can do that and I think they are very smart and I think President Xi is a great leader who happens to be a brilliant man and he can't lose 3 million jobs in a very short period of time and that is going to be magnified many times over and it is going to break down the Chinese system of trade and he can't do that. 10:54:40 So when you say do you think they want to, maybe they want to and may be they don't but I think they want to make a deal. I am not sure they have a choice and I don't say that as a threat. I don't think they have a choice. In the meantime the United States which has never collected $.10 from China will in a fairly short period of time be over $100 billion in tariffs. So I think they want to make a deal very badly. Go ahead. MACRON: Second question. 10:55:15 QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) Mr. President you have just declared that you created the conditions for a meeting between President Trump and President Rouhani. Does that mean that France for instance might be a mediator in that meeting and more concretely what did you discussed in terms of that possible agreement with Iran? Then a question for Mr. Trump. Are you ready to lift or to soften American sanctions on Iranian oil exports and would you be ready to meet President Rouhani? Thank you. 10:55:50 MACRON: On the first question the terms of the discussion are quite simple, and agreement was signed in 2015 on July 14. We call it the JCPOA and bad agreement set forth guarantees for the international community including these signatories of that agreement saying that Iran would no longer in rich uranium over a certain period of time. I am simplifying this but up to 2025 in exchange for reopening many economic sectors and massive investment largely made by the United States. That agreement had a twofold advantage, stability and security and also reopening economically speaking which was good for Iran. 10:56:40 This agreement also had drawbacks and shortcomings French negotiators in 2015 were the most determined and France was the country that hesitated most to sign this agreement because we considered we needed as many guarantees as possible. President Trump during his campaign made a commitment to those who voted for him to be more demanding and tougher because he considered that this agreement was insufficient which caused him to leave it. Today because of the sanctions made by President Trump the Iranian economy is having serious consequences and a serious slow down and that situation very clearly is the aspect--we might say the positive side of things from one standpoint it is creating pressure and therefore the necessary conditions to improve the terms of an agreement. On the other hand it is leading to reactions in Iran where saying well, we have signed this agreement but those who have signed it are not respecting its terms and so we are starting symbolically to enrich uranium and they risk that they are going to go further still and leave the JCPOA so given the two goals that we have where are we going with this? 10:57:52 We need to be sure that Iran will never get a nuclear weapon and that there will be no flareups in the region and so what we discussed very concretely was to see how we could improve very considerably or really in fact build a new nuclear agreement with Iran. President Trump was very clear saying that we would need a much longer time frame for it, that there needed to be surveillance of many more sites and this is how we can build a much further reaching agreement in terms of our security demands and on the other hand we need to convince the Iranians to go that direction and we can do that if we give them economic compensation of some form. If we make some movement in terms of lines of credit or reopening certain economic sectors. 10:58:44 I can't tell you today publicly more about this because anything I will tell you in detail will jeopardize the conversations we are going to have but this is basically what we are discussing on the basis of our initiative there is also a Japanese initiative I am talking in total transparency with the president but we agreed on a strategic goal and I want us to go further in this framework and to make proposals. At a given point in time there will have to be a meeting between the American and the Iranian presidents and I would wish that in the coming weeks such a meeting take place. France will play a role together with the other signatories who are our partners in the JCPOA but after that we will need to create the necessary conditions because we will have the necessary visibility for this agreement to be signed (INAUDIBLE) and for this meeting between the two presidents to take place. So I would rather talk about concert (INAUDIBLE) initiatives and exchanges rather than mediation because at the end of the day we have constant exchanges with President Trump. I share his goals. Sometimes we say we don't agree on methods but I want to get there. I want to have an agreement and I think there has been a true change. 10:59:54 This morning President Rouhani showed himself to be open to this meeting happening and President Trump has been saying for weeks that he is being demanding, he is being tough, he has put forward sanctions but I am ready to have a meeting to make a deal and I think that we are making progress. I want this meeting to happen and I want there to be an agreement between the United States and Iran and France will play the role it is meant to play together with the United Kingdom, with Germany and all of the other signatory powers and the pertinent members of the Security Council. 11:00:22 TRUMP: Iran is a country that is not the same country that it was 2 1/2 years ago when I came into office. Iran was the number one state of terror throughout the world. There were 18 sites of confliction. In my first week when I spoke with the folks at the Pentagon including lots of generals and lots of other military experts, 18 sites of confliction meaning 18 sites of big problems. Every one of them was backed by Iran or in some cases actually using Iranian soldiers but at a minimum Iranian wealth, much of it given in the ridiculous deal where they were given $150 billion plus $1.8 billion in cash and they use that money for some bad purposes. With that being said I think that Iran is a country of tremendous potential. 11:01:16 We are not looking for leadership change, we are not looking for that kind of change. This country has been through that many times before. That doesn't work. We are looking for no nuclear weapons, no ballistic missiles and a longer period of time. Mary simple. We can have it done in a very short period of time and I really believe that Iran can be a great nation, I would like to see that happen. But they can't have nuclear weapons. Okay? Thank you. QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) TRUMP: Excuse me? QUESTION: Would you agree to meet with (INAUDIBLE)? TRUMP: If these circumstances were correct or write I would certainly agree to that. But in the meantime they have to be good players. You understand what that means and they can't do what they were saying they were going to do because if they do that they are going to be met with really very violent force. We have no choice. So I think they are going to be good. I really think they would like to and by the way President Macron told me every step that he was making yesterday. A lot of you said he came in--he told me long before he came in what was happening. What was--I didn't think it was appropriate to meet yesterday, too soon and things have to be worked out first but President Macron told me exactly was happening, who was coming and what time they were coming, where they were going to meet and after the meeting he told me exactly what happens and I think he had a very positive meeting. 11:02:45 Prime Minister Abe of Japan also a large purchaser of oil from Iran he was also very much involved and he knows everybody there so he was very--make very positive force but I have to tell you the president has done an excellent job and we are going to see how it all turns out. Maybe it works, maybe it doesn't. I say it all of the time about everything. Maybe it works and maybe it doesn't but I will tell you what we made a ridiculously--we gave them $150 billion and $1.8 billion and we got nothing--we got (INAUDIBLE). And by the way, that agreement was so short term that it expires in a very short period of time. With the country, you don't make a deal that short. Countries last for long times, and you don't do a short-term deal especially when you're paying that kind of money. 11:03:35 So, I have the--I have good feelings about Iran. I have good feelings that it'll work. I know many Iranians living in New York City. I have many friends from Iran. They're incredible people, incredible people. So, the last thing I'd like to say is a big problem, but we have to do what we have to do, okay? Go ahead, please. No. No, no. For you--you first. Go ahead. No, no. Go ahead, yes. Yes. QUESTION: Okay. Thank you. President Macron did you--did you seek President Trump's permission before you invited Foreign Minister Zarif, or did you simply inform him that he was coming? MACRON: Thanks for this very precise question. (LAUGHTER) 11:04:20 But to be very clear and--we are part of the JCPOA. We decided to remain in it still. So, we are very much interested by the situation as a sovereign country. That's why we want the different parties to move. On the other side, as President Trump made it very clear over the summer, we never spoke on behalf all the countries. We just tried testing some solutions and to see if we can find an agreement with different countries. So, we took initiative this summer to make a proposal, a technical one. I got a reaction from Iran through President Zarif's visit on Friday--Friday morning in a Paris. After the discussion we had at the G7 dinner on a Saturday evening, I thought that it was very clear about where we can go together. So, the day after, I decided to invite, as France, Minister Zarif. 11:05:20 So, I informed--before making it, I informed President Trump that it was my idea not to involve the United States, not to say this is on behalf of you, of everybody, but to say, as France, I think it would be a good idea to ask him to go back and try to negotiate something separately. So, I did it on my own. I informed before making it President Trump. He was informed at each minute about the solution--the situation, sorry. And the idea for me was, in case of structural move and important move and appropriate solutions, perhaps to have meetings between ministers, not at President Trump's level, because President Trump's level is present (INAUDIBLE). So, this is my precise answer. This is a French initiative, but made by the clear information of the U.S. president before, information as well all of the--the three Europeans. And each time I informed President Trump, in order to monitor the situation and to appreciate together if something more was adopted. 11:06:38 TRUMP: I have to say, the JCPOA was a bad deal, should not have been entered into. A lot of things could've happened that would have been much different. They're allowed to test ballistic missiles. You're not allowed to go to various sites to check. And some of those sites are the most obvious sites for the creation or the making of nuclear weapons. And those things have to be changed, and other things have to be changed. And I will tell you I have very good feelings about it. I think that we're going to do something. It may not be immediately, but I think ultimately we're going to do something. As I said, Iran is a much different country than it was two and a half years ago. And we can get that back, and I'd encourage it. 11:07:27 I actually had friends years ago, many years ago. They were in the real estate business, and they were in Iran and they were building houses and building housing and building office buildings and apartment houses. And they did very well. They made a lot of money. And to this day--they are not exactly the youngest developers anymore, but they would tell you they were young when they were over there. They made a lot of money, and they loved the people and they loved what was going on. And it's a country with tremendous potential. I also say that, by the way, with respect to North Korea. Kim Jong-un, who I've got to know extremely well, the first lady has gotten to know Kim Jong-un and I think she'd agree with me, he is a man with a country that has tremendous potential. And you're in between China, Russia, and South Korea, people want to get to South Korea. They got to get there somehow. And if they're going to do anything other than essentially fly, they want to go through. So, railroads and everything else, so many things want to happen there. I think that North Korea has tremendous economic potential, and I think that Kim Jong-un sees that. He would be the leader, and I think he sees a tremendous potential that it's got. 11:08:44 With respect to Iran, same thing. Iran has incredible people. An incredible country, potentially, a location that's a little rough neighborhood, but eventually it's going to be a beautiful neighborhood. I think that it's going to be--I think it's going to work out. And I really believe that those countries that went into the original deal that more and more are agreeing with what I did. But I think those countries are going to be saying thank you someday. I hope they're going to be saying it, including France, including the president because I think we did the right thing. I know we did the right thing, if for no other reason. It's just too short. It's almost expiring, if you think about it. And somebody said, well, you'll go and make an extension. No, no. They're great negotiators. Look at what they did to get the deal. Look at what they did to John Kerry and to President Obama. Look what happened, where they're bringing planeloads of cash, planeloads, big planes, 757s, Boeing 757s coming in loaded up with cash. What kind of a deal is that? So, I think a lot of good things are going to happen. 11:09:56 And I just want to say this because I've spoken a lot with the president this last two and a half days. We've never had a better relationship. We had a lunch that lasted for quite a while that many of you got to see. It was the two of us, no staff, no anything. He wasn't trying to impress his people. I wasn't trying to impress his people. We were just trying to impress each other. And I'll tell you what, it was the best period of time we've ever had and we accomplished a lot. I don't mean just, gee whiz, wasn't that nice? He's a very capable man. He's doing a great job for France. He did an incredible job for the G7. And I just want to thank you. And you go ahead to your news conference and--very special. This was a very special, very unified two and a half days, and I want to thank you for it. Thank you. MACRON: Thank you. (APPLAUSE) TRUMP: Thank you (INAUDIBLE). Thank you, my friend. 11:11:02 MACRON: Thank you. I will leave the floor and the press conference to President Trump. And I will in the end--wait for the end of your own press conference. (UNTRANSLATED) QUESTION: Well, I don't want to give anything away, but we saw your wife, the first lady, during a glass of French wine yesterday. So, can you perhaps give up on your threats to put sanctions on French wine? Because if we understood correctly, you have arrived at an agreement on taxing digital firms. Could you confirm that there has been an agreement between you and France on taxing digital firms? TRUMP: I confirm that the first lady loved your French wine, okay? (LAUGHTER) All right? She loved your French wine. So, thank you very much. That's fine. You're good. MACRON: Thank you. TRUMP: Thank you, everyone. 11:12:02 MACRON: Merci a vous. I will wait for the end of this press conference to have the press conference of the presidency. I will leave the floor with you. Thank you. Thank you. TRUMP: Good job. She's worse than you are. I can't-- (LAUGHTER) I can't believe it, Jonathan. TRUMP: Thank you. Please sit down. QUESTION: You've recently-- TRUMP: --Thank you very much. 11:12:48 QUESTION: You've recently been saying that China wants a deal, but you're not necessarily ready for a deal and you like the tariff revenue that is coming in. Are you now ready to make a deal? TRUMP: Only if it's a fair deal and a good deal for the United States. Otherwise, I will not make a deal. We have billions and billions coming in, and I think we're going to get there. I do. I believe it more strongly now that I would have believed it a while ago. We're going to get there and we're going to have a really--we're going to have a fair deal. But remember this, say fair, China has been taking out of this country 500 plus billion dollars a year for many, many years. Many, many years. It was time to stop. 11:13:28 As a private person, I used to talk about it. It's one of the reasons I'm president. And we are in a great position. Our country is doing well, our unemployment numbers are the lowest they've been in over 50 years, our unemployment numbers for African--African-American, Asian, for Hispanic are the best they've ever been. Historic numbers. We are in a very strong position. Our consumers are strong. Walmart just announced numbers that were, I mean, mind-boggling numbers. That's a great poll right there. That's the ultimate poll, how are the retailers doing and how are certain--certain companies doing? So we're doing very well, and I think that--I think we're going to make a deal with China, and I think will probably, eventually were going to make a deal with Iran too. QUESTION: Why are you optimistic they'll change their behavior? TRUMP: It's not a question of behavior. I think they wanted to make a deal and I think they should make a deal. And I think if they don't make a deal, it's going to be very bad for China. And I very much appreciate the fact that they came out last night, very late last night, and they said, you know, they want to make a deal. They want it to be under calm circumstances with a little it was a little different kind of a statement. I thought it was a beautiful statement. I thought indicated a lot. Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you. TRUMP: Here we go. 11:14:45 QUESTION: I actually have a question for you on next year's G7 Summit, but can I just clarify something you said? You mentioned earlier today-- TRUMP: --One question. QUESTION: Well, let me do the clarification, and then I'll get to the question. TRUMP: No, no, no. QUESTION: You talk about polls-- TRUMP: --One question-- QUESTION: --Polls with China and a breaking news alert. I'm trying to understand what specifically you heard from China. And on next year's G7, you alluded today, dropped several hints about Miami about Doral at hosting next year's G7 at your property. What reassurances, if any, can you give the American people that you are not looking to profit off the presidency? 11:15:10 TRUMP: Well, I'll tell you what I've spent, and I think I will in a combination of loss an opportunity, probably it'll cost me from $3 to $5 billion to be president. And the only thing I care about is this country. I couldn't care less. Otherwise, and between opportunity, not doing I wouldn't have done it. People have asked me what do you think it costs? And between opportunity, not doing things, I used to get a lot of money to make speeches, now I give speeches all the time. You know what I get? Zippo. And that's good. And I did a lot of great jobs and great deals that I don't do anymore. I don't want to do them because the deals I'm making are great deals for the country, and that's, to me, much more important. Doral happens to be within Miami. It's a city. It's a wonderful place. It's a very, very successful area of Florida. It's very importantly only five minutes from the airport. The airport is right next door. It's a big international airport, one of the biggest in the world. Everybody that's coming, all of these people with all of their big entourages come. It's set up so--and by the way, my people look at 12 sites, all good, but some were 2 hours from an airport, some were 4 hours from--I mean, they were so far away. Some didn't allow this, or they didn't allow that. 11:16:22 With Doral, we have a series of magnificent buildings, we call them bungalows, they each hold from 50 to 70 very luxurious rooms with magnificent room views. We have credible conference rooms, incredible restaurants, it's like--it's like such a natural. We wouldn't even have to do the work that they did here, and they've done a beautiful job. They've really done a beautiful job. And what we have also is Miami and we have many hundreds of acres so that, in terms of parking, in terms of all of the things that you need. The ballrooms are among the biggest in Florida, and the best. It's brand-new and they want--my people wanted it. From my standpoint, I'm not going to make any money. In my opinion, I'm not going to make any money. I don't want to make money. I don't care about making money. If I wanted to make money, I wouldn't worry about $3 billion to $5 billion, because that's what's--I mean, at some point, I'm going to detail that, and we'll show. But I think it's just a great place to be. I think having it in Miami is fantastic, really fantastic. 11:17:29 Having it at that particular place, because of the way it's set up, each country can have their own villa or their own bungalow. And the bungalows, when I say, they have a lot of units in them. So I think it just works out well. And when my people came back, they took tours, they went to different places, I won't mention places, but you'll have a list because they're going to give a presentation on them fairly soon, they went to places all over the country and they came back and they said this is where we'd like to be. Now, we had military people doing it, we had Secret Service people doing it. We had people that really understand what it's about. It's not about me. It's about getting the right location. I think it's very important. Jonathan? QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) boost your own brand? TRUMP: No. Not at all. Go ahead, Jonathan. 11:18:10 KARL: Thank you, Mr. President. President Macron said he'd like to see talks between you and President Rouhani within weeks. Does that sound realistic to you? Could you see yourself-- TRUMP: --I think that's-- KARL: --In talks with Iranians within weeks? TRUMP: Well, I don't know the gentleman. I think that--I think I know him a little bit just by watching over the last number of years what's happened. I'll tell you one thing, he's a great negotiator. But he--I think he's going to want to meet. I think Iran wants to get this situation straightened out. Now, is that based on fact or based on gut? That's based on gut. But they want to get that situation straightened out, Jonathan. And they are really hurting badly. Their inflation, as you know, because I saw you reporting on it, their inflation is through the roof. Their economy has tanked entirely. The sanctions are absolutely hurting them horribly. I don't want to see that. I don't want to see that. They're great people. I don't want to see that, but we can't let them have a nuclear weapon. Can't let it happen. So I think that there's a really good chance that we would be. Jeff, please. 11:19:11 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Another follow-up from what the president of France said, he said that there might be a need for compensation to Iran. Would you, given all of the criticism you've made of the JC POA and the money that they got, be open to giving Iran compensation-- TRUMP: --No-- QUESTION: --If it met some of the criteria that you have? TRUMP: No. What he's talking in terms of compensation is they are out of money, and they meet--may need a short-term letter of credit or loan. No, we're not paying them. We don't pay. But they may need some money to get them over a very rough patch. And if they do need money, certainly--and we'd be secured by oil, which to me is great security. And they have a lot of oil, but it's secured by oil. So we are really talking about a letter of credit type facility. QUESTION: For the U.S. or from all the countries involved? TRUMP: It would be from numerous countries. It would be numerous countries. And it comes back. It would be--it would expire. It would be paid back immediately and very quickly. Yes, go ahead, please. Go ahead. Yes. QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Noet Oema (PH) with the (INAUDIBLE)-- TRUMP: --Good-- QUESTION: --Japanese newspaper. Now-- TRUMP: --Just left-- QUESTION: --Now the-- TRUMP: --Your prime minister, Abe. Good man. Great man. QUESTION: Okay. And the--now U.S. and Japan have an agreement in principle, which is has had a tremendous trade deal for the United States. So-- TRUMP: --And for Japan, both. QUESTION: Yes. So are you still considering imposing section 232 tariffs on Japan's older exports to the United States on national security grounds? 11:20:53 TRUMP: Not at this moment, no. Not at this moment. Well, it's one of the reasons we made the deal, but no, not at this moment. It's something I could do at a later date if I wanted to, but we're not looking at that. We just want to be treated fairly. You know, Japan has had a tremendous trade surplus with the United States for many, many years, long before I came here. And I'll tell you something, we are transforming our country. We are taking these horrible, one-sided, foolish, very dumb, stupid, if you'd like to use that word, because it's so descriptive, we are taking these trade deals that are so bad and we are making good, solid deals out of them. And that's transforming our country. That's--that will be transformative and very exciting, I think, for our country. Very, very exciting. Please, go ahead. Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. TRUMP: Well, I didn't actually say you. I said the woman behind you. So why don't we do her first. You've been asking a lot of questions all day long. QUESTION: Thanks, Mr. President. Yamiche (PH)-- TRUMP: --You can't say I don't give you access, right? Go ahead. 11:22:00 QUESTION: Thanks, Mr. President. Yamiche with PBS News Hour. Why do you think it's appropriate to invite Russia to the G7 even that they've meddled in the 2016 election? And are you worried that if Russia does come to the G7 that it might hurt you politically because it's only going to be a couple of months before the 2020 election? I don't care politically. I really don't. A little people a lot of people don't understand this. I ran one election and I won. It happened to be for president. I don't care politically. I'm going to run another election. I think I'm winning on polls that we see. Whether I win or not, I have to do the right thing. So I don't do things for political reasons. These are good, probably not, maybe it is. I mean, a lot of people are smart. A lot of people say having Russia, which is a power--having them inside the room is better than having them outside the room. By the way there were numerous people during the G7 that felt that way and we didn't take a vote or anything but we did discuss it. My inclination is to say yes, they should be in. They were really it was say President Obama--I am not blaming him but a lot of bad things happened with President Putin and President Obama. 11:23:03 One of the things that happened was as you know what happened with a very big area a very, very big and important area in the Middle East where the red line was drawn and then President Obama decided that he was not going to do anything about it. You can draw red lines in the sand--you just can't do it and the other was in Ukraine having to do with a certain section of Ukraine that you know very well where it was sort of taken away from President Obama--not taken away from President Trump, taken away from President Obama. President Obama was not happy that this happened because it was embarrassing to him, right? It was very embarrassing to him and he wanted (INAUDIBLE) Russia to be out of the--what was called the G8 and that was his determination. He was outsmarted by Putin. He was outsmarted. President Putin outsmarted President Obama. Wait a minute. And I can understand how President Obama would feel. He wasn't happy and (INAUDIBLE) for that reason. 11:24:05 Now I am only thinking about the world and I am thinking about this country in terms of the G7, whether it is G7, GA. I think it would be better to have Russia inside the tent than outside the tent. Do we live--by the way, yes we live either way. Is it politically popular for me to say that? Possibly not. I think a lot of people would agree with me frankly but possibly not. I do nothing for politics. I know a lot of you aren't--you are going to smile at that. I do nothing for politics. I do what is right and people like what I do and but I just do what is right. If I wanted to go strictly by politics I would probably pull that and possibly I would say gee, I don't want--I don't want Russia in but I really think it's good for security of the world, it is good for the economics of the world. Remember they are building a big pipeline in Europe going right up to Germany and I said to Angela who I had a great relationship with but I said you pay Russia billions of dollars and then we defend you from Russia. And I say how does that work? QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) misleading statement that Russia outsmarted President Obama-- TRUMP: Well, he did. QUESTION: What other countries have said that the reason why Russia was kicked out was very clearly because they annexed Crimea. Why keep repeating what some people would see as a clear lie? 11:25:19 TRUMP: Well, it was annexed during president--I know you like President Obama but it was annexed during President Obama's term. If it was annexed during my term I would say sorry, folks. I made a mistake. Sorry folks. President Obama was helping the Ukraine. Crimea was annexed during his term. Now it's a very big area--a very important area. Russia has its submarine. That is where they do their submarine work and that is where they dock large and powerful submarines but not as powerful as ours and not as large as ours but they have their submarines and President Obama was pure and simply outsmarted. They took Crimea during his term. That was not a good thing. It could have been stopped, it could have been stopped with the right whatever, it could have been stopped but President Obama was unable to stop it and it's too bad. Go ahead. QUESTION: President, as the G7 host next year you are allowed to invite other countries to come, even though they are not necessarily part of the overall group. Would you consider inviting Vladimir Putin under those circumstances? 11:26:31 TRUMP: I don't know that he would accept and those are tough circumstances. He was a part of G8 and all of the sudden he is not out or he's not in. So I think, John, that's a pretty tough thing for him. You know he is a proud person. Would I invite him? I would certainly invite him. Whether or not he could come psychologically I think that's a tough thing for him to do. You have a GA, now it's a G7 and you invite the person that was thrown out really by President Obama and really because he got outsmarted. President Obama pure and simple and don't forget it was not just Crimea. It was the red line in the sand and Obama said never violate the red line in the sand and then they went ahead and they killed many children with gas. It was terrible and he did nothing about it. I did but I was there years later. I did something about it but I was there late. Go ahead. 11:27:30 QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Can you help us understand the timeline on the China calls? Were you referring to the statement by the vice (INAUDIBLE)? TRUMP: Well, we have had many calls (AUDIO GAP) Secretary Mnuchin is here and you have had many calls over the last 24 hours but certainly over the last 48 hours we have had many calls, not just one. This isn't one and these are high-level calls. They want to make a deal and by the way I think a deal is going to be made but they want to make a deal. QUESTION: So the Chinese are saying that there weren't in the particular-- TRUMP: The Chinese are not saying that. Excuse me. Let--let me explain something. The vice-chairman of China--make do you get higher than that other than President Xi? The vice president, the vice chairman it is like the vice president, the vice-chairman made the statement that he wants to make a deal and he wants to see a calm atmosphere. He wants it all to happen. That says that they are--I don't have to talk of it. You know you folks were reporting before we can't find any phone call. He released a statement, I didn't really sick, he released a statement. QUESTION: But there were phone calls, sir? Mr. President, there were phone calls? TRUMP: Numerous calls. QUESTION: (INAUDIBLE) 11:28:38 TRUMP: And not only with Steve, there were calls with other people, too. Just so you understand, China wants to make a deal. Now whether or not we make a deal it has got to be a great deal for us. You know and I told this to President Xi who I really respect, I really do. I have great respect and I like him to and he is a tough guy but I have a lot of feeling for President Xi very outstanding in so many ways but I told him very strongly I said look, you are (INAUDIBLE) up here and you are making $500 billion a year and stealing our intellectual property. We are way down on the floor, lower than the floor. You have got to make a 50-50 deal. This has to be a deal that is better for us and if it is not better let's not do business together. I don't want to do business. Forget about tariffs for a second, we are taking in tremendous amounts of money to get that I don't want to do business. 11:29:33 Now when I raise and he raises, I raise and he raised--we can never catch up. We have to balance our trading relationship at least two and the extent and they were unwilling to do that and we will never have a deal if that happens but it's going to happen because they have to have a deal. And as far as phone calls are concerned Secretary of the Treasury and other people have been receiving many calls--not receiving, back and forth, many calls. China wants to make a deal and if we can we will make a deal, we will see. Go ahead. QUESTION: Mr. President if I could ask you a little bit about your China strategy-- TRUMP: Yeah. QUESTION: President Macron talked a little bit about instability and the worry in the market sand around the globe about instability one of the things that that comes from as--as you talk-- TRUMP: Are you talking about global economic instability? QUESTION: Right, but--but-- TRUMP: I don't consider it instability but that's (INAUDIBLE). QUESTION: One of the things that it comes from is the back and forth in the changing statements from your elf so that-- TRUMP: Sorry. It is the way I negotiate. QUESTION: So my question is is that a strategy? Is it a strategy to call President Xi an enemy one day and then say-- TRUMP: Yeah-- QUESTION: --the relations are very good the next day? TRUMP: No, no, no. QUESTION: And then you know it has gone back and-- 11:30:40 TRUMP: It is the way I negotiate. It has done very well for me over the years and it is doing even better for the country. QUESTION: Could you talk a little bit about-- TRUMP: And I do think--and I do think that look, here is the story. I hear people say just make a deal, make a deal, they don't have the guts and they don't have the wisdom to know that you can't continue to go on where a country is taking $500 billion, not million, $500 billion with a be out every single year, $500 billion. You just can't do that. Somebody had to do this. This should have been done by President Obama, it should have been done and by Sleepy Joe. It should have been done by other people. It should have been done by Bush, it should have been done by Clinton. Double (PH) Bush. It should have been done. I am doing it. Let me tell you something else. North Korea should have been done a long time ago. I am doing it. I am doing a lot of things that I shouldn't have to be doing. Please. Go ahead, please. 11:31:52 QUESTION: Beth Rigby, Sky News. President Trump you have met our new Prime Minister Boris Johnson yesterday. TRUMP: Yes. QUESTION: You said he was the right man for the job on Brexit. TRUMP: I believe that. QUESTION: Do you think Theresa May was the wrong woman and do you think that Boris Johnson can actually get a deal with the EU for October 31? TRUMP: Well, Theresa wasn't able to do the deal. I gave her my ideas as to doing it very early on and you possibly know what they are but I would have done that, she chose to do it her way and that didn't work out so well. I think she is a very, very good person and a good woman and I really believe that Boris Johnson would be a great Prime Minister. You know we like each other and we had a great 2 1/2 days. 11:32:43 I have been waiting for him to be prime minister for about six years. I told him what took you so long. I think he is going to be a great Prime Minister and especially after spending a lot of intense time with him over the last couple of days. He's really a--he is very smart and he is very strong and he is very enthusiastic. And you know what else? He loves your country. He really loves your country. That came out maybe more than anything else. Yeah, please. QUESTION: Vicky Young, BBC News. President Trump, Boris Johnson is a very keen on a trade deal with the USA. You sound keen on it too. Some of his critics though are worried that you're going to do over the UK in that deal-- TRUMP: --No, no-- QUESTION: --To protect Russia and China. 11:33:24 TRUMP: I love the UK. I own great property in the UK. I love the UK. I have no idea how my property is doing because I don't care. But I own Turnberry, and I own in Aberdeen and I own in Ireland, as you know, Doonbeg and great stuff. And I'll be honest with you. I think--I think that--I think he's going to just do a great job as prime minister. You know, it takes a lot. It's so many different elements to being a great prime minister. And you needed him. I just think his time is right. This is the right time for Boris. This is the right time for Boris. Yeah. Please go ahead. Go ahead, right here. Say who you're with, please. Yeah? QUESTION: Rob Peston from ITV in the UK as well. You've obviously had a good few days with President Macron, who you appear to be doing business with-- TRUMP: --Right-- QUESTION: --To use your favorite expression. After Brexit, who do you think will be your more important relationship, President Macron, France and the EU, or Boris Johnson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom? 11:34:30 TRUMP: I think we're going to have just--look, France is a great nation. It's being run--a lot of things are happening. You know, it's not easy, what he's doing. He's changing certain ways. It's a very hard thing to do. I won't get into it. I'm going to let him sell his ideas, but a lot of people don't disagree with his ideas. But it's a very hard thing to do. If you're a great citizen of France, you love your country but you want to do the way you've been doing it for a long time, but maybe that's not working and maybe they have to do what he has to do. I think he's going to do a fantastic job, but it's very tough for him. I know how tough it is for him. He's been having a hard time. And nobody would have an easy time. But I do believe he's doing the right thing. And Boris is different. It's a different kind of a deal. Boris has to try and do something with Brexit. It's very tough. I deal with the EU. The EU is--that's a very, very strong group of people. They have their ideas and they're not easy to deal with, I will tell you. 11:35:27 We're very close to making a deal, by the way, with the EU. I have to say this. We made a great deal with Japan, and we are very close to may be making a deal with the EU because they don't want tariffs. It's very simple. They don't want to tax cars. Mercedes-Benz, BMW, they don't need a 20 percent or a 25 percent tax. But we're very close. I think we're going to make a deal with the EU without having to go that route. I may have to go that route, but maybe not. We're going to have a deal, a really fair deal. But the EU is another one. We've been losing $180 billion a year for many years. That's a lot of money. How much can you take out of the piggy bank, right? QUESTION: But the--which alliance will be more important, with the EU or with Britain? TRUMP: Both. I don't want to say which. Look, I think that--I think that the--I think we have been with--I guess I would start out by saying England, right? You know, I asked Boris, where's England? What's happening with England? They don't use it too much anymore. We talked about it. It was very interesting. But the United Kingdom is a great, incredible place. It's an incredible nation. And it's, you know, been one of our tremendous allies. And another one happens to be Australia. He was here also, Scott. He is fantastic. In fact we're honoring him and Australia at the White House in a very short period of time. But I think that--excuse me? QUESTION: Will you visit Australia? 11:36:50 TRUMP: At some point I will, yeah. At some point I will, also Germany. Angela asked me to visit Germany. We're going there--going there too. So, I just think they're very different. And they're going to be going at it for a little while, but ultimately probably it works out. They may have to get out. They may not make a deal. The European Union is very tough to make deals with, very, very tough. Just ask Teresa May. QUESTION: Mr. President? TRUMP: Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. Sigel (PH) with the Associated Press. I was hoping that you could clarify. Last year, you left the summit in Canada feuding with the summit host. This year things to be--seem to be a little bit different. You're talking about unity. You had a hug with President Macron on the stage. What is different? And also, as President Macron said, he's passing you the baton now of leading this multilateral institution. You ran on the platform of America first. What is your now-- TRUMP: --I understand-- QUESTION: --Now that you have a mandate from the international community, what are you going to do with it? 11:37:45 TRUMP: Well, we actually had a very good meeting. I had it out with one or two people where we disagreed in terms of concept. But we actually had a pretty good meeting last year. I would say that this was a big step above in terms of unity, in terms of agreement. We have really great agreement on the lot of very important subjects. But last year was good also. I mean, last year was good also. I think last year might have been a little bit underrated, you know? Go ahead, please. QUESTION: And in terms of the G7 presidency-- TRUMP: --Go ahead-- QUESTION: --What do you want to do with it? What was--what's your agenda now? TRUMP: Well, we're going to do something hopefully special. We're going to build on what we have now. We built on something really good. We're going to be going in with some great unity. We really did. We--if there was any word for this particular meeting of seven a very important countries, it was unity. I think most important of all we got along great. We got along great. QUESTION: Mr. President, to follow up on China-- QUESTION: --Can I ask you a question, sir? TRUMP: Go ahead. QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. President. I'm Chi Li Chung (PH) with the Shanghai Media Group. You just mentioned that Chinese Vice Premier Liu He said to China is willing to resolve this issue through calm negotiations. 11:38:52 TRUMP: No, I didn't say it. He did. QUESTION: Yes. TRUMP: Yeah. QUESTION: And will the U.S. negotiate in the same manner? TRUMP: Yes. True. QUESTION: And also, the other--the other question-- TRUMP: --That was--that was an easy answer. (LAUGHTER) QUESTION: So, the U.S. will negotiate in the same manner with-- TRUMP: --Absolutely. Great respect for China, great respect for the leadership of China, absolutely. QUESTION: --And also, the other question is that you say you definitely will invite Putin to join in next year's summit. TRUMP: I haven't said that. But I think that having President Putin in what was the G8--he was a member of the G8. And I heard he was a--a good member of the G8. Having him in I think is more of an advantage. I think it's a positive for the world. I think it's a positive for Russia. I think it's a big positive for Russia. And it's something the group is discussing. They are discussing it. QUESTION: But just a few hours ago-- TRUMP: --People feel very much like me, many people. What? QUESTION: But just a few hours ago, Russian foreign minister is saying that it's not their foreign policy pursuit to return G-8. What's your reaction on that? 11:40:00 TRUMP: Well, you know, we'll see. I know one thing. If they were invited back, I think they'd be there. If they weren't, that's okay too. I just think they'd be better inside than outside, I mean, as I said before. I really do. I think they'd be an asset. I think it would be a good thing. You know, some of the things--we were going in the room, and yesterday in particular we were discussing four or five matters. And Russia was literally involved in all of those four or five matters. And a few of the people looked up and said, you know, why aren't they here talking to us about it? And like what are we going to do now, go home, take it easy for a day, although I'm not doing that. I don't take it easy. But what are we going--we're going to go home and start calling them at the end of the week and say, hey, how about this? Could have been in the room. We had numerous things that we were just going to see, right, numerous. We had a lot of things that we were discussing. And it would have been very easy if Russia was in the room. If he was in the room, we could have some of those things. Now they're just in limbo. But I have to say, with all of that, very little in limbo. But somebody will speak to him about some things. And frankly, they're not very complicated, but it would be easier if they were in the room, okay? QUESTION: Thank you so much. TRUMP: Josh, go ahead. Josh? 11:41:06 QUESTION: Mr. President, there was a--significant talk at the summit about climate change. I know in the past you've proffered some skepticism of the science and climate change. What do you think the world should be doing about climate change? And do you still harbor that skepticism? TRUMP: I feel that the United States has tremendous wealth. The wealth is under its feet. I have made that well, live in. We will soon be one of the--we will soon be export--in fact, were actually doing it now, exporting. But we are now the number one energy producer in the world, and soon it will be by far with a couple of pipelines that have not been able to get approved for many, many years. It will have a huge impact. I was able to get ANWR in Alaska. It could be the largest site in the world for oil and gas. I was able to get ANWR approved. Ronald Reagan was unable to do it. Nobody was able to do it. They've been trying to do it since before Ronald Reagan. I got it approved. 11:42:02 We're the number one energy producer in the world. Soon it will be by far the number one. It's a tremendous wealth. And LNG is being sought after all over Europe and all over the world, and we have more of it than anybody else. And I'm not going to lose that well. I'm not going to lose it on--on dreams, on windmills, which frankly aren't working too well. I'm not going to lose it. So, Josh, in a nutshell, I want the cleanest water on earth. I want the cleanest air on earth. And that's what we're doing. 11:42:41 And I'm an environmentalist. You--a lot of people don't understand that. I have done more environmental impacts statements probably than anybody that's--I guess I can say definitely, because I have done many, many, many of them, more than anybody that's ever been President or Vice President or anything even close to President. And I think I know more about the environment than most people. I want clean air. I want clean water. I want a wealthy country. I want a spectacular country with the jobs, with pensions, with so many things, and that's what we're getting. So I want to be very careful. QUESTION: (OFF-MIC) 11:43:15 TRUMP: --At the same time--at the same time--at the same time--you weren't called. At the same time, it's very important to me, very important to me. We have to maintain this incredible--this incredible place that we've all built. We've come a much richer country, and that's a good thing, not a bad thing, because that great wealth allows us to take care of people. We can take care of people we couldn't have taken care of in the past because of the great wealth. We can't let that wealth be taken away. Clean air, clean water. Thank you very much, everybody. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you very much.

SLO MO CU Portrait of a confident young school boy holding a skateboard as he looks up and softly smiles at camera

TVU 25 ELIZABETH WARREN JOHN LEGEND ORANGEBURG SC EVENT ABC UNI 022620 2020 Elizabeth Warren may be battling a raspy voice but she brought backup this afternoon, with John Legend introducing at her Get Out the Vote event - and in lieu of another selfie line or q&a session after Warren gave her stump, he performed two of his songs on stage: Ordinary People, and All of Me (performance starts at 134013) Legend praised the fire, tenacity and preparedness Warren would bring to the table. She has a lot of plans sure. But "let me just say, that one of those plans mean anything," Legend said on stage, "if you don't have the persistence, the wherewithal, the passion, the tenacity to get them done. Yes. And that's perhaps what inspires me most about Elizabeth Warren. She persists. She's not afraid of a fight. She's not afraid to take on a challenge." (131323) Warren herself stuck largely to her stump - it was Legend's appearance that revved up the room and asked for the Palmetto vote - acknowledging the pivotal moment and clout the #FITS primary holds. "Everybody's watching, South Carolina," he said. "Everybody wants to know what South Carolina is going to do in this primary. You have the power to send a message that will resound across this nation onto Super Tuesday and throughout this primary process." (131535) On Warren brand, Legend also took the opportunity to jab at one of Warren's own preferred targets, Mike Bloomberg: reminding the room as Warren has done on and off the debate stage, about his past comments on redlining -- especially germane in the halls of an HBCU. "She knows that all this harm visited specifically on the black community, intentionally on the black community, requires intentional remedies, requires solutions that are specifically targeted to our community... Unlike Mayor Bloomberg, she knows that housing discrimination through redlining has been a national tragedy," Legend said. (131216) And, Legend also echoed much of the fear Warren talks about amongst Democratic voters about a second term Trump presidency; and, the dismissiveness we've heard about the issue of "electability" in beating him, especially for a female candidate. "I know that folks are worried. I'm worried too," Legend said. A palpable murmur, that sentence resonating, rippled through the theatre. "I know that Donald Trump is an existential threat to this nation and everybody is hoping and praying we pick the most electable candidate from the Democratic Party. But the fact is, I can't predict with the most electable nominee is and you probably can't either." (131552) "So, I'm going to vote based on who I think would make the best president. I want someone brilliant. I want someone empathetic, someone with a plan and the persistence and the fire to make that plan happen." (131618) Warren's voice cracked several times throughout her speech - but it was with both the strain of talking as much as she has - and with particular urgency to her tone. "Right now we've got an America where if you're rich, you've got a really loud voice in Washington, but if you're not rich -- you don't get heard very much." (133326) "The danger is real. Our democracy hangs in the balance in this election. And we have a decision to make. In the face of this kind of danger, are we going to back up? Are we going to get timid? Are we going to crouch down or are we going to fight back? Me, I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back, fighting back is an act of patriotism," she said - her voice hoarse with every 'fighting back.' (133543) One interesting add to one of Warren's favored stump swipes at Bloomberg today also: when on her billionaire / wealth tax tear, she usually says how 'some billionaires go on TV and cry about it' (a reference to Leon Cooperman) and others just run for president, since they 'figure it'd be cheaper than paying a wealth tax.' But today, on the heels of back to back debate performances where she's so purposefully attacked Bloomberg - she switched it up: "Now, you may have heard there's some billionaires who don't like this {wealth tax.} Some of them go on TV and cry. So sad. Right. Some of them run for president. Maybe discovering it's harder than they thought..." Warren slyly smiled, to huge applause. (132705) ++ ADDED BROLL & COLOR ++ Legend's performance was quite powerful; the energy in the room was notably turned up several notches. If an awkward moment after when he walked offstage, only to have Warren come on stage from the other end and have to chase him down to come back - it was quickly recovered. Casually polling several voters after the event, several said they would be voting for her now, because of seeing her today with Legend. After performing, Legend stopped by D&B Fish and BBQ in Orangeburg - a nearly unmarked restaurant next to an abandoned and crumbling hotel - but inside, perfumed with barbecue and fried hush puppy aromas. He greeted the crowd (nearly all of whom were specifically there for Warren), took selfies, had a closed door lunch meeting, and left. No questions/good MOS, but the broll is good and it's also on TVU 24. TVU 24 ELIZABETH WARREN JOHN LEGEND ORANGEBURG SC EVENT ABC UNI 022620 2020 HIGHLIGHTS JOHN LEGEND KNOCK ON BLOOMBERG + REDLINING: 131143 She knows that all this harm visited specifically on the black community, intentionally on the black community, requires intentional remedies, requires solutions that are specifically targeted to our community. She supports creating a commission on reparations for the descendants of enslaved people. Unlike Mayor Bloomberg, she knows that housing discrimination through redlining has been a national tragedy. 131216 Her housing plan creates a first of its kind program to help First-Time Homebuyers living in formerly red lined areas, buy a home and start building the kind of wealth that government-sponsored discrimination denied their parents and grandparents over decades. PERSISTENCE: 131323 If you don't have the persistence, the wherewithal, the passion, the tenacity to get them done. Yes. And that's perhaps what inspires me most about Elizabeth Warren. She persists. She's not afraid of a fight. She's not afraid to take on a challenge. WATCHING SC: 131535 Everybody's watching South Carolina. Everybody wants to know what South Carolina is going to do in this primary. You have the power to send a message that will resound across this nation onto Super Tuesday and throughout this primary process. EVERYBODY'S WORRIED + ELECTABILITY: 131552 I know that folks are worried. I'm worried, too. I know that Donald Trump is an existential threat to this nation and everybody is hoping and praying we pick the most electable candidate from the Democratic Party. But the fact is, I can't predict with the most electable nominee is and you probably can't either. BRILLIANT AND EMPATHETIC: 131618 So, I'm going to vote based on who I think would make the best president. I want someone brilliant. I want someone empathetic, someone with a plan and the persistence and the fire to make that plan happen. So I hope you will join me.So I hope you will join me. I hope you'll vote to make Elizabeth Warren the next president of the United States. WARREN BILLIONAIRES RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT 132705 Now, you may have heard there's some billionaires who don't like this. Some of them go on TV and cry. So sad. Right. Some of them run for president. [crowd applause] Maybe discovering it's harder than they thought. HBCU's 133041 And it is time to level the playing field. To acknowledge for years, how much support went into universities that then lock their doors to African American students. We can put $15 billion directly into our historically black colleges and universities. [crowd cheers] RICH VOICES: 133326 Right now we've got an America where if you're rich you've got a really loud voice in Washington, but if you're not rich-- 133335 [feed freezes] BUILD A NEW AMERICA:1335 133448 So here's how I see this, we have such possibility, such possibility going forward. Such an America that we could build. This isn't an America of the past. That America had real problems. That's the America that elected Donald Trump. FIGHTING BACK: 133543 And the danger is real. Our democracy hangs in the balance in this election. And we have a decision to make. In the face of this kind of danger, aree we going to back up? Are we going to get timid? Are we going to crouch down or are we going to fight back? Me, I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back, fighting back is an act of patriotism. 133619 We fought back against a king to build this nation. We fought back against the scourge of slavery to try to preserve this union. We fought back against the Great Depression to rebuild this economy, and we fought back against the rise of fascism, to try to protect our democracy. Americans are at our best when we see a problem, we call it out and we fight back PEOPLE MORE IMPORTANT THAN MONEY: 133810 I believe in the America we can build together. An America, in which every single human being has value. An America, in which every child is worth investing in. An America, in which, in our democracy, people are more important than money. JOHN LEGEND PIANO: Introduced at 134013 JOHN LEGEND [13:02:32] I am so proud to be in South Carolina today. Very happy to be here at South Carolina State. Thank you for having me. I bring you greetings from the great state of California. My wife says hello to. She says, I'm happy to report that we received our mail in ballots back home in Los Angeles. [13:03:07] The ballots are doing March, but I'm proud to say that I've already marked my choices for the presidential nominee from the Democratic Party. I put in a pin because I made my decision and I'm not changing my mind. I believe Elizabeth Ward should be the next president of the United States of America. [13:03:32] Now, I'm going to look at this to myself at the beginning of the campaign. My intention was to stay out of it. I wasn't going to publicly endorse anybody in the primary. I would just vote for my preferred candidate. And no matter who won the primary, I worked my butt off to make sure Trump was a one term president. I just started watching the campaign. I had a open mind. I wanted to see who made the most compelling case that they were ready to be president of this country. [13:04:08] I watched many of the debates I saw with the candidates who opposed him on Twitter. I saw them in town halls and interviews. I read some of their policy positions. And as much as I wanted to publicly stay out of it, it became abundantly clear to me that one Kennedy set out from the rest. One candidate was my clear choice among a very talented field that one candidate was Elizabeth Warren. [13:04:36] Let me take you on. Let me tell you why I was so confident in Elizabeth Warner. First of all, she is brilliant. Now, I know the bar is very low right now. We currently have a president who embarrasses this great nation every single day with his incompetence is unabashedly the ignorance. His lack of curiosity will be so refreshing to have a woman of Senate awards ruins replacing him. [13:05:13] Wouldn't it be wonderful to have a woman who came from humble beginnings, worked her way through college and law school, and ascended all the ways to become a Harvard Law professor, a US senator, then president of the United States? Wouldn't that be magnificent? But it's not enough to be brilliant in a democracy, we don't simply rely on leaders to tell us what they know. Tradition commands from high up in their ivory tower. [13:05:44] We depend on our leaders to listen to us. The best leaders in a democracy are far more than just smart. They're the best leaders in a democracy have empathy. They care about ordinary people. They are intentional about paying attention to the everyday struggles of people who are often overlooked. Great leaders in democracy care about the sick, but the forgotten, the marginalized, the the poor, the disenfranchised, the incarcerated. [13:06:18] They go out of their way to understand the problems that people face, and then they have the passion and resolve to do something about it. How do I know? Elizabeth Warren practices in empathy. I hear it in the way she answers questions about policy, about what she would do in office. If you listen closely, shares just rattle off her policy prescriptions more than any candidate that I've seen in Elizabeth as policy. Start with a story about people. [13:06:53] She talks about a father she's met who's struggling to get childcare for the family. She seems driven to bankruptcy by medical care costs. Communities harmed by racial discrimination. She understands that a diverse nation has all kinds of people and they deserve a president who listens to their issues and cares about making the government work for all of them. [13:07:16] She has spent time wining and dining billionaires so she can run her campaign. She spends her time talking to the people who donate $5 to her campaign. She just might personally call you out to say thank you. If you wait in line one of her rallies to shake her hand and take a selfie, even if it is a line of thousands, she often will stand there and do it for each and every person who shows up and waits long enough. [13:07:48] Now, why does she do all that? Because Elizabeth Warren fundamentally believes that our democracy is in danger and that the government has become too corrupt, too beholden to the interests of the powerful and the connected. And the reason she ran is to give this democracy back to its rightful owners. That's usually for the people of the United States. [13:08:20] That's why she takes time to listen to everybody because she knows that democracy is you. And that's why she's got players. Yes, although she got a plan. You know nothing else about Elizabeth Warren. You know, she has plans that will bring meaningful, positive change to the lives of everyday Americans. You see, she combines her brilliance, her deep understanding of the law and the government with the profound passion for the people, a sense of empathy that informs every plan and every policy. That's why when it happens, she says she intends to do something. You can rest assured she's only in it for a reason. She's listening to people out. [13:09:00] She's thought about the impact. She's spoken to experts in the field and she's resolved to do something to make it happen. Elizabeth knows that our communities need big structural change, that the system has been rigged against too many people for too long. She has a plan for that. She was on edge with a middle class that, unlike any other candidate, her personal, professional and political experience has been devoted to the most critical issue of our time. [13:09:30] But the pursuit of equal opportunity for all in the United States, Elizabeth, will ease. And capitalism supports rules and enforcement to assure that it works for everybody, not just the powerful and well. And in order for our democracy to work, we need to make sure our politicians know who they're working for. And that's why Elizabeth has the most sweeping anti-corruption plan since Watergate. We cannot wait any longer to undo all the evil, all the corruption that Trump has unleashed into the last few years. [13:10:06] But it is not enough to undo this president's damage to this nation. We have to make big changes that have been needed for decades. Our country has been horrible and investing in education. Elizabeth will guarantee high quality childcare and an early education for every child from zero to the high. And then there is health care costs are crushing American families, even those who have world insurance. Millions of people without insurance or one bad diagnosis problem go on broke. [13:10:44] That's why Elizabeth supports Medicare for all. And she has a fully financed with how raising taxes on the middle class by one penny. We also know that racial inequality still runs rampant in our society. We know that this nation's original sin of slavery and its centuries long devaluing of black lives have had long lasting effects on the way black holes live. Twenty, twenty. We've seen the data when it comes to the wealth gap. The homeownership gap, the education gap. [13:11:18] The disparities in how we were treated by the criminal justice system. These aren't just graphs and numbers on the page. These are lived experiences, centuries of trauma and exclusion targeted at our communities. To many of us know what that looks like and what that feels like. And Elizabeth has listened to us. [13:11:43] She knows that all this harm visited specifically on the black community intentionally onto the black community requires intentional remedies, solutions that are specifically targeted to our community. She supports creating a commission on reparations for the descendants of a slave, people like Mayor Bloomberg. She knows that the housing discrimination, her redlining has been a national tragedy. [13:12:14] Her housing plan creates a first of its kind program to help First-Time Homebuyers living in formerly red light areas, buy a home and start building the kind of wealth that it government-sponsored discrimination to deny their parents and grandparents over decades. She could commit at least 50 billion dollars in investments at historically black colleges and universities. ACSU. [13:12:44] Chief executives see a public college at four year public college free. She would ban for profit colleges that prey on communities of color and veterans. She knows that a typical black entrepreneur starts a business with $35000 in capital, and that's a third of the startup capital for the typical white entrepreneur. The disparity is the single biggest reason that promising black owned businesses on average are less profitable and improving on fewer employees and more owned businesses. [13:13:19] Elizabeth has a plan for that soon. She wants to create a small business equity fund to help close this gap for entrepreneurs of color. She also knows, like I know, that racism hasn't been codified in our criminal justice system. We are the most incarcerated country in the world with more jails in our country than in colleges and universities. It's outrageous. [13:13:43] Elizabeth knows we need progressive criminal justice reform. She will end harsh jail, get rid of private prisons, repeal of the 94 crime bill, legalize marijuana and undo the legacy of the war on drugs. Elizabeth, may I have you just talked about what she plans to do on climate and immigration, protecting women's reproductive rights? Well, I'm going to get out of the way so she can tell you. Well, let me just say that none of these plans mean anything. [13:14:23] If you don't have the persistence, the wherewithal, the passion, the tenacity to get it done. Yes. And that's perhaps what inspires me most about with Elizabeth Warren. She persists. She's not afraid of a fight. She's not afraid to take on a challenge. She has a plan to win. Elizabeth Warren believes in this country. She believes in its people. She believes in a democracy. That if we come together, if we listen to one another, we love one another. [13:14:59] If we value each other's lives, we can build a more perfect union where we can address these problems that have been festering for years. We can make big structural change that would improve the lives of millions of everyday people. But none of this happens without the people. It doesn't happen without you. Elizabeth Warren, ease you. This country needs you. I vote California. [13:15:24] Like I said, I was born and raised in Ohio, never lived in South Carolina, but I flew all the way across the country to hang out with you all today. Everybody wants to know what software alone is going to do in this primary. You have the power to send a message that will resound across this nation on Super Tuesday and throughout this primary process. [13:15:52] I know that folks were read. I'm worried, too. I know that Donald Trump is an existential threat to this nation and everybody is hoping and praying we pick the most electable candidate from the Democratic Party. But the fact is, I can't predict with the most electable nominee is. You probably can't either. [13:16:18] So a lot of vote based on what I think would make the best president. I want someone brilliant once someone and empathetic, someone with a plan and persistence and the fight to make that plan happen. So I hope you will join me. [13:16:39] I hope you'll vote to make Elizabeth Warren the next president of the United States. And without further ado is to give it a little bit longer. ELIZABETH WARREN [13:17:28] It's good to see you this morning. A very, very special thank you to the amazing John Legend. Now for his music, because you got it, you loved John Legend for his words, too. He's a man who's got a lot to say. Way to go, Sean. Also on the security special, thank you to Barney Star, who's been there from the very beginning. Another man of incredible music and incredible words, humanity. [13:18:05] So Elizabeth Warren, the one who is going to be Donald Trump. Also going to be the one who's going to be in the fight to help me. Lindsey Graham, out of a job. We got a lot of work to do, and I just want to tell all of you. I was not born a politician, but I was born to fight. [13:18:45] I am ready to fight a little bit about myself. I'm not telling you about all this because I just can't help it. I got to talk some about over the past year about how to make real the changes we can make. We had enough of politicians coming in and they made some big promises every four years and then disappear. I want to talk about the real changes we can make. The ones we can make together and then set up the selfie line. Today, we're looking at music for John Legend. [13:19:22] So there is smarter ways to help. Oh, I have three older brothers. By the time I grow up in a family that kind of had its ups and downs financially paycheck to paycheck, unless we have better times, we had worse times. But a lot of the time I was in middle school all through my older brothers were gone by that it was just my mom and my daddy and me when my daddy had a heart attack. He pulled through, but I couldn't go back to work. [13:19:54] And about week after week after week of no money coming in. Even today, that even to this day I can remember on the day where we lost our family station wagon. I can't remember how my mother used to talk me into bed at night. And she gave me a big smile and then she walked out of the room. She because dawn at her start to cry because she never wanted to cry in front of me. These are the times that I learned words like mortgage and foreclosure. [13:20:27] And so I remember walking into their bedroom one day and I laid down on the bed with that dress. Now, some of you know, that dress is one that I only can't sell for weddings, funerals and graduations. And there was my mother than any other part of the room and her slip and her stockings. And she was walking back and forth as she had her head down. [13:20:51] And she was saying, we will not lose this house. We will not lose this house. We will not lose this house. She was 50 years old. She never had a job outside the home. And she was terrified. Finally, she looks up and she sees me standing in that doorway. Should I say anything? She just looks at me and she looks at that dress. She looks back at me. She walks over to the dress rehearsals and puts on her high heeled shoes. [13:21:30] And she walks to the Sears where she gets full time minimum wage, job answering phones, minimum wage job saved her house and it saved her family. And it's the first lesson my mother taught me. No matter how scared you are, no matter how hard it looks, you get in there and fight to take care of your family. [13:21:58] That's what we do. There was a second listen to that story that I didn't learn until years later, and that is that same story is a story about government. And I'll tell you how my mother went to the year and got a minimum wage job at a minimum wage job in America, which for a family of three, it would pay a mortgage, it would cover the utilities and it would put groceries on the table. [13:22:32] Today, a minimum wage job will not be a mama and a baby out of poverty. That is wrong. And that is why I am in this fight. Understand this difference. It didn't just happen, but because of gravity, but because something happens over time to the minimum wage. No, it happened because of food. Government works. Or when I was a girl, at least the question asked in Washington is when we set the minimum wage, we need to know what it is to take a family of three to survive. [13:23:12] What does it take for them to get a toehold in America city at a glance, a chance to build something solid today? The question asked in Washington is where we set the minimum wage to maximize the profits of giant multinational corporations. Well, I wanted a government that works for a giant multinational corporations. I want one of the. For our families. And that is the fight I'm in. How do we make government work for us? Think of it this way. We have a government right now. It works great. [13:23:52] It works great for drug companies. Just not for people trying to get a prescription filled. All right. For people who want to make money investing in private prisons, just not the human beings whose lives are torn apart by those places. Works great for oil companies that want to drill everywhere else. Not for the rest of us who see climate change bearing down on. [13:24:30] When you see a government that works great for those with money, works great. Those who can hire armies of lobbyists and lawyers and done work for much of anyone else. That is corruption, pure and simple. And you need to call it out for what it should. And I got a plan for that. The big news is it is the biggest anti-corruption plan since Watergate. The bad news is we need the biggest anti-corruption plan since Watergate. It's got a lot of pieces, too much. Just a couple real quick. [13:25:09] And lobbying as we know it got a power door between Wall Street and Washington. And you really want to hose down some corruption in Washington. Make everybody everybody who wants to serve federal office put their tax returns online. We fight back. We fight back, and when we get this government to represent the people, we push back the interests of money in this country and we can make big structural change. [13:25:52] And I just want to tell you about a couple parts to this strike. Talked about it, but I want to talk about it for just a sec. It is time for a wealth tax in America. This is a tax on fortunes above 50 million dollars. So I want everyone here to relax. You're the first 50 million is free and clear. If that makes you nervous. I may not be your candidate, but your first 50 million is pretty clear. [13:26:26] But 250 million in first dollar. You got a picture, two cents and two cents of every dollar act that hit it. A billion. You've got to pitch in a couple of cents more. Anybody in here? Live. Grow up with a family that Oklahoma, Ohio. Now, anybody who's been paying a wealth tax, it's just called property tax. All I'm saying is for the really rich folks, their property tax should include not just real estate, but also a stock portfolio. The diamond is the Rembrandt. [13:27:04] Now, you may have heard some billionaires don't like this. Some of them go on to duty. So sad. Right. Some of them ran for president. Discovering it's harder than I thought. Here's the thing. They say to me. You know, you shouldn't you shouldn't try to take our money. We should try to tax it's money. We worked hard for it. We had a good idea. We followed through. And in my view is you made a billion dollars. [13:27:46] Good for you. Good for you. But here's the deal. You made a billion dollars. You build that fortune here in America. You built it at least in part using workers. All of us help pay to educate today, at least in part of getting our goods to market on roads and bridges. [13:28:06] All of this help pay bills. Unfortunate, at least in part protected by police and firefighters. All of us help pay the salaries for all Americans. We're glad to do it. We're glad to invest in opportunity. That's who we are. But here's the thing. You make it big. You make real big. You make it top one tenth of 1 percent. Big picture, two cents. So everybody else gets a chance to make it. Astounding story. [13:28:38] But what can we do with two sense that a cell like March doesn't? But with two, since we can provide universal child care and early childhood education to every baby in this country, age 0.5 percent. Those babies and their mommies and for their daddies, we need to provide universal pre-K for every 3 year old and 4 year old in this country, and we can stop exploiting the people who do this work, mostly African-American women and Latinas, we could raise the wages of every child care worker and preschool teacher in America. [13:29:27] Since we can do all that for our babies, plus we can put eight hundred billion new federal dollars into our public schools. How about that? Let us quadruple our funding for Title 1 schools. Think about that and you'll hear this from a special education teacher. For the first time in history, we could fully fund IDSA so children with disabilities will get a full education. They say for. [13:30:07] 5:58 When you do all that for our babies, we can do all that for elementary kids. Plus, we could provide tuition free technical school to your college for your college life right here. We could increase the Pell Grant, so pay. And it is time to level the playing field. To my knowledge. For years, how much support went into universities that they lock their doors to African-American students? [13:30:54] We have a billion dollars directly into our historically black colleges and universities. Yes, and just one more thing to round out that too, since we can cancel student loan debt for 43 million. That's what it means to have a plan, a plan to restructure our economy. [13:31:34] Because I understand this this is about our values. We can leave that to sense with the billionaires. They already have their fortunes. They're growing those fortunes at 1 4 percent, 6 percent, 8 percent, 10 percent and here 2 percent. They invest in an entire generation of young Americans. All we have to do is decide we're going to make it happen. Are you with me on that? Oh, say one more word about how we make transformative change. [13:32:10] There is a lot of places that we need to be doing work in health care and particularly in the high, high rates of maternal mortality for African-American mothers. Yes. You bet. And environmental justice. How do we have four generations put polluting plants and toxic waste dumps in or near communities of color, destroying the health of young children and destroying property values? [13:32:40] I committed a trillion dollars to cleaning up the mess that America has made for AIDS and communities that have power so much more. We need to do clothes our private prisons, reform our criminal justice system, legalize marijuana. I don't know. Way out of what we can do, but understand this, it only happens if you've got a power. [13:33:21] It only happens if we make this democracy work. Right now, we've got an America where if you're rich, you've got a really loud voice in Washington, but if not rich. How about who's got it and who needs a whole lot more? So me, it starts right here. Push for a constitutional amendment to guarantee the right of every American citizen to go back and get that vote counted. Also, a federal war to end all political gerrymandering in this country. [13:34:12] And one more federal law. A federal law to roll back every racist voter suppression law in America. And just one more we got overturn Citizens United. Democracy is not for sale. So here's how I see this. We have such possibility, such possibility going forward, such in America that we could build this isn't an American of the past that America had real problems. [13:34:52] That is the America that elected Donald Trump. We got to build a better America than that. But right now, it's a time of fear for a lot of people in this country. I travel a lot and I hear people when they talk about every three years of Donald Trump. They're afraid for their families, afraid for their neighbors and friends, afraid, afraid for children locked in cages down at our border and afraid for children on lockdown in our public schools. Afraid, afraid for women, afraid for people of color, afraid for LGBTQ people. [13:35:31] All of these products will be up for grabs in this United States Supreme Court. They are afraid for our nation and afraid for our plan. And the danger is real. Our democracy hangs in the balance in this election and we have a decision to make in the face of this kind of danger. We don't back up. We couldn't get 10. [13:36:01] Are we going to crouch down or are we going to fight back? Me I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back. I'm fighting back. Fighting back is an act of patriotism. We fought back against the cane to build this nation. We fought back against the scourge of slavery to try to preserve this union. We fought back against the Great Depression to rebuild this economy. [13:36:33] And we fought back against the rise of fascism to try to protect our democracy. Americans are at our best when we see a problem. We call it out and we fight back. That's who we have today. This is not a time for small ideas. This is no time to nibble around the edges of what's broken. [13:37:01] We have to be in this fight and be in this fight all the way. I understand this. Of all the people who've run for office, who are still running for office, for president, who've had elective office. I've been in politics the least amount of time. I came to this as a teacher. I came to this as someone who has spent a life fighting for working families. I didn't run a campaign that was designed to buy a bunch of consultants. I didn't run a campaign that was designed not to offend big donors. I passed that stop sign a long time ago. [13:37:41] I ran a campaign from the heart because I believe that 2020 is the moment we've been called to in history, that a moment in our lives when we will determine the future of this nation. The future of this earth. We are called to this moment and I am in this fight because I believe in you. I can leave India in America. [13:38:11] We can build together an America in which every single human being has value and an America in which every child is worth investing in, an America in which in our democracy people are more important than money. I believe in that America. And if you can see that America I think just maybe that America is worth fighting for. But I'm asking you, get into this fight this Saturday. [13:38:56] It is up to you. Get in this fight. I'm asking for your vote. I'm asking for your daughter, Elizabeth Warren, to dot com and sign up to our brains, to some phone calls, knock on doors, talk to people ahead of you in line at the grocery store or standing next to you pumping gas. But get in this buy because understand this this moment in history will not come our way again. We will not get a second chance. [13:39:30] This is our time. Our time to choose hall over fear. Our time to choose courage. Over cynicism. Our time to dream big. Fight hard. And when. Stand by. That's all we got to do now. Amazing. The one and only shot.

Water slowly dripping into a transparent glass, creating a serene and mesmerizing effect.

FTG OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE JOHN G. ROBERTS TO BE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ROBERTS: It can cover a wide range of injuries. But you do have to show some injury that separates you from the general public. So you're just not voicing a gripe. You're trying to get a case decided. That's the importance of the standing doctrine. SEN. DEWINE: I appreciate the explanation, Judge. Let me ask you a more personal question. Last time you appeared before our committee, you were a lawyer in private practice. Since that time, you've spent approximately two years on the court of appeal for the District of Columbia, a new experience for even an experienced practitioner like you. What surprised you about the last two years of judging? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well -- SEN. DEWINE: If anything? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I think I had the biggest surprise on the first day that I heard cases. Obviously, it's opening day in the first day in my career. So I've prepared as good -- as well -- as I could. And the arguments were great and went into the conference room, and I had my notes in all the books. It's just the judges, you know, just the three judges. We bring the record in. We're surrounded by the U.S. reports, by our court of appeals reports, by the United States code that you folks have written. And I was ready. And I'm sitting there. And I remember a chief judge who, by tradition, sits on a new judge's first day. And he was there and another judge. I waited a while and I looked and they were still waiting. And waited a while longer and they were still waiting. And finally, the chief judge advised me that the tradition was that the junior judge goes first at the discussions. And so I was kind of put on the spot right off the bat. And part of what that conference was like, and throughout, really has -- I don't know if I'd say a surprise, but it's been illuminating to me. The judges really do roll up their sleeves and try to find the right answer. It's just the judges. But as we say, well, we think this case is controlled by the Smith case. We get out the Smith case, and we open it up, and we look at it and read it over each other's shoulders and see exactly what it says. If somebody says, well, but in this case under the record there was no evidence about this, or there was no objection raised about that. Well, you get out the record and you look and there at page, you know, 223 you point to it and say, well, here's where the objection was raised. And the judges are very open. It's a very encouraging part of the process from my point of view. Nobody goes in there with set views. They want the benefit of the collegial process, the benefit of each other's views. And you have to be able to substantiate your position. There's no place for rhetoric. People are pointing to the law. And I found that a very encouraging part of the process -- what goes on in the conference room -- which was, of course, a part of the process that I hadn't participated in before. SEN. DEWINE: That's something that we don't see either. JUDGE ROBERTS: Right. And the positive part of that process, to me, was the nobody was invested in anything other than getting the right result. And they're prepared to be convinced contrary to initial impressions. And I was as well. It's -- I found a very encouraging part of the process. SEN. DEWINE: Judge, let me ask you -- moving to an administrative law issue, if I could. As you know, in the 18th and 19th centuries, we really did not have the governmental agencies that have such a profound influence, for better or worse, on the lives of Americans today -- daily lives of Americans. Today, administrative agencies, workplace safety rules establish environmental regulations, lay down traffic safety standards, just to name a few things. But as far as I know there's no specific article in the Constitution dedicated to the administrative state that we live in today. In your view, what is there in the text or history of the Constitution that supports the growth of this administrative state that we live in? Is the growth of the administrative state an example that the Constitution (be amended?) simply out of necessity, or is the administrative state consistent with the Constitution as drafted by our Founding Fathers? How do we get to where we are from a constitutional point of view? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, you know, we all, of course, begin in high school civics with the notion of three branches of government -- the executive, the legislative and the judicial. And we study that. And then only occasionally do people look at the real world and see, well, what is this agency? What is that? Is that legislative or is that judicial or is that executive? And, of course, the answer is, well, it's a little bit of each. It's exercising power delegated by Congress. It's executing it in a particular way. It's issuing regulations that have the force and effect of law. And quite often it's adjudicating particular disputes. The activities of the administrative agencies are, of course, the bulk of what judges on the court of appeals for the D.C. circuit do. And the principles of administrative law that have recognized the legitimacy of these agencies and sought to ensure that their exercise of authority is consistent with constitutional provisions by basically -- I mean, I know the issue can seem arcane to many people. But the fundamentals of administrative law really go back to the basic principles of justice. Is someone being given an opportunity to be heard? Is someone being treated fairly? Is someone who's making a decision doing it for a rational reason or an arbitrary reason? These are the same basic principles that have animated the common law system since the time of Lord Cooke. And they're being applied here as well. And the objection is often, this agency made a decision without adequately hearing our concerns, or this agency made an adjudicatory decision without hearing the record evidence, or they did not explain. That's the basic requirement of administrative law -- explain your decision. That's the limitation on arbitrariness. And the agency didn't explain why it's doing this. The notion that even in these arcane areas, our legal system insists upon the observance of these basic requirements of -- I don't want to use it -- say, due process as a technical term, but that's the principle that is being applied. That goes a long way to explaining how these agencies have been accepted into the constitutional system because they've been required under principles of administrative law to comply with these basic precepts of procedural regularity. SEN. DEWINE: Judge, let me turn to the area of antitrust, a matter that's very important for the businesses and consumers of this country. For over a hundred years, our antitrust laws have helped consumers ensuring that our economy is competitive and vibrant. Our antitrust laws are the oldest in the world. And many people, including me, think they're the best in the world. In fact, I'm proud to say that John Sherman, Republican senator from my own home state of Ohio, wrote the first antitrust law back in 1890. Over the past 20 years, we've achieved a great deal of consensus, I think, about how the antitrust laws should be enforced -- Democrat and Republican administrations. As the chair of this committee's subcommittee on antitrust competition policy and consumer rights, I've worked very closely with Senator Kohl, who asked you some questions about antitrust. I think we've worked in a bipartisan way to ensure that consumers and competition are protected. It's a simple goal, but it's not always easy to achieve or put into practice. For example, recently the rise and expansion of the Internet and the technological explosion of the so-called new economy have led to a marketplace that's changing faster and more often than we have really ever experienced before. Judge, what challenges do you think the courts face in trying to square our old antitrust laws as they're currently written with new business strategies in the high-technology markets? And do you think these laws give courts enough guidance to deal with these new-economy issues? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that was really the basic issue that I faced in the Microsoft case before the D.C. Circuit en banc. There was a lot of argument, academic commentary back and forth, the idea "This is a whole new area. You can't apply the old principles. They don't work in this context. You need to do something different," the so-called new paradigm and all that. And at least the argument that I tried to make on behalf of the states was that the basic principles are the same. The Sherman Act was, as many have said, a charter of economic freedom and that those basic principles do have to be applied regardless of changes in the economics of the underlying businesses or the structure of the markets. Obviously it requires a great deal of sensitivity on the part of the judges, and it's a real challenge for the lawyers sometimes to be able to understand the economics, to be able to explain them to the judges. And judges appreciate that. But my basic instinct -- and it's nothing more than that -- is that the principles are there and the issue is simply application in a new context. SEN. DEWINE: Great. Thank you. Judge, just one final comment. Yesterday Senator Grassley asked you whether you think that there is, and I quote, "any room in constitutional interpretation for the judge's own values or beliefs." In response, you said, and I quote, "No, I don't think there is. Sometimes it's hard to give meaning to a constitutional term in a particular case. But you don't look to your own values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources," end of quote. You continued by saying that, and I quote, "Judges wear black robes because it doesn't matter who they are as individuals. That's not going to shape their decision. It's their understanding of the law that will shape their decision," end of quote. Now, Judge, I know what you meant by that answer. Judges should not impose their own preferences from the bench. In fact, I said pretty much the same thing in my opening statement on Monday. But Judge, putting on a black robe does not mean that a judge should lose his character. You, sir, have a perfect resume and certainly an outstanding professional career. But a Supreme Court justice is more than just impeccable academic credentials and impressive accomplishments. President Bush nominated John Roberts, the man. America has gotten to know John Roberts, the man. I'm quite sure that the Senate is, in fact, going to confirm John Roberts, the man. Over the past several months we've examined your life, met with you in private, and now question you about your beliefs. Throughout this time your honesty, your integrity, your wisdom, your judgment and, dare I say, yes, your values, have shown through. I would just say, sir, please don't check any of that at the door when you walk into the Supreme Court. By becoming John Roberts, the chief justice, don't ever forget to be John Roberts, the man. I think this country needs you to remember how you got here and who you met along the way. We need you to bring to the court your compassion and your understanding for the lives of others who haven't been as successful as you have been. We need you to bring to the court your strong commitment to equal justice for all. And we need you to always remember that your decisions will make a real difference in the lives of real people. When you put on that black robe and assume your spot on the Supreme Court, you will truly bring with you your heart and your soul, the values you learned from your parents and others that you learned as you grew up in the wide open fields of your youth. Those values are strong. They are true. The president saw them when he nominated you, and we have certainly seen them this week. And I must say, sir, they must never leave you. Justice Felix Frankfurter gave this same advice to his colleagues in 1949. "There comes a point," Justice Frankfurter wrote, "where this court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men." Great justices are more than just legal automatons, legal technicians. They're more than just that. Though they lose their individuality when they put on a black robe, great justices never forget who they are. I wish you well. Thank you, sir. JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you very much, Senator DeWine. Senator Feinstein. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Judge, I subscribe to much of what Senator DeWine said. I want to tell you what I think, perhaps a little differently and personally. Senator Graham last night pointed out that Justice Scalia was confirmed by 98 votes of this body. And I thought then and I think now how different the days were in 1986. There's so much water under the dam since then. The nation is divided. It's polarized. It's about 50-50. We're at war. Executive authority is very much on people's minds; the law as it relates to war, the Geneva Conventions, the conventions against torture, all of these things very much on everyone's minds. We've seen in the last 10 years 193 5-4 decisions of the court, which suggests that on major questions the court is also very divided. And so in comes this young justice. I was one on our side that voted for you for the D.C. court. I did so because there were so many testimonials about what a fine lawyer you are, what a fine human being you are, and I voted for you. But there's more in this vote. Senator DeWine just spoke about the man as opposed to the legal automaton. Yesterday morning you spoke, I thought, eloquently in answering Senator Specter's questions on Roe. You discussed stare decisis as fully as I have ever heard it discussed. I'm not a lawyer. I learned a lot from listening to you. You discussed the right to privacy. You were very full and forward- speaking. And then after lunch it was as if you shut down and became very cautious. So my first question: Did anybody caution you between the morning and the afternoon sessions? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator, no. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Has anyone, when you were being interviewed for this position, ever asked your opinion on Roe? JUDGE ROBERTS: No. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay, that's good to know. Nineteen seventy- three, 2005, 32 years, over three generations of women have come really to feel that finally they have some autonomy over their bodies. And, you know, women are all different. Many of them are very pro- life. Many are pro-choice. People have different religious views, moral views. So it's this big, diverse cosmopolitan of women. But the growth has been enormous, and the ability of women to succeed -- I mean, I went into the workforce at the same time Sandra Day O'Connor did, with a year's graduate work. The door was closed. It's now open, and women are so lucky. And it seems to me that the living Constitution is that each person in this great country, man or woman, rich or poor, white or black, whatever it might be, can really reach their full potential. And I guess what has begun to concern me a little bit is Judge Roberts, the legal automaton, as opposed to Judge Roberts, the man, because I've heard so many times, you know, "I can't really say because it may come before me." And yet I don't expect you to say what you would do with Roe, one way or another. But I do expect to know a little bit more about how you feel and how you think as a man, because you're a very young man to be chief justice. You could be chief justice for 40 years. That's a very long time. And because of the division -- and there's also a lot of fear out there where this new court, now with potentially two new justices, is going to go, whether you've got the ability to bring that court together to end the 5-4 decisions, to see the big decisions are made so that they represent a much greater consensus. And I'm trying to find out and see, are those qualities really there? I was interested in a colloquy you had with Senator Biden on the end of life. And he used the word -- asked a number of legal questions. And then he says, "Okay, just talk to me as a father and tell me." Now, I've been through two end-of-life situations, one with my husband, one with my father, both suffering terrible cancers, a lot of pain, enormous debilitation. Let me ask this question this way. If you were in that situation with someone you deeply loved and you saw the suffering, who would you want to listen to, your doctor or the government telling you what to do? To me it's that stark, because I've been through it. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, Senator, in that situation, obviously you want to talk and take into account the views and the heartfelt concerns of the loved one that you're trying to help in that situation, because you know how they're viewing this. You know what they mean when they're saying things like what their wishes are and their concerns are, and, of course, consulting with their physician. But it seems to me that in that situation you do want to understand and make sure that you appreciate the views of the loved one. And only you can do it, because -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That wasn't my question. JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. SEN. FEINSTEIN: I'm trying to see your feelings as a man. I'm not asking you for a legal view. JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't -- I wasn't trying to give a legal view. My point was that obviously you look to the views of the person involved. And if it's a loved one, you are the one who is in a position to make sure that you understand their views and can help them communicate those. SEN. FEINSTEIN: How would you feel if you were in that position? JUDGE ROBERTS: An end-of-life situation and suffering? You know, I do think it's one of those things that it's hard to conceptualize until you're there. I really would be hesitant to say, "This is what I would definitely want done or that's what I would definitely want done." You do need to confront that and appreciate all of the different concerns and impulses and considerations. SEN. FEINSTEIN: And every situation is different. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. And it's one of those things I think it's difficult to put yourself in that position and saying, "Well, with any degree of confidence, if I were suffering and confronting the end of life, this is what I would want to do or that is what I would want to do." I just -- you can theorize it and try to come up with your views or how you would confront -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That's right. All I'm saying is you wouldn't want the government telling you what to do. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I'm happy to say that as a general matter, because -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That there should be a basic right of privacy. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that's getting into a legal question, and you don't want -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay, I won't go there. I won't go there. Let me go somewhere else. Commerce clause, the 14th Amendment; Lopez, which began a chain of about 36 cases, striking down major pieces of legislation. It's not easy to get a bill passed here. I mean, there are hearings. There are discussions. There are markups. There's one house. There's another house. There's a president. It goes through -- most of the time it's scrubbed pretty good before it gets to the president. Gun-free schools. Struck down in 1995; an impermissible use of a commerce clause. '96, Moses Lake, Washington; shooting in a school. '97, Bethel, Alaska; principal and one student killed. '97, Pearl, Mississippi; two students killed and seven wounded by a 16-year old. 1997, West Paducah; three students killed, five wounded. Stamps, Arkansas; two students wounded. Jonesboro, '98; four students, one teacher killed, 10 others wounded outside West Side Middle School. Edinboro, Pennsylvania; one teacher killed, two students. And on and on and on. An impermissible use of the commerce clause to prohibit possession of a weapon in schools. Now at what point does crime influence commerce? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I think it does. And one of the things that's important to understand about the Lopez decision as the court analyzed it -- and again, I'm not taking a position on whether it was correctly decided or not. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Right, right. JUDGE ROBERTS: But as the court analyzed it, one of the things about the act was that it did not have what's known as a jurisdictional requirement. It didn't have a requirement that the firearm be transported in interstate commerce; a requirement that I would think it would be easy to meet in most cases because gun -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: But the firearm is transported in interstate commerce. Maybe not when that student had it, but to get to the student, the firearm has been transported in interstate commerce. JUDGE ROBERTS: My point is that the fix in Lopez -- all that the court was saying was missing in there, or what was different about Lopez than many of the other cases, was that lack of a jurisdictional requirement. And if the act had been -- as I understand the court's analysis, if the act had required that, which I think again it's fairly easy to show in almost every case -- as you say, these guns are transported in interstate commerce -- then that would have been within the Congress' power under the commerce clause. I think it was an unusual feature of the legislation that it didn't have that requirement, as so many laws you. As you know, it often says, you know, in interstate commerce. And that's, at least as I understand the Lopez decision, what made it unusual. SEN. FEINSTEIN: That's very helpful. You might get it back again someday with that fix. Let me turn to something else that Senator Leahy asked a number of questions on, and that's the Constitution and executive power. I'm looking for the section, but the Constitution very clearly says that any treaty is treated as the supreme law of the land, right? And that no state or official can abrogate it? JUDGE ROBERTS: Right. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Which gives it the total weight of law. Can a president then decide not to follow a treaty? JUDGE ROBERTS: As a general matter, the answer is no. The treaty power -- as long as it's ratified, according to the requirements in the Constitution, by two-thirds of the Senate, you're perfectly correct. It is, under the supremacy clause, the supreme law of the land. Now I don't know if there are particular arguments about executive authority in that area with which I'm not familiar, and I don't mean to state categorically, but my general understanding is that treaties that are ratified -- and of course we have treaties that aren't ratified and executive agreements that aren't submitted for ratification and so on, but the treaty that's ratified by the Senate under the supremacy clause is part of the supreme law of the land. Now -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: So the conventions against torture and the Geneva Convention would apply? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. Now there are questions, of course, that arise under those and have arisen under those about interpreting the conventions and how they apply in particular cases to non-parties to the convention and so on. And as you know, those cases have been coming up and are being litigated. but that's an issue of what the convention means in a particular case, not whether as a general matter a treaty is binding. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Let me take you to the morning, yesterday morning, in stare decisis, because you specifically discussed, when you were asked about Roe and Casey precedent, specifically, as we said, workability, reliance, pragmatic considerations, changed facts or circumstances, and whether the underlying legal or constitutional doctrine would still be valid. Are there any other factors that you think should be considered? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well the court has been somewhat inconsistent on some other factors. They, for example, talk about in some cases the length of a precedent; the idea that the longer it's been on the books, the more people have conformed their conduct to it. In other cases they've suggested that's not such an important consideration. In Payne versus Tennessee, the case said it noted how closely divided the court was in the prior case as a factor. But in other cases, the court has said that's not a major consideration. So I put those factors on the table simply because in some cases the court looks to them, in others it doesn't. But I think the ones I mentioned yesterday are ones that apply in every case, including the settled expectations, the workability, whether the doctrinal bases of a decision have been eroded. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Yesterday, in answering Senator Specter on this very point, when you referred to Payne v. Tennessee, you did point out there were other considerations that come into play, and they're laid out again in Dickerson and in other cases -- Payne v. Tennessee, Agastini -- JUDGE ROBERTS: Mm-hmm. SEN. FEINSTEIN: -- and a variety of decisions where the court has explained when it will revisit a precedent and when it will not. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. FEINSTEIN: What do you think, when it should and should not? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I do think you do have to look at those criteria, and the ones that I pull from those various cases are, first of all, the basic principle that it's not enough that you think the decision was wrongly decided. That's not enough to justify revisiting it. Otherwise there'd be no role for precedent, no role for stare decisis. Second of all, one basis for reconsidering it is the issue of workability. If a precedent has turned out not to provide workable rules, if courts get different results in the similar cases because the -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Or if another case like Casey finds that Roe is workable. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, again, that's a different -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: The base -- JUDGE ROBERTS: -- that is a precedent of its own -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Right. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- that obviously -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- would be looked at under the principles of stare decisis. The issue of the erosion of precedent. If you have a decision that's based on three different cases and two of them have been overruled, maybe that's a basis that justifies revisiting the prior precedent. The issue of settled expectations. The court has explained you look at the extent to which people have conformed their conduct to the rule and have developed settled expectations in connection with it. Perhaps the discussion earlier we had about the Dickerson case is a good example of that, where the chief justice thought Miranda was wrongly decided, but explained that it had become part of the established rules of police conduct, and he was going to respect those expectations. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Now yesterday you said this: "I agree with the Griswold court's conclusion that marital privacy extends to contraception and availability of that." The court since Griswold has grounded the privacy right discussed in that case in the liberty interest protected under the due process clause. Do you think that right of privacy that you're talking about there extends to single people as well as married people? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the courts held that in the Eisenstadt case which came shortly after Griswold, largely under principles of equal protection, and I don't have any quarrel with that conclusion in Eisenstadt. SEN. FEINSTEIN: So -- okay. Do you think that that same right extends beyond family choices, then, about a child's education? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well that's where it actually got started 80 years ago in the earliest cases. Meyer and Pierce involved questions about how to raise children, whether you could teach them a foreign language, whether you could send them to a private school. And those decisions are really what started that body of law. SEN. FEINSTEIN: I have another question I could ask, but you won't answer it, unless -- SEN. SPECTER: Give it a try, Dianne. Go ahead. (Laughter.) SEN. FEINSTEIN: Well, does it cover the right of a woman to decide whether to continue her pregnancy? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, Senator, as I've explained, that -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Yeah. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- is an area that's -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: It's apt to come before you and -- right. That message was well-conveyed. Could I ask you a couple of -- one question. I think I'll have time. In Acree v. the Republic of Iraq -- this was a case where 17 U.S. prisoners -- they were our people -- suffered severe beatings, starvation, mock executions, dark and unsanitary living conditions, et cetera, during the first Gulf War. And they sued the government of Iraq, the Iraqi intelligence services and Saddam Hussein for their brutal and inhumane treatment. The veterans won their case in district court in July of '03. They were awarded $959 million in damages. After the judgment, the Justice Department intervened in the suit to contest the district court's jurisdiction. The specific issue involved a statutory interpretation of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, passed in 2003. Justice argued that the statute gave the president the authority to change Iraq's designation as a state sponsor of terror, and thereby relieve it after the fact of its responsibilities for prior acts of terror. You wrote a concurring opinion in favor of overturning the district court's judgment. Although you agreed with the other two judges on the panel that the judgment should be reversed, you alone adopted the Department of Justice's argument that the statute granted the president total power to absolve Iraq of liability. You reached this conclusion while acknowledging that the question of statutory interpretation is close. (To the Chairman.) Can I ask my question? SEN. SPECTER: Yes, you may finish your question. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Do you believe that when, as in Acree, there's a close question of interpretation of a statute touching upon a foreign policy, that the executive deserves total deference? JUDGE ROBERTS: Oh, no, Senator. Whether the question is close or not, I don't think there's any situation where a court concludes that the executive deserves total deference. And that was not the basis of my decision. The judges were unanimous that the veterans were not entitled to relief. The panel was chosen from -- happened to be appointees of three different presidents. The view was unanimous that they were not entitled to relief. The other two judges concluded there was no cause of action available to them. I concluded that there was no jurisdiction, and wrote separately. The recognition that it was a close question is also reflected in the view of the other two judges in addressing my concern. They acknowledged that it was a close question, and I agreed with that. But you did have legislation that said that the president can determine that these laws do not apply, if he makes a determination under the criteria set forth in the statute. And he had done that. And my conclusion that that extended to the provision that otherwise would have allowed suit. The other two judges disagreed. They thought there was jurisdiction, but then concluded there was no right of action. So the end result of both of our position was the same. But it was not a question of deference, it was a question of interpreting the legal authority and consequences of an act that this body had passed and the president's finding under that. When it comes to interpreting questions of law -- I go back to the Marbury versus Madison -- that is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch. We don't defer to the executive, we don't defer to the legislature in making that final decision about what the law is. SEN. FEINSTEIN: To get confirmed, maybe you'll defer to the legislative a little bit. Thank you. JUDGE ROBERTS: We defer -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. JUDGE ROBERTS: Just to clarify. We certainly defer in the standards of review that make sure that we're not (infringing ?). But the final decision about what's constitutional nor not rests with the judicial branch. The policy judgments, we certainly defer to the legislature. Thank you. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Thank you. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Senator Sessions. SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your leadership as we move forward expeditiously, I think, today, and I think in a helpful way. I think that the hearings have been very good. And, Judge Roberts, I salute you for your excellent manner and your forthrightness and professionalism as you answer these questions. You know, I hope we are moving away, Senator Feinstein, from divisiveness. We've got a -- in some ways we do have a divided country. But in other ways I think we have the potential to move together. And I, frankly, believe that one thing that causes divisiveness and frustration and angst is when a Supreme Court were to render an opinion that really is more a political or social policy decision rather than a legal decision; and when they say it amounts to the Constitution -- a constitutional provision, then that Supreme Court opinion can only be changed by two-thirds of both houses and three-fourths of the states. Do you understand that danger, Judge Roberts, in opinions? And is that perhaps one reason you think a judge should show modesty? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, it's part of what I mean when I say a certain humility should characterize the judicial function. Judges need to appreciate that the legitimacy of their action is confined to interpreting the law and not making it. And if they exceed that function and start making the law, I do think that raises legitimate concerns about legitimacy of their authority to do that. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I would observe that the American people are beginning to believe that is occurring, and I think it does threaten legitimacy of the court in a way that all of us who love the law should be concerned. And I do love the law. And I'm a big critic of the courts on these kind of activist cases. But I have practiced full-time before federal judges. And as I said earlier, I believe day after day justice is done. You have said that in your -- before your court you were impressed with the objectivity and fairness that the judges bring. Is the ideal of blindfolded justice, a neutral umpire, is that a romantic, naive ideal, or is that something that you believe we can and should strive to achieve in America? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I do know that there are sophisticated academic theorists, people who spend a lot more time theorizing in this area than I do, and a lot more -- a lot smarter than I am, addressing these issues who -- some of whom conclude that in particular cases it's difficult to do, it's difficult to avoid making the law while you're interpreting it, and they kind of throw up their hands and suggest that we shouldn't even try, therefore. And I don't agree with that. I think as a practical matter, as a pragmatic matter, judges every day know the difference between interpreting the law and making the law. Every day judges put aside their personal views and beliefs and apply the law, whether the result is one they would agree with as a legislator or not agree with. The question is what the law is, not what they think it should be. I've seen that on the Court of Appeals. I've seen that as a practicing lawyer before the court. That is the ideal. I'm sure judges, I'm sure justices don't always achieve it in every case because it's a human endeavor, and error is going to infect any human endeavor. But that is the ideal, and I think good judges, working hard, can not only achieve it, but also achieve it together in a collegial way and benefit from the insight and views of each other. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I thank you for that, and I would share those views. And I absolutely believe the strength of our nation is our good legal system, We've talked about the commerce clause, and there's been a lot of criticism of some of the cases. I think there have only been two significant commerce clause cases made in the last 40 years: Lopez and Morrison. Senator Feinstein and you had a nice exchange about Lopez. I would certainly agree with your analysis. Had the Congress placed in there a requirement that the firearm had been traveled in interstate commerce, I believe that statute would have been upheld. We could pass it again with that simple requirement and virtually every state -- virtually every firearm will have traveled in interstate commerce. A few states have manufacturers. When I was a federal prosecutor, I prosecuted a lot of those cases. As a young prosecutor, I was sort of an expert at it in the `70s, and I proved sometimes that the interstate commerce -- by simply putting agent on the thing -- there was no gun manufacturer in Alabama or it said made in Italy on it. I remember I got that affirmed one time as that's proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not made in Alabama. So Lopez, I believe, is a good decision. Also with regard to crime, I would note that we've always had that nexus with interstate commerce. As a federal prosecutor, it's not a prosecution for theft. It's prosecution for interstate transportation of stolen property. That's the federal crime. Theft is prosecuted only by the state courts unless it's from -- theft from an interstate shipment. That's a federal crime. It's not stealing an automobile. It's interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The ITSMV is the federal crime. The Hobbs Act, the extortion act, to use against politicians you have to have an interstate nexus, and I've had cases where bribery was proven, but we were not able to prosecute it federally because it did not have an interstate nexus. RICO, even arson cases have to have it there. And so I just want to make sure that if -- let me ask you this. In general, wouldn't you agree if someone in Pennsylvania picks up a rock and murders their neighbor, that is a crime unreachable by federal prosecution under traditional interpretations of the commerce clause and the reach of the federal government? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, again, barring special circumstances of the sort you were talking about, that's generally something addressed by state authorities. SEN. SESSIONS: So we need to get this thing straight. We have some who complain we're federalizing too many crimes and then complain that we're striking down some that go too far. States should prosecute these cases locally and effectively, and should do that: guns, schools and guns and that kind of thing. And in the Violence Against Women's Act there was a commerce clause case where a woman was raped and then sued the people who attacked -- assaulted her and raped her. She wanted to sue in federal court under the Violence Against Women's Act, and what the court held there was, as I read it, that the -- there was a -- that it had limited -- the court limited Congress's power to provide for civil damages, money damages. She could sue that rapist in state court, but not for money damages in federal court. Is that the holding of that case? JUDGE ROBERTS: That's my understanding what the court held in the Morrison case, yes. SEN. SESSIONS: And I don't think it's an utterly extreme position. It certainly did not gut the Violence Against Women Act. It has a whole -- so many more provisions then just that. If the action had been against a private business, could the damages have been rendered in that case? JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm not sure I know the answer to that, Senator. SEN. SESSIONS: I'll take the follow-up. The Garrett case that several people have mentioned involved the University of Alabama in a lawsuit against the state institution, claiming violation of the disabilities act. The state defended on the grounds that you could sue the state of Alabama for back pay, you could sue the state of Alabama to get your job back, you could sue the state of Alabama and get an injunction against the state to not discriminate again in the future, but under the sovereign immunity doctrine that protects a state from lawsuits, you couldn't sue them for money damages. Now Senator Cornyn was attorney general of his state, and Attorney generals like Attorney General -- now Judge -- Bill Pryor, who defended Alabama, raised that defense. And I don't think it's a bogus defense. I think it's a legitimate concern. Judge, do you recall where -- the doctrine that's so famous in the law, that the power to sue is the power to destroy? Do you remember where that came from in our legal history? JUDGE ROBERTS: I remember tax opinions talking about it, but -- the power to tax being the power to destroy. But -- SEN. SESSIONS: I think the doctrine has been applied to the states. We attorney generals are familiar with it, under the sovereign immunity that the states have. If you're empowered to sue the state of Alabama in federal court, then you have virtually the power to destroy that state, financially, if there's no real limit on it. And so we've always provided and the states have provided a sovereign immunity that the states are -- only allow themselves to be sued under certain circumstances, and you cannot just sue them unnecessarily. I know Senator Mark Pryor, our Democratic colleague, signed on the brief for the state of Alabama in the Garrett case, taking this position. And the Supreme Court ruled with it. So -- I also would note that it did not in any way destroy the disabilities act. It applied to only -- state employees only make up about 3.7 percent of the employees in the nation that might be covered by that. So I think that -- there's been some healthy trends in reestablishing that there's some limit to the reach of the commerce clause. Wouldn't -- would not you agree? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the interesting thing in the court's most recent decision is the medical marijuana decision in Raich case. And the court there looked at the Lopez and Morrison decisions and tried to put them in context and said -- because the argument there was based on Lopez and Morrison, saying this is beyond Congress's power. And the court said those are only two of our cases, and they need to be put in the broad sweep of commerce clause precedents for over 200 years. Yes, they're two cases, and it had been, I think, 65, 70 years since the court had focused on limitation of -- under the commerce clause and concluded that it was beyond Congress's power. But the Raich case concluded this was within Congress' power. They said don't -- it's not as if Lopez and Morrison are setting -- junking all that came before. They just need to be considered in the broad context. And, of course, there's decision after decision, going back to Gibbons v. Ogden, one of Chief Justice John Marshall's early opinions, about the scope of Congress' power and the recognition under the constitutional scheme that it is a broad grant of power, and the recognition that this body has the authority to determine when issues affecting interstate commerce merit a legislative response at the federal level. I think that's -- SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I think you're going to another subject. But I think you're correct. These are some difficult areas. And the court need(s) to give a lot of attention to (it). But some recognition that there are limits to federal reach is, I think, legitimate for a court. Judge, are you aware of the salary that you'll be paid? When you become -- if you're so fortunate -- JUDGE ROBERTS: In a vague way, yes. SEN. SESSIONS: And I suppose you were, when you were affirmed to the Court of Appeals. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. SESSIONS: So, you're not going to be back next week asking for a pay raise, are you? (Light laughter.) JUDGE ROBERTS: Not next week, no. (Laughter.) SEN. SESSIONS: Chief was pretty -- always over here knocking on our door about pay raises. But, you know, we have a deficit in our country -- (laughter) -- and you are paid the same -- I guess the chief may be paid more than senators. But for the most part, judges are paid what members of Congress are paid. And I, frankly, am dubious that we should give ourselves big pay raises when we can't balance the budget. I also chair the Court subcommittee -- Courts and Administration. And as chief, you have a serious responsibility with regard to managing and providing guidance to the Congress on the needs of the court system. I know that -- I'm sure that you will do that with great skill and determination. But let me ask you, will you also seek to manage that court system -- and I hesitate, but I will use the word "bureaucracy" at times -- effectively and efficiently and keep it to be -- keep it as lean and effective a management team and maintain the -- as tight a budget as you can maintain? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, if I am confirmed, Senator, the answer is -- is yes. I am aware that there is, for example, the administrative office, and they provide value services to judges around the country. As a consumer of their services for the past two years, I have, certainly, particular views about where I think they're effective and helpful to judges, and other areas where, like any bureaucracy, where I think they can do better. It is an area where my first priority is going to be to listen, because I'm sure there are many considerations of which I'm not aware that are very important for the chief justice to take into account. And after listening, I'll try to make the best decisions I can about administering that system. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, there are a lot of problems. Our judges are not happy with the General Services Administration, and sometimes GSA's not happy with the judges, and sometimes judges overreach -- and want to be treated awfully specially. And so, I think you have a challenge there. I would look forward to working with you. If you'll help us make sure that your court system is lean and efficient and productive, we'll try to make sure that you have sufficient resources to do those jobs. One more thing, and -- I'd just like to inquire about, and that deals with stare decisis, the deference you give to a prior decision of the Supreme Court. And you've mentioned a number of factors, and I recognize those as valid and worthy of great consideration. But it almost strikes me that it's a bit circular. In other words, the court is creating a wall around its opinions to try to avoid seeing them overruled. Isn't it true that your first oath is to enforce the Constitution as God gives you the ability to understand it, and that sometimes decisions have to be reversed if they are contrary to a fair and just reading of the Constitution? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. The oath we take is to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. That's true. And the way judges go about that is within a system of precedent. And consistent with rules of stare decisis, no judge starts the day by opening a blank slate and say, what should the Constitution mean today? You operate within those systems of precedence. That's the best way that we judges have determined to interpret the Constitution and laws consistent with principles of stare decisis. SEN. SESSIONS: Judge, I'll just conclude with noting that I remember when the court in the Ninth Circuit ruled striking down the Pledge of Allegiance. The then majority leader, Tom Daschle, came to the floor, as now majority leader Harry Reid did, at the same afternoon, and they criticized the opinion and criticized the Ninth Circuit and expressed concern about activism in that circuit, which I have done often myself. But I responded that my concern was not so much with the circuit, but with the confusing number of opinions from the Supreme Court, and that I had no doubt that there was Supreme Court authority that would justify the Ninth Circuit rendering, or ruling that they did. And I say that because we've just received word today that a judge in San Francisco has upheld -- has ruled that the pledge's reference to "one nation under God" violates the Constitution and should be stricken down. So that case is going to be winding its way forward. I'm not going to ask you to comment on it because it will obviously come before you. But will you tell us whether or not you are concerned about the inconsistencies of these opinions, and will you work to try to establish a body of law in the Supreme Court that recommends -- recognizes the free exercise rights of American citizens in regard to religion and to avoid a state establishment of religion? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, we talked about this in the committee hearings on a couple of occasions, and I think everyone would agree that the religion jurisprudence under the First Amendment, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause could be clearer. The Ten Commandments cases are the example right at hand. You have two decisions of the Supreme Court; only one justice thinks both are right. That is an area in which I think the court can redouble its efforts to try to come to some consistency in its approach. Now, it obviously is an area -- the cases depend in a very significant way on the particular facts. And anytime that's the case, the differences may be explained by the facts. You do have the two provisions, as your question recognized: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. And I -- as I've said before, I think that both of those are animated by the principle that the framers intended the rights of full citizenship to be available to all citizens without regard to their religious belief or lack of religious belief. That, I think, is the underlying principle, and hopefully the court's precedents over the years will continue to give life to that ideal. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, thank you, Judge Roberts. You have by your testimony validated the high opinions that so many have of you. I am confident you would make a great chief justice. JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator. SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Feingold? SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge, let me start off by taking a couple of new topics. In September 1985 when you were in the White House counsel's office you recommended deleting the following line from the presidential briefing materials: quote, "As far as our best scientists have been able to determine, the AIDS virus is not transmitted through casual or routine contact," unquote. You said at the time that the conclusion was in dispute. We now know, of course, that the line is completely accurate. But I would say we also knew that then. The Center for Disease Control guidelines issued the month before you wanted to delete that line said the following: quote, "Casual person-to-person contact as would occur amongst school children appears to pose no risk," unquote. Major news organizations had reported the CDC's conclusion. In fact, the CDC had said as early as 1982 that it was unlikely that HIV could be spread through casual contact. JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm sorry, as early as when? SEN. FEINGOLD: As 1982 -- JUDGE ROBERTS: Oh. SEN. FEINGOLD: -- that it was unlikely that HIV could be spread through casual contact. Why did -- why did you recommend that that line be deleted? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, for the reason I gave in the memorandum. This was the -- a statement by the president, and I just wanted to -- didn't want the president giving out medical advice if it was a subject of some uncertainty. I obviously was not a medical expert, and you said the CDC had issued a report a month before. Well, it -- earlier in your commentary. I don't know what the 1982 issue was. But I just thought it was -- it's purely a matter of caution and prudence to have the president make a pronouncement on a -- you have to remember, this was at the very beginning of the -- AIDS coming into public consciousness, and I was just concerned that the president not be giving out medical statements if people weren't absolutely sure that it was correct. So -- . SEN. FEINGOLD: Let me follow on that a little bit. It certainly was a(n) early time, and also a critical time. I'm wondering what you did to check, or have someone check on these facts. I mean, it -- you must have known that the issue was so important the president was saying something like this, that it could have given a great reassurance to people all over the country as well as helping children infected with the AIDS virus to live happier and more normal lives to know that this was the medical conclusion. So I'm just wondering why you wouldn't check it out a little more. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, and -- I mean, I -- the -- the flip side of that, Senator, of course, is if turned out to be wrong, it could have been disastrous to have the president announcing -- because the president wasn't a medical expert, either. And I'm sure my suggestion would have caused the people drafting the president's speech to go back, and if they thought they were convinced and they were sure, then that's what would have gone in there. It was just a question of concern. I wanted to make sure that they were 100 percent confident that what the president was going to be saying about a medical issue was -- they had complete confidence in it. I don't know actually whether they took it out or left it in, but at least it caused them to focus - SEN. FEINGOLD: I don't want to belabor it, but I think that was a great opportunity for presidential leadership and reassurance and would just respectfully disagree with your judgment there. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, my judgment -- just so I could -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Fair enough. JUDGE ROBERTS: It wasn't my medical judgment. SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand. JUDGE ROBERTS: The impact of my suggestion was obviously to cause the people who wanted that in there to go back and make sure they were sure that they wanted the president of the United States issuing a medical statement. SEN. FEINGOLD: I think it was pretty certain at that time what the medical view was, as indicated by the medical community of our own government. But I'll leave it at that. Do you believe that the Congress has the power under the Constitution to prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't know if that's an issue that's going to come before the courts. I don't know if Congress has taken that step yet. And until it does, I think that's an issue that I have to maintain some silence on. I think -- personally I believe that everybody should be treated with dignity in this area and respect. The legal question of Congress's authority to address that, though, is one that could come before the courts, and so I'm - SEN. FEINGOLD: Could you imagine an argument that would be contrary to that view - JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I don't know what arguments people would make. I just know that I shouldn't be expressing an opinion on any issues that could come before the court. SEN. FEINGOLD: Let's go to something else then. I'd like to hear your views about the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms. This is an amendment where there is a real shortage of jurisprudence. You mentioned the Third Amendment with even less jurisprudence, but the Second Amendment's close. So I think you can maybe help us understand your approach to interpreting the Constitution by saying a bit about it. The Second Amendment raises interesting questions about a constitutional interpretation. I read the Second Amendment as providing an individual right to keep and bear arms as opposed to only a collective right. Individual Americans have a constitutional right to own and use guns, and there are a number of actions that legislatures should not take, in my view, to restrict gun ownership. The modern Supreme Court has only heard one case interpreting the Second Amendment. That case is U.S. versus Miller. It was heard in 1939. And the court indicated that it saw the right to bear arms as a collective right. In a second case, U.S. versus Emerson, the court denied cert and let stand a lower court opinion that upheld a statute banning gun possession by individuals subject to a restraining order under -- against a Second Amendment challenge. The appeals court viewed the right to bear arms as an individual right. The Supreme Court declined to review the appeals court decision. So what is your view of the Second Amendment? Do you support one or the other of the views of what the -- what was intended by that amendment? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yeah. Well, I mean, your quite right that there is a dispute among the circuit courts. It's really a conflict among the circuits. The 5th Circuit -- I think it was in the Emerson case, if I'm remembering it correctly -- agreed that -- with what I understand to be your view, that this protects an individual right. But they went on to say that the right was not infringed in that case. They upheld the regulation there. The 9th Circuit has taken a different view. And I don't remember the name of the case now, but a very recent case from the 9th Circuit has taken the opposite view, that it protects only a collective right, as they said; in other words, it's only the right of a militia to possess arms, and not an individual right. Particularly since you have this conflict, cert was denied in the Emerson case. I'm not sure it's been sought in the other one or will be. That's the sort of issue that's likely to come before the Supreme Court, when you have conflicting views. I know the Miller case sidestepped that issue. An argument was made back in 1939 that this provides only a collective right, and the court didn't address that. They said instead that the firearm at issue there -- I think it was a sawed-off shotgun -- is not the type of weapon protected under the militia aspect of the Second Amendment. So people try to read into the tea leaves about Miller and what would come out on this issue, but that's still very much an open issue. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, I understand that a case could come before you. I'm wondering if you would anticipate that in such a case that a serious question would be which interpretation is correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, any time you have two different courts of appeals taking opposite positions, I think you have to regard that as a serious question. That's not expressing a view one way or the other; it's just saying I know the 9th Circuit thinks it's only a collective right, I know the 5th Circuit thinks it's an individual right, and I know the job of the Supreme Court is to resolve circuit conflicts. So I do think that issue is one that's likely to come before the court. SEN. FEINGOLD: I'd like to revisit the Hamdi issue. I asked you which of the four opinions in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld best approximates your view on the executive's power to designate enemy combatants, and you refused to answer that question because the issue might return to the court. I want to press you a bit on that. In Hamdi, there were four different opinions -- and by the way, I checked, because you mentioned Youngstown, and all four opinions cited the Youngstown Sheet & Tube versus Sawyer case. Both Justice Thomas's dissent and Justice Ginsburg and Souter concurring cited Jackson's opinion in the Youngstown case, and they came to completely different conclusions. So your answer that you would apply that principle doesn't help me very much in understanding your view of this. We know where all eight other members of the court stand on these opinions. They -- in their opinions they wrote -- either wrote or joined one of them. Yet all eight of them will hear the next case that raises similar issues. No one is suggesting that their independence or impartiality in the next case has been compromised. Now Mr. Hamdi, of course, has left the country, so the precise facts of his case will never return to the court. Of course, if a member of the court expressed a view outside of the court on a specific case that was headed to court, that might be cause for recusal, as Justice Scalia recognized when he recused himself from the Pledge of Allegiance case a terms ago after discussing it in a speech. But obviously Justice Scalia can participate in the next case involving the questions at issue in Hamdi, even though we know exactly what he thinks about that decision. So I guess I want to know why are you different? I'm not asking for a commitment on a particular case. I recognize that your views might change once you're on the court and hear the arguments and discuss the issue with your colleagues. But why shouldn't the public have some idea of where you stand today on these crucial questions concerning the power of the government to jail them without charge or access to counsel in a time of war? They know a great deal about how each of the other justices approach these issues. Why is your situation different? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, because each of the other eight justices came to their views in those cases through the judicial process. They confronted that issue with an open mind. They read the briefs presented by the arguments -- by the parties and the arguments the parties presented. They researched the precedents as a judge. They heard the argument in the case. They sat in the conference room, just the nine of them on the court, and debated the issues and came to their conclusions as part of the judicial process. You're now asking me for my opinion outside of that process, not after hearing the arguments, not after reading the briefs, not after participating with the other judges as part of the collegial process, not after sitting in the conference room and discussing with them their views, being open to their considered views of the case, not after going through the process of writing an opinion, which I have found from personal experience and from observation often leads to a change in views, the process of the opinion writing. You can't -- if the opinion turns out it doesn't write; you have to change the result. The -- the discipline of writing helps lead you to the right result. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, what would be the harm -- JUDGE ROBERTS: You're asking for -- I'm sorry -- you're asking me for my views, you know, right here without going through any of that process. SEN. FEINGOLD: What would be the harm, Judge, if we got your views at this point and then that process caused you to come to a different conclusion, as it appropriately should? What would be the harm? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the harm would be affected the appearance of impartiality in the administration of justice. The people who would be arguing in that future case should not look at me and say, "Well, there's somebody who under oath testified that I should lose this case, because this is his view that he testified to." They're entitled to have someone consider their case through the whole process I've just described, not testifying under oath in response to a question at a confirmation hearing. I think that is the difference between the views expressed in the prior precedent by other justices in the judicial process and why -- as has been the view of all of those justices. Every one of those justices who participated in that case took the same view with respect to questions concerning cases that might come before them as I'm taking here. SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand your view. I think it's narrow. I had the experience of having one of my bills go before the Supreme Court, and I know I didn't have, as we say in Wisconsin, a snowball's chance with a couple of the justices because of what -- how they had ruled previously. But I didn't think that made the process in any way tainted that I knew that simply weren't going to agree with this statute. But I recognize your limitations. Let me ask you about something else, the Hamdan matter. Yesterday you refused to answer any questions regarding your conduct in the Hamdan versus Rumsfeld case. But today you answered questions from Senator Coburn regarding this matter. So I want to follow up in order to make sure the record is complete. You interviewed with the attorney general of the United States concerning a possible opening on the Supreme Court on April 1, 2005. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. The specifics of the details I discussed in the response to the committee's questionnaire. SEN. FEINGOLD: And that was six days before the oral argument in the Hamdan case. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't remember the exact date of it. I know it was shortly before that, yeah. SEN. FEINGOLD: You had further interviews on May 3rd concerning a possible appointment to the court with numerous White House officials, including Karl Rove, the vice president and the White House counsel before the decision in the Hamdan case was released. Isn't that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: The decision was June 15th. SEN. FEINGOLD: The question here is just did you have further interviews on May 3rd concerning a possible appointment to the court? JUDGE ROBERTS: May 3rd, yes. Whatever was -- I don't remember the exact dates, but whatever was -- SEN. FEINGOLD: You had interviews with those individuals. The record seems to indicate it was on May 3rd -- JUDGE ROBERTS: In the Senate questioning in it, right. SEN. FEINGOLD: You met again with Ms. Myers, the White House counsel, on May 23rd. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm relying on the -- if that's what I said in the questionnaire, yes. I don't have an independent recollection. SEN. FEINGOLD: You have no reason to doubt that those facts are correct. You never informed counsel in this case of these meetings, did you? JUDGE ROBERTS: I did not, no. SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Gonzales's advice to the president concerning the Geneva Conventions was an issue in the case. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't want to discuss anything about what's at issue in the case. The case is still pending and pending before the Supreme Court. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, how about this one: President Bush was named a defendant in the case, right? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, in his official capacity. SEN. FEINGOLD: The Hamdan decision was released on July 15th. Is it your testimony that no work on that decision took place after July 1? JUDGE ROBERTS: No. I didn't -- that was not my testimony. The opinions in the D.C. Circuit -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Or is it your testimony now that no work on that decision took place after July 1? JUDGE ROBERTS: Opinions in the D.C. Circuit are complete and circulated to the panel a week before they're released. That was my -- the conclusion of when work was complete -- again, I wasn't the author of the opinion -- would have been a week before it was released. SEN. FEINGOLD: Did you read over the opinion of the concurrence after July 1? Was there any editing that took place after that date? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't recall, Senator. And -- SEN. FEINGOLD: But when was the issue of whether you should recuse yourself from this case -when did that first come to your attention? JUDGE ROBERTS: I saw and was made aware of an article -- I think it was an article. I don't remember when that took place -- whenever the article was published. And then I understand the legal opinions on the other side were requested by, I believe, the chairman. And I know that those were public as well. SEN. FEINGOLD: You don't recall when this matter first came up? I think it would be something you'd remember is when somebody suggested you should have recused yourself - JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't remember the date of the -- SEN. FEINGOLD: How about the approximate time? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think it was sometime in July or -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Chairman, so the record will be complete, I'd like to submit the article from Slate magazine by Professors Gillers, Luban and Lubet and the letter sent to you responding to Professor Rotunda's criticism of their position. And I also want to submit an article by these three law professors that was published in the Los Angeles Times on this topic. I don't want to take any more time in this, but I think these -- SEN. SPECTER: Without objection, it will be made a part of the record. SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think these professors very convincingly answer Professor Rotunda's views and point out that his analysis of the case law is not particularly persuasive. And I would urge any of my colleagues who really want to understand the issue with Judge Roberts' participation in the case -- rather than just dismissing it because it's inconvenient that they take a look at it and actually see what the issues were here. But I do appreciate your answer to those questions. I will only be able to get the sum of my questions on the next subject and hopefully in the next round can continue. But Judge Roberts, as Senator Leahy mentioned earlier, when you came before the committee a couple of years ago, we discussed the fact that more than 100 people on death row have been exonerated and released, and in fact, I believe the number is now 121 people who we know were sentenced to die for crimes they did not commit. I want to follow up on the work that Senators Durbin and Leahy have done in discussing with you the Herrera case. I do differ with your characterization of the case. A solicitor general brief that you signed presented the issue as whether the Constitution, quote, "requires that a prisoner have the right to seek judicial review of a claim of newly discovered evidence," unquote. That is, the question was not how strong the evidence of innocence must be, as you seemed to be suggesting earlier, but whether the Constitution requires that there be some avenue for presenting evidence of innocence in federal court. Your brief argued that it does not. Now that brief also, as you know, contained a footnote that I'm going to ask you to comment on. It said, quote: "There's no reason to fear that there's a significant risk that an innocent person will be executed under the procedures that the states have in place. The direct review and collateral procedures that the federal government and the states have in place are more than ample to separate the guilty from the innocent." And yesterday you talked about the possible effect of DNA evidence on the legal framework in this type of case. In light of the many cases of innocent people ending up on death row that have come to light in the past decade, and aside from what was the ultimate issue at stake in that case, do you still agree with your statement from the government's Herrera brief? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that was the administration position at the time. It was one that the Supreme Court agreed with; 6 to 3 I think was the ruling. I know Justice O'Connor was in the majority. The issue -- and again, there was obviously argument at the time about what the issue really was in Herrera. And I thought it was quite inaccurate to view it as a case involving the question of whether actual innocence could be presented because there was -- it was a claim of newly discovered evidence. And it was a claim that somebody who had just died was actually the murderer. At the end of an exhaustive appeals to the state system, exhaustive collateral review through the state system, exhaustive collateral review through the federal system, is there an obligation to decide at that point that a new claim that somebody else committed the crime -- SEN. FEINGOLD: I'm just running out of time. I'm wondering if you just still stand by the statement? If you can just say yes or no? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that was the administration position that was presented on that. SEN. FEINGOLD: All right. Well, let me cut to the quick on it. I'd like to know whether you think there's a risk that innocent people may be sentenced to death in today's criminal justice system. And I must say, Judge. Supreme Court justices do have the power of life and death in these matters. SEN. FEINGOLD: Senator, I think there is always a risk in any enterprise that is a human enterprise like the legal system. Obviously, the objective of the provision of the rights to a criminal defendant in trial, the provision of collateral review at the state level, the provision of collateral review at the federal level, the availability of, as you suggested, clemency. All of that is designed to ensure that the risk is as low as possible. There are issues that are going to be presented about the availability of DNA evidence, which may or may not help reduce the risk even further. There's always a risk. And obviously when you're dealing with something like capital punishment, the risk is something that has to be taken extremely seriously at every stage of the process. As we talked about more than two years ago at the prior hearing, I think the most effective way of minimizing that risk is to ensure that people facing that sanction have the best counsel available at every stage. As you know, from looking at this problem, the issue that comes up are questions that weren't raised that should have been raised if the person had a more capable lawyer, avenues that weren't pursued that should have been pursued if that lawyer had the resources. And those -- that's where I think the risk of wrongful conviction is going to be most effectively addressed -- ensuring the availability of competent counsel at every stage of the proceeding. SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Judge. JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Feingold. Senator Graham? SEN. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Roberts, your intellectual stamina impresses me because you can't see this on television. It must be 150 degrees in here. (Laughter.) And I just don't know how you're doing it, but I'm tremendously impressed. Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to introduce into the record some law professor's opinion that being interviewed for the Supreme Court vacancy when Judge Roberts was interviewed did not require him to recuse himself. And I'll do that at the appropriate time. SEN. SPECTER: Without objection, they will be made part of the record. SEN. GRAHAM: But let's think about that in kind of political terms. And I know that's not really your job. If we took this to its logical conclusion -- say, I was president. I don't think that's going to happen so you don't need to be overly worried about it. But you could pick someone to be chief justice from the court -- people sitting on the court. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: So if you had a judge you didn't particularly like, the best thing you could do is go talk to them about the job and they couldn't decide anything. Would that be the logical conclusion of this? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think that would be the logical conclusion to some of the things. SEN. GRAHAM: Well, I remember that if I'm president. (Laughter.) Now, on my record now, I don't think I should have the right to do that. That's part of the process. Some big things here. Were you proud to work for Ronald Reagan? JUDGE ROBERTS: Very much, Senator. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: During your time of working with Ronald Reagan, were you ever asked to take a legal position that you thought was unethical or not solid? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator. I was not. SEN. GRAHAM: We talked about the Voting Rights Act. Proportionality test, in the Reagan administration's view, was changing the Voting Rights Act to create its own harm. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: The concern that the attorney general had and the president was that changing the -- changing Section 2 to the so-called effects test would cause courts to adopt a proportionality requirement, that if elected representatives were not elected in proportion to the racial composition in a particular jurisdiction that there would be a violation shown that would have to be redressed. SEN. GRAHAM: Do you think it would be fair to try to suggest that because you supported that position that you're somehow racially insensitive? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator. And I would resist the suggestion that I'm racially insensitive. I know why the phrase equal justice under law is carved in marble above the Supreme Court entrance. It is because of the fundamental commitment of the rule of law to ensure equal justice for all people without regard to their race or ethnic background or gender. The courts are a place where people need to be able to go to secure a determination of their rights under the law in a totally unbiased way. That's a commitment all judges make when they take a judicial oath. SEN. GRAHAM: Knowing this will not end this line of inquiry, but at least trying to put my stamp on what I think we've found from this long discussion. Basically, the Supreme Court decided in Section 2 that the intent test was constitutionally sound. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: That was its determination in Mobile against Bolden. SEN. GRAHAM: And Senator Kennedy disagreed because he wanted a different test. And I respect him. He is one of the great -- first, he's not part of the Reagan revolution. I think we all can agree with that, so I don't expect him to buy into it. But I respect him greatly for his passion about his causes. He took it upon himself to try to change a Supreme Court ruling, to go away from the intent test to the effects test. And he was able to reach a political compromise with the administration. And I just want that to be part of the record, that to say that Ronald Reagan, or Judge Roberts, by embracing a concept approved by the court, equates to that administration or this person being insensitive to people of color in this country I think is very unfair and off base. You said something yesterday that was very compelling to me. I asked you could you express or articulate what you thought might be one of the big threats to the rule of law. And I believe you said judges overstepping their boundaries -- getting into the land of making the law, putting their social stamp on a cause, rather than interpreting law because that could, over time, in the eyes of the public, undermine the confidence in the court. Is that a correct summary? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. SEN. GRAHAM: Well, we have before us today, Judge Roberts, a legal opinion just issued -- hot off the presses -- that says the establishment clause of the Constitution apparently is violated if an American expresses -- recites -- the pledge of allegiance. You will be on the court, I hope, and you will use your best judgment of how to reconcile the 9th Circuit opinion. And I'm not asking you to tell us how you might rule. I am making a personal observation that this is an example, in my opinion, of where judges do not protect us from having the government impose religion upon us, but declare war on all things religious. And that is my personal view and opinion. That's why most Americans sometimes are dumbfounded about what's going on in the name of religion. No American wants the government to tell them how to worship, where to worship or if to worship. But when we exercise our right to worship, it bothers me greatly that judges who are un-elected confuse the concept between establishment and free exercise. And I will move on. I think it is one of the cases that is undermining the confidence in the judiciary. And I'm glad you're sensitive to that. The war on terror. In my past legal life, I've spent most of my legal career associated with the military. And I'm proud to be a military lawyer. I'm the only Reservist in the Senate. I sit as an Air Force court of criminal appeals judge. I handle the easy cases because I don't have a whole lot of time, and I help where I can. But I understand, I think, very well what it means to abide by the judicial canons of ethics -- not to tip your hand, not to compromise yourself to get promoted or to get put on the court -- promoted in the military or to get put on the court -- trying to please your boss, trying to please a senator. And my respect for you has gone up because you're unwilling to compromise your ethics, and I hope the Senate will understand that in the past other people were not required to do so. Are you familiar with the Geneva Convention? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. SEN. GRAHAM: Do you believe that the Geneva Convention, as a body of law -- that it has been good for America to be part of that convention? JUDGE ROBERTS: I do. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: Why? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, my understanding in general is it's an effort to bring civilized standards to conduct of war, a generally uncivilized enterprise throughout history, an effort to bring some protection and regularity to prisoners of war, in particular. And I think that's a very important international effort. SEN. GRAHAM: As Senator Kyl said, this will be the only time we'll actually get to talk. And I don't want to compromise your role as a judge. But I do want you to help me express some concepts here that America needs to be more understanding of. And I want to work with my Democratic friends to see if we can find some way to deal with this. We're dealing with an enemy that is not covered by the Geneva Convention. Al Qaeda, by their very structure and nature, are not signatories of the Geneva Convention and are not covered under its dictates. An enemy combatant -- are you familiar with that term in the law? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. I am. SEN. GRAHAM: What would an enemy combatant be under American jurisprudence? Who would they be? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I really have to, I think -- SEN. GRAHAM: Fair enough. Fair enough. JUDGE ROBERTS: Those cases are both pending -- the ones that I've just cited are pending before the Supreme Court. And those issues are likely to come before. SEN. GRAHAM: Fair enough. The Geneva Convention doesn't cover al-Qaeda, but our president has said that anyone in our charge -- terrorist or not -- will be treated humanely. I applaud the president because, in fighting the war on terror, we need not become our enemy. Our strength as a nation is believing in the rule of law, even for those of the -- even for the worst of those that we may encounter. I admire Mr. Adams for representing the Red Coats. I cannot imagine how tough that must have been. But his willingness to take on the unpopular clause -- cause -- in the name of the rule of law has made it stronger. When the president said that we will treat everyone humanely -- even the worst of the worst -- I think he's brought out the best in who we are. But we're in a war, Judge Roberts, where the Geneva Convention doesn't apply. And we have before the courts a line of cases dealing with the dilemma this country faces. When you capture an enemy combatant, non-citizen, foreign terrorist, there's three things I think we must do. We must aggressively interrogate them without changing who we are. We must have the ability to keep them off the battlefield for a long period of time to protect our nation. And we must have a system to hold them accountable for some of the most horrible crimes imaginable. Justice Jackson was one of your favorite justices, is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think that's a fair description. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: He has indicated in the Youngstown Steel case that the presidency or the executive branch is at its strongest when it has concurrence with the legislative branch. Is that a fair summary of what he said? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. He divided up the area basically into three parts. And considering the executive's authority, he said when it has the support of Congress, it's at it's greatest. And obviously, when it's in opposition to Congress, it's at it's lowest ebb, as he put it. And he described a middle area in which it was sometimes difficult to tell whether Congress was supporting the action or not.

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON CYBER SECURITY Agenda To receive testimony on United States Cybersecurity policy and threats. Witnesses Honorable James Clapper Director Of National Intelligence Honorable Robert Work Deputy Secretary Of Defense Admiral Michael Rogers, USN Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/ Director, National Security Agency/ Chief, Central Security Services MCCAIN: The committee meets today to receive testimony from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Director of the National Intelligence James Clapper, and Admiral Mike Rogers, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, director of the National Security Agency and chief of the Central Security Service. We thank each of the witnesses for their service, and for appearing before the committee. We meet at a critical time for the defense of our nation from cyber attacks. In just the past year, as we all know, the United States has been attacked by cyberspace -- in cyberspace by Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. Indeed, since our last cyber hearing in March, the attacks have only increased, crippling or severely disrupting networks across the government and private sector, and compromising sensitive national security information. Recent attacks against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, and the Office of Personnel Management are just the latest examples of the growing boldness of our adversaries and their desire to push the limits of acceptable behavior in cyberspace. New intrusions, breaches and hacks are occurring daily; the trends are getting worse; but it seems the administration has still not mounted an adequate response. They say they will, quote, "Respond at the time and manner of our choosing," unquote. But then either take no action or pursue, largely, symbolic responses that have zero impact on our adversaries' behavior. Not surprisingly, the attacks continue. Our adversaries steal, delete, and manipulate our data at will, gaining a competitive economic edge in improving their military capability. They demonstrate their own means to attack our critical infrastructure, and they do all of this in a time and manner of their choosing. More and more, they are even leaving behind what Admiral Rogers recently referred to as, quote, "cyber fingerprints." Showing that they feel confident that they can attack us with impunity and without significant consequences. Just consider the recent case with China. After much hand- wringing, it appears the president will not impose sanctions in response to China's efforts to steal intellectual property, pillage the designs of our critical weapons systems, and wage economic espionage against U.S. companies. Instead, last week's state visit for the president of China simply amounted to more vague commitments not to conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. What's worse, the White House has chosen to reward China with diplomatic discussions about establishing norms of behavior that are favorable to both China and Russia. Any internationally agreed upon rules of the road in cyberspace must explicitly recognize the right of self defense. That's contained in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, along with meaningful human rights of intellectual property rights protections. The administration should not concede this point to autocratic regimes that seek to distort core principles of the international order, to our detriment. Make no mistake -- we are not wining the fight in cyberspace. Our adversaries view our response to malicious cyber activity as timid and ineffectual. Put simply, the problem is a lack of deterrence. As Admiral Rogers has previously testified, the administration has not demonstrated to our adversaries that the consequences of continued cyber attacks against us outweigh the benefit. Until this happens, the attacks will continue and our national security interests will suffer. Establishing cyber deterrence requires a strategy to defend, deter, and aggressively respond to the challenges to our national security in cyberspace. That is exactly what the Congress required in the fiscal year of 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. That strategy is now over a year late and counting. MCCAIN: And while the Department of Defense's 2015 cyber strategy is a big improvement over previous such efforts, it still does not integrate the ends, ways and means to deter attacks in cyberspace. Establishing a cyber deterrent also requires robust capabilities, both offensive and defensive, that can pose a credible threat to our adversaries. A goal, on which the Congress, and specifically this committee, remains actively engaged. The good news here is that significant progress has been made over the past few years in developing our cyber force. That force will include a mix of professionals trained to defend the nation against cyber-attacks to support the geographic combatant commands in meeting their objectives and to defend DOD networks. This is good, but the vast majority of our DOD resources have gone towards shoring up our cyber-defenses. Far more needs to be done to develop the necessary capabilities to deter attacks, fight, and win in cyberspace. Policy indecision, should not become a impediment to capability development. We do not develop weapons because we want to use them, we develop them, so as we do not have too. And yet, in the cyber-domain, as Admiral Rogers testified in March, quote, "we're at a tipping point." He said, quote, "we've got to broaden our capabilities to provide policy makers and operational commanders with a broader range of options." We must invest more in the offensive capabilities that our cyber- mission teams need to win on the cyber-battlefield. The fiscal year 2016, NDAA seeks to address this challenge in a number ways, including a pilot program to provide the commander of Cyber Command with limited rapid acquisition authority. Finally, we know the Defense Department is in the process of assessing whether the existing combatant command structure, adequately addresses the mission of cyber-warfare, and whether to elevate Cyber Command to a unified command. There are worthwhile arguments on both sides of this debate. I look forward to hearing Admiral Rogers views on this question and his assessment of how an elevation of Cyber Command, might enhance our overall cyber-defense posture. I also look forward from our witness what -- if any progress has been made on addressing disagreements within the inter-agency on the delegation and exercise of authority to use cyber-capabilities. I thank the witness again for appear before the committee. I look forward to their testimony. Senator Reed? REED: I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me command for scheduling this very important hearing. It's an appropriate to discuss a number of important cyber-issues with our witnesses, especially in light of the cyber agreements announced last Friday, between President Obama and the president of China. I want to thank, Director Clapper, Deputy Secretary Work and Cyber Commandeer Admiral Rogers for their testimony today and for their service to the nation. Thank you gentleman, very much. Let me start with the series of cyber agreements with China. The apparent commitment (ph) by China to cease stealing U.S. intellectual property for their economical gain is notable. And, I expect we will have a robust discussion about China's compliance in our course of action, if it does not. China's leaders must be aware that it's reputation in standing in the eyes of the America people will continue to decline if this piracy does not stop. Which ultimately, will have a tremendously negative impact on our relations with China. I would also emphasize the potential importance of China embracing a set of international norms besides themselves (ph) based, developed by the United Nations; which includes a commitment to refrain from attacks on other nation's critical infrastructure. Next, I would highlight that we are facing the reoccurring issue of whether or when to elevate Cyber Command from a sub-unified command to a full unified command. And whether, to sustain the current dual hat arrangement under which the commander of Cyber Command also serves as Director of NSA. I understand that the department may be nearing a recommendation to the president that the next unified command plan elevates Cyber Command to a unified command. The committee in the past, has questioned whether Cyber Command is mature enough to want it (ph) or in elevation to a unified command; and whether the dual hat arrangement should continue when a decision is made to elevate the command. Put simply, if Cyber Command is so reliant on NSA, that common leadership is so necessary, is the command ready to stand on it's own as a unified combatant command? This is an issue that Senator McCain has drawn attention to, and something that I think is very critical that I would forward (ph) to this committee. Directly related to that question, is the maturity of Cyber Command as a status to the military cyber-mission unit that the department only began fielding as little as two years. Commendably, the department is leading it's schedule by standing up these units with trained personnel, but by it's own admission, the equipment, tools, and capabilities of these forces will remain limited. Indeed, the committee's proposed F.Y. '16 National Council Authorization Act, includes a mandate that the Secretary of Defense, designates executive agents from among the services to build a so- called, unified platform for assisting, training environment and command, and control systems that are necessary for these forces to operate effectively. It will take a number of years to build these capabilities. We are behind in developing these military capabilities for our cyber forces because our Defense Department was persuaded that the systems and capabilities, that NSA already has, will be adequate and appropriate to use by Cyber Command. This is an important example in assumed critical dependency on NSA and an assumed commonality between intelligence operations and military operations in cyberspace; and in some cases, turned out to be inaccurate. For a number of years, this committee has been urging the executive branch to work diligently to identify all practical methods that deter malicious actions of cyberspace and articulate a strategy for implementing them. Some believe, that relation of a kind, in cyberspace is a necessary and effective component of such a strategy. I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on this matter. As my colleagues and our witnesses are well are, the Senate went into recess for the August break having recent agreement for bringing the Cyber Information Sharing bill to the floor debate. I know the Chairman is in full agreement on the needs to debate, amend, and pass that legislation this year, and the interest to national security and so among it. We must also recognize that the Defense Department and intelligence community are not operating alone to protect America's cyber-infrastructure. Most notably, we (ph) rely on the Department of Homeland Security for protection of America's critical infrastructure. The use of overseas contingency operations fund to avoid the Budget Control Act (inaudible) does nothing to help the DHS or another non-defense partners avoid of effects of sequestration. This is yet, another argument for why we need a comprehensive solution to the problem of sequestration. Finally, I think it is important that we hear from our witness on the subject of encryption. (inaudible) U.S. technology companies fearful of losing business at home and abroad are encrypting communications and offer encryption services, for which even the companies themselves have no technical capabilities to unlock. FBI Director Comey has given multiple speeches warning the law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies that they will be going dark, with serious consequences to public safety and national security. These and other questions, gentleman, are vitally important, and I look forward to your testimony. MCCAIN: I thank the witnesses. Director Clapper, I've to impress on members of this committee to show difference to old age and so we'd like to begin with you. CLAPPER: Senator McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee. When I testified on the intelligence community's World Wide Threat Assessment, at the end of February, cyber threats again, led our annual threat report for the third year in a row. We're here today, to respond to the several requests in your invitation letter, and I will focus on an overview of cyber-threats briefly that face our nations and their intended national security implications. CLAPPER: And then Secretary Work, Admiral Rogers will follow as well. We will, as you understand, perhaps run into some classified aspects that we won't be able to discuss as fully in this open televised hearing. I do want to take note of and thank the members of the committee who are engaged on this issue and have spoken to it publicly as the two of you just have. So by way of overview, cyber threats to the U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity of impact. Although we must be prepared for large Armageddon-scaled strike that would debilitate the entire U.S. infrastructure, that is not, we believe, the most likely scenario. Our primary concern now is low to moderate-level cyber-attacks from a variety of sources which will continue and probably expand. This imposes increasing costs to our business, to U.S. economic competiveness and -- and to national security. Because of our heavy dependence on the Internet, nearly all information communication technologies and I.T. networks and systems will be perpetually at risk. These weaknesses provide an array of possibilities for nefarious activity by cyber threat actors including remote hacking instructions, supply chain operations to insert compromised hardware or software, malicious actions by insiders and simple human mistakes by system users. These cyber threats come from a range of actors including nation states which fall into two broad categories, those with highly sophisticated cyber programs, most notably Russia and China, our -- our peer competitors. And those with lesser technical capabilities but more nefarious intent, such as Iran and North Korea who are also more -- but who are also much more aggressive and unpredictable. Then there are non-nation state entities, criminals motivated by profit, hackers or extremists motivated by ideology. Profit-motivated cyber criminals rely on loosely networked online marketplaces often referred to as the cyber underground or dark web that provide a forum for the merchandising of illicit tools, services and infrastructure, and stolen personal information and financial data. The most significant financial cybercriminal threats to U.S. entities and our international partners come from a relatively small subset of actors, facilitators and criminal forums. And terrorist groups will continue to experiment with hacking which could serve as the foundation for developing more advanced capabilities. Cyber espionage, criminal and terrorist entities, all undermine data confidentiality. Denial of service operations and data deletion attacks undermine availability. And in the future I believe we'll -- we'll see more cyber operations that will change or manipulate electronic information to compromise its integrity. In other words, compromised attackers (inaudible) liability instead of deleting it or disrupting access to it. As illustrated so dramatically in the OPM breaches, counter- intelligence risks are inherent when foreign intelligence agencies obtain access to an individual's identity information, of course a problem that the Department of Defense has encountered. Foreign intelligence agencies or non-state entities could target the individual, family members, co-workers and neighbors using a variety of physical and electronic methods for extortion or recruiting purposes. Speaking of the OPM breaches, let me say a couple words about attribution. It is not a simple process, involves at least three related but distinct determinations, the geographic point of origin, the identity of the actual perpetrator doing the keystrokes, and the responsibility for directing the act. In case of OPM, we had differing degrees of confidence in our assessment of -- of the actual responsibility for each of these three elements. Such malicious cyber activity will continue and probably accelerate until we establish and demonstrate the capability to deter malicious state-sponsored cyber activity, and establishing a credible deterrent depends on reaching agreement on norms of cyber behavior by the international community. So, in summary, the cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security have become increasingly diverse, sophisticated and harmful. There are a variety of federal entities that work this cyber problem, and DHS, FBI, NSA and other law enforcement intelligence and sector- specific agencies like Treasury and Energy. And every day each these centers and entities get better at what they do individually. But I believe now we've reached the point where we -- we think it's time to knit together all the intelligence these separate activities need to defend our networks because, while these entities may be defending different networks, they are often defending against the same threats. So that's one reason the President directed me to form a small center to integrate cyber threat intelligence. And I strongly believe the time's come for the creation of such a center to parallel the centers that we operate for counter terrorism, counter proliferation and counter intelligence and security. With that, let me turn to Deputy Secretary Work. WORK: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting us here this morning to talk about the threats of cyber -- of cyber. This committee has led the way in discussing the threats and the response to these threats and the Department looks forward to working with the committee to get better in this regard. As DNI Clapper has said, cyber intrusions and attacks by both state and non-state actors have increased dramatically in recent years, and particularly troubling are the increased frequency and scale of state-sponsored cyber actors breaching U.S. government and business networks. These adversaries continually adapt and evolve in response to our cyber countermeasures, threatening our networks and systems of the Department of Defense, our nation's critical infrastructure and U.S. companies and interests globally. The recent spate of cyber events conclude the intrusions into OPM, the attacks on Sony, and the Joint Staff networks by three separate state actors is not just espionage of convenience, but a threat to our national security. As one of our responses to this growing threat, we released in 2015 the DOD cyber strategy which will guide the development of our cyber forces and strengthen our cyber-security and cyber deterrence posture; that is its aim. The Department is pushing hard to achieve the Department's three core missions as defined in the strategy. The first and absolutely most important mission is to defend DOD network systems and information. Secretary Carter has made this the number one priority in the Department and we are really getting after it now. Second, to defend the nation against cyber events of significant consequence, and third, to provide cyber support to operational and contingency plans. And in this regard, the U.S. Cyber Command may be directed to conduct cyber operations in coordination with other government agencies as appropriate to deter or defeat strategic threats in other domains. Now, my submitted statement, Mr. Chairman, contains additional detail on how we're moving out to achieve these three strategic goals but I'd like to highlight a particular focus on deterrence, especially since I know this is key in the minds of most of the members here. I want to acknowledge upfront that the Secretary and I recognize that we are not where we need to be in our deterrent posture. We do believe that there are some things the Department is doing that are working, but we need to improve in this area without question. And that's why we've revised our cyber strategy. WORK: Deterrence is a function of perception. It works by convincing any potential adversary that the costs of conducting the attack far outweigh the potential benefits, and therefore our three main pillars of our cyber deterrence strategy in terms of deterrence are denial, resilience, and cost imposition. Denial means preventing a cyber adversary from achieving the -- his objectives. Resilience is ensuring that our systems will continue to perform their essential military tasks even when they are contested in a cyber environment. And cost imposition is our ability to make our adversaries pay a much higher price for their malicious activities than they hoped for. I'd like to briefly discuss these three elements. To deny the attacker the ability to adversely impact our military missions we have to better defend our own information networks and data. And we think the investments we have made in these capabilities are starting to bear fruit, but we recognize that technical upgrades are only part of the solution. Nearly every single one of the successful network exploitations that we have had to deal with can be traced to one or more human errors which allowed entry into our network. So raising the level of individual cybersecurity awareness in performance is absolutely paramount. Accordingly, we're working to transform our cybersecurity culture, something that we ignored for a long time, by the long term by improving human performance and accountability in this regard. As part of this effort, we have just recently published the cybersecurity discipline implementation plan and scorecard. It is brought before the secretary and me every month and they're critical to achieving this goal of securing our data and our networks and mitigating risks to DOD missions. This scorecard holds commanders accountable for hardening and protecting their end-points and critical systems, and also help them hold accountable their personnel. And directs, as I said, the compliance reporting to the secretary and me on a monthly a basis. The first scorecard was published in August of this year and it is being added to and improved as we go. Denial also means defending the nation against cyber threats of significant consequence. The president has directed DOD, working in partnership with our other agencies, to be prepared to blunt and stop the most dangerous cyber events. There may be times where the president and the secretary of defense directed the DOD and others to conduct a defensive cyber operation to stop a cyber attack from impacting our national interests. And that means building and maintaining the capabilities to do that -- just that. This is a challenging mission requiring high-end capabilities and extremely high-trained teams. We're building our cyber mission force and deepening our partnership with the law enforcement and the intelligence community to do that. The second principle is improving resiliency by reducing the ability of our adversaries to attack us through cyberspace, and protecting our ability to execute missions in a degraded cyber environment. Our adversaries view DOD cyber-dependency as a potential wartime vulnerability. Therefore, we view our ability to fight through cyber attacks as a critical mission function. That means normalizing cybersecurity as part of our mission assurance efforts, building redundancy whenever our systems are vulnerable, and training constantly to operate in a contested cyber environment. Our adversaries have to see that these cyber attacks will not provide them with significant operational advantage. And the third aspect of deterrence is having to demonstrate the capability to respond through cyber and non-cyber means to impose costs on a potential adversary. The administration has made clear that we will respond to cyber attacks in the time, manner and place of our choosing, and the department has developed cyber options to hold an aggressor at risk in cyberspace if required. Successfully executing our missions requires a whole-of- government and whole-of-nation approach. And for that reason, DOD continues to work with our partners in the other federal departments and agencies and the private sector, and our partners around the world to address the shared challenges we face. Secretary Carter has placed particular emphasis on partnering with the private sector. The department doesn't have all of the answers and is working with industry we think will be very, very critical. Finally, our relationship with Congress is absolutely critical. The secretary and I very much appreciate the support provided to DOD cyber activities throughout, from the very beginning. And we understand and we are looking forward to the National Defense Authorization Act to see if there are other improvements that we have -- we can do. I encourage continued efforts to pass legislation on cybersecurity information sharing. We think that is absolutely critical to data-breach motivation and law enforcement provisions related to cybersecurity, which were included in the president's legislative proposal submitted earlier this year. I know you agree that the American people expects us to defend the country against cyber threats of significant consequence. The secretary and I look forward to working with this committee and Congress to ensure we take every step possible to confront the substantial risks we face in the cyber realm. Thank you again for inviting us here today and giving the attention that you have always given to this urgent matter. I'd like to pass it on now to Admiral Rogers, if that's OK, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) ROGERS: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss U.S. cyber policy and the state of cyber threats worldwide. I'd like to thank you for convening this forum and for your efforts in this important area. I'm also honored to be sitting alongside Director Clapper and Deputy Secretary of Defense Work. It gives me great pride to appear before you today to highlight and commend the accomplishments of the uniformed and civilian personnel of U.S. Cyber Command. I'm both grateful for and humbled by the opportunity I've been given to lead our cyber team in the important work they do in the defense of our nation and our department. We are being challenged as never before to defend our nation's interests and values in cyberspace against state, group, and individuals that are using sophisticated capabilities to conduct cyber coercion, cyber aggression and cyber exploitation. The targets of their efforts extend well beyond government and into privately owned businesses and personally identifiable information. Our military is in constant contact with agile, learning adversaries in cyberspace -- adversaries that have shown the capacity and the willingness to take action against soft targets in the United States. There are countries that are integrating cyber operations into a total strategic concept for advancing their regional ambitions, who use cyber operations both to influence the perceptions and actions of states around them, and to shape what we see as our options in supporting allies and friends in a crisis. We need to deter these activities by showing that they are unacceptable, unprofitable and risky for the instigators. U.S. Cyber Command is building capabilities that can contribute to cross-domain deterrence, and thus make our commitments even more credible. We are hardening our networks and showing an opponent cyber aggression won't be easy. We are creating the mission force, trained and ready like any other maneuver element, that is defending DOD networks, supporting joint force commanders, and helping to defend critical infrastructure within our nation. We are partnering with federal, foreign and industry partners, and exercising together regularly to rehearse concepts and responses to destructive cyber attacks against critical infrastructures. We are generating options for commanders and policymakers across all phases of the conflict, and particularly in phase zero (ph) to hold at risk what our adversaries truly value. ROGERS: The demand for our cyber force far outstrips supply, but we continue to rapidly mature based on real-world experiences and the hard work of the men and women of the U.S. Cyber Command and our service cyber components as well as our broader partners. I'd like to assure the committee that U.S. Cyber Command has made measurable progress. We're achieving significant operational outcomes and we have a clear path ahead. With that, thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for convening this forum and inviting all of us to speak. Our progress has been made possible in no small part because of the support from this committee and other stakeholders. Unity of the effort within our department and across the U.S. government in this mission set is essential. And I appreciate our continued partnership as we build our nation's cyber defenses. And I welcome your questions. MCCAIN: Well, thank you admiral and thank the witnesses. Director Clapper recently, former Chairman of the Joint Chief, Dempsey was asked about various threats to the United States security and he said that in a whole range of threats we have a significant advantage except in cyber. Do you agree with that assessment? CLAPPER: It's probably true. We haven't I guess, exhibited what our potential capability there is. I think that's one of the reasons -- implicit reasons why I highlighted cyber threats in the last three years of my world wide threat assessments. MCCAIN: I thank you and you have done that and I think at least to great effect before this committee. As a result of the Chinese leader in Washington there was some agreement announced between the United States and China. Do you believe that that will result in an elimination of Chinese cyber attacks? CLAPPER: Well, hope springs eternal. I think we will have to watch what they're behavior is and it will be incumbent on the intelligence community I think to depict, portray (ph) to policymakers what behavioral changes if any, result from this agreement. MCCAIN: Are you optimistic? CLAPPER: No. MCCAIN: Thank you. Admiral Rogers, you recently stated quote, "There's is a perception, there is..." quote "...little price to pay for engaging in some pretty aggressive behaviors and because of the lack of repercussions you see actors, nation states indeed willing to do more." And that was what he stated. What is required? What action is required to deter these attacks since there is little price to pay? What do we have to do to make it a heavy price to pay? ROGERS: So I think we have to clearly articulate in broad terms what is acceptable and is unacceptable: the norms if you will, of behavior. I think we have to clearly articulate that as a nation, we are developing a set of capabilities. We are prepared to use those capabilities if required. They're not necessarily our preferences. We clearly want to engage in a dialogue with those around us. But on the other hand we do have to acknowledge the current situation we find ourselves in. I don't there's anyone who would agree that it is acceptable and that it is in our best long-term interest as a nation. MCCAIN: Well, I say with respect I understand it's not acceptable but in other words, what would an act of price would it be? Relations in other areas? Would it be counterattacks? In other words, what actions would be in our range of arsenals to respond? ROGERS: So I think it's potentially all of those things. The first comment I would make, I think Sony is a very instructive example. One of the things I always remind people of. We need to think about deterrents much more broadly, not just focus within the cyber arena. I thought the response to Sony where we for example, talked about the economic options as a nation we would exercise was a good way to remind the world around us that there are a broad set of capabilities and levers that are available to us as a nation and that we're prepared to do more than just respond in kind if you will. MCCAIN: Director Clapper, one of the things that has been disappointing to the committee is that in the fiscal year the Defense Authorization bill as you know it required the president to develop an integrated policy. The strategy is now a year late. Can you tell us where we are in that process and what you feel is what might bring the administration in compliance? CLAPPER: You're asking me about policy development? MCCAIN: Yes. CLAPPER: I think I would defer to Secretary Work on that. WORK: Well, Mr. Chairman, as we have said over and over, we believe our cyber deterrent strategy is evolving and getting stronger. MCCAIN: I'm talking about a policy, not a strategy Mr. Secretary. It required a policy that fiscal year '14 National Defense Authorization Act. WORK: The policy is still in development. We believe we have a good cyber strategy. The policy has been outlined in broad strokes by the ... Not broad enough I would think. It is -- describe what are -- whether we deter or whether we respond, or whether we -- in other words, as far as know and the committee knows, that there has been no specific policy articulated in compliance of the requirement of the Defense of Authorization Act. If you believe that it has, I would be very interested in hearing how it has. WORK: I believe the broad strokes are will respond to... MCCAIN: I'm not asking about broad strokes. Suppose there is an attack, a cyber attack like the one on OPM. Do we have a policy as to what we do? WORK: Yes we do. MCCAIN: And what is that? WORK: The first is to try. First we deny and then we first find out. We do the forensics... MCCAIN: I'm not asking about the methodology. I'm asking the policy. Do you respond by counter attacking? Do you respond by trying to enact other measures? What do we do in case of a cyber attack? WORK: We respond in the time, manner and the place MCCAIN: Does that mean that we counter attack? WORK: That may be one of the options. MCCAIN: That's not a policy Secretary Work. That is an exercise in options. We have not got a policy and for you to sit there and tell me that you do a broad stroke strategy is frankly not in compliance with the law. Senator Reed? REED: Well, thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, we are constantly engaged euphemistically, information operations with many other nations and they're involved with mission (ph) operations trying to, as you indicated in your testimony, influence the opinion, disguise activities, disrupt, et cetera. What agencies under your purview or outside your purview are actively engaged in information operations in the United States in the cyber world? CLAPPER: Actually sir, from an intelligence perspective we would feed that in that we don't at least, in what I can speak to publicly engage in that as a part of our normal intelligence activities. So we feed other arms, support other arms of the government, notably the State Department. And those responsible for messaging of the National Counter Terrorism Center has an office that is devoted to countering violent extremism context, helping to develop themes or recommending themes based on what we glean from intelligences for potential vulnerabilities and messages that would appear to various group that would obfuscate the message, disrupt it or compete with it. But generally speaking, intelligence writ large doesn't actively engage in information operations. REED: From your perspective, are these other agencies that you provide the information to adequately resourced and staffed so they can use it effectively or are they getting a lot of good insights and sitting around wondering what they can do after... CLAPPER: If I were king which I am not, I think I'd have a much more robust capability from the standpoint of resource commitment to counter messaging. REED: And that would fall, well outside of the purview of intelligence or the State Department as other agencies? CLAPPER: Correct. REED: Again, I think we're old enough to remember the voice of America when it was, you know, a pretty dominant sort of source of information. CLAPPER: Well, personal opinion only not company policy I would -- I think perhaps, you know, a U.S.I.A. on steroids that would address these messages more broadly and more robustly but that's strictly personal opinion. REED: But I think in terms of what you're observing, particularly some of our competitors have a extraordinarily robust information operation. They don't lack for resources or personnel and they're constantly engaged in these types of information operations: enhancing their image, discrediting their opponents, actively engaging local groups in other countries of interest et cetera. And we're sort of on the sidelines. CLAPPER: I think that's quite right and our -- in contrast to us, Russian intelligence services are very active and very aggressively engaged in messaging. REED: Thank you. Admiral Rogers, so this issue of encryption that Director Coleman pointed to. I think your thoughts would be very helpful. ROGERS: So the issue that we find ourselves -- this is less for me and the U.S. cyber (inaudible) side and much more on the NSA side is communications in the world around us increasingly going to end to end encryption, where every aspect of the path is encrypted and the data and the communication is protected at a level under -- with the current state of technology is difficult to overcome. Clearly that is in the best interest of the nation in broad terms and strong encryption is important to a strong Internet defense and a well defended Internet is in our best interest and in the nation's and the world's best interest. Within that broad framework though, the challenge we're trying to figure out is, realizing that that communication path is used by very law-abiding citizens, nation states and companies engaged in lawful activity, is also being used by criminals, terrorists, nation states who would attempt to generate advantage against the United States and against our allies and partners. And so we're trying to figure out how do we balance these two important imperatives of privacy and security and realizing that the technical world around us is changing in a foundational way. And so we're trying to come to grips broadly with how do we deal with the reality of technical world around us and yet the broader legal and social imperatives that we have. I'm the first to acknowledge we do not have a defined way ahead here. In the end I think this is about how do we get the best minds together as a nation to address this. Cause when I look at our capabilities as a nation, there is no problem that we can't overcome when we work together in an integrative way to in the private sector, industry, business, the academic world. I think that is that's the way ahead here in broad terms. REED: Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) SESSIONS (?): Senator Inhofe is chairing the EPW Committee; that's why he couldn't be here today. You've given us a good summary on the threats that we faced and the threats that are actually occurring today, and I appreciate that. Senator McCain, asked you about established reporting on the policy that Congress has asked you to report, and that not having been done. Mr. Secretary Work, in the 2014 NDAA, the Senate and House agreed on a provision that required the services to report on the cyber- vulnerabilities weapons and communications systems connected by networks. That was something that came out of our Strategic Subcommittee on a bipartisan basis and was eventually expanded to include all weapon systems, not just satellite, and missiles, and national missile defense. We don't have that final report, I believe it's overdue. This budget, I believe, has two hundred million in it, to help fund this effort. What can you tell us about that? First, let me say, it may take some time. If it does, I understand, but I don't think we've had any report from the DOD to state that; what progress you've made, and how much longer it will take. WORK: Well again, on both of the points, on the policy, we expect that is in the final deliberations. It's an interagency effort. You know, generally, trying to establish norms and deterrence is central to the policy. Again, it's the denial, resilience, and cost imposition. I'm the first to admit, that we are the farthest ahead on the denial and the resilience part, those are the areas where we are moving faster. The cost imposition part, because we have elected to retain the retaliatory mechanism of cyber-attacks at the national level. Just like nuclear weapons, because of the risk of escalation. SESSIONS (?): What about the... WORK: As far as the -- I'm sorry, sir. SESSIONS (?): The other... WORK: Yes, sir. SESSIONS (?): The vulnerabilities of our weapon systems? WORK: It is a big -- big problem. Many of the weapons systems that we have now, were not built to withstand a concerted cyber- threat. So going through every single one of the weapon systems, what Frank Kendall done, is he's prioritized the weapon systems and he is working through very carefully. And, I expect this work to be done very soon. We now have new requirements in our KPPs, our Key Performance Parameters... SESSIONS (?): So you have assigned an individual? WORK: Absolutely. SESSIONS (?): ... to be responsible for this? WORK: Yes, Frank Kendall, is the one who is going through all of the different -- working with, obviously, our CIO, also the Cyber Command, and all our cyber experts. But he's responsible for taking a look at the weapon systems and also requiring KPPs, Key Performance Parameters, for new weapon systems. So that when we build they will have cyber defenses built in from the beginning. SESSIONS (?): What about our defense contractors, Admiral Rogers? They maintain and build these systems and have highly sensitive information, are we satisfied they're sufficiently protected? ROGERS: So we've acknowledged there's a vulnerability there. We've been very public about our concerns about foreign nation-states trying to access some of our key operational technology through penetration in the cleared defenses contractor arena for us. We've made changes to the contractual relationships between us and those companies where they have to meet minimum cyber-security requirements. They have to inform us now of penetrations. We're clearly not where we need to be but we continue to make progress. SESSIONS (?): Well, I think it's a bipartisan commitment on Congress to help you with that. Secretary Work, if it takes more money, let us know. We'll have to evaluate it. And, I also understand that some of protections can be done without much cost; some may require considerable cost. So we hope that you will complete that. Admiral Rogers, you -- I believe last week, reported in the Los Angeles Times about the threat from China. You note one thing, that they are involved in obtaining U.S. commercial and trade data. Foreign nation, advanced nation, ally of ours; I was told that one of their companies bid on a contract and that the Chinese had gathered all the bid data from the web. And his comment was, "It's hard to win a bid when your competitor knows what you're bidding." Is that kind thing happening? ROGERS: It has been, we've been very public of it. I think that's reflected in the agreement that you saw raised during the President of China's visit last week. We were very explicit about that concern. SESSIONS (?): Well, my time is up but I would just ask; you're not allowed -- if you saw an American business being damaged through improper actions, you're not allowed to advise them or share any information with, while our adversary do assist their business? Is that basically correct? ROGERS: The way this works right now, is I would provide information and insight, both in my intelligence hat as the Director of NSA as well as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. If under that authority, I became aware of activity, I would share the insights with DHS and the FBI, who have a mission associated with interfacing with the private sector in a much more direct way than I do. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all three of you for your service and for being here today. Admiral Rogers, let's start with you. Which country is the most committed, and determined, and successful hacker of the U.S.? ROGERS: Could you say that one more time? (UNKNOWN) Which country, do you believe, is the most committed, successful hacker of the U.S.? ROGERS: If you look at volume and nation-state wise -- nation- state wise, I would -- China, the PRC, has been the one that we've been the most vocal about. They're not the only one by any the stretch of the imagination. (UNKNOWN) I thought the last time you were here, I recall you saying that you had more concerns over Russia, having more of the ability or expertise to do us damage. ROGERS: I thought your question was really focused more on volume. If the perspective is capability if you will, then we've been very public about saying -- I would probably put the Russians. (UNKNOWN) Russians? ROGERS: In a higher capability. (UNKNOWN) But it seems like that China is more committed and determined to do it. ROGERS: They certainly do it at a volume level. (UNKNOWN) Gotcha, I understand. And, Director Clapper, if I may? I know that you just said, no -- emphatically no, you don't believe that this agreement that the president of China and our president has made last week will work. With that saying, what are the penalties? Is there any penalties in this agreements if one or other violates it or is it just basically what we've agreed and let it go at that? CLAPPER: The terms that I've seen, I don't think it treats specifically a penalty. There certainly are implied penalties. I think the threat of economic sanctions which brought Minister Meng (ph) to this country, I think it's (inaudible), what would mean something to the Chinese if they transgress or violate this agreement? I think as Admiral Rogers was discussing earlier, with respect to sanctions, there certainly are a whole of government possibilities that don't have to do -- necessarily a cyber eye for an eye, it can be some other form of retribution -- of retaliation. But I don't think to answer your question, at least what I'm aware of that there are specific penalties if the agreement is violated. (UNKNOWN) That's why I think you were pretty quick in saying you don't think it will work. You said "no" to that, I think when the Chairman asked you. CLAPPER: Well, the reason I said "no," of course, is the extent to which the Chinese forewarning (ph) of our data, our intellectual property, is pretty pervasive. I think there's a question about the extent to which the government actually orchestrates all of it, or not? So, I think we're in the bottom of the barrel -- President Reagan term, "trust but verify," motives, at least as far as intelligence is concerned and we are inherently skeptics. WORK: Sir, if I could? (UNKNOWN) I have a question for you, Secretary, then you can go ahead and add to that. The recent news article that examines similarities between China's J-315 and our F-35 Strike Fighter, and what they've been able to do in such a rapid period of time without any R&D. Do you believe that gives them an competitive advantage? I mean, you can -- I understand that there might be some differences as far as, in the software, the weapons, and this and that. But they're making leaps which are uncommon at the behest of us and we know this, I understand, but we're not taking any actions against them. WORK: Well, I'd like work this in to your -- to follow up with your first question. (UNKNOWN) Yes, go ahead. WORK: At the highest levels, we have made it clear that we believe that Chinese actions in the cyber sphere are totally unacceptable as a nation-state. And, we made that clear in a wide variety of different was, and I would characterize the agreement that we have as a confidence building measure with the Chinese. Where we are asking them to prove to us that they are serious about what they say, about what they do to control these efforts. So we-- there were really four things, that we agreed to do. First, we would give timely responses to information when we say, "Hey, we believe that there is a problem here and we have agreed to exchange information on cyber-crimes, we've agreed to possibly collect electronic evidence, and to mitigate malicious cyber activity that's occurring on our soil." We both agreed, that we would not knowingly conduct cyber enabled theft of intellectual property, which as you say senator, has been a problem. We have told them, "It's a problem; it's unacceptable." They have said that they will work to curb that. Then we've agreed to have common effort to promote international norms. And the final thing is, we'll high level joint mechanism, where we can meet at least twice a year and say, "Look, this is just not working. You are not coming through with you've said." So this isn't a treaty or anything like that, it's a confidence building measure for us to find out if China is going to act responsibly. I agree tonally with Director Clapper, they've got to prove to us. And we know, that they have stolen information from our defense contractors. (UNKNOWN) Right. WORK: And, it has helped them develop systems, and we have hardened our systems through the Defense Industrial Base Initiative; and we've trying to make... (UNKNOWN) I understand, we know the J-20 is pretty much, mirroring our F-22. We know that their J-31 is pretty mirroring our F-35. When we know this and the cost to the American taxpayers -- and let them get a -- I mean, why wouldn't we take hard actions against them? Why wouldn't we come down -- I just don't understand, why we wouldn't retaliate from a financial standpoint? WORK: There are a wide variety of cost and position options that we have. They're developed through the interagency and, again, it's not necessarily a kind -- I mean, tit-for-tat, it is proportional response, and we're working through all of those right now. (UNKNOWN) My time is up, sir, and if I could just follow up on that later, if we could meet with you later, I'd... WORK (?): Absolutely, sir. (UNKNOWN) ... (inaudible) appreciate it. CLAPPER (?): Senator, if I may, just add a word here about -- this is a point Admiral Rogers has made in the past about, you know, terminology, lexicon, nomenclature, definitions are important. And so what this represents, of course, is espionage, economic... (UNKNOWN) Absolutely. CLAPPER (?): ... cyber espionage, and, of course, we too practice cyber espionage and in a public forum to, you know, say how successful we are but we're -- we're not bad at it. So when we talk about what are we going to do for -- to counter espionage or punish somebody or retaliate for espionage, well, we -- I think it's a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people live in glass houses... (UNKNOWN) That's (inaudible). CLAPPER (?): ... shouldn't throw rocks. MCCAIN (?): So it's OK for them to steal our secrets that are most important (inaudible)... CLAPPER: I -- I didn't say that, sir... MCCAIN (?): (inaudible) because we... CLAPPER (?): I -- I didn't say that, Senator. MCCAIN (?): ... because we live in a glass house. That is astounding. Senator Ayotte? CLAPPER (?): I did not say it's a -- it's a good thing. I'm just saying that both nations engage in this. AYOTTE: I want to thank all of you for being here. With regard to the Chinese, I want to follow up on -- we -- we've talked about the stealing of the highest secrets in terms of our weapons system, but what about the 21 million people whose background check and personal information has been, of course, associated publicly with the Chinese. And the fact that we know that 5 million sets of fingerprints, as well, leading to potential vulnerability for our citizens. And if you put that in the context of these other issues that we've raised, it seems to me -- I -- I looked very carefully, for example, Secretary Work, at some of the language you've been using. You -- you gave a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London; you said deterrents must be demonstrated to be effective. Secretary Clapper, in your prepared statement, you said the muted response by most victims to cyber-attacks has created a permissive environment. So I'm trying to figure out based on what you've said how we're not in a permissive environment in light of what they've stolen on our weapons systems but also this huge infringement on 21 million people in this country. And also could you comment on the vulnerability of that data and where we are in terms of how... CLAPPER: Well... AYOTTE: ... it would be used against us? CLAPPER: First, that -- that is an assessment of what was taken. We actually don't know in terms of specific -- specifics but that's -- I think, frames the magnitude of this theft and it is potentially very serious -- has very serious implications first close -- close to home from the standpoint of the intelligence community, and the potential for identifying people who may be under covered status, just one -- one small example. And of course it poses all kinds of potential -- and, unfortunately, this is a gift that's going to keep on giving for years. So it -- it's a very serious situation. What we try to do is educate people what to look for and how to protect themselves but, again, this is a huge threat of theft and it has potentially damaging implications for lots of people in the intelligence community and lots of people in the Department of Defense and other employees of government. AYOTTE: So I think what you're hearing from some of us up here is just a -- now, what are we going to do about it, is the issue as opposed to a -- a shared agreement on generic principles with the Chinese. This is a pretty significant issue that is going to impact millions of Americans. I'm not hearing what we're going to do about it, but that may be a higher level of decision going up to the President. But seems to me, if we're going to talk about deterrence, if we don't follow up with action, and if you look at that combined with the testimony we heard last week about the artificial islands being built by the Chinese and the fact that we won't even go within I believe its 12 nautical miles of those islands, if you put that all from the Chinese perspective, I think you think, hmm, we can pretty much do what we want to do because we haven't seen a response. Now, I'm not asking for -- from all of you to -- to answer that because it probably needs to be answered by the President and his national security team, but it seems to me that they aren't seeing a response right now from us and therefore we're going to see -- continue to see bad behavior from the Chinese. Before I go, I have an important question on another topic, Secretary Work, and that is yesterday we heard public reports about a potential violent -- violation of the INF Treaty by the Russians and that essentially Russia tested -- flight tested a new ground-launched cruise missile this month that U.S. intelligence agencies say further violates the 1987 INF Treaty. And, of course, this is going back also to the reports as early as 2008 of the -- Russia conducting tests of -- of another ground-launched cruise missile in potential violation of the INF Treaty that we've raised with them, and when Secretary Carter came before our committee on his confirmation, he listed three potential responses to these INF violations. So now we have the Russians violating the INF Treaty yet again and I guess my question is, Secretary Carter rightly identified that we should respond either through missile defense, counterforce or countervailing measures. What are we doing about it? WORK: Senator, this is a long-standing issue that we have been discussing with the Russians. The system that you're talking about is in development; has not been fielded yet. We are -- we have had different discussions with them on our perception of the violation of the INF and they have come back. This is still in discussions and we have not decided on any particular action at this point. AYOTTE: So are you saying that you don't think they violated the INF Treaty? WORK: We believe very strongly that they did. AYOTTE: That's what I thought. So what are we going to do about it, because they're claiming that they haven't, going back to the 2008 violations, and now here we have another situation. WORK: It's still under -- because they have not fielded the system, we are still in the midst of negotiating this position. We are giving ours but if they do field a system that violates the INF, I would expect us to take one of the three options that Secretary Carter outlined before the committee. AYOTTE: So my time is up but I see two consistent themes here, both with the Chinese and the Russian. A lot of talk, no action, unfortunately, and people take their cues from that and that worries me. Thank you, all. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) HIRONO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, you testified before the House Intelligence Committee recently that they -- while the United States makes distinctions between cyber-attacks conducted for economic purposes or to gain foreign intelligence, I would -- that's the espionage arena, I think that you're referring to, or to cause damage our adversaries do not. Would you consider the OPM breach to the extent that we believe it is a state actor who did that, that that would be in the category of espionage? CLAPPER: Yes. HIRONO: So... CLAPPER: That was the tenor of the discussion at the HPSCI hearing that Admiral Rogers and I engaged in. And, of course, that has to do with the -- as I mentioned earlier to Senator Manchin, the importance of definition, nomenclature and terms. So -- and the definition of these terms. And so what the theft of the OPM data, as egregious as it was, we wouldn't necessarily consider it as an attack. Rather, it would be... HIRONO: Yes. CLAPPER: ... a form of... HIRONO: Well, (inaudible)... CLAPPER: ... theft or espionage. HIRONO: And, as you say, other countries, including our own, engages in such activities. My understanding of the recent agreement between the United States and China, though, has to do with commercial cyber theft, and I think that's a very different category that has to do with obtaining information about corporations, et cetera, and -- and therefore, that that is in the category of economic attacks. So, Director Clapper, would you consider that kind of an agreement to be helpful? I realize that you are skeptical but to the extent that we are defining a particular kind of -- of cyber-attack and -- and that we're contemplating through this agreement an ability of our two countries to engage in high level dialogue regarding these kinds of -- of attacks, is it -- is that a helpful situation? CLAPPER: Well, it would be -- it would be -- it'd be very helpful if, of course, the Chinese actually live up to what they agreed to. So if -- and -- and what the agreement pertained to was theft of data for economic purposes, to give Chinese commercial concerns an advantage or their defense industries an advantage. As opposed to -- I don't believe they -- that we've agreed with the Chinese to stop spying on each other. HIRONO: Yes. CLAPPER: And so there -- there is a -- for purely espionage purposes and there is a distinction. HIRONO: Mr. Secretary, you can weigh in on this also. To the extent that we've created an -- a potential for dialogue or an environment where there's a process to be followed and the -- cases where we suspect commercial cyber-attacks, that at least we have a way that we can talk to the -- the Chinese. Because you also mentioned, Director Clapper, that attribution is not the easiest thing, although we are getting better at figuring out who actually were the actors that did these cyber-attacks. So one hopes that even with a -- a great deal of skepticism going forward that this agreement may create this space for us to have a -- more than a conversation but one that would lead to some kind of a -- a change in behavior on the part of these state actors. Mr. Secretary, feel free to give us your opinion. WORK: Senator, I think that's exactly right. WORK: I mean, as Director Clapper said, first you have to find out the geographical location from the -- where the attack came from. Then you have to identify the actor, then you have to identify whether the government of that geographic space was either controlling (inaudible)... HIRONO: Recognize that's not the easiest to do, yes. WORK: And what we have done is we have confronted China and China in some cases has said, "Look, this was a hacker; it was inside our country, but we have no control of it." What this allows us to do is say, "OK, well what are you going to do about that? That's a cyber crime. Are you going to provide us the information we need to prosecute this person? Are you going to take care of it on your own?" So I believe this type of confidence-building measure and this way to discuss these things will -- the truth will be in the pudding, how the Chinese react to this. HIRONO: Mr. Secretary, I think you mentioned that this particular agreement allows -- contemplates meeting at least twice a year. Is there anything that prevents more frequent dialogue between our two countries in suspected cases of commercial cyber attacks? WORK: Senator, I believe that if there was a significant cyber event that suspected the Chinese of doing, or they suspected us, that we would be able to meet (inaudible). This is going to be a high- level joint dialogue. The Chinese will have it at the ministerial level. Our U.S. secretary of homeland security and the U.S. attorney general will co-lead on our part. We're going to have the first meeting of this group by the end of this calendar year, and then at least twice a year. So I believe that -- Director Clapper (inaudible) -- I think all of us have some healthy skepticism about this, but I believe it's a good confidence-building measure and good first step, and we will see if it leads to better behavior on the part of the Chinese. HIRONO: Thank you. MCCAIN: Mr. Secretary, I can't help -- (inaudible) comment. We have identified the PLA building in which they operate. Now, please don't deceive this committee as if we don't know who's responsible for it. That's just -- that's just very disingenuous. There have been public reports that we've identified the PLA building in which these cyber attacks come from. Senator Ernst? ERNST: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. Admiral Rogers, I'll start with you, sir. Two of the president's nine lines of effort in defeating ISIL are, first, exposing ISIS's true nature, and second, disrupting the foreign fighter flow. And over the weekend, the New York Times reported that 30,000 recruits joined ISIS over the past year, and that's double the previous recruitment year. Earlier this month, in reference to ISIS recruiting, the State Department's ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism said that ISIS's recruiting trend is still upward, and this information came of no surprise to her. The ambassador also said the upward trend was primarily due to Internet and social media. So, sir, do you believe the administration's efforts have so far succeeded on these two lines of effort in cyberspace and social media? Just please, simple yes or no. ROGERS: No. ERNST: OK. In light of that, with the record recruiting numbers for ISIS, how would you then assess the effectiveness of the U.S. government's counter-ISIS effort in cyberspace? So, what specifically is your assessment of the State Department's think again, turn away program in support of efforts to disrupt ISIS's online recruiting effort? ROGERS: Senator, I'm not in a position to comment on the State Department -- the specifics of their program. I honestly am just not know knowledgeable about it. I will say this broadly, to get to I think your broader point, I have always believed that we must contest ISIL in the information domain every bit as aggressively as we are contesting them on the battlefield; that the information dynamic is an essential component of their vision, their strategy and ultimately their success. And we have go to be willing to attempt to fight them in that domain just like we are on the battlefield and we clearly at not there yet. ERNST: I agree. I think we are failing in this effort. And some of the programs that we have seen obviously are not working. So are there areas where you could recommend how the U.S. government better partner with various NGOs or private entities to more effectively counter the ISIS propaganda? ROGERS: Again, the contesting the propaganda piece is much broader than Cyber Command's mission. I will say from a technical and operational perspective, we broadly within the DOD, the Cyber Command, Strategic Command and CENTCOM, are looking at within our authorities, within our capabilities, let's look in the realm of the possible in terms of what can we do to help contest them in this domain. ERNST: We have a larger problem coming forward, too, in regards to ISIS and ISIL in the Middle East. We seem to see the emergence of a trifecta between Syria, Iran and Russia. And now it seems that Iraq has begun information sharing with Russia, with Iran, with Syria. Director Clapper, can you speak to that and the broader implications of Russia emerging as a leader in the Middle East while we seem to be frittering away our opportunity with ISIL? CLAPPER: Well, that's certainly their objective. I think they have several objectives here, one of which is that I think protect their base, their presence in Syria, ergo their buildup in the northwest part of Syria; clearly want to prop up Assad. And I think a belated motivation for them is fighting ISIL. As far as the joint intelligence arrangement is concerned, I can't go into detail here in this forum, but I will say they are -- each of the parties entering into this are a little bit suspicious of just what is entailed here. So we'll have to see just how robust a capability that actually provides. ERNST: OK. I appreciate that. Secretary Work, do you have any thoughts on the emergence of Russia with the intelligence sharing, how that might impact the operations that we have ongoing in Iraq against ISIS? WORK: Well, I think we were caught by surprise that Iraq entered into this agreement with Syria and Iran and Russia. Obviously, we are not going to share intelligence with either Syria or Russia or Iran. So we are in the process -- our -- we are in the process of working to try to find out exactly what Iraq has said. Certainly, we're not going to provide any classified information to help those actors on the battlefield. Really, what we're trying to do is de-conflict. And that is the primary purpose of the discussion between President Obama and President Putin yesterday is if you are going to act on this battlefield, we have to de-conflict. The other thing we have made clear is they would like to do the military first, followed by a political transition. We would -- we believe those two things have to go in parallel and that has been our consistent message. This is early days. We are still in the midst of discussing what exactly this means. So I don't have any definitive answers for you at this point, Senator. ERNST: Well, I'm very concerned that we have abdicated our role in the Middle East, and in so many other areas, as have been pointed out earlier -- a grave concern to all of us. And I think we need to be working much more diligently on this. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Admiral, I'm concerned about all of these private telecoms that are going to encrypt. If you have encryption of everything, how in your opinion does that affect section 702 and 215 collection programs? ROGERS: It certainly makes it more difficult. NELSON: Does the administration have a policy position on this? ROGERS: No. I think we're still -- I mean, we're the first to acknowledge that this is an incredibly complicated issue, with a lot of very valid perspectives. And we're still I think collectively trying to work our way through sort of what's the right way ahead, recognizing that there's a lot of very valid perspectives. But from the perspective of Cyber Command and NSA, that I look at the issue, there's a huge challenge for us here that we have got to deal with. NELSON: A huge challenge. And I have a policy position, and that is that the telecoms better cooperate with the United States government, or else it just magnifies the ability for the bad guys to utilize the Internet to achieve their purposes. Speaking of that, we have a fantastic U.S. military. We are able to protect ourselves. It's the best military in the world, but we have a vulnerability. And it's a cyber attack. Do you want to see if you can make me feel any better about our ability to protect ourselves going forward? ROGERS: I would tell you that current state of capability in the department, if I just look at where we were 18 months ago, two years ago, it is significantly improved. We currently defeat probably 99 point some-odd percentage of attempts to penetrate DOD systems on a daily basis. The capability in terms of both the amount of teams; their capability just continues to improve -- our speed, our agility. The challenge for us fundamentally to me is we are trying to overcome decades of a thought process in which redundancy, defensibility, and reliability were never core-designed characteristics for our networks; where we assumed in the development of our weapons systems that external interfaces, if you will, with the outside world were not something to be overly concerned with. They represented opportunity for us. They were remotely monitored activity to generate data as to how aircraft, for example, or ships holds (ph) were doing in different (inaudible) around the world -- all positives (inaudible) China developed the next generation, for example, of cruiser destroyers for the Navy. But in a world in which those public interfaces, if you were, increasingly represent also potential points of vulnerability, you get this clash of strategy, if you will. And that's where we find ourselves now. So one of the things I try to remind people is it took us decades to get here. We are not going to fix this set of problems in a few years. It takes dedicated prioritization, dedicated commitment, resources, and we've got to do this in a smart way. ROGERS: We've got to prioritize and we've got to figure out what's the greatest vulnerability and where's the greatest return (ph) for us... WORK: Senator, is it OK if I jump in here for a second? I just want to add to that... ROGERS: ... and for us to let our potential enemies understand that we have the capabilities of doing to them what they do to us. However, that gets more complicated when you're dealing with a rogue group of people stuck in a room somewhere that are not part of a nation state. NELSON: Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary. WORK: Well, I was just going to echo what Admiral Rogers said. When Secretary Carter came in he said, look we are absolutely not where we need to be and he made job number one defense of the networks. So we're going from 15,000 enclaves to less than 500. We're going to have -- we're going from 1,000 defendable firewalls to less than 200, somewhere between 50 and 200. So, you're absolutely right. We have recognized this as a terrible vulnerability. We are working, first to defend our networks as we talked about earlier. We're looking at our systems and we're also trying to change the culture. Right now if you discharge a weapon, you are held accountable for that. Negligent discharge is one of the worst things you can do. But we need to do is inoculate a culture where cyber discharge is just as bad and make sure that culture is inoculated throughout the force. NELSON: I agree, but now the Admiral is assaulted by the telecoms who want tie his hands behind his back by doing all of the encryption. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you Mr. Chairman. In our state, naval surface warfare (ph), Senator Cardin (ph) has taken the lead on much of our efforts to protect against the threat of counterfeit electronics. And so, Secretary Work and Director Clapper, the global supply chain for micro electronics presents a growing challenge for cyber-security. One of the things we saw recently, IBM sold it's chip-making facilities with DOD trusted foundry status to a foreign-owned competitor. So I was wondering your top priorities in managing the risk posed by the globalization of our micro electronics manufacturing capabilities and our abilities to protect our systems in that area. WORK: That's a big question Senator, in fact it's going to be one of the key things we look at in this fall review because of the recent -- as you said, the recent sale of the IBM chips. Now, there are two schools of thought on this. Secretary Carter personally has jumped into this and some say you do not need a trusted foundry. Another group says you absolutely have to have it. Having confidence in the chips that we put in our weapons system is important and I would expect that come February we would be able to report out the final decisions through the fall review on how we're going to tackle this problem. (UNKNOWN) Who within DOD's leadership has primary responsibility for overseeing the supply chain risk management. WORK: That would be Frank Kendall and DLA. DLA has the supply chain and Frank Kendall is really focused on the trusted chip, the fabrication of trusted chips. (UNKNOWN) One of the areas that we look at in regards to cyber and in some ways you know, technology in particular parts of it, not advancing it has been a good thing in this respect, is in the nuclear area. So are there any specific groups that are focused just on protecting our nuclear efforts against cyber? WORK: There's the national, the NESA, and also we have a nuclear weapons council which is co-chaired by again, Frank Kendall, our undersecretary of defense for ATML and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They are the ones that work with DOE to make sure that our weapons system components are reliable and trusted. And to make sure that we have a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent. (UNKNOWN) Admiral, when we look at building the force of cyber warriors, the cyber team, how can we use the National Guard, Reserves to do that. Because it strikes me that can help us in retaining highly qualified individuals who want to devote part of their life to helping their country. And it would seem to almost be a perfect fit for us. ROGERS: So we have taken a total force approach to the force that we're building out, that includes both guard and reserve, every service slightly different not the least of which because different services have different Reserve and Guard structures. So that is a part of it. I'd say one challenge we're still trying to work our way through is under the title 32 piece, how we coordinate, what guard and reserve are doing, how we generate capacity and bring to bear with maximum efficiency. The one thing -- the two things in partnering with my guard teammates and my reserve teammates, because we are taking a total force approach for this, we need one standard for this. We don't want a place where the guard and reserve are trained to one standard and the active side is trained to a different. That gives us maximum flexibility in how we apply the capability across the force, and the Guard and Reserve has done great in that regard. And then secondly, we need one common unit structure. We don't want to build unique one of a kind structures in the guard and reserves that don't match the title ten side again. We want to treat this is as one integrated force and again I would give the guard and the reserve great kudos in that regard. We've got a common vision about the way we need to go. We've got a great exercise series cyber guard that we're using every year where we bring together the guard, the private sector, the active component, government and work our way through the specifics of how we will make it work. (UNKNOWN) Director Clapper, and I apologize if you have already answered this. What is the one cyber challenge you are most concerned about? CLAPPER: Well, obviously, the one that I have to think about is -- would be a massive armaggedon-like scale attack against our infrastructure. That is not -- we don't consider that the most likely probability right now that the greater threat or the low to moderate sort of threats that we're seeing. And what I have seen in the five years that I've been in this job is a sort of progression where these get more aggressive and more damaging. And as I indicated in my oral statement at the outset what I will see, I think what we can expect next are data manipulation which then cause -- calls into question the integrity of the data which in many ways is more insidious than the kinds of attacks that we've suffered thus far. So, you know, the greater -- the specter is this massive attack though it's not likely. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Annex 3 of the recently signed nuclear agreement calls for the participating countries to work with Iran to quote "Strengthen Iran's ability to protect against and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems." Close quote. Secretary Clapper, do you read this portion of the nuclear agreement -- the annex to include cyber threats, meaning that the P5- plus-one countries who are part of this agreement will be expected, will be deemed to have an obligation under the agreement to assist Iran in developing systems to prevent other countries from using cyber capabilities to acquire information about or to disrupt the operations of Iran's nuclear capabilities or Iran's nuclear programs? CLAPPER: Well, in this environment I would say that I trust that this is not going to prevent us from gleaning intelligence from our traditional sources in the interest in verifying the agreement which will be principally monitored by an international organization, IDEA. So I'm not aware of any strictures on our ability to collect on their behavior and their components. (UNKNOWN) But why would we want to give Iran the ability to defend against cyber weapons that we or perhaps some of our allies might one day want to use against Iran? CLAPPER: Well, sir in this open environment there are some aspects here that I can't stress. I'd be happy to talk with you privately or in a classified environment about that. (UNKNOWN) OK, OK. But you're not disputing the fact that the agreement says that, that we would have to... CLAPPER: No. (UNKNOWN) OK. Now, can you tell me in this environment what specific technical assistance we'll be offering Iran in this portion of the agreement. CLAPPER: I honestly don't know the answer to that question. I would have to have that researched. I don't know exactly what's in mind there. (UNKNOWN) Now, would any of these capabilities, once acquired by Iran, prevent or inhibit the United States or any of our allies and another enemy of Iran from using any cyber measure against Iranian nuclear facilities? CLAPPER: Again, I'm reluctant to discuss that in this setting. (UNKNOWN) Were you consulted by U.S. negotiators during the nuclear negotiations in connection with this portion of the agreement? CLAPPER: Well, the intelligence community was deeply involved throughout the negotiations. (UNKNOWN) Can you describe the nature of any consultation you had with them as to this portion of annex 3? CLAPPER: With the Iranians? (UNKNOWN) Yes. CLAPPER: No, I did not engage with the Iranians with... (UNKNOWN) No, that's not what I'm asking. I'm asking if you can describe your discussions with U.S. negotiators as they came to you and consulted with you on the implication of this portion annex 3. CLAPPER: I didn't actually -- my lead for this was Norm Rule (ph), known to many of you on this committee as National Intelligence manager (ph) for Iran and he was the direct participant and I don't want to speak for him as to the extent to which he was involved or consulted on that provision. I would have to ask him. (UNKNOWN) OK, but you would of been aware of consultations going on? I'm sure he came to you and said look this is going to impact our ability, the ability of the United States to do what we need to do with respect to Iran. Might that have been something... CLAPPER: Again, sir, I would rather discuss what the potential response of ours could be in a closed setting. (UNKNOWN) OK, Secretary Work, how is the department working to ensure that the hardware and software on some of these major programs we're developing can fit to future contingencies in technological advances, so they can continue to address emerging cyber threats well into the future without major overhauls of the entire system? WORK: Senator, as I said, "we are now putting into our KPPS, our Key Performance Parameters in any new systems, specific cyber- hardening requirements." Much like during the Cold War when we had EMP requirements for many of our systems. The problem that we face is that many of the old systems that are still in service, were not built to the -- to respond to the cyber-threats that we see today. So we're having to go back through all of those older systems, determine which ones were most vulnerable, to prioritize them, and to make fixes. So it also goes back to Senator Donnelly's question on the trusted foundry (ph), we are trying to determine, what is the best way to assure that we have reliable and trusted micro-electronics. (UNKNOWN) Thank you, I see my time's expired. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) KING: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Work, if there's a catastrophic attack tonight on the fiscal instructor, the financial infrastructure of this country, I do not want to go on cable news in morning -- if there is cable news in the morning, and say, "the administration told us that the policy is still in development." We've got to get on this. We've been talking about it for years and as the Chairman pointed, this was an essential part of our National Defense Authorization Act a year ago. And the idea, that we can continue to simply defend and never have an offensive capability, I just think is ignoring this enormous threat which we all agree. So, let me ask a one word answer question to each of you. Do we need an offensive capability in cyber-realm in order to act as a deterrent, Secretary Work? WORK: We need a broad range of response options, to include... KING: Do we need a offensive cyber capability to act as a deterrent? WORK: I would say, "yes, sir." KING: Director Clapper? CLAPPER: Absolutely. KING: Admiral Rogers? ROGERS: Yes. KING: Thank you. The second part of that is, that it can't be secret. Our instinct is to make everything secret and the whole point of a deterrent capability, is that it not be secret. So, I think we need to establish what we have. I suspect we do have some significant offensive capability but part of making it a deterrent is, that is has to be made public. I think another question that needs to be addressed and I don't necessarily think -- in this hearing this morning, but in terms of the policy; we need to define what an of war is in the cyber area. Whether hitting Sony Pictures is an act of war, or the OPM, and how do draw those lines. And, I would suggest that, that's got to be part of this policy definition. And, I don't mean to imply Secretary Work, that this is easy, but it's urgent. And, that's the -- and, just simply can't defend ourselves by saying, "well, it was complicated, we didn't get to it." Changing the subject slightly, Admiral Rogers, do you believe that the dispersion of responsibility in the federal government for cyber, is a potential problem? It strikes me, we've got agencies, and departments, and bureaus; I suspect you could name 15 of them if you tried, that all have some responsibility here. Do we need to strengthen Cyber Command and make that the central repository of this policy. ROGERS: I would not make Cyber Command and the Department of Defense, the central repository. This is much broader than just the DOD perspective, but I will say this, I have been very public in saying, "we have got to simplify this structure for the outside world." Because, if you're on the outside looking in, and I hear this from private sector fairly regularly, "who do you want me to go? Should I talk to the FBI? Should I talk to DHS? Why can't I deal with you? Do I need to talk the financial company? Should I be talking to the sector of constructs that we've created?" We have to try to simplify this for the private sector. CLAPPER: What I might add to that Senator King, it's one of the reasons why I had a very brief commercial for, just within the intelligence community of integrating the cyber pictures, the common operating pictures, simply from within intelligence, let alone, you know, what we do to react or protect. And that, to me is one important thing that I have come to believe, we need along the lines of a mini-NCTC (ph) or NCPC. KING: And, I would hope that, that would also -- and that, the leadership and decision making on that, has to start with the White House. It has to start with the administration for an all of government approach to dealing with this dispersion of responsibility problem. I would point out parenthetically, that there has been a lot of talk about China and our ability to interact with China and to respond and hold China responsible, and it's not the subject of this hearing but the fact that we owe China trillions of dollars, compromises our ability to interact with China in a firm way. It's a complicated relationship and that's one of the things that makes it difficult. Director Clapper, do you have any idea, what brought the Chinese to the table for this recent agreement with the president? CLAPPER: Well, it appears that the -- the threat of potential economic sanctions, particularly, in opposing them right before the visit of President Xi, I think that got their attention and that's why they dispatched Minister Mong (ph) to try to come to some sort of, agreement. Which is what ensured subsequently. KING: And I agree, that it's not a definitive agreement or a treaty, but I do Secretary Work, that it's a step in the right direction. At least, these issues are being discussed. But countries ultimately, only act in their own self-interest and we have to convince the Chinese that it's in their interest to cut out this activity that's so detrimental to our country. Thank you gentleman, for you... WORK: Sir, could I make one real quick comment? KING: Yes, sir. WORK: Just because we have not published our policy, it is so broad and encompassing going over things like encryption; what are the types of authority we need? It does not mean, that if we did have an attack tonight; we do not have the structure in place right now, with the national security team to get together, to try to understand who caused the attack, to understand what the implications of the attack were, and what response we should take. Those are in place right. KING: But the whole point of being able to respond is deterrent so that the attack won't occur. If Dr. Strangelove taught us, that if you have a doomsday machine and no one knows about, it's useless. So having a secret plan as to how we will respond, isn't the point I'm trying to get at. The deal is, they have to know how we will respond and therefore not attack in the first place. Thank you. Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony. REED: On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize Senator Fischer. FISCHER: Thank you, Senator Reed. Following up a little bit, where Senator King was going on this. Many of you talked about establishing norms in cyberspace? Do you think it's possible to establish or maintain that norm without enforcement behaviors? When we look at publicly identifying those who are responsible for an activity or imposing costs on them, can we do that? I'll begin with Mr. Secretary. WORK: Well, I believe that trying to establish these norms are very -- very helpful. In the Cold War, for example, there was a task agreement that we would not attack each of our early warning missiles launch -- I mean, warning satellites. So establishing these norms are very important. But they will be extremely difficult because the enforcement mechanisms in cyber are far more difficult, because it's more much easy to attribute missile attacks, et cetera. So, I believe that this agreement with China is a good first step. That we should strive to establish norms, especially between nation-states. And establish norms, which we believe are beyond the bounds and to try to establish mechanisms by which we can work these through. But this will be very, very difficult, Senator, because it's much more difficult. CLAPPER: And we have the added problem, of course, of the norms, that Secretary Work said, that are really applicable to nation-states. And, of course, they have a whole range of non-nation-states actors out there who wouldn't necessarily subscribe to these norms and would be a challenge to deal with, even if there were nation-states, mutual agreements. FISCHER: Admiral? ROGERS: I would echo the comment that my two teammates made. I'm struck by raw captives (ph) of our own experience. In my early days as a sailor, well, before I got into this business, at the height of the Cold War out there, we knew exactly how far we can get between the Soviets and us. We knew exactly how far we could push each other, and we pushed each other at times right up to the edge, very aggressive behaviors. But we developed that set of norms, we a series of a deconfliction mechanisms in the maritime environment, we actually developed a set a signals over time so we can communicated with each other; but it's so uncomfortable that we're are going to achieve over time in the nation-state arena. But as my teammates have said, "it's the non-state actors that really complicates this," to me. It's going to make this difficult. FISCHER: So, when we're attacked in cyberspace, how do we impose cost on those who are attack us? Do we respond in cyberspace or can we look at other ways to, I think, respond in an appropriate manner, say with sanctions? What would you look at, Admiral? ROGERS: So what we have talked about previously is, we want to make sure we don't look at this just from one narrow perspective. That we think more broadly, we look across the breadth of capabilities and advantages that we enjoy as a nation, and we bring all of that to bear as we're looking at options as to what we do; and that it's a case by case basis. There's no one single -- one size fits all answer to this. ROGERS: Fundamentally, think more broadly than just cyber. Not that cyber isn't potentially a part of this, I don't mean to imply that. FISCHER: Correct, Mr. Secretary, would you agree with the Admiral on that? Do you see a variety of options other than? And wouldn't -- wouldn't this be more beneficial to us as a country to be able to have a policy that -- that is a public policy on what those options should be and the consequences that would be felt when we are attacked? WORK: Absolutely. And that is what I say about a broad policy, where we will respond in a time -- manner -- time, place and manner of our own choosing. In this case, there's an asymmetry with our nation- state potential adversaries. They are all authoritarian states. The attack surfaces that they have are far smaller than what we have as a free nation. And we value that. We do not want to close down the Internet, but we are more vulnerable to a wide variety of attack surfaces than our adversaries. So we may sometimes have to respond proportionately, but in a different way than a simple cyber response. It might be sanctions. It might be a criminal indictment. It might be other reactions. So we believe very strongly that this is something that's an interagency process, a process established where they are taking care of and handled on a case-by-case basis. FISCHER: And does the administration have a definition on what constitutes a cyber attack? WORK (?): Well, any type of malicious activity which causes either damage or theft of -- theft of information or I.T. -- all of those are under either cyber -- malicious cyber activities. It might be espionage. In each case, there's no defined red line for what would constitute... FISCHER: What -- what would be the difference between a cyber attack and cyber vandalism? CLAPPER: Well, we'd have to make, again, a case-by-case determination. And of course, an important consideration here would be, in terms of our reaction, would be attribution. And that, again, would be case-by-case. WORK: And cyber vandalism, ma'am, do you believe -- is that stealing information or I.T. or... FISCHER: The attack by North Korea on Sony was described by the president as cyber vandalism. I was just wondering on how you distinguish that -- that definition from a cuber attack. CLAPPER: Well, it didn't affect a national security entity, but it certainly did cause damage to a company. And in that case, and this is an important illustration of when we could attribute very clearly, and there was uniform agreement across the intelligence community, to attribute that attack to the North Koreans. And we did sanction them. FISCHER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) HEINRICH (?): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for joining us here today. And Director Clapper, before I start on -- begin to focus on cyber policy, I think we're all very concerned about the allegations that leadership at Central Command deliberately distorted the assessments of intelligence officers related to the fight against ISIL. And I understand that there's an ongoing investigation and I'm going to wait for the results of that investigation. But I want to say that as a member of both this committee and the Intelligence Committee, I want in the strongest terms possible impress upon you the importance for all of us to receive absolutely objective and unbiased assessments. And I look forward to the results of the I.G. investigation and I expect that you will hold accountable anyone who has failed in their duty in the intelligence community no matter how high up the chain that may go. CLAPPER: Well, Senator, I -- you brought up a very important consideration here, which is a great concern to me. I'm a son of an Army intelligence officer that served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. And I served in various intelligence capacities for over 52 years, ranging from my first tour in southeast Asia in the early '60s, to my service now as the longest-tenured DNI. And it is an almost sacred writ in intelligence -- in the intelligence profession never to politicize intelligence. I don't engage in it. I never have and I don't condone it when it's identified. Having said that, I -- I completely agree with you. In spite of all the media hyperbole, I think it's best that we all await the outcome of the DOD I.G. investigation to determine whether and to what extent there was any politicization of intelligence at CENTCOM. I will also say that the intelligence assessments from CENTCOM or any other combatant command come to the national level only through the Defense Intelligence Agency. That is the main conduit and I will say (inaudible) evaluator and filter for what flows into the national intelligence arena. HEINRICH (?): Thank you, Director. Turning to you, Admiral Rogers, as the director of U.S. Cyber Command, your responsibilities include strengthening our cyber defense and our cyber deterrence posture. And I want to return to the line of questioning several of my colleagues have -- have begun this morning. As you know, the breach of OPM computers resulted in an enormous loss of sensitive personal information. Thus far, to my knowledge, the U.S. has not responded. And to put it in the words of Deputy Secretary Work's language this morning, we haven't imposed a cost, which raises questions about whether we truly have developed the mechanisms for proportionate response to cyber attacks against the U.S. government, even after the April 2015 publication of the DOD cyber strategy. We know that if a foreign agent had been caught trying to steal U.S. personnel files in a less digital age we would either kick them out of the country if they were a diplomat, or we'd throw them in jail if they weren't a diplomat. That would be considered a proportionate response. But in the case of the OPM breach, the U.S. government seems uncertain about what a proportioned response would look like. So I want to ask you three questions and I'll let you take them as you may. What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? Has the United States decided on a proportionate response in the case of the OPM cyber espionage case? And what types of information gathering by nation-states, by governments, are legitimate? And what types are not? ROGERS: Well, first let me start off by saying, look, so I'm the operations (ph) commander. And all three of the questions you've just asked me as much broader than that. I'm glad to give you a (inaudible), but I'm mindful of what my role is. In terms of the three things that we define what an act of war is, the bottom line is clearly we're still working our way through that. What are the parameters that we want to use to define what is an act of war? My going in position is we ought to build on the framework that we have developed over time in the more conventional domain. That's a good point of departure for it. It's got a broadly built framework. It's something that people recognize. And it's where we ought to start as a point of departure. The second question was about -- (inaudible). HEINRICH (?): A proportional response to the OPM case. ROGERS: Again, I think that what OPM represents is a good question about so what are the parameters we want (inaudible). Is it, as the DNI just said, is it the intent (inaudible). Is it scaled? Is it -- you can do espionage at some level, for example, but if you trip some magic threshold, hey, is 20 million records (inaudible) those records? Is there some scale component to this? I think we're clearly still trying to work our way through that issue, and there is no one-size-fits-all (inaudible). I think there's recognition -- I think that's clearly what has driven this broad discussion between the United States and China, for example. That's been a positive, I would argue. And the third -- could you repeat again -- the types of information? HEINRICH (?): You know, I'll -- my time is expired, so I'll (inaudible). I think what you're hearing from all of us... MCCAIN: Go ahead, Senator. This is an important (inaudible) line of questioning. HEINRICH (?): We would like to see more transparency in being able to telegraph our deterrence. Because we all know that looking back into the cold war, that our deterrent was very important, but the other side knowing what that deterrent was was absolutely critical for it to be effective. And so we need to be clear about what types of information gathering by government are considered legitimate and acceptable, and where those red lines are going to be. ROGERS: I agree. I think that's an important of part of the whole deterrence (inaudible). It has to be something that's communicated and that generates understanding and expectation, and (inaudible) a sense of consequence. CLAPPER: I think the contrast with the cold war is a good one to think about in that I think what you're -- the concern that people are raising is should there be red lines on spying. That's really what this gets down to. We didn't have red lines in the cold war. It was free-wheeling as far as us collecting intelligence against the Soviet Union and vice versa. There were no limits on that. It's very difficult for both sides -- well, more so for us. And, of course, underlying -- the backdrop to all that was the deterrent, the nuclear deterrent, which of course restrained behavior, even though it got rough at times, as the example that Admiral Rogers cited in (inaudible) maritime context. But there were ground rules that governed that. We're sort of in the wild west here with cyber, where there are no limits; that we've agreed on no red lines certainly on collecting information, which is what the OPM breach represented. MCCAIN: Director and Admiral, I would like to thank you for your forthright and candid assessment, and also I think the lesson that all of us are getting is that we really have to have some policy decisions. And you've been very helpful in fleshing them out for us. Senator Cotton? COTTON: Secretary Work, I'd like to return to an exchange you had with Senator Ayotte about the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, also known as the INF Treaty. Is Russia in violation of their obligations under the INF Treaty? WORK: We believe that a system that they have in development would violate the treaty. COTTON: And you said just now "in development," I thought I heard you say with Senator Ayotte that it's not deployed or it's not yet operationally capable. Is that correct? WORK: That's my understanding. I can have -- I can get back to you with a question for the record. It is in development and we have indicated our concern to the Russians that if they did deploy it, we believe it would violate the INF. COTTON: Thank you. Could you please do that in writing? And if it's appropriate, in a classified writing that's fine as well. I'd now like to move to the cyber mission force at the Air Force Association conference a couple weeks ago, Major General Ed Wilson, the commander of the 24th Air Force stated that DOD cyber mission force was halfway through its buildup. How difficult is it to establish the needed infrastructure and manning across the services to create the capability that we need to defend and deter cyber threats? WORK (?): I'd like to start, and then I'll turn it over Admiral Rogers. We're building to 133 total teams, 68 are cyber protection teams that are focused on our number one mission, defense of our networks. We have 13 national mission teams that we are building to help defend our nation's critical infrastructure, and we have 27 combat mission teams that are aligned with the combatant commanders and assist them in their planning. To support those, we have 25 support teams which they could call upon, for a total of 133. We're building to 6,200 military personnel civilians and some specialized contractors and another 2,000 in the reserves. So about 8,400. We expect to reach that in 2018 provided there's not another government shutdown. The last time we had a government shutdown and the sequestration, it put us behind by six months in building this. So as of right now, we are -- I think we're on track. And I turn it over to Admiral Rogers to explain the -- how well we're doing in attracting talent. ROGERS: And if I could first, let me accent (ph) a few (ph) on one particular portion of DepSec Work's comments in terms of impact of a government shutdown or sequestration for us. The last time we went through this and we shut it down, we assessed that we probably lost six months' worth of progress because we had to shut down the school system, we went to all stop in terms of generation of capability and the -- like a domino, the layover effect of all of that we think cost us about six months of time. If we go to a VCA or sequestration level, it puts us even further behind and in -- in an environment in which we have all uniformly come to the conclusion we're not where we need to be, and we've got to be more aggressive in getting there. And you can't do that if -- when you're shutting down your efforts, when you're cutting money to go specifically. Senator, to the question you asked, I would tell you the generation of the teams in terms of the manpower and their capability, we knock on wood, is exceeding my expectations. The bigger challenge to me has been less -- but it's not an insignificant challenge. But the bigger challenge has been less the teams and more some of the enabling capabilities that really power them. The tools, if you will. The platform that we operate from. The training environment that we take for granted in every other mission set. The idea that we would take a brigade combat team that before it went to Iraq, before it went to Afghanistan, we put it out in the National Training Center and we put it through the spectrum of scenarios we thinks they're likely to encounter in their deployment. We don't have that capability right now in cyber. We have got to create that capability. It's those enablers to me and the intelligence piece just like any other mission set. Everything we do is predicated on knowledge and insights. It's no different for the CENTCOM commander than it is for me. Those are the areas to me where the challenges are -- are greater, if you will, than -- than just the manpower. I'm not trying to minimize (inaudible). COTTON: Yes, and -- and how -- how important is it that we take advantage of the existing infrastructure and capabilities that we have as you're building out the entire mission force? ROGERS: I mean, that's what we're doing right now, but I will say one of our experiences -- Cyber Command has now been in place for approximately five years -- one of our insights that we've gained with practical experience and as we're looking at both defensive response as well as potential offensive options, we need to create infrastructure that is slightly separate from the infrastructure we use at NSA. It's -- so a unified platform you've heard us talk about, it's supported in the funding. That's an important part of this. Experience has taught us this in a way that five, six years ago we didn't fully understand. COTTON: Well, I'd -- my time is up for questions but I'd just like to bring to your attention that Arkansas General Mark Berry has requested cyber protection team at Little Rock Air Force Base. There's an 11,000 square foot facility there, it has a skip (ph) of 8,500 square feet. It's already had $3.5 million invested in it. One of these facilities I understand would cost about $4 million. It's a request that I support. I think it's harnessed resources that we've already invested, and also it's a -- they're ready to support in addition to the professional educational center that does a lot of the cyber training for the National Guard which is less than 30 minutes away. Thank you. CLAPPER: Mr. Chairman, I -- I have to comment and I'm rather struck by the irony here of -- before I left my office to come to this hearing I was reviewing the directions that we're putting out to our people for shutting down and furloughing people. What better time for a cyber-attack by an adversary when much of our expertise might be furloughed? MCCAIN: I think that's a very important comment, Director, and thank you for saying it. There's some of us who -- who feel it's urgent that we inform the American people of the threats to our national security of another government shutdown. I believe that it was an Arkansas philosopher that said there is no education in the second kick of a mule, so I thank you for your comment. Senator McCaskill? MCCASKILL: That's probably a Missouri mule. Director Clapper, earlier this year I introduced a bill that would give intelligence community contractors whistleblower protections as long as those complaints were made within the chain or to the inspector general or the GAO. So disclosures made to the press would not be protected. I -- as you probably know, Defense Department -- I know that Secretary Work knows this -- that we've already put into the law in recent years whistleblower protections for the contractors at the Department of Defense, and to my knowledge, and certainly correct me if I'm wrong, any of you, I'm not aware of any classified or sensitive information that has made its way to a damaging place as a result of these protections. The -- the 2014 intel authorization gave these protections to the government employees within intelligence. And one of the challenges we have in government is this divide between the contractors and government employees. And, frankly, whistleblower protections -- I can't think of a good policy reason that we would give whistleblower protections to employees and not give them to contractors. And so I'm hopeful today that you would indicate that you believe this is an important principle and that we should move forward with this legislation. CLAPPER: Absolutely, Senator, and we have published internal to the intelligence community an intelligence community directive that includes whistleblowing protections for contractors. After all, that was the source of our -- our big problem here with Mr. Snowden who was a contractor. And so our -- our challenge -- the -- the additional burden we have, of course, is trying to prevent the exposure of classified information outside channels so that's why whistleblowers absolutely must be protected so that they are induced or motivated to go within the channels knowing that they'll be protected. This program is managed by the intelligence community inspector general who is, of course, independent as a Senate-confirmed official. MCCASKILL: Thank you, and I'm pleased to -- to see that -- that you would be supportive of that. And -- and, Secretary Work, and Admiral Rogers, I assume that you would be supportive of giving whistleblower protections to intelligence community contractors? WORK: Absolutely. I agree total with what Director Clapper said. ROGERS: Yes, ma'am, and I say this as the head of an intelligence agency. MCCASKILL: Thank you. I want to follow up a little bit, Director Clapper, with your comment about a shutdown. Could you tell us what impact another government shutdown would have on your progress of getting the cyber mission force fully operational? Excuse me, Admiral Rogers. I -- I -- I think that in political isolation, shutdown appeals to a certain swath of Americans, and I understand why because sometimes it just feels good to say, well, let's just shut it down because obviously government is never going to win popularity contests, certainly not in my state. On the other hand, there's a difference between being responsible in terms of public policy and being irresponsible in terms of recognizing -- I love it when some of my friends wave the Constitution in my face and then fail to read the part that we have a divided checks and balances in this country, unlike other countries. The American people sent a party -- a President of one party to the White House and elected a Congress of a different party and that means we have to figure out how to get along. So could you talk a moment about what the impact would be to this important mission if, once again, we went down the rabbit hole of deciding the best thing to do is just to shut down government? ROGERS: So if we use our experience the last time, first thing I had to do is shut down the school system and training and education is a core component of our ability to create this workforce. Just shut it all down because it was only mission essential. The second thing I was struck (ph) for, all travel that was associated with training, all -- we had to shut all that down so I couldn't send people to generate more insights, to gain more knowledge. We had to shut down some of our technical development efforts because of the closure. Again, put that all on hold at a time where we had talked about the need to develop more capability, the need to develop more tools. I had to shut that all down during the period of the last shutdown. We were forced to focus our efforts on the continued day-to-day defense which is critical -- don't get me wrong -- as Secretary Work has indicated, it is priority number one for us. The other concern I have is -- and I have watched this play out now just in the last 10 days. I've been in command 18 months and I will tell you, the biggest thing I get from my workforce prior to the last 10 days, sir, this happened to us once in 2013, is this going to happen again? If it is, why should I stay here working for the government? I could make a whole lot more money in the cyber arena on the outside. So in addition to the threat increase (ph) that the DNI has highlighted, my other concern is if we do this again, is the amount of our workforce that says, you know, twice in the course of two years, I've got a family, I've got mortgages, I've got to -- to take care of myself. As much as I love the mission, as much as I believe in defending the nation, I can't put myself or my family through this. I've got to go work in the commercial sector. That would be terrible for us. Because people -- despite all our technology, never forget, it is men and women who power this enterprise. That's our advantage. MCCASKILL: At the risk of sounding like a smart aleck, which I do from time to time, I would say maybe we need to open some of those schools so some of my colleagues could do some math and realize the votes are not there to overcome a presidential veto and this is a recipe for dysfunction that does not help anyone in this country, in particular our national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to echo the comments from my colleague Senator McCaskill. I think it's irresponsible. We have the Secretary come before this committee and say the number and severity of threats have not been greater since 9/11. That should be enough said in terms of what we need to do to keep continuity in funding the government. All the other things I may have a problem with have to be second to that priority. I thank you all for your work and Director Clapper I thank you for your comment. Admiral Rogers, we've had briefing from you since you've taken the command. And one of the briefings I'm reminded of is the trend that you see in terms of the gap between what tends to be still at American advantage overall, narrowing. Particularly with nations like China and Russia and I think you maybe even mentioned Iran being an emerging threat. Can you tell me, really in the context of maybe another six months reset (ph) on your training, but more importantly, based on your current funding streams and your current plan, are we going to be able to widen that gap again or this just a matter of staying slightly ahead of our adversaries? ROGERS: For right now, I think the most likely scenarios is we're staying slightly ahead of our adversaries because we're trying to do so much foundational work if you will. As I said previously, trying to overcome a very different approach over the previous decade (ph). It's not a criticism of that approach. It was a totally different world. It lead to a different prioritization. It led to a different level of effort and a different investment strategy. Clearly we're going to have to change that and we're changing that at a time when budgets are going down and threats, not just in cyber, but more broadly, are proliferating. I don't envy the choices Secretary Carter and the leadership has to make. There's nothing easy here. So I think in the near term, the most likely scenario for us is, how can we focus on the best investments that maximize our defense capability while continuing to help us retain the advantage we do right now against most. (UNKNOWN) Thank you and this question may be for Secretary Work. The announcement about the agreement with China, that we're basically not going to attack each other in the face of the compelling evidence that we have that China's done it in the past and they've denied it, why is this agreement a positive thing if the -- with the smoking gun information we have right now on prior attacks, theft of intellectual property, theft of commercial data, that we have a pretty strong base evidence to say that they're guilty of it, if they deny it, why does this agreement mean anything? WORK: On the build up to this visit we made it very clear through a wide variety of efforts that this was going to be something that was foremost in the discussions when President Xi came, we made it as clear as we possibly can in every single level from the President on down that the Chinese cyber activities are unacceptable and we believe that this is a good first step as a confidence building measure where China can either demonstrate that they are serious about establishing some new norms (ph) and going after cyber crimes, et cetera. But the proof will be in the pudding. I agree with Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, it's going to be up to the Chinese that they're serious about this. (UNKNOWN) Will the manipulation of commercial data fall within the definition of theft under this agreement? WORK: Well, specifically, one part of it is, the theft of I.P., intellectual property for commercial advantage and say for example, the Chinese state enterprise. And we have agreed, at least we have made a tentative agreement that we will not do those types of activities. China has done those activities in the past and it will be up to them to prove that we won't do in the future. (UNKNOWN) And the -- for anyone, and then I'll yield. I know that the committee's gone on awhile. But at what point -- I think Senator Heinrich made some very important points about drawing redlines. But, at what point are we going to have clear definitions about malignant (ph) activities in cyberspace being acts of war or acts of terrorism, and then have appropriate responses whether they be through cyber or through sanctions or other? When are we going to get that clarity because we don't have it today? WORK: Senator, I don't believe that we will ever have a definitive, one size fits all definition for these types of things. Every single attack will be have to handled on a case by case basis and you will have to judge the damaged that was caused, who made attack, was it just a non-state actor, or just a malicious hacker. We'd have to go after that person in terms of criminal activity. So I don't believe we're going to ever a have a specific definite that says, "if this happens, we will trigger this response." Each one, will be handled in a case by case basis and be proportioned. (UNKNOWN) Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chair (ph), I think of lack of clarity though, the only concern that I have is that you're not establishing some level of known deterrent. I understand that complexities of it, I've worked in the field but I think that without that clarity, you're more likely to have more things that you're going to have to look and figure out to do in situations or response. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, today, on a really important topic. I believe, and I was looking for transcript but at the joint press conference between President Xi and President Obama; the president of China, I think publicly stated that, "They don't engage in these kind of cyber activities." Was that an accurate statement, if that was indeed what he said, in terms of cyber-warfare? It's pretty remarkable if you're in a press conference with another head of state and you just say something that seems to be pretty blatantly false. CLAPPER: Well, it is and I think apart from the statements, at least for our part, it'll be, what happens now? Will there be a change in their behavior? And I said earlier, well, hope spring eternal. But I personally am somewhat of a skeptic. But it will be our responsibility to look for the presence or absence of their proving (ph) of intellectual property and other information. (UNKNOWN) And were any of you gentleman, or all of you gentlemen, consulted on the terms of the agreement? CLAPPER: We were aware of the negotiations but at least from -- normally, intelligence wouldn't be a voice or shaper of policy for electives between two heads of state. I think our responsibility is to report what they do. WORK: We participated in the build-up of the visit in terms of policy development, et cetera. But in terms of what went on between the two leaders of the nations, we were not directly consulted. (UNKNOWN) Admiral? ROGERS: And I was aware of the ongoing process and like Secretary Work, same thing, part of the broad effort in preparation for the visit. (UNKNOWN) But you weren't, you didn't see the terms of this agreement before the -- did you Mr. Secretary? Let's assume, you know, kind of, past is prologue here, and you know, we're talking intellectual property. As you know, our country's been trying to get the Chinese from -- to stop stealing U.S. intellectual property for decades really, and it hasn't really worked out very well. If -- let's assume that the -- that this agreement, that there is some additional cyber theft that we can attribute to China, what would you recommend the actions of the United States should be, particularly in light of this agreement? WORK (?): I wouldn't be able to answer that as -- I would have to know what the degree of the activity would be. (UNKNOWN) Let's say another OPM kind of activity? WORK (?): I think that we -- the Department of Defense would recommend a very vigorous response. (UNKNOWN) And, Mr. Secretary, what would -- what would you -- I mean, just give me a sense of what that would be. Sanctions, retaliation? WORK: Could be any of those, Senator, maybe all of the above. It will depend upon the severity of the -- of the activity. But, again, I know this is -- I know this is a big point of contention with the committee. It is -- we are serious about cost imposition and our statement is if you participate in that -- this activity, we will seek some type of measure which imposes costs upon you. And we just do not think it's a proportional cyber-attack for a cyber-attack. It might be something entirely different like a criminal indictment or sanctions or some other thing. (UNKNOWN) Let me ask kind of a related question for all three of you. How -- and I know you've been discussing this so I'm sorry if I'm kind of going over areas that we've already discussed, but help us think through the issue of rules of engagement here. I mean, we have rules of engagement in so many other spheres of the military that are well established. How do we think through these issues which I think in some ways are the fundamental aspects of what we do in response to cyber-attacks? Admiral, do you want to take a stab at that? ROGERS: So if you look at the defensive side, I'm pretty comfortable that we've got a good, broad recognition of what is permissible within a rules of engagement framework. (UNKNOWN) Do we? I mean, between us and other nations? ROGERS: I -- I -- I wouldn't -- if you define it between us and other nations, I wouldn't know. I apologize. I don't know if (inaudible)_ question was in a -- was in a DOD kind of responsive framework. If you want to expand it to a broader set of nations, then it's probably fair to say no. CLAPPER: I would agree. I think when it comes to offensive -- if -- if you're thinking about offensive cyber warfare, we probably do not have rules -- defined rules of engagement. WORK: Agree with what Director Clapper said earlier, Senator, that this really is the Wild West right now. There's a lot of activity going on, both from nation state actors all the way down to criminals. And so sorting through each of the different attacks and trying to attribute what happened and who it came from and who was responsible for it, all -- all demand specific responses on these attacks. But I agree totally with the committee that we need to strengthen our deterrence posture, and the best way to do that is continue to work through these things and make sure that everyone knows that there will be some type of cost. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: The committee would also like to know when there's going to be a policy that would fit in to these attacks and would then be much more easily responded to if we had a policy as mandated by the 2014 defense authorization bill. I thank the witnesses for a very helpful hearing. I know that they're very busy and we -- the committee appreciates your appearance here today. Thank you. CQ Transcriptions, Sept. 29, 2015List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: SEN. JOHN MCCAIN, R-ARIZ. CHAIRMAN SEN. JAMES M. INHOFE, R-OKLA. SEN. JEFF SESSIONS, R-ALA. SEN. ROGER WICKER, R-MISS. SEN. KELLY AYOTTE, R-N.H. SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM, R-S.C. SEN. DEB FISCHER, R-NEB. SEN. TED CRUZ, R-TEXAS SEN. MIKE LEE, R-UTAH SEN. TOM COTTON, R-ARK. SEN. MIKE ROUNDS, R-S.D. SEN. JONI ERNST, R-IOWA SEN. THOM TILLIS, R-N.C. SEN. DAN SULLIVAN, R-ALASKA SEN. JACK REED, D-R.I. RANKING MEMBER SEN. BILL NELSON, D-FLA. SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, D-MO. SEN. JOE MANCHIN III, D-W.VA. SEN. JEANNE SHAHEEN, D-N.H. SEN. KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, D-N.Y. SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, D-CONN. SEN. JOE DONNELLY, D-IND. SEN. MAZIE K. HIRONO, D-HAWAII SEN. TIM KAINE, D-VA. SEN. MARTIN HEINRICH, D-N.M. SEN. ANGUS KING, I-MAINE WITNESSES: JAMES R. CLAPPER JR., DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BOB WORK ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS (USN), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AND COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING ON CYBER SECURITY Agenda To receive testimony on United States Cybersecurity policy and threats. Witnesses Honorable James Clapper Director Of National Intelligence Honorable Robert Work Deputy Secretary Of Defense Admiral Michael Rogers, USN Commander, U.S. Cyber Command/ Director, National Security Agency/ Chief, Central Security Services MCCAIN: The committee meets today to receive testimony from Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Director of the National Intelligence James Clapper, and Admiral Mike Rogers, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command, director of the National Security Agency and chief of the Central Security Service. We thank each of the witnesses for their service, and for appearing before the committee. We meet at a critical time for the defense of our nation from cyber attacks. In just the past year, as we all know, the United States has been attacked by cyberspace -- in cyberspace by Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. Indeed, since our last cyber hearing in March, the attacks have only increased, crippling or severely disrupting networks across the government and private sector, and compromising sensitive national security information. Recent attacks against the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Pentagon, and the Office of Personnel Management are just the latest examples of the growing boldness of our adversaries and their desire to push the limits of acceptable behavior in cyberspace. New intrusions, breaches and hacks are occurring daily; the trends are getting worse; but it seems the administration has still not mounted an adequate response. They say they will, quote, "Respond at the time and manner of our choosing," unquote. But then either take no action or pursue, largely, symbolic responses that have zero impact on our adversaries' behavior. Not surprisingly, the attacks continue. Our adversaries steal, delete, and manipulate our data at will, gaining a competitive economic edge in improving their military capability. They demonstrate their own means to attack our critical infrastructure, and they do all of this in a time and manner of their choosing. More and more, they are even leaving behind what Admiral Rogers recently referred to as, quote, "cyber fingerprints." Showing that they feel confident that they can attack us with impunity and without significant consequences. Just consider the recent case with China. After much hand- wringing, it appears the president will not impose sanctions in response to China's efforts to steal intellectual property, pillage the designs of our critical weapons systems, and wage economic espionage against U.S. companies. Instead, last week's state visit for the president of China simply amounted to more vague commitments not to conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. What's worse, the White House has chosen to reward China with diplomatic discussions about establishing norms of behavior that are favorable to both China and Russia. Any internationally agreed upon rules of the road in cyberspace must explicitly recognize the right of self defense. That's contained in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, along with meaningful human rights of intellectual property rights protections. The administration should not concede this point to autocratic regimes that seek to distort core principles of the international order, to our detriment. Make no mistake -- we are not wining the fight in cyberspace. Our adversaries view our response to malicious cyber activity as timid and ineffectual. Put simply, the problem is a lack of deterrence. As Admiral Rogers has previously testified, the administration has not demonstrated to our adversaries that the consequences of continued cyber attacks against us outweigh the benefit. Until this happens, the attacks will continue and our national security interests will suffer. Establishing cyber deterrence requires a strategy to defend, deter, and aggressively respond to the challenges to our national security in cyberspace. That is exactly what the Congress required in the fiscal year of 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. That strategy is now over a year late and counting. MCCAIN: And while the Department of Defense's 2015 cyber strategy is a big improvement over previous such efforts, it still does not integrate the ends, ways and means to deter attacks in cyberspace. Establishing a cyber deterrent also requires robust capabilities, both offensive and defensive, that can pose a credible threat to our adversaries. A goal, on which the Congress, and specifically this committee, remains actively engaged. The good news here is that significant progress has been made over the past few years in developing our cyber force. That force will include a mix of professionals trained to defend the nation against cyber-attacks to support the geographic combatant commands in meeting their objectives and to defend DOD networks. This is good, but the vast majority of our DOD resources have gone towards shoring up our cyber-defenses. Far more needs to be done to develop the necessary capabilities to deter attacks, fight, and win in cyberspace. Policy indecision, should not become a impediment to capability development. We do not develop weapons because we want to use them, we develop them, so as we do not have too. And yet, in the cyber-domain, as Admiral Rogers testified in March, quote, "we're at a tipping point." He said, quote, "we've got to broaden our capabilities to provide policy makers and operational commanders with a broader range of options." We must invest more in the offensive capabilities that our cyber- mission teams need to win on the cyber-battlefield. The fiscal year 2016, NDAA seeks to address this challenge in a number ways, including a pilot program to provide the commander of Cyber Command with limited rapid acquisition authority. Finally, we know the Defense Department is in the process of assessing whether the existing combatant command structure, adequately addresses the mission of cyber-warfare, and whether to elevate Cyber Command to a unified command. There are worthwhile arguments on both sides of this debate. I look forward to hearing Admiral Rogers views on this question and his assessment of how an elevation of Cyber Command, might enhance our overall cyber-defense posture. I also look forward from our witness what -- if any progress has been made on addressing disagreements within the inter-agency on the delegation and exercise of authority to use cyber-capabilities. I thank the witness again for appear before the committee. I look forward to their testimony. Senator Reed? REED: I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me command for scheduling this very important hearing. It's an appropriate to discuss a number of important cyber-issues with our witnesses, especially in light of the cyber agreements announced last Friday, between President Obama and the president of China. I want to thank, Director Clapper, Deputy Secretary Work and Cyber Commandeer Admiral Rogers for their testimony today and for their service to the nation. Thank you gentleman, very much. Let me start with the series of cyber agreements with China. The apparent commitment (ph) by China to cease stealing U.S. intellectual property for their economical gain is notable. And, I expect we will have a robust discussion about China's compliance in our course of action, if it does not. China's leaders must be aware that it's reputation in standing in the eyes of the America people will continue to decline if this piracy does not stop. Which ultimately, will have a tremendously negative impact on our relations with China. I would also emphasize the potential importance of China embracing a set of international norms besides themselves (ph) based, developed by the United Nations; which includes a commitment to refrain from attacks on other nation's critical infrastructure. Next, I would highlight that we are facing the reoccurring issue of whether or when to elevate Cyber Command from a sub-unified command to a full unified command. And whether, to sustain the current dual hat arrangement under which the commander of Cyber Command also serves as Director of NSA. I understand that the department may be nearing a recommendation to the president that the next unified command plan elevates Cyber Command to a unified command. The committee in the past, has questioned whether Cyber Command is mature enough to want it (ph) or in elevation to a unified command; and whether the dual hat arrangement should continue when a decision is made to elevate the command. Put simply, if Cyber Command is so reliant on NSA, that common leadership is so necessary, is the command ready to stand on it's own as a unified combatant command? This is an issue that Senator McCain has drawn attention to, and something that I think is very critical that I would forward (ph) to this committee. Directly related to that question, is the maturity of Cyber Command as a status to the military cyber-mission unit that the department only began fielding as little as two years. Commendably, the department is leading it's schedule by standing up these units with trained personnel, but by it's own admission, the equipment, tools, and capabilities of these forces will remain limited. Indeed, the committee's proposed F.Y. '16 National Council Authorization Act, includes a mandate that the Secretary of Defense, designates executive agents from among the services to build a so- called, unified platform for assisting, training environment and command, and control systems that are necessary for these forces to operate effectively. It will take a number of years to build these capabilities. We are behind in developing these military capabilities for our cyber forces because our Defense Department was persuaded that the systems and capabilities, that NSA already has, will be adequate and appropriate to use by Cyber Command. This is an important example in assumed critical dependency on NSA and an assumed commonality between intelligence operations and military operations in cyberspace; and in some cases, turned out to be inaccurate. For a number of years, this committee has been urging the executive branch to work diligently to identify all practical methods that deter malicious actions of cyberspace and articulate a strategy for implementing them. Some believe, that relation of a kind, in cyberspace is a necessary and effective component of such a strategy. I look forward to hearing the views of our witnesses on this matter. As my colleagues and our witnesses are well are, the Senate went into recess for the August break having recent agreement for bringing the Cyber Information Sharing bill to the floor debate. I know the Chairman is in full agreement on the needs to debate, amend, and pass that legislation this year, and the interest to national security and so among it. We must also recognize that the Defense Department and intelligence community are not operating alone to protect America's cyber-infrastructure. Most notably, we (ph) rely on the Department of Homeland Security for protection of America's critical infrastructure. The use of overseas contingency operations fund to avoid the Budget Control Act (inaudible) does nothing to help the DHS or another non-defense partners avoid of effects of sequestration. This is yet, another argument for why we need a comprehensive solution to the problem of sequestration. Finally, I think it is important that we hear from our witness on the subject of encryption. (inaudible) U.S. technology companies fearful of losing business at home and abroad are encrypting communications and offer encryption services, for which even the companies themselves have no technical capabilities to unlock. FBI Director Comey has given multiple speeches warning the law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies that they will be going dark, with serious consequences to public safety and national security. These and other questions, gentleman, are vitally important, and I look forward to your testimony. MCCAIN: I thank the witnesses. Director Clapper, I've to impress on members of this committee to show difference to old age and so we'd like to begin with you. CLAPPER: Senator McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee. When I testified on the intelligence community's World Wide Threat Assessment, at the end of February, cyber threats again, led our annual threat report for the third year in a row. We're here today, to respond to the several requests in your invitation letter, and I will focus on an overview of cyber-threats briefly that face our nations and their intended national security implications. CLAPPER: And then Secretary Work, Admiral Rogers will follow as well. We will, as you understand, perhaps run into some classified aspects that we won't be able to discuss as fully in this open televised hearing. I do want to take note of and thank the members of the committee who are engaged on this issue and have spoken to it publicly as the two of you just have. So by way of overview, cyber threats to the U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity of impact. Although we must be prepared for large Armageddon-scaled strike that would debilitate the entire U.S. infrastructure, that is not, we believe, the most likely scenario. Our primary concern now is low to moderate-level cyber-attacks from a variety of sources which will continue and probably expand. This imposes increasing costs to our business, to U.S. economic competiveness and -- and to national security. Because of our heavy dependence on the Internet, nearly all information communication technologies and I.T. networks and systems will be perpetually at risk. These weaknesses provide an array of possibilities for nefarious activity by cyber threat actors including remote hacking instructions, supply chain operations to insert compromised hardware or software, malicious actions by insiders and simple human mistakes by system users. These cyber threats come from a range of actors including nation states which fall into two broad categories, those with highly sophisticated cyber programs, most notably Russia and China, our -- our peer competitors. And those with lesser technical capabilities but more nefarious intent, such as Iran and North Korea who are also more -- but who are also much more aggressive and unpredictable. Then there are non-nation state entities, criminals motivated by profit, hackers or extremists motivated by ideology. Profit-motivated cyber criminals rely on loosely networked online marketplaces often referred to as the cyber underground or dark web that provide a forum for the merchandising of illicit tools, services and infrastructure, and stolen personal information and financial data. The most significant financial cybercriminal threats to U.S. entities and our international partners come from a relatively small subset of actors, facilitators and criminal forums. And terrorist groups will continue to experiment with hacking which could serve as the foundation for developing more advanced capabilities. Cyber espionage, criminal and terrorist entities, all undermine data confidentiality. Denial of service operations and data deletion attacks undermine availability. And in the future I believe we'll -- we'll see more cyber operations that will change or manipulate electronic information to compromise its integrity. In other words, compromised attackers (inaudible) liability instead of deleting it or disrupting access to it. As illustrated so dramatically in the OPM breaches, counter- intelligence risks are inherent when foreign intelligence agencies obtain access to an individual's identity information, of course a problem that the Department of Defense has encountered. Foreign intelligence agencies or non-state entities could target the individual, family members, co-workers and neighbors using a variety of physical and electronic methods for extortion or recruiting purposes. Speaking of the OPM breaches, let me say a couple words about attribution. It is not a simple process, involves at least three related but distinct determinations, the geographic point of origin, the identity of the actual perpetrator doing the keystrokes, and the responsibility for directing the act. In case of OPM, we had differing degrees of confidence in our assessment of -- of the actual responsibility for each of these three elements. Such malicious cyber activity will continue and probably accelerate until we establish and demonstrate the capability to deter malicious state-sponsored cyber activity, and establishing a credible deterrent depends on reaching agreement on norms of cyber behavior by the international community. So, in summary, the cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security have become increasingly diverse, sophisticated and harmful. There are a variety of federal entities that work this cyber problem, and DHS, FBI, NSA and other law enforcement intelligence and sector- specific agencies like Treasury and Energy. And every day each these centers and entities get better at what they do individually. But I believe now we've reached the point where we -- we think it's time to knit together all the intelligence these separate activities need to defend our networks because, while these entities may be defending different networks, they are often defending against the same threats. So that's one reason the President directed me to form a small center to integrate cyber threat intelligence. And I strongly believe the time's come for the creation of such a center to parallel the centers that we operate for counter terrorism, counter proliferation and counter intelligence and security. With that, let me turn to Deputy Secretary Work. WORK: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting us here this morning to talk about the threats of cyber -- of cyber. This committee has led the way in discussing the threats and the response to these threats and the Department looks forward to working with the committee to get better in this regard. As DNI Clapper has said, cyber intrusions and attacks by both state and non-state actors have increased dramatically in recent years, and particularly troubling are the increased frequency and scale of state-sponsored cyber actors breaching U.S. government and business networks. These adversaries continually adapt and evolve in response to our cyber countermeasures, threatening our networks and systems of the Department of Defense, our nation's critical infrastructure and U.S. companies and interests globally. The recent spate of cyber events conclude the intrusions into OPM, the attacks on Sony, and the Joint Staff networks by three separate state actors is not just espionage of convenience, but a threat to our national security. As one of our responses to this growing threat, we released in 2015 the DOD cyber strategy which will guide the development of our cyber forces and strengthen our cyber-security and cyber deterrence posture; that is its aim. The Department is pushing hard to achieve the Department's three core missions as defined in the strategy. The first and absolutely most important mission is to defend DOD network systems and information. Secretary Carter has made this the number one priority in the Department and we are really getting after it now. Second, to defend the nation against cyber events of significant consequence, and third, to provide cyber support to operational and contingency plans. And in this regard, the U.S. Cyber Command may be directed to conduct cyber operations in coordination with other government agencies as appropriate to deter or defeat strategic threats in other domains. Now, my submitted statement, Mr. Chairman, contains additional detail on how we're moving out to achieve these three strategic goals but I'd like to highlight a particular focus on deterrence, especially since I know this is key in the minds of most of the members here. I want to acknowledge upfront that the Secretary and I recognize that we are not where we need to be in our deterrent posture. We do believe that there are some things the Department is doing that are working, but we need to improve in this area without question. And that's why we've revised our cyber strategy. WORK: Deterrence is a function of perception. It works by convincing any potential adversary that the costs of conducting the attack far outweigh the potential benefits, and therefore our three main pillars of our cyber deterrence strategy in terms of deterrence are denial, resilience, and cost imposition. Denial means preventing a cyber adversary from achieving the -- his objectives. Resilience is ensuring that our systems will continue to perform their essential military tasks even when they are contested in a cyber environment. And cost imposition is our ability to make our adversaries pay a much higher price for their malicious activities than they hoped for. I'd like to briefly discuss these three elements. To deny the attacker the ability to adversely impact our military missions we have to better defend our own information networks and data. And we think the investments we have made in these capabilities are starting to bear fruit, but we recognize that technical upgrades are only part of the solution. Nearly every single one of the successful network exploitations that we have had to deal with can be traced to one or more human errors which allowed entry into our network. So raising the level of individual cybersecurity awareness in performance is absolutely paramount. Accordingly, we're working to transform our cybersecurity culture, something that we ignored for a long time, by the long term by improving human performance and accountability in this regard. As part of this effort, we have just recently published the cybersecurity discipline implementation plan and scorecard. It is brought before the secretary and me every month and they're critical to achieving this goal of securing our data and our networks and mitigating risks to DOD missions. This scorecard holds commanders accountable for hardening and protecting their end-points and critical systems, and also help them hold accountable their personnel. And directs, as I said, the compliance reporting to the secretary and me on a monthly a basis. The first scorecard was published in August of this year and it is being added to and improved as we go. Denial also means defending the nation against cyber threats of significant consequence. The president has directed DOD, working in partnership with our other agencies, to be prepared to blunt and stop the most dangerous cyber events. There may be times where the president and the secretary of defense directed the DOD and others to conduct a defensive cyber operation to stop a cyber attack from impacting our national interests. And that means building and maintaining the capabilities to do that -- just that. This is a challenging mission requiring high-end capabilities and extremely high-trained teams. We're building our cyber mission force and deepening our partnership with the law enforcement and the intelligence community to do that. The second principle is improving resiliency by reducing the ability of our adversaries to attack us through cyberspace, and protecting our ability to execute missions in a degraded cyber environment. Our adversaries view DOD cyber-dependency as a potential wartime vulnerability. Therefore, we view our ability to fight through cyber attacks as a critical mission function. That means normalizing cybersecurity as part of our mission assurance efforts, building redundancy whenever our systems are vulnerable, and training constantly to operate in a contested cyber environment. Our adversaries have to see that these cyber attacks will not provide them with significant operational advantage. And the third aspect of deterrence is having to demonstrate the capability to respond through cyber and non-cyber means to impose costs on a potential adversary. The administration has made clear that we will respond to cyber attacks in the time, manner and place of our choosing, and the department has developed cyber options to hold an aggressor at risk in cyberspace if required. Successfully executing our missions requires a whole-of- government and whole-of-nation approach. And for that reason, DOD continues to work with our partners in the other federal departments and agencies and the private sector, and our partners around the world to address the shared challenges we face. Secretary Carter has placed particular emphasis on partnering with the private sector. The department doesn't have all of the answers and is working with industry we think will be very, very critical. Finally, our relationship with Congress is absolutely critical. The secretary and I very much appreciate the support provided to DOD cyber activities throughout, from the very beginning. And we understand and we are looking forward to the National Defense Authorization Act to see if there are other improvements that we have -- we can do. I encourage continued efforts to pass legislation on cybersecurity information sharing. We think that is absolutely critical to data-breach motivation and law enforcement provisions related to cybersecurity, which were included in the president's legislative proposal submitted earlier this year. I know you agree that the American people expects us to defend the country against cyber threats of significant consequence. The secretary and I look forward to working with this committee and Congress to ensure we take every step possible to confront the substantial risks we face in the cyber realm. Thank you again for inviting us here today and giving the attention that you have always given to this urgent matter. I'd like to pass it on now to Admiral Rogers, if that's OK, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) ROGERS: Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you today to discuss U.S. cyber policy and the state of cyber threats worldwide. I'd like to thank you for convening this forum and for your efforts in this important area. I'm also honored to be sitting alongside Director Clapper and Deputy Secretary of Defense Work. It gives me great pride to appear before you today to highlight and commend the accomplishments of the uniformed and civilian personnel of U.S. Cyber Command. I'm both grateful for and humbled by the opportunity I've been given to lead our cyber team in the important work they do in the defense of our nation and our department. We are being challenged as never before to defend our nation's interests and values in cyberspace against state, group, and individuals that are using sophisticated capabilities to conduct cyber coercion, cyber aggression and cyber exploitation. The targets of their efforts extend well beyond government and into privately owned businesses and personally identifiable information. Our military is in constant contact with agile, learning adversaries in cyberspace -- adversaries that have shown the capacity and the willingness to take action against soft targets in the United States. There are countries that are integrating cyber operations into a total strategic concept for advancing their regional ambitions, who use cyber operations both to influence the perceptions and actions of states around them, and to shape what we see as our options in supporting allies and friends in a crisis. We need to deter these activities by showing that they are unacceptable, unprofitable and risky for the instigators. U.S. Cyber Command is building capabilities that can contribute to cross-domain deterrence, and thus make our commitments even more credible. We are hardening our networks and showing an opponent cyber aggression won't be easy. We are creating the mission force, trained and ready like any other maneuver element, that is defending DOD networks, supporting joint force commanders, and helping to defend critical infrastructure within our nation. We are partnering with federal, foreign and industry partners, and exercising together regularly to rehearse concepts and responses to destructive cyber attacks against critical infrastructures. We are generating options for commanders and policymakers across all phases of the conflict, and particularly in phase zero (ph) to hold at risk what our adversaries truly value. ROGERS: The demand for our cyber force far outstrips supply, but we continue to rapidly mature based on real-world experiences and the hard work of the men and women of the U.S. Cyber Command and our service cyber components as well as our broader partners. I'd like to assure the committee that U.S. Cyber Command has made measurable progress. We're achieving significant operational outcomes and we have a clear path ahead. With that, thank you again, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for convening this forum and inviting all of us to speak. Our progress has been made possible in no small part because of the support from this committee and other stakeholders. Unity of the effort within our department and across the U.S. government in this mission set is essential. And I appreciate our continued partnership as we build our nation's cyber defenses. And I welcome your questions. MCCAIN: Well, thank you admiral and thank the witnesses. Director Clapper recently, former Chairman of the Joint Chief, Dempsey was asked about various threats to the United States security and he said that in a whole range of threats we have a significant advantage except in cyber. Do you agree with that assessment? CLAPPER: It's probably true. We haven't I guess, exhibited what our potential capability there is. I think that's one of the reasons -- implicit reasons why I highlighted cyber threats in the last three years of my world wide threat assessments. MCCAIN: I thank you and you have done that and I think at least to great effect before this committee. As a result of the Chinese leader in Washington there was some agreement announced between the United States and China. Do you believe that that will result in an elimination of Chinese cyber attacks? CLAPPER: Well, hope springs eternal. I think we will have to watch what they're behavior is and it will be incumbent on the intelligence community I think to depict, portray (ph) to policymakers what behavioral changes if any, result from this agreement. MCCAIN: Are you optimistic? CLAPPER: No. MCCAIN: Thank you. Admiral Rogers, you recently stated quote, "There's is a perception, there is..." quote "...little price to pay for engaging in some pretty aggressive behaviors and because of the lack of repercussions you see actors, nation states indeed willing to do more." And that was what he stated. What is required? What action is required to deter these attacks since there is little price to pay? What do we have to do to make it a heavy price to pay? ROGERS: So I think we have to clearly articulate in broad terms what is acceptable and is unacceptable: the norms if you will, of behavior. I think we have to clearly articulate that as a nation, we are developing a set of capabilities. We are prepared to use those capabilities if required. They're not necessarily our preferences. We clearly want to engage in a dialogue with those around us. But on the other hand we do have to acknowledge the current situation we find ourselves in. I don't there's anyone who would agree that it is acceptable and that it is in our best long-term interest as a nation. MCCAIN: Well, I say with respect I understand it's not acceptable but in other words, what would an act of price would it be? Relations in other areas? Would it be counterattacks? In other words, what actions would be in our range of arsenals to respond? ROGERS: So I think it's potentially all of those things. The first comment I would make, I think Sony is a very instructive example. One of the things I always remind people of. We need to think about deterrents much more broadly, not just focus within the cyber arena. I thought the response to Sony where we for example, talked about the economic options as a nation we would exercise was a good way to remind the world around us that there are a broad set of capabilities and levers that are available to us as a nation and that we're prepared to do more than just respond in kind if you will. MCCAIN: Director Clapper, one of the things that has been disappointing to the committee is that in the fiscal year the Defense Authorization bill as you know it required the president to develop an integrated policy. The strategy is now a year late. Can you tell us where we are in that process and what you feel is what might bring the administration in compliance? CLAPPER: You're asking me about policy development? MCCAIN: Yes. CLAPPER: I think I would defer to Secretary Work on that. WORK: Well, Mr. Chairman, as we have said over and over, we believe our cyber deterrent strategy is evolving and getting stronger. MCCAIN: I'm talking about a policy, not a strategy Mr. Secretary. It required a policy that fiscal year '14 National Defense Authorization Act. WORK: The policy is still in development. We believe we have a good cyber strategy. The policy has been outlined in broad strokes by the ... Not broad enough I would think. It is -- describe what are -- whether we deter or whether we respond, or whether we -- in other words, as far as know and the committee knows, that there has been no specific policy articulated in compliance of the requirement of the Defense of Authorization Act. If you believe that it has, I would be very interested in hearing how it has. WORK: I believe the broad strokes are will respond to... MCCAIN: I'm not asking about broad strokes. Suppose there is an attack, a cyber attack like the one on OPM. Do we have a policy as to what we do? WORK: Yes we do. MCCAIN: And what is that? WORK: The first is to try. First we deny and then we first find out. We do the forensics... MCCAIN: I'm not asking about the methodology. I'm asking the policy. Do you respond by counter attacking? Do you respond by trying to enact other measures? What do we do in case of a cyber attack? WORK: We respond in the time, manner and the place MCCAIN: Does that mean that we counter attack? WORK: That may be one of the options. MCCAIN: That's not a policy Secretary Work. That is an exercise in options. We have not got a policy and for you to sit there and tell me that you do a broad stroke strategy is frankly not in compliance with the law. Senator Reed? REED: Well, thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, we are constantly engaged euphemistically, information operations with many other nations and they're involved with mission (ph) operations trying to, as you indicated in your testimony, influence the opinion, disguise activities, disrupt, et cetera. What agencies under your purview or outside your purview are actively engaged in information operations in the United States in the cyber world? CLAPPER: Actually sir, from an intelligence perspective we would feed that in that we don't at least, in what I can speak to publicly engage in that as a part of our normal intelligence activities. So we feed other arms, support other arms of the government, notably the State Department. And those responsible for messaging of the National Counter Terrorism Center has an office that is devoted to countering violent extremism context, helping to develop themes or recommending themes based on what we glean from intelligences for potential vulnerabilities and messages that would appear to various group that would obfuscate the message, disrupt it or compete with it. But generally speaking, intelligence writ large doesn't actively engage in information operations. REED: From your perspective, are these other agencies that you provide the information to adequately resourced and staffed so they can use it effectively or are they getting a lot of good insights and sitting around wondering what they can do after... CLAPPER: If I were king which I am not, I think I'd have a much more robust capability from the standpoint of resource commitment to counter messaging. REED: And that would fall, well outside of the purview of intelligence or the State Department as other agencies? CLAPPER: Correct. REED: Again, I think we're old enough to remember the voice of America when it was, you know, a pretty dominant sort of source of information. CLAPPER: Well, personal opinion only not company policy I would -- I think perhaps, you know, a U.S.I.A. on steroids that would address these messages more broadly and more robustly but that's strictly personal opinion. REED: But I think in terms of what you're observing, particularly some of our competitors have a extraordinarily robust information operation. They don't lack for resources or personnel and they're constantly engaged in these types of information operations: enhancing their image, discrediting their opponents, actively engaging local groups in other countries of interest et cetera. And we're sort of on the sidelines. CLAPPER: I think that's quite right and our -- in contrast to us, Russian intelligence services are very active and very aggressively engaged in messaging. REED: Thank you. Admiral Rogers, so this issue of encryption that Director Coleman pointed to. I think your thoughts would be very helpful. ROGERS: So the issue that we find ourselves -- this is less for me and the U.S. cyber (inaudible) side and much more on the NSA side is communications in the world around us increasingly going to end to end encryption, where every aspect of the path is encrypted and the data and the communication is protected at a level under -- with the current state of technology is difficult to overcome. Clearly that is in the best interest of the nation in broad terms and strong encryption is important to a strong Internet defense and a well defended Internet is in our best interest and in the nation's and the world's best interest. Within that broad framework though, the challenge we're trying to figure out is, realizing that that communication path is used by very law-abiding citizens, nation states and companies engaged in lawful activity, is also being used by criminals, terrorists, nation states who would attempt to generate advantage against the United States and against our allies and partners. And so we're trying to figure out how do we balance these two important imperatives of privacy and security and realizing that the technical world around us is changing in a foundational way. And so we're trying to come to grips broadly with how do we deal with the reality of technical world around us and yet the broader legal and social imperatives that we have. I'm the first to acknowledge we do not have a defined way ahead here. In the end I think this is about how do we get the best minds together as a nation to address this. Cause when I look at our capabilities as a nation, there is no problem that we can't overcome when we work together in an integrative way to in the private sector, industry, business, the academic world. I think that is that's the way ahead here in broad terms. REED: Thank you very much. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) SESSIONS (?): Senator Inhofe is chairing the EPW Committee; that's why he couldn't be here today. You've given us a good summary on the threats that we faced and the threats that are actually occurring today, and I appreciate that. Senator McCain, asked you about established reporting on the policy that Congress has asked you to report, and that not having been done. Mr. Secretary Work, in the 2014 NDAA, the Senate and House agreed on a provision that required the services to report on the cyber- vulnerabilities weapons and communications systems connected by networks. That was something that came out of our Strategic Subcommittee on a bipartisan basis and was eventually expanded to include all weapon systems, not just satellite, and missiles, and national missile defense. We don't have that final report, I believe it's overdue. This budget, I believe, has two hundred million in it, to help fund this effort. What can you tell us about that? First, let me say, it may take some time. If it does, I understand, but I don't think we've had any report from the DOD to state that; what progress you've made, and how much longer it will take. WORK: Well again, on both of the points, on the policy, we expect that is in the final deliberations. It's an interagency effort. You know, generally, trying to establish norms and deterrence is central to the policy. Again, it's the denial, resilience, and cost imposition. I'm the first to admit, that we are the farthest ahead on the denial and the resilience part, those are the areas where we are moving faster. The cost imposition part, because we have elected to retain the retaliatory mechanism of cyber-attacks at the national level. Just like nuclear weapons, because of the risk of escalation. SESSIONS (?): What about the... WORK: As far as the -- I'm sorry, sir. SESSIONS (?): The other... WORK: Yes, sir. SESSIONS (?): The vulnerabilities of our weapon systems? WORK: It is a big -- big problem. Many of the weapons systems that we have now, were not built to withstand a concerted cyber- threat. So going through every single one of the weapon systems, what Frank Kendall done, is he's prioritized the weapon systems and he is working through very carefully. And, I expect this work to be done very soon. We now have new requirements in our KPPs, our Key Performance Parameters... SESSIONS (?): So you have assigned an individual? WORK: Absolutely. SESSIONS (?): ... to be responsible for this? WORK: Yes, Frank Kendall, is the one who is going through all of the different -- working with, obviously, our CIO, also the Cyber Command, and all our cyber experts. But he's responsible for taking a look at the weapon systems and also requiring KPPs, Key Performance Parameters, for new weapon systems. So that when we build they will have cyber defenses built in from the beginning. SESSIONS (?): What about our defense contractors, Admiral Rogers? They maintain and build these systems and have highly sensitive information, are we satisfied they're sufficiently protected? ROGERS: So we've acknowledged there's a vulnerability there. We've been very public about our concerns about foreign nation-states trying to access some of our key operational technology through penetration in the cleared defenses contractor arena for us. We've made changes to the contractual relationships between us and those companies where they have to meet minimum cyber-security requirements. They have to inform us now of penetrations. We're clearly not where we need to be but we continue to make progress. SESSIONS (?): Well, I think it's a bipartisan commitment on Congress to help you with that. Secretary Work, if it takes more money, let us know. We'll have to evaluate it. And, I also understand that some of protections can be done without much cost; some may require considerable cost. So we hope that you will complete that. Admiral Rogers, you -- I believe last week, reported in the Los Angeles Times about the threat from China. You note one thing, that they are involved in obtaining U.S. commercial and trade data. Foreign nation, advanced nation, ally of ours; I was told that one of their companies bid on a contract and that the Chinese had gathered all the bid data from the web. And his comment was, "It's hard to win a bid when your competitor knows what you're bidding." Is that kind thing happening? ROGERS: It has been, we've been very public of it. I think that's reflected in the agreement that you saw raised during the President of China's visit last week. We were very explicit about that concern. SESSIONS (?): Well, my time is up but I would just ask; you're not allowed -- if you saw an American business being damaged through improper actions, you're not allowed to advise them or share any information with, while our adversary do assist their business? Is that basically correct? ROGERS: The way this works right now, is I would provide information and insight, both in my intelligence hat as the Director of NSA as well as the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. If under that authority, I became aware of activity, I would share the insights with DHS and the FBI, who have a mission associated with interfacing with the private sector in a much more direct way than I do. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all three of you for your service and for being here today. Admiral Rogers, let's start with you. Which country is the most committed, and determined, and successful hacker of the U.S.? ROGERS: Could you say that one more time? (UNKNOWN) Which country, do you believe, is the most committed, successful hacker of the U.S.? ROGERS: If you look at volume and nation-state wise -- nation- state wise, I would -- China, the PRC, has been the one that we've been the most vocal about. They're not the only one by any the stretch of the imagination. (UNKNOWN) I thought the last time you were here, I recall you saying that you had more concerns over Russia, having more of the ability or expertise to do us damage. ROGERS: I thought your question was really focused more on volume. If the perspective is capability if you will, then we've been very public about saying -- I would probably put the Russians. (UNKNOWN) Russians? ROGERS: In a higher capability. (UNKNOWN) But it seems like that China is more committed and determined to do it. ROGERS: They certainly do it at a volume level. (UNKNOWN) Gotcha, I understand. And, Director Clapper, if I may? I know that you just said, no -- emphatically no, you don't believe that this agreement that the president of China and our president has made last week will work. With that saying, what are the penalties? Is there any penalties in this agreements if one or other violates it or is it just basically what we've agreed and let it go at that? CLAPPER: The terms that I've seen, I don't think it treats specifically a penalty. There certainly are implied penalties. I think the threat of economic sanctions which brought Minister Meng (ph) to this country, I think it's (inaudible), what would mean something to the Chinese if they transgress or violate this agreement? I think as Admiral Rogers was discussing earlier, with respect to sanctions, there certainly are a whole of government possibilities that don't have to do -- necessarily a cyber eye for an eye, it can be some other form of retribution -- of retaliation. But I don't think to answer your question, at least what I'm aware of that there are specific penalties if the agreement is violated. (UNKNOWN) That's why I think you were pretty quick in saying you don't think it will work. You said "no" to that, I think when the Chairman asked you. CLAPPER: Well, the reason I said "no," of course, is the extent to which the Chinese forewarning (ph) of our data, our intellectual property, is pretty pervasive. I think there's a question about the extent to which the government actually orchestrates all of it, or not? So, I think we're in the bottom of the barrel -- President Reagan term, "trust but verify," motives, at least as far as intelligence is concerned and we are inherently skeptics. WORK: Sir, if I could? (UNKNOWN) I have a question for you, Secretary, then you can go ahead and add to that. The recent news article that examines similarities between China's J-315 and our F-35 Strike Fighter, and what they've been able to do in such a rapid period of time without any R&D. Do you believe that gives them an competitive advantage? I mean, you can -- I understand that there might be some differences as far as, in the software, the weapons, and this and that. But they're making leaps which are uncommon at the behest of us and we know this, I understand, but we're not taking any actions against them. WORK: Well, I'd like work this in to your -- to follow up with your first question. (UNKNOWN) Yes, go ahead. WORK: At the highest levels, we have made it clear that we believe that Chinese actions in the cyber sphere are totally unacceptable as a nation-state. And, we made that clear in a wide variety of different was, and I would characterize the agreement that we have as a confidence building measure with the Chinese. Where we are asking them to prove to us that they are serious about what they say, about what they do to control these efforts. So we-- there were really four things, that we agreed to do. First, we would give timely responses to information when we say, "Hey, we believe that there is a problem here and we have agreed to exchange information on cyber-crimes, we've agreed to possibly collect electronic evidence, and to mitigate malicious cyber activity that's occurring on our soil." We both agreed, that we would not knowingly conduct cyber enabled theft of intellectual property, which as you say senator, has been a problem. We have told them, "It's a problem; it's unacceptable." They have said that they will work to curb that. Then we've agreed to have common effort to promote international norms. And the final thing is, we'll high level joint mechanism, where we can meet at least twice a year and say, "Look, this is just not working. You are not coming through with you've said." So this isn't a treaty or anything like that, it's a confidence building measure for us to find out if China is going to act responsibly. I agree tonally with Director Clapper, they've got to prove to us. And we know, that they have stolen information from our defense contractors. (UNKNOWN) Right. WORK: And, it has helped them develop systems, and we have hardened our systems through the Defense Industrial Base Initiative; and we've trying to make... (UNKNOWN) I understand, we know the J-20 is pretty much, mirroring our F-22. We know that their J-31 is pretty mirroring our F-35. When we know this and the cost to the American taxpayers -- and let them get a -- I mean, why wouldn't we take hard actions against them? Why wouldn't we come down -- I just don't understand, why we wouldn't retaliate from a financial standpoint? WORK: There are a wide variety of cost and position options that we have. They're developed through the interagency and, again, it's not necessarily a kind -- I mean, tit-for-tat, it is proportional response, and we're working through all of those right now. (UNKNOWN) My time is up, sir, and if I could just follow up on that later, if we could meet with you later, I'd... WORK (?): Absolutely, sir. (UNKNOWN) ... (inaudible) appreciate it. CLAPPER (?): Senator, if I may, just add a word here about -- this is a point Admiral Rogers has made in the past about, you know, terminology, lexicon, nomenclature, definitions are important. And so what this represents, of course, is espionage, economic... (UNKNOWN) Absolutely. CLAPPER (?): ... cyber espionage, and, of course, we too practice cyber espionage and in a public forum to, you know, say how successful we are but we're -- we're not bad at it. So when we talk about what are we going to do for -- to counter espionage or punish somebody or retaliate for espionage, well, we -- I think it's a good idea to at least think about the old saw about people live in glass houses... (UNKNOWN) That's (inaudible). CLAPPER (?): ... shouldn't throw rocks. MCCAIN (?): So it's OK for them to steal our secrets that are most important (inaudible)... CLAPPER: I -- I didn't say that, sir... MCCAIN (?): (inaudible) because we... CLAPPER (?): I -- I didn't say that, Senator. MCCAIN (?): ... because we live in a glass house. That is astounding. Senator Ayotte? CLAPPER (?): I did not say it's a -- it's a good thing. I'm just saying that both nations engage in this. AYOTTE: I want to thank all of you for being here. With regard to the Chinese, I want to follow up on -- we -- we've talked about the stealing of the highest secrets in terms of our weapons system, but what about the 21 million people whose background check and personal information has been, of course, associated publicly with the Chinese. And the fact that we know that 5 million sets of fingerprints, as well, leading to potential vulnerability for our citizens. And if you put that in the context of these other issues that we've raised, it seems to me -- I -- I looked very carefully, for example, Secretary Work, at some of the language you've been using. You -- you gave a speech at the Royal United Services Institute in London; you said deterrents must be demonstrated to be effective. Secretary Clapper, in your prepared statement, you said the muted response by most victims to cyber-attacks has created a permissive environment. So I'm trying to figure out based on what you've said how we're not in a permissive environment in light of what they've stolen on our weapons systems but also this huge infringement on 21 million people in this country. And also could you comment on the vulnerability of that data and where we are in terms of how... CLAPPER: Well... AYOTTE: ... it would be used against us? CLAPPER: First, that -- that is an assessment of what was taken. We actually don't know in terms of specific -- specifics but that's -- I think, frames the magnitude of this theft and it is potentially very serious -- has very serious implications first close -- close to home from the standpoint of the intelligence community, and the potential for identifying people who may be under covered status, just one -- one small example. And of course it poses all kinds of potential -- and, unfortunately, this is a gift that's going to keep on giving for years. So it -- it's a very serious situation. What we try to do is educate people what to look for and how to protect themselves but, again, this is a huge threat of theft and it has potentially damaging implications for lots of people in the intelligence community and lots of people in the Department of Defense and other employees of government. AYOTTE: So I think what you're hearing from some of us up here is just a -- now, what are we going to do about it, is the issue as opposed to a -- a shared agreement on generic principles with the Chinese. This is a pretty significant issue that is going to impact millions of Americans. I'm not hearing what we're going to do about it, but that may be a higher level of decision going up to the President. But seems to me, if we're going to talk about deterrence, if we don't follow up with action, and if you look at that combined with the testimony we heard last week about the artificial islands being built by the Chinese and the fact that we won't even go within I believe its 12 nautical miles of those islands, if you put that all from the Chinese perspective, I think you think, hmm, we can pretty much do what we want to do because we haven't seen a response. Now, I'm not asking for -- from all of you to -- to answer that because it probably needs to be answered by the President and his national security team, but it seems to me that they aren't seeing a response right now from us and therefore we're going to see -- continue to see bad behavior from the Chinese. Before I go, I have an important question on another topic, Secretary Work, and that is yesterday we heard public reports about a potential violent -- violation of the INF Treaty by the Russians and that essentially Russia tested -- flight tested a new ground-launched cruise missile this month that U.S. intelligence agencies say further violates the 1987 INF Treaty. And, of course, this is going back also to the reports as early as 2008 of the -- Russia conducting tests of -- of another ground-launched cruise missile in potential violation of the INF Treaty that we've raised with them, and when Secretary Carter came before our committee on his confirmation, he listed three potential responses to these INF violations. So now we have the Russians violating the INF Treaty yet again and I guess my question is, Secretary Carter rightly identified that we should respond either through missile defense, counterforce or countervailing measures. What are we doing about it? WORK: Senator, this is a long-standing issue that we have been discussing with the Russians. The system that you're talking about is in development; has not been fielded yet. We are -- we have had different discussions with them on our perception of the violation of the INF and they have come back. This is still in discussions and we have not decided on any particular action at this point. AYOTTE: So are you saying that you don't think they violated the INF Treaty? WORK: We believe very strongly that they did. AYOTTE: That's what I thought. So what are we going to do about it, because they're claiming that they haven't, going back to the 2008 violations, and now here we have another situation. WORK: It's still under -- because they have not fielded the system, we are still in the midst of negotiating this position. We are giving ours but if they do field a system that violates the INF, I would expect us to take one of the three options that Secretary Carter outlined before the committee. AYOTTE: So my time is up but I see two consistent themes here, both with the Chinese and the Russian. A lot of talk, no action, unfortunately, and people take their cues from that and that worries me. Thank you, all. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) HIRONO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Clapper, you testified before the House Intelligence Committee recently that they -- while the United States makes distinctions between cyber-attacks conducted for economic purposes or to gain foreign intelligence, I would -- that's the espionage arena, I think that you're referring to, or to cause damage our adversaries do not. Would you consider the OPM breach to the extent that we believe it is a state actor who did that, that that would be in the category of espionage? CLAPPER: Yes. HIRONO: So... CLAPPER: That was the tenor of the discussion at the HPSCI hearing that Admiral Rogers and I engaged in. And, of course, that has to do with the -- as I mentioned earlier to Senator Manchin, the importance of definition, nomenclature and terms. So -- and the definition of these terms. And so what the theft of the OPM data, as egregious as it was, we wouldn't necessarily consider it as an attack. Rather, it would be... HIRONO: Yes. CLAPPER: ... a form of... HIRONO: Well, (inaudible)... CLAPPER: ... theft or espionage. HIRONO: And, as you say, other countries, including our own, engages in such activities. My understanding of the recent agreement between the United States and China, though, has to do with commercial cyber theft, and I think that's a very different category that has to do with obtaining information about corporations, et cetera, and -- and therefore, that that is in the category of economic attacks. So, Director Clapper, would you consider that kind of an agreement to be helpful? I realize that you are skeptical but to the extent that we are defining a particular kind of -- of cyber-attack and -- and that we're contemplating through this agreement an ability of our two countries to engage in high level dialogue regarding these kinds of -- of attacks, is it -- is that a helpful situation? CLAPPER: Well, it would be -- it would be -- it'd be very helpful if, of course, the Chinese actually live up to what they agreed to. So if -- and -- and what the agreement pertained to was theft of data for economic purposes, to give Chinese commercial concerns an advantage or their defense industries an advantage. As opposed to -- I don't believe they -- that we've agreed with the Chinese to stop spying on each other. HIRONO: Yes. CLAPPER: And so there -- there is a -- for purely espionage purposes and there is a distinction. HIRONO: Mr. Secretary, you can weigh in on this also. To the extent that we've created an -- a potential for dialogue or an environment where there's a process to be followed and the -- cases where we suspect commercial cyber-attacks, that at least we have a way that we can talk to the -- the Chinese. Because you also mentioned, Director Clapper, that attribution is not the easiest thing, although we are getting better at figuring out who actually were the actors that did these cyber-attacks. So one hopes that even with a -- a great deal of skepticism going forward that this agreement may create this space for us to have a -- more than a conversation but one that would lead to some kind of a -- a change in behavior on the part of these state actors. Mr. Secretary, feel free to give us your opinion. WORK: Senator, I think that's exactly right. WORK: I mean, as Director Clapper said, first you have to find out the geographical location from the -- where the attack came from. Then you have to identify the actor, then you have to identify whether the government of that geographic space was either controlling (inaudible)... HIRONO: Recognize that's not the easiest to do, yes. WORK: And what we have done is we have confronted China and China in some cases has said, "Look, this was a hacker; it was inside our country, but we have no control of it." What this allows us to do is say, "OK, well what are you going to do about that? That's a cyber crime. Are you going to provide us the information we need to prosecute this person? Are you going to take care of it on your own?" So I believe this type of confidence-building measure and this way to discuss these things will -- the truth will be in the pudding, how the Chinese react to this. HIRONO: Mr. Secretary, I think you mentioned that this particular agreement allows -- contemplates meeting at least twice a year. Is there anything that prevents more frequent dialogue between our two countries in suspected cases of commercial cyber attacks? WORK: Senator, I believe that if there was a significant cyber event that suspected the Chinese of doing, or they suspected us, that we would be able to meet (inaudible). This is going to be a high- level joint dialogue. The Chinese will have it at the ministerial level. Our U.S. secretary of homeland security and the U.S. attorney general will co-lead on our part. We're going to have the first meeting of this group by the end of this calendar year, and then at least twice a year. So I believe that -- Director Clapper (inaudible) -- I think all of us have some healthy skepticism about this, but I believe it's a good confidence-building measure and good first step, and we will see if it leads to better behavior on the part of the Chinese. HIRONO: Thank you. MCCAIN: Mr. Secretary, I can't help -- (inaudible) comment. We have identified the PLA building in which they operate. Now, please don't deceive this committee as if we don't know who's responsible for it. That's just -- that's just very disingenuous. There have been public reports that we've identified the PLA building in which these cyber attacks come from. Senator Ernst? ERNST: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us today. Admiral Rogers, I'll start with you, sir. Two of the president's nine lines of effort in defeating ISIL are, first, exposing ISIS's true nature, and second, disrupting the foreign fighter flow. And over the weekend, the New York Times reported that 30,000 recruits joined ISIS over the past year, and that's double the previous recruitment year. Earlier this month, in reference to ISIS recruiting, the State Department's ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism said that ISIS's recruiting trend is still upward, and this information came of no surprise to her. The ambassador also said the upward trend was primarily due to Internet and social media. So, sir, do you believe the administration's efforts have so far succeeded on these two lines of effort in cyberspace and social media? Just please, simple yes or no. ROGERS: No. ERNST: OK. In light of that, with the record recruiting numbers for ISIS, how would you then assess the effectiveness of the U.S. government's counter-ISIS effort in cyberspace? So, what specifically is your assessment of the State Department's think again, turn away program in support of efforts to disrupt ISIS's online recruiting effort? ROGERS: Senator, I'm not in a position to comment on the State Department -- the specifics of their program. I honestly am just not know knowledgeable about it. I will say this broadly, to get to I think your broader point, I have always believed that we must contest ISIL in the information domain every bit as aggressively as we are contesting them on the battlefield; that the information dynamic is an essential component of their vision, their strategy and ultimately their success. And we have go to be willing to attempt to fight them in that domain just like we are on the battlefield and we clearly at not there yet. ERNST: I agree. I think we are failing in this effort. And some of the programs that we have seen obviously are not working. So are there areas where you could recommend how the U.S. government better partner with various NGOs or private entities to more effectively counter the ISIS propaganda? ROGERS: Again, the contesting the propaganda piece is much broader than Cyber Command's mission. I will say from a technical and operational perspective, we broadly within the DOD, the Cyber Command, Strategic Command and CENTCOM, are looking at within our authorities, within our capabilities, let's look in the realm of the possible in terms of what can we do to help contest them in this domain. ERNST: We have a larger problem coming forward, too, in regards to ISIS and ISIL in the Middle East. We seem to see the emergence of a trifecta between Syria, Iran and Russia. And now it seems that Iraq has begun information sharing with Russia, with Iran, with Syria. Director Clapper, can you speak to that and the broader implications of Russia emerging as a leader in the Middle East while we seem to be frittering away our opportunity with ISIL? CLAPPER: Well, that's certainly their objective. I think they have several objectives here, one of which is that I think protect their base, their presence in Syria, ergo their buildup in the northwest part of Syria; clearly want to prop up Assad. And I think a belated motivation for them is fighting ISIL. As far as the joint intelligence arrangement is concerned, I can't go into detail here in this forum, but I will say they are -- each of the parties entering into this are a little bit suspicious of just what is entailed here. So we'll have to see just how robust a capability that actually provides. ERNST: OK. I appreciate that. Secretary Work, do you have any thoughts on the emergence of Russia with the intelligence sharing, how that might impact the operations that we have ongoing in Iraq against ISIS? WORK: Well, I think we were caught by surprise that Iraq entered into this agreement with Syria and Iran and Russia. Obviously, we are not going to share intelligence with either Syria or Russia or Iran. So we are in the process -- our -- we are in the process of working to try to find out exactly what Iraq has said. Certainly, we're not going to provide any classified information to help those actors on the battlefield. Really, what we're trying to do is de-conflict. And that is the primary purpose of the discussion between President Obama and President Putin yesterday is if you are going to act on this battlefield, we have to de-conflict. The other thing we have made clear is they would like to do the military first, followed by a political transition. We would -- we believe those two things have to go in parallel and that has been our consistent message. This is early days. We are still in the midst of discussing what exactly this means. So I don't have any definitive answers for you at this point, Senator. ERNST: Well, I'm very concerned that we have abdicated our role in the Middle East, and in so many other areas, as have been pointed out earlier -- a grave concern to all of us. And I think we need to be working much more diligently on this. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) NELSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Admiral, I'm concerned about all of these private telecoms that are going to encrypt. If you have encryption of everything, how in your opinion does that affect section 702 and 215 collection programs? ROGERS: It certainly makes it more difficult. NELSON: Does the administration have a policy position on this? ROGERS: No. I think we're still -- I mean, we're the first to acknowledge that this is an incredibly complicated issue, with a lot of very valid perspectives. And we're still I think collectively trying to work our way through sort of what's the right way ahead, recognizing that there's a lot of very valid perspectives. But from the perspective of Cyber Command and NSA, that I look at the issue, there's a huge challenge for us here that we have got to deal with. NELSON: A huge challenge. And I have a policy position, and that is that the telecoms better cooperate with the United States government, or else it just magnifies the ability for the bad guys to utilize the Internet to achieve their purposes. Speaking of that, we have a fantastic U.S. military. We are able to protect ourselves. It's the best military in the world, but we have a vulnerability. And it's a cyber attack. Do you want to see if you can make me feel any better about our ability to protect ourselves going forward? ROGERS: I would tell you that current state of capability in the department, if I just look at where we were 18 months ago, two years ago, it is significantly improved. We currently defeat probably 99 point some-odd percentage of attempts to penetrate DOD systems on a daily basis. The capability in terms of both the amount of teams; their capability just continues to improve -- our speed, our agility. The challenge for us fundamentally to me is we are trying to overcome decades of a thought process in which redundancy, defensibility, and reliability were never core-designed characteristics for our networks; where we assumed in the development of our weapons systems that external interfaces, if you will, with the outside world were not something to be overly concerned with. They represented opportunity for us. They were remotely monitored activity to generate data as to how aircraft, for example, or ships holds (ph) were doing in different (inaudible) around the world -- all positives (inaudible) China developed the next generation, for example, of cruiser destroyers for the Navy. But in a world in which those public interfaces, if you were, increasingly represent also potential points of vulnerability, you get this clash of strategy, if you will. And that's where we find ourselves now. So one of the things I try to remind people is it took us decades to get here. We are not going to fix this set of problems in a few years. It takes dedicated prioritization, dedicated commitment, resources, and we've got to do this in a smart way. ROGERS: We've got to prioritize and we've got to figure out what's the greatest vulnerability and where's the greatest return (ph) for us... WORK: Senator, is it OK if I jump in here for a second? I just want to add to that... ROGERS: ... and for us to let our potential enemies understand that we have the capabilities of doing to them what they do to us. However, that gets more complicated when you're dealing with a rogue group of people stuck in a room somewhere that are not part of a nation state. NELSON: Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary. WORK: Well, I was just going to echo what Admiral Rogers said. When Secretary Carter came in he said, look we are absolutely not where we need to be and he made job number one defense of the networks. So we're going from 15,000 enclaves to less than 500. We're going to have -- we're going from 1,000 defendable firewalls to less than 200, somewhere between 50 and 200. So, you're absolutely right. We have recognized this as a terrible vulnerability. We are working, first to defend our networks as we talked about earlier. We're looking at our systems and we're also trying to change the culture. Right now if you discharge a weapon, you are held accountable for that. Negligent discharge is one of the worst things you can do. But we need to do is inoculate a culture where cyber discharge is just as bad and make sure that culture is inoculated throughout the force. NELSON: I agree, but now the Admiral is assaulted by the telecoms who want tie his hands behind his back by doing all of the encryption. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you Mr. Chairman. In our state, naval surface warfare (ph), Senator Cardin (ph) has taken the lead on much of our efforts to protect against the threat of counterfeit electronics. And so, Secretary Work and Director Clapper, the global supply chain for micro electronics presents a growing challenge for cyber-security. One of the things we saw recently, IBM sold it's chip-making facilities with DOD trusted foundry status to a foreign-owned competitor. So I was wondering your top priorities in managing the risk posed by the globalization of our micro electronics manufacturing capabilities and our abilities to protect our systems in that area. WORK: That's a big question Senator, in fact it's going to be one of the key things we look at in this fall review because of the recent -- as you said, the recent sale of the IBM chips. Now, there are two schools of thought on this. Secretary Carter personally has jumped into this and some say you do not need a trusted foundry. Another group says you absolutely have to have it. Having confidence in the chips that we put in our weapons system is important and I would expect that come February we would be able to report out the final decisions through the fall review on how we're going to tackle this problem. (UNKNOWN) Who within DOD's leadership has primary responsibility for overseeing the supply chain risk management. WORK: That would be Frank Kendall and DLA. DLA has the supply chain and Frank Kendall is really focused on the trusted chip, the fabrication of trusted chips. (UNKNOWN) One of the areas that we look at in regards to cyber and in some ways you know, technology in particular parts of it, not advancing it has been a good thing in this respect, is in the nuclear area. So are there any specific groups that are focused just on protecting our nuclear efforts against cyber? WORK: There's the national, the NESA, and also we have a nuclear weapons council which is co-chaired by again, Frank Kendall, our undersecretary of defense for ATML and the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs. They are the ones that work with DOE to make sure that our weapons system components are reliable and trusted. And to make sure that we have a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent. (UNKNOWN) Admiral, when we look at building the force of cyber warriors, the cyber team, how can we use the National Guard, Reserves to do that. Because it strikes me that can help us in retaining highly qualified individuals who want to devote part of their life to helping their country. And it would seem to almost be a perfect fit for us. ROGERS: So we have taken a total force approach to the force that we're building out, that includes both guard and reserve, every service slightly different not the least of which because different services have different Reserve and Guard structures. So that is a part of it. I'd say one challenge we're still trying to work our way through is under the title 32 piece, how we coordinate, what guard and reserve are doing, how we generate capacity and bring to bear with maximum efficiency. The one thing -- the two things in partnering with my guard teammates and my reserve teammates, because we are taking a total force approach for this, we need one standard for this. We don't want a place where the guard and reserve are trained to one standard and the active side is trained to a different. That gives us maximum flexibility in how we apply the capability across the force, and the Guard and Reserve has done great in that regard. And then secondly, we need one common unit structure. We don't want to build unique one of a kind structures in the guard and reserves that don't match the title ten side again. We want to treat this is as one integrated force and again I would give the guard and the reserve great kudos in that regard. We've got a common vision about the way we need to go. We've got a great exercise series cyber guard that we're using every year where we bring together the guard, the private sector, the active component, government and work our way through the specifics of how we will make it work. (UNKNOWN) Director Clapper, and I apologize if you have already answered this. What is the one cyber challenge you are most concerned about? CLAPPER: Well, obviously, the one that I have to think about is -- would be a massive armaggedon-like scale attack against our infrastructure. That is not -- we don't consider that the most likely probability right now that the greater threat or the low to moderate sort of threats that we're seeing. And what I have seen in the five years that I've been in this job is a sort of progression where these get more aggressive and more damaging. And as I indicated in my oral statement at the outset what I will see, I think what we can expect next are data manipulation which then cause -- calls into question the integrity of the data which in many ways is more insidious than the kinds of attacks that we've suffered thus far. So, you know, the greater -- the specter is this massive attack though it's not likely. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Annex 3 of the recently signed nuclear agreement calls for the participating countries to work with Iran to quote "Strengthen Iran's ability to protect against and respond to nuclear security threats, including sabotage, as well as to enable effective and sustainable nuclear security and physical protection systems." Close quote. Secretary Clapper, do you read this portion of the nuclear agreement -- the annex to include cyber threats, meaning that the P5- plus-one countries who are part of this agreement will be expected, will be deemed to have an obligation under the agreement to assist Iran in developing systems to prevent other countries from using cyber capabilities to acquire information about or to disrupt the operations of Iran's nuclear capabilities or Iran's nuclear programs? CLAPPER: Well, in this environment I would say that I trust that this is not going to prevent us from gleaning intelligence from our traditional sources in the interest in verifying the agreement which will be principally monitored by an international organization, IDEA. So I'm not aware of any strictures on our ability to collect on their behavior and their components. (UNKNOWN) But why would we want to give Iran the ability to defend against cyber weapons that we or perhaps some of our allies might one day want to use against Iran? CLAPPER: Well, sir in this open environment there are some aspects here that I can't stress. I'd be happy to talk with you privately or in a classified environment about that. (UNKNOWN) OK, OK. But you're not disputing the fact that the agreement says that, that we would have to... CLAPPER: No. (UNKNOWN) OK. Now, can you tell me in this environment what specific technical assistance we'll be offering Iran in this portion of the agreement. CLAPPER: I honestly don't know the answer to that question. I would have to have that researched. I don't know exactly what's in mind there. (UNKNOWN) Now, would any of these capabilities, once acquired by Iran, prevent or inhibit the United States or any of our allies and another enemy of Iran from using any cyber measure against Iranian nuclear facilities? CLAPPER: Again, I'm reluctant to discuss that in this setting. (UNKNOWN) Were you consulted by U.S. negotiators during the nuclear negotiations in connection with this portion of the agreement? CLAPPER: Well, the intelligence community was deeply involved throughout the negotiations. (UNKNOWN) Can you describe the nature of any consultation you had with them as to this portion of annex 3? CLAPPER: With the Iranians? (UNKNOWN) Yes. CLAPPER: No, I did not engage with the Iranians with... (UNKNOWN) No, that's not what I'm asking. I'm asking if you can describe your discussions with U.S. negotiators as they came to you and consulted with you on the implication of this portion annex 3. CLAPPER: I didn't actually -- my lead for this was Norm Rule (ph), known to many of you on this committee as National Intelligence manager (ph) for Iran and he was the direct participant and I don't want to speak for him as to the extent to which he was involved or consulted on that provision. I would have to ask him. (UNKNOWN) OK, but you would of been aware of consultations going on? I'm sure he came to you and said look this is going to impact our ability, the ability of the United States to do what we need to do with respect to Iran. Might that have been something... CLAPPER: Again, sir, I would rather discuss what the potential response of ours could be in a closed setting. (UNKNOWN) OK, Secretary Work, how is the department working to ensure that the hardware and software on some of these major programs we're developing can fit to future contingencies in technological advances, so they can continue to address emerging cyber threats well into the future without major overhauls of the entire system? WORK: Senator, as I said, "we are now putting into our KPPS, our Key Performance Parameters in any new systems, specific cyber- hardening requirements." Much like during the Cold War when we had EMP requirements for many of our systems. The problem that we face is that many of the old systems that are still in service, were not built to the -- to respond to the cyber-threats that we see today. So we're having to go back through all of those older systems, determine which ones were most vulnerable, to prioritize them, and to make fixes. So it also goes back to Senator Donnelly's question on the trusted foundry (ph), we are trying to determine, what is the best way to assure that we have reliable and trusted micro-electronics. (UNKNOWN) Thank you, I see my time's expired. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) KING: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Work, if there's a catastrophic attack tonight on the fiscal instructor, the financial infrastructure of this country, I do not want to go on cable news in morning -- if there is cable news in the morning, and say, "the administration told us that the policy is still in development." We've got to get on this. We've been talking about it for years and as the Chairman pointed, this was an essential part of our National Defense Authorization Act a year ago. And the idea, that we can continue to simply defend and never have an offensive capability, I just think is ignoring this enormous threat which we all agree. So, let me ask a one word answer question to each of you. Do we need an offensive capability in cyber-realm in order to act as a deterrent, Secretary Work? WORK: We need a broad range of response options, to include... KING: Do we need a offensive cyber capability to act as a deterrent? WORK: I would say, "yes, sir." KING: Director Clapper? CLAPPER: Absolutely. KING: Admiral Rogers? ROGERS: Yes. KING: Thank you. The second part of that is, that it can't be secret. Our instinct is to make everything secret and the whole point of a deterrent capability, is that it not be secret. So, I think we need to establish what we have. I suspect we do have some significant offensive capability but part of making it a deterrent is, that is has to be made public. I think another question that needs to be addressed and I don't necessarily think -- in this hearing this morning, but in terms of the policy; we need to define what an of war is in the cyber area. Whether hitting Sony Pictures is an act of war, or the OPM, and how do draw those lines. And, I would suggest that, that's got to be part of this policy definition. And, I don't mean to imply Secretary Work, that this is easy, but it's urgent. And, that's the -- and, just simply can't defend ourselves by saying, "well, it was complicated, we didn't get to it." Changing the subject slightly, Admiral Rogers, do you believe that the dispersion of responsibility in the federal government for cyber, is a potential problem? It strikes me, we've got agencies, and departments, and bureaus; I suspect you could name 15 of them if you tried, that all have some responsibility here. Do we need to strengthen Cyber Command and make that the central repository of this policy. ROGERS: I would not make Cyber Command and the Department of Defense, the central repository. This is much broader than just the DOD perspective, but I will say this, I have been very public in saying, "we have got to simplify this structure for the outside world." Because, if you're on the outside looking in, and I hear this from private sector fairly regularly, "who do you want me to go? Should I talk to the FBI? Should I talk to DHS? Why can't I deal with you? Do I need to talk the financial company? Should I be talking to the sector of constructs that we've created?" We have to try to simplify this for the private sector. CLAPPER: What I might add to that Senator King, it's one of the reasons why I had a very brief commercial for, just within the intelligence community of integrating the cyber pictures, the common operating pictures, simply from within intelligence, let alone, you know, what we do to react or protect. And that, to me is one important thing that I have come to believe, we need along the lines of a mini-NCTC (ph) or NCPC. KING: And, I would hope that, that would also -- and that, the leadership and decision making on that, has to start with the White House. It has to start with the administration for an all of government approach to dealing with this dispersion of responsibility problem. I would point out parenthetically, that there has been a lot of talk about China and our ability to interact with China and to respond and hold China responsible, and it's not the subject of this hearing but the fact that we owe China trillions of dollars, compromises our ability to interact with China in a firm way. It's a complicated relationship and that's one of the things that makes it difficult. Director Clapper, do you have any idea, what brought the Chinese to the table for this recent agreement with the president? CLAPPER: Well, it appears that the -- the threat of potential economic sanctions, particularly, in opposing them right before the visit of President Xi, I think that got their attention and that's why they dispatched Minister Mong (ph) to try to come to some sort of, agreement. Which is what ensured subsequently. KING: And I agree, that it's not a definitive agreement or a treaty, but I do Secretary Work, that it's a step in the right direction. At least, these issues are being discussed. But countries ultimately, only act in their own self-interest and we have to convince the Chinese that it's in their interest to cut out this activity that's so detrimental to our country. Thank you gentleman, for you... WORK: Sir, could I make one real quick comment? KING: Yes, sir. WORK: Just because we have not published our policy, it is so broad and encompassing going over things like encryption; what are the types of authority we need? It does not mean, that if we did have an attack tonight; we do not have the structure in place right now, with the national security team to get together, to try to understand who caused the attack, to understand what the implications of the attack were, and what response we should take. Those are in place right. KING: But the whole point of being able to respond is deterrent so that the attack won't occur. If Dr. Strangelove taught us, that if you have a doomsday machine and no one knows about, it's useless. So having a secret plan as to how we will respond, isn't the point I'm trying to get at. The deal is, they have to know how we will respond and therefore not attack in the first place. Thank you. Thank you all, gentlemen, for your testimony. REED: On behalf of the Chairman, let me recognize Senator Fischer. FISCHER: Thank you, Senator Reed. Following up a little bit, where Senator King was going on this. Many of you talked about establishing norms in cyberspace? Do you think it's possible to establish or maintain that norm without enforcement behaviors? When we look at publicly identifying those who are responsible for an activity or imposing costs on them, can we do that? I'll begin with Mr. Secretary. WORK: Well, I believe that trying to establish these norms are very -- very helpful. In the Cold War, for example, there was a task agreement that we would not attack each of our early warning missiles launch -- I mean, warning satellites. So establishing these norms are very important. But they will be extremely difficult because the enforcement mechanisms in cyber are far more difficult, because it's more much easy to attribute missile attacks, et cetera. So, I believe that this agreement with China is a good first step. That we should strive to establish norms, especially between nation-states. And establish norms, which we believe are beyond the bounds and to try to establish mechanisms by which we can work these through. But this will be very, very difficult, Senator, because it's much more difficult. CLAPPER: And we have the added problem, of course, of the norms, that Secretary Work said, that are really applicable to nation-states. And, of course, they have a whole range of non-nation-states actors out there who wouldn't necessarily subscribe to these norms and would be a challenge to deal with, even if there were nation-states, mutual agreements. FISCHER: Admiral? ROGERS: I would echo the comment that my two teammates made. I'm struck by raw captives (ph) of our own experience. In my early days as a sailor, well, before I got into this business, at the height of the Cold War out there, we knew exactly how far we can get between the Soviets and us. We knew exactly how far we could push each other, and we pushed each other at times right up to the edge, very aggressive behaviors. But we developed that set of norms, we a series of a deconfliction mechanisms in the maritime environment, we actually developed a set a signals over time so we can communicated with each other; but it's so uncomfortable that we're are going to achieve over time in the nation-state arena. But as my teammates have said, "it's the non-state actors that really complicates this," to me. It's going to make this difficult. FISCHER: So, when we're attacked in cyberspace, how do we impose cost on those who are attack us? Do we respond in cyberspace or can we look at other ways to, I think, respond in an appropriate manner, say with sanctions? What would you look at, Admiral? ROGERS: So what we have talked about previously is, we want to make sure we don't look at this just from one narrow perspective. That we think more broadly, we look across the breadth of capabilities and advantages that we enjoy as a nation, and we bring all of that to bear as we're looking at options as to what we do; and that it's a case by case basis. There's no one single -- one size fits all answer to this. ROGERS: Fundamentally, think more broadly than just cyber. Not that cyber isn't potentially a part of this, I don't mean to imply that. FISCHER: Correct, Mr. Secretary, would you agree with the Admiral on that? Do you see a variety of options other than? And wouldn't -- wouldn't this be more beneficial to us as a country to be able to have a policy that -- that is a public policy on what those options should be and the consequences that would be felt when we are attacked? WORK: Absolutely. And that is what I say about a broad policy, where we will respond in a time -- manner -- time, place and manner of our own choosing. In this case, there's an asymmetry with our nation- state potential adversaries. They are all authoritarian states. The attack surfaces that they have are far smaller than what we have as a free nation. And we value that. We do not want to close down the Internet, but we are more vulnerable to a wide variety of attack surfaces than our adversaries. So we may sometimes have to respond proportionately, but in a different way than a simple cyber response. It might be sanctions. It might be a criminal indictment. It might be other reactions. So we believe very strongly that this is something that's an interagency process, a process established where they are taking care of and handled on a case-by-case basis. FISCHER: And does the administration have a definition on what constitutes a cyber attack? WORK (?): Well, any type of malicious activity which causes either damage or theft of -- theft of information or I.T. -- all of those are under either cyber -- malicious cyber activities. It might be espionage. In each case, there's no defined red line for what would constitute... FISCHER: What -- what would be the difference between a cyber attack and cyber vandalism? CLAPPER: Well, we'd have to make, again, a case-by-case determination. And of course, an important consideration here would be, in terms of our reaction, would be attribution. And that, again, would be case-by-case. WORK: And cyber vandalism, ma'am, do you believe -- is that stealing information or I.T. or... FISCHER: The attack by North Korea on Sony was described by the president as cyber vandalism. I was just wondering on how you distinguish that -- that definition from a cuber attack. CLAPPER: Well, it didn't affect a national security entity, but it certainly did cause damage to a company. And in that case, and this is an important illustration of when we could attribute very clearly, and there was uniform agreement across the intelligence community, to attribute that attack to the North Koreans. And we did sanction them. FISCHER: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) HEINRICH (?): Thank you, Mr. Chair. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and for joining us here today. And Director Clapper, before I start on -- begin to focus on cyber policy, I think we're all very concerned about the allegations that leadership at Central Command deliberately distorted the assessments of intelligence officers related to the fight against ISIL. And I understand that there's an ongoing investigation and I'm going to wait for the results of that investigation. But I want to say that as a member of both this committee and the Intelligence Committee, I want in the strongest terms possible impress upon you the importance for all of us to receive absolutely objective and unbiased assessments. And I look forward to the results of the I.G. investigation and I expect that you will hold accountable anyone who has failed in their duty in the intelligence community no matter how high up the chain that may go. CLAPPER: Well, Senator, I -- you brought up a very important consideration here, which is a great concern to me. I'm a son of an Army intelligence officer that served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. And I served in various intelligence capacities for over 52 years, ranging from my first tour in southeast Asia in the early '60s, to my service now as the longest-tenured DNI. And it is an almost sacred writ in intelligence -- in the intelligence profession never to politicize intelligence. I don't engage in it. I never have and I don't condone it when it's identified. Having said that, I -- I completely agree with you. In spite of all the media hyperbole, I think it's best that we all await the outcome of the DOD I.G. investigation to determine whether and to what extent there was any politicization of intelligence at CENTCOM. I will also say that the intelligence assessments from CENTCOM or any other combatant command come to the national level only through the Defense Intelligence Agency. That is the main conduit and I will say (inaudible) evaluator and filter for what flows into the national intelligence arena. HEINRICH (?): Thank you, Director. Turning to you, Admiral Rogers, as the director of U.S. Cyber Command, your responsibilities include strengthening our cyber defense and our cyber deterrence posture. And I want to return to the line of questioning several of my colleagues have -- have begun this morning. As you know, the breach of OPM computers resulted in an enormous loss of sensitive personal information. Thus far, to my knowledge, the U.S. has not responded. And to put it in the words of Deputy Secretary Work's language this morning, we haven't imposed a cost, which raises questions about whether we truly have developed the mechanisms for proportionate response to cyber attacks against the U.S. government, even after the April 2015 publication of the DOD cyber strategy. We know that if a foreign agent had been caught trying to steal U.S. personnel files in a less digital age we would either kick them out of the country if they were a diplomat, or we'd throw them in jail if they weren't a diplomat. That would be considered a proportionate response. But in the case of the OPM breach, the U.S. government seems uncertain about what a proportioned response would look like. So I want to ask you three questions and I'll let you take them as you may. What constitutes an act of war in cyberspace? Has the United States decided on a proportionate response in the case of the OPM cyber espionage case? And what types of information gathering by nation-states, by governments, are legitimate? And what types are not? ROGERS: Well, first let me start off by saying, look, so I'm the operations (ph) commander. And all three of the questions you've just asked me as much broader than that. I'm glad to give you a (inaudible), but I'm mindful of what my role is. In terms of the three things that we define what an act of war is, the bottom line is clearly we're still working our way through that. What are the parameters that we want to use to define what is an act of war? My going in position is we ought to build on the framework that we have developed over time in the more conventional domain. That's a good point of departure for it. It's got a broadly built framework. It's something that people recognize. And it's where we ought to start as a point of departure. The second question was about -- (inaudible). HEINRICH (?): A proportional response to the OPM case. ROGERS: Again, I think that what OPM represents is a good question about so what are the parameters we want (inaudible). Is it, as the DNI just said, is it the intent (inaudible). Is it scaled? Is it -- you can do espionage at some level, for example, but if you trip some magic threshold, hey, is 20 million records (inaudible) those records? Is there some scale component to this? I think we're clearly still trying to work our way through that issue, and there is no one-size-fits-all (inaudible). I think there's recognition -- I think that's clearly what has driven this broad discussion between the United States and China, for example. That's been a positive, I would argue. And the third -- could you repeat again -- the types of information? HEINRICH (?): You know, I'll -- my time is expired, so I'll (inaudible). I think what you're hearing from all of us... MCCAIN: Go ahead, Senator. This is an important (inaudible) line of questioning. HEINRICH (?): We would like to see more transparency in being able to telegraph our deterrence. Because we all know that looking back into the cold war, that our deterrent was very important, but the other side knowing what that deterrent was was absolutely critical for it to be effective. And so we need to be clear about what types of information gathering by government are considered legitimate and acceptable, and where those red lines are going to be. ROGERS: I agree. I think that's an important of part of the whole deterrence (inaudible). It has to be something that's communicated and that generates understanding and expectation, and (inaudible) a sense of consequence. CLAPPER: I think the contrast with the cold war is a good one to think about in that I think what you're -- the concern that people are raising is should there be red lines on spying. That's really what this gets down to. We didn't have red lines in the cold war. It was free-wheeling as far as us collecting intelligence against the Soviet Union and vice versa. There were no limits on that. It's very difficult for both sides -- well, more so for us. And, of course, underlying -- the backdrop to all that was the deterrent, the nuclear deterrent, which of course restrained behavior, even though it got rough at times, as the example that Admiral Rogers cited in (inaudible) maritime context. But there were ground rules that governed that. We're sort of in the wild west here with cyber, where there are no limits; that we've agreed on no red lines certainly on collecting information, which is what the OPM breach represented. MCCAIN: Director and Admiral, I would like to thank you for your forthright and candid assessment, and also I think the lesson that all of us are getting is that we really have to have some policy decisions. And you've been very helpful in fleshing them out for us. Senator Cotton? COTTON: Secretary Work, I'd like to return to an exchange you had with Senator Ayotte about the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty, also known as the INF Treaty. Is Russia in violation of their obligations under the INF Treaty? WORK: We believe that a system that they have in development would violate the treaty. COTTON: And you said just now "in development," I thought I heard you say with Senator Ayotte that it's not deployed or it's not yet operationally capable. Is that correct? WORK: That's my understanding. I can have -- I can get back to you with a question for the record. It is in development and we have indicated our concern to the Russians that if they did deploy it, we believe it would violate the INF. COTTON: Thank you. Could you please do that in writing? And if it's appropriate, in a classified writing that's fine as well. I'd now like to move to the cyber mission force at the Air Force Association conference a couple weeks ago, Major General Ed Wilson, the commander of the 24th Air Force stated that DOD cyber mission force was halfway through its buildup. How difficult is it to establish the needed infrastructure and manning across the services to create the capability that we need to defend and deter cyber threats? WORK (?): I'd like to start, and then I'll turn it over Admiral Rogers. We're building to 133 total teams, 68 are cyber protection teams that are focused on our number one mission, defense of our networks. We have 13 national mission teams that we are building to help defend our nation's critical infrastructure, and we have 27 combat mission teams that are aligned with the combatant commanders and assist them in their planning. To support those, we have 25 support teams which they could call upon, for a total of 133. We're building to 6,200 military personnel civilians and some specialized contractors and another 2,000 in the reserves. So about 8,400. We expect to reach that in 2018 provided there's not another government shutdown. The last time we had a government shutdown and the sequestration, it put us behind by six months in building this. So as of right now, we are -- I think we're on track. And I turn it over to Admiral Rogers to explain the -- how well we're doing in attracting talent. ROGERS: And if I could first, let me accent (ph) a few (ph) on one particular portion of DepSec Work's comments in terms of impact of a government shutdown or sequestration for us. The last time we went through this and we shut it down, we assessed that we probably lost six months' worth of progress because we had to shut down the school system, we went to all stop in terms of generation of capability and the -- like a domino, the layover effect of all of that we think cost us about six months of time. If we go to a VCA or sequestration level, it puts us even further behind and in -- in an environment in which we have all uniformly come to the conclusion we're not where we need to be, and we've got to be more aggressive in getting there. And you can't do that if -- when you're shutting down your efforts, when you're cutting money to go specifically. Senator, to the question you asked, I would tell you the generation of the teams in terms of the manpower and their capability, we knock on wood, is exceeding my expectations. The bigger challenge to me has been less -- but it's not an insignificant challenge. But the bigger challenge has been less the teams and more some of the enabling capabilities that really power them. The tools, if you will. The platform that we operate from. The training environment that we take for granted in every other mission set. The idea that we would take a brigade combat team that before it went to Iraq, before it went to Afghanistan, we put it out in the National Training Center and we put it through the spectrum of scenarios we thinks they're likely to encounter in their deployment. We don't have that capability right now in cyber. We have got to create that capability. It's those enablers to me and the intelligence piece just like any other mission set. Everything we do is predicated on knowledge and insights. It's no different for the CENTCOM commander than it is for me. Those are the areas to me where the challenges are -- are greater, if you will, than -- than just the manpower. I'm not trying to minimize (inaudible). COTTON: Yes, and -- and how -- how important is it that we take advantage of the existing infrastructure and capabilities that we have as you're building out the entire mission force? ROGERS: I mean, that's what we're doing right now, but I will say one of our experiences -- Cyber Command has now been in place for approximately five years -- one of our insights that we've gained with practical experience and as we're looking at both defensive response as well as potential offensive options, we need to create infrastructure that is slightly separate from the infrastructure we use at NSA. It's -- so a unified platform you've heard us talk about, it's supported in the funding. That's an important part of this. Experience has taught us this in a way that five, six years ago we didn't fully understand. COTTON: Well, I'd -- my time is up for questions but I'd just like to bring to your attention that Arkansas General Mark Berry has requested cyber protection team at Little Rock Air Force Base. There's an 11,000 square foot facility there, it has a skip (ph) of 8,500 square feet. It's already had $3.5 million invested in it. One of these facilities I understand would cost about $4 million. It's a request that I support. I think it's harnessed resources that we've already invested, and also it's a -- they're ready to support in addition to the professional educational center that does a lot of the cyber training for the National Guard which is less than 30 minutes away. Thank you. CLAPPER: Mr. Chairman, I -- I have to comment and I'm rather struck by the irony here of -- before I left my office to come to this hearing I was reviewing the directions that we're putting out to our people for shutting down and furloughing people. What better time for a cyber-attack by an adversary when much of our expertise might be furloughed? MCCAIN: I think that's a very important comment, Director, and thank you for saying it. There's some of us who -- who feel it's urgent that we inform the American people of the threats to our national security of another government shutdown. I believe that it was an Arkansas philosopher that said there is no education in the second kick of a mule, so I thank you for your comment. Senator McCaskill? MCCASKILL: That's probably a Missouri mule. Director Clapper, earlier this year I introduced a bill that would give intelligence community contractors whistleblower protections as long as those complaints were made within the chain or to the inspector general or the GAO. So disclosures made to the press would not be protected. I -- as you probably know, Defense Department -- I know that Secretary Work knows this -- that we've already put into the law in recent years whistleblower protections for the contractors at the Department of Defense, and to my knowledge, and certainly correct me if I'm wrong, any of you, I'm not aware of any classified or sensitive information that has made its way to a damaging place as a result of these protections. The -- the 2014 intel authorization gave these protections to the government employees within intelligence. And one of the challenges we have in government is this divide between the contractors and government employees. And, frankly, whistleblower protections -- I can't think of a good policy reason that we would give whistleblower protections to employees and not give them to contractors. And so I'm hopeful today that you would indicate that you believe this is an important principle and that we should move forward with this legislation. CLAPPER: Absolutely, Senator, and we have published internal to the intelligence community an intelligence community directive that includes whistleblowing protections for contractors. After all, that was the source of our -- our big problem here with Mr. Snowden who was a contractor. And so our -- our challenge -- the -- the additional burden we have, of course, is trying to prevent the exposure of classified information outside channels so that's why whistleblowers absolutely must be protected so that they are induced or motivated to go within the channels knowing that they'll be protected. This program is managed by the intelligence community inspector general who is, of course, independent as a Senate-confirmed official. MCCASKILL: Thank you, and I'm pleased to -- to see that -- that you would be supportive of that. And -- and, Secretary Work, and Admiral Rogers, I assume that you would be supportive of giving whistleblower protections to intelligence community contractors? WORK: Absolutely. I agree total with what Director Clapper said. ROGERS: Yes, ma'am, and I say this as the head of an intelligence agency. MCCASKILL: Thank you. I want to follow up a little bit, Director Clapper, with your comment about a shutdown. Could you tell us what impact another government shutdown would have on your progress of getting the cyber mission force fully operational? Excuse me, Admiral Rogers. I -- I -- I think that in political isolation, shutdown appeals to a certain swath of Americans, and I understand why because sometimes it just feels good to say, well, let's just shut it down because obviously government is never going to win popularity contests, certainly not in my state. On the other hand, there's a difference between being responsible in terms of public policy and being irresponsible in terms of recognizing -- I love it when some of my friends wave the Constitution in my face and then fail to read the part that we have a divided checks and balances in this country, unlike other countries. The American people sent a party -- a President of one party to the White House and elected a Congress of a different party and that means we have to figure out how to get along. So could you talk a moment about what the impact would be to this important mission if, once again, we went down the rabbit hole of deciding the best thing to do is just to shut down government? ROGERS: So if we use our experience the last time, first thing I had to do is shut down the school system and training and education is a core component of our ability to create this workforce. Just shut it all down because it was only mission essential. The second thing I was struck (ph) for, all travel that was associated with training, all -- we had to shut all that down so I couldn't send people to generate more insights, to gain more knowledge. We had to shut down some of our technical development efforts because of the closure. Again, put that all on hold at a time where we had talked about the need to develop more capability, the need to develop more tools. I had to shut that all down during the period of the last shutdown. We were forced to focus our efforts on the continued day-to-day defense which is critical -- don't get me wrong -- as Secretary Work has indicated, it is priority number one for us. The other concern I have is -- and I have watched this play out now just in the last 10 days. I've been in command 18 months and I will tell you, the biggest thing I get from my workforce prior to the last 10 days, sir, this happened to us once in 2013, is this going to happen again? If it is, why should I stay here working for the government? I could make a whole lot more money in the cyber arena on the outside. So in addition to the threat increase (ph) that the DNI has highlighted, my other concern is if we do this again, is the amount of our workforce that says, you know, twice in the course of two years, I've got a family, I've got mortgages, I've got to -- to take care of myself. As much as I love the mission, as much as I believe in defending the nation, I can't put myself or my family through this. I've got to go work in the commercial sector. That would be terrible for us. Because people -- despite all our technology, never forget, it is men and women who power this enterprise. That's our advantage. MCCASKILL: At the risk of sounding like a smart aleck, which I do from time to time, I would say maybe we need to open some of those schools so some of my colleagues could do some math and realize the votes are not there to overcome a presidential veto and this is a recipe for dysfunction that does not help anyone in this country, in particular our national security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to echo the comments from my colleague Senator McCaskill. I think it's irresponsible. We have the Secretary come before this committee and say the number and severity of threats have not been greater since 9/11. That should be enough said in terms of what we need to do to keep continuity in funding the government. All the other things I may have a problem with have to be second to that priority. I thank you all for your work and Director Clapper I thank you for your comment. Admiral Rogers, we've had briefing from you since you've taken the command. And one of the briefings I'm reminded of is the trend that you see in terms of the gap between what tends to be still at American advantage overall, narrowing. Particularly with nations like China and Russia and I think you maybe even mentioned Iran being an emerging threat. Can you tell me, really in the context of maybe another six months reset (ph) on your training, but more importantly, based on your current funding streams and your current plan, are we going to be able to widen that gap again or this just a matter of staying slightly ahead of our adversaries? ROGERS: For right now, I think the most likely scenarios is we're staying slightly ahead of our adversaries because we're trying to do so much foundational work if you will. As I said previously, trying to overcome a very different approach over the previous decade (ph). It's not a criticism of that approach. It was a totally different world. It lead to a different prioritization. It led to a different level of effort and a different investment strategy. Clearly we're going to have to change that and we're changing that at a time when budgets are going down and threats, not just in cyber, but more broadly, are proliferating. I don't envy the choices Secretary Carter and the leadership has to make. There's nothing easy here. So I think in the near term, the most likely scenario for us is, how can we focus on the best investments that maximize our defense capability while continuing to help us retain the advantage we do right now against most. (UNKNOWN) Thank you and this question may be for Secretary Work. The announcement about the agreement with China, that we're basically not going to attack each other in the face of the compelling evidence that we have that China's done it in the past and they've denied it, why is this agreement a positive thing if the -- with the smoking gun information we have right now on prior attacks, theft of intellectual property, theft of commercial data, that we have a pretty strong base evidence to say that they're guilty of it, if they deny it, why does this agreement mean anything? WORK: On the build up to this visit we made it very clear through a wide variety of efforts that this was going to be something that was foremost in the discussions when President Xi came, we made it as clear as we possibly can in every single level from the President on down that the Chinese cyber activities are unacceptable and we believe that this is a good first step as a confidence building measure where China can either demonstrate that they are serious about establishing some new norms (ph) and going after cyber crimes, et cetera. But the proof will be in the pudding. I agree with Director Clapper and Admiral Rogers, it's going to be up to the Chinese that they're serious about this. (UNKNOWN) Will the manipulation of commercial data fall within the definition of theft under this agreement? WORK: Well, specifically, one part of it is, the theft of I.P., intellectual property for commercial advantage and say for example, the Chinese state enterprise. And we have agreed, at least we have made a tentative agreement that we will not do those types of activities. China has done those activities in the past and it will be up to them to prove that we won't do in the future. (UNKNOWN) And the -- for anyone, and then I'll yield. I know that the committee's gone on awhile. But at what point -- I think Senator Heinrich made some very important points about drawing redlines. But, at what point are we going to have clear definitions about malignant (ph) activities in cyberspace being acts of war or acts of terrorism, and then have appropriate responses whether they be through cyber or through sanctions or other? When are we going to get that clarity because we don't have it today? WORK: Senator, I don't believe that we will ever have a definitive, one size fits all definition for these types of things. Every single attack will be have to handled on a case by case basis and you will have to judge the damaged that was caused, who made attack, was it just a non-state actor, or just a malicious hacker. We'd have to go after that person in terms of criminal activity. So I don't believe we're going to ever a have a specific definite that says, "if this happens, we will trigger this response." Each one, will be handled in a case by case basis and be proportioned. (UNKNOWN) Well, thank you. And, Mr. Chair (ph), I think of lack of clarity though, the only concern that I have is that you're not establishing some level of known deterrent. I understand that complexities of it, I've worked in the field but I think that without that clarity, you're more likely to have more things that you're going to have to look and figure out to do in situations or response. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MCCAIN: (OFF-MIKE) (UNKNOWN) Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, today, on a really important topic. I believe, and I was looking for transcript but at the joint press conference between President Xi and President Obama; the president of China, I think publicly stated that, "They don't engage in these kind of cyber activities." Was that an accurate statement, if that was indeed what he said, in terms of cyber-warfare? It's pretty remarkable if you're in a press conference with another head of state and you just say something that seems to be pretty blatantly false. CLAPPER: Well, it is and I think apart from the statements, at least for our part, it'll be, what happens now? Will there be a change in their behavior? And I said earlier, well, hope spring eternal. But I personally am somewhat of a skeptic. But it will be our responsibility to look for the presence or absence of their proving (ph) of intellectual property and other information. (UNKNOWN) And were any of you gentleman, or all of you gentlemen, consulted on the terms of the agreement? CLAPPER: We were aware of the negotiations but at least from -- normally, intelligence wouldn't be a voice or shaper of policy for electives between two heads of state. I think our responsibility is to report what they do. WORK: We participated in the build-up of the visit in terms of policy development, et cetera. But in terms of what went on between the two leaders of the nations, we were not directly consulted. (UNKNOWN) Admiral? ROGERS: And I was aware of the ongoing process and like Secretary Work, same thing, part of the broad effort in preparation for the visit. (UNKNOWN) But you weren't, you didn't see the terms of this agreement before the -- did you Mr. Secretary? Let's assume, you know, kind of, past is prologue here, and you know, we're talking intellectual property. As you know, our country's been trying to get the Chinese from -- to stop stealing U.S. intellectual property for decades really, and it hasn't really worked out very well. If -- let's assume that the -- that this agreement, that there is some additional cyber theft that we can attribute to China, what would you recommend the actions of the United States should be, particularly in light of this agreement? WORK (?): I wouldn't be able to answer that as -- I would have to know what the degree of the activity would be. (UNKNOWN) Let's say another OPM kind of activity? WORK (?): I think that we -- the Department of Defense would recommend a very vigorous response. (UNKNOWN) And, Mr. Secretary, what would -- what would you -- I mean, just give me a sense of what that would be. Sanctions, retaliation? WORK: Could be any of those, Senator, maybe all of the above. It will depend upon the severity of the -- of the activity. But, again, I know this is -- I know this is a big point of contention with the committee. It is -- we are serious about cost imposition and our statement is if you participate in that -- this activity, we will seek some type of measure which imposes costs upon you. And we just do not think it's a proportional cyber-attack for a cyber-attack. It might be something entirely different like a criminal indictment or sanctions or some other thing. (UNKNOWN) Let me ask kind of a related question for all three of you. How -- and I know you've been discussing this so I'm sorry if I'm kind of going over areas that we've already discussed, but help us think through the issue of rules of engagement here. I mean, we have rules of engagement in so many other spheres of the military that are well established. How do we think through these issues which I think in some ways are the fundamental aspects of what we do in response to cyber-attacks? Admiral, do you want to take a stab at that? ROGERS: So if you look at the defensive side, I'm pretty comfortable that we've got a good, broad recognition of what is permissible within a rules of engagement framework. (UNKNOWN) Do we? I mean, between us and other nations? ROGERS: I -- I -- I wouldn't -- if you define it between us and other nations, I wouldn't know. I apologize. I don't know if (inaudible)_ question was in a -- was in a DOD kind of responsive framework. If you want to expand it to a broader set of nations, then it's probably fair to say no. CLAPPER: I would agree. I think when it comes to offensive -- if -- if you're thinking about offensive cyber warfare, we probably do not have rules -- defined rules of engagement. WORK: Agree with what Director Clapper said earlier, Senator, that this really is the Wild West right now. There's a lot of activity going on, both from nation state actors all the way down to criminals. And so sorting through each of the different attacks and trying to attribute what happened and who it came from and who was responsible for it, all -- all demand specific responses on these attacks. But I agree totally with the committee that we need to strengthen our deterrence posture, and the best way to do that is continue to work through these things and make sure that everyone knows that there will be some type of cost. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MCCAIN: The committee would also like to know when there's going to be a policy that would fit in to these attacks and would then be much more easily responded to if we had a policy as mandated by the 2014 defense authorization bill. I thank the witnesses for a very helpful hearing. I know that they're very busy and we -- the committee appreciates your appearance here today. Thank you. CQ Transcriptions, Sept. 29, 2015List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: SEN. JOHN MCCAIN, R-ARIZ. CHAIRMAN SEN. JAMES M. INHOFE, R-OKLA. SEN. JEFF SESSIONS, R-ALA. SEN. ROGER WICKER, R-MISS. SEN. KELLY AYOTTE, R-N.H. SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM, R-S.C. SEN. DEB FISCHER, R-NEB. SEN. TED CRUZ, R-TEXAS SEN. MIKE LEE, R-UTAH SEN. TOM COTTON, R-ARK. SEN. MIKE ROUNDS, R-S.D. SEN. JONI ERNST, R-IOWA SEN. THOM TILLIS, R-N.C. SEN. DAN SULLIVAN, R-ALASKA SEN. JACK REED, D-R.I. RANKING MEMBER SEN. BILL NELSON, D-FLA. SEN. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, D-MO. SEN. JOE MANCHIN III, D-W.VA. SEN. JEANNE SHAHEEN, D-N.H. SEN. KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, D-N.Y. SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, D-CONN. SEN. JOE DONNELLY, D-IND. SEN. MAZIE K. HIRONO, D-HAWAII SEN. TIM KAINE, D-VA. SEN. MARTIN HEINRICH, D-N.M. SEN. ANGUS KING, I-MAINE WITNESSES: JAMES R. CLAPPER JR., DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BOB WORK ADMIRAL MICHAEL S. ROGERS (USN), DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AND COMMANDER, U.S. CYBER COMMAND

Young asian brunette woman smile touch face against marsala copyspace

FTG OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARING ON THE NOMINATION OF JUDGE JOHN G. ROBERTS TO BE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT I did so because there were so many testimonials about what a fine lawyer you are, what a fine human being you are, and I voted for you. But there's more in this vote. Senator DeWine just spoke about the man as opposed to the legal automaton. Yesterday morning you spoke, I thought, eloquently in answering Senator Specter's questions on Roe. You discussed stare decisis as fully as I have ever heard it discussed. I'm not a lawyer. I learned a lot from listening to you. You discussed the right to privacy. You were very full and forward- speaking. And then after lunch it was as if you shut down and became very cautious. So my first question: Did anybody caution you between the morning and the afternoon sessions? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator, no. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Has anyone, when you were being interviewed for this position, ever asked your opinion on Roe? JUDGE ROBERTS: No. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay, that's good to know. Nineteen seventy- three, 2005, 32 years, over three generations of women have come really to feel that finally they have some autonomy over their bodies. And, you know, women are all different. Many of them are very pro- life. Many are pro-choice. People have different religious views, moral views. So it's this big, diverse cosmopolitan of women. But the growth has been enormous, and the ability of women to succeed -- I mean, I went into the workforce at the same time Sandra Day O'Connor did, with a year's graduate work. The door was closed. It's now open, and women are so lucky. And it seems to me that the living Constitution is that each person in this great country, man or woman, rich or poor, white or black, whatever it might be, can really reach their full potential. And I guess what has begun to concern me a little bit is Judge Roberts, the legal automaton, as opposed to Judge Roberts, the man, because I've heard so many times, you know, "I can't really say because it may come before me." And yet I don't expect you to say what you would do with Roe, one way or another. But I do expect to know a little bit more about how you feel and how you think as a man, because you're a very young man to be chief justice. You could be chief justice for 40 years. That's a very long time. And because of the division -- and there's also a lot of fear out there where this new court, now with potentially two new justices, is going to go, whether you've got the ability to bring that court together to end the 5-4 decisions, to see the big decisions are made so that they represent a much greater consensus. And I'm trying to find out and see, are those qualities really there? I was interested in a colloquy you had with Senator Biden on the end of life. And he used the word -- asked a number of legal questions. And then he says, "Okay, just talk to me as a father and tell me." Now, I've been through two end-of-life situations, one with my husband, one with my father, both suffering terrible cancers, a lot of pain, enormous debilitation. Let me ask this question this way. If you were in that situation with someone you deeply loved and you saw the suffering, who would you want to listen to, your doctor or the government telling you what to do? To me it's that stark, because I've been through it. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, Senator, in that situation, obviously you want to talk and take into account the views and the heartfelt concerns of the loved one that you're trying to help in that situation, because you know how they're viewing this. You know what they mean when they're saying things like what their wishes are and their concerns are, and, of course, consulting with their physician. But it seems to me that in that situation you do want to understand and make sure that you appreciate the views of the loved one. And only you can do it, because -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That wasn't my question. JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. SEN. FEINSTEIN: I'm trying to see your feelings as a man. I'm not asking you for a legal view. JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't -- I wasn't trying to give a legal view. My point was that obviously you look to the views of the person involved. And if it's a loved one, you are the one who is in a position to make sure that you understand their views and can help them communicate those. SEN. FEINSTEIN: How would you feel if you were in that position? JUDGE ROBERTS: An end-of-life situation and suffering? You know, I do think it's one of those things that it's hard to conceptualize until you're there. I really would be hesitant to say, "This is what I would definitely want done or that's what I would definitely want done." You do need to confront that and appreciate all of the different concerns and impulses and considerations. SEN. FEINSTEIN: And every situation is different. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. And it's one of those things I think it's difficult to put yourself in that position and saying, "Well, with any degree of confidence, if I were suffering and confronting the end of life, this is what I would want to do or that is what I would want to do." I just -- you can theorize it and try to come up with your views or how you would confront -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That's right. All I'm saying is you wouldn't want the government telling you what to do. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I'm happy to say that as a general matter, because -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: That there should be a basic right of privacy. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that's getting into a legal question, and you don't want -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay, I won't go there. I won't go there. Let me go somewhere else. Commerce clause, the 14th Amendment; Lopez, which began a chain of about 36 cases, striking down major pieces of legislation. It's not easy to get a bill passed here. I mean, there are hearings. There are discussions. There are markups. There's one house. There's another house. There's a president. It goes through -- most of the time it's scrubbed pretty good before it gets to the president. Gun-free schools. Struck down in 1995; an impermissible use of a commerce clause. '96, Moses Lake, Washington; shooting in a school. '97, Bethel, Alaska; principal and one student killed. '97, Pearl, Mississippi; two students killed and seven wounded by a 16-year old. 1997, West Paducah; three students killed, five wounded. Stamps, Arkansas; two students wounded. Jonesboro, '98; four students, one teacher killed, 10 others wounded outside West Side Middle School. Edinboro, Pennsylvania; one teacher killed, two students. And on and on and on. An impermissible use of the commerce clause to prohibit possession of a weapon in schools. Now at what point does crime influence commerce? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I think it does. And one of the things that's important to understand about the Lopez decision as the court analyzed it -- and again, I'm not taking a position on whether it was correctly decided or not. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Right, right. JUDGE ROBERTS: But as the court analyzed it, one of the things about the act was that it did not have what's known as a jurisdictional requirement. It didn't have a requirement that the firearm be transported in interstate commerce; a requirement that I would think it would be easy to meet in most cases because gun -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: But the firearm is transported in interstate commerce. Maybe not when that student had it, but to get to the student, the firearm has been transported in interstate commerce. JUDGE ROBERTS: My point is that the fix in Lopez -- all that the court was saying was missing in there, or what was different about Lopez than many of the other cases, was that lack of a jurisdictional requirement. And if the act had been -- as I understand the court's analysis, if the act had required that, which I think again it's fairly easy to show in almost every case -- as you say, these guns are transported in interstate commerce -- then that would have been within the Congress' power under the commerce clause. I think it was an unusual feature of the legislation that it didn't have that requirement, as so many laws you. As you know, it often says, you know, in interstate commerce. And that's, at least as I understand the Lopez decision, what made it unusual. SEN. FEINSTEIN: That's very helpful. You might get it back again someday with that fix. Let me turn to something else that Senator Leahy asked a number of questions on, and that's the Constitution and executive power. I'm looking for the section, but the Constitution very clearly says that any treaty is treated as the supreme law of the land, right? And that no state or official can abrogate it? JUDGE ROBERTS: Right. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Which gives it the total weight of law. Can a president then decide not to follow a treaty? JUDGE ROBERTS: As a general matter, the answer is no. The treaty power -- as long as it's ratified, according to the requirements in the Constitution, by two-thirds of the Senate, you're perfectly correct. It is, under the supremacy clause, the supreme law of the land. Now I don't know if there are particular arguments about executive authority in that area with which I'm not familiar, and I don't mean to state categorically, but my general understanding is that treaties that are ratified -- and of course we have treaties that aren't ratified and executive agreements that aren't submitted for ratification and so on, but the treaty that's ratified by the Senate under the supremacy clause is part of the supreme law of the land. Now -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: So the conventions against torture and the Geneva Convention would apply? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. Now there are questions, of course, that arise under those and have arisen under those about interpreting the conventions and how they apply in particular cases to non-parties to the convention and so on. And as you know, those cases have been coming up and are being litigated. but that's an issue of what the convention means in a particular case, not whether as a general matter a treaty is binding. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Let me take you to the morning, yesterday morning, in stare decisis, because you specifically discussed, when you were asked about Roe and Casey precedent, specifically, as we said, workability, reliance, pragmatic considerations, changed facts or circumstances, and whether the underlying legal or constitutional doctrine would still be valid. Are there any other factors that you think should be considered? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well the court has been somewhat inconsistent on some other factors. They, for example, talk about in some cases the length of a precedent; the idea that the longer it's been on the books, the more people have conformed their conduct to it. In other cases they've suggested that's not such an important consideration. In Payne versus Tennessee, the case said it noted how closely divided the court was in the prior case as a factor. But in other cases, the court has said that's not a major consideration. So I put those factors on the table simply because in some cases the court looks to them, in others it doesn't. But I think the ones I mentioned yesterday are ones that apply in every case, including the settled expectations, the workability, whether the doctrinal bases of a decision have been eroded. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Yesterday, in answering Senator Specter on this very point, when you referred to Payne v. Tennessee, you did point out there were other considerations that come into play, and they're laid out again in Dickerson and in other cases -- Payne v. Tennessee, Agastini -- JUDGE ROBERTS: Mm-hmm. SEN. FEINSTEIN: -- and a variety of decisions where the court has explained when it will revisit a precedent and when it will not. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. FEINSTEIN: What do you think, when it should and should not? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I do think you do have to look at those criteria, and the ones that I pull from those various cases are, first of all, the basic principle that it's not enough that you think the decision was wrongly decided. That's not enough to justify revisiting it. Otherwise there'd be no role for precedent, no role for stare decisis. Second of all, one basis for reconsidering it is the issue of workability. If a precedent has turned out not to provide workable rules, if courts get different results in the similar cases because the -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Or if another case like Casey finds that Roe is workable. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, again, that's a different -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: The base -- JUDGE ROBERTS: -- that is a precedent of its own -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Right. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- that obviously -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Okay. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- would be looked at under the principles of stare decisis. The issue of the erosion of precedent. If you have a decision that's based on three different cases and two of them have been overruled, maybe that's a basis that justifies revisiting the prior precedent. The issue of settled expectations. The court has explained you look at the extent to which people have conformed their conduct to the rule and have developed settled expectations in connection with it. Perhaps the discussion earlier we had about the Dickerson case is a good example of that, where the chief justice thought Miranda was wrongly decided, but explained that it had become part of the established rules of police conduct, and he was going to respect those expectations. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Now yesterday you said this: "I agree with the Griswold court's conclusion that marital privacy extends to contraception and availability of that." The court since Griswold has grounded the privacy right discussed in that case in the liberty interest protected under the due process clause. Do you think that right of privacy that you're talking about there extends to single people as well as married people? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the courts held that in the Eisenstadt case which came shortly after Griswold, largely under principles of equal protection, and I don't have any quarrel with that conclusion in Eisenstadt. SEN. FEINSTEIN: So -- okay. Do you think that that same right extends beyond family choices, then, about a child's education? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well that's where it actually got started 80 years ago in the earliest cases. Meyer and Pierce involved questions about how to raise children, whether you could teach them a foreign language, whether you could send them to a private school. And those decisions are really what started that body of law. SEN. FEINSTEIN: I have another question I could ask, but you won't answer it, unless -- SEN. SPECTER: Give it a try, Dianne. Go ahead. (Laughter.) SEN. FEINSTEIN: Well, does it cover the right of a woman to decide whether to continue her pregnancy? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, Senator, as I've explained, that -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Yeah. JUDGE ROBERTS: -- is an area that's -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: It's apt to come before you and -- right. That message was well-conveyed. Could I ask you a couple of -- one question. I think I'll have time. In Acree v. the Republic of Iraq -- this was a case where 17 U.S. prisoners -- they were our people -- suffered severe beatings, starvation, mock executions, dark and unsanitary living conditions, et cetera, during the first Gulf War. And they sued the government of Iraq, the Iraqi intelligence services and Saddam Hussein for their brutal and inhumane treatment. The veterans won their case in district court in July of '03. They were awarded $959 million in damages. After the judgment, the Justice Department intervened in the suit to contest the district court's jurisdiction. The specific issue involved a statutory interpretation of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, passed in 2003. Justice argued that the statute gave the president the authority to change Iraq's designation as a state sponsor of terror, and thereby relieve it after the fact of its responsibilities for prior acts of terror. You wrote a concurring opinion in favor of overturning the district court's judgment. Although you agreed with the other two judges on the panel that the judgment should be reversed, you alone adopted the Department of Justice's argument that the statute granted the president total power to absolve Iraq of liability. You reached this conclusion while acknowledging that the question of statutory interpretation is close. (To the Chairman.) Can I ask my question? SEN. SPECTER: Yes, you may finish your question. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Do you believe that when, as in Acree, there's a close question of interpretation of a statute touching upon a foreign policy, that the executive deserves total deference? JUDGE ROBERTS: Oh, no, Senator. Whether the question is close or not, I don't think there's any situation where a court concludes that the executive deserves total deference. And that was not the basis of my decision. The judges were unanimous that the veterans were not entitled to relief. The panel was chosen from -- happened to be appointees of three different presidents. The view was unanimous that they were not entitled to relief. The other two judges concluded there was no cause of action available to them. I concluded that there was no jurisdiction, and wrote separately. The recognition that it was a close question is also reflected in the view of the other two judges in addressing my concern. They acknowledged that it was a close question, and I agreed with that. But you did have legislation that said that the president can determine that these laws do not apply, if he makes a determination under the criteria set forth in the statute. And he had done that. And my conclusion that that extended to the provision that otherwise would have allowed suit. The other two judges disagreed. They thought there was jurisdiction, but then concluded there was no right of action. So the end result of both of our position was the same. But it was not a question of deference, it was a question of interpreting the legal authority and consequences of an act that this body had passed and the president's finding under that. When it comes to interpreting questions of law -- I go back to the Marbury versus Madison -- that is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch. We don't defer to the executive, we don't defer to the legislature in making that final decision about what the law is. SEN. FEINSTEIN: To get confirmed, maybe you'll defer to the legislative a little bit. Thank you. JUDGE ROBERTS: We defer -- SEN. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. JUDGE ROBERTS: Just to clarify. We certainly defer in the standards of review that make sure that we're not (infringing ?). But the final decision about what's constitutional nor not rests with the judicial branch. The policy judgments, we certainly defer to the legislature. Thank you. SEN. FEINSTEIN: Thank you. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Senator Sessions. SEN. JEFF SESSIONS (R-AL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your leadership as we move forward expeditiously, I think, today, and I think in a helpful way. I think that the hearings have been very good. And, Judge Roberts, I salute you for your excellent manner and your forthrightness and professionalism as you answer these questions. You know, I hope we are moving away, Senator Feinstein, from divisiveness. We've got a -- in some ways we do have a divided country. But in other ways I think we have the potential to move together. And I, frankly, believe that one thing that causes divisiveness and frustration and angst is when a Supreme Court were to render an opinion that really is more a political or social policy decision rather than a legal decision; and when they say it amounts to the Constitution -- a constitutional provision, then that Supreme Court opinion can only be changed by two-thirds of both houses and three-fourths of the states. Do you understand that danger, Judge Roberts, in opinions? And is that perhaps one reason you think a judge should show modesty? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, it's part of what I mean when I say a certain humility should characterize the judicial function. Judges need to appreciate that the legitimacy of their action is confined to interpreting the law and not making it. And if they exceed that function and start making the law, I do think that raises legitimate concerns about legitimacy of their authority to do that. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I would observe that the American people are beginning to believe that is occurring, and I think it does threaten legitimacy of the court in a way that all of us who love the law should be concerned. And I do love the law. And I'm a big critic of the courts on these kind of activist cases. But I have practiced full-time before federal judges. And as I said earlier, I believe day after day justice is done. You have said that in your -- before your court you were impressed with the objectivity and fairness that the judges bring. Is the ideal of blindfolded justice, a neutral umpire, is that a romantic, naive ideal, or is that something that you believe we can and should strive to achieve in America? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I do know that there are sophisticated academic theorists, people who spend a lot more time theorizing in this area than I do, and a lot more -- a lot smarter than I am, addressing these issues who -- some of whom conclude that in particular cases it's difficult to do, it's difficult to avoid making the law while you're interpreting it, and they kind of throw up their hands and suggest that we shouldn't even try, therefore. And I don't agree with that. I think as a practical matter, as a pragmatic matter, judges every day know the difference between interpreting the law and making the law. Every day judges put aside their personal views and beliefs and apply the law, whether the result is one they would agree with as a legislator or not agree with. The question is what the law is, not what they think it should be. I've seen that on the Court of Appeals. I've seen that as a practicing lawyer before the court. That is the ideal. I'm sure judges, I'm sure justices don't always achieve it in every case because it's a human endeavor, and error is going to infect any human endeavor. But that is the ideal, and I think good judges, working hard, can not only achieve it, but also achieve it together in a collegial way and benefit from the insight and views of each other. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I thank you for that, and I would share those views. And I absolutely believe the strength of our nation is our good legal system, We've talked about the commerce clause, and there's been a lot of criticism of some of the cases. I think there have only been two significant commerce clause cases made in the last 40 years: Lopez and Morrison. Senator Feinstein and you had a nice exchange about Lopez. I would certainly agree with your analysis. Had the Congress placed in there a requirement that the firearm had been traveled in interstate commerce, I believe that statute would have been upheld. We could pass it again with that simple requirement and virtually every state -- virtually every firearm will have traveled in interstate commerce. A few states have manufacturers. When I was a federal prosecutor, I prosecuted a lot of those cases. As a young prosecutor, I was sort of an expert at it in the `70s, and I proved sometimes that the interstate commerce -- by simply putting agent on the thing -- there was no gun manufacturer in Alabama or it said made in Italy on it. I remember I got that affirmed one time as that's proof beyond a reasonable doubt that it was not made in Alabama. So Lopez, I believe, is a good decision. Also with regard to crime, I would note that we've always had that nexus with interstate commerce. As a federal prosecutor, it's not a prosecution for theft. It's prosecution for interstate transportation of stolen property. That's the federal crime. Theft is prosecuted only by the state courts unless it's from -- theft from an interstate shipment. That's a federal crime. It's not stealing an automobile. It's interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. The ITSMV is the federal crime. The Hobbs Act, the extortion act, to use against politicians you have to have an interstate nexus, and I've had cases where bribery was proven, but we were not able to prosecute it federally because it did not have an interstate nexus. RICO, even arson cases have to have it there. And so I just want to make sure that if -- let me ask you this. In general, wouldn't you agree if someone in Pennsylvania picks up a rock and murders their neighbor, that is a crime unreachable by federal prosecution under traditional interpretations of the commerce clause and the reach of the federal government? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, again, barring special circumstances of the sort you were talking about, that's generally something addressed by state authorities. SEN. SESSIONS: So we need to get this thing straight. We have some who complain we're federalizing too many crimes and then complain that we're striking down some that go too far. States should prosecute these cases locally and effectively, and should do that: guns, schools and guns and that kind of thing. And in the Violence Against Women's Act there was a commerce clause case where a woman was raped and then sued the people who attacked -- assaulted her and raped her. She wanted to sue in federal court under the Violence Against Women's Act, and what the court held there was, as I read it, that the -- there was a -- that it had limited -- the court limited Congress's power to provide for civil damages, money damages. She could sue that rapist in state court, but not for money damages in federal court. Is that the holding of that case? JUDGE ROBERTS: That's my understanding what the court held in the Morrison case, yes. SEN. SESSIONS: And I don't think it's an utterly extreme position. It certainly did not gut the Violence Against Women Act. It has a whole -- so many more provisions then just that. If the action had been against a private business, could the damages have been rendered in that case? JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm not sure I know the answer to that, Senator. SEN. SESSIONS: I'll take the follow-up. The Garrett case that several people have mentioned involved the University of Alabama in a lawsuit against the state institution, claiming violation of the disabilities act. The state defended on the grounds that you could sue the state of Alabama for back pay, you could sue the state of Alabama to get your job back, you could sue the state of Alabama and get an injunction against the state to not discriminate again in the future, but under the sovereign immunity doctrine that protects a state from lawsuits, you couldn't sue them for money damages. Now Senator Cornyn was attorney general of his state, and Attorney generals like Attorney General -- now Judge -- Bill Pryor, who defended Alabama, raised that defense. And I don't think it's a bogus defense. I think it's a legitimate concern. Judge, do you recall where -- the doctrine that's so famous in the law, that the power to sue is the power to destroy? Do you remember where that came from in our legal history? JUDGE ROBERTS: I remember tax opinions talking about it, but -- the power to tax being the power to destroy. But -- SEN. SESSIONS: I think the doctrine has been applied to the states. We attorney generals are familiar with it, under the sovereign immunity that the states have. If you're empowered to sue the state of Alabama in federal court, then you have virtually the power to destroy that state, financially, if there's no real limit on it. And so we've always provided and the states have provided a sovereign immunity that the states are -- only allow themselves to be sued under certain circumstances, and you cannot just sue them unnecessarily. I know Senator Mark Pryor, our Democratic colleague, signed on the brief for the state of Alabama in the Garrett case, taking this position. And the Supreme Court ruled with it. So -- I also would note that it did not in any way destroy the disabilities act. It applied to only -- state employees only make up about 3.7 percent of the employees in the nation that might be covered by that. So I think that -- there's been some healthy trends in reestablishing that there's some limit to the reach of the commerce clause. Wouldn't -- would not you agree? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the interesting thing in the court's most recent decision is the medical marijuana decision in Raich case. And the court there looked at the Lopez and Morrison decisions and tried to put them in context and said -- because the argument there was based on Lopez and Morrison, saying this is beyond Congress's power. And the court said those are only two of our cases, and they need to be put in the broad sweep of commerce clause precedents for over 200 years. Yes, they're two cases, and it had been, I think, 65, 70 years since the court had focused on limitation of -- under the commerce clause and concluded that it was beyond Congress's power. But the Raich case concluded this was within Congress' power. They said don't -- it's not as if Lopez and Morrison are setting -- junking all that came before. They just need to be considered in the broad context. And, of course, there's decision after decision, going back to Gibbons v. Ogden, one of Chief Justice John Marshall's early opinions, about the scope of Congress' power and the recognition under the constitutional scheme that it is a broad grant of power, and the recognition that this body has the authority to determine when issues affecting interstate commerce merit a legislative response at the federal level. I think that's -- SEN. SESSIONS: Well, I think you're going to another subject. But I think you're correct. These are some difficult areas. And the court need(s) to give a lot of attention to (it). But some recognition that there are limits to federal reach is, I think, legitimate for a court. Judge, are you aware of the salary that you'll be paid? When you become -- if you're so fortunate -- JUDGE ROBERTS: In a vague way, yes. SEN. SESSIONS: And I suppose you were, when you were affirmed to the Court of Appeals. JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. SESSIONS: So, you're not going to be back next week asking for a pay raise, are you? (Light laughter.) JUDGE ROBERTS: Not next week, no. (Laughter.) SEN. SESSIONS: Chief was pretty -- always over here knocking on our door about pay raises. But, you know, we have a deficit in our country -- (laughter) -- and you are paid the same -- I guess the chief may be paid more than senators. But for the most part, judges are paid what members of Congress are paid. And I, frankly, am dubious that we should give ourselves big pay raises when we can't balance the budget. I also chair the Court subcommittee -- Courts and Administration. And as chief, you have a serious responsibility with regard to managing and providing guidance to the Congress on the needs of the court system. I know that -- I'm sure that you will do that with great skill and determination. But let me ask you, will you also seek to manage that court system -- and I hesitate, but I will use the word "bureaucracy" at times -- effectively and efficiently and keep it to be -- keep it as lean and effective a management team and maintain the -- as tight a budget as you can maintain? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, if I am confirmed, Senator, the answer is -- is yes. I am aware that there is, for example, the administrative office, and they provide value services to judges around the country. As a consumer of their services for the past two years, I have, certainly, particular views about where I think they're effective and helpful to judges, and other areas where, like any bureaucracy, where I think they can do better. It is an area where my first priority is going to be to listen, because I'm sure there are many considerations of which I'm not aware that are very important for the chief justice to take into account. And after listening, I'll try to make the best decisions I can about administering that system. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, there are a lot of problems. Our judges are not happy with the General Services Administration, and sometimes GSA's not happy with the judges, and sometimes judges overreach -- and want to be treated awfully specially. And so, I think you have a challenge there. I would look forward to working with you. If you'll help us make sure that your court system is lean and efficient and productive, we'll try to make sure that you have sufficient resources to do those jobs. One more thing, and -- I'd just like to inquire about, and that deals with stare decisis, the deference you give to a prior decision of the Supreme Court. And you've mentioned a number of factors, and I recognize those as valid and worthy of great consideration. But it almost strikes me that it's a bit circular. In other words, the court is creating a wall around its opinions to try to avoid seeing them overruled. Isn't it true that your first oath is to enforce the Constitution as God gives you the ability to understand it, and that sometimes decisions have to be reversed if they are contrary to a fair and just reading of the Constitution? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. The oath we take is to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States. That's true. And the way judges go about that is within a system of precedent. And consistent with rules of stare decisis, no judge starts the day by opening a blank slate and say, what should the Constitution mean today? You operate within those systems of precedence. That's the best way that we judges have determined to interpret the Constitution and laws consistent with principles of stare decisis. SEN. SESSIONS: Judge, I'll just conclude with noting that I remember when the court in the Ninth Circuit ruled striking down the Pledge of Allegiance. The then majority leader, Tom Daschle, came to the floor, as now majority leader Harry Reid did, at the same afternoon, and they criticized the opinion and criticized the Ninth Circuit and expressed concern about activism in that circuit, which I have done often myself. But I responded that my concern was not so much with the circuit, but with the confusing number of opinions from the Supreme Court, and that I had no doubt that there was Supreme Court authority that would justify the Ninth Circuit rendering, or ruling that they did. And I say that because we've just received word today that a judge in San Francisco has upheld -- has ruled that the pledge's reference to "one nation under God" violates the Constitution and should be stricken down. So that case is going to be winding its way forward. I'm not going to ask you to comment on it because it will obviously come before you. But will you tell us whether or not you are concerned about the inconsistencies of these opinions, and will you work to try to establish a body of law in the Supreme Court that recommends -- recognizes the free exercise rights of American citizens in regard to religion and to avoid a state establishment of religion? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, we talked about this in the committee hearings on a couple of occasions, and I think everyone would agree that the religion jurisprudence under the First Amendment, the establishment clause and the free exercise clause could be clearer. The Ten Commandments cases are the example right at hand. You have two decisions of the Supreme Court; only one justice thinks both are right. That is an area in which I think the court can redouble its efforts to try to come to some consistency in its approach. Now, it obviously is an area -- the cases depend in a very significant way on the particular facts. And anytime that's the case, the differences may be explained by the facts. You do have the two provisions, as your question recognized: the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. And I -- as I've said before, I think that both of those are animated by the principle that the framers intended the rights of full citizenship to be available to all citizens without regard to their religious belief or lack of religious belief. That, I think, is the underlying principle, and hopefully the court's precedents over the years will continue to give life to that ideal. SEN. SESSIONS: Well, thank you, Judge Roberts. You have by your testimony validated the high opinions that so many have of you. I am confident you would make a great chief justice. JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator. SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Feingold? SEN. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge, let me start off by taking a couple of new topics. In September 1985 when you were in the White House counsel's office you recommended deleting the following line from the presidential briefing materials: quote, "As far as our best scientists have been able to determine, the AIDS virus is not transmitted through casual or routine contact," unquote. You said at the time that the conclusion was in dispute. We now know, of course, that the line is completely accurate. But I would say we also knew that then. The Center for Disease Control guidelines issued the month before you wanted to delete that line said the following: quote, "Casual person-to-person contact as would occur amongst school children appears to pose no risk," unquote. Major news organizations had reported the CDC's conclusion. In fact, the CDC had said as early as 1982 that it was unlikely that HIV could be spread through casual contact. JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm sorry, as early as when? SEN. FEINGOLD: As 1982 -- JUDGE ROBERTS: Oh. SEN. FEINGOLD: -- that it was unlikely that HIV could be spread through casual contact. Why did -- why did you recommend that that line be deleted? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, for the reason I gave in the memorandum. This was the -- a statement by the president, and I just wanted to -- didn't want the president giving out medical advice if it was a subject of some uncertainty. I obviously was not a medical expert, and you said the CDC had issued a report a month before. Well, it -- earlier in your commentary. I don't know what the 1982 issue was. But I just thought it was -- it's purely a matter of caution and prudence to have the president make a pronouncement on a -- you have to remember, this was at the very beginning of the -- AIDS coming into public consciousness, and I was just concerned that the president not be giving out medical statements if people weren't absolutely sure that it was correct. So -- . SEN. FEINGOLD: Let me follow on that a little bit. It certainly was a(n) early time, and also a critical time. I'm wondering what you did to check, or have someone check on these facts. I mean, it -- you must have known that the issue was so important the president was saying something like this, that it could have given a great reassurance to people all over the country as well as helping children infected with the AIDS virus to live happier and more normal lives to know that this was the medical conclusion. So I'm just wondering why you wouldn't check it out a little more. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, and -- I mean, I -- the -- the flip side of that, Senator, of course, is if turned out to be wrong, it could have been disastrous to have the president announcing -- because the president wasn't a medical expert, either. And I'm sure my suggestion would have caused the people drafting the president's speech to go back, and if they thought they were convinced and they were sure, then that's what would have gone in there. It was just a question of concern. I wanted to make sure that they were 100 percent confident that what the president was going to be saying about a medical issue was -- they had complete confidence in it. I don't know actually whether they took it out or left it in, but at least it caused them to focus - SEN. FEINGOLD: I don't want to belabor it, but I think that was a great opportunity for presidential leadership and reassurance and would just respectfully disagree with your judgment there. JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, my judgment -- just so I could -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Fair enough. JUDGE ROBERTS: It wasn't my medical judgment. SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand. JUDGE ROBERTS: The impact of my suggestion was obviously to cause the people who wanted that in there to go back and make sure they were sure that they wanted the president of the United States issuing a medical statement. SEN. FEINGOLD: I think it was pretty certain at that time what the medical view was, as indicated by the medical community of our own government. But I'll leave it at that. Do you believe that the Congress has the power under the Constitution to prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians in employment? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't know if that's an issue that's going to come before the courts. I don't know if Congress has taken that step yet. And until it does, I think that's an issue that I have to maintain some silence on. I think -- personally I believe that everybody should be treated with dignity in this area and respect. The legal question of Congress's authority to address that, though, is one that could come before the courts, and so I'm - SEN. FEINGOLD: Could you imagine an argument that would be contrary to that view - JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I don't know what arguments people would make. I just know that I shouldn't be expressing an opinion on any issues that could come before the court. SEN. FEINGOLD: Let's go to something else then. I'd like to hear your views about the Second Amendment, the right to bear arms. This is an amendment where there is a real shortage of jurisprudence. You mentioned the Third Amendment with even less jurisprudence, but the Second Amendment's close. So I think you can maybe help us understand your approach to interpreting the Constitution by saying a bit about it. The Second Amendment raises interesting questions about a constitutional interpretation. I read the Second Amendment as providing an individual right to keep and bear arms as opposed to only a collective right. Individual Americans have a constitutional right to own and use guns, and there are a number of actions that legislatures should not take, in my view, to restrict gun ownership. The modern Supreme Court has only heard one case interpreting the Second Amendment. That case is U.S. versus Miller. It was heard in 1939. And the court indicated that it saw the right to bear arms as a collective right. In a second case, U.S. versus Emerson, the court denied cert and let stand a lower court opinion that upheld a statute banning gun possession by individuals subject to a restraining order under -- against a Second Amendment challenge. The appeals court viewed the right to bear arms as an individual right. The Supreme Court declined to review the appeals court decision. So what is your view of the Second Amendment? Do you support one or the other of the views of what the -- what was intended by that amendment? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yeah. Well, I mean, your quite right that there is a dispute among the circuit courts. It's really a conflict among the circuits. The 5th Circuit -- I think it was in the Emerson case, if I'm remembering it correctly -- agreed that -- with what I understand to be your view, that this protects an individual right. But they went on to say that the right was not infringed in that case. They upheld the regulation there. The 9th Circuit has taken a different view. And I don't remember the name of the case now, but a very recent case from the 9th Circuit has taken the opposite view, that it protects only a collective right, as they said; in other words, it's only the right of a militia to possess arms, and not an individual right. Particularly since you have this conflict, cert was denied in the Emerson case. I'm not sure it's been sought in the other one or will be. That's the sort of issue that's likely to come before the Supreme Court, when you have conflicting views. I know the Miller case sidestepped that issue. An argument was made back in 1939 that this provides only a collective right, and the court didn't address that. They said instead that the firearm at issue there -- I think it was a sawed-off shotgun -- is not the type of weapon protected under the militia aspect of the Second Amendment. So people try to read into the tea leaves about Miller and what would come out on this issue, but that's still very much an open issue. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, I understand that a case could come before you. I'm wondering if you would anticipate that in such a case that a serious question would be which interpretation is correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, any time you have two different courts of appeals taking opposite positions, I think you have to regard that as a serious question. That's not expressing a view one way or the other; it's just saying I know the 9th Circuit thinks it's only a collective right, I know the 5th Circuit thinks it's an individual right, and I know the job of the Supreme Court is to resolve circuit conflicts. So I do think that issue is one that's likely to come before the court. SEN. FEINGOLD: I'd like to revisit the Hamdi issue. I asked you which of the four opinions in the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld best approximates your view on the executive's power to designate enemy combatants, and you refused to answer that question because the issue might return to the court. I want to press you a bit on that. In Hamdi, there were four different opinions -- and by the way, I checked, because you mentioned Youngstown, and all four opinions cited the Youngstown Sheet & Tube versus Sawyer case. Both Justice Thomas's dissent and Justice Ginsburg and Souter concurring cited Jackson's opinion in the Youngstown case, and they came to completely different conclusions. So your answer that you would apply that principle doesn't help me very much in understanding your view of this. We know where all eight other members of the court stand on these opinions. They -- in their opinions they wrote -- either wrote or joined one of them. Yet all eight of them will hear the next case that raises similar issues. No one is suggesting that their independence or impartiality in the next case has been compromised. Now Mr. Hamdi, of course, has left the country, so the precise facts of his case will never return to the court. Of course, if a member of the court expressed a view outside of the court on a specific case that was headed to court, that might be cause for recusal, as Justice Scalia recognized when he recused himself from the Pledge of Allegiance case a terms ago after discussing it in a speech. But obviously Justice Scalia can participate in the next case involving the questions at issue in Hamdi, even though we know exactly what he thinks about that decision. So I guess I want to know why are you different? I'm not asking for a commitment on a particular case. I recognize that your views might change once you're on the court and hear the arguments and discuss the issue with your colleagues. But why shouldn't the public have some idea of where you stand today on these crucial questions concerning the power of the government to jail them without charge or access to counsel in a time of war? They know a great deal about how each of the other justices approach these issues. Why is your situation different? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, because each of the other eight justices came to their views in those cases through the judicial process. They confronted that issue with an open mind. They read the briefs presented by the arguments -- by the parties and the arguments the parties presented. They researched the precedents as a judge. They heard the argument in the case. They sat in the conference room, just the nine of them on the court, and debated the issues and came to their conclusions as part of the judicial process. You're now asking me for my opinion outside of that process, not after hearing the arguments, not after reading the briefs, not after participating with the other judges as part of the collegial process, not after sitting in the conference room and discussing with them their views, being open to their considered views of the case, not after going through the process of writing an opinion, which I have found from personal experience and from observation often leads to a change in views, the process of the opinion writing. You can't -- if the opinion turns out it doesn't write; you have to change the result. The -- the discipline of writing helps lead you to the right result. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, what would be the harm -- JUDGE ROBERTS: You're asking for -- I'm sorry -- you're asking me for my views, you know, right here without going through any of that process. SEN. FEINGOLD: What would be the harm, Judge, if we got your views at this point and then that process caused you to come to a different conclusion, as it appropriately should? What would be the harm? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, the harm would be affected the appearance of impartiality in the administration of justice. The people who would be arguing in that future case should not look at me and say, "Well, there's somebody who under oath testified that I should lose this case, because this is his view that he testified to." They're entitled to have someone consider their case through the whole process I've just described, not testifying under oath in response to a question at a confirmation hearing. I think that is the difference between the views expressed in the prior precedent by other justices in the judicial process and why -- as has been the view of all of those justices. Every one of those justices who participated in that case took the same view with respect to questions concerning cases that might come before them as I'm taking here. SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand your view. I think it's narrow. I had the experience of having one of my bills go before the Supreme Court, and I know I didn't have, as we say in Wisconsin, a snowball's chance with a couple of the justices because of what -- how they had ruled previously. But I didn't think that made the process in any way tainted that I knew that simply weren't going to agree with this statute. But I recognize your limitations. Let me ask you about something else, the Hamdan matter. Yesterday you refused to answer any questions regarding your conduct in the Hamdan versus Rumsfeld case. But today you answered questions from Senator Coburn regarding this matter. So I want to follow up in order to make sure the record is complete. You interviewed with the attorney general of the United States concerning a possible opening on the Supreme Court on April 1, 2005. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. The specifics of the details I discussed in the response to the committee's questionnaire. SEN. FEINGOLD: And that was six days before the oral argument in the Hamdan case. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't remember the exact date of it. I know it was shortly before that, yeah. SEN. FEINGOLD: You had further interviews on May 3rd concerning a possible appointment to the court with numerous White House officials, including Karl Rove, the vice president and the White House counsel before the decision in the Hamdan case was released. Isn't that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: The decision was June 15th. SEN. FEINGOLD: The question here is just did you have further interviews on May 3rd concerning a possible appointment to the court? JUDGE ROBERTS: May 3rd, yes. Whatever was -- I don't remember the exact dates, but whatever was -- SEN. FEINGOLD: You had interviews with those individuals. The record seems to indicate it was on May 3rd -- JUDGE ROBERTS: In the Senate questioning in it, right. SEN. FEINGOLD: You met again with Ms. Myers, the White House counsel, on May 23rd. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I'm relying on the -- if that's what I said in the questionnaire, yes. I don't have an independent recollection. SEN. FEINGOLD: You have no reason to doubt that those facts are correct. You never informed counsel in this case of these meetings, did you? JUDGE ROBERTS: I did not, no. SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Gonzales's advice to the president concerning the Geneva Conventions was an issue in the case. Isn't that right? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't want to discuss anything about what's at issue in the case. The case is still pending and pending before the Supreme Court. SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, how about this one: President Bush was named a defendant in the case, right? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, in his official capacity. SEN. FEINGOLD: The Hamdan decision was released on July 15th. Is it your testimony that no work on that decision took place after July 1? JUDGE ROBERTS: No. I didn't -- that was not my testimony. The opinions in the D.C. Circuit -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Or is it your testimony now that no work on that decision took place after July 1? JUDGE ROBERTS: Opinions in the D.C. Circuit are complete and circulated to the panel a week before they're released. That was my -- the conclusion of when work was complete -- again, I wasn't the author of the opinion -- would have been a week before it was released. SEN. FEINGOLD: Did you read over the opinion of the concurrence after July 1? Was there any editing that took place after that date? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't recall, Senator. And -- SEN. FEINGOLD: But when was the issue of whether you should recuse yourself from this case -when did that first come to your attention? JUDGE ROBERTS: I saw and was made aware of an article -- I think it was an article. I don't remember when that took place -- whenever the article was published. And then I understand the legal opinions on the other side were requested by, I believe, the chairman. And I know that those were public as well. SEN. FEINGOLD: You don't recall when this matter first came up? I think it would be something you'd remember is when somebody suggested you should have recused yourself - JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't remember the date of the -- SEN. FEINGOLD: How about the approximate time? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think it was sometime in July or -- SEN. FEINGOLD: Mr. Chairman, so the record will be complete, I'd like to submit the article from Slate magazine by Professors Gillers, Luban and Lubet and the letter sent to you responding to Professor Rotunda's criticism of their position. And I also want to submit an article by these three law professors that was published in the Los Angeles Times on this topic. I don't want to take any more time in this, but I think these -- SEN. SPECTER: Without objection, it will be made a part of the record. SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think these professors very convincingly answer Professor Rotunda's views and point out that his analysis of the case law is not particularly persuasive. And I would urge any of my colleagues who really want to understand the issue with Judge Roberts' participation in the case -- rather than just dismissing it because it's inconvenient that they take a look at it and actually see what the issues were here. But I do appreciate your answer to those questions. I will only be able to get the sum of my questions on the next subject and hopefully in the next round can continue. But Judge Roberts, as Senator Leahy mentioned earlier, when you came before the committee a couple of years ago, we discussed the fact that more than 100 people on death row have been exonerated and released, and in fact, I believe the number is now 121 people who we know were sentenced to die for crimes they did not commit. I want to follow up on the work that Senators Durbin and Leahy have done in discussing with you the Herrera case. I do differ with your characterization of the case. A solicitor general brief that you signed presented the issue as whether the Constitution, quote, "requires that a prisoner have the right to seek judicial review of a claim of newly discovered evidence," unquote. That is, the question was not how strong the evidence of innocence must be, as you seemed to be suggesting earlier, but whether the Constitution requires that there be some avenue for presenting evidence of innocence in federal court. Your brief argued that it does not. Now that brief also, as you know, contained a footnote that I'm going to ask you to comment on. It said, quote: "There's no reason to fear that there's a significant risk that an innocent person will be executed under the procedures that the states have in place. The direct review and collateral procedures that the federal government and the states have in place are more than ample to separate the guilty from the innocent." And yesterday you talked about the possible effect of DNA evidence on the legal framework in this type of case. In light of the many cases of innocent people ending up on death row that have come to light in the past decade, and aside from what was the ultimate issue at stake in that case, do you still agree with your statement from the government's Herrera brief? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that was the administration position at the time. It was one that the Supreme Court agreed with; 6 to 3 I think was the ruling. I know Justice O'Connor was in the majority. The issue -- and again, there was obviously argument at the time about what the issue really was in Herrera. And I thought it was quite inaccurate to view it as a case involving the question of whether actual innocence could be presented because there was -- it was a claim of newly discovered evidence. And it was a claim that somebody who had just died was actually the murderer. At the end of an exhaustive appeals to the state system, exhaustive collateral review through the state system, exhaustive collateral review through the federal system, is there an obligation to decide at that point that a new claim that somebody else committed the crime -- SEN. FEINGOLD: I'm just running out of time. I'm wondering if you just still stand by the statement? If you can just say yes or no? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, that was the administration position that was presented on that. SEN. FEINGOLD: All right. Well, let me cut to the quick on it. I'd like to know whether you think there's a risk that innocent people may be sentenced to death in today's criminal justice system. And I must say, Judge. Supreme Court justices do have the power of life and death in these matters. SEN. FEINGOLD: Senator, I think there is always a risk in any enterprise that is a human enterprise like the legal system. Obviously, the objective of the provision of the rights to a criminal defendant in trial, the provision of collateral review at the state level, the provision of collateral review at the federal level, the availability of, as you suggested, clemency. All of that is designed to ensure that the risk is as low as possible. There are issues that are going to be presented about the availability of DNA evidence, which may or may not help reduce the risk even further. There's always a risk. And obviously when you're dealing with something like capital punishment, the risk is something that has to be taken extremely seriously at every stage of the process. As we talked about more than two years ago at the prior hearing, I think the most effective way of minimizing that risk is to ensure that people facing that sanction have the best counsel available at every stage. As you know, from looking at this problem, the issue that comes up are questions that weren't raised that should have been raised if the person had a more capable lawyer, avenues that weren't pursued that should have been pursued if that lawyer had the resources. And those -- that's where I think the risk of wrongful conviction is going to be most effectively addressed -- ensuring the availability of competent counsel at every stage of the proceeding. SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Judge. JUDGE ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator. SEN. SPECTER: Thank you, Senator Feingold. Senator Graham? SEN. GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Roberts, your intellectual stamina impresses me because you can't see this on television. It must be 150 degrees in here. (Laughter.) And I just don't know how you're doing it, but I'm tremendously impressed. Mr. Chairman, I would like permission to introduce into the record some law professor's opinion that being interviewed for the Supreme Court vacancy when Judge Roberts was interviewed did not require him to recuse himself. And I'll do that at the appropriate time. SEN. SPECTER: Without objection, they will be made part of the record. SEN. GRAHAM: But let's think about that in kind of political terms. And I know that's not really your job. If we took this to its logical conclusion -- say, I was president. I don't think that's going to happen so you don't need to be overly worried about it. But you could pick someone to be chief justice from the court -- people sitting on the court. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: So if you had a judge you didn't particularly like, the best thing you could do is go talk to them about the job and they couldn't decide anything. Would that be the logical conclusion of this? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think that would be the logical conclusion to some of the things. SEN. GRAHAM: Well, I remember that if I'm president. (Laughter.) Now, on my record now, I don't think I should have the right to do that. That's part of the process. Some big things here. Were you proud to work for Ronald Reagan? JUDGE ROBERTS: Very much, Senator. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: During your time of working with Ronald Reagan, were you ever asked to take a legal position that you thought was unethical or not solid? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator. I was not. SEN. GRAHAM: We talked about the Voting Rights Act. Proportionality test, in the Reagan administration's view, was changing the Voting Rights Act to create its own harm. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: The concern that the attorney general had and the president was that changing the -- changing Section 2 to the so-called effects test would cause courts to adopt a proportionality requirement, that if elected representatives were not elected in proportion to the racial composition in a particular jurisdiction that there would be a violation shown that would have to be redressed. SEN. GRAHAM: Do you think it would be fair to try to suggest that because you supported that position that you're somehow racially insensitive? JUDGE ROBERTS: No, Senator. And I would resist the suggestion that I'm racially insensitive. I know why the phrase equal justice under law is carved in marble above the Supreme Court entrance. It is because of the fundamental commitment of the rule of law to ensure equal justice for all people without regard to their race or ethnic background or gender. The courts are a place where people need to be able to go to secure a determination of their rights under the law in a totally unbiased way. That's a commitment all judges make when they take a judicial oath. SEN. GRAHAM: Knowing this will not end this line of inquiry, but at least trying to put my stamp on what I think we've found from this long discussion. Basically, the Supreme Court decided in Section 2 that the intent test was constitutionally sound. Is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: That was its determination in Mobile against Bolden. SEN. GRAHAM: And Senator Kennedy disagreed because he wanted a different test. And I respect him. He is one of the great -- first, he's not part of the Reagan revolution. I think we all can agree with that, so I don't expect him to buy into it. But I respect him greatly for his passion about his causes. He took it upon himself to try to change a Supreme Court ruling, to go away from the intent test to the effects test. And he was able to reach a political compromise with the administration. And I just want that to be part of the record, that to say that Ronald Reagan, or Judge Roberts, by embracing a concept approved by the court, equates to that administration or this person being insensitive to people of color in this country I think is very unfair and off base. You said something yesterday that was very compelling to me. I asked you could you express or articulate what you thought might be one of the big threats to the rule of law. And I believe you said judges overstepping their boundaries -- getting into the land of making the law, putting their social stamp on a cause, rather than interpreting law because that could, over time, in the eyes of the public, undermine the confidence in the court. Is that a correct summary? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. SEN. GRAHAM: Well, we have before us today, Judge Roberts, a legal opinion just issued -- hot off the presses -- that says the establishment clause of the Constitution apparently is violated if an American expresses -- recites -- the pledge of allegiance. You will be on the court, I hope, and you will use your best judgment of how to reconcile the 9th Circuit opinion. And I'm not asking you to tell us how you might rule. I am making a personal observation that this is an example, in my opinion, of where judges do not protect us from having the government impose religion upon us, but declare war on all things religious. And that is my personal view and opinion. That's why most Americans sometimes are dumbfounded about what's going on in the name of religion. No American wants the government to tell them how to worship, where to worship or if to worship. But when we exercise our right to worship, it bothers me greatly that judges who are un-elected confuse the concept between establishment and free exercise. And I will move on. I think it is one of the cases that is undermining the confidence in the judiciary. And I'm glad you're sensitive to that. The war on terror. In my past legal life, I've spent most of my legal career associated with the military. And I'm proud to be a military lawyer. I'm the only Reservist in the Senate. I sit as an Air Force court of criminal appeals judge. I handle the easy cases because I don't have a whole lot of time, and I help where I can. But I understand, I think, very well what it means to abide by the judicial canons of ethics -- not to tip your hand, not to compromise yourself to get promoted or to get put on the court -- promoted in the military or to get put on the court -- trying to please your boss, trying to please a senator. And my respect for you has gone up because you're unwilling to compromise your ethics, and I hope the Senate will understand that in the past other people were not required to do so. Are you familiar with the Geneva Convention? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. SEN. GRAHAM: Do you believe that the Geneva Convention, as a body of law -- that it has been good for America to be part of that convention? JUDGE ROBERTS: I do. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: Why? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, my understanding in general is it's an effort to bring civilized standards to conduct of war, a generally uncivilized enterprise throughout history, an effort to bring some protection and regularity to prisoners of war, in particular. And I think that's a very important international effort. SEN. GRAHAM: As Senator Kyl said, this will be the only time we'll actually get to talk. And I don't want to compromise your role as a judge. But I do want you to help me express some concepts here that America needs to be more understanding of. And I want to work with my Democratic friends to see if we can find some way to deal with this. We're dealing with an enemy that is not covered by the Geneva Convention. Al Qaeda, by their very structure and nature, are not signatories of the Geneva Convention and are not covered under its dictates. An enemy combatant -- are you familiar with that term in the law? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes, Senator. I am. SEN. GRAHAM: What would an enemy combatant be under American jurisprudence? Who would they be? JUDGE ROBERTS: Well, I really have to, I think -- SEN. GRAHAM: Fair enough. Fair enough. JUDGE ROBERTS: Those cases are both pending -- the ones that I've just cited are pending before the Supreme Court. And those issues are likely to come before. SEN. GRAHAM: Fair enough. The Geneva Convention doesn't cover al-Qaeda, but our president has said that anyone in our charge -- terrorist or not -- will be treated humanely. I applaud the president because, in fighting the war on terror, we need not become our enemy. Our strength as a nation is believing in the rule of law, even for those of the -- even for the worst of those that we may encounter. I admire Mr. Adams for representing the Red Coats. I cannot imagine how tough that must have been. But his willingness to take on the unpopular clause -- cause -- in the name of the rule of law has made it stronger. When the president said that we will treat everyone humanely -- even the worst of the worst -- I think he's brought out the best in who we are. But we're in a war, Judge Roberts, where the Geneva Convention doesn't apply. And we have before the courts a line of cases dealing with the dilemma this country faces. When you capture an enemy combatant, non-citizen, foreign terrorist, there's three things I think we must do. We must aggressively interrogate them without changing who we are. We must have the ability to keep them off the battlefield for a long period of time to protect our nation. And we must have a system to hold them accountable for some of the most horrible crimes imaginable. Justice Jackson was one of your favorite justices, is that correct? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think that's a fair description. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: He has indicated in the Youngstown Steel case that the presidency or the executive branch is at its strongest when it has concurrence with the legislative branch. Is that a fair summary of what he said? JUDGE ROBERTS: Yes. He divided up the area basically into three parts. And considering the executive's authority, he said when it has the support of Congress, it's at it's greatest. And obviously, when it's in opposition to Congress, it's at it's lowest ebb, as he put it. And he described a middle area in which it was sometimes difficult to tell whether Congress was supporting the action or not. SEN. GRAHAM: This is me speaking, not you. Congress is AWOL, ladies and gentlemen, in the war on terror when it comes to detention, interrogation and prosecution of enemy, non-citizen combatants. Justice Scalia has written eloquently that Congress has the power to get involved in these issues, and Congress is silent. What is the case -- is it the Rasul case -- where the Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, has given habeas corpus rights to a non-citizen, foreign terrorist? JUDGE ROBERTS: I think that's correct, Senator. Yes. SEN. GRAHAM: That is an amazing departure from what we've been as a nation for 200 years. I've been to Guantanamo Bay twice. The people running the prison tell me that 185 of detainees have lawyers in federal court. Justice Scalia says we've set up a situation where 94 different jurisdictions can hear habeas cases involving non-citizen, foreign terrorists. The people running the jail says this process is undermining our ability to get good information. And habeas corpus petition hearing -- would it allow a defense attorney to call a military commander in to answer for how this person was captured? JUDGE ROBERTS: I don't know, Senator. And I hesitate to opine on that without knowing. SEN. GRAHAM: The truth is that we've set up a situation where our military leaders and our military commanders and soldiers in the field can be called from all over the world, all over the country, to answer for why such a person is detained. We had a conversation in our office, my office. You said something to the effect