Two full frame shots of bees by the hundreds clinging to side of hive. MLS of Katimavik with people tree in comparative foreground. Distorted views of La Ronde shot through wide angle lens from skyride. First shot shows passengers in camera car, window frames. Second shot is clear of objects in foreground. Distorted HA view of people crossing one of the bridges over Expo canal in accelerated motion, hovercraft is shown whizzing by away from camera. HAS of crowd moving toward Place d'Accueil (off frame), buses bringing more visitors, cars speeding past on Bonaventure autoroute in background. HAS of crowd, focus on First nations man wearing headdress moving by. Level shot of three more Indigenous men. HAS of crowd. HAS of interior of US pavilion, visitors on floor below, others going up on long escalator. Vertical LAS of parachutes holding space capsule, roof of bubble. People moving up escalator. Man, two boys trying out astronaut seats. Moving circular designs in light. Side view of same, plastic tubing forming designs.

Timelapse of clouds in the night sky, tilting down to show cars on a highway. The moon is surrounded by a bright corona. This is an optical effect caused by the diffraction of light by water droplets in the clouds. Coronas are bluer in the centre with a reddish edge. The large building is the BMW headquarters and museum. Filmed in Munich, Bavaria, Germany.

Various vehicles being driven and changing lanes on a busy highway.

Various American Motors Films

Camera passes by suburban tract houses, kids play in yards, Woman dances in futuristic kitchen, View of more suburban tract houses, Chart labeled Residential Building Construction shows rate of construction in the 1930s, Still pictures (advertising photos) of: man looking at architectural plans, married couple gazing into crystal ball at image of new home, married couple trying to make sense of assembly plans, men sitting in a conference discussing blueprint, Hand points at drawing of three pie charts showing financial information, Cover of handbook titled Suggested Land Subdivision Regulations, Footage of suburban development, kids on bikes, men riding horses, all from the film "This Is Tomorrow.", Cover of magazine showing a large V with a drawing of a house behind it, Overhead view of cars on a freeway, Titles of an industrial film: The Asbestos-Cement Products Association Presents "According To Plan.", Man in suit and hat shows other man a sign advertising a lot for sale, Industrial film titles: "Better Housing News Flashes.", Text on screen: Housing Act Peps Building, Animated chart shows the decrease of new home construction in the 1930s, An array of newspaper clippings about new housing, Men work on a residential construction site, Construction workers lay brick and mortar in place at residential construction site, Men hammer nails into house, Men on ladder paint side of house, Construction workers sit in front of construction site and eat sandwiches, drink coffee, Cover of pamphlet: Amortized Mortgage - Government Insured, Emblem of The FHA reads: Better Housing Program, (The following footage can also be seen in "This Is Tomorrow"), Plane in flight, POV plane: View of land tracts below, Kid on roller skates rolls along paved pathway in front of suburban house, View of attractive houses, Row of suburban houses along neighborhood street, Men ride on horseback in country setting, Children run happily out of modern school building, Boys on bikes ride toward camera, with suburban houses in background, Boys on bikes ride under bridge, Newspaper delivery boy tosses paper onto stoop of modern building, Inside library woman places book on bookshelf, Housewife tends to laundry in washing machine then steps onto patio to join her girlfriends, Boys play in front of store, Woman shopper looks at cans in grocery aisle, Woman selects a head of lettuce, hands it to clerk who places it on scale, Young boy lifts grocery bag, Boys with wagons wait outside grocery store, Boys and girls walk into modern school building, Young woman paints a picture of the building in front of her, Boys ride bikes along paved paths in suburban development, Boy scoots along in his wagon, tosses newspapers to neighboring houses, Chapter III: FHA. HOME FOR VETERANS (1946), An explosion lights up the night sky, Soldier wearing steel helmet looks up from his foxhole and begins gazing at picture of a house, Soldier ducks for another explosion, reaches for his picture, Man and woman walk along road, man pushes baby carriage, Views of government buildings and the Capitol Building, Text on screen: National Housing Agency, Text on screen super imposed over images of people in offices and city settings:, Veterans Housing Project Is Launched To Help Solve Housing Emergency In Hundreds Of Cities, The Target: 2,700,000 Homes and Apartments by the end of 1947!, View of valley dotted by houses, graphic images of signs labeled 1945, 1946 and 1947 appear over the scene, Man brings a meeting to order, discusses a plan for housing, Man's finger points to drawings of houses, Men shake hands while visiting plots of land, View of residential area under construction, Man empties wheel barrow filled with bricks at construction site, Men lay fiberglass insulation in wood panels, Men use riveting guns to assemble parts of house, Men assemble walls of a prefabricated house, Man and woman walk toward newly erected house, Camera pans up apartment house under construction, Man in sailor uniform and wife examine an architectural model of a house, View of houses covering a landscape, Man in army uniform pushing baby carriage and wife walk wearily along road, CU man's face as he says "I've Got To Have A Home", Man and woman walk past the camera, then turn around and smile, Hand opens album-style book, first page reads REPORT TO HOME BUILDERS (1946), THE FOLLOWING IS COLOR FOOTAGE, Pages showing drawings of steel rods and modern structures are turned, Hand paints an illustration on page from book, Man signs a document with fountain pen, Wounded man in army uniform steps out of cab and walks toward house with cane, Wife runs out of the house and embraces him, they kiss, Page from pamphlet reads "Things People Plan To Buy First When Peace Comes", Hand holding pencil circles the percentage for Houses And Property, Array of magazines: American Builder, Engineering News, etc, Finger points to printed text in magazine, highlighted in red, Woman's hands open an issue of House Beautiful magazine, a picture of a living room is visible, Woman puts her feet on sofa and reads magazine, POV window looking down on street at cars on road below, Car pulls up to curb and parks, View of newly constructed homes, Array of steel girders. Nice suburban developments, Opening titles of industrial film: The Asbestos-Cement Products Association Husband and wife sit in living room looking at blueprints and architectural model of new house, Couple putting together a model of their dream house, Man moves the walls around, creating a new layout, Husband and wife look at large book of houses, Wife tells how things will be designed to we can see the children playing in the yard. Husband: "not more than six I hope", CU pages of binder showing illustrations of different kinds of houses, hand flips the pages, CU exterior wall of house, Row of suburban houses, Car pulls into garage of suburban house, SUBURAN DEVELOPMENTS IN WOODBURY GARDENS IN LONG ISLAND, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, MISSLE HILLS, GLASCO IN MISSOURI, EL DORADO RANCHO IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA all seen, in nice shots, Camera pans across new suburban development with identical houses, Men inspect the outside of house, point at roof, Illustrated map of America, Sign: Levittown. (GREAT!!!!!), View of Levittown village-style development, Norman Denny, Levitt employee speaks about the building materials, Boy dives off diving board of built-in swimming pool, Man stands by new house, writes notes on clipboard, he speaks to camera about Levittown, View of Levittown houses, Hand stretches to man and wife on sofa with a piece of building material, The husband takes the material, looks at it, hands it to his wife, Wife looks at it, smiles approvingly and places it on the model of the house, View of suburban house, Man in suit stands (ROY WEBB) in front of suburban house, speaks to camera about building quality housing developments, Husband and wife sit in builder's office, the husband discusses plan with builder and the wife reads a magazine, The husband and wife bicker over details of the house, Little boy stands over architectural model, plays with miniature plane, wife scolds the boy, Little boy wears toy guns, Blonde wife only interested in aesthetics, husband interested in practicalities "I don't know anything about pipes or wires" INCREADIBLY DATED, STEREOTYPED, Builder sits in between the husband and wife, tries to get them to compromise, View of New York Harbor with skyline in background, POV car driving on highway, View of suburban neighborhood (most likely Long Island), Bulldozers prepare lot for construction, View of Levittown development area. (more great developments between Philadelphia and New York), View of newly constructed houses on lots where lawn has not yet been put in, A Levittown Church on the corner of neighborhood, A Levittown playground, Sign: Levittown Shopping Center "America's Finest", View of empty lot of land. (SIMPLY GREAT), Bulldozers dig up land, View of suburban neighborhood with many houses in the background, View of house under construction, Fast-motion photography illustrates the construction of a house by laborers piece by piece all done in one day, Upon completion of the house, the footage returns to regular speed and the workers pose in front of the finished house, Man in tuxedo turns to camera and speaks to the camera, Man in tuxedo conducts a choir behind him as piano player accompanies and a bouncing ball appears over lyrics on screen, Song is sung to tune of Caissons Go Rolling Along. - "Youngstown Kitchens are keeping the lead" (a song about selling kitchen components!), Man in tuxedo and top hat dances with woman in gown and apron in a modern kitchen, CU hand pushes a disc through a slot in cabinet, Woman presses a button on a cabinet, Electric mixer beaters are lowered from cabinet and spin in a mixing bowl as woman looks on, Woman pushes a button, prompting a curved, glass-walled refrigerator to rotate, Woman places a cake pan under a glass dome and skips out of the kitchen, Woman changes into a variety of recreational outfits (stop-action photography): tennis outfit, golfing outfit, swimsuit, Woman returns to kitchen, finds a completely frosted cake under the glass dome, she closes her eyes and makes a wish, Man in his den (African masks on walls, bookcase, globe, etc.) removes press release from wire service machine and reads it aloud, faces camera, View of suburban houses. (seems to look like more Levitt type homes), Man sits at his desk and speaks to camera about FHA, View of newly constructed houses, identical, in new development, Man looks at architectural model, discusses his plans with the builder, Builder shows his projections to clients, CU chart of mortgage rates, Two men inspect a house under construction, they walk around the building site, Man discusses plan with three committee members (two men and a woman), they hold a conference, Still pictures: Brick wall, view of house with trees in front of it, various styles of houses ranging from colonial to ranch, Cars in a traffic jam in small town, Cars in a traffic jam on highway, Man looks annoyed in driver's seat, Couple quarrel in front seat of car stuck in traffic jam, Reflection in side mirror of woman applying lipstick, Montage of faces of men and women in driver's seats stuck in traffic, Aerial view of highway with several on and off ramps, POV driver on highway. (early Road Rage), CU car wheel driving on highway, Aerial view of cars on highway moving freely, Several angles of cars moving freely on highway, Cars drive on a highway overpass. (seems like LOS ANGELES), POV driver in car driving into a tunnel, In the darkness of the tunnel, text appears on screen: Don't Honk Your Horn, Raise Your Voice, Ask For Better Highways, And More Parking Space, It's Your Country, To Get The Green Light, Write Your State Capitol, Write Washington D.C, Write Your Hometown Officials, Postcard Your Newspaper Editors, Call Your Radio and TV Commentators, Support Your Highway Officials, And When You Vote, Vote For Your Right Of Way, Don't Honk Your Horn, The car emerges from the tunnel into the daylight, Aerial view of city, Housewife talks on telephone, smiles, hangs up phone, Housewife in kitchen talks to camera, walks toward sink, turns to face camera, Speaks about the happiness that is a second car (Ford Victoria, Ranch Wagon), Husband in suit gets into car in driveway, drives off, Camera pans to second car in a driveway, a station wagon, Housewife talks to camera in kitchen, Car drives on road, Housewife gets into station wagon, drives off, Ford emblem appears on screen, Camera pans across landscape of pasture and hills, Cars drive along small town street, Camera pans across country landscape, View of trees on mountainside, Aerial view of city, Family walks to their car in crowded parking lot of shopping center, Bulldozer at a construction site, Men lift side of wall at construction site, Partially constructed homes, Illustration of a city and its residential areas around it, Still photo of soldiers walking off ship, Still photo of confetti filling the air during a parade, Still photo of a new ranch-style house, Still photo of many identical houses in a planned suburban community, Aerial view of a suburban housing development, Camera pans up from a traditional farmhouse to a sprawling suburban community, Still photo of an attractively laid out house with complementary landscaping, Still photo of overhead view of hundreds of little box-type houses lined up in grids, Still photo of Crucible Factory, Illustration of housing development plan, POV car passing by several suburban houses in neighborhood, Housewife sings to herself as she enters kitchen, opens refrigerator door, closes it, then looks annoyed when it doesn't stay closed, Housewife runs tap water into a pan, then looks annoyed when the faucet drips after it's been turned off, Housewife turns gas stove dial, it doesn't light, she lights a match to the burner, Man in robe smiles from the roof, sprinkles magic dust on the house, Snow-like dust falls over the housewife, Old sink turns into new, different one, Refrigerator changes from old to new model, Housewife floats over to the refrigerator and touches it admiringly, Old fashioned stove is transformed into a range top and an oven built into the wall, A wall telephone appears on empty wall space, Housewife sings into the telephone. Singing about the wonders of all the new appliances and kitchen phone, CU golden doorknob turns, opens, Camera pans across silhouette of objects: Coffee pot, iron, spatula, vase, bowl, Ceiling lamp fixture is turned on, showing its bright blue color, Camera turns to show side view and top of modern table, Woman in party dress lifts a bowl of fruit from console to table in modernly furnished living room, Camera pulls back to show sleek, modern sideboard with vase on top, A Mies Van Der Rohe chair. Nice views of ultra modern late 1950s home, Camera pans across various modern furniture pieces in living room: chair and ottoman, chair, lighting fixtures, sideboard, dining set, drapes, Camera pans across ultra-modern kitchen with built-in appliances, Housewife in party dress gets up from desk and walks over to range, tilts range top down from its stow-away position, Mother in capri pants attends to baby in play pen while father puts a log in modern fireplace, Mother stands up and walk over to sit in front of modern wall unit containing television and various art objects, Toddler smiles from play pen, Car pulls away from night club entrance as doorman stands by, Camera pans across objects on patio, Silhouette of arrangement of small modern home objects, CU lamp, A stereo speaker shaped like a television set, A modern coffee maker drips coffee into cup below spout, Camera pans across modern office designs, Architectural model of office building, Exterior of star shaped house, Illustration of plane in flight, Modern prototype car drives down road, Man and women emerge from modern prototype car (futuristic) and walk toward modern office building, Sun sets over a domed house. (house of tomorrow circa 1958)

OC & CP 1200 SOF / MAG & OPT ROLL F VS OF TWO MOTORCYCLISTS DOING FIGURES. MORE OF SLOW MOTION SAFETY SHOTS SIMULATING COMMON ACCIDENT SITUATION, HUMAN FIGURES MOUNTED ON CYCLES CRASHING AT HIGH VELOCITY INTO PARKED CARS. VS OF THIS FROM MANY ANGLES, SPEEDS. VS OF CYCLISTS RIDING THROUGH LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA STREETS DEMONSTRATING CORRECT DRIVING. GOOD SHOTS OF HEAVY TRAFFIC ON FREEWAYS, SUBURBAN LOS ANGELES STREETS. NIGHT SHOT OF LOS ANGELES AT NIGHT. CI: TRANSPORTATION: MOTORCYCLES. TRANSPORTATION: TRAFFIC, LOS ANGELES. PARADES: NYC, NY. SPORTS: RACES, MOTORCYCLE. AIR VIEWS: MISC. MOTORCYCLE RACE. PERSONALITIES: LINDSAY, JOHN. ORGANIZATIONS: HELL'S ANGELS. TRANSPORTATION: SAFETY EXPERIMENTS.

The Ontario Provincial Police test a new radar system to detect motorists who speed on Ontario highways. An OPP officer speaks on a radio and monitors radar equipment. Another OPP officer stops a driver and waves him to the side of the road. A CU on a radar meter shows the needle bouncing up to 40 mph.

ORIG. NEG. 470 FT. SOF MAG CU SIGN " DRIVING SIMULATION LABORATORY. " MS BOY DRIVES CAR WHICH IS STANDING STILL IN THE LAB (THE REAR WHEELS SPINNING ON A MACHINE WHICH REGISTERS SPEED, BRAKING, ETC). A LARGE SCREEN IS IN FRONT OF HIM ON WHICH IS PROJECTED MOVIES OF TRAFFIC CONDITIONS. CU WIRES ARE ATTACHED TO THE SUBJECT LEGS. CU HE TURNS ON THE IGNITION. MS SPRINKLERS SPRAY WATER ON WINDSHIELD - HE TURNS ON THE WINDSHIELD WIPERS. CU HIS FACE (INTERMITTANT LIGHT REFLECTIONS HIT HIS FACE AND CAUSE HIM TO FALL ASLEEP). CU MACHINE MAKES THE CAR BOUNCE TO SIMULATE DRIVING MOTION. CU REAR WHEEL SPINNING ON MACHINE. CU OBSERVER IN BOOTH. CU DYNAMOMETER REGISTERS THE SPEED. VARIOUS SHOTS TECHNICIANS OPERATE ULTRALINEAR OSCILLOGRAPH. VARIOUS SHOTS OF SUBJECT ATTACHING WIRES TO VARIOUS PARTS OF THE BODY. INTERVIEW WITH DR. SLATE HOBERT, OF THE LAB. HE SAYS THEY HAVE BEEN STUDYING PEOPLE WHO HAVE STAYED UP ALL NIGHT AND THE FOLLOWING NIGHT HAVE DRIVEN FOR ONE HOUR AND FELL ASLEEP. SAYS FALLING ASLEEP AT THE WHEEL CAUSES MOST FATAL ACCIDENTS. MOVING SHOT FROM CAR ALONG LOS ANGELES FREEWAY. CI: SCIENCE RESEARCH -

Timelapse of cars passing on a highway at night. The BMW headquarters and museum is at left. Filmed in Munich, Bavaria, Germany.

Last Clear Chance, The

Timelapse of clouds in the night sky, tilting down to show cars on a highway. The large building is the BMW headquarters and museum. Filmed in Munich, Bavaria, Germany.

LAND OF THE FREE

INT BROLL HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE GM RECALL HEARING HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE HEARING 4/1/14 (CSPAN SWITCHED FEED, x 80) NHTSA Acting Administrator David Friedman Mary Barra, GM CEO 13:50:22 empty room 14:02:57 walk in barra 14:04:02 TIM MURPHY, chair, As soon as rolled of customers told GM that just by pumping knee it would shut off 14:04:20 great shot of cameras trained on Barra*** 14:04:42 just a year later GM told Delphi told them to change switch so it wouldn't turn off..NHTSA was also evaluating concerns with the cobult. But they only looked at airbag non deployment 14:05:32 Spike in warranty claims in Cobalt crashes.NTSA decided NOT to investigate..and also in 2010. 14:05:53 Pan from dias over to Barra**** GREAT SHOT 14:06:08 Not until 2013 14:06:26 Did not happen. Why didn't they put the pieces together. Why didn't anyone ask the questions. 14:06:50 Why did GM keep the old part number? Did they consider how faulty switch would interface with airbags? Why did.memo about size of keychains would solve the problems..why make link.did anyone ask why 14:07:21 Barra, head on listening 14:07:30 Does GM have problem communicate.What we have here is a failure to communicate and the failures were deadly 14:07:47 fix the culture. This is about restoring public trust. Could be prevented.hope and expectation wont hear blame game.All brilliant.People don't care that you know, they know that you care. 14:08:19 Bi partisan. 14:08:34 Ranking.Michael Burgess Dianna DeGette 14:10:32 holds up = switch that cost pennies TIGHT AND WIDE 14:10:44 they were warned again and again and did nothing 14:10:58 if you had a heavy key chain like my mom key chain// could cause it to shear right off 14:11:11 defective from the start 14:11:41 in 2003 the owner of a Saturn ion with 343 made a warranty report that she bumoped the key .130 claims over the decade. Never informed the public or told regulators 14:12:17 put into the record 14:12:22 initially GM opened investigations that concluded the switch was bad, didn't meet.. 14:12:42 GREAT SHOT, push in to Barra with stills around** **14:12:57 cost was only 57 cents 14:13:28 these are the keys of a staff member.there is a long insert. They were supposed to go in the middle and create a hole so keys wouldn't go back and forth. Unfortunately GM never made this public 14:14:01 GM knew it. They quietly redesigned the switch but didn't change part number. They did it knowing the new switch didn't meet specs. Put more bad cars on the road. 14:14:37 Between 2003- 2014 GM knew from investigations, law suits, etc. but time and time again GM did nothing knowing the cars were unsafe 14:15:02 I know we have families.we want to get to bottom of this be sure it doesn't happen again. Thank Mara for coming. New to company. Committed to fix this. We have a lot of questions. 14:15:29 UPTON- Zero margin for error. 14:17:39 todays hearing is personal for me bc I come from mich, the auto state, the auto cap of the world 14:17:54 both NHTSA and GM have probs with ign switches and airbags. 14:19:28 Dingell..identify the problem 14:19:37 Blackburn- owe this hearing to the public, GM customers, 12 people that lost their lives.see what the roles of GM were and figure out who is at fault. Who knew what when. Miss Barra that includes you. what did you know when you took the helm of GM 14:20:15 In my district the Saturn Ion was recalled, important to my constituents.Thanks you for being here. 14:20:38 Barra- head on listening 14:20:44 Waxman- have a sad déjà vu/ part of the comte with tires, each time heard about how others knew about the fix and how federal officials missed signals that should have alerted them.here we are today. 14:21:23 over the last month full dimensions have unfolded. GM .dozens of crashes. 14:21:48 I know fams of some of the fams are in the audience. We owe it to them to find out what happened. The facts that we know are hard to believe. Gm has known for years and failed to take action to fix the problem. 14:22:23 resulted in a non public solution, fix for fewer than 500 drivers. 14:23:01 barra side shot, cameras around** 14:23:20 bc GM didn't institute a simple fix at least 12 people have died 14:23:32 GM still has failed to own up to potential problems. Modified for later model cars 14:23:48 Adelphi said the 2008-2011 switches still didn't meet GM specs.GM finally announced recall last fri but told public it was bc of bad parts during repairs, not bc of original parts 14:24:32 Agency missed red flags. But handicap bc a lot of info that GM knew that they didn't share. 14:24:49 need to be sure NHTSA and public have same info as auto execs MARY BARRA- CEO 14:26:52 Do you sear that the testimony.. 14:27:11 Statement 14:27:38 I cannot tell you why it took so long but we will find out 14:27:46 it is an extra situation. Vehicles we no longer make but I can on watch..transparent 14:28:03 cannot turn back the clock. Soon as I learned about the prob acted on it 14:28:15 we will not shirk from our respons now or in the future. Todays GM will do the right thing ***** 14:29:03 the facts will be the facts. Be sure that this does not happen again. Fully accountable. 14:29:25 identify and resolve any and all safety issues. I stand with him and senior leadership team stands with him as well 14:29:42 Murphy cu 14:29:48 latest rounds of recalls demonstrates how serious we are at todays gm. Identifies issue, brough forward and fix them. Work with one thing in mind. Customer and safety. 14:30:16 wide rear shot** 14:30:39 customer call centers, dealers, 14:32:25 technical center..heart of GM. Met and it was a tough meeting. Disappointed and upset. They had same questions 14:32:44 cu committee 14:32:48 want to make GM better 14:32:54 what we plan to do about those. We have retained Kenneth Feinberg for compensation.*** 14:33:23 expertise and objectivity to this effort 14:33:30 extraordinary event and responding in a extr way- civil and legal responsible ways. How to balance those in a respon manner QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 14:34:19 Murphy- as soon as hit the road lose steering and breaks 14:34:44 when first GM knew, correct? Yes. 14:34:53 Is it common practice for GM to allow parts to not meet GM specs? /// NO. But different between specs for steel and defect.material that doesn't meet spec but it acceptable.. 14:35:48 Is switch acceptable? At the beginning? // As we know today, it is not. 14:36:06 So in 2008 changes switch, right?// 14:36:28 turn to tab 25, e mail exchange. E mail notes.. cobalt is blowing up in their face. if this was a big prob why didn't they replace switch with cars already on the road. 14:37:16 Barra- doesn't match 14:37:22 Lot of statements made. That is why hired DeLuca. 14:37:32 You don't know why not replaced? // Don't know why// Why not identified as issue?// Don't know that is why we are investigating. 14:38:05 Did company investigate?// That is why they are investigating.// Should they?// yes 14:38:29 How about the cost being too high// Find that statement to be very disturbing. If that was the reason the decision was made that is unacceptable. That is not how we do biz at GM. 14:39:11 In general we have moved from a cost to a customer culture. Customer first. Core values, one of the most important issues. 14:39:35 DeGette 14:39:50 Knew about defect before . Is that correct? Yes or no will work. You don't know about that? 14:40:35 you don't know how long GM knew about this.// that is why we are doing the investigation// the specs is correct.// and these were between 4 and 10, correct? / GM was notified by Delphi by this. 14:41:18 we need a yes or no, I only have 5 minutes, I am sorry. 14:41:56 And btw ma'am.cuts off Barra. 14:42:10 Back and forth with DeGette. 14:44:24 camera on barra.is that correct 14:44:30 3 recalls were made this year. 14:44:46 gm is intending to replace , right?/ new design or old switch?/ old design/ 14:45:22 You are saying on going investigation..are you getting updates? Yes I am 14:45:36 Upton- 14:46:01 dox we looked at show gm had issues for 2 years that had redesign in 2006 14:46:17 who in GM would know about complaints?// Don't know that// Don't know who would have been handling the issue//What is supposed to happen 14:46:44 When you have a safety issue you have a team of engineers that work on that..have a cross functional team and then goes for a decision 14:47:08 Redesigned bc it doesn't meet specs, right? // Upton, engineering 101, new part should have a diff number// Correct// Did not happen// Correct// who made the decision to move forward w.o new part number// Will have name?// Yes.// Likely that same person decided not to recal the defective // Don't know. Part of investigation. 14:50:24 What is the timeline?// Very much want to know but we are doing an investigation that spanned over a decade. 14:50:44 When did GM inform NHTSA redesigned 14:51:03 Waxman didbnt recall until a month later..// company looking. 14:55:50 Waxman- later model car awith switch..recall implies I don't have to do anything but car miught have a sub par switch.// we are recalling all of those parts 14:56:24 all vehicles being recalled 14:56:29 Waxman- I know you are taking job at bad time to clean up mess. How can GM assure customers that new switches will meet requirements? 14:57:00 Barra- testing,e tc. 14:57:30 Saw this for the first time a day ago 14:57:44 Blackburn- todays GM. You are going to run it in a different way than in the past. Making some changes. Timeline. This is the first investigation we are going to do. 14:59:58 Do you think it was a cover up or sloppy work?.. Waiting for info 15:00:10 anything to do with auto bailout? 15:00:31 have you brought engineers into the process? 15:01:25 Did you say defective part? // Points that suggest that. Why doing investigation. Going to hear from more than one of us about not having new part number. 15:02:13 does that seem inconceivable to you/ Yes, inconcei, not our process and unacceptable. 15:02:54 SIDE SHOT COMTE. 15:03:00 DINGELL*** 15:03:07 begin by telling families they have our sympathies. Tragic indeed. Condolences of family. Now it is incumbent upon Congress to determine how happened and take steps to see how could have happened. 15:04:19 is it correct GM recalled 2.5 million small parts/Yes// Is it correct expanded recall of small cars bc maybe on / Yes/ Correct that switch was developed in 1990s and approved in 2002?/ Yes./ Correct that GM own designs ..torque to move switch// Yes. 15:05:26 Miss Barra is it correct approved production of switch despite test results.. showing didn't meet torque requirements// not clear to me 15:05:57 Correct redesign of switch//Yes// 15:06:06 Is it correct that the torque requirement was the same// Not clear to me. 15:06:30 Did redesign switch meet requirements// ?/ Did redesign meet torque requirements// Yes 15:06- 15:10 STOPPED LOGGING>>> 15:10:48 Barton- you are the CEO but you were the vp for product development 15:11:13 Barra- We will not accept parts that don't meet our performance safety durability requirements*** 15:13:39 if we find we have a part that is defective we do a recall 15:13:48 Barton- not an acceptable answer to the American people. we are not telling you what specs to set but there shouldn't be a part used in any auto product that doesn't meet the specifications. 15:14:20 At one level was the decision made to over ride. // Part of our investigation to answer that question. 15:14:47 Braley// Staring on photos on back wall.men same age as sons, my son owns one of the cobalt.photo of my father in age 18 in dress blues.the focus of this hearing is on GM commitment to safety.. 15:16:21 20 years ago an iowa family gave me this promo screw set .slogan..safety comes first at GM*** so my question for you is what has changed at GM? What has changed at GM 15:17:05 The way that we are working now. The decision making, leading by example.In addition to when technical community makes decision we will review it to see if more to do 15:17:35 Isnt core value that safety always comes first?// Never seen that// 15:17:53 Barra- todays GM focused on safety. 15:18:32 reads from NYT-problem known about for a decade led to 12 deaths. 15:19:18 agree this is a grave crisis// took way too long, not acceptable. That is why we are taking changes.we will continue to make process and people changes as we get results of investigation. Take all recommendations and will make changes. 15:19:56 Article added to record. 15:20:04 Blackburn- submit new core values 15:20:31 Burgess- why did GM embark on small car program 10 years ago?// To have complete portfolio.//New biz line? // The cobalt was following a previous small car. All new program. // Because of the CAFÉ standards?// Cant answer that, wasn't in decision making at that point. 15:23:27 side shot committee**** 15:24:19 people evaluating this must ask why no airbag went off. Would that be a logical question for airbag to deploy. Barra- Tragic situation. See it as a tragedy and we have apologized. I find it unacceptable that anyone.we will take action. Have made process changes. Will fix the process. World class. 15:25:34 Should be a red flag, air bag non deployments 15:26:22 Barra- tragic situation. Any time there is a loss of life in a traffic situation.will make whatever info we have available. Schakowsky 15:27:00 these deaths were needless. So I want to ask about something more than an apology. How will GM today deal with accidents bf GM bankruptcy.New GM may not be liable for accidents that occurred bf July 2009. Is that your understanding 15:27:45 we want to do the right thing for our customers. Took too long to get to answers. That is why we hired Mr Feinberg. He will bring expertise..have civic and legal responsibilities*** 15:28:19 indicates GM will give settlement with families with lost ones lost their lives 15:28:32 just begun to wotk with him, first meeting Friday. Take 30-60 days to evaluate. Not made any decisions. Just started . 15:29:00 S- during the restructuring did GM discuss? 15:29:11 I wasn't aware of this issue but our investigation will cover.not known at senior leadership of the co. GOOD BACK AND FORTH// 15:29:28 Does GM accept responsibilities. 15:29:36 B: tragic, apologize, 15:29:42 talking about respon and liability 15:29:48 do you take responsibility? Is the new GM responsible? 15:29:58 B: we will make best decisions for our customers..legal and moral responsibiltieis 15:30:12 do right thing for customers. 15:30:54 underwhelmed by safety officer 15:31:24 will take action.. take serious steps and hold people accountable 15:31:36 so no one has lost their job as a result of knowledge about defective part 15:31:47 few weeks in and process changes and will look at implications and take approp steps. 15:32:20 Gingrey- Brook lived in my district.brought to light what is going on now 15:33:21 kliled on her 29th bd..horrific accident.day before her death she took the cobalt in for service and customer states shut off while driving, please check***** 15:34:22 not included bc side impact// included in GM count, yes or no? // no. 15:35:38 whether head on or side for same reason and she is dead..i don't understand why gm doesn't include the non deployment of airbags.can you explain that to us 15:36:00 all accidents are very tragic and deeply sorry for those. 15:36:20 do you plan to investigate// 15:36:48 to what extent do you involve service technicians.how do you make sure dealerships and service depts. are making sure getting info//will communicate info. 15:37:39 What are drivers supposed to do in meantime. If you have the key with the ring.we are making loaners or rentals available.13000 customers in rentals or loaners now. 15:38:11 if take key off ring safe to drive? We believe it is safe based on our testing. Tonko//Barra 15:41:50 Barra- systemically gone across the company and are making changes..most detailed we have every provided..conducting an investigation with mr. 15:42:28 leadership at the top, how make decisions, how focus on customer.culture change doesn't happen in a year or two. Dedicated to it and want to have safest vehicles on the road. 15:43:29 we will share the appropriate information. We will commit that we will share what is appropriate.// No commitment to share the full report? Will share appro// Hear the answer. Scalise 15:44:18 pan audience to Barra, no cameras around her 15:45:30 Barra- I was aware on Jan 31 of this year. 15:45:45 When was this found out within GM. 15:46:18 holds up dox= has anyone at GM taken this employee when you signed off on this why didn you change the part number and why did you approve the change and not recall? 15:46:53 you are under oath- have any of you all asked him the questions? 15:47:40 you talk about a new culture. Has anyone been held accountable? 15:47:54 just learned about it in jan// redesigned in 2006// 15:48:29 head on wide wide** 15:48:37 are you aware of whether or not GM has met timeliness. That would be a violation of federal law. // aware of findings from mr. volukas today// 15:49:18 there were points in time where one part had info not shared with other sides.didn't understand info would be valuable to another party. Already made changes to structure so that wont happen again. Green 15:50:02 congrats on being the ceo of gm.been a customer of gm.lists all the cars he has from gm. 15:51:14 I thot of my wife's key ring. It has everything on the world on it.. 15:53:41 when someone died in chemical accident. what didn't they do that caused people to die. GM greater company than to do that. 15:54:11 you need to fix it but you need to fix it as quickly as you can (OFF CAMERA DAMIT-maybe somewhere on cam) 15:54:44 wish you would send a note to me. 15:54:53 wide side comte** Griffith 15:55:09 breach of protocol?/ Not acceptable reason to do that.// A reason might be that harder to track prob with old part when you have new part put in place// Yes// 15:55:40 While you don't know name do you know job title to make decision not to put new part. Within engineering dept.// In your dept// since 2011. 15:56:27 trail lawyer savvy..sharp people at GM do you not?// Why didn't your team of engineers figure it out that airbags wont f properly 15:56:53 congressman, answers I want too. Hold people accountable. Taken way too long 15:57:05 what kind of liability..legal and moral. 15:57:14 side wide** 15:57:22 it would have been easier to do it in bankruptcy. 15:57:30 best thing in the world is as soon as find a prob we fix it and it gets fixed and doesn't create any tragedies 15:57:50 initial convos with Feinberg. 30-60 days. //Anyone given best or worst case scenarios? //In public but none given to me. 15:58:22 would have affected a bailout or prior to that the people keeping GM afloat. Have the potential to dissuade from giving cash to GM 15:58:50 as soon as we fix the liabilities are contained. As we look at probs we wanna fix as soon as we can. If safety issue will make change 15:59:09 in real world of bus harder to get money if new source of liability//depends on situation.. 15:59:42 Severity three- what does that mean?// Don't know 16:00:16 Chair: did GM wilfully negotiate during bankruptcy did they purposely with hold any info about pending lawsuits about cobalt? // I personally didn't withhold any info.. 16:00:54 Welch: Got to thank GM for doing the impossible. Got dems and repubs working together 16:01:30 Known to me in Jan 2014. // Totally irrelevant to the people who lost their lives// Thot you meant when did I know// Changed switch in 2006. 16:02:06 Hope to get those answers. // Starting point. Someone decided to change a critical part of the car bn 2006 and 2007. If you acted on this aggressively how many cars would you have to recall. //Give me an estimate// Talk to your back row// 1.2 million// Cut in half, maybe more. 16:03:12 What would have been cost to GM if done recall in 2007. 1.8 vehicles, something less than 100 million.// Cost of recall now being done 8 years later// Can provide the info// Want people to be able to hear this// Decision delay is money and lives at risk. Ball park. 16:04:08 if we had acted at that point, smaller population. I don't understand your question. 16:04:21 if I were on the board of directors and I had a co that could have acted 8 years ago but by not acting, increased in magnitufe, damage to bottom line, reputation to company, harm to citizens 16:04:58 would have been substantially less at that time frame than it will be now 16:05:24 Settlements confidential by both parties// This is not good, you are the company now 16:05:45 do you believe that when a co has been sued on product safety do you think the co that settles should be able to keep secret what that settlement was about 16:06:09 every settlement is unique. No comment. This one is unique. 16:06:26 if a company settles and pays a lot of money to pay settlement for death should they be able to keep secret from govt agency that is supposed to keep safe 16:06:50 so if you don't have to do it, you wont do it. Make assumption both parties agree to it, what I was told. Long 16:07:10 side wide** 16:07:25 cu families and photos** 16:11:21 how many models, how many ignition switches are made?// don't know// Yarmuth 16:13:16 cu families and push into them.they look bored 16:13:33 aware of any other ignition problems that have been discovered?/ Not reviewed everything. In this case took way too long. 16:14:14 how decide push button or key? What are differences in terms of safety// We evaluate, the push button start evaluate across the portfolio. Want experts to provide that info. Both can be designed to be safe. It is a function, a lighter when they have pushbutton start. 16:18:39 Harper- we do not trust the company right now 16:19:36 when people talk to piece part it is just the switch?// didn't write the note but generallythat is what the e mail means 16:19:54 the e mail says increase of 90 cents// since warranty offset was 10-15 cents they didn't make the change// that is not something I find acceptable. This analysis is inappropriate// I appreciate this is nto appropriate but this is what happened here// we will take action, not the behavior we want. 16:20:41 want to make sure that this never happens to anyone else again. Lorrie Queen, who was she?// Vehicle line 16:21:06 how does cost factor into safety/ THEY DON'T 16:21:39 it hasn't been this way before but the way ti is now. // More of a cost culture before but now focus on safety and quality 16:22:10 When GM filed bankruptcy in 2009. the fact that GM going thru many years of financial issues did that impact how this was categorized?// Cant answered that issue. Will . 16:23:05 I would like to see other traffic deaths or injuries but was not part of this total. Castor 16:23:38 lists people who died. 16:26:39 we will put all the pieces together of incidents and make the process changes.//is a repair cost of 57 cents too costly.// If we are making the decision on safety we don't look at cost. We make the change. 16:27:41 reading from nyt piece.inadvertently bumping the key while running.baffling that gm knew about it a decade ago and told no big deal.when your engine cuts off would you consider this a safety issue?// Ah, yes.// Not aware til 2013.// At time NYT wrote report what was your position?// In 2005 I was in manuf . //equipment that we use to built cars/ Big news paper writes it? not aware?// No, didn't know. Didn't know it was an issue with Cobalt. Terry 16:30:50 what is the difference bn non compliance and a defect./Broad question/ Depends on the specific situation/ Regarding ignition switch/ My understanding is it is a term used for standards versus when we feel it is a defect. DeGette 16:33:08 thinking about the new switches but you are saying will meet the highest safety standards// Going thru extensive validation testing// Tab 53 says minimum torque must be 15 n-cm. is that the standard then?// yes// 16:34:05 wide head on DeGette talking 16:34:11 this comte had experienced with Feinberg.did BP investigation. Did fund after marathon.But want to make sure when you hire him is really doing something. He is hired to sort out value of people's claims and assign money. I assume GM is doing that..Willing to put together some sort of compensation fund? Is that why you hired him? 16:35:06 So no money involved in this? // Just hired him no money involved// Hired, announced today, but no money to compensate people/ Will determine what the right course of action is// Havent made any decisions on that yet. General Motors Ignition Switch Recall General Motors CEO Mary Barra and David Friedman, acting administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, testified at a hearing on the automaker's ignition switch recall.The defect was linked to at least a dozen deaths. · Barra, Mary Chief Executive Officer General Motors · Friedman, David J. Administrator Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS Congressional Hearings April 1, 2014 - Final House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Holds Hearing on the General Motors Ignition Switch Recall MURPHY: I now convene this hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee entitled "The G.M. Ignition Switch Recall, Why Did It Take So Long?" Ms. Barra, if you'd like to take your seat, please. Thank you. This question is the focus of our investigation. As soon as the Chevy Cobalt rolled off the production line in 2004, customers began filing complaints about the ignition switch. These customers told General Motors that just by bumping the key with their knee driving the Cobalt, it would shut off. In 2004 and 2005, G.M. engineers twice considered the problem and even developed potential solutions to fix it. But G.M. decided the, quote, "tooling cost and piece prices are too high," unquote, and that the, quote "none of the solutions represent an acceptable business case," end quote. The solution G.M. settled for was to tell their dealers to ask Cobalt drivers to remove heavy objects from their key chains. And yet, just a year later, G.M. decided to fix the ignition switch. In 2005, G.M. told their supplier, Delphi, to increase the torque in the ignition switch so the key wouldn't move out of the run position and into accessory mode. MURPHY: G.M. was not alone in examining problems with the Cobalt. The lead government safety regulator, the National Highway Traffic Administration, known as NHTSA, was also evaluating concerns with the Cobalt. But NHTSA didn't look at the ignition switch problem, just air bag nondeployment. In 2007, three years after the Cobalt's release, the chief of NHTSA Defects Assessment Division proposed that the agency investigate the Cobalt because he spotted a, quote, "pattern of non-deployments," unquote, in Cobalt airbags that didn't exist with similar sedans. An internal NHTSA presentation noted a spike in warranty claims for Cobalt airbags, a total of 29 crashes causing 25 injuries, 4 deaths and 14 field reports. Yet NHTSA ultimately decided not to investigate. Even when the issue was again raised three years later, in 2010, NHTSA again passed on investigating. GM was also looking into the airbag non-deployments. As early as 2007, GM started tracking incidents where Cobalt airbags did not deploy in car crashes. In 2011 and 2012, GM assigned at least two groups of engineers to examine the problem. According to GM's public statements, it wasn't until December 2013 the company finally put the pieces together and linked the problems with the airbags with the faulty ignition switch almost 10 years after customers first told GM the Cobalt ignition switch didn't work. We know this. The red flags were there for GM and NHTSA to take action, but for some reason, it did not happen. Why didn't GM and NHTSA put the pieces together for 10 years? Why didn't anyone ask the critical, important questions? Why did GM accept parts below their own company standards and specs? When GM decided to get a new ignition switch for the Cobalt in 2006, did GM do so recognized they recognized that the faulty switch posed a safety problem? Why did GM keep the old part number, which led to confusion? And when GM replaced the ignition switch, did engineers also consider how the faulty ignition impacted other systems in the car, like airbags? Why did GM replace the ignition switch in new cars but not the older models? Why did GM think a memo about the size of key chains was enough to solve the problems? Why did NHTSA twice decide not to investigate the Cobalt? And why didn't NHTSA make the link between keys being in the accessory position and airbags not deploying? Did anyone ask why? And for both GM and NHTSA, are people talking to one another? Did GM and NHTSA have a culture where people don't pass information up and down the chain of command? To borrow a phrase, what we have here is a failure to communicate, and the results were deadly, a failure to communicate both between and within GM and NHTSA. Today, we will ask GM and NHTSA what they're doing to not just fix the car but to fix a culture within a business and a government regulator that led to these problems. This is about restoring public trust and giving the families and crash victims the truth about whether this tragedy could have been prevented and if future ones will be prevented. It is my hope and expectation that today, we will not hear a blame game or finger pointing. All the brilliant engineers and workers in the world won't matter if the people don't really care. And as the old saying goes, people don't care that you know until they know that you care. This investigation is only three weeks old and we are determined to find the facts and identify the problems so a tragedy like will this never happen again. This investigation is bipartisan, as a priority of all the members of this committee. I want to thank Mary Barra for being here and also the head of NHTSA, David Friedman, ranking members Waxman, DeGette and Dingell for working with us. And I now give the remaining of my time to Dr. Michael Burgess. BURGESS: I thank the chairman for yielding. I thank our witnesses for being here. I thank our witnesses for being so responsive to the committee's staff requests. We are here to examine a very important matter. The hearing is appropriately named. We do have questions for General Motors. We have questions for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Two chances to open up formal investigations into the recall of General Motors cars both in 2007 and 2010, NHTSA initially examined problems with the vehicles, and both times, both times decided that no investigation was needed. We need to hear from NHTSA today how you intend to improve the process going forward. And we were just here five years ago with the Toyota investigation. We heard a lot of things out of NHTSA on those hearings. I'd like to know how they have improved the process and how we can expect to have confidence in their ability going forward. I yield back. MURPHY: Now recognize the ranking member of the committee, Ms. DeGette of Colorado. DEGETTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Like all of us, I'm deeply troubled about what our investigation has revealed about GM's business practices and its commitment to safety. Here's what we know. We know that GM has recalled over 2.5 million vehicles because of defective ignition switches. We know they should have done it much, much earlier. We know that GM failed to provide federal regulators with key information. And sadly, we know that at least 13 people are dead, and there have been dozens of crashes because GM produced cars that had a deadly effect. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the ignition switch assembly for one of these vehicles. And this is it. A spring inside the switch, a piece that costs pennies, failed to provide enough force, causing the switch to turn off when the car went over a bump. GM knew about this problem in 2001. They were warned again and again over the next decade, but they did nothing. And I just want to show how easy it is to turn this key in this switch. If you had a heavy key chain like my mom (ph) key chair, or if you had -- if you were short and you bumped up against the ignition with your knee, it could cause this key to switch right off. Mr. Chairman, we now know that these switches were defective from the start. In February of 2002, GM's ignition switch supplier, Delphi, informed the company that the switch did not meet GM's minimum specifications, but GM approved it anyway. Now, yesterday, we sent Ms. Barra a letter about this decision. I'd like unanimous consent to make that letter a part of the hearing record. MURPHY: Without objection. DEGETTE: Soon after this approval, the defective cars were on the road, and it didn't take long for problems to appear. In 2003, June 2003, the owner of a Saturn Ion with 3,474 miles on the odometer made a warranty report that he or she, quote, "bumped the key and the car shut off." GM would receive more than 130 similar warranty claims through owners about this problem over the next decade, but it never informed the public or reported the problem to federal safety regulators. The minority staff conducted this warranty analysis, and again, we prepared a memo about these claims. I'd also ask unanimous consent to put that in the record, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Without objection. DEGETTE: Initially, GM opened multiple investigations into the ignition switch issue, each of which concluded the switch was bad. It didn't meet the minimums. In 2005, GM identified solutions to the problem but concluded that, quote, "the tooling cost and piece price are too high. Thus none of the solutions represents an acceptable business case." Documents provided by GM show that this unacceptable cost increase was only 57 cents. And Mr. Chairman, we have this document that we got from GM. Somehow, it's not in the binder. I'd ask unanimous consent to put this in the record, as well. MURPHY: Without objection, so ordered. DEGETTE: Another technical investigation completed in 2005 led GM to issue a technical service bulletin advising dealers to distribute key inserts to help reduce the problem. This was a simple fix to reduce the force on the switch. And Mr. Chairman, these are the keys of one of my staff members who actually owns one of these cars. And as you can see, there's a long, long insert. What the key inserts were supposed to do is go in the middle and just create a little hole so the key and the keys wouldn't go back and forth. Unfortunately, GM never made this bulletin public. More than 500 people out of the thousands of drivers who had cars with faulty switches got the key insert. And GM knew it. Soon after this decision, company officials quietly redesigned the switch, but they never changed the part number. And astonishingly, this committee learned that when GM approved a new switch in 2006, they did it with still knowing that the new switch didn't meet specifications. The company even put more cars with bad switches on the road from 2008 until 2011. And we still don't know all the information about this. Between 2003 and 2014, GM learned of hundreds of reports of ignition switch problems through customer complaints, warranty claims, lawsuits, press coverage, field reports and even more internal investigations. But time and time again, GM did nothing. The company continued to sell cars knowing they were unsafe. I know we have a lot of family members here, Mr. Chairman, and I know -- and I want to express my deepest sympathies to them, but I want to tell them something more. We're going to get to the bottom of this. We're going to figure out what happened, and we're going to make sure it doesn't happen again. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Ms. Barra for coming. She's brand-new at the company. I believe she's committed to fixing the situation. We have a lot of questions to ask today, though. And I know every member of this committee is concerned about this. Thank you very much. MURPHY: Gentlelady's time expired. Now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We know that with a two-ton piece of high-velocity machinery, there is, in fact, a zero margin for error. Product safety is, indeed, a life or death issue. But sadly, vehicle safety has fallen short, and it's not the first time. During the late summer of 2000, in this very room, I led the oversight hearings that examined the Ford Firestone recalls. A tire malfunction was causing violent crashes, and Americans did not feel safe behind the wheel. We gathered testimony from the company and agency officials and reviewed thousands and thousands of pages of documents, and we found that the system, indeed, had failed. Information about the defective tires had been shared with the companies and with NHTSA. The parties failed to protect the public safety, and over 100 people died. After that investigation, I introduced the Tread Act to correct many of the problems that contributed to the Ford Firestone tragedy. That bill was meant to ensure data about safety is reported so that defects can be quickly identified and fixed, and lives ultimately saved. The Tread Act has now been law since November 2000, yet here we are, investigating another safety failure. It's deja vu all over again. One month ago, GM issued a recall for an ignition switch defect in six vehicles totalling 1.6 million cars. And last Friday, they recalled another 900,000 vehicles. GM acknowledges that a dozen people have died in automobile crashes associated with that defect. Two were teenagers from my own community. Testifying today are GM's CEO Mary Barra and NHTSA acting administrator David Friedman, a first step in our quest to find out what went wrong. The committee's purpose is the same as it was in 2000, making sure that drivers and families are protected and cars are safe. And I'll repeat what I said at the first oversight hearing on Firestone tires in 2000. Today's hearing is very personal to me because I come from Michigan, the auto state, the auto capital of the world. That is no less true today. Michigan is proud of its auto industry, and while Michigan citizens build cars, obviously, we drive them, too. Document produced to the committee show that both NHTSA and GM received complaints about and data about problems with ignition switches and airbags. These complaints go back at least a decade. NHTSA engineers did crash investigations as early as '05 and twice examined whether complaints with airbags constituted a trend. GM submitted early warning reports to NHTSA, including data about crashes in the recalled cars. With all that information available, why did it take so long to issue the recall? In this case, just as it was with Ford Firestone, it was news reports that brought the attention to the nation's attention -- brought the problem to the nation's attention. This investigation of the recall is, indeed, bipartisan, as it should be. We'll follow the facts wherever they lead us, and we're going to work until we have the answers and can assure the public that, indeed, they're safe. And I'd like to note that the chairman of our CMT subcommittee, Mr. Terry (ph), will be joining us for questions this afternoon. With his subcommittee's record on motor vehicle safety issues, he will be watching closely as this investigation unfolds so that he can take our findings and determine whether and what changes may be needed to the laws designed to keep drivers safe on the road. After all, our goal on every issue follows the Dingell model, identify the problem or abuse fully, and where needed, fix it with legislation so that it won't happen again. I yield to the vice chair of the committee, Ms. Blackburn. BLACKBURN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Ms. Barra, thank you very much for being here today. We really owe this hearing to the American people, to GM customers, and to the relatives of the 12 individuals that have lost their lives. And it is important that we get to the bottom of this and to see what the roles of GM and NHTSA were in this, figure out who's at fault. And we want to know who knew what when. And Ms. Barra, that includes you. BLACKBURN: We're going to want to know what your exposure was to this issue as you took the helm at GM as the CEO. You know, in my district, we have the GM plant. The Saturn Ion has been recalled. That was made at that plant there in Spring Hill, so this is something that is important to my constituents, those that have worked with GM. I thank you for being here, and we look forward to the answers. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentlelady yields back. Now recognize ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for five minutes. WAXMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a sad sense of deja vu as I sit here today. I was part of this committee holding our Ford Firestone hearing in 2000. I led the committee's hearing on Toyota's problems with unintended acceleration in 2010. Each time, we heard about how auto manufacturers knew about potential defects and about how federal safety officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration missed signals that should have alerted them to defective cars on the road. And here we are today under similar circumstances. Over the last month, the full dimensions of another auto safety disaster have unfolded. General Motors has recalled 2.5 million vehicles due to a defective ignition switch, and the company has acknowledged that these cars have caused dozens of crashes and 13 fatalities. Mr. Chairman, I know the families of some of these victims are in the audience for today's hearing. I want to acknowledge them, thank them for coming. We owe it to them to find out what happened. The facts that we already know are hard to believe. GM has known for years about this safety defect and has failed to take appropriate action to fix the problem. The company installed an ignition switch it knew did not meet its own specifications. Numerous internal investigations resulted in nothing but a non-public technical service bulletin that partially fixed the problem for fewer than 500 drivers. A new analysis I released this morning revealed that over the last decade, GM received over 130 warranty claims from drivers and GM technicians who experienced and identified the defect. Drivers reported that their cars shut off after hitting bumps or potholes at highway speeds when they did something as simple as brushing the ignition switch with their knee. One GM technician even identified the exact part causing the problem, a spring that would have caused, at most, as much as a few postage stamps, a couple of dollars. Because GM didn't implement this simple fix when it learned about the problem, at least a dozen people have died in defective GM vehicles. What's more, new information the committee received last week suggests that GM still has failed to fully own up to potential problems. GM finally modified the ignition switch for later model cars, but Delphi, the manufacturer of the ignition switch, told the committee that the switches installed in model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles still do not meet GM's own specifications. GM finally announced a recall of these vehicles last Friday, but told the public that it was because of bad parts installed during repairs, not because of defective parts originally installed in the vehicles. There are legitimate questions we need to ask about whether NHTSA did enough to identify and uncover this problem. In retrospect, it's clear that the agency missed some red flags. But NHTSA was also laboring under a handicap. There appears to have been a lot of information that GM knew but they didn't share with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. We need to make sure that NHTSA and the public have access to the same information about safety as auto executives. That's why today I've introduced the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2014. This bill is modeled on the legislation that the committee passed in 2010 but was never enacted into law. It will make more information on defects available to the public, and it will increase NHTSA's funding and increase civil penalties for manufacturers when companies like GM fail to comply with the law. Mr. Chairman, we should learn as much as we can from this investigation. Then we should improve the law to make sure we're not here again after another auto safety tragedy in the near future. I want to yield back my time. Thank you. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. I'd now like to introduce the witness on the first panel for today's hearing. Ms. Mary Barra is the chief executive officer at General Motors Company and has been in this role since January 15th, 2014, when she also became a member of its board of directors. She has held a number of positions in this company. From 2008 to 2009, Ms. Barra served as vice president of global manufacturing, engineering. And from 2005 to 2008, she was executive director of vehicle manufacturing engineering. She's also served as a plant manager and director of competitive operations engineering, as well as numerous other positions. I'll now swear in the witness. Ms. Barra, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so, has a practice of taking testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath? BARRA: No. MURPHY: The chair then advises you under the rules of the House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during today's hearing. BARRA: No. MURPHY: In that case, if you would please rise and raise your right hand, I'll swear you in. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? BARRA: I do. MURPHY: Thank you. Ms. Barra, you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, section 1-001 of the United States code. You may now give a five-minute summary of your written statement. BARRA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. MURPHY: Please pull your microphone close to your mouth and make sure it's on. Thank you. BARRA: Can you hear me? OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. My name is Mary Barra, and I am the chief executive officer of General Motors. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. More than a decade ago, GM embarked on a small car program. Sitting here today, I cannot tell you why it took so long for a safety defect to be announced for this program, but I can tell you we will find out. This is an extraordinary situation. It involves vehicles we no longer make, but it came to light on my watch, so I'm responsible for resolving it. When we have answers, we will be fully transparent with you, with our regulators and with our customers. While I cannot turn back the clock, as soon as I learned about the problem, we acted without hesitation. We told the world we had a problem that needed to be fixed. We did so because whatever mistakes were made in the past, we will not shirk from our responsibilities now or in the future. Today's GM will do the right thing. That begins with my sincere apologies to everyone who has been affected by this recall, especially the families and friends who lost their lives or were injured. I am deeply sorry. I've asked former U.S. attorney Anton Valukas to conduct a thorough and unimpeded investigation of the actions of General Motors. I have received updates from him, and he tells me he's well along with his work. He has free rein to go where the facts take him, regardless of outcome. The facts will be the facts. Once they are in, my leadership team and I will do need to help assure this does not happen again. We will hold ourselves fully accountable. However, I want to stress I'm not waiting for his results to make changes. I've named a new vice president of global vehicle safety, a first for General Motors. Jeff Boyer's top priority is to quickly identify and resolve any and all product safety issues. He is not taking on this task alone. I stand with him and my senior leadership team stands with him, as well. And we will welcome input from outside of GM, from you, from NHTSA, from our customers, our dealers and current and former employees. The latest round of recalls demonstrates just how serious we are about the way we want to do things at today's GM. We've identified these issues, and we've brought them forward and we're fixing them. BARRA: I have asked our team to keep to keep stressing the system at GM and work with one thing in mind, the customer and their safety are at the center of everything we do. Our customers who have been affected by this recall are getting our full and undivided attention. We are talking directly to them through a dedicated Web site, with constantly updated information, and through social media platforms. We've trained and assigned more people, over 100, to the customer call centers and wait times are down to seconds. And of course, we're sending customers written information through the mail. We've empowered our dealers to take extraordinary measures to treat each case specifically. If people do not want to drive a recalled vehicle before it is repaired, dealers can provide then with a loaner or a rental car free of charge. To date, we've provided nearly 13,000 loaner vehicles. If a customer's already looking for another car, dealers are allowed to provide additional cash allowances for the purchase of a lease or new vehicle. Our supplier is manufacturing new replacement parts for the vehicles that are no longer in production. We have commissioned two lines and have asked for a third production line, and those parts will start being delivered to dealers next week. These measures are only the first in making things right and rebuilding trust with our customers. And as I've reminded our employees, getting the cars repaired is only the first step. Giving customers the best support possible throughout this process is how we will be judged. I would like this committee to know that all of our GM employees and I are determined to set a new standard. I'm encouraged to say that everyone at GM up to and including our board of directors supports this. I'm a second-generation GM employee, and I'm here as our CEO, but I'm also here representing the men and women who are part of today's GM and are dedicated to putting the highest quality, safest vehicles on the road. I recently held a town hall meeting to formally introduce our new VP of safety. We met at our technical center in Michigan. This is one of the places where the men and women who engineer our vehicles work. They are the brains behind our cars, but they are also the heart of General Motors. It was a tough meeting. Like me, they are disappointed and upset. I could see it in their faces. I could hear it in their voices. They had many of the same questions that I suspect are on your mind. They want to make things better for our customers, and in that process, make GM better. They particularly wanted to know what we plan to do for those who have suffered the most from this tragedy. That's why I'm pleased to announce that we have retained Kenneth Feinberg as a consultant to help us evaluate the situation and recommend the best path forward. I am sure this committee knows Mr. Feinberg is highly qualified and is very experienced in handling matters such as this. Having led the compensation efforts involved with 9/11, the BP oil spill and the Boston Marathon bombing, Mr. Feinberg brings expertise and objectivity to this effort. As I have said, I consider this to be an extraordinary event, and we are responding to it in an extraordinary way. As I see it, GM has civil responsibilities and legal responsibilities. We are thinking through exactly what those responsibilities are and how to balance them in an appropriate manner. Bringing on Mr. Feinberg is the first step. I would now be happy to answer your questions. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you, Ms. Barra. I also want to acknowledge, although the families are here today and now that we are aware and have sympathies, all the committee here. One Kelly Erin Ruddy (ph) of Scranton, Pennsylvania, is one of those that we offer sympathy to the families, but we have all of you in our hearts. Ms. Barra, our committee reviewed more than 200,000 pages of documents. What we have found is that as soon as the Cobalt hit the road in 2004, drivers began to immediately complain to General Motors that the cars' ignition systems didn't work properly. You can imagine how frightening it is to drive a car that, suddenly, you lose your power steering and power brakes. When the switch for the Cobalt was being built back in 2002, GM knew the switch did not meet its specifications for torque, am I correct? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: GM engineers began to look at the problem and try to figure out how to address it. GM understood the torque and the switches measured below its own specifications, is that right? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: Is it common practice for GM to accept a part that does not meet GM specifications? BARRA: No. But there's a difference between a part meeting or not meeting specifications and a part being defective. MURPHY: So under what scenario is accepting parts that don't meet GM specs allowable? BARRA: An example of that would be when you're purchasing steel. You'll set a specification for steel, but then because of the different suppliers and availability of steel to make products, you'll assess the performance, the functionality, the durability, you know, the aspects of the part or the -- in this case, steel, that is necessary to live up to what the performance and the durability, the safety needs to be. MURPHY: Well, let's... BARRA: That would be an example of when you would have a part or have material that doesn't meet the spec that was set out, but is acceptable from a safety, from a functionality perspective, performance, as well. MURPHY: Is that switch acceptable? BARRA: The switch -- I'm sorry, the switch... MURPHY: Is the switch acceptable in 2000? MURPHY: At what timeframe? I'm sorry. MURPHY: Well, at the beginning it seemed it didn't meet the specs for GM. So is that what you would consider acceptable? BARRA: As we clearly know today, it's not. MURPHY: So in 2006, GM changed its ignition switch and GM's switch supplier, Delphi, put in a new spring to increase the torque. Am I correct? BARRA: I didn't hear the last part. I'm sorry. MURPHY: GM's switch supplier, Delphi, put a new spring in to increase the torque? Is that correct? BARRA: There was a new part. MURPHY: Thank you. Now, in that binder next to you, if you would turn to tab 25, this is an e-mail exchange between Delphi employees in 2005 discussing the changes to the ignition switch. The e-mail notes that a GM engineer is asking for information about the ignition switch because, quote, "Cobalt is blowing up in their face in regards to turning the car off with the driver's knee," unquote. If this was such a big problem, why didn't GM replace the ignition switch on the cars already on the road, the cars where the torque fell well below the specifications, instead of just the new cars? Why? BARRA: I -- what you just said does not match under tab 25. MURPHY: At the bottom of the page, there should be something there. Well, just note that what I said -- I apologize for that. BARRA: OK. MURPHY: But there was a statement that "Cobalt is blowing up in their face," you know, just by being bumped with the driver's knee. BARRA: Clearly, there were a lot of things that happened. There's been a lot of statements made as it relates. That's why we've hired Anton Valukas to do a complete investigation of this process. We are spanning over a decade of time... MURPHY: But you don't know why they didn't just replace the switch on the old cars, as well as the new cars? BARRA: I do not know the answer to that, and that's why we're doing this investigation. MURPHY: Given the number of complaints about ignitions turning off while driving, why wasn't this identified as a safety issue? BARRA: Again, I can't answer specific questions at that point in time. That's why we're doing a full and complete investigation. MURPHY: Let me add another one. In the chronology GM submitted to NHTSA, GM states it didn't make the connection between the ignition switch problems and the airbag non-deployment problems until late 2013. So my question is, when GM decided to switch the ignition in 2006, did the company ever examine how a faulty ignition switch could affect other vehicle systems like the airbags? BARRA: Again, that's part of the investigation. MURPHY: Should they? BARRA: Should we understand... MURPHY: Should they look at how it affects other vehicle systems? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: Let me ask another question, then. So when GM concluded -- and you heard from my opening statement -- that the tooling cost and price pieces are too high, what does that mean? BARRA: I find that statement to be very disturbing. As we do this investigation and understand it in the context of the whole timeline, if that was the reason the decision was made, that is unacceptable. That is not the way we do business in today's GM. MURPHY: Well, how does GM balance cost and safety? BARRA: We don't. Today, if there's a safety issue, we take action. If we know there is a defect on our vehicles, we do not look at the cost associated with it, we look at the speed in which we can fix the issue. MURPHY: Well, was there a culture in GM at that time that they would have put cost over safety? BARRA: Again, we're doing a complete investigation. But I would say, in general, we've moved from a cost culture after the bankruptcy to a customer culture. We've trained thousands of people on putting the customer first. We've have actually gone with outside training. It's a part of the core values, and it's one of the most important cultural changes we're driving in General Motors today. MURPHY: I understand today. We're asking about then. I'm out of time. Ms. DeGette, you're recognized for five minutes. DEGETTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, GM knew about the defect in the ignition switches as far back as 2001, 13 years before the recall, correct? BARRA: The... MURPHY: Yes or no will work. BARRA: The investigation will tell us that. MURPHY: You don't know when GM knew about the defect? BARRA: I will -- I... DEGETTE: Take a look at tab 7 in your notebook, Ms. Barra. DEGETTE: This is a GM document, and what this GM document talks about is this switch. It says, "Tear (ph) down evaluation on the switch revealed two causes of failure, low contact force and low detent (ph) plunger force." Do you recognize that document, ma'am? BARRA: This is the first I've seen this document. DEGETTE: OK. Well, so you don't know how long GM knew about this... (CROSSTALK) BARRA: ... and that's why I'm doing an investigation. DEGETTE: OK. In fact, Delphi, the manufacturer of the ignition switch, informed GM in 2002 that the switch was supposed to be 15 minimum torque specification. But in fact, these switches were between 4 and 10, didn't it. BARRA: The specification is correct that it was supposed to be 20, plus or minus 5. DEGETTE: And these switches were between 4 and 10, correct? Yes or no will work. BARRA: We know that now. DEGETTE: And the -- and GM was notified by Delphi of this, correct? Yes or no. BARRA: I am not aware of being notified. DEGETTE: OK, then... BARRA: Can I also correct -- I was... DEGETTE: I need a yes or no. I only have five minutes. I'm sorry. So as far back as 2004, 10 years ago, GM conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition in a 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt. Is this correct? BARRA: Again, you're relating specific incidents that happened (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: You don't know? BARRA: Our entire investigation (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: You don't know about that? Take a look at tab 8, please. Yes. And by the way, ma'am, I'm getting this information from the chronology that GM provided to NHTSA. BARRA: Right. And there... DEGETTE: So let me ask you, again, as far back as 2004, GM conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: Thank you. Now, after the PRTS inquiry, one engineer advised against further action because there was, quote, "no acceptable business case to provide a resolution," and the PRTS was closed. Is that correct? BARRA: If that is true, that is a very disturbing fact. DEGETTE: Yes, it is. BARRA: That is not the way we make decisions. DEGETTE: OK. Again in 2005, GM received more reports of engines stopping when the keys were jerked out of the run condition. Further investigations were conducted, and engineers proposed changes to the keys. Is that correct? BARRA: It's part of our investigation to get that complete timeline. I understand (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: OK. Well, much of this I'm taking from the timeline GM has already done. BARRA: Which was a summary. DEGETTE: OK. So as a result of the investigation, a technical service bulletin was issued to dealers that if car owners complain, they should be warned of this risk and advised to take unessential items from the key chain. But this recommendation was not made to the public. No public statements were issued, no recall sent. Is that correct? BARRA: To my understanding, yes. DEGETTE: Thank you. In 2006, GM contracted with Delphi to redesign the ignition switch to use a new detent (ph) plunger and spring that would increase torque force in the switch. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And for some reason, though, the new switch was not given a part number and instead shared a number with the original defective switch. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: Now, this new switch also did not meet GM's minimum torque specifications, either. This one, Delphi said, was the range of 10 to 15, and it really should have been 15 at a minimum. Is that correct? BARRA: I have not seen the test results from that. DEGETTE: You don't know that. OK. Now, despite these facts, GM continued to manufacture cars with these same ignition switches for the model years 2008 to 2011. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And between 2004 and 2014, no public notices were issued as a result of GM's knowledge of these facts, and no recalls were issued for the over 2.5 million vehicles manufactured with these defective ignition switches. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And finally, three recalls were made this year, 2014 -- two in February and one just last February. Is that right? BARRA: Related to this ignition switch? MURPHY: Now, I have just a couple more questions. The first question I have, Ms. Barra, GM is intending to replace all the switches for those cars beginning April 7th, is that right? BARRA: We'll begin shipping material -- or new parts... DEGETTE: Now, are you going to put a completely redesigned switch or are you going to put the old switches from 2006 into those cars? BARRA: It's going to be a switch that meets the... DEGETTE: Is it going to be a newly redesigned switch, or is it going to be the old switch from 2006? BARRA: It's the old design that meets the performance that's required to (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: OK. I have more questions, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can do another round. Thanks. MURPHY: But an important part, a follow up, several members may be concerned about this, too. You're saying that there's an ongoing investigation, you cannot comment on these yet. Are you getting updates on a regular basis as this is going on? BARRA: From Mr. Valukas? MURPHY: From anybody in the company regarding these proceedings. Are you getting updates? BARRA: Yes, I am. DEGETTE: Thank you. Now go to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Once again, thank you, Ms. Barra, for being here this afternoon. I want to make sure we ask similar questions of both you and of NHTSA. We want to learn about the documents that were submitted on a timely and appropriate basis to NHTSA, and in fact, what did they do with that information. The documents that we've looked at produced (ph) show that GM received complaints about its Cobalt ignition switches for about two years that ultimately resulted in a redesigned ignition switch in 2006. Who within GM would have known about those specific complaints? What was the process back then? BARRA: I was not a part of that organization at that time. That's why I'm doing the investigation to understand that. UPTON: So you don't know the folks that would have been reported to at this point, is that right? BARRA: I don't know the people who would have been handling this issue at that point. UPTON: But you're getting updates. And what's -- what's supposed to happen? What -- looking back, what should have happened when these reports came in? BARRA: In general, when you have an issue, a product issue, a safety issue, a field incident, any type of issue that comes in, you have a team of engineers that are the most knowledgeable that work on that. If they see there's an issue, they elevate it to a cross- functional team that looks at it, and then it goes to a group for decision. UPTON: Now, we know that the ignition switch was, in fact, redesigned because it didn't meet the specs that were there. Is that right? BARRA: Yes. UPTON: Now, I would guess Engineering 101 would normally require that when you assign a new part or replace a new part or replace a part with a new part, that that newly redesigned part, in fact, should have a different number on it. Is that right? BARRA: That is correct. UPTON: So that didn't happen, right? Did not happen. BARRA: Correct. UPTON: Who within GM made the decision to move forward with that redesigned switch without a new part number? Do you know who that is? BARRA: I do not know the name of the individual. UPTON: Are you going to be able to find that out for us? BARRA: Yes, I will. UPTON: And will you give that name to our committee? BARRA: I can provide that. UPTON: Is it likely that that same person was the one that decided not to recall the defective version? Where did -- where in the timeline is that? BARRA: I don't know, but that is part of the investigation that we're doing. UPTON: Do you know when it was that it was discovered, what year, what -- you know, where in the timeline that it was discovered that, in fact, a new part number was not assigned? UPTON: I became aware of that after we did the recall and the timeline was put together. UPTON: So that was just in the last month or so. Is that right? BARRA: That's when I became aware. UPTON: But when did GM realize that no new part number had been assigned? BARRA: Again, that's part of our investigation. I want to know that just as much as you because that is an unacceptable practice. It is not the way we do business. UPTON: So you've stated publicly that, Something went wrong with our process. How is the process supposed to work? How is this -- how are you redesigning the process to ensure that, in fact, it should work the way that it needs to work? BARRA: Well, one of the things we're doing is the investigation by Mr. Valukas. I have some early findings from Mr. Valukas. As we look across the company, it appears at this time there was information in one part of the company, and another part of the company didn't have access to that. At times, they didn't share information just by course of process, or they didn't recognize that the information would be valuable to another area of the company. We have fixed that. We have announced a new position, Jeff Boyer, who is the vice president of global vehicle safety. All of this will report to him. He will have additional staff and will have the ability to cut across the organization. And we'll also have the right functional leadership that understands what's going on in the different areas. So that's a fix we have already made, and he is operating that way today. UPTON: So when GM received complaints about ignition switches for a number of years, it ended up resulting in the redesigned ignition switch in '06. UPTON: When was it that anyone linked up the ignition switch problems to look at the Cobalt's airbags not deploying? Was that about the same time? Was that later? What's the timeline on that? BARRA: That is something I very much want to understand and know. But again, this is -- we are doing an investigation that spans over a decade. And it's very important, because designing a vehicle is a very complex process, that we get a detailed understanding of exactly what happened because that's the only way we can know that we can fix processes and make sure it never happens again. UPTON: When was it that GM informed NHTSA that, in fact, a redesign -- did, in fact, GM inform NHTSA that the ignition switch had been redesigned? BARRA: I don't know that. UPTON: I yield back. MURPHY: Chairman yields back. Now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for five minutes. WAXMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, we've heard about how in 2002, GM approved the use of faulty ignition switches in Cobalts, Ions and other cars. That's what caused many of the problems that led to the recall of the cars from model years 2003 to 2007. So new ignition switches were designed and approved by General Motors. These were switches that were used -- were used in the model years 2008 to 2010. Does that all sound right to you? Am I correct in what I'm saying? BARRA: There's a couple of statements you made at the beginning that I don't know to be true. WAXMAN: Well, in 2002, GM approved the use of what turned out to be faulty ignition switches in several of these cars. BARRA: They were actually -- they were parts that went into a 2003, was the earliest model. WAXMAN: Well, the tests were done in 2002, but the cars were 2003 to 2007. So we have a recall of those cars. And then there was a new switch, a new ignition switch designed and approved by GM, and these new switches were in use in the model years 2008 to 2010 Cobalts and Ions. Is that... BARRA: To the best of my knowledge, that's correct. WAXMAN: OK. But in a briefing last week, Delphi told committee staff that these new switches also did not meet GM specifications. They told us the force required to turn these switches was about two thirds what GM said it should be. And documents that were provided to the committee also confirm that top GM officials were aware of the out-of-spec switches in 2008 to 2002 vehicles in December 2013. So there's a document -- if you want to look it up, it's tab 39, page 6 of your binder. There was a December presentation for GM's high-level executive field action decision committee, and that -- at that meeting, they showed that the performance measurement for almost half of the 2008 -- so you go to 2008, 2010 model year vehicles -- ignition switches were below the minimum GM required specifications. My question to you is, are you concerned that many 2008 to 2010 model year cars have switches that do not meet the company's specifications? BARRA: As we assessed the situation, my understanding that there was work going on to look at these switches again, looking at -- just because a switch -- or a part, any generic part, doesn't meet specification does not necessarily it is a defective part. As that analysis was going on, at the same time, we were doing the look across to make sure we could get all of the spare parts. And when we recognized that spare parts might be -- have been sold through third parties that have no tracking to know which VIN (ph), we made the decision... WAXMAN: Well, your own executives... BARRA: ... to recall all of those vehicles. WAXMAN: ... were informed that a lot of these cars, those model years, had switches that were just as defective as the 2003 to 2007 cars. That -- those cars were recalled, but you didn't recall the model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles until a month later, on March 28th. Why did the company delay in recalling these newer vehicles? BARRA: The company was looking -- my understanding is the company was assessing those switches, but again, at the same time, in parallel, they were looking at the spare parts issue, and the spare parts issue -- it became very clear we needed to go and get all of those vehicles because we couldn't identify which vehicles may have had a spare part put in them. And we... WAXMAN: But you... BARRA: We recalled the entire population. WAXMAN: But you recalled those vehicles. You recalled them later, but not... BARRA: Yes, we did. WAXMAN: ... when you knew there was a problem. BARRA: Well, we recalled them... WAXMAN: Your recall of these later vehicles did not mention the faulty switches that were originally installed in the cars. They mentioned only, quote, "Faulty switches may have been used to repair" the vehicles. Why did the company not announce that subpar switches may have been installed in those vehicles in the first place? BARRA: There was an assessment going on to understand if the specification -- the parts performance was adequate. WAXMAN: Well, wasn't it misleading to say that -- the company didn't tell them subpar switches may have been installed in the first place? What if I owned a later model car with its original ignition switch. Your recall implies that I don't have to do anything, but my car might still have a subpar switch. Will your company conduct a detailed analysis of these late model vehicles to determine if they're safe? And will you provide the committee with warranty reports and other information so we can do our own analysis? BARRA: I believe we're recalling all of those parts. All of those vehicles are being recalled. WAXMAN: They're all being recalled. Well, I must say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned. I know you've taken this job in an inauspicious time. You're trying to clean up a mess that was left behind for you by your predecessors. But I have one last question. How can GM assure its customers that new switches being installed beginning April 7th will finally meet GM's requirements? MURPHY: Thank you. BARRA: We have done -- we are working very closely with our supplier. Our executive director responsible for switches is personally looking at the performance of the new switches. We will do 100 percent end-of-line testing to be sure that the performance, the safety, the functionality of these switches are safe. MURPHY: Thank you. Gentleman's time's expired. Ms. Barra (INAUDIBLE) question. I just want to be clear. Did you review the documents that GM submitted to the committee? BARRA: No, I did not. There was over 200,000 pages (INAUDIBLE) MURPHY: How about the document Mr. Waxman was talking about? Did you review that? BARRA: I -- this page right here? MURPHY: Yes. BARRA: I actually saw this for first time I think a day ago. MURPHY: Thank you. Now recognize Ms. Blackburn for five minutes. BLACKBURN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, you've mentioned several times in your comments "today's GM." So my assumption is that you are going to run GM in a different manner than it has been run in the past... BARRA: That's correct. MURPHY: ... and that you are making some changes. I want to ask you just a little bit about timeline, helping us get our hands around this because we're -- this is the first investigation we're going to do. We're going to have others and continue to look at this to get answers and figure out what has happened here between you all and NHTSA, and also within what happened at GM. So you mentioned in your testimony that this came to light on your watch. So I am assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in GM about this issue until you became CEO. Am I correct on that? BARRA: At the senior level of the company, we learned of this after the recall decision was made on January 31st. I was aware in late December there was analysis going on on a Cobalt issue, but I had no more information than that. But I can assure you, as soon as we understood -- the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made, we acted without hesitation. BLACKBURN: OK, then, how did you find out about it? Was it through someone bringing the issue to you to say, Ms. Barra, we have a real problem here, or in doing your due diligence, did you find out about it? BARRA: The committee -- the leadership committee responsible for making recall decisions made its decision on January 31st. They notified Mark Royce (ph), who immediately picked up the phone and called me. BLACKBURN: OK. And could you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations? BARRA: Yes. BLACKBURN: Thank you. And then was your predecessor, Mr. Acreson, your predecessor -- was he aware of this issue? BARRA: Not to my knowledge. BLACKBURN: He was not. Are any of the members of the leadership committee also -- were they a part of his leadership committee? BARRA: There are members of today's team that were also members of Mr. Acreson's leadership team, and to my knowledge, they were not aware. BLACKBURN: OK. Do you think there was a cover-up or it was sloppy work? BARRA: That is the question I've asked Mr. Valukas to uncover, and I'm anxiously awaiting the results from his study. BLACKBURN: OK. Do you think it had anything to do with the auto bail-out? BARRA: With -- I'm sorry? BLACKBURN: With the auto bail-out. Do you think it had anything to... BARRA: Again, I need to get the results of the study to make all determinations. BLACKBURN: And going back to what Mr. Upton said, you're going to be sharing that information with us. BARRA: Yes. We will. We will be (OFF-MIKE) BLACKBURN: Because -- OK. Was there -- the engineers that were responsible for this, have you brought them into the process? I know this is something that the part was actually created by Delphi. Correct? BARRA: Correct. BLACKBURN: And they have an engineering team that was working on that. So they have a shared responsibility and liability in this entire issue. Have you met with them and with the engineering team that was responsible for this switch? BARRA: I have not met with the specific engineering team that is responsible... BLACKBURN: OK. BARRA: ... but I am speaking to leadership, and those individuals are being interviewed as part of the investigation conducted by Mr. Valukas. BLACKBURN: OK. Now, going back, did you say that this was a defective part when you talked about it earlier? BARRA: We have learned when we knew -- when the recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology, there's points that suggest, and that's why we're doing the investigation. BLACKBURN: OK. All right. Now, I think that you're going to hear from more than one of us about not having the new part number assigned. That -- who made that decision? Was that strictly a Delphi decision, or did that come into the GM supply chain for that decision to be made as to how the part number would be coded? BARRA: At a general level, General Motors is responsible for General Motors parts numbers. BLACKBURN: OK. BARRA: But again, that's part of the investigation to understand how that happened. BLACKBURN: OK. Does that seem inconceivable to you? BARRA: Yes, it is inconceivable. It is not our process, and it is not acceptable. BLACKBURN: OK. I would think that it probably is not. Have you asked Delphi if you can have access to their documentation and e-mail chain dealing with this issue? BARRA: I have not. Again, Mr. Valukas will go as the investigation takes him to get the information that he needs to get a complete and accurate accounting of what happened. BLACKBURN: OK. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. MURPHY: Just for clarification, Ms. Blackburn, we have asked for that e-mail chain from Delphi, and we'll let you know when we get that. Now recognize chairman emeritus of the committee, Mr. Dingell, for five minutes. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. I begin by telling the families injured or killed by the defective General Motors vehicles that they have our sympathy, and we believe the events here are tragic indeed. And I join everyone in expressing my condolences to the families who were killed or injured in those crashes. Now it is incumbent up on the Congress, federal regulators and General Motors to determine how these deaths could have happened and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the safety of American motorists and their families are moving forward. I expect that this investigation will be thorough, and I counsel all the stakeholders to be unabashedly forthright. Now, Ms. Barra, I'd like to build on Chairman Murphy's line of questioning, and all of my questions will require yes or no answers. If you cannot answer some of my questions, I expect that you will submit responses for the record and all available relevant supporting materials. Now Ms. Barra, is it correct that GM has now recalled approximately 2.5 million small cars in the United States due to defective ignition switches? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Yes or no. Now, Ms. Barra, is it correct that GM recently expanded its recall of small cars because it was possible that the defective ignition switches may have been installed as replacement parts, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that the ignition switch in question was originally developed in late 1990s and approved by General Motors in February of 2002? Yes or no. BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that General Motors's own design specifications for such ignition switch required 20, plus or minus 5, Newton (ph) centimeters of torque to move the switch from the accessory position to the run position, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that General Motors approved production of such ignition switch, despite test results by Delphi during the production part approval processor, or PPAP, showing that the switch did not meet GM's torque requirement, yes or no? BARRA: That's not clear to me. DINGELL: Now, Ms. Barra, is it correct a General Motors approved a redesign of the ignition switch used in the presently recalled vehicles in April of 2006? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, and is it correct that GM's torque requirement for the redesigned switch remained the same as for the original ignition switch, yes or no? BARRA: It is not clear to me, and that's why we're focusing the investigation on that area specifically. DINGELL: When that information becomes available, would you submit it to the committee? BARRA: Yes, I will. DINGELL: Now, Ms. Barra, to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet GM's torque requirements, yes or no? BARRA: I believe... DINGELL: Want me to say it again? To your knowledge, did the redesign ignition switch meet GM's torque requirement, yes or no? BARRA: It's part of the investigation. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, will you please submit for the record an explanation of the factors that GM takes into consideration when approving a part for production? Are there a circumstances where GM may approve parts or production when such parts do not make such design specifications, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: If so, could you please submit materials for the record explaining when and why that might occur? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, I appreciate the lengths to which GM under your leadership is going to recall the vehicles and ensure that they're safe to drive. GM's cooperation with the committee is necessary in order to understand the process by which and the reasons decisions were made leading up to the 2014 recall. You may have so far done so, and I expect that you'll continue to do so. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Barra. I yield back the balance of my time. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. Now recognize the chairman emeritus of the majority, Mr. Barton from Texas, for five minutes. BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask my questions, I want to make just a general observation. This is probably the last major investigation that this subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct where we have the services of Mr. Dingell and Mr. Waxman. We've had a history on this committee and this subcommittee going back 40 or 50 years that when we have major issues, we try to approach them on behalf of the American people in a nonpartisan, very open way, and it certainly appears that we're going to continue that tradition today. So I hope that we can show the best to the American people, that the Congress at its best gets the facts, presents the facts, and does so in a way that in the future, we protect the public health and safety for the American people. Now, with that caveat, I do have a few questions. A number of congressmen have made the point that these ignition switches didn't appear to meet specifications. And I -- my assumption is that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications, is that correct? BARRA: We've learned that as we did the recall. BARTON: Now, I'm an industrial engineer. I used to be a registered professional engineer. I'm not currently registered, but I have been in the past. Why in the world would a company with the stellar reputation of General Motors purchase a part that did not meet its own specifications? BARRA: I want to know that as much as you do. It is not the way we do business today. It's not the way we want to design and engineer vehicles for our customers. BARTON: I mean, I just don't understand that. I'm -- I've never worked in an auto assembly environment. I've worked in a defense plant, an aircraft plant. I was plant manager of a printing plant. I've done limited, very limited, consulting in the oil and gas industry. But I've never been a part of an organization that said we set the specs, when a part doesn't meet the specs, we go ahead and buy it anyway. And I just -- you know, you're currently the CEO, but at one time, I think before you became CEO, you were the vice president for global product development purchasing and supply chain. I mean, is it your position now that General Motors will not accept parts that don't meet specifications? BARRA: We will not accept parts that don't meet our performance, safety, functionality, durability requirements. As I mentioned before in the steel example, there will be times where there will be a material or a part that doesn't meet the exact specifications, but after analysis and looking at the performance, the safety, the durability, the reliability, the functionality, it will be OKed. That happens very often as we buy steel to make the bodies of the vehicles. BARTON: Well, then you don't need specifications -- with all respect... BARRA: No, but... BARTON: ... what you just answered is gobbledy-gook. BARRA: But... BARTON: It's your own specification. It's your company's specification. If a part doesn't meet the specification, why in the world would you not refuse it and only accept a part that meets a specification? BARRA: There needs to be a well documented process if you accept a part that doesn't meet the original specification. BARTON: All right, I'm... DEGETTE: Would the gentleman yield? BARTON: Briefly, yes. DEGETTE: Do you have that information? BARRA: On steel? DEGETTE: No, on starters. BARRA: On the -- on the ignition switch? DEGETTE: Yes. If it didn't -- doesn't -- didn't meet specifications, do you have the information on these starters that it met all those other criteria? BARRA: That is part of the investigation. But clearly, by the fact that we made a recall, it did not meet the performance... BARTON: We have the advantage as a subcommittee that we know now what happened in the past. We know now that there's a real problem. We know now that a number of young people have lost their lives, and apparently because of this -- this defect. So we have the advantage of hindsight. And I -- so I understand that. But as Ms. DeGette just said, and a number of others, there's no reason to have specifications if you don't enforce them. Now, this next question is not a trick question, but it's an important question. Right now, how many parts are being used in General Motors product that don't meet your own company's specifications? BARRA: I don't have that exact number, but I can tell you the parts that we're using today meet the performance and the reliability, the safety that they need to. If we find we have a part that is defective, that doesn't meet the requirements, we then do a recall. BARTON: Well, again, with -- that's not an acceptable answer, I think, to the American people. We're not telling you the specifications to set. Now, there are some safety specifications that by law and NHTSA by regulation sets, but there shouldn't be a part used in any GM product, or for that matter, any other automobile product that's sold in the United States that doesn't meet the specifications. My last -- well -- at what level was the decision made to override and to use this part, even though it didn't meet specification? Was that made at the manufacturing level, at the executive level, or even at some subcomponent purchasing level? Do you know that right now? BARRA: That's part of our investigation to find that -- answer that question. BARTON: All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. Gentleman (INAUDIBLE) now recognize Mr. Braley for five minutes. BRALEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, we've had different perspectives during this hearing. You've been appropriately focusing your attention on the members of this committee and answering our questions. And I've been staring at these photographs on the back wall, and I see young women the same age as my daughter. I see young men the same age as my two sons. My son Paul owns one of your Cobalts. I see a young Marine in his dress blues and I'm reminded of the photograph I have in my office upstairs of my father at the age of 18 in his dress blues at Camp Pendleton. And the focus of this hearing so far has been on GM's commitment to safety, which I think we all agree on is an important topic for this hearing. You testified in your opening -- and I think I'm quoting -- "Our customers and their safety are at the center of everything we do." And you responded to a question from Ms. Blackburn and told us that you were going to run GM differently than it's been run in the past. And I have a copy of GM's March 18th press release announcing Jeff Boyer as your new vice president of global vehicle safety. In this press release, he is quoted as saying, "Nothing is more important than the safety of our customers and the vehicles they drive. Today's GM is committed to this, and I'm ready to take on this assignment." Twenty years ago before this hearing, an Iowa family harmed by another defective vehicle gave me this promotional screwdriver set that they got from their local GM dealer. And if you look at it, on the outside, it has a slogan, "Safety comes first at GM." So my question for you, and I think the question that these families back here want to know is, what's changed at GM? Isn't it true that throughout its corporate history, GM has represented to the driving public that safety has always been their number one priority? BARRA: I can't speak to the statements that were made in the past. All I can tell you is the way we're working now, the training that we've done. We've changed our core values. The decision making we're leading, we're leading by example. We're -- you know, one of the process changes that we've also made is in addition to when the technical community makes their decision about a safety recall or a recall, we are going to be reviewing it, Mark Royce (ph), the head of global product development and myself, to see if there's more that we want to do. We... BRALEY: Hasn't the core values of General Motors always been that safety comes first? BARRA: I've never seen that part before. BRALEY: Isn't it true that throughout the history of the company, it's made representations like this to the driving public as a way of inducing them to buy your vehicles? BARRA: Today's General Motors, we -- all I can tell you is today's General Motors, we are focused on safety. We have over 18 vehicles that have a five-star crash rating. Our entire Buick lineup meets that requirement. We take it very seriously. BRALEY: But we're talking about these vehicles and what's changed. Have you had a chance to read this article in the Saturday New York Times, "A Florida engineer's eureka moment with a deadly GM flaw"? BARRA: I believe I read part of that article. BRALEY: OK, this is an article by a writer named Bill Vlasek (ph). And he wrote in here about an engineer named Mark Hood (ph), who was at a loss to explain why the engine in Brook Melton's (ph) Cobalt had suddenly shut off, causing her fatal accident in 2010 in Georgia. Then he bought a replacement for $30 from a local GM dealership, and the mystery quickly unraveled. For the first time, someone outside GM, even by the company's own account, had figured out a problem that it had known about for a decade and is now linked to 12 deaths. Even though the new switch had the same identification number, Mr. Hood found big differences." And then the article continues, "So began the discovery that would set in motion GM's worldwide recall of 2.6 million Cobalts and other cars and one of the gravest safety crises in the company's history." Do you agree with the author that this is a grave safety crisis in the history of General Motors? BARRA: I've said that this incident took way too long. It is not acceptable. And that's why we're making radical change to the entire process, adding more resources, naming vice president of global vehicle safety, who is tremendously experienced and of the highest integrity. And we will continue to make processes -- and process changes and people changes as we get the results of Mr. Valukas's investigation, and we will take all of those recommendations and we will make changes. BRALEY: Before I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to have this article added to the record for the hearing if it's not already part of the record. MURPHY: Without objection, so ordered. BLACKBURN: If the gentleman would yield his remaining second. Ms. Barra said they changed their core values. I think it would be great if she could submit what those new core values for G.M. are so we would have those for the record. MURPHY: We'll ask that for the record. BRALEY: And I would also like to have any prior statement of core values from General Motors over the last 20 years so we can see what has changed, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: We'll ask members for several to submit for the record. Now I we recognize the vice chair of the subcommittee, Dr. Burgess, for five minutes. BURGESS: I thank the chairman, and thank the witness for spending so much time with us this afternoon. You mentioned, Ms. Barra, in the start of your written testimony that over a decade ago General Motors embarked upon a small car program. Do you recall why that was? BARRA: I'm sorry? BURGESS: Why did GM embark upon a small car program 10 years ago, over a decade ago? BARRA: To have a complete portfolio, I believe. BURGESS: The -- but the mission or the type of car that was manufactured by G.M. previously had not fit that model, so this was an entirely new business line that G.M. was undertaking? BARRA: The Cobalt and they're several products, but if you're speaking specifically about the Cobalt, it was following a previous small car, but it was an all new program architecture, et cetera. BURGESS: Was any part of this done in -- because of the CAFE standards that were changing? Was any of this done because of congressional action that had occurred previously? BARRA: I can't answer that question. I wasn't in decision- making at that point. BURGESS: Let me ask you this, when Mr. Waxman was giving his opening statement, he said it was a shame that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration did not have access to the same information that General Motors had. Do you think that was a fair statement for him to have made? BARRA: As part of the investigation we're doing, I'm looking at what information was provided and when. BARRA: And that's -- you know, becomes then the troubling part of al of this. I think ranking member Degette had you at tab 8 in the information binder, and this was talking about the ignition key, cylinder assembly and the date of the PDF that I have is January 1st of 2005. Again, you'll find that under Tab 8 but later on in the same document, it says we are closing this with no action. The main reasons are all possible solutions were presented, lead time for solutions is too long. The tooling cost and piece price were too high, and none of the solutions seems to fully countermeasure the possibility of the key being turned off. So that was all in January of 2005, and then you know, as part of our document evaluation for getting ready for this hearing, there were several accident reports that were supplied to us and one of those occurred not too far away in Maryland, in the middle of the summer of 2005. And in that accident sequence, a Cobalt hit a series of trees at the end of a cul-de-sac, and the driver was fatally injured during that. She wasn't wearing a seat belt. Wasn't a terribly large individual; she weighed about 100 pounds. Because the airbag did not deploy though, it would be my -- you just have too wonder, had the airbag deployed. would her small frame have been protected. I mean, she broke the rim off of the steering wheel because of the impact of the collision, her body with the steering wheel and steering column. Of course the steering wheel being somewhat indented toward the lower part of the driver's body, hit her under the rib cage, apparently resulting in a liver laceration, which resulted in the (inaudible) in the time sequence to get her out of the crash and get her to the hospital. You can't help but wonder, because the other injuries that were reported with that crash, are really fairly mild. You've got to believe the airbag would've made a difference there. I just can't help but think that the people evaluating this must have asked themselves why no air bag went off with this type of crash? She was going 70 miles per hour and hit an oak tree. Wouldn't that be a logical place for an air bag to deploy? BARRA: Firstly, it's a very tragic situation. Some of the fatalities in this vehicles, again, we see as a tragedy and we have apologized. As I read the document that you asked me, I find that unacceptable that any engineer would stop at that point if there was an issue that they felt was a safety defect, and that's why we're doing the investigation, again, to put a complete timeline together, and I commit to you we will take action and we've made process changes. We will fix the process. Our goal is to have a world-class safety process. BARRA: And I respect you for being here and answering that way. One of the other accidents that it's reported in our binder under tab 20 was a head-on collision that occurred I believe in Pennsylvania, where the Cobalt was not at fault, another car went over the center line and there was a hit on impact. Again, the Cobalt airbags did not deploy. The driver of the other vehicle, the airbag did deploy. I mean, it seems to me this should be a red flag to the people who investigate air bag nondeployments as an occurrence or as an issue. In fairness, let me just state that all of the front see occupants in both vehicles were deceased as a result of that accident. So the deployment of the airbag in that situation did not protect -- preserve the life of the driver. But still, you would have to ask the question, you've got a Cobalt and Hyundai meeting head on. Why did Cobalt's airbags not deploy? It was the exact same force for both vehicles, and there was no intercedent jarring of the vehicle. They didn't run off the curb. They didn't run over another tree first. So the air bag did not deploy, and why would that have been the case in that particular accident? BARRA: And it's a tragic situation, any time there's a loss of life in a traffic situation. Again, I -- this is not a report -- or an investigation that was done by G.M. I can't answer your questions, because it's usually very complex as they look at that. So I can't comment on this particular study. BURGESS: If that is part of your internal investigation, though, I would like for you to make that information available to the committee staff and to the committee. BARRA: We'll make whatever information we have available. BURGESS: Thank you, and thanks for being here. BARRA: The gentleman's time expired. Now I'll recognize Mr. Schakowsy for five minutes. SCHAKOWSKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Braley talked about the pictures in the back, and I think that's what must makes it more -- even more painful is that these deaths were needless. So I want to ask you for something a little bit more than an apology. One of the many questions raised about G.M. today -- is how you will handle accidents that happened prior to the company's bankruptcy. G.M. filed for bankruptcy in June, 2009, emerging as new G.M. about six weeks later. So that Means that new G.M., the company as it exists today, I've been told, may not be liable for accidents that occurred prior to July 2009. Is that your understanding, Ms. Barra? BARRA: We at General Motors want to do the right thing for our customers. And that's why we feel this is an extraordinary situation. As I have said, it took too long to get to the answers and the understandings about this part. That's why we've hired Mr. Feinberg. We feel Mr. Feinberg has had extensive experience, and he will bring his experience and objectivity to assess what are the appropriate next steps. Because we do understand that we have civic responsibilities, as well as legal responsibilities. SCHAKOWSKY: Are you saying that the hiring of Mr. Feinberg indicates that G.M. will give some kind of settlement with those individuals whose families -- whose loved ones lost their lives? BARRA: We are -- we have just begun to work with Mr. Feinberg. In fact our first meeting will be on Friday. It will take probably 30 to 60 days to evaluate the situation. So I have -- we have not made any decisions. We have just started this process with Mr. Feinberg. SCHAKOWSKY: And that might include people who have been injured as well? BARRA: Again, I -- we have not made any decisions. SCHAKOWSKY: Let me ask you this. Yes, during G.M.'s restructuring, did the company disclose what it knew about the ignition-switch defect. By 2009 there is now doubt that officials in G.M. were aware of this problem. BARRA: I was not aware of this issue. I can't speak to what was disclosed but -- again, our investigation will cover if there was any information. But to my knowledge, there was -- it was not known at the senior leadership of the company. So does G.M. accept responsibility for the accidents caused by the company's defective vehicles? We -- I, first of all, I, again, want to reiterate we think the situation is tragic, and we apologize for what has happened, and we are doing a full investigation to understand... SCHAKOWSKY: I'm talking about responsibility and even liability. BARRA: Responsibility and -- I'm sorry, I don't understand. SCHAKOWSKY: And even liability. Do you would take responsibility -- is the company responsible? The new G.M., is it responsible? BARRA: We will make the best decisions for our customers, recognizing that we have legal obligations and responsibilities as well as moral obligations. We are committed to our customers and we are going to work very hard to do the right thing for our customers. SCHAKOWSKY: I hope that you do do the right thing. Let me ask you about some of the people who potentially knew about this. Where's my -- (OFF MIKE) SCHAKOWSKY: Hold on one second. OK. So you've reported a new -- for the first time, a president of global vehicle safety, I have to tell you, I'm underwhelmed by that, thinking that it's such an obvious thing to have someone high up that would in fact be able to connect the departments so everybody knew. I guess it's a good thing, however, that it's finally done. So we know that Ray DiGiorgio (ph) was the G.M. engineer who approved the ignition switch redesign in 2006. Is he still an employee of your company? BARRA: I believe he is. SCHAKOWSKY: Do you know who signed off on the initial faulty ignition switch that did not meet your specifications? BARRA: I don't. But that's what I will learn with the investigation. And after we have a complete investigation from a very complex process, we will take action. We will change process and we will deal with any people issues. I think we demonstrated in the issues we learned in India with the Travera (ph) about a year ago, we will take serious steps and hold people accountable. SCHAKOWSKY: So no one right now has lost their job as a result of this knowledge about this defective part? BARRA: We're just a few weeks into the investigation by Mr. Valucas (ph). We've already made process changes. And as I return to the office after this, we will begin to look at the implications now that we have further data coming from the investigation and take the appropriate steps. SCHAKOWSKY: Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: Gentlewoman yields back. Now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for five minutes. GINGREY: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. This hearing is much appreciated. Pretty poignant to me since Brooke Melton (ph) lived in my congressional district at the time. And had it not been for an outstanding plaintiff's attorney in the Cobb (ph) Judicial District of Georgia and bringing this case -- I'm sure it was against the local dealership -- resulted in a settlement but it brought to light what's going on now. And the purpose -- and hopefully some good can come from this hearing. And I want to thank Chairman Murphy for holding it and investigating the root causes of the General Motors recall of over 2.6 million vehicles linked to these ignition defects. Unfortunately, Ms. Barra, I heard just yesterday that the recall now includes 6.3 million vehicles. And I do want to speak a little about this young lady named Brooke Melton (ph), a nurse in Paulding (ph) County, Georgia, which, at the time was in the district I represent and she was, as you know, tragically killed March the 10th, 2010 on her 29th birthday in a horrific side impact accident on Highway 92 and the ignition switch in the accessory position. Just the day before, just the day before her death, she took her 2005 Chevy Cobalt into the dealership for service. And the service report stated, "Customer states engine shut off while driving. Please check," end of quote. Despite the fact that a service bulletin was issued from General Motors for faulty ignition switches back in 2005 for that make and that model, the on-site mechanics cleaned the fuel line, cleaned the fuel injection, told her to come pick up her car, which she did. Brooke Melton's (ph) tragic death is not acknowledged as part of this recall because it involved a side impact instead of a front impact. Ms. Melton's parents, Ken and Beth, are not here today, I don't think, but they deserve answers. Ms. Barra, is Brooke Melton included in General Motors death count, yes or no? BARRA: To my knowledge, no. GINGREY: No? BARRA: It was a side impact and we -- (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Right. Why did General Motors not include the non-deployment of air bags from side impact accidents resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall? BARRA: As you look at a frontal collision and the way the air bag is to operate, I believe the assessment, that was -- the assessment was made that would be potentially be related to the switch. GINGREY: Yes, but Ms. Barra, if you connect the dots, I mean, the ignition gets knocked over to the accessory position; there was a problem, you're using faulty, even by your own standards, equipment. And so maybe what happened was that all of a sudden the car stalls; she's driving perfectly, trying to control, without any power steering, without any power brakes, may very well have -- and I don't know the details of that accident -- but may very well have run through a four-way or a red light and was slammed into from the side. And whether it was a head-on collision or a side collision, it was for the same reason and she is dead and that was almost four years ago. I don't understand why General Motors does not include the non- deployment of air bags from side impact accidents resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall. Can you explain that to us? BARRA: Well, first of all, all of the accidents and fatalities are very tragic, as you've -- as you've indicated, and we're deeply sorry for those. We've been very clear of the number that we put forward. There's been a lot of analysis that's gone on to look at potential incidents and -- GINGREY: Well, did General Motors investigate or do you plan to investigate whether this condition relates to the non-deployment of air bags in side-impact crashes? BARRA: We have individuals that are looking at the available information from accidents -- GINGREY: You told us about your recent hire and I hope -- well, lastly, Ms. Barra, to what extent did G.M. regularly inform dealerships, like the dealership obviously in Cobb County, of its 2005 technical service bulletin on faulty ignition switches so that these service technicians, these young guys, you know, maybe working there six months to a year, that they could properly address a customer complaint like Brooke had the day before her death? BARRA: I'm sorry; was your question how do we communicate service bulletins? I just didn't hear. GINGREY: How do you make sure that these dealerships all across the country and their service departments are making sure that their technicians are getting and receiving the instruction? BARRA: We can provide details and exactly how we communicate service bulletins and how that's rolled out to each of our dealerships across the country. GINGREY: I hope you will. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Barra. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. MURPHY: Mr. Barra, related to his questions, with all these cars in recall and waiting for parts, what are drivers supposed to do in the meantime when their car is sitting in their driveway? BARRA: We have communicated and we've done extensive testing that if you take the -- if you have just the ignition key with the ring or just the ignition key, the vehicle is safe to drive. If people are not comfortable with that, we are making loaners or rentals available. They can go to their dealer. We have over 13,000 customers that have these vehicles in rentals or loaners right now. MURPHY: And you're assuring people that it is safe to drive if they just take the other rings off the key? BARRA: There's been extensive testing done by the engineering team and with just the key and the ring or just the key, we believe it is safe, based on our testing. MURPHY: Recognize -- (CROSSTALK) (UNKNOWN) Yes, Mr. Chairman, is that true of the -- of the earlier ignition as well as the 2006 -- what, all of them, all these cars, that's true? BARRA: That is our -- yes. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. MURPHY: Mr. Tonko, you're recognized for five minutes. TONKO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, thank you for appearing before the committee and I have to believe for the members of -- family members and friends of the victims of this tragic outcome, it must be a very painful process to sit here and listen to the exchange. Just a comment at first, we're hearing a lot about information that will come post the investigation or the review. However, I hold in my hands a February report and a March report to NHTSA on behalf of G.M. under your watch, that provides detailed timelines with a whole bit of knowledge exchanged. And I'm confused somewhat about that fair amount of knowledge that has been formally exchanged to NHTSA and at the same time we're hearing, well, we don't know until the investigation is complete. So there's a conflict that I think is brought to bear here in terms of -- in exchange that has been detailed in the last few weeks, under the watch of the new General Motors today's G.M.. And at the same time, when I was listening to -- our representative from Illinois asked about the corporate chart and the changes, no changes have been made. We're waiting for that pending the investigation. But at the same time, we characterized or labeled it as today's General Motors. So while we're all products of the environment that produces us, the cultural impact of G.M. seems to still be in play with a number of people who have perhaps shifted positions, but all part of that organization. So comfort me by telling me that there's a new thinking. There's a new culture that has beset at G.M. while all of the players are there in the corporate chart? Tell me how the company is restructured and reorganized so as to bring comfort to the consumer? BARRA: First, there are many new people in the company as well as people who have experience across the company. There is a new structure, for instance, in global product development. We've streamlined -- eliminated bureaucracy. We took out an entire layer of management in the product development. We've completely redone the quality processes over the last -- it started in the 2011, 2012 time frame. We changed our test procedure. We've added additional validation, so there's been a complete remake of the way we drive quality. We test to failure instead of testing to a standard. That's just one example. And we've looked across the entire organization. We've rebuilt our supplier quality organization, adding over 100 resources just in this country alone. So there's systemically gone across the company and we're making changes. Even in the chronologies, which I think you held up, those are the most detailed chronologies that we have ever provided, sharing again in a summary fashion with the information we have now, but then we are conducting an investigation with Mr. Valucas (ph). We've also rolled out new values with the customer as our compass, relationships matter and individual excellence. We've trained thousands of people. And -- but most importantly, it's leadership at the top. It's the leadership of how we behave and how we demonstrate when we make decisions, and that we make decisions that focus on the customer, focus on safety, focus on quality. And I can tell you in -- from my leadership team and the next layer, we continue to drive that every day. We recognize culture change doesn't happen in a year or two. But we're well on that journey, and we will -- are dedicated to it, and we very clearly want to have the safest vehicles on the road. TONKO: And will you make that list public from the report that you're anticipating? BARRA: I'm sorry. TONKO: Will you make the list that will be coming forth public? Will share that... BARRA: The list of -- I'm sorry. TONKO: The full report coming from Mr. Valucas (ph). BARRA: Mr. Valucas will make the findings and why give the appropriate findings available to this body, to our customers and to our employees. TONKO: The appropriate findings? What about full report? BARRA: I'm not confident -- I don't know if he'll give a report or if he'll share findings. TONKO: If he does, will you share the report? BARRA: We'll share the appropriate information. TONKO: Not the full report? BARRA: Again, I don't know if there will be a full report, but we will share... TONKO: If there will be a full report, will you share? BARRA: I commit that we will be very transparent and we will share what's appropriate. TONKO: So in other words, there's no commitment to share the full report? BARRA: I'm saying I will share what is appropriate. TONKO: I hear the answer. Mr. Chair, I yield back. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. Recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise for five minutes. SCALISE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having this hearing. Ms. Barra, thank you for being here and let me first say, my prayers are with the families who lost their lives and others who have been impacted by this. I want to thank you all for being here in this room as well. Obviously the questions we have are even more pertinent to the families that are here, and that's why it's important we ask the questions and get answers and -- if work to ensure we can prevent something like this from happening again. We've got to get into the real details of what went on during this period of years -- unfortunately -- years where it seemed somewhere inside of General Motors there was knowledge that this was a problem before it got to the level of recall. And want to first take you, Ms. Barra, to the tab you got there, number 38. Tab 38 is the sign off. This is called the General Motors commodity validation sign-off. This is the actual sheet that the engineer signed off on that approved the design change in the faulty ignition switch. Have you seen that document before? BARRA: This is the first time I've seen this document that's labeled delphi (ph). SCALISE: Now, what we're talking about here, how long have you been aware of the problem with these faulty ignition switches? BARRA: I was aware there was a faulty ignition switch on January 31st. SCALISE: Of this year? BARRA: Of this year. SCALISE: As you're going through I'm sure some of the questions you have or asked and maybe some of the ones we're having, first question you would want to ask, what did we know about it, when did we know, did we know well in advance -- I mean, why didn't you prevent it from happening? The first thing we are all talking about is when was this found out within G.M. to the point they actually made a change. I mean y'all made a design change. The letter I've got here -- this -- this form is dated April 25th of 2006. So 2006 is when your engineers -- and there's a name on the sheet, there's an actual engineer who you said under oath earlier is still employed with G.M. -- there's an engineer that actually signed this document requesting -- not requesting, approving a change in this ignition switch. In fact, with a part number, the part number is on here. Has anyone -- in your knowledge -- has anyone at G.M. taken this -- he's an employee of yours, you can pull him aside right now and asked him, when you signed off in 2006, number one, why didn't you change the part number. And number two, why did you approve a change in the ignition switch and not bring it to the level of recall? In 2006 clearly people lost their lives after -- after this was signed off on. So do you know right now -- you're under oath -- do you know of anyone that has asked the person that signed this -- that signed off on this, have any of y'all asked him those basic questions? BARRA: I know this is part of the Anton Valucas (ph) investigation and I want to know the answers... SCALISE: Do you know of anyone who has asked him that question? I mean, he's an employee of yours right now -- you can pull him aside right when you leave here today and ask those questions. BARRA: I think it's very important as we do an independent investigation that we let Mr. Valucas (ph) do a thorough investigation, talk to people, that there's not a lot of side investigations going on. He's the one standard that we're going to use in this investigation. He brings objectivity to it. SCALISE: Clearly -- you know, I mean you talk about a new culture. Has anyone been held accountable, as of now, for what's happened? BARRA: Again, we're just -- we learned of this on January 31st... SCALISE: Again, you have a design change in 2006 related to what we're talking about. This is not a 2014 issue. The recall was issued in 2014, but the product -- the product faulty ignition switch we're talking about was redesigned in 2006 by one of your engineers who's still an employee at General Motors. If you can't give me that information, and if you do find that information out, would you get that to the committee? BARRA: It will be part of the investigation... SCALISE: OK, the other question I want to ask you, later on we're going to have the acting administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration -- some of the things he says in his testimony before you leave, I would like to get responses, he says, "Number one, we're pursuing an investigation whether G.M. met its timeliness responsibility to report and address this defect under federal law." Are you aware of whether or not G.M. has met its obligations of timeliness? BARRA: That will be part of the investigation that we're doing... SCALISE: So you're not aware at this time. I mean, if you're aware of something, that would be a violation of federal law if you're aware of that already, can you share that with us? BARRA: I'm aware of the findings that I've already shared from Mr. Valucas (ph) today. SCALISE: OK, and another question he asks in the brief time I have left, he says, "G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect." That's the gentleman that's testifying right after you. You don't have the opportunity to come behind him and respond. He's going to be saying this. He's writing this in his testimony. What would you say in response to his statement that G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify... BARRA: As I've already said, we've already learned through Mr. Valucas' (ph) investigation there were points in time where one part of the investigation had information that wasn't shared across to the other side of the organization -- you can call lit a silo -- at this point they didn't understand that the information would be valuable to another party. So I've already shared we have found that to be true and we've already made changes to the structure and to the responsibilities of people so that won't happen again. SCALISE: All right, we appreciate getting the full range of answers to all of these questions, and with that I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MURPHY: I know recognize Mr. Green for five minutes of Texas. GREEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ms. Barr, first of all, congratulations on being the CEO of General Motors. Like a lot of my constituents, I've been a customer of G.M. In fact I can't list the number of vehicles I've owned. Although my wife drives a Tahoe, I lease a Malibu. I have a Blazer, and, you know so -- and we keep them for a long time. So I've appreciate (sic) G.M. products. And you've heard the questioning today from -- and it seems like on a bipartisan basis we're trying to find out what's happening. Although, Mr. Chairman, I know you heard it, I was surprised, because Dr. Gingrey is a good friend of mine, and a physician. And to say he thanked the plaintiff's lawyer for something, you've at least you have gotten Republicans and Democrats on the same side on something. So Phil's not here now, but there is a reason we have a civil bar. You have gone down the litany with the other questions of the problems that were happening. In 2002, the switch was acknowledged it was (inaudible) so 2005 the dealers were notified of a problem, but was because of heavier key rings. And I thought about my wife's key ring that she uses. It's like has everything in the world on that key ring so I couldn't imagine that would be an issue. But I guess, getting down to the concern I have, in 2007 you modified the switch ignition for future models, but though the switch condition still fell below the initial torch (ph) standards by G.M. Let me give you an example of what this has caused. I have a constituent, who I talked to yesterday before I left Houston, and -- whose mother, Lois, owns a 2003 Regal which is 10 years old. And she has owned G.M. products like I guess I have for many years. But, the Regal began stalling and turning off in February of '13, and even (sic) the car had less than 50,000 miles. Since she's owned the car it's gone to the G.M. dealer six times. The battery's been replaced. And each time the dealer did not fix the problem. She ended up finding a quote -- Ms. Kenutsa (ph) who told it to me -- that she finally found a shade tree mechanic who actually fixed it. And I guess what bothers me, if you go back to the dealer this many times -- and I hold the dealer's, you know, repair shops to a higher level simply because they know the product -- that what has happened -- can you confidently say that these stalling issues are limited only to the Cobalt, the HHR, the Pontiac G5, the Solstice and Saturn Ion and the Sky models of vehicles, or is it other ones like the Regal, or maybe like the Malibu I drive? BARRA: Again, I'm not aware of any other stalling issues. If we have an issue, we put it into our recall process and make decisions. So if there is a defect that you are aware of, I would appreciate the information. I will definitely look into it. GREEN: Well, we'll get you that information, from what they had. I have a couple of minutes left, but I represent an industrial area. We have refineries and chemical plants. What we do is inherently dangerous. And so you have to take extra concern about it. And it looks like, in the last 10 years, G.M. has not -- somewhere along that line -- the culture of the company is not there to deal with that. And, as the new CEO, I would hope that you make sure it happens. I have said this many times when I have a chemical plant or refinery that has an accident, and somebody dies, and we've been able to pinpoint -- sometimes with civil justice, but sometimes through chemical safety board -- on what the decision was made that they didn't do that caused people to die. That is what happened here. And General Motors is a much greater company than to do that. And I would hope the culture of your corporation would be better so that it would continue to earn the respect that both this lady and I have. But that's your job now as CEO, but you need to fix it. And fix it as quickly as you can because it's gonna cause problems, obviously. BARRA: I agree with you. It is completely my responsibility . And I will work day and night. We've already made tremendous change at General Motors. We'll continue to do that, and I recognize that it is my responsibility. GREEN: The last thing in my 30 seconds is, should that -- my constituent -- should she have her mother in Phoenix take that Regal back and have it checked by a dealer now to see what happened? BARRA: Yes, I wish you would send a note to me. And I will... GREEN: I'll get you that information. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: I now recognize Mr. Griffith for five minutes. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, you have indicated that the -- not having a new part number when the part was changed in 2006 is not acceptable. Is that correct? Yes. BARRA: Yes, that's correct. GRIFFITH: And I guess it is hard to figure that somebody would have just done that by accident. And that there had to be a reason, because that was a breach of protocol wasn't it? BARRA: I don't think there was an acceptable reason to do that. GRIFFITH: OK. And while there may not be an acceptable reason, you would have to acknowledge that a reason in somebody's mind, while not acceptable, might be that it is harder to track the problem with the old part when you have an improved new part that is put in it's place, isn't that correct? Yes, or no? BARRA: Yes. GRIFFITH: And while you have indicated that you did not know the individual name of the person that made that decision, do you know whose job title it was or in whose chain of command it was to make the decision not to create a new part number for that part? BARRA: I don't -- it would be within the engineering organization and I will learn that and we will take appropriate action. GRIFFITH: And would that engineering department have been under your chain of command at some point in your tenure with G.M.? BARRA: Since February of 2011. GRIFFITH: But it never get to you? Nobody ever brought this to your attention. BARRA: No, it did not. GRIFFITH: I appreciate that. I have this question and I think that the answer probably is that your investigation will reveal this it is concerning that the trial lawyer that uncovered this may be very savvy, and his expert might be pretty sharp, you all have sharp people working at G.M. as well do you not? BARRA: I believe we do. GRIFFITH: And it is one of those questions that I'm sure your investigation will uncover, but why didn't your team of engineers connect the dots and figure out that when the ignition slips into the auxiliary position the air bags won't function properly? GRIFFITH: Congressman, those are the questions I want to answer, and as I've said, it has taken way too long, and we will learn from this, and we will make make changes and we will hold people accountable. GRIFFITH: And not only hold people accountable -- you were asked earlier -- and I know you are in a tough spot on that as to what kind of liability G.M. will end up excepting because there's legal liability and moral liability and you've said that. One of the questions that I would have is it would have been a whole lot easier just to list these liabilities in the bankruptcy wouldn't it? It would have been easier to do it in the bankruptcy instead of having to come out now, wouldn't it? BARRA: The best thing in the world would be as soon as we find a problem we fix it, and it doesn't exist in the marketplace and doesn't effect our customers and doesn't create tragedies. GRIFFITH: And here's here's one of the things that concerns me. Have you been given estimates yet by Mr. Feinberg or others as to best case or worst case scenario is on your civil liabilities? BARRA: We have been in initial conversations with Mr. Feinberg. I believe we will work through him to evaluate the situation over the next 30 to 60 days. GRIFFITH: Has anybody else given you a best case or worst case scenario over liability issues related tot his problem? BARRA: There have been a lot of estimates done in the public, but none given specifically to me. GRIFFITH: OK, would those liability issues have negatively impacted the prospects of either a bail out by the federal government, or prior to the bail out, the people who were lending you money to keep G.M. afloat with it's heavy liabilities already existing, would not the additional liabilities that would have come forward by this problem have had the potential to dissuade private investors or the federal government from giving cash to G.M. BARRA: As I look at it, as soon as we identity an issue and fix it, then there aren't liabilities or the liabilities are contained. And that's what we -- as look at problems as go forward, we want to fix them as soon as we can. If there's a safety issue, we are going to make the change, make the right investment and accept that. GRIFFITH: But, in the -- in the real world of business, if there's a new set of liabilities that come onto the page that weren't there before, it's harder to get money from both public and private sources, isn't that true? BARRA: I think ti depends -- it depends on the situation. So it's a general question. I don't feel appropriate commenting. GRIFFITH: All right. I appreciate that. Let me ask this last question. When this issue first came up the corresponding problem resolution tracking system report document identified the issue as "Severity Three." What does that mean? BARRA: I'm sorry... GRIFFITH: I said, "Severity Three." I'm referencing back to some of the documents that your folks have given us. In the initial assessment in 2004, 2005 when your problem resolution tracking system report came out it related this problem as being "Severity Three." What does that mean? BARRA: I don't have a specific definition for that... GRIFFITH: Can you get one for us? BARRA: I can. GRIFFITH: I appreciate that. And I yield back. MURPHY: Can I ask a clarifying question for what Mr. Griffith was saying, did G.M. purposely and willfully negotiate during a bankruptcy issues, or in the process of obtaining the loans -- did they purposely with hold the information that they may have known about pending lawsuits or things that would be emerging in the future about the Cobalt or other cars? BARRA: I am not aware -- I personally did not with hold information. I am not aware, but I can not speak to every single person. MURPHY: Thank you. Mr. Welsh, you're recognized for five minutes. WELSH: Thank you. I have to congratulate General Motors for doing the impossible. You've got Republicans and Democrats working together, and I thank my colleagues for their focus on this hearing. A couple of things. How many cars have been recalled as of this date? BARRA: Related to the ignition switch? WELSH: Right. BARRA: Over 2.5 million. WELSH: Now, this ignition switch issue was first -- it came to light in 2006 is that correct? BARRA: Through our investigation we'll know when it came to light. It came to light to me on January 31st (sic), 2014. WELSH: Well that -- I mean, that is totally irrelevant to the people who lost their lives. BARRA: I understand... WELSH: I mean, you are the current CEO, but that is not relevant to the question I just asked. BARRA: I'm sorry, I thought you asked when I became aware of that. WELSH: No, no G.M. BARRA: Again, that is what we will learn in our investigation. WELSH: Well, you changed the switch after 2006. You began in 2007 changing the switch right? BARRA: Yeah, there were changes made. WELSH: So would it be a logical inference that somebody thought there was a reason change the switch that had been in use in to 2006 to 2007? BARRA: As we do our internal investigation, I hope to get those answers. WELSH: Well, wouldn't that be a starting point? Somebody for some reason decided to change a very critical part in the car between 2006 and 2007, correct? BARRA: Correct. WELSH: So let me ask you this. If you had recalled cars and acted on this aggressively in 2006 when you were making the decision that you had to change -- you G.M., not you -- G.M. changed the switch, how many cars would you have had to recall had you acted in 2007 when you made the decision to change the switch? BARRA: I can get you the exact number, but it would have been significantly less. I don't... WELSH: Give me an estimate. You can talk to your back row there if you want. BARRA: I would again -- I will confirm the answer, but I would assume it is something around more 1.2 million. WELSH: Just from -- you would have cut it at least in half and maybe more. BARRA: Because, again, we are starting with vehicles that the Saturn Ion was in production in '03. WELSH: All right, let me just get a business-type question here. What do you estimate would have been the cost to G.M. of this recall had they done it in 2007? BARRA: When we looked at the population from '03 to '07 -- actually if I look at all the vehicles that had this it would have been a higher number. I believe it was 1.8 million, and that would have probably -- the estimated cost for those two pieces is something less than $100 million. WELSH: OK, and what do you estimate would be the cost of the recall now that it is being done 8 years later? BARRA: Well, there is a larger population. We can provide the information... WELSH: I want an estimate. I want people to be able to hear this. I mean, the decision delayed is money and lives at risk. I'm trying to get an opinion from you and it is ball park so it can be adjusted as to what the cost would have been had you acted 8 years ago versus acting now, you G.M. BARRA: Well, if we we would have acted at that point, we would have had a smaller population as we talked about. WELSH: Look, I know that. That's obvious. I'm asking about the cost. BARRA: I'm sorry. I'm not trying to be difficult. I don't understand your question. WELSH: You know, what if I were on the board of directors, and I had an obligation to shareholders, and I had a company that could have acted 8 years ago to deal with a problem, but by not acting let that problem increase in magnitude, do more damage to shareholders, do more damage to the bottom line, do enormous damage to the reputation of this company and cause -- we don't know how much -- harm to citizens, I would want an answer to the question. BARRA: I agree and it would have been substantially less at that time frame had we done it than what it would be now. WELSH: G.M. was involved in litigation concerning allegations that this switch was defective and caused problems, correct? BARRA: Yes. WELSH: And G.M. settled some of these litigation matters, correct? BARRA: Correct. WELSH: After a very aggressive defense. Those settlements were secret? BARRA: They are confidential by both parties. WELSH: By both parties -- I'm not -- you know, some of us have been in court. By parties usually means by the request of the party that's paying the damages. BARRA: I wasn't involved in those settlements. I only know it's confidential and it was by both parties. WELSH: OK, no this is not good. You are the company right now. All right? Let me ask this question, do you believe that when a company that has been sued about a matter involving product safety, where a person has been seriously injured or has died, that the company that settles -- as a matter of policy -- should be entitled to keep secret what that settlement was about? BARRA: I'm not -- I think that there are issues associated with that that every settlement is unique, and it's a decision that is agreed to by both parties. I don't have any comment on that... WELSH: Let me ask you another question. If a company -- G.M. or any other company -- settles litigation, and pays a substantial amount of money pertaining to an allegation about serious bodily injury or death, should that company be permitted to keep secret that settlement from the governmental agency whose responsibility it is to protect the public safety? BARRA: If that is information required by that government agency, then we would provide it. If the two parties involved in the settlement agree to it, that is their agreement. WELSH: So if you don't have to do it, you won't have to do it? BARRA: If both parties want that -- I'm making the assumption that both parties agreed to it which is what I've been told. WELSH: OK, I yield back. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. Now recognize the Gentleman from Missouri for five minutes. Mr. Long. LONG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, Ms. Barra. And I want to thank the families that are here today for keeping safety in the forefront of America's and Congress's consciousness when it comes to automobile safety. And we have heard about this same subcommittee in the past dealing with the issues before I came to Congress. The Ford Explorer Firestone Tire situation. We have heard about the Toyota accelerating car issue, and like I said, I wasn't here, but I can imagine that the questions were similar: Who knew what when, did you know this person, have you done anything about it? I want to take a different tact with my line of questioning as I normally do. And that is that, people ask me all the time, do you think you make a difference? When you go to Congress, you are up here a few years do you think you are making a difference? And that is hard to quantify, to tell somebody whether you're making a difference or not. But today, this is a day that I want to look back on and say, you know, I think I made a difference. I think that it -- we got some answers to questions in the future to prevent -- I don't want to be here again, and I don't want to have them say, Ford Explorer, Firestone Tire, Toyota accelerating and do you remember the G.M. faulty ignition switch? So that's what I would like to say, yeah, we made a difference. And with that, like I said, I thank the families for being here and keeping it in the forefront of safety so there is (sic) not other people sitting in the same seats next time we approach an issue like this, because hopefully there won't be a next time. And the finger pointing, the old analogy, when you are pointing a finger, you have three pointing at yourself. There's gonna be a lot of finger pointing in this, but what I really would like to drill down on and get answers to is, how the NHTSA, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and you all, as an automobile manufacturer, if you can work, to see that this doesn't happen again so that the two organizations can work together and drill down on these problems when we first learn them whatever the next problem may be that would be my goal for here today. And in answer to one of Chairman Upton's -- the chairman of the full committee's -- questions a while ago and I don't know what he was asking about exactly, but you said, "I was not part of that organization at the time." I'm sure that was something within General Motors, because you like I have a history that goes back, I think, to when you were 18 years old with General Motors. So you were there at the time as far as the overall organization, but not whatever part he has; your father, I believe, worked 39 years for Pontiac. So you indeed go way back. I go back to 18 years old with General Motors, too. I -- when I was 18, my folks bought me a 1973 G.M. Jimmy. It's -- if you think of a big Suburban today, cut off two doors and that was a Jimmy or a Blazer; Chevrolet called theirs the Blazer. I've been in the real estate and auction business for years, from '73 to about '05, I drove nothing but General Motors Suburbans. I remember times when the key would be in there and you would go to put your key in and it wouldn't work. Why wouldn't it work? Because I had a big keychain, a big keyring. And it would vibrate and it would tear the teeth off the keys to where the key no longer functioned, but never once did I have that shut off. And never once did I have that fail to act or shut off in the middle of driving. So to me, from '73 to '05, with my experience, they made pretty good ignition switches. Can you tell me how many models G.M. makes today? BARRA: Oh, around the globe, I'm very -- over 100. LONG: A hundred different models? (CROSSTALK) LONG: Can you tell me how many ignition switches they make? BARRA: Well, we sell, you know, over 8 million -- LONG: No, I mean, how many per -- if you have 100 -- if you have 100 models, how many different ignition switches would there be? BARRA: I can't answer that question; I don't know. LONG: Well, to me, G.M. has proven in the past and other companies have that you can -- I just don't understand this reinventing the wheel, that every car has to have a different ignition switch with different set of circumstances made by somebody down in Mexico to make sure that it meets the qualifications. So I'd recommend two things, that you work hard with us, our next witness from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration says that a car -- when it shuts off that the airbag will still deploy for 60 seconds. I can't imagine being in a crash that a car shut off and you continue for more than 60 seconds. So that's question that I'm going to have for him. But I would ask that you reach out and work, not only with your engineers, saying, hey we have got some pretty good -- why do we reinvent the wheel every time we go to invent a new ignition switch for all these different models? And also hope that you will reach out and work with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. So... BARRA: I would welcome the opportunity to have our technical experts look at how we can improve the way the system works because airbag deployment is part of a system. And I would welcome the opportunity, if there are improvements that can be made, we would want to be in the forefront of making them. LONG: In communication with -- BARRA: -- and work closely with -- LONG: Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate it. And again, I thank the families. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. MURPHY: We now recognize Mr. Yarmuth for five minutes. YARMUTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, at the outset, want to express my condolences to the family of the victims of this tragedy. And I know it must be frustrating to you to listen to this testimony. And you're looking for answer and so are we. And so is G.M. right now. And I hope we do get answers, because I was frustrated by the same questions that my colleague had just mentioned. I have been driving a long time and this is a pretty well established technology, sticking a key into an ignition and turning it. Are you aware of any other ignition problems that have been -- that have been discovered or -- in G.M. or any other vehicle over the history of key ignition systems? BARRA: I have not reviewed every incident we've ever had. But I, you know, we do, as we find issues, we document them and take them through our process. In this particular case, it took way too long. YARMUTH: And there is a new technology -- I have been driving a car for 4.5 years, I confess it's a Ford product, not a G.M. product, that has a push-button ignition. I was in a G.M. car last week, a very nice one, by the way, which has a push-button ignition system. How do you make a judG.M.ent as to whether a car has a push- button ignition system and -- or a key ignition system and what are the differences, first of all, in terms of safety? We know that this wouldn't -- this particular situation wouldn't occur with a push- button ignition system. But how do you make that decision as to what goes into which car? BARRA: We evaluate and actually the push-button start is something that we are evaluating putting across the portfolio. As you look at the specifics of a push-button start versus the traditional ignition, I'd like our experts to provide that information because, again, the ignition switch and how it -- it is a component that operates as part of a system of the vehicle, especially as it relates from a safety perspective. And I think we would be better served to have our experts cover that. YARMUTH: But you are doing an analysis of whether a push-button ignition system is safer than a key ignition system? BARRA: I -- we can definitely do that. I think, you know, there has work done that both can be designed to be safe. But we are looking because of the customer -- you know, it is a function, it's a delighter (ph) usually when the vehicle has a push-button start. We have them on some of our vehicles. We continue to roll those out across our entire portfolio. And we are looking at doing it across the board. YARMUTH: Yes, I mean, I have no idea if there's a difference in safety; there may be none, but it would be worth doing that analysis. My -- one of my staff members has a 2005 Malibu that was recalled because of a power steering issue. And she called the dealership and the dealership said that they didn't know how to fix it. So my question to you is, are you confident that G.M. knows how to fix the vehicles it recalls for the variety of problems that have -- BARRA: Well, first of all, if we find a situation that is not safe and we don't know how to fix it, we're still going to recall the vehicles and we'll take those actions. In this case, there may be a communication lag because there is a fix, whether it's a check or a replacement of the product. So, that does exist for that specific vehicle. YARMUTH: So she is getting bad information from her dealership or they haven't been told yet? BARRA: I would assume. I can follow up if you would like. YARMUTH: Well, I'm not, I mean, I think the public would want to know that -- because you now have -- BARRA: Right. But there is -- YARMUTH: -- millions of vehicles out there under recall, and she was told to go ahead and drive the vehicle if she felt safe, and I'm not sure that every driver would know whether they should feel safe or not. I mean, that -- some people, if the power steering goes out, are strong people and maybe it has happened to them before and they know that it's going to take a little bit more effort to steer. Other people might not. So I mean, I don't even know how a -- the average consumer is supposed to know whether they feel safe or not after a vehicle has been recalled. Doesn't the company have some disclosure responsibility to say these things -- at least these things could happen? There could -- BARRA: Yes, we have done that. And that is a part of a letter that we send to the customer when they -- we notify them of this issue. And then we provide information to the dealers as well. YARMUTH: OK. One final question, we talk about and we're going to have the NHTSA representative here earlier, one of the things that you are not required to do is to provide warranty data proactively to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Do you think that's something that ought to be considered that -- (CROSSTALK) YARMUTH: -- might be helpful in this case? Maybe dots could have been connected sooner if all that data -- ? BARRA: I welcome the opportunity to look at what information that NHTSA would feel is of value to submit. YARMUTH: OK. Thank you. (CROSSTALK) YARMUTH: I yield back. MURPHY: Thank you, the gentleman yields back. I now recognize Mr. Harper for five minutes. HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the family members that are here, our hearts indeed go out to you and we will continue to get to the bottom of this. And Ms. Barra, I know this is not the most enjoyable experience to go through this. But we are in a situation that you know, we don't trust the company right now. And we have to get to the bottom of this. And so we want to continue to ask some questions. If I could get you to refer to tab 28 in your binder, and I want to direct your attention to that email that's found at tab 28. In September of 2005, a few months after General Motors decided that there was not an acceptable business case to implement changes to the ignition switch, an engineering group manager email, Lorie Queen (ph) and other G.M. personnel, including Raymond DiGiorgio (ph) about proposed changes for model year 2008 ignition switch. So this engineer obviously explains that a more robust ignition switch will not be implemented in that model year 2008 vehicles, because it appears the piece cost could not be offset with warranty savings. In his email, he references "piece cost," is that just the ignition switch?" BARRA: Generally when people refer to piece cost they refer to the part. HARPER: So he is just referring to that ignition switch; that's a yes? BARRA: Again, I didn't write this note but I'm just telling you generally when people use -- HARPER: OK. BARRA: -- piece cost, that is what it means. HARPER: As he notes in that email, an increase of 90 cents; is that correct? BARRA: I'm sorry? HARPER: It says does the e-mail say that there would be an increase of 90 cents? BARRA: Yes. Yes -- HARPER: And since the warranty offset was only 10 cents to 15 cents, G.M. didn't make the change. BARRA: Right. And that is not something that I find acceptable. If there is a safety defect, there is not a business case, there is -- this analysis is inappropriate. HARPER: And I appreciate that you don't find that acceptable, but that indeed is what happened here, correct? BARRA: And -- and that is -- that exactly, and that's one piece of data as we go through the investigation, as we put the pieces together, we will take action, because this is not the type of behavior that we want in our company today with our engineers today. HARPER: And understand, we're trying to go back and figure out what happened and understand that so we can indeed make sure, as you do, that this never happens to anyone else again. Now, Laurie Queen (ph), what was her position at the time? BARRA: If the 2005 -- I believe she was a vehicle line executive, but I can go back and confirm that. HARPER: If you would let us know, please. How does cost factor into decisions about safety? BARRA: They don't. HARPER: Has... BARRA: Again, I can only speak to the way that we are running the company, and if there is a safety issue, if there is a defect identified, we go fix the -- fix the vehicle, fix the part, fix the system. It's not acceptable to have a cost put on a safety issue. HARPER: And that is obviously your position and your goal and your -- the way you want it to be now, but that's not the case of what we're going back and looking at. So you're telling us that General Motors has changed its position on how it handles cost and safety issues. It hasn't been this way before, but this is how you want it now, am I correct? BARRA: This is how it is. I think we in the past had more of a cost culture, and we are going to a customer culture that focuses on safety and quality. HARPER: When we go back and look at who first -- who first authorized the use of an ignition switch that did not meet specifications? BARRA: And that is something we'll learn in our investigation. HARPER: Now, one of the things that concerns us, of course, is when General Motors filed bankruptcy in 2009, it wasn't an overnight problem with -- with money or with the loss of profits or losing money each year. In 2005, I know General Motors lost $20.6 billion. Jump to 2007, lost $38.7 billion. 2008, lost $30.9 billion and then filed for bankruptcy in 2009. The fact that General Motors was going through many years of financial issues, did that impact how this was categorized and was not dealt with at that time as it should've been? BARRA: I can't answer that question. I want to know the answer to that question, and when I do, I will take action. HARPER: Right. You indicated earlier that a specific traffic death was not included in the -- the count of fatalities that may have been associated with this issue. I would like to see other traffic deaths or serious injuries that were looked at, but the determination was made that it was not part of this total. Can you get us that information? BARRA: Through our -- our tread information, yes. HARPER: Will you get that for us? BARRA: Yes. HARPER: Thank you very much, I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Ms. Castor for five minutes. CASTOR: Thank you. Natasha Weigel (ph), age eighteen, was killed October 24th, 2006 while riding in a 2005 Chevy Cobalt. Shiera Troutwine (ph), age 19, was killed on June 12th 2009 after losing control of her 2005 Chevy Cobalt. And Alan Ray Floyd (ph), age 26 was killed on July 3rd 2009 after losing control of his 2006 Chevy Cobalt. I understand Ms. Weigel's (ph) parents and Ms. Troutwine's (ph) family are in attendance at the hearing today. Others have been killed because of G.M.'s defective ignition switch. The fact is, we do not know yet the full extent of the fatalities, injuries, and accidents, but evidence is growing through this investigation and that -- in the press, and hopefully your own investigation, that the deaths could've been avoided if G.M. had addressed this issue long ago. We know that G.M. knew about this problem as far back as 2001. The committee learned last week that the supplier of the faulty switch, Delphi (ph), conducted tests that year, 2001, which showed that the switch didn't meet G.M.'s specifications. But G.M. used this switch in Cobalts and Ions and other vehicles anyway. Ms. Barra, the committee sent you a letter about this issue, and Dr. -- documents were received yesterday that showed that these inadequate switches were approved by G.M. in May 2002. I have a document here, and it's been placed before you and it's in tab 54 in the binder as well, this document shows that the force required to turn the ignition switch was too low. That specification is clearly marked "not OK." Ms. Barra, does this document show that G.M. officials were aware that the ignition switch did not meet company standards in 2002? BARRA: If this document was provided to the engineers, again, that's something I will learn in our investigation. CASTOR: Internally, G.M. knew there were problems. By 2004, they were considering ways to fix the problem by redesigning the faulty switch. This document, which is also placed before you, this is at tab 8 in that notebook as well, from 2004, shows that G.M. did reject alternative designs. It mentions one year lead times and says, quote, "the tooling costs and piece prices are" too -- excuse me -- "are too high." Then concludes, "thus, none of the solutions represents an acceptable business case." Other documents present the piece cost increase for a potential solution as 57 cents per unit. Ms. Barra, do you know who at G.M. would've made the decision about whether to make this change in 2004? BARRA: Well, first of all, I find that decision unacceptable, as I've stated. If there is a safety defect, the cost is not the issue that we look at. We look at what it's going to take to fix the problem and make the vehicle safe. As we go through our investigation, we will put all the pieces together of incidents and -- and actions that were taken or not taken over a more than a decade period, and make the appropriate process changes. CASTOR: So, in retrospect, you think that a repair cost of 57 cents was too costly for G.M. to undertake? BARRA: Again, if we are making a decision on safety, we don't even look at cost, we make the change. CASTOR: But there was a major disconnect between what G.M. told the public and what it knew in private. In private, G.M. approved the switch, that it knew it was defective, and then the company appeared to reject other changes because a cost of 37 cents per fix was too high a price to pay. Now, also in 2005, the New York Times ran a review in which the author wrote about his wife encountering a problem with a Chevy Cobalt, and quote, said, "she was driving on a freeway when the car just went dead. The only other thing besides the key on the ring was a remote control fob provided by G.M." The G.M. spokesman at that time, Alan Adler (ph), issued a statement saying, "in rare cases, when a combination of factors is present, a Chevrolet Cobalt driver can cut power to the engine by inadvertently bumping the ignition key to the accessory or off position while the car is running. When this happens, the Cobalt is still controllable." So, I find it baffling that not only did G.M. know about this serious problem over a decade ago, but that it was discussed in the pages of the New York Times, and when G.M. responded publicly, it essentially told drivers, "No big deal, engines cut off all the time." When your engine suddenly cuts off when you're driving on the highway, would you consider this a safety issue? BARRA: Yes. CASTOR: And you've indicated that you were not even aware that G.M. was investigating the Cobalt until December 2013, is that correct? BARRA: I was aware that there was analysis going on related to a Cobalt. CASTOR: But at the time the New York Times wrote their report in 2005, what was your position? BARRA: In 2005, I believe I was in the manufacturing, engineering organization of the company. CASTOR: So, you were a high level executive at G.M. responsible for vehicle manufacturing? BARRA: Vehicle -- the equipment that we used to build vehicles. CASTOR: And one of the nation's largest newspapers raised the issue in this important new vehicle launch for G.M., and you did not know about it at the time? BARRA: I don't have a recollection of that article. CASTOR: Do you recall it being a concern for G.M.? BARRA: I was not aware that there was this issue until the recall was introduced on January 31st. I only knew at the end of December that there was an issue with the Cobalt. I did not know it was an ignition switch issue. CASTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. That concludes our members, but I would like to see if Mr. Terry of Nebraska who is the subcommittee chairman of Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, would have an opportunity for five minutes. Is there any objections? TERRY: Thank you. MURPHY: Without objection, you may proceed, Mr. Terry. TERRY: Thank you. I appreciate this and I'm sorry for being late, but my plane was canceled for mechanical reasons. Probably an ignition switch. (OFF-MIKE) U.S. Air. So, getting back to NHTSA, and I chair the subcommittee over jurisdiction with NHTSA and the Tread Act (ph), and the Tread Act (ph) clearly requires manufacturers to inform NHTSA within five days of any, quote, "noncompliance or defects that create an unreasonable risk of safety." Did G.M. at any time contact or notice NHTSA of any noncompliance or defects regarding the ignition switch? BARRA: That is something I hope to learn as we go through our investigation. TERRY: OK. What is the difference between noncompliance and a defect? BARRA: That is a very broad question. TERRY: No. It is a very specific question. BARRA: Well, I think it depends on the specific situation that you are talking about. TERRY: Regarding an ignition switch. BARRA: So your question is what is a noncompliant -- TERRY: Yes, non-compliant ignition switch. BARRA: My understanding of when there's a noncompliant, it's a very specific term used by NHTSA to standards, but I can get you the specific definition of that versus when we feel we have found a defect with one of our parts. (CROSSTALK) TERRY: And that's why it's "or." So when it -- when an ignition switch is substandard it's non-compliant and a defect then is a higher level. And I think that's what we are looking for here today is to determine if there was quote-unquote a "defect." BARRA: Congressman, I think in the language that we use with NHTSA, there's very specific definitions, and I would like to provide those to you as a -- (CROSSTALK) TERRY: Oh, I can get the definitions from NHTSA. That's -- that - I'm not asking you to do that -- BARRA: -- very specific question related to this, and I'm trying to be truthful. TERRY: OK. But just -- I'm not trying to beat up on you here, but just repeating back NHTSA's definition, I'm asking specifically how it -- how it applies to the ignition switch and that -- NHTSA is going to testify there was no notice. BARRA: I'm sorry; I didn't hear you? NHTSA's going to -- TERRY: I'm -- my understanding is that NHTSA said that G.M. did not contact them with noncompliance. BARRA: If I find through our investigation that we did not provide the appropriate information to NHTSA, that will be a very serious issue and we will take appropriate action with the individuals involved. TERRY: All right. Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. I think there's no further questions. Oh, Ms. DeGette, you had a clarifying question? DEGETTE: Yes, I just had two questions, Mr. Chairman, thank you. The first one is, I've been sitting here thinking about these new ignition switches that you are putting into the recalled cars. They are based on the 2006 specs but what you are saying, Ms. Barra, is that they are going to meet the highest safety standards when they are manufactured, is that right? BARRA: Our engineering team is going through extensive validation testing to make sure that they meet the requirements. DEGETTE: And on the component technical specification, it's tab 53 of your notebook, which was December 6th, 2012, it says the minimum torque required by the switch on the return side of the ignition switch from crank to the run position must be 15N-CM. So would that be the standard then, since it says it must be that? BARRA: From the position of run to accessory? DEGETTE: Yes. BARRA: Fifteen is the minimum; the spec is 20 plus -- DEGETTE: Right. But -- yes, OK. And my final question is, I'm impressed this committee has had -- has had experience with Kenneth Feinberg before, because he was appointed to help administer the fund that was set up by BP after Deepwater Horizon, which was this committee's investigation. He was also appointed to administer the fund after the Boston Marathon terrorist attacks. But I want to make sure that what you are doing when you hire him is you are really doing something, because he is usually hired to sort out the value of people's claims and then assign money. And I'm assuming G.M.'s hiring him to help identify the size of claims and then help compensate the victims. Is that right? Is G.M. willing to put together some kind of a compensation fund for this -- these victims that Mr. Feinberg will then administer? Is that why you've hired him? BARRA: We have hired Mr. Feinberg to help us assess the situation. We -- DEGETTE: So really there is no money involved in this at this point? BARRA: We have just hired him and will begin work with him on Friday. DEGETTE: So really, you hired him; you announced it today. But so far he has not been given any ability to compensate victims. Is that what you're saying? BARRA: We are going to work with him to determine what the right course of action is. DEGETTE: And might that include victim compensation here? BARRA: We haven't made any decisions on that yet. DEGETTE: OK. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. Ms. Barra, we thank you for your time today. G.M. has cooperated with this investigation. And we expect your company will continue to cooperate. Let me make a couple of requests. One is members will have other questions for you and we hope that you respond to those with -- in a timely manner. We also plan to conduct interviews, further interviews with General Motors officials and employees involved in the recall part and may be requesting more records. Will you make sure you make those available to us? BARRA: We will absolutely cooperate. MURPHY: Thank you. And also, on behalf of Chairman Upton and I, we would also like to be notified when you get your internal report and would like to discuss when you've had a chance to review that report as well. BARRA: We will notify you. MURPHY: Thank you very much. I thank you, Ms. Barra. You will be dismissed, but while this is taking place and waiting for Mr. Friedman to sit down, we are going to take a five-minute break to allow Mr. Friedman to take his seat and we will reconvene this hearing in five minutes. Thank you. (BREAK) MURPHY: ... for becoming NHTSA's -- which is the National Highway Transportation (sic) Safety Administration's deputy administer, Mr. Friedman worked for 12 years at the Union of Concerned Scientists as a senior engineer, research director and as the deputy director of the Clean Vehicles Program. I will now swear in the witness. Mr. Friedman, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so, has the practice of taking testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath? FRIEDMAN: I do not. MURPHY: Thank you. This chair then advises you that under the rules of the House, and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? FRIEDMAN: I do not. MURPHY: In that case, will you please rise and raise your right hand? Do you swear -- I'll wait until you're ready. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? FRIEDMAN: I do. MURPHY: Let the record show the witness is now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title XVIII, Section 1, 001 of the United States Code. Mr. Friedman, you may now give a five-minute summary of your written statement. FRIEDMAN: Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. To begin, I would like to say that on behalf of everyone at NHTSA, we are deeply saddened by the lives lost in crashes involving the General Motors ignition switch defect. The victims' families and friends, some of whom I believe are here today, have suffered greatly and I am deeply sorry for their loss. Safety is NHTSA's top priority and our employees go to work every day trying to prevent tragedies just like these. Our work reducing dangerous behaviors behind the wheel, improving the safety of vehicles and addressing safety defects has helped reduce highway fatalities to historic lows not seen since 1950. In the case of the recently recalled General Motors vehicles, we are first focused on ensuring that General Motors identifies all vehicles with a defective ignition switch, fixes the vehicles quickly and is doing all it can to inform consumers on how to keep themselves safe. We are also investigating whether General Motors met its responsibilities to report and address this defect as required under federal law. If it failed to do so, we will hold General Motors accountable as we have in other cases over the last five years which have led to record fines on automakers. Internally at NHTSA and the department, we have already begun a review of our actions and assumptions in this case to further our ability to address potential defects. Today I will share what I have learned so far. NHTSA used consumer complaints and early warning data, three special crash investigations on the Cobalt (ph), industry websites and agency expertise on airbag technology. Some of that information did raise concerns about airbag non-deployments, so in 2007, we convened an expert panel to review the data. Our consumer complaint data on injury crashes with airbag nondeployments showed that neither the Cobalt nor the Ion stood out when compared to other vehicles. The two special crash investigation reports we reviewed at the time were inconclusive on the cause of non- deployment. The reports noted that the airbags did not deploy and the power mode was in accessory but these crashes involved unbelted occupants in off-road conditions that began with relatively small collisions where by design airbags are less likely to deploy in order to avoid doing more harm than good. Further, power loss is not uncommon in crashes where airbags deploy and did not stand out as a reason for non-deployment. In light of these factors, NHTSA did not launch a formal investigation. We continued monitoring the data and, in 2010, found that the related consumer complaint rate for the Cobalt had decreased by nearly half since the 2007 review. Based on our engineering expertise and our process, the data available to NHTSA at the time was not sufficient to warrant a formal investigation. So what does all this mean? It means that NHTSA was concerned and engaged on this issue. This was a difficult case, where we used tools and expertise that, over the last decade have successfully resulted in 1,299 recalls, including 35 recalls on airbag non- deployments. These tools and expertise have served us well and we will continue to rely on and improve them. For example, we have already invested in advanced computer tools to improve our ability to spot defects and trends and we are planning to expand that effort. But what we know now also means that we need to challenge our assumptions. We need to look at how we handle difficult cases like this going forward. So we're looking to better understand how manufacturers deal with power loss and airbags. We are also considering ways to improve the use of crash investigations in identifying defects. We are reviewing ways to address what appear to be remote defect possibilities. And we are evaluating our approach to engaging manufacturers in all stages of our defects process. Between these efforts and those of the department's inspector general, I know that we will continue to improve our ability to identify vehicle defects and ensure that they are fixed. But I want to close on one last important note. Our ability to find defects also requires automakers to act in good faith and to provide information on time. General Motors has now provided new information definitively linking airbag non-deployment to faulty ignition switches, identifying a parts change and indicating potentially critical supplier conversations on airbags. Had this information been available earlier, it would have likely changed NHTSA's approach to this issue. But let me be clear, both NHTSA and the auto industry has a whole must look to improve. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeGette, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you. And I'll recognize myself for five minutes. Mr. Friedman, I -- with the understanding you have just gotten this position of acting administrator just a couple of months ago, and for the last 12 years, you were involved in other groups focused on green energy and fuel cell technology, we understand that if you are unable or uncomfortable asking specific questions about automobile engineering and safety, you're more than welcome to someone else, some of your support staff behind you. So I wanted to find out how NHTSA is communicating to the public about this recall. And I believe I have a slide available or I have a poster here. I went to your website to see what I could learn and... Do we have that image available about this? And what it shows, this is all. This is all I could find on your website about the recall notice. No information about the broader recalls about parts replacement, investing or anything. I can't even click on this. It simply says, "Get rid your car key fobs." But there's nothing else that a person could do. Can you fix this website so people can use it to get more useful information, please? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, if there is added information that should be on there to make sure that people can get to the information available on our website, we'll take those steps. Right now, consumers can go to our website and get all of the details associated with this recall. If they go to the search button and select the 2005 Cobalt? MURPHY: I -- just, to make it easier... (CROSSTALK) FRIEDMAN: (OFF-MIKE) Absolutely... MURPHY: In 2007, the chief of NHTSA's defect assessment division proposed opening an investigation of air bag non-deployment in Chevy Cobalt's, am I correct about that date? FRIEDMAN: Yes. MURPHY: Now, if you turn to page -- to tab 19 in your binder, it's labeled as the DAD panel for November 15th, 2007. This is the Power Point presentation made to the defect assessment panel on November 15th. At Bate (ph) Stamp 4474 -- those little numbers at the bottom of the page -- the presentation states that there had been 29 complaints about the Cobalt air bags, four fatal crashes and 14 (ph) field reports, is that correct? MURPHY: At Bates (ph) Stamp 4480, there is is a chart of air bag warranty claims for Cobalt air bags, as compared to other comparable vehicles? Do you agree that the number of warranty claims for Cobalt air bags is much higher than other cars? FRIEDMAN: Congressman -- Mr. Chairman, That is one of the issues that did raise concerns on our part. What that chart shows is warranty claims, some of which are likely associated with air bag non- deployments, some of which may also -- and are very likely to -- be associated with warning lights on air bags or other potential problems. This -- this is a gross look at the data, an important look at the data that is provided by our early warning data system that we use to decide whether or not we need to look further into one of the issues, which is what we did do in this case. MURPHY: But still, NHTSA panel decided there was not a trend here and decided not to investigate despite the number of complaints -- the fatal crashes and the warranty claims. Why was NHTSA convinced that an investigation was not warranted? And I believe this happened on two occasions. NHTSA decided twice, don't move forward with an investigation. What specific information did you have that said don't go forward? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, when we look at these cases, and when they looked at this case at the time, the whole body of information, they don't -- you can't just rely necessarily on one piece of information. The core piece of information that they relied on in the determination that was not sufficient enough information, first was an analysis of the complaints -- the injury crash complaints associated with air bag non-deployment. And the exposure. The number of those divided by the number of vehicles that were on the road, and the number of years they were on the road. That gives you a sense of how large the problem is in comparison to other vehicles. When the team did that comparison, the Cobalt did not stand out. It was a little above average, but there were several vehicles that were significantly higher. There were some vehicles... MURPHY: I understand, but twice employees at NHTSA raised a red flag on this. It wasn't just once. And the second time too, they said something's not right here. So I'm wondering if you did something different when that occurred, the second time, in reviewing that. Such as, did anybody ask questions of why an air bag doesn't deploy? I mean, I looked at the statement there and saw a number of things about power losses, or how much longer battery power would be involved in air bag deployment in the case of an accident. But did anybody ask the question was there anything else -- any other reason why an air bag wouldn't deploy? Did anybody ask those questions? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, my understanding is folks were trying to understand why the air bags did not deploy. When they looked at the special crash investigations in 2007, as well as the data available, those special crash investigations were inconclusive. Why? Because they indicated that these crashes were happening in off road conditions with unbelted occupants... MURPHY: I understand, I'm looking at reasons why air bags wouldn't deploy. So you're talking among yourselves, according to what we understand -- the Power Points -- what specifically did NHTSA ask G.M.? And, for example, this is very important, did NHTSA raise a question with G.M., tell us the reasons why an air bag wouldn't deploy in one of your cars? Did you ask G.M. that question. FRIEDMAN: I don't have a record of that. I know our team did bring up concerns over this case to General Motors in a meeting, but I don't have records of us asking that specific question. MURPHY: I mean, it's important, because you're saying G.M. didn't provide you information, but you're also saying you don't know if you asked some of the information. I mean, it's important for the families to know what happened, and if this key key government agency, which is tasked with protecting the safety of the public, I just want to know if those questions get asked. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, those questions typically do get asked of the car companies when we move into the investigation phase. What this phase and where this was, was a phase where concerns are raised, and it's discussed whether or not there is sufficient information to move to the point of asking those questions of auto makers. Roughly in these defects panels, roughly half of the cases that are brought into investigations, roughly half are not. One of the things that we are looking relative to this process going forward is do we need to make any changes when it comes to how we present this information, and when we present our concerns to auto makers. I do believe that there are some changes we can make to engage auto makers earlier in the process to put them in the position of letting us know if our concerns are shared by them.... MURPHY: Certainly I know families would want to know in retrospect what would you change in this whole process, but I'm out of time. I now recognize Ms. Degette for five minutes. DEGETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Friedman, NHTSA investigated air bag non-deployment, but as you talked about it was never able to connect the dots between that problem and the defective ignition switch. So what I want to know is if NHTSA had the relevant information it needed to make a fully informed determination and what the agency believed about the connection between the ignition switch position and air bag non- deployment during the time of its special crash investigations? In your written testimony, you know that when NHTSA was investigating the air bag non-deployment issue, the agency mistakenly believed based on G.M. service literature that the air bags would function up to 60 seconds after the power cut off. Why did NHTSA think that? FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Ranking Member. That knowledge was actually based on years of experience and previous experience with earlier air bags where there was actually a problem where air bags would go off long after the vehicle was turned off. Air bag systems have capacitors in them, and those capacitors are designed to store energy so that if power was lost the air bag can still deploy, because power is often lost in some of these kinds of... DEGETTE: So that's based on the G.M. service literature, or the agency's experience or both? FRIEDMAN: That's a very important question. My understanding is that was based on the agency's experience. My understanding is -- and I apologize, if I was not clear enough in my testimony -- we have since after General Motors read this recall found that service information that confirmed our understanding at the time, which was that air bags are designed to be powered when the power is lost. So a power loss would not typically stand out. DEGETTE: So -- OK, so you were basing -- NHTSA was basing -- you weren't there -- But NHTSA was basing its determination on its experience. How is that then that it failed to connect the dots between the air bag non-deployment problem and ignition switch problem? FRIEDMAN: Excuse me. I believe there is two situations here. First of all, the information that we had at the time indicated that there were two possibilities put in front of us in one of the special crash investigation reports. One of them was that the ignition being off could have been a cause, another one was that the circumstances of the crash could have been the cause. In those two cases, the more likely scenario was that the circumstances of the crash were more likely to yield to the air bags not deploying. DEGETTE: So you also said that G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect that NHTSA didn't have. What information could G.M. have given you that would have -- the agency -- that would have helped identify the real problem? FRIEDMAN: Well, I made that statement based on looking at the chronology that General Motors provided with this recall. And there were a few things in that chronology that raised serious concerns for me. DEGETTE: And what were those things. FRIEDMAN: The first was that there was a change in part number relative to the ignition switch, and we were never informed of that change. The second is that, there was -- there were some conservation with suppliers about their control algorithms, the control systems for air bags. We were never informed of that conversation to my knowledge, and we did not have the details on how that -- those algorithms worked. Third, and most importantly, General Motors created a direct connection in their recall between the air bag non-deployment and the ignition switch. If we had any of those pieces of information, I truly believe it would have changed the way NHTSA would have approached this. DEGETTE: Now, if -- if G.M. is changing a part, are they legally required to inform NHTSA of that change? FRIEDMAN: It's not clear to me that that is a legal requirement, but I can get back to you to make sure. DEGETTE: I'd appreciate that, because it seems to me that's critical. Now, in your opening statement, you said that -- you said that, in order for NHTSA to be able to make a correct determination, you need all of the information as you just said, and you need the company to be acting in good faith. DEGETTE: Based on what you know now, do you think that at the time that all of this was happening, G.M. was acting in good faith towards the agency? FRIEDMAN: Congresswoman, we have an open investigation to answer that exact question. And if we find out that they were not, we will hold them accountable. DEGETTE: And I would hope that you would inform this committee irrespective of your determination, whether they did or didn't. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely. DEGETTE: When do you expect to finish that investigation? FRIEDMAN: I can't put an exact timeline on it. We're getting hundreds of thousands of documents from General Motors. The deadline is April 3rd for them to provide those documents. It's not clear that they will be able to provide all the documents at the time, but we've been making sure that they're continuously producing documents so that we can understand. As soon as my team is able to find information in those documents that indicate that General Motors had information that they should have acted on sooner, we will determine how to move forward to hold General Motors accountable. Or if we don't find that information, then we'll also let you know. DEGETTE: Thank you. MURPHY: The gentlelady's (inaudible). With regard to Ms. DeGette's question about if there's a change in a part, do they need to notify you? Will you also let us know if they make a change in a part, do they also have to have a different part number? I don't know what NHTSA's requirements are on that. That's an issue. Just -- just you can submit that for the record. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I'll circle back to you to be clear. MURPHY: We also need to know what information you are reviewing with regard to these airbags on G.M. cars, specifically the Cobalt. And would you please provide that information to the committee? FRIEDMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I believe we've provided a significant amount of documentation, but we'll continue to do so. MURPHY: On this, we'd like to know what you're reviewing. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to -- I know you are, as well as our committee, is literally we're looking through boxes of information -- thousands and thousands of pages, and that continues. And it looks like we'll be getting some more down the road. Well, as you know, I wrote the TREAD Act, which passed unanimously in the Congress. President Clinton signed it into law. And the whole point, or a major point of that law was that NHTSA would in fact get the information that it needed to detect a trend as quickly as they could. So when NHTSA considered whether to investigate the Cobalt for an airbag defect back in '07, the early warning data was one of the factors that was cited in the Defect Assessment Division's recommendation to investigate it, correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. UPTON: So, what was -- looking back -- what is the problem? Did G.M. not report the information that the law required? Or was NHTSA unable to sort through the information that is had to find the problem? Or both? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, we have an open investigation to determine whether or not General Motors failed in their responsibility to provide information, and we will definitely report to this committee the results of that effort. In terms of what our team did, our team looked at all the available information using the approach that we've used successfully to lead to over 1,299 recalls influenced by NHTSA over the last 10 years. We used that process to look into the early warning data, to look at the consumer complaint data, to look at special crash investigations and a variety of other information. We dug into that data. We analyzed it. We tried to see if there was a defect trend that stood out. The data didn't support that. It showed that the Cobalt did not stand out when it came to airbag nondeployments. We looked at the special crash investigations. Those available at the time were inconclusive. This was a case where the team worked very hard to try to understand what was happening, and wasn't able to see a significant enough trend or a clear enough defect. What I'm learning from this, and where we have to go in the future, is we need to look more carefully at remote defect possibilities. We need to reconsider the way we're using special crash investigations. We need to continue to invest in tools. We're already investing in computer tools, basically grown out of the Watson IBM software to be able to more effectively, more efficiently use our resources to spot trends. We've got to put all these tools forward and we've got to look for opportunities to make changes so we can better spot... (CROSSTALK) UPTON: So when you look to embark on an investigation, do you consider the number of deaths? I mean, is there some trigger that you use to warrant further exploration, whether it's one death, four deaths, 10 deaths, 20, 100? I mean, is there some type of standard equation that you put into place? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, there's not. Our -- our goal, what I would love to be able to do is to find each and every one of these defects before there's a single death. It is the manufacturer's responsibility to be reporting all of these defects and getting them fixed. When they do not, it is our job to try to find them. We don't have a simple rule of thumb because each case is different. In some cases, we have open investigations after one incident where it was clear that it was a defect. In other cases, we've had to rely on the trend data that indicates that this stands out. I can't give you a -- a specific... UPTON: So, let's -- so let's play Monday morning quarterback. So, today's April 1st, 2014. These problems arose over the last 10 years. What would you have liked to have had on your platter from G.M. specifically in terms of information today that you didn't have in the last eight or 10 years? FRIEDMAN: Well, at a minimum, what I can tell you, based on their chronology, I would have liked to have had information that they had changed the parts on the ignition switch. I would have liked to have had information that they were talking to their suppliers because they appeared to have had concerns about the algorithm associated with airbag non-deployment. I would have certainly liked have any information they had directly linking the ignition switch defect to airbag non-deployment. As we go through out investigation, I should be able to come back to you and let you know if there's additional information they should have... UPTON: And are -- and are you pretty certain that today that they did not provide that information to you? FRIEDMAN: It's my understanding that none of that information was available. We are continuing our efforts to try to make sure that we understand what happened. So, I can't say that I -- I can give you a comprehensive and definitive answer. But my understanding at this point is that, no, we did not have that information. UPTON: I know Mr. Long wanted my last 15 seconds, so I bet it's now gone. I yield back. LONG (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll have my friend Mr. Terry (ph) here assist me. And the chairman of the committee here -- subcommittee showed you this picture a while ago and said he couldn't navigate past this page, and you said that if any new information became available to you, that you would get that on the web site. Something we learned in the first hearing that I think is very germane is, if you will take your car to General Motors, they will give you a loaner at no cost or a rental car at no cost. I would call that very germane. I would call it critical. And if somebody's got an '05, '06, '06, I think it would be enticing to drive a '14 for a little while while they repair your car. So, that'd be a suggestion to put on there. I yield back. (UNKNOWN) I think I might note, the gentleman -- I received a call from one of my constituents who's said he tried to get a loaner car and the dealer told him he couldn't have one to... (UNKNOWN) One more thing, too, you could put on there is, take all your keys off the key ring except for the ignition key. That's the other thing Ms. Barra (ph) said. Is that on there? FRIEDMAN: I believe that is very clearly on there. And, in fact, just -- just to be clear, the reason why we did that is because safety is our top priority. We are all focused on investigating this case, but safety... (UNKNOWN) Right. FRIEDMAN: ... safety is our top priority, which is why the first thing I wanted people to see when they came to that web site was how to keep themselves safe. So, I do just want to be clear, that's why we have that limited information there, because I didn't want anyone out there who came to our web site not to understand the steps, how to keep themselves safe. I agree it's a good idea to put on there. I'll to see if we can fit it in the space we've got, or if there's another way to point people to it. But I agree, it's a good idea to let them know that... MURPHY: You could link to -- people need to know if it's safe to drive their current cars. Mr. Dingell, you're now recognized for five minutes. DINGELL: Thank you. Mr. Friedman, let's look at NHTSA's internal decision-making processes. These questions will require yes or no answers. Is it correct that contractors for NHTSA's special crash investigations program conducted three separate investigations of Chevy Cobalt in 2005, 2006, and 2009, related to airbag non- deployment? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation reviews early warning reporting data and consumer complaints in deciding whether to open a formal defects investigation? FRIEDMAN: Yes, those are parts of the process. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that G.M. submitted EWR data to NHTSA concerning the Chevrolet Cobalt, subject to NHTSA's 2005 and 2006 special -- special crash investigations? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry, sir. Could you repeat that, please? DINGELL: I'll give it to you again. Is it correct that G.M. submitted EWR data to NHTSA concerning Chevrolet Cobalt, subject to NHTSA's 2005 and 2006 special crash investigations? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. Those are important parts of... DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the Office of Defects Investigation -- ODI -- follows a multi-step process in order to determine whether a defect exists in the vehicle? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: Yes. DINGELL: Now, and that process includes an initial evaluation, a preliminary evaluation, and an engineering analysis. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's the standard process, but we will act earlier in that stage if we have compelling information that there's a defect. We do not wait, necessarily, to go through that whole process if we have sufficient information to act. DINGELL: All right. Now, let's clarify something. This (inaudible) crash investigation program is something separate and distinct from the formal ODI investigations process. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the Office of Defects Investigation convened an initial evaluation panel in 2007 to investigate the non-deployment of airbags in the 2003 - 2006 Chevy Cobalts and Ions, yes or no? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the review was prompted by 29 consumer complaints, four fatal crashes, and fourteen field reports? FRIEDMAN: That was one of the reasons for the review. The additional... DINGELL: What were the other reasons? FRIEDMAN: In addition, we were looking at consumer complaints, those complaints-based concerns as well, and I can get back to you on the record with each of the pieces of information that were involved, but we do have a memo that was provided when this -- when it was proposed to potentially move this to a defect that lays out early warning data, consumer complaint data concerns, special crash investigations... DINGELL: Would you submit that for the record, please? FRIEDMAN: Yes. DINGELL: Now, were there other things that triggered this review? FRIEDMAN: My understanding is it was all the items in that memo was the information that triggered this review. DINGELL: So, there weren't other things. Now, is it correct that ODI decided not to elevate that review to a more formal investigation because there was a lack of discernible trend? Yes or no. FRIEDMAN: Yes, that was one of the reasons. DINGELL: What were the other reasons? FRIEDMAN: The other reason is that the crash investigation information we had was inconclusive and did not, was not able to point to a specific defect. DINGELL: All right. Now, to be clear, at the time of the 2000 initial evaluation, NHTSA had concluded that the Chevy Cobalt was -- was not over represented compared to other peer vehicles with respect to injury crash incident rates. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Was there any other reason? FRIEDMAN: With the other... DINGELL: Was there any other reason that you came to that conclusion? FRIEDMAN: In 2007. DINGELL: Now, also to be clear, NHTSA did not have information at the time of the 2007 investigation, that for example, linked airbag non-deployment to ignition switch position. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: Could you not have any specific information that provided a direct link? DINGELL: So you're agreeing. FRIEDMAN: I believe so. DINGELL: OK. Now, Mr. Chairman, I'm troubled here. It appears that we have a flaw in NHTSA's decision-making process which is related to defects and their inquiries into defects. I fully recognize and I am, like most of the members of this committee, I think, critical to the fact that NHTSA is short-staffed and under-funded. At the same time, I'm compelled to agree with actually the administrator Friedman, that Congress may need to examine the usual use of special crash investigations in the defects screening process. How best to get NHTSA the information it needs for that process and how best to engage manufacturers around issue evaluations. In so doing, I think we will help (inaudible) the safety of American motorists and their families. I yield back the balance of my time. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Dr. Phil Gingrey for five minutes. GINGREY: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Friedman, in your written testimony, you suggested that NHTSA, your agency, did not pursue investigations into the issues with Cobalts and Ion, because they were unaware of information developed by General Motors. In the years leading up to this recall, has NHTSA had any concerns with General Motors' responsiveness or lack thereof to safety defects and concerns? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I would like to get back to you on the record with that. Just... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Well, let me do this. You may not have to do that. Just look at tab 34. It's right there in front of you. In July 2013, the head of ODI emailed General Motors with a number of concerns. It's the second page, bottom of the second page. Sent to Carmen (ph). You see where I'm -- you with me? FRIEDMAN: Yes. I have not seen this before. But, yes, I see it. GINGREY: Yes. OK. Do you want to read that first paragraph? And then look up and I will know that you have read it? FRIEDMAN: Yes. GINGREY: He stated: "The general perception is that General Motors is slow to communicate, slow to act, and at times requires additional efforts of ODI that we do not feel is necessary with some of your peers." You read that, didn't you? FRIEDMAN: Yes. GINGREY: Were you aware the concerns raised by ODI in, I guess that was July of 2013? FRIEDMAN: I was not aware of this specific email, but I have been in at least one meeting where we sat down with General Motors and made clear to them that they needed to make sure that they were following an effective process when it came to their recall. GINGREY: Yes. So there was definitely some concern? FRIEDMAN: Well, we -- with each and every automaker we need to make sure that they have a good and effective process to quickly deal with this. This email clearly indicates some very specific concerns. GINGREY: Did the agency have similar concerns in 2007, 2010 when it declined to advance any investigations into non-deployment of airbags in these G.M. vehicles? FRIEDMAN: I don't know. GINGREY: You weren't with NHTSA at the time? FRIEDMAN: No. I joined NHTSA back last year. I have been there for almost a year now. GINGREY: Do you think NHTSA did enough to get the information that it needed? FRIEDMAN: I believe in this case that the team looked very clearly and very carefully at the data. I believe that the reason why we didn't move forward was because the data indicated that the Cobalts didn't stand out and that we didn't have conclusive information as to a very specific... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Well, you know in 2005, G.M. issued this technical services bulletin, and that's tab 12, if you want to flip quickly to tab 12 in the document binder. This technical service bulletin (INAUDIBLE), and it recommended a solution for complaints of this inadvertent key turn due to the low torque, particularly by the Chevrolet Cobalts. The technical service bulletin instructed the dealers exactly what to do to provide an insert that converted a key from a slot design to a hole design. I don't know exactly what that means, but they do. General Motors believed that this would help reduce the force exerted on the ignition while driving from maybe shaking of the keys or bumping it with your knee. In 2006, the technical service bulletin was expanded to include additional make and model years. Unfortunately, in the case of this young girl, 29-year-old Brooke Melton, the nurse from my congressional district, that was killed the day after she took her car in, saying, hey, this engine is cutting off for no reason. And you know, I know they must have gotten it the technical service bulletin about this issue, but all they did was clean out her fuel line, gave her the call the next day, and led her to her death. Administrator Friedman, yes or no, was NHTSA aware of General Motors's 2005-2006 technical services bulletins related to low ignition key cylinder torque effect? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Gingrey, first, if I may, Brooke's death was a tragedy. And it's a tragedy that we work each and every day to avoid. I do believe we were aware, as part of our efforts and as part of the special crash investigation that we were aware of that technical service bulletin. At the time, that technical service bulletin would not have been seen as being associated with airbag... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Yes, listen, I believe you. Mr. Friedman, I believe you. And, you know, obviously when people are driving impaired or texting or emailing or whatever, and, you know, they don't change the oil when they should and their tires are low and the brakes are worn out, you know, there is some responsibility there, some personal responsibility. But when they are doing everything the right way and they take their car in and, you know, they think that they trust the service department of the local dealership, and they get a situation like this, I mean, you can understand why she's gone but her parents are obviously -- and all of these parents, these families are just irate because the expectation, if they're doing the right thing, they ought to be safe. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I completely understand. And I would actually argue that consumers should expect that their cars should function as they're designed, no matter the cause of the crash. GINGREY: Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. I yield back. MURPHY: I'd venture to say that they would assume the car keys don't have to be monitored... FRIEDMAN: Correct. MURPHY: Mr. Green, you're recognized for five minutes. GREEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Friedman, thank you for appearing today. NHTSA has a central role for consumer safety, and I would like to understand better how long it took for NHTSA to identify this fault. In your opinion, how did NHTSA not identify the deadly trend? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, when our team looked at the data, the trend did not -- there was not a trend that stuck out. In fact, when it came to airbag non-deployments, the Cobalt was not an outlier. GREEN: Was G.M. forthcoming with their data? FRIEDMAN: Well, that's the exact question and that's the exact reason why we have an open investigation into them. I do have concerns about the parts change, about conversations they had with suppliers, and any other information they may have had, which is exactly why we opened up an investigation into them. And if they did not follow the law in their requirements to get information to us and to respond quickly, we're going to hold them accountable, as we have with many other automakers. GREEN: OK. Earlier this month The New York Times reported on NHTSA's response to the consumer complaints over the years about ignition switch issues for the recalled vehicles. According to The Times, many of the complaints detailed frightening scenes in which moving cars suddenly stalled at high speeds on highways in the middle of (INAUDIBLE) traffic and while crossing railroad tracks. A number of the complaints warned of catastrophic consequences if something was not done. NHTSA received more than 260 of these consumer complaints over the past 11 years about G.M. vehicles suddenly turning off while driving. But it never once opened a defective investigation with the ignition switch issue. If consumers submitted these complaints to NHTSA, many were met with a quote of just silence. Mr. Friedman, Mary Ruddy's daughter died in a crash involving a 2005 Cobalt. Ms. Ruddy has repeatedly tried to contact NHTSA for information, but has only received form letters. She told The New York Times that "I just want someone to hear from me, we have had no closure, we still have no answers." Ms. Ruddy was -- I don't know if she's still here today, but she was in the audience. Has NHTSA been in contact with Ms. Ruddy? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Congressman, my understanding of what happened with Ms. Ruddy -- well, first of all, Ms. Ruddy deserves answers and that's exactly why we're looking into what G.M. did, that's exactly why we're making sure we understand what happened. What she has been through, it's a tragedy, and we've got to work to make sure that those don't happen again. In terms of my understanding of Ms. Ruddy's contacts with NHTSA, those contacts were made through our complaint system. In those complaint systems, as we do note on the Web site, we do not necessarily respond to all of those complaints. Because what we're doing with those complaints is we are looking for potential problems. And if those complaints don't contain sufficient information, if we have questions about them, we do follow up with consumers. But if they have the information we need, we do not, because the goal of those complaint databases is to try to find problems. In this case, my understanding is Ms. Ruddy provided those complaints after being notified of a recall that NHTSA did influence. We got the Cobalt recalled... (CROSSTALK) GREEN: I only have five minutes. But did NHTSA really receive 260 consumer complaints over 11 years about this automatic shutdown of your engine? FRIEDMAN: I don't have the exact number, but what I do know is that at NHTSA we -- human eyes look at every single one of these complaints to try to find out if there is something that stands out. My understanding of the complaints you're referencing are that they were for stalls and that only a very small number of them were related to airbag non-deployments. What we were looking for... (CROSSTALK) GREEN: Oh, I know, but 260 complaints on the car stopping on the freeway or wherever it's at. I don't know if that's a high number or low number over, you know, 11 years, but you might need to have somebody who actually looks at complaints. And I assume they come from different parts of the country. So somebody identifies it and says, hey, we need to focus on these 260 complaints. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, in this case, a human eye looks at each and every one of those. And whether that's a large or a small number, based on the analyses that I've seen, relative to the number of Cobalts that were out on the road, that was not a very large number compared to a lot of the other stall complaints that do happen for a variety of other vehicles that are out there. GREEN: Well, you told me about how NHTSA responds to consumer complaints. But it seems like in this case NHTSA might look at how they respond to consumer complaints much better, because I know as a member of Congress, believe me, if we don't respond to emails and letters, we will hear about it. And if I get a number of emails on a certain subject, you know, we obviously respond to it. So, Mr. Chairman, I know I'm almost out of time, and thank you for your courtesy. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise, for five minutes. SCALISE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Friedman, thank you for being with us and participating in this investigative hearing as well. I know earlier you had talked about the decision back in 2007, when the chief of defect assessment division at your agency had suggested opening an investigation and then ultimately sometime after it was decided not to open that investigation. When was the decision made not to open the investigation? FRIEDMAN: That was also made in 2007. And basically what the chief of the defects assessment division was doing was exactly what his job requires him to do. He's supposed to look for potential defect cases and bring those up to a panel where those are considered, where a broad set of evidence is considered. SCALISE: Is that the trends in relation to peers? I think that's the language that you all were using when you are looking at, I guess, similar cars that were having similar problems with airbags? FRIEDMAN: That's one of the pieces of information that's used as well as crash investigations and other EWR data that is involved. About half of those that are brought up do not end up going to investigation. But we have designed our system to make sure that we have at least two teams always looking for potential problems. The defects assessment division is always looking for potential problems and raising that question. That's what... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: All right. And I would be curious to get the information that you've got within NHTSA that helped make that decision not to move forward with the investigation between September of 2007, when the defect assessment division decided that the -- suggested to go forward, and then when you subsequently -- your agency subsequently decided not to. Because when you look at this chart we've got from 2007, the Cobalt versus peer crash rate, there is a chart, and you have got the other peers, and you've got some fairly static numbers, and then you have got the spike here in what is called exposure rate per population that seems to spike with the Cobalt. And so if the internal decision-making was that they were similar to their peers, it doesn't seem to mesh with this chart from 2007. So if you can get me or get the committee whatever information you have on what decision-making went into NHTSA's final call to reject what was a warning or so from internal defect assessment division and -- can you get us that information? FRIEDMAN: Well, I believe we have provided that information to the committee already. But if there is additional information, I'll make sure the committee has it. But I... SCALISE: And then were you all... FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry, sir. SCALISE: Were you all -- or did you have something else you wanted to add to that? FRIEDMAN: Thank you. Yes, I apologize. I just wanted to be clear about what the data shows. I believe you're referring to this chart. The bars here represent the defect -- the potential defect or really the complaint rate. And what you'll see with these bars is they're not spiking, they're not standing out in comparison to these others. The average is here, and they're just above average. SCALISE: The blue line there on your chart. FRIEDMAN: Right. And that's what I was wondering if you were pointing to. The blue line is the volume of -- I believe that's the volume of reports -- no, that's the volume of sales. So that indicates how many vehicles were sold. But the complaint rate, that's the important data that we're looking at, are the bars. (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: OK. Did you take action on any of those other cars that are identified in that chart? FRIEDMAN: In some cases we took action, in some cases we did not. And I can get back to you on that... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: OK. So on some you did. If you can get us -- again, if you can get the committee the list of those cars where you did take action, because clearly you made the choice not to take action in the case of the Cobalt. So we would appreciate it if you can get us that. I do want to ask a few other questions, because in your testimony, you had made a few, I don't know if we would call them accusations, but I guess you could call them that, I mean, here you are saying, we're pursuing an investigation of whether G.M. met its timeliness responsibilities to report and address this defect under federal law. I know you addressed this a little bit earlier. But if you've got any specifics that you're referring to when you make that statement, can you get that to the committee? FRIEDMAN: Yes. Well, the specifics, I believe, are in my testimony that there are three things that I am concerned about based on their chronology. First and foremost is that they have identified that there is a link between the ignition switch and airbag non-deployment. Second is that they changed the part. And third is they appear to have had conversations with their suppliers about the airbag algorithm in relationship to the... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: And the final question, and I know I'm out of time, G.M. had -- this is your statement, G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect. Have you gotten our staff that critical information already that you feel G.M. had that would have helped identify this defect? FRIEDMAN: So that information is the information that was referred to in General Motors's chronology. I believe the committee has asked for all of that information... SCALISE: So we don't yet have that? FRIEDMAN: ... from General Motors... SCALISE: As far as you know? FRIEDMAN: I'm not aware of exactly what documents you do or don't have. But if you don't have that information... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: If you can make sure we get that information. FRIEDMAN: I also just wanted to clarify, we don't only look for trends. If there is a clear defect, we move forward into the investigation as well. So on -- I don't know the answer, but on some of these cases, there may have not been as large of a trend, but if there was a clear defect, we would have investigated... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: Thanks for your testimony. And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: I just want to make sure so we're very clear on this, when he is referring to the information given this committee, if you could highlight very specifically the information you did not have that GM later gave you that would have changed your decision, you make sure the committee has that? I mean, I know you said it was a part switch, and that's what we have. FRIEDMAN: Well, so what I'm referring to, and I can highlight in GM's chronology, is I'm referring to specific items that are identified in General Motors's chronology that brought concerns. We are getting that information from General Motors. MURPHY: Thank you. Thank you. Now recognize gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor, for five minutes. CASTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Friedman, GM has confirmed that it knew as early as 2001 that its ignition switches contained defects. And by 2004, GM had a body of consumer complaints that raised enough questions for them to open an internal engineering inquiry of the switches. Meanwhile, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, your agency, was beginning to receive its own body of consumer complaints of cars stalling and ignition switch failures. And in 2005, as your agency was monitoring airbag non-deployment issues, its special crash investigation of a 2005 Cobalt found that the ignition switch was in the accessory position when the airbags did not deploy. You said at this point it was not clear to the Highway Traffic Safety Administration what was happening. But then information came out subsequently that, you can tell us, should this have pointed NHTSA in the right direction? In 2007, the agency investigated a second crash of a 2005 Cobalt where the airbags did not deploy. I think you said at this point still it did not stick out. And you've testified that you didn't see trends. The crash report found that the non-deployment could be the result of "power loss due to movement of the ignition switch just prior to impact." But at this point GM was also providing your agency with early warning reports in the third quarter of 2005, the fourth quarter of 2006, in addition to the crash -- special crash investigations. So we're all trying to figure out how it took so long for these defective ignition switches to trigger a recall at GM and the raise red flags at NHTSA, and how the Highway Traffic Safety administration could have noticed this issue sooner if GM had been more forthcoming. So the committee's investigation has revealed that GM approved switches for these cars that did not meet the company specifications in 2002, and again in 2006. Did GM ever inform the Highway Traffic Safety Administration of this fact? FRIEDMAN: Of which specific fact? I apologize. CASTOR: That the ignition switches did not meet the company specifications. FRIEDMAN: It's my understanding that we did not have that information. CASTOR: OK. The supplemental memo released this morning by the committee staff also reveals that GM had over 130 warranty claims on the recalled vehicles that specifically referred to problems with the ignition switch turning off -- turning the car off when going over bumps or when drivers accidentally hit the key with their knee or leg. Is it true that GM provides -- provided early -- in their early warning reports aggregate data of the warranty information, but not the specific warranty claims listed one by one in the comments from consumers? FRIEDMAN: What all car companies provide are aggregate numbers associated with warranties. And so we don't know when we get those counts what the reason for those warranties could be. For example, on the airbag (INAUDIBLE), I believe I mentioned before, you know, the complaints could be because the airbag light was going off when they thought it shouldn't, or because the passenger sensor was not working. So we don't -- when we have that count, we do not have the information as to the detail of exactly what each and every one of those warranty claims is. CASTOR: So if GM had shared the specific warranty claims, would that have been helpful to your agency? FRIEDMAN: The specific warranty claims I believe you're speaking of are related to the ignition switch itself. CASTOR: Yes. The 130 that have now come out with the -- due to the committee investigation. FRIEDMAN: And my honest answer is, I don't know. And that is in part because what -- at the time we did not have the information we now have from General Motors directly connecting the ignition switch to the airbag recalls. CASTOR: So the state of the law currently is that in early warning reports on any type of vehicle problem, the car companies do not have to provide you the specific warranty claims? FRIEDMAN: I believe that's the case. CASTOR: They just give you a summary in general? FRIEDMAN: Yes, I believe that's the case. CASTOR: And that's true whether it is a warranty problem with a radio or a warranty problem that could be a serious safety defect? FRIEDMAN: I believe that is correct. CASTOR: Is that -- do you think it's time to look at the law if the -- if a car company has so many -- you know, here, 130 warranty claims that are specific and they relate to a serious safety defect, do you think that would be helpful to your agency, maybe change the law and say, when a car company becomes aware that they have so many of these serious safety defects that they have to provide you the specific warranty complaints from the consumer? FRIEDMAN: Congresswoman, I have to look at the exact data to -- before I would be able to tell you whether or not it would be valuable. But what I will... CASTOR: But certainly if a company has gathered a critical mass of serious safety defect complaints, that would be helpful to your agency. FRIEDMAN: Well, if they have information regarding a defect, I believe that information they, without a doubt, have to provide to us. I believe the information... CASTOR: But the law does not require that currently. FRIEDMAN: Well, if they have information about a defect, I believe the law does. I believe what you are referring to are warranty claims, which may or may not be associated with a defect. CASTOR: OK. Well, I think this is an important issue for the committee to look at. There might be some new line-drawing or direction on what these early warning reports and if there are serious safety information that they -- a car company has gleaned through their own internal investigation, it really needs to be provided to the agency. MURPHY: Thank you. FRIEDMAN: And, Congressman -- Chairman... MURPHY: Now recognize Dr. Burgess for five minutes. Thank you. BURGESS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Friedman, for being here with us. It has been a long afternoon. Now your testimony, I think you stated that in 2007 and 2010, there was not enough evidence to conduct a formal investigation into General Motors's Chevrolet Cobalt despite the number of complaints and four fatal crashes that had already shown up. But in 2012, your agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, opened an investigation into an airbag problem that some Hyundai models -- my understanding is this was based on a single complaint. And that's OK. I think the airbag non-deployment is a serious issue. But why wasn't it a serious issue when the complaints were coming in about the Cobalt given the fact that you initiated investigation with much less evidence in the case of Hyundai? How can you -- how can you assert that there was not enough evidence to proceed with General Motors's case? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, safety is our priority. And airbag non- deployments is a serious issue. And we treat them very, very seriously. I would have to get back to you on the specifics of the Hyundai case. But it goes back to one of the points I was -- I made before, which is, we are looking for two potential things. The best thing and the easiest ability -- the best thing to be able to find and the clearest thing to be able to find is when there is an obvious indication of a defect. All it takes is one, if that's clear. BURGESS: Yes, and I agree completely. And I don't know -- I mean, you were not here when the CEO testified and we posed questions, one of the questions I posed was for the accident that occurred in Maryland in July of 2005 where a Chevy Cobalt went down a street that ended in a cul-de-sac. It was driving too fast, a lot of problems that night. But the airbag didn't deploy when the car impacted some trees. And it was a pretty serious impact. In fact, it was so serious that the driver was then pushed up, compressed against the steering wheel with such force, I mean, she only weighed 106 pounds, and she broke the rim off the steering wheel. That's a massive amount of force for a little 106-pound body to exhibit. So the airbag didn't deploy. And, you know, I've got your report here that it was in fact investigated in December of 2006. But that's a big deal that that airbag didn't deploy. Different from all of the other accidents that we were given information about . Because of the nature of this person's injuries, because of the cause of her demise, I can't tell you that the airbag would have saved her life, but I know without the airbag there was no chance at all. And, of course, that was proven that night. But an airbag might have made a difference because the steering wheel that she broke off actually compressed against the upper dome -- just below the diaphragm, below the rib cage, and lacerated the liver. And over the course of the next hour and 45 minutes, small woman, small blood volume, she bled out. I mean, an airbag might have made a big difference that night. Now contrasting that was another accident that occurred in Pennsylvania in 2009, where there was a head-on collision between a Hyundai and a Cobalt. And as I pointed out to the GM CEO, the Cobalt was not at fault in this, the driver of the Cobalt was not at fault. The Hyundai came over the center line and there was a head-on collision, closing speed was probably close to 100 miles an hour with -- add the twos speeds of the automobiles together. Everyone who was in the front seat of those vehicles died. But the Cobalt airbag did not deploy. The Hyundai did. Now unfortunately it didn't make any difference as to the overall fatality of that accident, but here you have got a side-by-side identical speeds with which the impact occurred. The deceleration forces were identical in both automobiles. Hyundai deploys, Cobalt doesn't, this is a problem, don't you agree? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, when airbags don't deploy, that's a serious issue. There's also a serious issue sometimes when airbags do deploy. Over 200 people died because airbags -- earlier airbags deployed when they shouldn't have, or deployed too strongly when they shouldn't have. Part of the challenge with all of this, part of the reason why this information ended up not being conclusive for us is because airbags are designed, even in some difficult crashes, to not go off because that's the safest thing, that's the best way to avoid potential harm. BURGESS: Sir, with all due respect, I cannot imagine, and I'm not an engineer, and I'm not a lawyer, but I cannot imagine any circumstance where impacting an oak tree at 70 miles an hour or a head-on collision at 45 miles per hour per vehicle would not be a situation where you did not want the deployment of the airbag. I can't think of a single reason why the airbag deploying would add to the lethality of that accident sequence. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I completely understand why you feel that and why you have that impression. In the case of the 2005 crash, and in general with these airbags, if you have an unbelted occupant and a small strike first, the risk at play here is that the occupant may be moving forward during that crash. If you're moving forward during that crash and the airbag is opening, yes, it actually could cause more harm than good. When the airbag is -- system is trying to decide... (CROSSTALK) BURGRESS: It couldn't have caused any more harm that night. I would just submit that first impact was with a five-inch pine tree. And although the pine tree yielded to the Cobalt, it was still a pretty significant impact when that happened. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman's time has expired. Now recognize Mr. Barton for five minutes. BARTON: Thank you. And I want to apologize to the other members that are still here. I have been watching the hearing and -- as I've been doing meetings, but I apologize for not being here physically to go ahead of some of you folks. And having said that, I'm going to go ahead. I have listened to most of what you've said today on the television and I think it's obvious that GM has some real questions that they have not done a very good job answering today. But I also think as the federal regulator on the block, there are some valid questions for your agency to answer. My first question is, at what level of accidents or deaths or incidents of malfunction triggers more than normal NHTSA review, not necessarily a full-fledged investigation? But in this case we, in hindsight, have got 13 deaths that we feel are attributable to this ignition problem over a 10-year period. I don't know how many accidents to how many injuries. But, you know, when would NHTSA really start looking at something and say, you know, there is an anomaly here, we need to check it out? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, first, I appreciate your question. And, you know, part of where you started with this is there are important questions that NHTSA has to answer in addition to General Motors. And I think this is an incredibly important process because we have questions, you have questions. What my focus is, in addition to the recall, is making sure NHTSA does everything we can to improve the way we deal with these cases. When it comes to your question about, is there a specific level? Each case ends up being different. Ideally what I like would to have happen is that we find any -- well, first, that automakers find and fix these defects right away. If they don't, ideally, I want to find and fix these defects before any single life is lost. BARTON: But there is some internal reporting system or monitoring system. And like if a specific model started showing up 100 accidents a month that were unexplainable, that would be a big enough blip that somebody at NHTSA would say, well, what's going on there? I mean, if you had a steering problem, if you had a brake problem, if you had a gasoline tank problem that kept exploding over and over again, not once every decade, but, I mean, you know, enough that you could see in your reporting, somebody at NHTSA would say, hey, we need to check that out. Now I am told that at the staff level there were some internal NHTSA employees, and employees at NHTSA said, you know, before GM admitted there was a problem, there were some NHTSA mid-level people that said, we need to look at it, and a decision was made within NHTSA that it wasn't at a level that was worthy of further investigation. Is that true? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, we have a process to do exactly what you just said. We have people who are reading every single one of the more than 45,000 complaints that come in. We have a team dedicated to do that. We have a team dedicated to looking at all the early warning data that comes in. In this case, red flags were raised, concerns were raised, and it was proposed because of that exact process, the exact process you're talking about, that we do have. Concerns were raised, and this was brought to a panel. The job of that panel is to consider all of the evidence, the initial evidence as well as more detailed look at the data, whether or not there is a clear trend, whether or not there is enough information to have concern over a specific defect. The panel did that in this case. What I'm learning, what I'm seeing from all of this is that we need to reconsider and look at how do we deal with cases where there may be something that's considered a remote explanation. Should we change the way we follow up on it? Should we change the way we follow up on that with the car company? These are things that I think we're learning lessons that... (CROSSTALK) BARTON: My time is just about out. I want to make one general comment and then one final question. You know, we pointed out to the GM executive that was here that their part didn't meet their own specifications. And it didn't just almost not meet them, it didn't meet them by a long way. I mean, like a third. It was like two-thirds off. It was way below, not just a little bit. And that's not NHTSA's problem. And you're not expected to -- the NHTSA people aren't expected to know things at that level. But on the general point that Dr. Burgess was asking about, you know, when an airbag doesn't deploy when it runs into a tree at 40 or 50 miles an hour, and the general response from NHTSA is that we didn't know how that particular airbag system was supposed to work, I don't think that's a very good answer. FRIEDMAN: Congressman... BARTON: Isn't NHTSA supposed to know how the airbag systems work? And if they're not, if NHTSA doesn't know, aren't you and your agency supposed to find out? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, the circumstances of these crashes were much more complicated than that. We applied expertise. We applied our understanding. We applied a process that has worked to generate over 1,299 recalls over the last decade. Are there improvements that we need to make to that process based on what we've learned today? Yes, absolutely. And I am committed to making sure that that happens. But these -- I wish these crashes were as simple as they appear to be. I wish the connection was as direct as we now know it is. At the time and with the information we had... BARTON: Hindsight is always easier than current sight. FRIEDMAN: And as you've said before, hindsight is 20/20. And ideally... (CROSSTALK) BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. The gentlemen yields back. Now recognize Mr. Griffith of Virginia for five minutes. GRIFFITH: Thank you very much. Appreciate it. I appreciate you being here today and I would ask several questions following up, you know, on why didn't NHTSA know. And it is true that hindsight is 20/20. But it appears that some of your folks were at least sending up warning signals. I'm looking at what I believe is tab 18. And the DAD, which is the Defects Assessment Division, and I know you know that, but not everybody watching on TV knows that. And so I want to make sure they know because I had to look it up. Sent out and said -- in one of their emails in 2007 said: "notwithstanding GM's indications that they see no specific problem pattern, DAD perceives a pattern of non-deployments in these vehicles that does not exist in their peers and that their circumstances are such that in our engineering judgment, merited a deployment, and that such a deployment would have reduced the injury level or saved lives." When you combine that flag with the flag I think you mentioned earlier in your testimony that you were getting a number, if I remember correctly, it was about 200 and some complaints on this particular Cobalt vehicle, that they were stalling out on the road, or the engine was cutting off. And you start adding those together along with the fact that I believe you all knew that there was at least I think it was three where the airbag didn't deploy and the ignition was in the accessory mode. It would seem that somebody ought to start an investigation, that those coincidences might have been more than coincidences. And I would ask, I know you're trying to do things better, but apparently the person who put all this together was an investigator for a one-man law firm. He did have somebody of counsel, but basically you got have a one-man law firm with an engineering investigator who figures this out. So I would say to you, you know, what can you do better? And have you called on that investigator to come in and maybe train some of your folks that -- to look at some of these coincidences, because when you start seeing a series of negative things happen, that might be where you ought to be looking. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, our team was looking at this issue. The Defects Assessment Division was doing exactly their job. We have a system that is designed to raise those red flags. About half of the time the recommendations of those Defects Assessment Division end up moving on to investigations. This -- what I see in this case is one of the things I mentioned before, which is one of the things we need to look at is how do we make connections between remote defect possibilities? In this case, you had one theory that was put forth which was that the accessory -- the key being in the accessory position could have caused airbag non-deployments. In the crashes that we looked at, the circumstances of those crashes led the investigators to believe that it was much more likely that the airbags didn't go off because of the circumstances of that crash. I understand -- completely understand why it looks like it should have been clear, but it's clear now in part because we have that clear connection from General Motors. GRIFFITH: Well, but let me raise this concern. This memo indicates that there's a reliance, if you -- and I'm implying this from the wording, "notwithstanding GM's indication that they see no specific pattern problem." It shows -- that statement shows a reliance on GM. Likewise in your testimony, you state that this understanding was verified -- talking about the power-loss situation. "This understanding was verified by GM's service literature during our due diligence effort." Now, if you've got a company that has got a car that's not functioning the way it's supposed to, I would like to think that with 51 employees versus that one-man law firm out of Georgia, that you would look at something other than the service literature and not necessarily to rely on GM indications that they see no specific pattern or problem pattern. So I'm concerned that there may have been too much reliance on information from GM, including their service, make sure I get the wording right, their "service literature," and what they saw as problem patterns when, in fact, I think that you all are supposed to be finding the problem patterns. Now I understand it's easy in hindsight sitting up here to say that. But these are warning signs that go off to me as a legislator that maybe you all need to take a look at that. And, you know, when you see problems, maybe the service literature of the company that you're looking at is not the best place to get your information. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, just to be clear, we did not rely on General Motors when it came to defects, whether or not there's a defect trend. We did our own analysis of the data. And our own analysis indicated that the Cobalt didn't stand out. I also wonder if I haven't been clear enough relative to that service bulletin. We did not rely on that service bulletin at the time. We did not rely on that information from General Motors. We relied on our experts' understanding of airbag systems. GRIFFITH: But their understanding of the airbag system in the Cobalt was based on the service literature for the Cobalt according to your written testimony. FRIEDMAN: Well... GRIFFITH: Am I not correct? Is that not what you said? FRIEDMAN: My testimony sounds like it was not clear enough. What happened was once we found out about this defect, we looked into the service literature to confirm our understanding at the time. And the service literature that we looked at this year for that vehicle confirmed our understanding at the time which was that... GRIFFITH: But your... (CROSSTALK) GRIFFITH: Your understanding at the time and the service literature were both wrong, isn't that correct? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. GRIFFITH: Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Mr. Long for five minutes. LONG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member and all of the members on both sides that have been here today. We originally weren't scheduled to be in this soon. And so a lot of us had to change our travel plans to get in today. And a lot of us have been sitting here through the entire both hearings today because it is a very, very important issue, of course, that we're discussing. And, thank you, Mr. Friedman, for being here with us today with your testimony. You know, when I think of NHTSA, I think of number 66 for the Green Bay Packers, linebacker Ray Nitschke. And all day we've been talking about NHTSA, NHTSA, NHTSA. Tell me what NHTSA is. FRIEDMAN: NHTSA is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. It's an organization of nearly 600 people whose mission is to save lives and reduce injuries by addressing issues like drunk driving, unbelted occupants, vehicle safety, and the subject we're talking about today, which is finding vehicle defects when automakers don't find them, themselves, which is their first and foremost responsibility. LONG: I just wanted to get that out there on the record. I, of course, know what it is, but I think a lot of people when they hear that, NHTSA, NHTSA, NHTSA, all day are thinking, what exactly is this? So the next question I would have would be, do you have any way to track consumer complaints to auto dealers short of waiting for them to reach out to you? Not the dealers, but the consumers that are having a problem. Do you have any way to track people coming in and, my car stopped, it died, it did this, it did that? Do you have any way to track that or do you have to wait for someone to contact you all? FRIEDMAN: We have early warning data which tracks the cases where warranty services are provided on vehicles... (CROSSTALK) LONG: So any time a warranty service is provided, you will be notified of that? FRIEDMAN: We're notified of a count. We have a total number -- a count of the number of those and the part that that's associated with. LONG: And how often... FRIEDMAN: Not the reason for the complaint. LONG: Do you get that annually, semi-annually, quarterly? FRIEDMAN: Once a quarter. LONG: Once a quarter. OK. FRIEDMAN: The information is required once a quarter. LONG: How would a -- what kind of marketing do you do? How would a consumer know, learn about the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration? What kind of marketing do you do? If I took my car in, had a problem, it wouldn't pop into my head to call you, so how do you market yourself? How can we let the American public know if they do have an issue, and they're not satisfied with their dealer, how can they contact you? Or what can we do to better augment that, I guess? FRIEDMAN: Well, some of the things that we're already looking at doing and that we're already making sure that happens is on every single recall letter that goes out, both NHTSA's name is on that letter, even though it's sent from the automaker, and it's in clear red letters that this is an important safety recall information. We also have apps that are available online that we try to make sure that consumers download. These apps allow people to lodge complaints directly to us. They allow them to track their recalls. We're also moving forward later on this year with a tool that will allow all consumers to come to our Web site, put in their VIN number to find out if there's a recall associated with their very specific vehicle that has yet to be addressed. We have additional efforts where we try to make sure that people are aware of who NHTSA is. But, yes, I've seen the same data. And one of the things I've talked to my staff about is that I'm concerned that we are not at the top of the list when people have complaints. And we've been talking about ways to make sure that we have campaigns to make people aware that if you've got a complaint, if you've got a concern, come to NHTSA and we need that information. Consumer complaint data is one of the vital tools that we have to try to find these defects. And I would appreciate any help anyone can provide to make sure that people are aware that people go to safercar.gov to report these defects, any help. LONG: For tomorrow you're going to be able to see on there that you can take your car in and get a free loaner or a free rental, right? FRIEDMAN: Absolutely. LONG: Very good. My last question, at what point is the consumer supposed to reach out to you? FRIEDMAN: At any point they have a concern. I mean, you know, when it... LONG: At what point is that, though? If I get a -- go home this evening, in the mail I get a recall on my vehicle and they want me to bring it in and fix this switch or that doodad there, whatever, do I run to the phone, call you, and say, hey, I've got a recall? Or do I wait until I'm not satisfied with the dealer? At what point do consumers -- should consumers reach out to you? FRIEDMAN: Well, in that case, if you get a recall letter, the first thing you should do, without a doubt, is contact your dealer and get your vehicle fixed as soon as possible. LONG: Yes, but I'm talking about contacting you. At what point do I -- if it's just a standard thing, I don't need to contact you on that? FRIEDMAN: If it's a standard recall, and you're concerned and you want to reach out to us, absolutely. But typically when we want people to contact us is well before there's a recall. We rely on, and look at, over 45,000 consumer complaints every single year to try to spot these trends. So I want someone to reach out to NHTSA the instant they have a serious concern about their vehicle and they feel that their safety is at risk, so that we can have that information. Right now we've got 45,000 complaints. I'd like to see that number get up to 50,000, 60,000, 75,000 complaints relative to safety issues so that we can have more information to be able to track down these problems. LONG: Okay. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any time left, but if I did, I'd sure yield back. ACTING CHAIRMAN: I thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, for five minutes. TERRY: Thank you, acting chair. You had testified, Mr. Friedman, or in your testimony you showed, or testified that there were two SCI reports that showed indications of power loss and identified the vehicle power mode as accessory. And I think one of these has been highlighted in several newspaper articles that the SCI noted during airbag investigation, a problem with the accessory. So the question I have is, did these reports merely report the vehicle power mode as a fact? Or did it report and identify it as a potential contributing factor? FRIEDMAN: Well, the two reports handled the case differently. My understanding and my memory is that in one of the reports, it simply had an entry in the EDR data, in the event data recorder data, that indicated that the vehicle power mode was accessory. That's typically not reported. In another case, in the other case, it was included in the special crash investigation. There were two possible reasons why the airbags did not deploy. One possible reason was because of the ignition switch. The other possible reason was because the yielding nature of the trees wasn't sufficient. TERRY: You mean they're hard when they're hit. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry? TERRY: I'm being sarcastic. You said the yielding nature of the tree is... FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry. I'm using technical... TERRY: They're hard and objects hit them. FRIEDMAN: Well, different trees of different sizes. In this case... TERRY: Anyway, I don't want to get bogged down into the force, the impact of a tree. But the point is that they were noted in two SCI reports but not acted upon. So what is the communication process between the SCI and the ODI? Someone's got to take that up and say, geez, there's a problem with the an ignition switch that's been noted, maybe we should follow up on that. What's the process? FRIEDMAN: So, the process, it depends on the circumstance. In some cases, our office of defects investigation will actually ask the special crash investigators to go out and look at a crash so that they can seek new information. In other cases, when the special crash investigators follow up on a crash, they will bring it to the attention of the Office of Defects Investigation. So we try to make sure that both teams are talking to each other and sharing critical information. TERRY: Okay. So in these two SCI reports that were filed, did the SCI -- did the special crash investigator communicate that there's a problem other than noting it in those reports on those two occasions to the ODI? FRIEDMAN: I don't know if SCI specifically communicated the accessory issue, but when the team did look at especially the investigation that indicated that there were two possible reasons for that... TERRY: Yes, so the ODI knew that there may have been -- that the switch may have been part of the problem, let's say? FRIEDMAN: ODI would have been aware of exactly... TERRY: So odi was aware? FRIEDMAN: I believe so, because my understanding is... TERRY: Right, because it looks like you have one group of people that's not talking to another group of people. FRIEDMAN: Our teams do talk to each other, but as you'll notice in my testimony, one of the thing that I do think we need to discuss is are there ways we can change the way these crash investigations are used in our defects process? But in this case, I do want to note that the draft version of this report that the team had at the time, at that moment, indicated that the crash investigators thought the more likely reason the airbags did not go off was because of the circumstances of the crash. TERRY: I would think if you note that there's a problem with the switch to automatically turning to accessory, that that would be significant enough to just follow up on whether or not it was deemed to be a contributing factor or the sole factor. I need to ask, though, on the EW -- early warning reports. You were receiving early warning, the reports from G.M., correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. TERRY: In my question to the chair -- I'm sorry, the president of G.M., she said that they were submitting those. Were they required when they know or feel that there is a problem with a specific item in that car, like the ignition switch to report that, or is that just one of the many items to be submitted within the EWR? FRIEDMAN: Well, my understanding is that if they're aware aware of a problem that relates to a safety defect that that actually is not reported within EWR, that needs... (CROSSTALK) TERRY: They support, under the TREAD Act, they have to support that separately. FRIEDMAN: Well, under the TREAD act, they're required to report warranty claims and a variety of other pieces of information to us. But if they saw a defect, then they needed to report that to us, completely separate from. That's simply their -- (CROSSTALK) TERRY: What's noncompliance... FRIEDMAN: ... why we have an investigation. TERRY: I'm over my time, but I do need to get on the record. What is noncompliance versus defect? FRIEDMAN: So these are two -- TERRY: And you have two seconds. FRIEDMAN: Sure. Really quickly. Noncompliance means you did not meet the standards that we have. A safety defect means that you may have met the standards, but there's something wrong with a vehicle that poses an unreasonable risk to safety. TERRY: All right. Thank you. ACTING CHAIRMAN: I thank the gentleman. I would ask for unanimous consent that the members' written opening statements be introduced into the record. Without objection, the documents will be entered into the record. Hearing none. I'll also ask unanimous consent that the contents of the documents and binder be introducted into the record, and to authorize staff to make appropration redactions. Without objection, the documents will be entered into the record with any redactions that staff determines are appropriate. Hearing no objections. In conclusion, i'd like to thank all the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. ACTING CHAIRMAN: And members that participated in today's hearing. I remind members that they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record, and I ask that the witnesses all agree to respond promptly to the questions. Anything else? Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. CQ Transcriptions, April 1, 2014 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: REP. TIM MURPHY, R-PA. CHAIRMAN REP. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, R-TEXAS REP. MARSHA BLACKBURN, R-TENN. REP. PHIL GINGREY, R-GA. REP. STEVE SCALISE, R-LA. REP. CORY GARDNER, R-COLO. REP. MORGAN GRIFFITH, R-VA. REP. GREGG HARPER, R-MISS. REP. PETE OLSON, R-TEXAS REP. RENEE ELLMERS, R-N.C. REP. BILL JOHNSON, R-OHIO REP. BILLY LONG, R-MO. REP. JOE L. BARTON, R-TEXAS EX OFFICIO REP. FRED UPTON, R-MICH. EX OFFICIO REP. DIANA DEGETTE, D-COLO. RANKING MEMBER REP. GENE GREEN, D-TEXAS REP. JAN SCHAKOWSKY, D-ILL. REP. KATHY CASTOR, D-FLA. REP. BRUCE BRALEY, D-IOWA REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C. REP. BEN RAY LUJAN, D-N.M. REP. PAUL TONKO, D-N.Y. REP. PETER WELCH, D-VT. REP. JOHN D. DINGELL, D-MICH. EX OFFICIO REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN, D-CALIF. EX OFFICIO REP. LEE TERRY, R-NEB. WITNESSES: MARY BARRA, CEO, GM DAVID FRIEDMAN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NHTSA Source: CQ Transcriptions All materials herein are protected by United States copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, published or broadcast without the prior written permission of CQ Transcriptions. You may not alter or remove any trademark, copyright or other notice from copies of the content. © 2014 CQ Roll Call All Rights Reserved...

INT BROLL HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE GM RECALL HEARING HOUSE ENERGY AND COMMERCE HEARING 4/1/14 (CSPAN SWITCHED FEED, x 80) NHTSA Acting Administrator David Friedman Mary Barra, GM CEO 13:50:22 empty room 14:02:57 walk in barra 14:04:02 TIM MURPHY, chair, As soon as rolled of customers told GM that just by pumping knee it would shut off 14:04:20 great shot of cameras trained on Barra*** 14:04:42 just a year later GM told Delphi told them to change switch so it wouldn't turn off..NHTSA was also evaluating concerns with the cobult. But they only looked at airbag non deployment 14:05:32 Spike in warranty claims in Cobalt crashes.NTSA decided NOT to investigate..and also in 2010. 14:05:53 Pan from dias over to Barra**** GREAT SHOT 14:06:08 Not until 2013 14:06:26 Did not happen. Why didn't they put the pieces together. Why didn't anyone ask the questions. 14:06:50 Why did GM keep the old part number? Did they consider how faulty switch would interface with airbags? Why did.memo about size of keychains would solve the problems..why make link.did anyone ask why 14:07:21 Barra, head on listening 14:07:30 Does GM have problem communicate.What we have here is a failure to communicate and the failures were deadly 14:07:47 fix the culture. This is about restoring public trust. Could be prevented.hope and expectation wont hear blame game.All brilliant.People don't care that you know, they know that you care. 14:08:19 Bi partisan. 14:08:34 Ranking.Michael Burgess Dianna DeGette 14:10:32 holds up = switch that cost pennies TIGHT AND WIDE 14:10:44 they were warned again and again and did nothing 14:10:58 if you had a heavy key chain like my mom key chain// could cause it to shear right off 14:11:11 defective from the start 14:11:41 in 2003 the owner of a Saturn ion with 343 made a warranty report that she bumoped the key .130 claims over the decade. Never informed the public or told regulators 14:12:17 put into the record 14:12:22 initially GM opened investigations that concluded the switch was bad, didn't meet.. 14:12:42 GREAT SHOT, push in to Barra with stills around** **14:12:57 cost was only 57 cents 14:13:28 these are the keys of a staff member.there is a long insert. They were supposed to go in the middle and create a hole so keys wouldn't go back and forth. Unfortunately GM never made this public 14:14:01 GM knew it. They quietly redesigned the switch but didn't change part number. They did it knowing the new switch didn't meet specs. Put more bad cars on the road. 14:14:37 Between 2003- 2014 GM knew from investigations, law suits, etc. but time and time again GM did nothing knowing the cars were unsafe 14:15:02 I know we have families.we want to get to bottom of this be sure it doesn't happen again. Thank Mara for coming. New to company. Committed to fix this. We have a lot of questions. 14:15:29 UPTON- Zero margin for error. 14:17:39 todays hearing is personal for me bc I come from mich, the auto state, the auto cap of the world 14:17:54 both NHTSA and GM have probs with ign switches and airbags. 14:19:28 Dingell..identify the problem 14:19:37 Blackburn- owe this hearing to the public, GM customers, 12 people that lost their lives.see what the roles of GM were and figure out who is at fault. Who knew what when. Miss Barra that includes you. what did you know when you took the helm of GM 14:20:15 In my district the Saturn Ion was recalled, important to my constituents.Thanks you for being here. 14:20:38 Barra- head on listening 14:20:44 Waxman- have a sad déjà vu/ part of the comte with tires, each time heard about how others knew about the fix and how federal officials missed signals that should have alerted them.here we are today. 14:21:23 over the last month full dimensions have unfolded. GM .dozens of crashes. 14:21:48 I know fams of some of the fams are in the audience. We owe it to them to find out what happened. The facts that we know are hard to believe. Gm has known for years and failed to take action to fix the problem. 14:22:23 resulted in a non public solution, fix for fewer than 500 drivers. 14:23:01 barra side shot, cameras around** 14:23:20 bc GM didn't institute a simple fix at least 12 people have died 14:23:32 GM still has failed to own up to potential problems. Modified for later model cars 14:23:48 Adelphi said the 2008-2011 switches still didn't meet GM specs.GM finally announced recall last fri but told public it was bc of bad parts during repairs, not bc of original parts 14:24:32 Agency missed red flags. But handicap bc a lot of info that GM knew that they didn't share. 14:24:49 need to be sure NHTSA and public have same info as auto execs MARY BARRA- CEO 14:26:52 Do you sear that the testimony.. 14:27:11 Statement 14:27:38 I cannot tell you why it took so long but we will find out 14:27:46 it is an extra situation. Vehicles we no longer make but I can on watch..transparent 14:28:03 cannot turn back the clock. Soon as I learned about the prob acted on it 14:28:15 we will not shirk from our respons now or in the future. Todays GM will do the right thing ***** 14:29:03 the facts will be the facts. Be sure that this does not happen again. Fully accountable. 14:29:25 identify and resolve any and all safety issues. I stand with him and senior leadership team stands with him as well 14:29:42 Murphy cu 14:29:48 latest rounds of recalls demonstrates how serious we are at todays gm. Identifies issue, brough forward and fix them. Work with one thing in mind. Customer and safety. 14:30:16 wide rear shot** 14:30:39 customer call centers, dealers, 14:32:25 technical center..heart of GM. Met and it was a tough meeting. Disappointed and upset. They had same questions 14:32:44 cu committee 14:32:48 want to make GM better 14:32:54 what we plan to do about those. We have retained Kenneth Feinberg for compensation.*** 14:33:23 expertise and objectivity to this effort 14:33:30 extraordinary event and responding in a extr way- civil and legal responsible ways. How to balance those in a respon manner QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 14:34:19 Murphy- as soon as hit the road lose steering and breaks 14:34:44 when first GM knew, correct? Yes. 14:34:53 Is it common practice for GM to allow parts to not meet GM specs? /// NO. But different between specs for steel and defect.material that doesn't meet spec but it acceptable.. 14:35:48 Is switch acceptable? At the beginning? // As we know today, it is not. 14:36:06 So in 2008 changes switch, right?// 14:36:28 turn to tab 25, e mail exchange. E mail notes.. cobalt is blowing up in their face. if this was a big prob why didn't they replace switch with cars already on the road. 14:37:16 Barra- doesn't match 14:37:22 Lot of statements made. That is why hired DeLuca. 14:37:32 You don't know why not replaced? // Don't know why// Why not identified as issue?// Don't know that is why we are investigating. 14:38:05 Did company investigate?// That is why they are investigating.// Should they?// yes 14:38:29 How about the cost being too high// Find that statement to be very disturbing. If that was the reason the decision was made that is unacceptable. That is not how we do biz at GM. 14:39:11 In general we have moved from a cost to a customer culture. Customer first. Core values, one of the most important issues. 14:39:35 DeGette 14:39:50 Knew about defect before . Is that correct? Yes or no will work. You don't know about that? 14:40:35 you don't know how long GM knew about this.// that is why we are doing the investigation// the specs is correct.// and these were between 4 and 10, correct? / GM was notified by Delphi by this. 14:41:18 we need a yes or no, I only have 5 minutes, I am sorry. 14:41:56 And btw ma'am.cuts off Barra. 14:42:10 Back and forth with DeGette. 14:44:24 camera on barra.is that correct 14:44:30 3 recalls were made this year. 14:44:46 gm is intending to replace , right?/ new design or old switch?/ old design/ 14:45:22 You are saying on going investigation..are you getting updates? Yes I am 14:45:36 Upton- 14:46:01 dox we looked at show gm had issues for 2 years that had redesign in 2006 14:46:17 who in GM would know about complaints?// Don't know that// Don't know who would have been handling the issue//What is supposed to happen 14:46:44 When you have a safety issue you have a team of engineers that work on that..have a cross functional team and then goes for a decision 14:47:08 Redesigned bc it doesn't meet specs, right? // Upton, engineering 101, new part should have a diff number// Correct// Did not happen// Correct// who made the decision to move forward w.o new part number// Will have name?// Yes.// Likely that same person decided not to recal the defective // Don't know. Part of investigation. 14:50:24 What is the timeline?// Very much want to know but we are doing an investigation that spanned over a decade. 14:50:44 When did GM inform NHTSA redesigned 14:51:03 Waxman didbnt recall until a month later..// company looking. 14:55:50 Waxman- later model car awith switch..recall implies I don't have to do anything but car miught have a sub par switch.// we are recalling all of those parts 14:56:24 all vehicles being recalled 14:56:29 Waxman- I know you are taking job at bad time to clean up mess. How can GM assure customers that new switches will meet requirements? 14:57:00 Barra- testing,e tc. 14:57:30 Saw this for the first time a day ago 14:57:44 Blackburn- todays GM. You are going to run it in a different way than in the past. Making some changes. Timeline. This is the first investigation we are going to do. 14:59:58 Do you think it was a cover up or sloppy work?.. Waiting for info 15:00:10 anything to do with auto bailout? 15:00:31 have you brought engineers into the process? 15:01:25 Did you say defective part? // Points that suggest that. Why doing investigation. Going to hear from more than one of us about not having new part number. 15:02:13 does that seem inconceivable to you/ Yes, inconcei, not our process and unacceptable. 15:02:54 SIDE SHOT COMTE. 15:03:00 DINGELL*** 15:03:07 begin by telling families they have our sympathies. Tragic indeed. Condolences of family. Now it is incumbent upon Congress to determine how happened and take steps to see how could have happened. 15:04:19 is it correct GM recalled 2.5 million small parts/Yes// Is it correct expanded recall of small cars bc maybe on / Yes/ Correct that switch was developed in 1990s and approved in 2002?/ Yes./ Correct that GM own designs ..torque to move switch// Yes. 15:05:26 Miss Barra is it correct approved production of switch despite test results.. showing didn't meet torque requirements// not clear to me 15:05:57 Correct redesign of switch//Yes// 15:06:06 Is it correct that the torque requirement was the same// Not clear to me. 15:06:30 Did redesign switch meet requirements// ?/ Did redesign meet torque requirements// Yes 15:06- 15:10 STOPPED LOGGING>>> 15:10:48 Barton- you are the CEO but you were the vp for product development 15:11:13 Barra- We will not accept parts that don't meet our performance safety durability requirements*** 15:13:39 if we find we have a part that is defective we do a recall 15:13:48 Barton- not an acceptable answer to the American people. we are not telling you what specs to set but there shouldn't be a part used in any auto product that doesn't meet the specifications. 15:14:20 At one level was the decision made to over ride. // Part of our investigation to answer that question. 15:14:47 Braley// Staring on photos on back wall.men same age as sons, my son owns one of the cobalt.photo of my father in age 18 in dress blues.the focus of this hearing is on GM commitment to safety.. 15:16:21 20 years ago an iowa family gave me this promo screw set .slogan..safety comes first at GM*** so my question for you is what has changed at GM? What has changed at GM 15:17:05 The way that we are working now. The decision making, leading by example.In addition to when technical community makes decision we will review it to see if more to do 15:17:35 Isnt core value that safety always comes first?// Never seen that// 15:17:53 Barra- todays GM focused on safety. 15:18:32 reads from NYT-problem known about for a decade led to 12 deaths. 15:19:18 agree this is a grave crisis// took way too long, not acceptable. That is why we are taking changes.we will continue to make process and people changes as we get results of investigation. Take all recommendations and will make changes. 15:19:56 Article added to record. 15:20:04 Blackburn- submit new core values 15:20:31 Burgess- why did GM embark on small car program 10 years ago?// To have complete portfolio.//New biz line? // The cobalt was following a previous small car. All new program. // Because of the CAFÉ standards?// Cant answer that, wasn't in decision making at that point. 15:23:27 side shot committee**** 15:24:19 people evaluating this must ask why no airbag went off. Would that be a logical question for airbag to deploy. Barra- Tragic situation. See it as a tragedy and we have apologized. I find it unacceptable that anyone.we will take action. Have made process changes. Will fix the process. World class. 15:25:34 Should be a red flag, air bag non deployments 15:26:22 Barra- tragic situation. Any time there is a loss of life in a traffic situation.will make whatever info we have available. Schakowsky 15:27:00 these deaths were needless. So I want to ask about something more than an apology. How will GM today deal with accidents bf GM bankruptcy.New GM may not be liable for accidents that occurred bf July 2009. Is that your understanding 15:27:45 we want to do the right thing for our customers. Took too long to get to answers. That is why we hired Mr Feinberg. He will bring expertise..have civic and legal responsibilities*** 15:28:19 indicates GM will give settlement with families with lost ones lost their lives 15:28:32 just begun to wotk with him, first meeting Friday. Take 30-60 days to evaluate. Not made any decisions. Just started . 15:29:00 S- during the restructuring did GM discuss? 15:29:11 I wasn't aware of this issue but our investigation will cover.not known at senior leadership of the co. GOOD BACK AND FORTH// 15:29:28 Does GM accept responsibilities. 15:29:36 B: tragic, apologize, 15:29:42 talking about respon and liability 15:29:48 do you take responsibility? Is the new GM responsible? 15:29:58 B: we will make best decisions for our customers..legal and moral responsibiltieis 15:30:12 do right thing for customers. 15:30:54 underwhelmed by safety officer 15:31:24 will take action.. take serious steps and hold people accountable 15:31:36 so no one has lost their job as a result of knowledge about defective part 15:31:47 few weeks in and process changes and will look at implications and take approp steps. 15:32:20 Gingrey- Brook lived in my district.brought to light what is going on now 15:33:21 kliled on her 29th bd..horrific accident.day before her death she took the cobalt in for service and customer states shut off while driving, please check***** 15:34:22 not included bc side impact// included in GM count, yes or no? // no. 15:35:38 whether head on or side for same reason and she is dead..i don't understand why gm doesn't include the non deployment of airbags.can you explain that to us 15:36:00 all accidents are very tragic and deeply sorry for those. 15:36:20 do you plan to investigate// 15:36:48 to what extent do you involve service technicians.how do you make sure dealerships and service depts. are making sure getting info//will communicate info. 15:37:39 What are drivers supposed to do in meantime. If you have the key with the ring.we are making loaners or rentals available.13000 customers in rentals or loaners now. 15:38:11 if take key off ring safe to drive? We believe it is safe based on our testing. Tonko//Barra 15:41:50 Barra- systemically gone across the company and are making changes..most detailed we have every provided..conducting an investigation with mr. 15:42:28 leadership at the top, how make decisions, how focus on customer.culture change doesn't happen in a year or two. Dedicated to it and want to have safest vehicles on the road. 15:43:29 we will share the appropriate information. We will commit that we will share what is appropriate.// No commitment to share the full report? Will share appro// Hear the answer. Scalise 15:44:18 pan audience to Barra, no cameras around her 15:45:30 Barra- I was aware on Jan 31 of this year. 15:45:45 When was this found out within GM. 15:46:18 holds up dox= has anyone at GM taken this employee when you signed off on this why didn you change the part number and why did you approve the change and not recall? 15:46:53 you are under oath- have any of you all asked him the questions? 15:47:40 you talk about a new culture. Has anyone been held accountable? 15:47:54 just learned about it in jan// redesigned in 2006// 15:48:29 head on wide wide** 15:48:37 are you aware of whether or not GM has met timeliness. That would be a violation of federal law. // aware of findings from mr. volukas today// 15:49:18 there were points in time where one part had info not shared with other sides.didn't understand info would be valuable to another party. Already made changes to structure so that wont happen again. Green 15:50:02 congrats on being the ceo of gm.been a customer of gm.lists all the cars he has from gm. 15:51:14 I thot of my wife's key ring. It has everything on the world on it.. 15:53:41 when someone died in chemical accident. what didn't they do that caused people to die. GM greater company than to do that. 15:54:11 you need to fix it but you need to fix it as quickly as you can (OFF CAMERA DAMIT-maybe somewhere on cam) 15:54:44 wish you would send a note to me. 15:54:53 wide side comte** Griffith 15:55:09 breach of protocol?/ Not acceptable reason to do that.// A reason might be that harder to track prob with old part when you have new part put in place// Yes// 15:55:40 While you don't know name do you know job title to make decision not to put new part. Within engineering dept.// In your dept// since 2011. 15:56:27 trail lawyer savvy..sharp people at GM do you not?// Why didn't your team of engineers figure it out that airbags wont f properly 15:56:53 congressman, answers I want too. Hold people accountable. Taken way too long 15:57:05 what kind of liability..legal and moral. 15:57:14 side wide** 15:57:22 it would have been easier to do it in bankruptcy. 15:57:30 best thing in the world is as soon as find a prob we fix it and it gets fixed and doesn't create any tragedies 15:57:50 initial convos with Feinberg. 30-60 days. //Anyone given best or worst case scenarios? //In public but none given to me. 15:58:22 would have affected a bailout or prior to that the people keeping GM afloat. Have the potential to dissuade from giving cash to GM 15:58:50 as soon as we fix the liabilities are contained. As we look at probs we wanna fix as soon as we can. If safety issue will make change 15:59:09 in real world of bus harder to get money if new source of liability//depends on situation.. 15:59:42 Severity three- what does that mean?// Don't know 16:00:16 Chair: did GM wilfully negotiate during bankruptcy did they purposely with hold any info about pending lawsuits about cobalt? // I personally didn't withhold any info.. 16:00:54 Welch: Got to thank GM for doing the impossible. Got dems and repubs working together 16:01:30 Known to me in Jan 2014. // Totally irrelevant to the people who lost their lives// Thot you meant when did I know// Changed switch in 2006. 16:02:06 Hope to get those answers. // Starting point. Someone decided to change a critical part of the car bn 2006 and 2007. If you acted on this aggressively how many cars would you have to recall. //Give me an estimate// Talk to your back row// 1.2 million// Cut in half, maybe more. 16:03:12 What would have been cost to GM if done recall in 2007. 1.8 vehicles, something less than 100 million.// Cost of recall now being done 8 years later// Can provide the info// Want people to be able to hear this// Decision delay is money and lives at risk. Ball park. 16:04:08 if we had acted at that point, smaller population. I don't understand your question. 16:04:21 if I were on the board of directors and I had a co that could have acted 8 years ago but by not acting, increased in magnitufe, damage to bottom line, reputation to company, harm to citizens 16:04:58 would have been substantially less at that time frame than it will be now 16:05:24 Settlements confidential by both parties// This is not good, you are the company now 16:05:45 do you believe that when a co has been sued on product safety do you think the co that settles should be able to keep secret what that settlement was about 16:06:09 every settlement is unique. No comment. This one is unique. 16:06:26 if a company settles and pays a lot of money to pay settlement for death should they be able to keep secret from govt agency that is supposed to keep safe 16:06:50 so if you don't have to do it, you wont do it. Make assumption both parties agree to it, what I was told. Long 16:07:10 side wide** 16:07:25 cu families and photos** 16:11:21 how many models, how many ignition switches are made?// don't know// Yarmuth 16:13:16 cu families and push into them.they look bored 16:13:33 aware of any other ignition problems that have been discovered?/ Not reviewed everything. In this case took way too long. 16:14:14 how decide push button or key? What are differences in terms of safety// We evaluate, the push button start evaluate across the portfolio. Want experts to provide that info. Both can be designed to be safe. It is a function, a lighter when they have pushbutton start. 16:18:39 Harper- we do not trust the company right now 16:19:36 when people talk to piece part it is just the switch?// didn't write the note but generallythat is what the e mail means 16:19:54 the e mail says increase of 90 cents// since warranty offset was 10-15 cents they didn't make the change// that is not something I find acceptable. This analysis is inappropriate// I appreciate this is nto appropriate but this is what happened here// we will take action, not the behavior we want. 16:20:41 want to make sure that this never happens to anyone else again. Lorrie Queen, who was she?// Vehicle line 16:21:06 how does cost factor into safety/ THEY DON'T 16:21:39 it hasn't been this way before but the way ti is now. // More of a cost culture before but now focus on safety and quality 16:22:10 When GM filed bankruptcy in 2009. the fact that GM going thru many years of financial issues did that impact how this was categorized?// Cant answered that issue. Will . 16:23:05 I would like to see other traffic deaths or injuries but was not part of this total. Castor 16:23:38 lists people who died. 16:26:39 we will put all the pieces together of incidents and make the process changes.//is a repair cost of 57 cents too costly.// If we are making the decision on safety we don't look at cost. We make the change. 16:27:41 reading from nyt piece.inadvertently bumping the key while running.baffling that gm knew about it a decade ago and told no big deal.when your engine cuts off would you consider this a safety issue?// Ah, yes.// Not aware til 2013.// At time NYT wrote report what was your position?// In 2005 I was in manuf . //equipment that we use to built cars/ Big news paper writes it? not aware?// No, didn't know. Didn't know it was an issue with Cobalt. Terry 16:30:50 what is the difference bn non compliance and a defect./Broad question/ Depends on the specific situation/ Regarding ignition switch/ My understanding is it is a term used for standards versus when we feel it is a defect. DeGette 16:33:08 thinking about the new switches but you are saying will meet the highest safety standards// Going thru extensive validation testing// Tab 53 says minimum torque must be 15 n-cm. is that the standard then?// yes// 16:34:05 wide head on DeGette talking 16:34:11 this comte had experienced with Feinberg.did BP investigation. Did fund after marathon.But want to make sure when you hire him is really doing something. He is hired to sort out value of people's claims and assign money. I assume GM is doing that..Willing to put together some sort of compensation fund? Is that why you hired him? 16:35:06 So no money involved in this? // Just hired him no money involved// Hired, announced today, but no money to compensate people/ Will determine what the right course of action is// Havent made any decisions on that yet. General Motors Ignition Switch Recall General Motors CEO Mary Barra and David Friedman, acting administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, testified at a hearing on the automaker's ignition switch recall.The defect was linked to at least a dozen deaths. · Barra, Mary Chief Executive Officer General Motors · Friedman, David J. Administrator Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS Congressional Hearings April 1, 2014 - Final House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Holds Hearing on the General Motors Ignition Switch Recall MURPHY: I now convene this hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee entitled "The G.M. Ignition Switch Recall, Why Did It Take So Long?" Ms. Barra, if you'd like to take your seat, please. Thank you. This question is the focus of our investigation. As soon as the Chevy Cobalt rolled off the production line in 2004, customers began filing complaints about the ignition switch. These customers told General Motors that just by bumping the key with their knee driving the Cobalt, it would shut off. In 2004 and 2005, G.M. engineers twice considered the problem and even developed potential solutions to fix it. But G.M. decided the, quote, "tooling cost and piece prices are too high," unquote, and that the, quote "none of the solutions represent an acceptable business case," end quote. The solution G.M. settled for was to tell their dealers to ask Cobalt drivers to remove heavy objects from their key chains. And yet, just a year later, G.M. decided to fix the ignition switch. In 2005, G.M. told their supplier, Delphi, to increase the torque in the ignition switch so the key wouldn't move out of the run position and into accessory mode. MURPHY: G.M. was not alone in examining problems with the Cobalt. The lead government safety regulator, the National Highway Traffic Administration, known as NHTSA, was also evaluating concerns with the Cobalt. But NHTSA didn't look at the ignition switch problem, just air bag nondeployment. In 2007, three years after the Cobalt's release, the chief of NHTSA Defects Assessment Division proposed that the agency investigate the Cobalt because he spotted a, quote, "pattern of non-deployments," unquote, in Cobalt airbags that didn't exist with similar sedans. An internal NHTSA presentation noted a spike in warranty claims for Cobalt airbags, a total of 29 crashes causing 25 injuries, 4 deaths and 14 field reports. Yet NHTSA ultimately decided not to investigate. Even when the issue was again raised three years later, in 2010, NHTSA again passed on investigating. GM was also looking into the airbag non-deployments. As early as 2007, GM started tracking incidents where Cobalt airbags did not deploy in car crashes. In 2011 and 2012, GM assigned at least two groups of engineers to examine the problem. According to GM's public statements, it wasn't until December 2013 the company finally put the pieces together and linked the problems with the airbags with the faulty ignition switch almost 10 years after customers first told GM the Cobalt ignition switch didn't work. We know this. The red flags were there for GM and NHTSA to take action, but for some reason, it did not happen. Why didn't GM and NHTSA put the pieces together for 10 years? Why didn't anyone ask the critical, important questions? Why did GM accept parts below their own company standards and specs? When GM decided to get a new ignition switch for the Cobalt in 2006, did GM do so recognized they recognized that the faulty switch posed a safety problem? Why did GM keep the old part number, which led to confusion? And when GM replaced the ignition switch, did engineers also consider how the faulty ignition impacted other systems in the car, like airbags? Why did GM replace the ignition switch in new cars but not the older models? Why did GM think a memo about the size of key chains was enough to solve the problems? Why did NHTSA twice decide not to investigate the Cobalt? And why didn't NHTSA make the link between keys being in the accessory position and airbags not deploying? Did anyone ask why? And for both GM and NHTSA, are people talking to one another? Did GM and NHTSA have a culture where people don't pass information up and down the chain of command? To borrow a phrase, what we have here is a failure to communicate, and the results were deadly, a failure to communicate both between and within GM and NHTSA. Today, we will ask GM and NHTSA what they're doing to not just fix the car but to fix a culture within a business and a government regulator that led to these problems. This is about restoring public trust and giving the families and crash victims the truth about whether this tragedy could have been prevented and if future ones will be prevented. It is my hope and expectation that today, we will not hear a blame game or finger pointing. All the brilliant engineers and workers in the world won't matter if the people don't really care. And as the old saying goes, people don't care that you know until they know that you care. This investigation is only three weeks old and we are determined to find the facts and identify the problems so a tragedy like will this never happen again. This investigation is bipartisan, as a priority of all the members of this committee. I want to thank Mary Barra for being here and also the head of NHTSA, David Friedman, ranking members Waxman, DeGette and Dingell for working with us. And I now give the remaining of my time to Dr. Michael Burgess. BURGESS: I thank the chairman for yielding. I thank our witnesses for being here. I thank our witnesses for being so responsive to the committee's staff requests. We are here to examine a very important matter. The hearing is appropriately named. We do have questions for General Motors. We have questions for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Two chances to open up formal investigations into the recall of General Motors cars both in 2007 and 2010, NHTSA initially examined problems with the vehicles, and both times, both times decided that no investigation was needed. We need to hear from NHTSA today how you intend to improve the process going forward. And we were just here five years ago with the Toyota investigation. We heard a lot of things out of NHTSA on those hearings. I'd like to know how they have improved the process and how we can expect to have confidence in their ability going forward. I yield back. MURPHY: Now recognize the ranking member of the committee, Ms. DeGette of Colorado. DEGETTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Like all of us, I'm deeply troubled about what our investigation has revealed about GM's business practices and its commitment to safety. Here's what we know. We know that GM has recalled over 2.5 million vehicles because of defective ignition switches. We know they should have done it much, much earlier. We know that GM failed to provide federal regulators with key information. And sadly, we know that at least 13 people are dead, and there have been dozens of crashes because GM produced cars that had a deadly effect. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the ignition switch assembly for one of these vehicles. And this is it. A spring inside the switch, a piece that costs pennies, failed to provide enough force, causing the switch to turn off when the car went over a bump. GM knew about this problem in 2001. They were warned again and again over the next decade, but they did nothing. And I just want to show how easy it is to turn this key in this switch. If you had a heavy key chain like my mom (ph) key chair, or if you had -- if you were short and you bumped up against the ignition with your knee, it could cause this key to switch right off. Mr. Chairman, we now know that these switches were defective from the start. In February of 2002, GM's ignition switch supplier, Delphi, informed the company that the switch did not meet GM's minimum specifications, but GM approved it anyway. Now, yesterday, we sent Ms. Barra a letter about this decision. I'd like unanimous consent to make that letter a part of the hearing record. MURPHY: Without objection. DEGETTE: Soon after this approval, the defective cars were on the road, and it didn't take long for problems to appear. In 2003, June 2003, the owner of a Saturn Ion with 3,474 miles on the odometer made a warranty report that he or she, quote, "bumped the key and the car shut off." GM would receive more than 130 similar warranty claims through owners about this problem over the next decade, but it never informed the public or reported the problem to federal safety regulators. The minority staff conducted this warranty analysis, and again, we prepared a memo about these claims. I'd also ask unanimous consent to put that in the record, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Without objection. DEGETTE: Initially, GM opened multiple investigations into the ignition switch issue, each of which concluded the switch was bad. It didn't meet the minimums. In 2005, GM identified solutions to the problem but concluded that, quote, "the tooling cost and piece price are too high. Thus none of the solutions represents an acceptable business case." Documents provided by GM show that this unacceptable cost increase was only 57 cents. And Mr. Chairman, we have this document that we got from GM. Somehow, it's not in the binder. I'd ask unanimous consent to put this in the record, as well. MURPHY: Without objection, so ordered. DEGETTE: Another technical investigation completed in 2005 led GM to issue a technical service bulletin advising dealers to distribute key inserts to help reduce the problem. This was a simple fix to reduce the force on the switch. And Mr. Chairman, these are the keys of one of my staff members who actually owns one of these cars. And as you can see, there's a long, long insert. What the key inserts were supposed to do is go in the middle and just create a little hole so the key and the keys wouldn't go back and forth. Unfortunately, GM never made this bulletin public. More than 500 people out of the thousands of drivers who had cars with faulty switches got the key insert. And GM knew it. Soon after this decision, company officials quietly redesigned the switch, but they never changed the part number. And astonishingly, this committee learned that when GM approved a new switch in 2006, they did it with still knowing that the new switch didn't meet specifications. The company even put more cars with bad switches on the road from 2008 until 2011. And we still don't know all the information about this. Between 2003 and 2014, GM learned of hundreds of reports of ignition switch problems through customer complaints, warranty claims, lawsuits, press coverage, field reports and even more internal investigations. But time and time again, GM did nothing. The company continued to sell cars knowing they were unsafe. I know we have a lot of family members here, Mr. Chairman, and I know -- and I want to express my deepest sympathies to them, but I want to tell them something more. We're going to get to the bottom of this. We're going to figure out what happened, and we're going to make sure it doesn't happen again. Now, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Ms. Barra for coming. She's brand-new at the company. I believe she's committed to fixing the situation. We have a lot of questions to ask today, though. And I know every member of this committee is concerned about this. Thank you very much. MURPHY: Gentlelady's time expired. Now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We know that with a two-ton piece of high-velocity machinery, there is, in fact, a zero margin for error. Product safety is, indeed, a life or death issue. But sadly, vehicle safety has fallen short, and it's not the first time. During the late summer of 2000, in this very room, I led the oversight hearings that examined the Ford Firestone recalls. A tire malfunction was causing violent crashes, and Americans did not feel safe behind the wheel. We gathered testimony from the company and agency officials and reviewed thousands and thousands of pages of documents, and we found that the system, indeed, had failed. Information about the defective tires had been shared with the companies and with NHTSA. The parties failed to protect the public safety, and over 100 people died. After that investigation, I introduced the Tread Act to correct many of the problems that contributed to the Ford Firestone tragedy. That bill was meant to ensure data about safety is reported so that defects can be quickly identified and fixed, and lives ultimately saved. The Tread Act has now been law since November 2000, yet here we are, investigating another safety failure. It's deja vu all over again. One month ago, GM issued a recall for an ignition switch defect in six vehicles totalling 1.6 million cars. And last Friday, they recalled another 900,000 vehicles. GM acknowledges that a dozen people have died in automobile crashes associated with that defect. Two were teenagers from my own community. Testifying today are GM's CEO Mary Barra and NHTSA acting administrator David Friedman, a first step in our quest to find out what went wrong. The committee's purpose is the same as it was in 2000, making sure that drivers and families are protected and cars are safe. And I'll repeat what I said at the first oversight hearing on Firestone tires in 2000. Today's hearing is very personal to me because I come from Michigan, the auto state, the auto capital of the world. That is no less true today. Michigan is proud of its auto industry, and while Michigan citizens build cars, obviously, we drive them, too. Document produced to the committee show that both NHTSA and GM received complaints about and data about problems with ignition switches and airbags. These complaints go back at least a decade. NHTSA engineers did crash investigations as early as '05 and twice examined whether complaints with airbags constituted a trend. GM submitted early warning reports to NHTSA, including data about crashes in the recalled cars. With all that information available, why did it take so long to issue the recall? In this case, just as it was with Ford Firestone, it was news reports that brought the attention to the nation's attention -- brought the problem to the nation's attention. This investigation of the recall is, indeed, bipartisan, as it should be. We'll follow the facts wherever they lead us, and we're going to work until we have the answers and can assure the public that, indeed, they're safe. And I'd like to note that the chairman of our CMT subcommittee, Mr. Terry (ph), will be joining us for questions this afternoon. With his subcommittee's record on motor vehicle safety issues, he will be watching closely as this investigation unfolds so that he can take our findings and determine whether and what changes may be needed to the laws designed to keep drivers safe on the road. After all, our goal on every issue follows the Dingell model, identify the problem or abuse fully, and where needed, fix it with legislation so that it won't happen again. I yield to the vice chair of the committee, Ms. Blackburn. BLACKBURN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Ms. Barra, thank you very much for being here today. We really owe this hearing to the American people, to GM customers, and to the relatives of the 12 individuals that have lost their lives. And it is important that we get to the bottom of this and to see what the roles of GM and NHTSA were in this, figure out who's at fault. And we want to know who knew what when. And Ms. Barra, that includes you. BLACKBURN: We're going to want to know what your exposure was to this issue as you took the helm at GM as the CEO. You know, in my district, we have the GM plant. The Saturn Ion has been recalled. That was made at that plant there in Spring Hill, so this is something that is important to my constituents, those that have worked with GM. I thank you for being here, and we look forward to the answers. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentlelady yields back. Now recognize ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for five minutes. WAXMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a sad sense of deja vu as I sit here today. I was part of this committee holding our Ford Firestone hearing in 2000. I led the committee's hearing on Toyota's problems with unintended acceleration in 2010. Each time, we heard about how auto manufacturers knew about potential defects and about how federal safety officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration missed signals that should have alerted them to defective cars on the road. And here we are today under similar circumstances. Over the last month, the full dimensions of another auto safety disaster have unfolded. General Motors has recalled 2.5 million vehicles due to a defective ignition switch, and the company has acknowledged that these cars have caused dozens of crashes and 13 fatalities. Mr. Chairman, I know the families of some of these victims are in the audience for today's hearing. I want to acknowledge them, thank them for coming. We owe it to them to find out what happened. The facts that we already know are hard to believe. GM has known for years about this safety defect and has failed to take appropriate action to fix the problem. The company installed an ignition switch it knew did not meet its own specifications. Numerous internal investigations resulted in nothing but a non-public technical service bulletin that partially fixed the problem for fewer than 500 drivers. A new analysis I released this morning revealed that over the last decade, GM received over 130 warranty claims from drivers and GM technicians who experienced and identified the defect. Drivers reported that their cars shut off after hitting bumps or potholes at highway speeds when they did something as simple as brushing the ignition switch with their knee. One GM technician even identified the exact part causing the problem, a spring that would have caused, at most, as much as a few postage stamps, a couple of dollars. Because GM didn't implement this simple fix when it learned about the problem, at least a dozen people have died in defective GM vehicles. What's more, new information the committee received last week suggests that GM still has failed to fully own up to potential problems. GM finally modified the ignition switch for later model cars, but Delphi, the manufacturer of the ignition switch, told the committee that the switches installed in model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles still do not meet GM's own specifications. GM finally announced a recall of these vehicles last Friday, but told the public that it was because of bad parts installed during repairs, not because of defective parts originally installed in the vehicles. There are legitimate questions we need to ask about whether NHTSA did enough to identify and uncover this problem. In retrospect, it's clear that the agency missed some red flags. But NHTSA was also laboring under a handicap. There appears to have been a lot of information that GM knew but they didn't share with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. We need to make sure that NHTSA and the public have access to the same information about safety as auto executives. That's why today I've introduced the Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 2014. This bill is modeled on the legislation that the committee passed in 2010 but was never enacted into law. It will make more information on defects available to the public, and it will increase NHTSA's funding and increase civil penalties for manufacturers when companies like GM fail to comply with the law. Mr. Chairman, we should learn as much as we can from this investigation. Then we should improve the law to make sure we're not here again after another auto safety tragedy in the near future. I want to yield back my time. Thank you. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. I'd now like to introduce the witness on the first panel for today's hearing. Ms. Mary Barra is the chief executive officer at General Motors Company and has been in this role since January 15th, 2014, when she also became a member of its board of directors. She has held a number of positions in this company. From 2008 to 2009, Ms. Barra served as vice president of global manufacturing, engineering. And from 2005 to 2008, she was executive director of vehicle manufacturing engineering. She's also served as a plant manager and director of competitive operations engineering, as well as numerous other positions. I'll now swear in the witness. Ms. Barra, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so, has a practice of taking testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath? BARRA: No. MURPHY: The chair then advises you under the rules of the House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during today's hearing. BARRA: No. MURPHY: In that case, if you would please rise and raise your right hand, I'll swear you in. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? BARRA: I do. MURPHY: Thank you. Ms. Barra, you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, section 1-001 of the United States code. You may now give a five-minute summary of your written statement. BARRA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. MURPHY: Please pull your microphone close to your mouth and make sure it's on. Thank you. BARRA: Can you hear me? OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. My name is Mary Barra, and I am the chief executive officer of General Motors. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. More than a decade ago, GM embarked on a small car program. Sitting here today, I cannot tell you why it took so long for a safety defect to be announced for this program, but I can tell you we will find out. This is an extraordinary situation. It involves vehicles we no longer make, but it came to light on my watch, so I'm responsible for resolving it. When we have answers, we will be fully transparent with you, with our regulators and with our customers. While I cannot turn back the clock, as soon as I learned about the problem, we acted without hesitation. We told the world we had a problem that needed to be fixed. We did so because whatever mistakes were made in the past, we will not shirk from our responsibilities now or in the future. Today's GM will do the right thing. That begins with my sincere apologies to everyone who has been affected by this recall, especially the families and friends who lost their lives or were injured. I am deeply sorry. I've asked former U.S. attorney Anton Valukas to conduct a thorough and unimpeded investigation of the actions of General Motors. I have received updates from him, and he tells me he's well along with his work. He has free rein to go where the facts take him, regardless of outcome. The facts will be the facts. Once they are in, my leadership team and I will do need to help assure this does not happen again. We will hold ourselves fully accountable. However, I want to stress I'm not waiting for his results to make changes. I've named a new vice president of global vehicle safety, a first for General Motors. Jeff Boyer's top priority is to quickly identify and resolve any and all product safety issues. He is not taking on this task alone. I stand with him and my senior leadership team stands with him, as well. And we will welcome input from outside of GM, from you, from NHTSA, from our customers, our dealers and current and former employees. The latest round of recalls demonstrates just how serious we are about the way we want to do things at today's GM. We've identified these issues, and we've brought them forward and we're fixing them. BARRA: I have asked our team to keep to keep stressing the system at GM and work with one thing in mind, the customer and their safety are at the center of everything we do. Our customers who have been affected by this recall are getting our full and undivided attention. We are talking directly to them through a dedicated Web site, with constantly updated information, and through social media platforms. We've trained and assigned more people, over 100, to the customer call centers and wait times are down to seconds. And of course, we're sending customers written information through the mail. We've empowered our dealers to take extraordinary measures to treat each case specifically. If people do not want to drive a recalled vehicle before it is repaired, dealers can provide then with a loaner or a rental car free of charge. To date, we've provided nearly 13,000 loaner vehicles. If a customer's already looking for another car, dealers are allowed to provide additional cash allowances for the purchase of a lease or new vehicle. Our supplier is manufacturing new replacement parts for the vehicles that are no longer in production. We have commissioned two lines and have asked for a third production line, and those parts will start being delivered to dealers next week. These measures are only the first in making things right and rebuilding trust with our customers. And as I've reminded our employees, getting the cars repaired is only the first step. Giving customers the best support possible throughout this process is how we will be judged. I would like this committee to know that all of our GM employees and I are determined to set a new standard. I'm encouraged to say that everyone at GM up to and including our board of directors supports this. I'm a second-generation GM employee, and I'm here as our CEO, but I'm also here representing the men and women who are part of today's GM and are dedicated to putting the highest quality, safest vehicles on the road. I recently held a town hall meeting to formally introduce our new VP of safety. We met at our technical center in Michigan. This is one of the places where the men and women who engineer our vehicles work. They are the brains behind our cars, but they are also the heart of General Motors. It was a tough meeting. Like me, they are disappointed and upset. I could see it in their faces. I could hear it in their voices. They had many of the same questions that I suspect are on your mind. They want to make things better for our customers, and in that process, make GM better. They particularly wanted to know what we plan to do for those who have suffered the most from this tragedy. That's why I'm pleased to announce that we have retained Kenneth Feinberg as a consultant to help us evaluate the situation and recommend the best path forward. I am sure this committee knows Mr. Feinberg is highly qualified and is very experienced in handling matters such as this. Having led the compensation efforts involved with 9/11, the BP oil spill and the Boston Marathon bombing, Mr. Feinberg brings expertise and objectivity to this effort. As I have said, I consider this to be an extraordinary event, and we are responding to it in an extraordinary way. As I see it, GM has civil responsibilities and legal responsibilities. We are thinking through exactly what those responsibilities are and how to balance them in an appropriate manner. Bringing on Mr. Feinberg is the first step. I would now be happy to answer your questions. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you, Ms. Barra. I also want to acknowledge, although the families are here today and now that we are aware and have sympathies, all the committee here. One Kelly Erin Ruddy (ph) of Scranton, Pennsylvania, is one of those that we offer sympathy to the families, but we have all of you in our hearts. Ms. Barra, our committee reviewed more than 200,000 pages of documents. What we have found is that as soon as the Cobalt hit the road in 2004, drivers began to immediately complain to General Motors that the cars' ignition systems didn't work properly. You can imagine how frightening it is to drive a car that, suddenly, you lose your power steering and power brakes. When the switch for the Cobalt was being built back in 2002, GM knew the switch did not meet its specifications for torque, am I correct? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: GM engineers began to look at the problem and try to figure out how to address it. GM understood the torque and the switches measured below its own specifications, is that right? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: Is it common practice for GM to accept a part that does not meet GM specifications? BARRA: No. But there's a difference between a part meeting or not meeting specifications and a part being defective. MURPHY: So under what scenario is accepting parts that don't meet GM specs allowable? BARRA: An example of that would be when you're purchasing steel. You'll set a specification for steel, but then because of the different suppliers and availability of steel to make products, you'll assess the performance, the functionality, the durability, you know, the aspects of the part or the -- in this case, steel, that is necessary to live up to what the performance and the durability, the safety needs to be. MURPHY: Well, let's... BARRA: That would be an example of when you would have a part or have material that doesn't meet the spec that was set out, but is acceptable from a safety, from a functionality perspective, performance, as well. MURPHY: Is that switch acceptable? BARRA: The switch -- I'm sorry, the switch... MURPHY: Is the switch acceptable in 2000? MURPHY: At what timeframe? I'm sorry. MURPHY: Well, at the beginning it seemed it didn't meet the specs for GM. So is that what you would consider acceptable? BARRA: As we clearly know today, it's not. MURPHY: So in 2006, GM changed its ignition switch and GM's switch supplier, Delphi, put in a new spring to increase the torque. Am I correct? BARRA: I didn't hear the last part. I'm sorry. MURPHY: GM's switch supplier, Delphi, put a new spring in to increase the torque? Is that correct? BARRA: There was a new part. MURPHY: Thank you. Now, in that binder next to you, if you would turn to tab 25, this is an e-mail exchange between Delphi employees in 2005 discussing the changes to the ignition switch. The e-mail notes that a GM engineer is asking for information about the ignition switch because, quote, "Cobalt is blowing up in their face in regards to turning the car off with the driver's knee," unquote. If this was such a big problem, why didn't GM replace the ignition switch on the cars already on the road, the cars where the torque fell well below the specifications, instead of just the new cars? Why? BARRA: I -- what you just said does not match under tab 25. MURPHY: At the bottom of the page, there should be something there. Well, just note that what I said -- I apologize for that. BARRA: OK. MURPHY: But there was a statement that "Cobalt is blowing up in their face," you know, just by being bumped with the driver's knee. BARRA: Clearly, there were a lot of things that happened. There's been a lot of statements made as it relates. That's why we've hired Anton Valukas to do a complete investigation of this process. We are spanning over a decade of time... MURPHY: But you don't know why they didn't just replace the switch on the old cars, as well as the new cars? BARRA: I do not know the answer to that, and that's why we're doing this investigation. MURPHY: Given the number of complaints about ignitions turning off while driving, why wasn't this identified as a safety issue? BARRA: Again, I can't answer specific questions at that point in time. That's why we're doing a full and complete investigation. MURPHY: Let me add another one. In the chronology GM submitted to NHTSA, GM states it didn't make the connection between the ignition switch problems and the airbag non-deployment problems until late 2013. So my question is, when GM decided to switch the ignition in 2006, did the company ever examine how a faulty ignition switch could affect other vehicle systems like the airbags? BARRA: Again, that's part of the investigation. MURPHY: Should they? BARRA: Should we understand... MURPHY: Should they look at how it affects other vehicle systems? BARRA: Yes. MURPHY: Let me ask another question, then. So when GM concluded -- and you heard from my opening statement -- that the tooling cost and price pieces are too high, what does that mean? BARRA: I find that statement to be very disturbing. As we do this investigation and understand it in the context of the whole timeline, if that was the reason the decision was made, that is unacceptable. That is not the way we do business in today's GM. MURPHY: Well, how does GM balance cost and safety? BARRA: We don't. Today, if there's a safety issue, we take action. If we know there is a defect on our vehicles, we do not look at the cost associated with it, we look at the speed in which we can fix the issue. MURPHY: Well, was there a culture in GM at that time that they would have put cost over safety? BARRA: Again, we're doing a complete investigation. But I would say, in general, we've moved from a cost culture after the bankruptcy to a customer culture. We've trained thousands of people on putting the customer first. We've have actually gone with outside training. It's a part of the core values, and it's one of the most important cultural changes we're driving in General Motors today. MURPHY: I understand today. We're asking about then. I'm out of time. Ms. DeGette, you're recognized for five minutes. DEGETTE: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, GM knew about the defect in the ignition switches as far back as 2001, 13 years before the recall, correct? BARRA: The... MURPHY: Yes or no will work. BARRA: The investigation will tell us that. MURPHY: You don't know when GM knew about the defect? BARRA: I will -- I... DEGETTE: Take a look at tab 7 in your notebook, Ms. Barra. DEGETTE: This is a GM document, and what this GM document talks about is this switch. It says, "Tear (ph) down evaluation on the switch revealed two causes of failure, low contact force and low detent (ph) plunger force." Do you recognize that document, ma'am? BARRA: This is the first I've seen this document. DEGETTE: OK. Well, so you don't know how long GM knew about this... (CROSSTALK) BARRA: ... and that's why I'm doing an investigation. DEGETTE: OK. In fact, Delphi, the manufacturer of the ignition switch, informed GM in 2002 that the switch was supposed to be 15 minimum torque specification. But in fact, these switches were between 4 and 10, didn't it. BARRA: The specification is correct that it was supposed to be 20, plus or minus 5. DEGETTE: And these switches were between 4 and 10, correct? Yes or no will work. BARRA: We know that now. DEGETTE: And the -- and GM was notified by Delphi of this, correct? Yes or no. BARRA: I am not aware of being notified. DEGETTE: OK, then... BARRA: Can I also correct -- I was... DEGETTE: I need a yes or no. I only have five minutes. I'm sorry. So as far back as 2004, 10 years ago, GM conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition in a 2005 Chevrolet Cobalt. Is this correct? BARRA: Again, you're relating specific incidents that happened (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: You don't know? BARRA: Our entire investigation (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: You don't know about that? Take a look at tab 8, please. Yes. And by the way, ma'am, I'm getting this information from the chronology that GM provided to NHTSA. BARRA: Right. And there... DEGETTE: So let me ask you, again, as far back as 2004, GM conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: Thank you. Now, after the PRTS inquiry, one engineer advised against further action because there was, quote, "no acceptable business case to provide a resolution," and the PRTS was closed. Is that correct? BARRA: If that is true, that is a very disturbing fact. DEGETTE: Yes, it is. BARRA: That is not the way we make decisions. DEGETTE: OK. Again in 2005, GM received more reports of engines stopping when the keys were jerked out of the run condition. Further investigations were conducted, and engineers proposed changes to the keys. Is that correct? BARRA: It's part of our investigation to get that complete timeline. I understand (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: OK. Well, much of this I'm taking from the timeline GM has already done. BARRA: Which was a summary. DEGETTE: OK. So as a result of the investigation, a technical service bulletin was issued to dealers that if car owners complain, they should be warned of this risk and advised to take unessential items from the key chain. But this recommendation was not made to the public. No public statements were issued, no recall sent. Is that correct? BARRA: To my understanding, yes. DEGETTE: Thank you. In 2006, GM contracted with Delphi to redesign the ignition switch to use a new detent (ph) plunger and spring that would increase torque force in the switch. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And for some reason, though, the new switch was not given a part number and instead shared a number with the original defective switch. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: Now, this new switch also did not meet GM's minimum torque specifications, either. This one, Delphi said, was the range of 10 to 15, and it really should have been 15 at a minimum. Is that correct? BARRA: I have not seen the test results from that. DEGETTE: You don't know that. OK. Now, despite these facts, GM continued to manufacture cars with these same ignition switches for the model years 2008 to 2011. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And between 2004 and 2014, no public notices were issued as a result of GM's knowledge of these facts, and no recalls were issued for the over 2.5 million vehicles manufactured with these defective ignition switches. Is that correct? BARRA: Yes. DEGETTE: And finally, three recalls were made this year, 2014 -- two in February and one just last February. Is that right? BARRA: Related to this ignition switch? MURPHY: Now, I have just a couple more questions. The first question I have, Ms. Barra, GM is intending to replace all the switches for those cars beginning April 7th, is that right? BARRA: We'll begin shipping material -- or new parts... DEGETTE: Now, are you going to put a completely redesigned switch or are you going to put the old switches from 2006 into those cars? BARRA: It's going to be a switch that meets the... DEGETTE: Is it going to be a newly redesigned switch, or is it going to be the old switch from 2006? BARRA: It's the old design that meets the performance that's required to (OFF-MIKE) DEGETTE: OK. I have more questions, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can do another round. Thanks. MURPHY: But an important part, a follow up, several members may be concerned about this, too. You're saying that there's an ongoing investigation, you cannot comment on these yet. Are you getting updates on a regular basis as this is going on? BARRA: From Mr. Valukas? MURPHY: From anybody in the company regarding these proceedings. Are you getting updates? BARRA: Yes, I am. DEGETTE: Thank you. Now go to the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Once again, thank you, Ms. Barra, for being here this afternoon. I want to make sure we ask similar questions of both you and of NHTSA. We want to learn about the documents that were submitted on a timely and appropriate basis to NHTSA, and in fact, what did they do with that information. The documents that we've looked at produced (ph) show that GM received complaints about its Cobalt ignition switches for about two years that ultimately resulted in a redesigned ignition switch in 2006. Who within GM would have known about those specific complaints? What was the process back then? BARRA: I was not a part of that organization at that time. That's why I'm doing the investigation to understand that. UPTON: So you don't know the folks that would have been reported to at this point, is that right? BARRA: I don't know the people who would have been handling this issue at that point. UPTON: But you're getting updates. And what's -- what's supposed to happen? What -- looking back, what should have happened when these reports came in? BARRA: In general, when you have an issue, a product issue, a safety issue, a field incident, any type of issue that comes in, you have a team of engineers that are the most knowledgeable that work on that. If they see there's an issue, they elevate it to a cross- functional team that looks at it, and then it goes to a group for decision. UPTON: Now, we know that the ignition switch was, in fact, redesigned because it didn't meet the specs that were there. Is that right? BARRA: Yes. UPTON: Now, I would guess Engineering 101 would normally require that when you assign a new part or replace a new part or replace a part with a new part, that that newly redesigned part, in fact, should have a different number on it. Is that right? BARRA: That is correct. UPTON: So that didn't happen, right? Did not happen. BARRA: Correct. UPTON: Who within GM made the decision to move forward with that redesigned switch without a new part number? Do you know who that is? BARRA: I do not know the name of the individual. UPTON: Are you going to be able to find that out for us? BARRA: Yes, I will. UPTON: And will you give that name to our committee? BARRA: I can provide that. UPTON: Is it likely that that same person was the one that decided not to recall the defective version? Where did -- where in the timeline is that? BARRA: I don't know, but that is part of the investigation that we're doing. UPTON: Do you know when it was that it was discovered, what year, what -- you know, where in the timeline that it was discovered that, in fact, a new part number was not assigned? UPTON: I became aware of that after we did the recall and the timeline was put together. UPTON: So that was just in the last month or so. Is that right? BARRA: That's when I became aware. UPTON: But when did GM realize that no new part number had been assigned? BARRA: Again, that's part of our investigation. I want to know that just as much as you because that is an unacceptable practice. It is not the way we do business. UPTON: So you've stated publicly that, Something went wrong with our process. How is the process supposed to work? How is this -- how are you redesigning the process to ensure that, in fact, it should work the way that it needs to work? BARRA: Well, one of the things we're doing is the investigation by Mr. Valukas. I have some early findings from Mr. Valukas. As we look across the company, it appears at this time there was information in one part of the company, and another part of the company didn't have access to that. At times, they didn't share information just by course of process, or they didn't recognize that the information would be valuable to another area of the company. We have fixed that. We have announced a new position, Jeff Boyer, who is the vice president of global vehicle safety. All of this will report to him. He will have additional staff and will have the ability to cut across the organization. And we'll also have the right functional leadership that understands what's going on in the different areas. So that's a fix we have already made, and he is operating that way today. UPTON: So when GM received complaints about ignition switches for a number of years, it ended up resulting in the redesigned ignition switch in '06. UPTON: When was it that anyone linked up the ignition switch problems to look at the Cobalt's airbags not deploying? Was that about the same time? Was that later? What's the timeline on that? BARRA: That is something I very much want to understand and know. But again, this is -- we are doing an investigation that spans over a decade. And it's very important, because designing a vehicle is a very complex process, that we get a detailed understanding of exactly what happened because that's the only way we can know that we can fix processes and make sure it never happens again. UPTON: When was it that GM informed NHTSA that, in fact, a redesign -- did, in fact, GM inform NHTSA that the ignition switch had been redesigned? BARRA: I don't know that. UPTON: I yield back. MURPHY: Chairman yields back. Now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for five minutes. WAXMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, we've heard about how in 2002, GM approved the use of faulty ignition switches in Cobalts, Ions and other cars. That's what caused many of the problems that led to the recall of the cars from model years 2003 to 2007. So new ignition switches were designed and approved by General Motors. These were switches that were used -- were used in the model years 2008 to 2010. Does that all sound right to you? Am I correct in what I'm saying? BARRA: There's a couple of statements you made at the beginning that I don't know to be true. WAXMAN: Well, in 2002, GM approved the use of what turned out to be faulty ignition switches in several of these cars. BARRA: They were actually -- they were parts that went into a 2003, was the earliest model. WAXMAN: Well, the tests were done in 2002, but the cars were 2003 to 2007. So we have a recall of those cars. And then there was a new switch, a new ignition switch designed and approved by GM, and these new switches were in use in the model years 2008 to 2010 Cobalts and Ions. Is that... BARRA: To the best of my knowledge, that's correct. WAXMAN: OK. But in a briefing last week, Delphi told committee staff that these new switches also did not meet GM specifications. They told us the force required to turn these switches was about two thirds what GM said it should be. And documents that were provided to the committee also confirm that top GM officials were aware of the out-of-spec switches in 2008 to 2002 vehicles in December 2013. So there's a document -- if you want to look it up, it's tab 39, page 6 of your binder. There was a December presentation for GM's high-level executive field action decision committee, and that -- at that meeting, they showed that the performance measurement for almost half of the 2008 -- so you go to 2008, 2010 model year vehicles -- ignition switches were below the minimum GM required specifications. My question to you is, are you concerned that many 2008 to 2010 model year cars have switches that do not meet the company's specifications? BARRA: As we assessed the situation, my understanding that there was work going on to look at these switches again, looking at -- just because a switch -- or a part, any generic part, doesn't meet specification does not necessarily it is a defective part. As that analysis was going on, at the same time, we were doing the look across to make sure we could get all of the spare parts. And when we recognized that spare parts might be -- have been sold through third parties that have no tracking to know which VIN (ph), we made the decision... WAXMAN: Well, your own executives... BARRA: ... to recall all of those vehicles. WAXMAN: ... were informed that a lot of these cars, those model years, had switches that were just as defective as the 2003 to 2007 cars. That -- those cars were recalled, but you didn't recall the model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles until a month later, on March 28th. Why did the company delay in recalling these newer vehicles? BARRA: The company was looking -- my understanding is the company was assessing those switches, but again, at the same time, in parallel, they were looking at the spare parts issue, and the spare parts issue -- it became very clear we needed to go and get all of those vehicles because we couldn't identify which vehicles may have had a spare part put in them. And we... WAXMAN: But you... BARRA: We recalled the entire population. WAXMAN: But you recalled those vehicles. You recalled them later, but not... BARRA: Yes, we did. WAXMAN: ... when you knew there was a problem. BARRA: Well, we recalled them... WAXMAN: Your recall of these later vehicles did not mention the faulty switches that were originally installed in the cars. They mentioned only, quote, "Faulty switches may have been used to repair" the vehicles. Why did the company not announce that subpar switches may have been installed in those vehicles in the first place? BARRA: There was an assessment going on to understand if the specification -- the parts performance was adequate. WAXMAN: Well, wasn't it misleading to say that -- the company didn't tell them subpar switches may have been installed in the first place? What if I owned a later model car with its original ignition switch. Your recall implies that I don't have to do anything, but my car might still have a subpar switch. Will your company conduct a detailed analysis of these late model vehicles to determine if they're safe? And will you provide the committee with warranty reports and other information so we can do our own analysis? BARRA: I believe we're recalling all of those parts. All of those vehicles are being recalled. WAXMAN: They're all being recalled. Well, I must say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned. I know you've taken this job in an inauspicious time. You're trying to clean up a mess that was left behind for you by your predecessors. But I have one last question. How can GM assure its customers that new switches being installed beginning April 7th will finally meet GM's requirements? MURPHY: Thank you. BARRA: We have done -- we are working very closely with our supplier. Our executive director responsible for switches is personally looking at the performance of the new switches. We will do 100 percent end-of-line testing to be sure that the performance, the safety, the functionality of these switches are safe. MURPHY: Thank you. Gentleman's time's expired. Ms. Barra (INAUDIBLE) question. I just want to be clear. Did you review the documents that GM submitted to the committee? BARRA: No, I did not. There was over 200,000 pages (INAUDIBLE) MURPHY: How about the document Mr. Waxman was talking about? Did you review that? BARRA: I -- this page right here? MURPHY: Yes. BARRA: I actually saw this for first time I think a day ago. MURPHY: Thank you. Now recognize Ms. Blackburn for five minutes. BLACKBURN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, you've mentioned several times in your comments "today's GM." So my assumption is that you are going to run GM in a different manner than it has been run in the past... BARRA: That's correct. MURPHY: ... and that you are making some changes. I want to ask you just a little bit about timeline, helping us get our hands around this because we're -- this is the first investigation we're going to do. We're going to have others and continue to look at this to get answers and figure out what has happened here between you all and NHTSA, and also within what happened at GM. So you mentioned in your testimony that this came to light on your watch. So I am assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in GM about this issue until you became CEO. Am I correct on that? BARRA: At the senior level of the company, we learned of this after the recall decision was made on January 31st. I was aware in late December there was analysis going on on a Cobalt issue, but I had no more information than that. But I can assure you, as soon as we understood -- the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made, we acted without hesitation. BLACKBURN: OK, then, how did you find out about it? Was it through someone bringing the issue to you to say, Ms. Barra, we have a real problem here, or in doing your due diligence, did you find out about it? BARRA: The committee -- the leadership committee responsible for making recall decisions made its decision on January 31st. They notified Mark Royce (ph), who immediately picked up the phone and called me. BLACKBURN: OK. And could you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations? BARRA: Yes. BLACKBURN: Thank you. And then was your predecessor, Mr. Acreson, your predecessor -- was he aware of this issue? BARRA: Not to my knowledge. BLACKBURN: He was not. Are any of the members of the leadership committee also -- were they a part of his leadership committee? BARRA: There are members of today's team that were also members of Mr. Acreson's leadership team, and to my knowledge, they were not aware. BLACKBURN: OK. Do you think there was a cover-up or it was sloppy work? BARRA: That is the question I've asked Mr. Valukas to uncover, and I'm anxiously awaiting the results from his study. BLACKBURN: OK. Do you think it had anything to do with the auto bail-out? BARRA: With -- I'm sorry? BLACKBURN: With the auto bail-out. Do you think it had anything to... BARRA: Again, I need to get the results of the study to make all determinations. BLACKBURN: And going back to what Mr. Upton said, you're going to be sharing that information with us. BARRA: Yes. We will. We will be (OFF-MIKE) BLACKBURN: Because -- OK. Was there -- the engineers that were responsible for this, have you brought them into the process? I know this is something that the part was actually created by Delphi. Correct? BARRA: Correct. BLACKBURN: And they have an engineering team that was working on that. So they have a shared responsibility and liability in this entire issue. Have you met with them and with the engineering team that was responsible for this switch? BARRA: I have not met with the specific engineering team that is responsible... BLACKBURN: OK. BARRA: ... but I am speaking to leadership, and those individuals are being interviewed as part of the investigation conducted by Mr. Valukas. BLACKBURN: OK. Now, going back, did you say that this was a defective part when you talked about it earlier? BARRA: We have learned when we knew -- when the recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology, there's points that suggest, and that's why we're doing the investigation. BLACKBURN: OK. All right. Now, I think that you're going to hear from more than one of us about not having the new part number assigned. That -- who made that decision? Was that strictly a Delphi decision, or did that come into the GM supply chain for that decision to be made as to how the part number would be coded? BARRA: At a general level, General Motors is responsible for General Motors parts numbers. BLACKBURN: OK. BARRA: But again, that's part of the investigation to understand how that happened. BLACKBURN: OK. Does that seem inconceivable to you? BARRA: Yes, it is inconceivable. It is not our process, and it is not acceptable. BLACKBURN: OK. I would think that it probably is not. Have you asked Delphi if you can have access to their documentation and e-mail chain dealing with this issue? BARRA: I have not. Again, Mr. Valukas will go as the investigation takes him to get the information that he needs to get a complete and accurate accounting of what happened. BLACKBURN: OK. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. MURPHY: Just for clarification, Ms. Blackburn, we have asked for that e-mail chain from Delphi, and we'll let you know when we get that. Now recognize chairman emeritus of the committee, Mr. Dingell, for five minutes. DINGELL: Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. I begin by telling the families injured or killed by the defective General Motors vehicles that they have our sympathy, and we believe the events here are tragic indeed. And I join everyone in expressing my condolences to the families who were killed or injured in those crashes. Now it is incumbent up on the Congress, federal regulators and General Motors to determine how these deaths could have happened and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the safety of American motorists and their families are moving forward. I expect that this investigation will be thorough, and I counsel all the stakeholders to be unabashedly forthright. Now, Ms. Barra, I'd like to build on Chairman Murphy's line of questioning, and all of my questions will require yes or no answers. If you cannot answer some of my questions, I expect that you will submit responses for the record and all available relevant supporting materials. Now Ms. Barra, is it correct that GM has now recalled approximately 2.5 million small cars in the United States due to defective ignition switches? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Yes or no. Now, Ms. Barra, is it correct that GM recently expanded its recall of small cars because it was possible that the defective ignition switches may have been installed as replacement parts, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that the ignition switch in question was originally developed in late 1990s and approved by General Motors in February of 2002? Yes or no. BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that General Motors's own design specifications for such ignition switch required 20, plus or minus 5, Newton (ph) centimeters of torque to move the switch from the accessory position to the run position, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, is it correct that General Motors approved production of such ignition switch, despite test results by Delphi during the production part approval processor, or PPAP, showing that the switch did not meet GM's torque requirement, yes or no? BARRA: That's not clear to me. DINGELL: Now, Ms. Barra, is it correct a General Motors approved a redesign of the ignition switch used in the presently recalled vehicles in April of 2006? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, and is it correct that GM's torque requirement for the redesigned switch remained the same as for the original ignition switch, yes or no? BARRA: It is not clear to me, and that's why we're focusing the investigation on that area specifically. DINGELL: When that information becomes available, would you submit it to the committee? BARRA: Yes, I will. DINGELL: Now, Ms. Barra, to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet GM's torque requirements, yes or no? BARRA: I believe... DINGELL: Want me to say it again? To your knowledge, did the redesign ignition switch meet GM's torque requirement, yes or no? BARRA: It's part of the investigation. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, will you please submit for the record an explanation of the factors that GM takes into consideration when approving a part for production? Are there a circumstances where GM may approve parts or production when such parts do not make such design specifications, yes or no? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: If so, could you please submit materials for the record explaining when and why that might occur? BARRA: Yes. DINGELL: Ms. Barra, I appreciate the lengths to which GM under your leadership is going to recall the vehicles and ensure that they're safe to drive. GM's cooperation with the committee is necessary in order to understand the process by which and the reasons decisions were made leading up to the 2014 recall. You may have so far done so, and I expect that you'll continue to do so. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Barra. I yield back the balance of my time. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. Now recognize the chairman emeritus of the majority, Mr. Barton from Texas, for five minutes. BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I ask my questions, I want to make just a general observation. This is probably the last major investigation that this subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct where we have the services of Mr. Dingell and Mr. Waxman. We've had a history on this committee and this subcommittee going back 40 or 50 years that when we have major issues, we try to approach them on behalf of the American people in a nonpartisan, very open way, and it certainly appears that we're going to continue that tradition today. So I hope that we can show the best to the American people, that the Congress at its best gets the facts, presents the facts, and does so in a way that in the future, we protect the public health and safety for the American people. Now, with that caveat, I do have a few questions. A number of congressmen have made the point that these ignition switches didn't appear to meet specifications. And I -- my assumption is that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications, is that correct? BARRA: We've learned that as we did the recall. BARTON: Now, I'm an industrial engineer. I used to be a registered professional engineer. I'm not currently registered, but I have been in the past. Why in the world would a company with the stellar reputation of General Motors purchase a part that did not meet its own specifications? BARRA: I want to know that as much as you do. It is not the way we do business today. It's not the way we want to design and engineer vehicles for our customers. BARTON: I mean, I just don't understand that. I'm -- I've never worked in an auto assembly environment. I've worked in a defense plant, an aircraft plant. I was plant manager of a printing plant. I've done limited, very limited, consulting in the oil and gas industry. But I've never been a part of an organization that said we set the specs, when a part doesn't meet the specs, we go ahead and buy it anyway. And I just -- you know, you're currently the CEO, but at one time, I think before you became CEO, you were the vice president for global product development purchasing and supply chain. I mean, is it your position now that General Motors will not accept parts that don't meet specifications? BARRA: We will not accept parts that don't meet our performance, safety, functionality, durability requirements. As I mentioned before in the steel example, there will be times where there will be a material or a part that doesn't meet the exact specifications, but after analysis and looking at the performance, the safety, the durability, the reliability, the functionality, it will be OKed. That happens very often as we buy steel to make the bodies of the vehicles. BARTON: Well, then you don't need specifications -- with all respect... BARRA: No, but... BARTON: ... what you just answered is gobbledy-gook. BARRA: But... BARTON: It's your own specification. It's your company's specification. If a part doesn't meet the specification, why in the world would you not refuse it and only accept a part that meets a specification? BARRA: There needs to be a well documented process if you accept a part that doesn't meet the original specification. BARTON: All right, I'm... DEGETTE: Would the gentleman yield? BARTON: Briefly, yes. DEGETTE: Do you have that information? BARRA: On steel? DEGETTE: No, on starters. BARRA: On the -- on the ignition switch? DEGETTE: Yes. If it didn't -- doesn't -- didn't meet specifications, do you have the information on these starters that it met all those other criteria? BARRA: That is part of the investigation. But clearly, by the fact that we made a recall, it did not meet the performance... BARTON: We have the advantage as a subcommittee that we know now what happened in the past. We know now that there's a real problem. We know now that a number of young people have lost their lives, and apparently because of this -- this defect. So we have the advantage of hindsight. And I -- so I understand that. But as Ms. DeGette just said, and a number of others, there's no reason to have specifications if you don't enforce them. Now, this next question is not a trick question, but it's an important question. Right now, how many parts are being used in General Motors product that don't meet your own company's specifications? BARRA: I don't have that exact number, but I can tell you the parts that we're using today meet the performance and the reliability, the safety that they need to. If we find we have a part that is defective, that doesn't meet the requirements, we then do a recall. BARTON: Well, again, with -- that's not an acceptable answer, I think, to the American people. We're not telling you the specifications to set. Now, there are some safety specifications that by law and NHTSA by regulation sets, but there shouldn't be a part used in any GM product, or for that matter, any other automobile product that's sold in the United States that doesn't meet the specifications. My last -- well -- at what level was the decision made to override and to use this part, even though it didn't meet specification? Was that made at the manufacturing level, at the executive level, or even at some subcomponent purchasing level? Do you know that right now? BARRA: That's part of our investigation to find that -- answer that question. BARTON: All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. Gentleman (INAUDIBLE) now recognize Mr. Braley for five minutes. BRALEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, we've had different perspectives during this hearing. You've been appropriately focusing your attention on the members of this committee and answering our questions. And I've been staring at these photographs on the back wall, and I see young women the same age as my daughter. I see young men the same age as my two sons. My son Paul owns one of your Cobalts. I see a young Marine in his dress blues and I'm reminded of the photograph I have in my office upstairs of my father at the age of 18 in his dress blues at Camp Pendleton. And the focus of this hearing so far has been on GM's commitment to safety, which I think we all agree on is an important topic for this hearing. You testified in your opening -- and I think I'm quoting -- "Our customers and their safety are at the center of everything we do." And you responded to a question from Ms. Blackburn and told us that you were going to run GM differently than it's been run in the past. And I have a copy of GM's March 18th press release announcing Jeff Boyer as your new vice president of global vehicle safety. In this press release, he is quoted as saying, "Nothing is more important than the safety of our customers and the vehicles they drive. Today's GM is committed to this, and I'm ready to take on this assignment." Twenty years ago before this hearing, an Iowa family harmed by another defective vehicle gave me this promotional screwdriver set that they got from their local GM dealer. And if you look at it, on the outside, it has a slogan, "Safety comes first at GM." So my question for you, and I think the question that these families back here want to know is, what's changed at GM? Isn't it true that throughout its corporate history, GM has represented to the driving public that safety has always been their number one priority? BARRA: I can't speak to the statements that were made in the past. All I can tell you is the way we're working now, the training that we've done. We've changed our core values. The decision making we're leading, we're leading by example. We're -- you know, one of the process changes that we've also made is in addition to when the technical community makes their decision about a safety recall or a recall, we are going to be reviewing it, Mark Royce (ph), the head of global product development and myself, to see if there's more that we want to do. We... BRALEY: Hasn't the core values of General Motors always been that safety comes first? BARRA: I've never seen that part before. BRALEY: Isn't it true that throughout the history of the company, it's made representations like this to the driving public as a way of inducing them to buy your vehicles? BARRA: Today's General Motors, we -- all I can tell you is today's General Motors, we are focused on safety. We have over 18 vehicles that have a five-star crash rating. Our entire Buick lineup meets that requirement. We take it very seriously. BRALEY: But we're talking about these vehicles and what's changed. Have you had a chance to read this article in the Saturday New York Times, "A Florida engineer's eureka moment with a deadly GM flaw"? BARRA: I believe I read part of that article. BRALEY: OK, this is an article by a writer named Bill Vlasek (ph). And he wrote in here about an engineer named Mark Hood (ph), who was at a loss to explain why the engine in Brook Melton's (ph) Cobalt had suddenly shut off, causing her fatal accident in 2010 in Georgia. Then he bought a replacement for $30 from a local GM dealership, and the mystery quickly unraveled. For the first time, someone outside GM, even by the company's own account, had figured out a problem that it had known about for a decade and is now linked to 12 deaths. Even though the new switch had the same identification number, Mr. Hood found big differences." And then the article continues, "So began the discovery that would set in motion GM's worldwide recall of 2.6 million Cobalts and other cars and one of the gravest safety crises in the company's history." Do you agree with the author that this is a grave safety crisis in the history of General Motors? BARRA: I've said that this incident took way too long. It is not acceptable. And that's why we're making radical change to the entire process, adding more resources, naming vice president of global vehicle safety, who is tremendously experienced and of the highest integrity. And we will continue to make processes -- and process changes and people changes as we get the results of Mr. Valukas's investigation, and we will take all of those recommendations and we will make changes. BRALEY: Before I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent to have this article added to the record for the hearing if it's not already part of the record. MURPHY: Without objection, so ordered. BLACKBURN: If the gentleman would yield his remaining second. Ms. Barra said they changed their core values. I think it would be great if she could submit what those new core values for G.M. are so we would have those for the record. MURPHY: We'll ask that for the record. BRALEY: And I would also like to have any prior statement of core values from General Motors over the last 20 years so we can see what has changed, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: We'll ask members for several to submit for the record. Now I we recognize the vice chair of the subcommittee, Dr. Burgess, for five minutes. BURGESS: I thank the chairman, and thank the witness for spending so much time with us this afternoon. You mentioned, Ms. Barra, in the start of your written testimony that over a decade ago General Motors embarked upon a small car program. Do you recall why that was? BARRA: I'm sorry? BURGESS: Why did GM embark upon a small car program 10 years ago, over a decade ago? BARRA: To have a complete portfolio, I believe. BURGESS: The -- but the mission or the type of car that was manufactured by G.M. previously had not fit that model, so this was an entirely new business line that G.M. was undertaking? BARRA: The Cobalt and they're several products, but if you're speaking specifically about the Cobalt, it was following a previous small car, but it was an all new program architecture, et cetera. BURGESS: Was any part of this done in -- because of the CAFE standards that were changing? Was any of this done because of congressional action that had occurred previously? BARRA: I can't answer that question. I wasn't in decision- making at that point. BURGESS: Let me ask you this, when Mr. Waxman was giving his opening statement, he said it was a shame that National Highway Traffic Safety Administration did not have access to the same information that General Motors had. Do you think that was a fair statement for him to have made? BARRA: As part of the investigation we're doing, I'm looking at what information was provided and when. BARRA: And that's -- you know, becomes then the troubling part of al of this. I think ranking member Degette had you at tab 8 in the information binder, and this was talking about the ignition key, cylinder assembly and the date of the PDF that I have is January 1st of 2005. Again, you'll find that under Tab 8 but later on in the same document, it says we are closing this with no action. The main reasons are all possible solutions were presented, lead time for solutions is too long. The tooling cost and piece price were too high, and none of the solutions seems to fully countermeasure the possibility of the key being turned off. So that was all in January of 2005, and then you know, as part of our document evaluation for getting ready for this hearing, there were several accident reports that were supplied to us and one of those occurred not too far away in Maryland, in the middle of the summer of 2005. And in that accident sequence, a Cobalt hit a series of trees at the end of a cul-de-sac, and the driver was fatally injured during that. She wasn't wearing a seat belt. Wasn't a terribly large individual; she weighed about 100 pounds. Because the airbag did not deploy though, it would be my -- you just have too wonder, had the airbag deployed. would her small frame have been protected. I mean, she broke the rim off of the steering wheel because of the impact of the collision, her body with the steering wheel and steering column. Of course the steering wheel being somewhat indented toward the lower part of the driver's body, hit her under the rib cage, apparently resulting in a liver laceration, which resulted in the (inaudible) in the time sequence to get her out of the crash and get her to the hospital. You can't help but wonder, because the other injuries that were reported with that crash, are really fairly mild. You've got to believe the airbag would've made a difference there. I just can't help but think that the people evaluating this must have asked themselves why no air bag went off with this type of crash? She was going 70 miles per hour and hit an oak tree. Wouldn't that be a logical place for an air bag to deploy? BARRA: Firstly, it's a very tragic situation. Some of the fatalities in this vehicles, again, we see as a tragedy and we have apologized. As I read the document that you asked me, I find that unacceptable that any engineer would stop at that point if there was an issue that they felt was a safety defect, and that's why we're doing the investigation, again, to put a complete timeline together, and I commit to you we will take action and we've made process changes. We will fix the process. Our goal is to have a world-class safety process. BARRA: And I respect you for being here and answering that way. One of the other accidents that it's reported in our binder under tab 20 was a head-on collision that occurred I believe in Pennsylvania, where the Cobalt was not at fault, another car went over the center line and there was a hit on impact. Again, the Cobalt airbags did not deploy. The driver of the other vehicle, the airbag did deploy. I mean, it seems to me this should be a red flag to the people who investigate air bag nondeployments as an occurrence or as an issue. In fairness, let me just state that all of the front see occupants in both vehicles were deceased as a result of that accident. So the deployment of the airbag in that situation did not protect -- preserve the life of the driver. But still, you would have to ask the question, you've got a Cobalt and Hyundai meeting head on. Why did Cobalt's airbags not deploy? It was the exact same force for both vehicles, and there was no intercedent jarring of the vehicle. They didn't run off the curb. They didn't run over another tree first. So the air bag did not deploy, and why would that have been the case in that particular accident? BARRA: And it's a tragic situation, any time there's a loss of life in a traffic situation. Again, I -- this is not a report -- or an investigation that was done by G.M. I can't answer your questions, because it's usually very complex as they look at that. So I can't comment on this particular study. BURGESS: If that is part of your internal investigation, though, I would like for you to make that information available to the committee staff and to the committee. BARRA: We'll make whatever information we have available. BURGESS: Thank you, and thanks for being here. BARRA: The gentleman's time expired. Now I'll recognize Mr. Schakowsy for five minutes. SCHAKOWSKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Braley talked about the pictures in the back, and I think that's what must makes it more -- even more painful is that these deaths were needless. So I want to ask you for something a little bit more than an apology. One of the many questions raised about G.M. today -- is how you will handle accidents that happened prior to the company's bankruptcy. G.M. filed for bankruptcy in June, 2009, emerging as new G.M. about six weeks later. So that Means that new G.M., the company as it exists today, I've been told, may not be liable for accidents that occurred prior to July 2009. Is that your understanding, Ms. Barra? BARRA: We at General Motors want to do the right thing for our customers. And that's why we feel this is an extraordinary situation. As I have said, it took too long to get to the answers and the understandings about this part. That's why we've hired Mr. Feinberg. We feel Mr. Feinberg has had extensive experience, and he will bring his experience and objectivity to assess what are the appropriate next steps. Because we do understand that we have civic responsibilities, as well as legal responsibilities. SCHAKOWSKY: Are you saying that the hiring of Mr. Feinberg indicates that G.M. will give some kind of settlement with those individuals whose families -- whose loved ones lost their lives? BARRA: We are -- we have just begun to work with Mr. Feinberg. In fact our first meeting will be on Friday. It will take probably 30 to 60 days to evaluate the situation. So I have -- we have not made any decisions. We have just started this process with Mr. Feinberg. SCHAKOWSKY: And that might include people who have been injured as well? BARRA: Again, I -- we have not made any decisions. SCHAKOWSKY: Let me ask you this. Yes, during G.M.'s restructuring, did the company disclose what it knew about the ignition-switch defect. By 2009 there is now doubt that officials in G.M. were aware of this problem. BARRA: I was not aware of this issue. I can't speak to what was disclosed but -- again, our investigation will cover if there was any information. But to my knowledge, there was -- it was not known at the senior leadership of the company. So does G.M. accept responsibility for the accidents caused by the company's defective vehicles? We -- I, first of all, I, again, want to reiterate we think the situation is tragic, and we apologize for what has happened, and we are doing a full investigation to understand... SCHAKOWSKY: I'm talking about responsibility and even liability. BARRA: Responsibility and -- I'm sorry, I don't understand. SCHAKOWSKY: And even liability. Do you would take responsibility -- is the company responsible? The new G.M., is it responsible? BARRA: We will make the best decisions for our customers, recognizing that we have legal obligations and responsibilities as well as moral obligations. We are committed to our customers and we are going to work very hard to do the right thing for our customers. SCHAKOWSKY: I hope that you do do the right thing. Let me ask you about some of the people who potentially knew about this. Where's my -- (OFF MIKE) SCHAKOWSKY: Hold on one second. OK. So you've reported a new -- for the first time, a president of global vehicle safety, I have to tell you, I'm underwhelmed by that, thinking that it's such an obvious thing to have someone high up that would in fact be able to connect the departments so everybody knew. I guess it's a good thing, however, that it's finally done. So we know that Ray DiGiorgio (ph) was the G.M. engineer who approved the ignition switch redesign in 2006. Is he still an employee of your company? BARRA: I believe he is. SCHAKOWSKY: Do you know who signed off on the initial faulty ignition switch that did not meet your specifications? BARRA: I don't. But that's what I will learn with the investigation. And after we have a complete investigation from a very complex process, we will take action. We will change process and we will deal with any people issues. I think we demonstrated in the issues we learned in India with the Travera (ph) about a year ago, we will take serious steps and hold people accountable. SCHAKOWSKY: So no one right now has lost their job as a result of this knowledge about this defective part? BARRA: We're just a few weeks into the investigation by Mr. Valucas (ph). We've already made process changes. And as I return to the office after this, we will begin to look at the implications now that we have further data coming from the investigation and take the appropriate steps. SCHAKOWSKY: Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: Gentlewoman yields back. Now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey, for five minutes. GINGREY: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. This hearing is much appreciated. Pretty poignant to me since Brooke Melton (ph) lived in my congressional district at the time. And had it not been for an outstanding plaintiff's attorney in the Cobb (ph) Judicial District of Georgia and bringing this case -- I'm sure it was against the local dealership -- resulted in a settlement but it brought to light what's going on now. And the purpose -- and hopefully some good can come from this hearing. And I want to thank Chairman Murphy for holding it and investigating the root causes of the General Motors recall of over 2.6 million vehicles linked to these ignition defects. Unfortunately, Ms. Barra, I heard just yesterday that the recall now includes 6.3 million vehicles. And I do want to speak a little about this young lady named Brooke Melton (ph), a nurse in Paulding (ph) County, Georgia, which, at the time was in the district I represent and she was, as you know, tragically killed March the 10th, 2010 on her 29th birthday in a horrific side impact accident on Highway 92 and the ignition switch in the accessory position. Just the day before, just the day before her death, she took her 2005 Chevy Cobalt into the dealership for service. And the service report stated, "Customer states engine shut off while driving. Please check," end of quote. Despite the fact that a service bulletin was issued from General Motors for faulty ignition switches back in 2005 for that make and that model, the on-site mechanics cleaned the fuel line, cleaned the fuel injection, told her to come pick up her car, which she did. Brooke Melton's (ph) tragic death is not acknowledged as part of this recall because it involved a side impact instead of a front impact. Ms. Melton's parents, Ken and Beth, are not here today, I don't think, but they deserve answers. Ms. Barra, is Brooke Melton included in General Motors death count, yes or no? BARRA: To my knowledge, no. GINGREY: No? BARRA: It was a side impact and we -- (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Right. Why did General Motors not include the non-deployment of air bags from side impact accidents resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall? BARRA: As you look at a frontal collision and the way the air bag is to operate, I believe the assessment, that was -- the assessment was made that would be potentially be related to the switch. GINGREY: Yes, but Ms. Barra, if you connect the dots, I mean, the ignition gets knocked over to the accessory position; there was a problem, you're using faulty, even by your own standards, equipment. And so maybe what happened was that all of a sudden the car stalls; she's driving perfectly, trying to control, without any power steering, without any power brakes, may very well have -- and I don't know the details of that accident -- but may very well have run through a four-way or a red light and was slammed into from the side. And whether it was a head-on collision or a side collision, it was for the same reason and she is dead and that was almost four years ago. I don't understand why General Motors does not include the non- deployment of air bags from side impact accidents resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall. Can you explain that to us? BARRA: Well, first of all, all of the accidents and fatalities are very tragic, as you've -- as you've indicated, and we're deeply sorry for those. We've been very clear of the number that we put forward. There's been a lot of analysis that's gone on to look at potential incidents and -- GINGREY: Well, did General Motors investigate or do you plan to investigate whether this condition relates to the non-deployment of air bags in side-impact crashes? BARRA: We have individuals that are looking at the available information from accidents -- GINGREY: You told us about your recent hire and I hope -- well, lastly, Ms. Barra, to what extent did G.M. regularly inform dealerships, like the dealership obviously in Cobb County, of its 2005 technical service bulletin on faulty ignition switches so that these service technicians, these young guys, you know, maybe working there six months to a year, that they could properly address a customer complaint like Brooke had the day before her death? BARRA: I'm sorry; was your question how do we communicate service bulletins? I just didn't hear. GINGREY: How do you make sure that these dealerships all across the country and their service departments are making sure that their technicians are getting and receiving the instruction? BARRA: We can provide details and exactly how we communicate service bulletins and how that's rolled out to each of our dealerships across the country. GINGREY: I hope you will. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Barra. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. MURPHY: Mr. Barra, related to his questions, with all these cars in recall and waiting for parts, what are drivers supposed to do in the meantime when their car is sitting in their driveway? BARRA: We have communicated and we've done extensive testing that if you take the -- if you have just the ignition key with the ring or just the ignition key, the vehicle is safe to drive. If people are not comfortable with that, we are making loaners or rentals available. They can go to their dealer. We have over 13,000 customers that have these vehicles in rentals or loaners right now. MURPHY: And you're assuring people that it is safe to drive if they just take the other rings off the key? BARRA: There's been extensive testing done by the engineering team and with just the key and the ring or just the key, we believe it is safe, based on our testing. MURPHY: Recognize -- (CROSSTALK) (UNKNOWN) Yes, Mr. Chairman, is that true of the -- of the earlier ignition as well as the 2006 -- what, all of them, all these cars, that's true? BARRA: That is our -- yes. (UNKNOWN) Thank you. MURPHY: Mr. Tonko, you're recognized for five minutes. TONKO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, thank you for appearing before the committee and I have to believe for the members of -- family members and friends of the victims of this tragic outcome, it must be a very painful process to sit here and listen to the exchange. Just a comment at first, we're hearing a lot about information that will come post the investigation or the review. However, I hold in my hands a February report and a March report to NHTSA on behalf of G.M. under your watch, that provides detailed timelines with a whole bit of knowledge exchanged. And I'm confused somewhat about that fair amount of knowledge that has been formally exchanged to NHTSA and at the same time we're hearing, well, we don't know until the investigation is complete. So there's a conflict that I think is brought to bear here in terms of -- in exchange that has been detailed in the last few weeks, under the watch of the new General Motors today's G.M.. And at the same time, when I was listening to -- our representative from Illinois asked about the corporate chart and the changes, no changes have been made. We're waiting for that pending the investigation. But at the same time, we characterized or labeled it as today's General Motors. So while we're all products of the environment that produces us, the cultural impact of G.M. seems to still be in play with a number of people who have perhaps shifted positions, but all part of that organization. So comfort me by telling me that there's a new thinking. There's a new culture that has beset at G.M. while all of the players are there in the corporate chart? Tell me how the company is restructured and reorganized so as to bring comfort to the consumer? BARRA: First, there are many new people in the company as well as people who have experience across the company. There is a new structure, for instance, in global product development. We've streamlined -- eliminated bureaucracy. We took out an entire layer of management in the product development. We've completely redone the quality processes over the last -- it started in the 2011, 2012 time frame. We changed our test procedure. We've added additional validation, so there's been a complete remake of the way we drive quality. We test to failure instead of testing to a standard. That's just one example. And we've looked across the entire organization. We've rebuilt our supplier quality organization, adding over 100 resources just in this country alone. So there's systemically gone across the company and we're making changes. Even in the chronologies, which I think you held up, those are the most detailed chronologies that we have ever provided, sharing again in a summary fashion with the information we have now, but then we are conducting an investigation with Mr. Valucas (ph). We've also rolled out new values with the customer as our compass, relationships matter and individual excellence. We've trained thousands of people. And -- but most importantly, it's leadership at the top. It's the leadership of how we behave and how we demonstrate when we make decisions, and that we make decisions that focus on the customer, focus on safety, focus on quality. And I can tell you in -- from my leadership team and the next layer, we continue to drive that every day. We recognize culture change doesn't happen in a year or two. But we're well on that journey, and we will -- are dedicated to it, and we very clearly want to have the safest vehicles on the road. TONKO: And will you make that list public from the report that you're anticipating? BARRA: I'm sorry. TONKO: Will you make the list that will be coming forth public? Will share that... BARRA: The list of -- I'm sorry. TONKO: The full report coming from Mr. Valucas (ph). BARRA: Mr. Valucas will make the findings and why give the appropriate findings available to this body, to our customers and to our employees. TONKO: The appropriate findings? What about full report? BARRA: I'm not confident -- I don't know if he'll give a report or if he'll share findings. TONKO: If he does, will you share the report? BARRA: We'll share the appropriate information. TONKO: Not the full report? BARRA: Again, I don't know if there will be a full report, but we will share... TONKO: If there will be a full report, will you share? BARRA: I commit that we will be very transparent and we will share what's appropriate. TONKO: So in other words, there's no commitment to share the full report? BARRA: I'm saying I will share what is appropriate. TONKO: I hear the answer. Mr. Chair, I yield back. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. Recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise for five minutes. SCALISE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you having this hearing. Ms. Barra, thank you for being here and let me first say, my prayers are with the families who lost their lives and others who have been impacted by this. I want to thank you all for being here in this room as well. Obviously the questions we have are even more pertinent to the families that are here, and that's why it's important we ask the questions and get answers and -- if work to ensure we can prevent something like this from happening again. We've got to get into the real details of what went on during this period of years -- unfortunately -- years where it seemed somewhere inside of General Motors there was knowledge that this was a problem before it got to the level of recall. And want to first take you, Ms. Barra, to the tab you got there, number 38. Tab 38 is the sign off. This is called the General Motors commodity validation sign-off. This is the actual sheet that the engineer signed off on that approved the design change in the faulty ignition switch. Have you seen that document before? BARRA: This is the first time I've seen this document that's labeled delphi (ph). SCALISE: Now, what we're talking about here, how long have you been aware of the problem with these faulty ignition switches? BARRA: I was aware there was a faulty ignition switch on January 31st. SCALISE: Of this year? BARRA: Of this year. SCALISE: As you're going through I'm sure some of the questions you have or asked and maybe some of the ones we're having, first question you would want to ask, what did we know about it, when did we know, did we know well in advance -- I mean, why didn't you prevent it from happening? The first thing we are all talking about is when was this found out within G.M. to the point they actually made a change. I mean y'all made a design change. The letter I've got here -- this -- this form is dated April 25th of 2006. So 2006 is when your engineers -- and there's a name on the sheet, there's an actual engineer who you said under oath earlier is still employed with G.M. -- there's an engineer that actually signed this document requesting -- not requesting, approving a change in this ignition switch. In fact, with a part number, the part number is on here. Has anyone -- in your knowledge -- has anyone at G.M. taken this -- he's an employee of yours, you can pull him aside right now and asked him, when you signed off in 2006, number one, why didn't you change the part number. And number two, why did you approve a change in the ignition switch and not bring it to the level of recall? In 2006 clearly people lost their lives after -- after this was signed off on. So do you know right now -- you're under oath -- do you know of anyone that has asked the person that signed this -- that signed off on this, have any of y'all asked him those basic questions? BARRA: I know this is part of the Anton Valucas (ph) investigation and I want to know the answers... SCALISE: Do you know of anyone who has asked him that question? I mean, he's an employee of yours right now -- you can pull him aside right when you leave here today and ask those questions. BARRA: I think it's very important as we do an independent investigation that we let Mr. Valucas (ph) do a thorough investigation, talk to people, that there's not a lot of side investigations going on. He's the one standard that we're going to use in this investigation. He brings objectivity to it. SCALISE: Clearly -- you know, I mean you talk about a new culture. Has anyone been held accountable, as of now, for what's happened? BARRA: Again, we're just -- we learned of this on January 31st... SCALISE: Again, you have a design change in 2006 related to what we're talking about. This is not a 2014 issue. The recall was issued in 2014, but the product -- the product faulty ignition switch we're talking about was redesigned in 2006 by one of your engineers who's still an employee at General Motors. If you can't give me that information, and if you do find that information out, would you get that to the committee? BARRA: It will be part of the investigation... SCALISE: OK, the other question I want to ask you, later on we're going to have the acting administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration -- some of the things he says in his testimony before you leave, I would like to get responses, he says, "Number one, we're pursuing an investigation whether G.M. met its timeliness responsibility to report and address this defect under federal law." Are you aware of whether or not G.M. has met its obligations of timeliness? BARRA: That will be part of the investigation that we're doing... SCALISE: So you're not aware at this time. I mean, if you're aware of something, that would be a violation of federal law if you're aware of that already, can you share that with us? BARRA: I'm aware of the findings that I've already shared from Mr. Valucas (ph) today. SCALISE: OK, and another question he asks in the brief time I have left, he says, "G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect." That's the gentleman that's testifying right after you. You don't have the opportunity to come behind him and respond. He's going to be saying this. He's writing this in his testimony. What would you say in response to his statement that G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify... BARRA: As I've already said, we've already learned through Mr. Valucas' (ph) investigation there were points in time where one part of the investigation had information that wasn't shared across to the other side of the organization -- you can call lit a silo -- at this point they didn't understand that the information would be valuable to another party. So I've already shared we have found that to be true and we've already made changes to the structure and to the responsibilities of people so that won't happen again. SCALISE: All right, we appreciate getting the full range of answers to all of these questions, and with that I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chair. MURPHY: I know recognize Mr. Green for five minutes of Texas. GREEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ms. Barr, first of all, congratulations on being the CEO of General Motors. Like a lot of my constituents, I've been a customer of G.M. In fact I can't list the number of vehicles I've owned. Although my wife drives a Tahoe, I lease a Malibu. I have a Blazer, and, you know so -- and we keep them for a long time. So I've appreciate (sic) G.M. products. And you've heard the questioning today from -- and it seems like on a bipartisan basis we're trying to find out what's happening. Although, Mr. Chairman, I know you heard it, I was surprised, because Dr. Gingrey is a good friend of mine, and a physician. And to say he thanked the plaintiff's lawyer for something, you've at least you have gotten Republicans and Democrats on the same side on something. So Phil's not here now, but there is a reason we have a civil bar. You have gone down the litany with the other questions of the problems that were happening. In 2002, the switch was acknowledged it was (inaudible) so 2005 the dealers were notified of a problem, but was because of heavier key rings. And I thought about my wife's key ring that she uses. It's like has everything in the world on that key ring so I couldn't imagine that would be an issue. But I guess, getting down to the concern I have, in 2007 you modified the switch ignition for future models, but though the switch condition still fell below the initial torch (ph) standards by G.M. Let me give you an example of what this has caused. I have a constituent, who I talked to yesterday before I left Houston, and -- whose mother, Lois, owns a 2003 Regal which is 10 years old. And she has owned G.M. products like I guess I have for many years. But, the Regal began stalling and turning off in February of '13, and even (sic) the car had less than 50,000 miles. Since she's owned the car it's gone to the G.M. dealer six times. The battery's been replaced. And each time the dealer did not fix the problem. She ended up finding a quote -- Ms. Kenutsa (ph) who told it to me -- that she finally found a shade tree mechanic who actually fixed it. And I guess what bothers me, if you go back to the dealer this many times -- and I hold the dealer's, you know, repair shops to a higher level simply because they know the product -- that what has happened -- can you confidently say that these stalling issues are limited only to the Cobalt, the HHR, the Pontiac G5, the Solstice and Saturn Ion and the Sky models of vehicles, or is it other ones like the Regal, or maybe like the Malibu I drive? BARRA: Again, I'm not aware of any other stalling issues. If we have an issue, we put it into our recall process and make decisions. So if there is a defect that you are aware of, I would appreciate the information. I will definitely look into it. GREEN: Well, we'll get you that information, from what they had. I have a couple of minutes left, but I represent an industrial area. We have refineries and chemical plants. What we do is inherently dangerous. And so you have to take extra concern about it. And it looks like, in the last 10 years, G.M. has not -- somewhere along that line -- the culture of the company is not there to deal with that. And, as the new CEO, I would hope that you make sure it happens. I have said this many times when I have a chemical plant or refinery that has an accident, and somebody dies, and we've been able to pinpoint -- sometimes with civil justice, but sometimes through chemical safety board -- on what the decision was made that they didn't do that caused people to die. That is what happened here. And General Motors is a much greater company than to do that. And I would hope the culture of your corporation would be better so that it would continue to earn the respect that both this lady and I have. But that's your job now as CEO, but you need to fix it. And fix it as quickly as you can because it's gonna cause problems, obviously. BARRA: I agree with you. It is completely my responsibility . And I will work day and night. We've already made tremendous change at General Motors. We'll continue to do that, and I recognize that it is my responsibility. GREEN: The last thing in my 30 seconds is, should that -- my constituent -- should she have her mother in Phoenix take that Regal back and have it checked by a dealer now to see what happened? BARRA: Yes, I wish you would send a note to me. And I will... GREEN: I'll get you that information. Thank you Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: I now recognize Mr. Griffith for five minutes. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Barra, you have indicated that the -- not having a new part number when the part was changed in 2006 is not acceptable. Is that correct? Yes. BARRA: Yes, that's correct. GRIFFITH: And I guess it is hard to figure that somebody would have just done that by accident. And that there had to be a reason, because that was a breach of protocol wasn't it? BARRA: I don't think there was an acceptable reason to do that. GRIFFITH: OK. And while there may not be an acceptable reason, you would have to acknowledge that a reason in somebody's mind, while not acceptable, might be that it is harder to track the problem with the old part when you have an improved new part that is put in it's place, isn't that correct? Yes, or no? BARRA: Yes. GRIFFITH: And while you have indicated that you did not know the individual name of the person that made that decision, do you know whose job title it was or in whose chain of command it was to make the decision not to create a new part number for that part? BARRA: I don't -- it would be within the engineering organization and I will learn that and we will take appropriate action. GRIFFITH: And would that engineering department have been under your chain of command at some point in your tenure with G.M.? BARRA: Since February of 2011. GRIFFITH: But it never get to you? Nobody ever brought this to your attention. BARRA: No, it did not. GRIFFITH: I appreciate that. I have this question and I think that the answer probably is that your investigation will reveal this it is concerning that the trial lawyer that uncovered this may be very savvy, and his expert might be pretty sharp, you all have sharp people working at G.M. as well do you not? BARRA: I believe we do. GRIFFITH: And it is one of those questions that I'm sure your investigation will uncover, but why didn't your team of engineers connect the dots and figure out that when the ignition slips into the auxiliary position the air bags won't function properly? GRIFFITH: Congressman, those are the questions I want to answer, and as I've said, it has taken way too long, and we will learn from this, and we will make make changes and we will hold people accountable. GRIFFITH: And not only hold people accountable -- you were asked earlier -- and I know you are in a tough spot on that as to what kind of liability G.M. will end up excepting because there's legal liability and moral liability and you've said that. One of the questions that I would have is it would have been a whole lot easier just to list these liabilities in the bankruptcy wouldn't it? It would have been easier to do it in the bankruptcy instead of having to come out now, wouldn't it? BARRA: The best thing in the world would be as soon as we find a problem we fix it, and it doesn't exist in the marketplace and doesn't effect our customers and doesn't create tragedies. GRIFFITH: And here's here's one of the things that concerns me. Have you been given estimates yet by Mr. Feinberg or others as to best case or worst case scenario is on your civil liabilities? BARRA: We have been in initial conversations with Mr. Feinberg. I believe we will work through him to evaluate the situation over the next 30 to 60 days. GRIFFITH: Has anybody else given you a best case or worst case scenario over liability issues related tot his problem? BARRA: There have been a lot of estimates done in the public, but none given specifically to me. GRIFFITH: OK, would those liability issues have negatively impacted the prospects of either a bail out by the federal government, or prior to the bail out, the people who were lending you money to keep G.M. afloat with it's heavy liabilities already existing, would not the additional liabilities that would have come forward by this problem have had the potential to dissuade private investors or the federal government from giving cash to G.M. BARRA: As I look at it, as soon as we identity an issue and fix it, then there aren't liabilities or the liabilities are contained. And that's what we -- as look at problems as go forward, we want to fix them as soon as we can. If there's a safety issue, we are going to make the change, make the right investment and accept that. GRIFFITH: But, in the -- in the real world of business, if there's a new set of liabilities that come onto the page that weren't there before, it's harder to get money from both public and private sources, isn't that true? BARRA: I think ti depends -- it depends on the situation. So it's a general question. I don't feel appropriate commenting. GRIFFITH: All right. I appreciate that. Let me ask this last question. When this issue first came up the corresponding problem resolution tracking system report document identified the issue as "Severity Three." What does that mean? BARRA: I'm sorry... GRIFFITH: I said, "Severity Three." I'm referencing back to some of the documents that your folks have given us. In the initial assessment in 2004, 2005 when your problem resolution tracking system report came out it related this problem as being "Severity Three." What does that mean? BARRA: I don't have a specific definition for that... GRIFFITH: Can you get one for us? BARRA: I can. GRIFFITH: I appreciate that. And I yield back. MURPHY: Can I ask a clarifying question for what Mr. Griffith was saying, did G.M. purposely and willfully negotiate during a bankruptcy issues, or in the process of obtaining the loans -- did they purposely with hold the information that they may have known about pending lawsuits or things that would be emerging in the future about the Cobalt or other cars? BARRA: I am not aware -- I personally did not with hold information. I am not aware, but I can not speak to every single person. MURPHY: Thank you. Mr. Welsh, you're recognized for five minutes. WELSH: Thank you. I have to congratulate General Motors for doing the impossible. You've got Republicans and Democrats working together, and I thank my colleagues for their focus on this hearing. A couple of things. How many cars have been recalled as of this date? BARRA: Related to the ignition switch? WELSH: Right. BARRA: Over 2.5 million. WELSH: Now, this ignition switch issue was first -- it came to light in 2006 is that correct? BARRA: Through our investigation we'll know when it came to light. It came to light to me on January 31st (sic), 2014. WELSH: Well that -- I mean, that is totally irrelevant to the people who lost their lives. BARRA: I understand... WELSH: I mean, you are the current CEO, but that is not relevant to the question I just asked. BARRA: I'm sorry, I thought you asked when I became aware of that. WELSH: No, no G.M. BARRA: Again, that is what we will learn in our investigation. WELSH: Well, you changed the switch after 2006. You began in 2007 changing the switch right? BARRA: Yeah, there were changes made. WELSH: So would it be a logical inference that somebody thought there was a reason change the switch that had been in use in to 2006 to 2007? BARRA: As we do our internal investigation, I hope to get those answers. WELSH: Well, wouldn't that be a starting point? Somebody for some reason decided to change a very critical part in the car between 2006 and 2007, correct? BARRA: Correct. WELSH: So let me ask you this. If you had recalled cars and acted on this aggressively in 2006 when you were making the decision that you had to change -- you G.M., not you -- G.M. changed the switch, how many cars would you have had to recall had you acted in 2007 when you made the decision to change the switch? BARRA: I can get you the exact number, but it would have been significantly less. I don't... WELSH: Give me an estimate. You can talk to your back row there if you want. BARRA: I would again -- I will confirm the answer, but I would assume it is something around more 1.2 million. WELSH: Just from -- you would have cut it at least in half and maybe more. BARRA: Because, again, we are starting with vehicles that the Saturn Ion was in production in '03. WELSH: All right, let me just get a business-type question here. What do you estimate would have been the cost to G.M. of this recall had they done it in 2007? BARRA: When we looked at the population from '03 to '07 -- actually if I look at all the vehicles that had this it would have been a higher number. I believe it was 1.8 million, and that would have probably -- the estimated cost for those two pieces is something less than $100 million. WELSH: OK, and what do you estimate would be the cost of the recall now that it is being done 8 years later? BARRA: Well, there is a larger population. We can provide the information... WELSH: I want an estimate. I want people to be able to hear this. I mean, the decision delayed is money and lives at risk. I'm trying to get an opinion from you and it is ball park so it can be adjusted as to what the cost would have been had you acted 8 years ago versus acting now, you G.M. BARRA: Well, if we we would have acted at that point, we would have had a smaller population as we talked about. WELSH: Look, I know that. That's obvious. I'm asking about the cost. BARRA: I'm sorry. I'm not trying to be difficult. I don't understand your question. WELSH: You know, what if I were on the board of directors, and I had an obligation to shareholders, and I had a company that could have acted 8 years ago to deal with a problem, but by not acting let that problem increase in magnitude, do more damage to shareholders, do more damage to the bottom line, do enormous damage to the reputation of this company and cause -- we don't know how much -- harm to citizens, I would want an answer to the question. BARRA: I agree and it would have been substantially less at that time frame had we done it than what it would be now. WELSH: G.M. was involved in litigation concerning allegations that this switch was defective and caused problems, correct? BARRA: Yes. WELSH: And G.M. settled some of these litigation matters, correct? BARRA: Correct. WELSH: After a very aggressive defense. Those settlements were secret? BARRA: They are confidential by both parties. WELSH: By both parties -- I'm not -- you know, some of us have been in court. By parties usually means by the request of the party that's paying the damages. BARRA: I wasn't involved in those settlements. I only know it's confidential and it was by both parties. WELSH: OK, no this is not good. You are the company right now. All right? Let me ask this question, do you believe that when a company that has been sued about a matter involving product safety, where a person has been seriously injured or has died, that the company that settles -- as a matter of policy -- should be entitled to keep secret what that settlement was about? BARRA: I'm not -- I think that there are issues associated with that that every settlement is unique, and it's a decision that is agreed to by both parties. I don't have any comment on that... WELSH: Let me ask you another question. If a company -- G.M. or any other company -- settles litigation, and pays a substantial amount of money pertaining to an allegation about serious bodily injury or death, should that company be permitted to keep secret that settlement from the governmental agency whose responsibility it is to protect the public safety? BARRA: If that is information required by that government agency, then we would provide it. If the two parties involved in the settlement agree to it, that is their agreement. WELSH: So if you don't have to do it, you won't have to do it? BARRA: If both parties want that -- I'm making the assumption that both parties agreed to it which is what I've been told. WELSH: OK, I yield back. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. Now recognize the Gentleman from Missouri for five minutes. Mr. Long. LONG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here, Ms. Barra. And I want to thank the families that are here today for keeping safety in the forefront of America's and Congress's consciousness when it comes to automobile safety. And we have heard about this same subcommittee in the past dealing with the issues before I came to Congress. The Ford Explorer Firestone Tire situation. We have heard about the Toyota accelerating car issue, and like I said, I wasn't here, but I can imagine that the questions were similar: Who knew what when, did you know this person, have you done anything about it? I want to take a different tact with my line of questioning as I normally do. And that is that, people ask me all the time, do you think you make a difference? When you go to Congress, you are up here a few years do you think you are making a difference? And that is hard to quantify, to tell somebody whether you're making a difference or not. But today, this is a day that I want to look back on and say, you know, I think I made a difference. I think that it -- we got some answers to questions in the future to prevent -- I don't want to be here again, and I don't want to have them say, Ford Explorer, Firestone Tire, Toyota accelerating and do you remember the G.M. faulty ignition switch? So that's what I would like to say, yeah, we made a difference. And with that, like I said, I thank the families for being here and keeping it in the forefront of safety so there is (sic) not other people sitting in the same seats next time we approach an issue like this, because hopefully there won't be a next time. And the finger pointing, the old analogy, when you are pointing a finger, you have three pointing at yourself. There's gonna be a lot of finger pointing in this, but what I really would like to drill down on and get answers to is, how the NHTSA, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and you all, as an automobile manufacturer, if you can work, to see that this doesn't happen again so that the two organizations can work together and drill down on these problems when we first learn them whatever the next problem may be that would be my goal for here today. And in answer to one of Chairman Upton's -- the chairman of the full committee's -- questions a while ago and I don't know what he was asking about exactly, but you said, "I was not part of that organization at the time." I'm sure that was something within General Motors, because you like I have a history that goes back, I think, to when you were 18 years old with General Motors. So you were there at the time as far as the overall organization, but not whatever part he has; your father, I believe, worked 39 years for Pontiac. So you indeed go way back. I go back to 18 years old with General Motors, too. I -- when I was 18, my folks bought me a 1973 G.M. Jimmy. It's -- if you think of a big Suburban today, cut off two doors and that was a Jimmy or a Blazer; Chevrolet called theirs the Blazer. I've been in the real estate and auction business for years, from '73 to about '05, I drove nothing but General Motors Suburbans. I remember times when the key would be in there and you would go to put your key in and it wouldn't work. Why wouldn't it work? Because I had a big keychain, a big keyring. And it would vibrate and it would tear the teeth off the keys to where the key no longer functioned, but never once did I have that shut off. And never once did I have that fail to act or shut off in the middle of driving. So to me, from '73 to '05, with my experience, they made pretty good ignition switches. Can you tell me how many models G.M. makes today? BARRA: Oh, around the globe, I'm very -- over 100. LONG: A hundred different models? (CROSSTALK) LONG: Can you tell me how many ignition switches they make? BARRA: Well, we sell, you know, over 8 million -- LONG: No, I mean, how many per -- if you have 100 -- if you have 100 models, how many different ignition switches would there be? BARRA: I can't answer that question; I don't know. LONG: Well, to me, G.M. has proven in the past and other companies have that you can -- I just don't understand this reinventing the wheel, that every car has to have a different ignition switch with different set of circumstances made by somebody down in Mexico to make sure that it meets the qualifications. So I'd recommend two things, that you work hard with us, our next witness from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration says that a car -- when it shuts off that the airbag will still deploy for 60 seconds. I can't imagine being in a crash that a car shut off and you continue for more than 60 seconds. So that's question that I'm going to have for him. But I would ask that you reach out and work, not only with your engineers, saying, hey we have got some pretty good -- why do we reinvent the wheel every time we go to invent a new ignition switch for all these different models? And also hope that you will reach out and work with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. So... BARRA: I would welcome the opportunity to have our technical experts look at how we can improve the way the system works because airbag deployment is part of a system. And I would welcome the opportunity, if there are improvements that can be made, we would want to be in the forefront of making them. LONG: In communication with -- BARRA: -- and work closely with -- LONG: Thank you, ma'am. I appreciate it. And again, I thank the families. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. MURPHY: We now recognize Mr. Yarmuth for five minutes. YARMUTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, at the outset, want to express my condolences to the family of the victims of this tragedy. And I know it must be frustrating to you to listen to this testimony. And you're looking for answer and so are we. And so is G.M. right now. And I hope we do get answers, because I was frustrated by the same questions that my colleague had just mentioned. I have been driving a long time and this is a pretty well established technology, sticking a key into an ignition and turning it. Are you aware of any other ignition problems that have been -- that have been discovered or -- in G.M. or any other vehicle over the history of key ignition systems? BARRA: I have not reviewed every incident we've ever had. But I, you know, we do, as we find issues, we document them and take them through our process. In this particular case, it took way too long. YARMUTH: And there is a new technology -- I have been driving a car for 4.5 years, I confess it's a Ford product, not a G.M. product, that has a push-button ignition. I was in a G.M. car last week, a very nice one, by the way, which has a push-button ignition system. How do you make a judG.M.ent as to whether a car has a push- button ignition system and -- or a key ignition system and what are the differences, first of all, in terms of safety? We know that this wouldn't -- this particular situation wouldn't occur with a push- button ignition system. But how do you make that decision as to what goes into which car? BARRA: We evaluate and actually the push-button start is something that we are evaluating putting across the portfolio. As you look at the specifics of a push-button start versus the traditional ignition, I'd like our experts to provide that information because, again, the ignition switch and how it -- it is a component that operates as part of a system of the vehicle, especially as it relates from a safety perspective. And I think we would be better served to have our experts cover that. YARMUTH: But you are doing an analysis of whether a push-button ignition system is safer than a key ignition system? BARRA: I -- we can definitely do that. I think, you know, there has work done that both can be designed to be safe. But we are looking because of the customer -- you know, it is a function, it's a delighter (ph) usually when the vehicle has a push-button start. We have them on some of our vehicles. We continue to roll those out across our entire portfolio. And we are looking at doing it across the board. YARMUTH: Yes, I mean, I have no idea if there's a difference in safety; there may be none, but it would be worth doing that analysis. My -- one of my staff members has a 2005 Malibu that was recalled because of a power steering issue. And she called the dealership and the dealership said that they didn't know how to fix it. So my question to you is, are you confident that G.M. knows how to fix the vehicles it recalls for the variety of problems that have -- BARRA: Well, first of all, if we find a situation that is not safe and we don't know how to fix it, we're still going to recall the vehicles and we'll take those actions. In this case, there may be a communication lag because there is a fix, whether it's a check or a replacement of the product. So, that does exist for that specific vehicle. YARMUTH: So she is getting bad information from her dealership or they haven't been told yet? BARRA: I would assume. I can follow up if you would like. YARMUTH: Well, I'm not, I mean, I think the public would want to know that -- because you now have -- BARRA: Right. But there is -- YARMUTH: -- millions of vehicles out there under recall, and she was told to go ahead and drive the vehicle if she felt safe, and I'm not sure that every driver would know whether they should feel safe or not. I mean, that -- some people, if the power steering goes out, are strong people and maybe it has happened to them before and they know that it's going to take a little bit more effort to steer. Other people might not. So I mean, I don't even know how a -- the average consumer is supposed to know whether they feel safe or not after a vehicle has been recalled. Doesn't the company have some disclosure responsibility to say these things -- at least these things could happen? There could -- BARRA: Yes, we have done that. And that is a part of a letter that we send to the customer when they -- we notify them of this issue. And then we provide information to the dealers as well. YARMUTH: OK. One final question, we talk about and we're going to have the NHTSA representative here earlier, one of the things that you are not required to do is to provide warranty data proactively to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Do you think that's something that ought to be considered that -- (CROSSTALK) YARMUTH: -- might be helpful in this case? Maybe dots could have been connected sooner if all that data -- ? BARRA: I welcome the opportunity to look at what information that NHTSA would feel is of value to submit. YARMUTH: OK. Thank you. (CROSSTALK) YARMUTH: I yield back. MURPHY: Thank you, the gentleman yields back. I now recognize Mr. Harper for five minutes. HARPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the family members that are here, our hearts indeed go out to you and we will continue to get to the bottom of this. And Ms. Barra, I know this is not the most enjoyable experience to go through this. But we are in a situation that you know, we don't trust the company right now. And we have to get to the bottom of this. And so we want to continue to ask some questions. If I could get you to refer to tab 28 in your binder, and I want to direct your attention to that email that's found at tab 28. In September of 2005, a few months after General Motors decided that there was not an acceptable business case to implement changes to the ignition switch, an engineering group manager email, Lorie Queen (ph) and other G.M. personnel, including Raymond DiGiorgio (ph) about proposed changes for model year 2008 ignition switch. So this engineer obviously explains that a more robust ignition switch will not be implemented in that model year 2008 vehicles, because it appears the piece cost could not be offset with warranty savings. In his email, he references "piece cost," is that just the ignition switch?" BARRA: Generally when people refer to piece cost they refer to the part. HARPER: So he is just referring to that ignition switch; that's a yes? BARRA: Again, I didn't write this note but I'm just telling you generally when people use -- HARPER: OK. BARRA: -- piece cost, that is what it means. HARPER: As he notes in that email, an increase of 90 cents; is that correct? BARRA: I'm sorry? HARPER: It says does the e-mail say that there would be an increase of 90 cents? BARRA: Yes. Yes -- HARPER: And since the warranty offset was only 10 cents to 15 cents, G.M. didn't make the change. BARRA: Right. And that is not something that I find acceptable. If there is a safety defect, there is not a business case, there is -- this analysis is inappropriate. HARPER: And I appreciate that you don't find that acceptable, but that indeed is what happened here, correct? BARRA: And -- and that is -- that exactly, and that's one piece of data as we go through the investigation, as we put the pieces together, we will take action, because this is not the type of behavior that we want in our company today with our engineers today. HARPER: And understand, we're trying to go back and figure out what happened and understand that so we can indeed make sure, as you do, that this never happens to anyone else again. Now, Laurie Queen (ph), what was her position at the time? BARRA: If the 2005 -- I believe she was a vehicle line executive, but I can go back and confirm that. HARPER: If you would let us know, please. How does cost factor into decisions about safety? BARRA: They don't. HARPER: Has... BARRA: Again, I can only speak to the way that we are running the company, and if there is a safety issue, if there is a defect identified, we go fix the -- fix the vehicle, fix the part, fix the system. It's not acceptable to have a cost put on a safety issue. HARPER: And that is obviously your position and your goal and your -- the way you want it to be now, but that's not the case of what we're going back and looking at. So you're telling us that General Motors has changed its position on how it handles cost and safety issues. It hasn't been this way before, but this is how you want it now, am I correct? BARRA: This is how it is. I think we in the past had more of a cost culture, and we are going to a customer culture that focuses on safety and quality. HARPER: When we go back and look at who first -- who first authorized the use of an ignition switch that did not meet specifications? BARRA: And that is something we'll learn in our investigation. HARPER: Now, one of the things that concerns us, of course, is when General Motors filed bankruptcy in 2009, it wasn't an overnight problem with -- with money or with the loss of profits or losing money each year. In 2005, I know General Motors lost $20.6 billion. Jump to 2007, lost $38.7 billion. 2008, lost $30.9 billion and then filed for bankruptcy in 2009. The fact that General Motors was going through many years of financial issues, did that impact how this was categorized and was not dealt with at that time as it should've been? BARRA: I can't answer that question. I want to know the answer to that question, and when I do, I will take action. HARPER: Right. You indicated earlier that a specific traffic death was not included in the -- the count of fatalities that may have been associated with this issue. I would like to see other traffic deaths or serious injuries that were looked at, but the determination was made that it was not part of this total. Can you get us that information? BARRA: Through our -- our tread information, yes. HARPER: Will you get that for us? BARRA: Yes. HARPER: Thank you very much, I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Ms. Castor for five minutes. CASTOR: Thank you. Natasha Weigel (ph), age eighteen, was killed October 24th, 2006 while riding in a 2005 Chevy Cobalt. Shiera Troutwine (ph), age 19, was killed on June 12th 2009 after losing control of her 2005 Chevy Cobalt. And Alan Ray Floyd (ph), age 26 was killed on July 3rd 2009 after losing control of his 2006 Chevy Cobalt. I understand Ms. Weigel's (ph) parents and Ms. Troutwine's (ph) family are in attendance at the hearing today. Others have been killed because of G.M.'s defective ignition switch. The fact is, we do not know yet the full extent of the fatalities, injuries, and accidents, but evidence is growing through this investigation and that -- in the press, and hopefully your own investigation, that the deaths could've been avoided if G.M. had addressed this issue long ago. We know that G.M. knew about this problem as far back as 2001. The committee learned last week that the supplier of the faulty switch, Delphi (ph), conducted tests that year, 2001, which showed that the switch didn't meet G.M.'s specifications. But G.M. used this switch in Cobalts and Ions and other vehicles anyway. Ms. Barra, the committee sent you a letter about this issue, and Dr. -- documents were received yesterday that showed that these inadequate switches were approved by G.M. in May 2002. I have a document here, and it's been placed before you and it's in tab 54 in the binder as well, this document shows that the force required to turn the ignition switch was too low. That specification is clearly marked "not OK." Ms. Barra, does this document show that G.M. officials were aware that the ignition switch did not meet company standards in 2002? BARRA: If this document was provided to the engineers, again, that's something I will learn in our investigation. CASTOR: Internally, G.M. knew there were problems. By 2004, they were considering ways to fix the problem by redesigning the faulty switch. This document, which is also placed before you, this is at tab 8 in that notebook as well, from 2004, shows that G.M. did reject alternative designs. It mentions one year lead times and says, quote, "the tooling costs and piece prices are" too -- excuse me -- "are too high." Then concludes, "thus, none of the solutions represents an acceptable business case." Other documents present the piece cost increase for a potential solution as 57 cents per unit. Ms. Barra, do you know who at G.M. would've made the decision about whether to make this change in 2004? BARRA: Well, first of all, I find that decision unacceptable, as I've stated. If there is a safety defect, the cost is not the issue that we look at. We look at what it's going to take to fix the problem and make the vehicle safe. As we go through our investigation, we will put all the pieces together of incidents and -- and actions that were taken or not taken over a more than a decade period, and make the appropriate process changes. CASTOR: So, in retrospect, you think that a repair cost of 57 cents was too costly for G.M. to undertake? BARRA: Again, if we are making a decision on safety, we don't even look at cost, we make the change. CASTOR: But there was a major disconnect between what G.M. told the public and what it knew in private. In private, G.M. approved the switch, that it knew it was defective, and then the company appeared to reject other changes because a cost of 37 cents per fix was too high a price to pay. Now, also in 2005, the New York Times ran a review in which the author wrote about his wife encountering a problem with a Chevy Cobalt, and quote, said, "she was driving on a freeway when the car just went dead. The only other thing besides the key on the ring was a remote control fob provided by G.M." The G.M. spokesman at that time, Alan Adler (ph), issued a statement saying, "in rare cases, when a combination of factors is present, a Chevrolet Cobalt driver can cut power to the engine by inadvertently bumping the ignition key to the accessory or off position while the car is running. When this happens, the Cobalt is still controllable." So, I find it baffling that not only did G.M. know about this serious problem over a decade ago, but that it was discussed in the pages of the New York Times, and when G.M. responded publicly, it essentially told drivers, "No big deal, engines cut off all the time." When your engine suddenly cuts off when you're driving on the highway, would you consider this a safety issue? BARRA: Yes. CASTOR: And you've indicated that you were not even aware that G.M. was investigating the Cobalt until December 2013, is that correct? BARRA: I was aware that there was analysis going on related to a Cobalt. CASTOR: But at the time the New York Times wrote their report in 2005, what was your position? BARRA: In 2005, I believe I was in the manufacturing, engineering organization of the company. CASTOR: So, you were a high level executive at G.M. responsible for vehicle manufacturing? BARRA: Vehicle -- the equipment that we used to build vehicles. CASTOR: And one of the nation's largest newspapers raised the issue in this important new vehicle launch for G.M., and you did not know about it at the time? BARRA: I don't have a recollection of that article. CASTOR: Do you recall it being a concern for G.M.? BARRA: I was not aware that there was this issue until the recall was introduced on January 31st. I only knew at the end of December that there was an issue with the Cobalt. I did not know it was an ignition switch issue. CASTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. That concludes our members, but I would like to see if Mr. Terry of Nebraska who is the subcommittee chairman of Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, would have an opportunity for five minutes. Is there any objections? TERRY: Thank you. MURPHY: Without objection, you may proceed, Mr. Terry. TERRY: Thank you. I appreciate this and I'm sorry for being late, but my plane was canceled for mechanical reasons. Probably an ignition switch. (OFF-MIKE) U.S. Air. So, getting back to NHTSA, and I chair the subcommittee over jurisdiction with NHTSA and the Tread Act (ph), and the Tread Act (ph) clearly requires manufacturers to inform NHTSA within five days of any, quote, "noncompliance or defects that create an unreasonable risk of safety." Did G.M. at any time contact or notice NHTSA of any noncompliance or defects regarding the ignition switch? BARRA: That is something I hope to learn as we go through our investigation. TERRY: OK. What is the difference between noncompliance and a defect? BARRA: That is a very broad question. TERRY: No. It is a very specific question. BARRA: Well, I think it depends on the specific situation that you are talking about. TERRY: Regarding an ignition switch. BARRA: So your question is what is a noncompliant -- TERRY: Yes, non-compliant ignition switch. BARRA: My understanding of when there's a noncompliant, it's a very specific term used by NHTSA to standards, but I can get you the specific definition of that versus when we feel we have found a defect with one of our parts. (CROSSTALK) TERRY: And that's why it's "or." So when it -- when an ignition switch is substandard it's non-compliant and a defect then is a higher level. And I think that's what we are looking for here today is to determine if there was quote-unquote a "defect." BARRA: Congressman, I think in the language that we use with NHTSA, there's very specific definitions, and I would like to provide those to you as a -- (CROSSTALK) TERRY: Oh, I can get the definitions from NHTSA. That's -- that - I'm not asking you to do that -- BARRA: -- very specific question related to this, and I'm trying to be truthful. TERRY: OK. But just -- I'm not trying to beat up on you here, but just repeating back NHTSA's definition, I'm asking specifically how it -- how it applies to the ignition switch and that -- NHTSA is going to testify there was no notice. BARRA: I'm sorry; I didn't hear you? NHTSA's going to -- TERRY: I'm -- my understanding is that NHTSA said that G.M. did not contact them with noncompliance. BARRA: If I find through our investigation that we did not provide the appropriate information to NHTSA, that will be a very serious issue and we will take appropriate action with the individuals involved. TERRY: All right. Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. I think there's no further questions. Oh, Ms. DeGette, you had a clarifying question? DEGETTE: Yes, I just had two questions, Mr. Chairman, thank you. The first one is, I've been sitting here thinking about these new ignition switches that you are putting into the recalled cars. They are based on the 2006 specs but what you are saying, Ms. Barra, is that they are going to meet the highest safety standards when they are manufactured, is that right? BARRA: Our engineering team is going through extensive validation testing to make sure that they meet the requirements. DEGETTE: And on the component technical specification, it's tab 53 of your notebook, which was December 6th, 2012, it says the minimum torque required by the switch on the return side of the ignition switch from crank to the run position must be 15N-CM. So would that be the standard then, since it says it must be that? BARRA: From the position of run to accessory? DEGETTE: Yes. BARRA: Fifteen is the minimum; the spec is 20 plus -- DEGETTE: Right. But -- yes, OK. And my final question is, I'm impressed this committee has had -- has had experience with Kenneth Feinberg before, because he was appointed to help administer the fund that was set up by BP after Deepwater Horizon, which was this committee's investigation. He was also appointed to administer the fund after the Boston Marathon terrorist attacks. But I want to make sure that what you are doing when you hire him is you are really doing something, because he is usually hired to sort out the value of people's claims and then assign money. And I'm assuming G.M.'s hiring him to help identify the size of claims and then help compensate the victims. Is that right? Is G.M. willing to put together some kind of a compensation fund for this -- these victims that Mr. Feinberg will then administer? Is that why you've hired him? BARRA: We have hired Mr. Feinberg to help us assess the situation. We -- DEGETTE: So really there is no money involved in this at this point? BARRA: We have just hired him and will begin work with him on Friday. DEGETTE: So really, you hired him; you announced it today. But so far he has not been given any ability to compensate victims. Is that what you're saying? BARRA: We are going to work with him to determine what the right course of action is. DEGETTE: And might that include victim compensation here? BARRA: We haven't made any decisions on that yet. DEGETTE: OK. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. Ms. Barra, we thank you for your time today. G.M. has cooperated with this investigation. And we expect your company will continue to cooperate. Let me make a couple of requests. One is members will have other questions for you and we hope that you respond to those with -- in a timely manner. We also plan to conduct interviews, further interviews with General Motors officials and employees involved in the recall part and may be requesting more records. Will you make sure you make those available to us? BARRA: We will absolutely cooperate. MURPHY: Thank you. And also, on behalf of Chairman Upton and I, we would also like to be notified when you get your internal report and would like to discuss when you've had a chance to review that report as well. BARRA: We will notify you. MURPHY: Thank you very much. I thank you, Ms. Barra. You will be dismissed, but while this is taking place and waiting for Mr. Friedman to sit down, we are going to take a five-minute break to allow Mr. Friedman to take his seat and we will reconvene this hearing in five minutes. Thank you. (BREAK) MURPHY: ... for becoming NHTSA's -- which is the National Highway Transportation (sic) Safety Administration's deputy administer, Mr. Friedman worked for 12 years at the Union of Concerned Scientists as a senior engineer, research director and as the deputy director of the Clean Vehicles Program. I will now swear in the witness. Mr. Friedman, you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing, and when doing so, has the practice of taking testimony under oath. Do you have any objections to testifying under oath? FRIEDMAN: I do not. MURPHY: Thank you. This chair then advises you that under the rules of the House, and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony today? FRIEDMAN: I do not. MURPHY: In that case, will you please rise and raise your right hand? Do you swear -- I'll wait until you're ready. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? FRIEDMAN: I do. MURPHY: Let the record show the witness is now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title XVIII, Section 1, 001 of the United States Code. Mr. Friedman, you may now give a five-minute summary of your written statement. FRIEDMAN: Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. To begin, I would like to say that on behalf of everyone at NHTSA, we are deeply saddened by the lives lost in crashes involving the General Motors ignition switch defect. The victims' families and friends, some of whom I believe are here today, have suffered greatly and I am deeply sorry for their loss. Safety is NHTSA's top priority and our employees go to work every day trying to prevent tragedies just like these. Our work reducing dangerous behaviors behind the wheel, improving the safety of vehicles and addressing safety defects has helped reduce highway fatalities to historic lows not seen since 1950. In the case of the recently recalled General Motors vehicles, we are first focused on ensuring that General Motors identifies all vehicles with a defective ignition switch, fixes the vehicles quickly and is doing all it can to inform consumers on how to keep themselves safe. We are also investigating whether General Motors met its responsibilities to report and address this defect as required under federal law. If it failed to do so, we will hold General Motors accountable as we have in other cases over the last five years which have led to record fines on automakers. Internally at NHTSA and the department, we have already begun a review of our actions and assumptions in this case to further our ability to address potential defects. Today I will share what I have learned so far. NHTSA used consumer complaints and early warning data, three special crash investigations on the Cobalt (ph), industry websites and agency expertise on airbag technology. Some of that information did raise concerns about airbag non-deployments, so in 2007, we convened an expert panel to review the data. Our consumer complaint data on injury crashes with airbag nondeployments showed that neither the Cobalt nor the Ion stood out when compared to other vehicles. The two special crash investigation reports we reviewed at the time were inconclusive on the cause of non- deployment. The reports noted that the airbags did not deploy and the power mode was in accessory but these crashes involved unbelted occupants in off-road conditions that began with relatively small collisions where by design airbags are less likely to deploy in order to avoid doing more harm than good. Further, power loss is not uncommon in crashes where airbags deploy and did not stand out as a reason for non-deployment. In light of these factors, NHTSA did not launch a formal investigation. We continued monitoring the data and, in 2010, found that the related consumer complaint rate for the Cobalt had decreased by nearly half since the 2007 review. Based on our engineering expertise and our process, the data available to NHTSA at the time was not sufficient to warrant a formal investigation. So what does all this mean? It means that NHTSA was concerned and engaged on this issue. This was a difficult case, where we used tools and expertise that, over the last decade have successfully resulted in 1,299 recalls, including 35 recalls on airbag non- deployments. These tools and expertise have served us well and we will continue to rely on and improve them. For example, we have already invested in advanced computer tools to improve our ability to spot defects and trends and we are planning to expand that effort. But what we know now also means that we need to challenge our assumptions. We need to look at how we handle difficult cases like this going forward. So we're looking to better understand how manufacturers deal with power loss and airbags. We are also considering ways to improve the use of crash investigations in identifying defects. We are reviewing ways to address what appear to be remote defect possibilities. And we are evaluating our approach to engaging manufacturers in all stages of our defects process. Between these efforts and those of the department's inspector general, I know that we will continue to improve our ability to identify vehicle defects and ensure that they are fixed. But I want to close on one last important note. Our ability to find defects also requires automakers to act in good faith and to provide information on time. General Motors has now provided new information definitively linking airbag non-deployment to faulty ignition switches, identifying a parts change and indicating potentially critical supplier conversations on airbags. Had this information been available earlier, it would have likely changed NHTSA's approach to this issue. But let me be clear, both NHTSA and the auto industry has a whole must look to improve. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member DeGette, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. Thank you. MURPHY: Thank you. And I'll recognize myself for five minutes. Mr. Friedman, I -- with the understanding you have just gotten this position of acting administrator just a couple of months ago, and for the last 12 years, you were involved in other groups focused on green energy and fuel cell technology, we understand that if you are unable or uncomfortable asking specific questions about automobile engineering and safety, you're more than welcome to someone else, some of your support staff behind you. So I wanted to find out how NHTSA is communicating to the public about this recall. And I believe I have a slide available or I have a poster here. I went to your website to see what I could learn and... Do we have that image available about this? And what it shows, this is all. This is all I could find on your website about the recall notice. No information about the broader recalls about parts replacement, investing or anything. I can't even click on this. It simply says, "Get rid your car key fobs." But there's nothing else that a person could do. Can you fix this website so people can use it to get more useful information, please? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, if there is added information that should be on there to make sure that people can get to the information available on our website, we'll take those steps. Right now, consumers can go to our website and get all of the details associated with this recall. If they go to the search button and select the 2005 Cobalt? MURPHY: I -- just, to make it easier... (CROSSTALK) FRIEDMAN: (OFF-MIKE) Absolutely... MURPHY: In 2007, the chief of NHTSA's defect assessment division proposed opening an investigation of air bag non-deployment in Chevy Cobalt's, am I correct about that date? FRIEDMAN: Yes. MURPHY: Now, if you turn to page -- to tab 19 in your binder, it's labeled as the DAD panel for November 15th, 2007. This is the Power Point presentation made to the defect assessment panel on November 15th. At Bate (ph) Stamp 4474 -- those little numbers at the bottom of the page -- the presentation states that there had been 29 complaints about the Cobalt air bags, four fatal crashes and 14 (ph) field reports, is that correct? MURPHY: At Bates (ph) Stamp 4480, there is is a chart of air bag warranty claims for Cobalt air bags, as compared to other comparable vehicles? Do you agree that the number of warranty claims for Cobalt air bags is much higher than other cars? FRIEDMAN: Congressman -- Mr. Chairman, That is one of the issues that did raise concerns on our part. What that chart shows is warranty claims, some of which are likely associated with air bag non- deployments, some of which may also -- and are very likely to -- be associated with warning lights on air bags or other potential problems. This -- this is a gross look at the data, an important look at the data that is provided by our early warning data system that we use to decide whether or not we need to look further into one of the issues, which is what we did do in this case. MURPHY: But still, NHTSA panel decided there was not a trend here and decided not to investigate despite the number of complaints -- the fatal crashes and the warranty claims. Why was NHTSA convinced that an investigation was not warranted? And I believe this happened on two occasions. NHTSA decided twice, don't move forward with an investigation. What specific information did you have that said don't go forward? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, when we look at these cases, and when they looked at this case at the time, the whole body of information, they don't -- you can't just rely necessarily on one piece of information. The core piece of information that they relied on in the determination that was not sufficient enough information, first was an analysis of the complaints -- the injury crash complaints associated with air bag non-deployment. And the exposure. The number of those divided by the number of vehicles that were on the road, and the number of years they were on the road. That gives you a sense of how large the problem is in comparison to other vehicles. When the team did that comparison, the Cobalt did not stand out. It was a little above average, but there were several vehicles that were significantly higher. There were some vehicles... MURPHY: I understand, but twice employees at NHTSA raised a red flag on this. It wasn't just once. And the second time too, they said something's not right here. So I'm wondering if you did something different when that occurred, the second time, in reviewing that. Such as, did anybody ask questions of why an air bag doesn't deploy? I mean, I looked at the statement there and saw a number of things about power losses, or how much longer battery power would be involved in air bag deployment in the case of an accident. But did anybody ask the question was there anything else -- any other reason why an air bag wouldn't deploy? Did anybody ask those questions? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, my understanding is folks were trying to understand why the air bags did not deploy. When they looked at the special crash investigations in 2007, as well as the data available, those special crash investigations were inconclusive. Why? Because they indicated that these crashes were happening in off road conditions with unbelted occupants... MURPHY: I understand, I'm looking at reasons why air bags wouldn't deploy. So you're talking among yourselves, according to what we understand -- the Power Points -- what specifically did NHTSA ask G.M.? And, for example, this is very important, did NHTSA raise a question with G.M., tell us the reasons why an air bag wouldn't deploy in one of your cars? Did you ask G.M. that question. FRIEDMAN: I don't have a record of that. I know our team did bring up concerns over this case to General Motors in a meeting, but I don't have records of us asking that specific question. MURPHY: I mean, it's important, because you're saying G.M. didn't provide you information, but you're also saying you don't know if you asked some of the information. I mean, it's important for the families to know what happened, and if this key key government agency, which is tasked with protecting the safety of the public, I just want to know if those questions get asked. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Chairman, those questions typically do get asked of the car companies when we move into the investigation phase. What this phase and where this was, was a phase where concerns are raised, and it's discussed whether or not there is sufficient information to move to the point of asking those questions of auto makers. Roughly in these defects panels, roughly half of the cases that are brought into investigations, roughly half are not. One of the things that we are looking relative to this process going forward is do we need to make any changes when it comes to how we present this information, and when we present our concerns to auto makers. I do believe that there are some changes we can make to engage auto makers earlier in the process to put them in the position of letting us know if our concerns are shared by them.... MURPHY: Certainly I know families would want to know in retrospect what would you change in this whole process, but I'm out of time. I now recognize Ms. Degette for five minutes. DEGETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Friedman, NHTSA investigated air bag non-deployment, but as you talked about it was never able to connect the dots between that problem and the defective ignition switch. So what I want to know is if NHTSA had the relevant information it needed to make a fully informed determination and what the agency believed about the connection between the ignition switch position and air bag non- deployment during the time of its special crash investigations? In your written testimony, you know that when NHTSA was investigating the air bag non-deployment issue, the agency mistakenly believed based on G.M. service literature that the air bags would function up to 60 seconds after the power cut off. Why did NHTSA think that? FRIEDMAN: Thank you, Ranking Member. That knowledge was actually based on years of experience and previous experience with earlier air bags where there was actually a problem where air bags would go off long after the vehicle was turned off. Air bag systems have capacitors in them, and those capacitors are designed to store energy so that if power was lost the air bag can still deploy, because power is often lost in some of these kinds of... DEGETTE: So that's based on the G.M. service literature, or the agency's experience or both? FRIEDMAN: That's a very important question. My understanding is that was based on the agency's experience. My understanding is -- and I apologize, if I was not clear enough in my testimony -- we have since after General Motors read this recall found that service information that confirmed our understanding at the time, which was that air bags are designed to be powered when the power is lost. So a power loss would not typically stand out. DEGETTE: So -- OK, so you were basing -- NHTSA was basing -- you weren't there -- But NHTSA was basing its determination on its experience. How is that then that it failed to connect the dots between the air bag non-deployment problem and ignition switch problem? FRIEDMAN: Excuse me. I believe there is two situations here. First of all, the information that we had at the time indicated that there were two possibilities put in front of us in one of the special crash investigation reports. One of them was that the ignition being off could have been a cause, another one was that the circumstances of the crash could have been the cause. In those two cases, the more likely scenario was that the circumstances of the crash were more likely to yield to the air bags not deploying. DEGETTE: So you also said that G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect that NHTSA didn't have. What information could G.M. have given you that would have -- the agency -- that would have helped identify the real problem? FRIEDMAN: Well, I made that statement based on looking at the chronology that General Motors provided with this recall. And there were a few things in that chronology that raised serious concerns for me. DEGETTE: And what were those things. FRIEDMAN: The first was that there was a change in part number relative to the ignition switch, and we were never informed of that change. The second is that, there was -- there were some conservation with suppliers about their control algorithms, the control systems for air bags. We were never informed of that conversation to my knowledge, and we did not have the details on how that -- those algorithms worked. Third, and most importantly, General Motors created a direct connection in their recall between the air bag non-deployment and the ignition switch. If we had any of those pieces of information, I truly believe it would have changed the way NHTSA would have approached this. DEGETTE: Now, if -- if G.M. is changing a part, are they legally required to inform NHTSA of that change? FRIEDMAN: It's not clear to me that that is a legal requirement, but I can get back to you to make sure. DEGETTE: I'd appreciate that, because it seems to me that's critical. Now, in your opening statement, you said that -- you said that, in order for NHTSA to be able to make a correct determination, you need all of the information as you just said, and you need the company to be acting in good faith. DEGETTE: Based on what you know now, do you think that at the time that all of this was happening, G.M. was acting in good faith towards the agency? FRIEDMAN: Congresswoman, we have an open investigation to answer that exact question. And if we find out that they were not, we will hold them accountable. DEGETTE: And I would hope that you would inform this committee irrespective of your determination, whether they did or didn't. FRIEDMAN: Absolutely. DEGETTE: When do you expect to finish that investigation? FRIEDMAN: I can't put an exact timeline on it. We're getting hundreds of thousands of documents from General Motors. The deadline is April 3rd for them to provide those documents. It's not clear that they will be able to provide all the documents at the time, but we've been making sure that they're continuously producing documents so that we can understand. As soon as my team is able to find information in those documents that indicate that General Motors had information that they should have acted on sooner, we will determine how to move forward to hold General Motors accountable. Or if we don't find that information, then we'll also let you know. DEGETTE: Thank you. MURPHY: The gentlelady's (inaudible). With regard to Ms. DeGette's question about if there's a change in a part, do they need to notify you? Will you also let us know if they make a change in a part, do they also have to have a different part number? I don't know what NHTSA's requirements are on that. That's an issue. Just -- just you can submit that for the record. FRIEDMAN: Yes, I'll circle back to you to be clear. MURPHY: We also need to know what information you are reviewing with regard to these airbags on G.M. cars, specifically the Cobalt. And would you please provide that information to the committee? FRIEDMAN: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I believe we've provided a significant amount of documentation, but we'll continue to do so. MURPHY: On this, we'd like to know what you're reviewing. I now recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Upton, for five minutes. UPTON: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just want to -- I know you are, as well as our committee, is literally we're looking through boxes of information -- thousands and thousands of pages, and that continues. And it looks like we'll be getting some more down the road. Well, as you know, I wrote the TREAD Act, which passed unanimously in the Congress. President Clinton signed it into law. And the whole point, or a major point of that law was that NHTSA would in fact get the information that it needed to detect a trend as quickly as they could. So when NHTSA considered whether to investigate the Cobalt for an airbag defect back in '07, the early warning data was one of the factors that was cited in the Defect Assessment Division's recommendation to investigate it, correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. UPTON: So, what was -- looking back -- what is the problem? Did G.M. not report the information that the law required? Or was NHTSA unable to sort through the information that is had to find the problem? Or both? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, we have an open investigation to determine whether or not General Motors failed in their responsibility to provide information, and we will definitely report to this committee the results of that effort. In terms of what our team did, our team looked at all the available information using the approach that we've used successfully to lead to over 1,299 recalls influenced by NHTSA over the last 10 years. We used that process to look into the early warning data, to look at the consumer complaint data, to look at special crash investigations and a variety of other information. We dug into that data. We analyzed it. We tried to see if there was a defect trend that stood out. The data didn't support that. It showed that the Cobalt did not stand out when it came to airbag nondeployments. We looked at the special crash investigations. Those available at the time were inconclusive. This was a case where the team worked very hard to try to understand what was happening, and wasn't able to see a significant enough trend or a clear enough defect. What I'm learning from this, and where we have to go in the future, is we need to look more carefully at remote defect possibilities. We need to reconsider the way we're using special crash investigations. We need to continue to invest in tools. We're already investing in computer tools, basically grown out of the Watson IBM software to be able to more effectively, more efficiently use our resources to spot trends. We've got to put all these tools forward and we've got to look for opportunities to make changes so we can better spot... (CROSSTALK) UPTON: So when you look to embark on an investigation, do you consider the number of deaths? I mean, is there some trigger that you use to warrant further exploration, whether it's one death, four deaths, 10 deaths, 20, 100? I mean, is there some type of standard equation that you put into place? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, there's not. Our -- our goal, what I would love to be able to do is to find each and every one of these defects before there's a single death. It is the manufacturer's responsibility to be reporting all of these defects and getting them fixed. When they do not, it is our job to try to find them. We don't have a simple rule of thumb because each case is different. In some cases, we have open investigations after one incident where it was clear that it was a defect. In other cases, we've had to rely on the trend data that indicates that this stands out. I can't give you a -- a specific... UPTON: So, let's -- so let's play Monday morning quarterback. So, today's April 1st, 2014. These problems arose over the last 10 years. What would you have liked to have had on your platter from G.M. specifically in terms of information today that you didn't have in the last eight or 10 years? FRIEDMAN: Well, at a minimum, what I can tell you, based on their chronology, I would have liked to have had information that they had changed the parts on the ignition switch. I would have liked to have had information that they were talking to their suppliers because they appeared to have had concerns about the algorithm associated with airbag non-deployment. I would have certainly liked have any information they had directly linking the ignition switch defect to airbag non-deployment. As we go through out investigation, I should be able to come back to you and let you know if there's additional information they should have... UPTON: And are -- and are you pretty certain that today that they did not provide that information to you? FRIEDMAN: It's my understanding that none of that information was available. We are continuing our efforts to try to make sure that we understand what happened. So, I can't say that I -- I can give you a comprehensive and definitive answer. But my understanding at this point is that, no, we did not have that information. UPTON: I know Mr. Long wanted my last 15 seconds, so I bet it's now gone. I yield back. LONG (?): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll have my friend Mr. Terry (ph) here assist me. And the chairman of the committee here -- subcommittee showed you this picture a while ago and said he couldn't navigate past this page, and you said that if any new information became available to you, that you would get that on the web site. Something we learned in the first hearing that I think is very germane is, if you will take your car to General Motors, they will give you a loaner at no cost or a rental car at no cost. I would call that very germane. I would call it critical. And if somebody's got an '05, '06, '06, I think it would be enticing to drive a '14 for a little while while they repair your car. So, that'd be a suggestion to put on there. I yield back. (UNKNOWN) I think I might note, the gentleman -- I received a call from one of my constituents who's said he tried to get a loaner car and the dealer told him he couldn't have one to... (UNKNOWN) One more thing, too, you could put on there is, take all your keys off the key ring except for the ignition key. That's the other thing Ms. Barra (ph) said. Is that on there? FRIEDMAN: I believe that is very clearly on there. And, in fact, just -- just to be clear, the reason why we did that is because safety is our top priority. We are all focused on investigating this case, but safety... (UNKNOWN) Right. FRIEDMAN: ... safety is our top priority, which is why the first thing I wanted people to see when they came to that web site was how to keep themselves safe. So, I do just want to be clear, that's why we have that limited information there, because I didn't want anyone out there who came to our web site not to understand the steps, how to keep themselves safe. I agree it's a good idea to put on there. I'll to see if we can fit it in the space we've got, or if there's another way to point people to it. But I agree, it's a good idea to let them know that... MURPHY: You could link to -- people need to know if it's safe to drive their current cars. Mr. Dingell, you're now recognized for five minutes. DINGELL: Thank you. Mr. Friedman, let's look at NHTSA's internal decision-making processes. These questions will require yes or no answers. Is it correct that contractors for NHTSA's special crash investigations program conducted three separate investigations of Chevy Cobalt in 2005, 2006, and 2009, related to airbag non- deployment? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation reviews early warning reporting data and consumer complaints in deciding whether to open a formal defects investigation? FRIEDMAN: Yes, those are parts of the process. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that G.M. submitted EWR data to NHTSA concerning the Chevrolet Cobalt, subject to NHTSA's 2005 and 2006 special -- special crash investigations? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry, sir. Could you repeat that, please? DINGELL: I'll give it to you again. Is it correct that G.M. submitted EWR data to NHTSA concerning Chevrolet Cobalt, subject to NHTSA's 2005 and 2006 special crash investigations? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. Those are important parts of... DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the Office of Defects Investigation -- ODI -- follows a multi-step process in order to determine whether a defect exists in the vehicle? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: Yes. DINGELL: Now, and that process includes an initial evaluation, a preliminary evaluation, and an engineering analysis. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's the standard process, but we will act earlier in that stage if we have compelling information that there's a defect. We do not wait, necessarily, to go through that whole process if we have sufficient information to act. DINGELL: All right. Now, let's clarify something. This (inaudible) crash investigation program is something separate and distinct from the formal ODI investigations process. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the Office of Defects Investigation convened an initial evaluation panel in 2007 to investigate the non-deployment of airbags in the 2003 - 2006 Chevy Cobalts and Ions, yes or no? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Now, is it correct that the review was prompted by 29 consumer complaints, four fatal crashes, and fourteen field reports? FRIEDMAN: That was one of the reasons for the review. The additional... DINGELL: What were the other reasons? FRIEDMAN: In addition, we were looking at consumer complaints, those complaints-based concerns as well, and I can get back to you on the record with each of the pieces of information that were involved, but we do have a memo that was provided when this -- when it was proposed to potentially move this to a defect that lays out early warning data, consumer complaint data concerns, special crash investigations... DINGELL: Would you submit that for the record, please? FRIEDMAN: Yes. DINGELL: Now, were there other things that triggered this review? FRIEDMAN: My understanding is it was all the items in that memo was the information that triggered this review. DINGELL: So, there weren't other things. Now, is it correct that ODI decided not to elevate that review to a more formal investigation because there was a lack of discernible trend? Yes or no. FRIEDMAN: Yes, that was one of the reasons. DINGELL: What were the other reasons? FRIEDMAN: The other reason is that the crash investigation information we had was inconclusive and did not, was not able to point to a specific defect. DINGELL: All right. Now, to be clear, at the time of the 2000 initial evaluation, NHTSA had concluded that the Chevy Cobalt was -- was not over represented compared to other peer vehicles with respect to injury crash incident rates. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. DINGELL: Was there any other reason? FRIEDMAN: With the other... DINGELL: Was there any other reason that you came to that conclusion? FRIEDMAN: In 2007. DINGELL: Now, also to be clear, NHTSA did not have information at the time of the 2007 investigation, that for example, linked airbag non-deployment to ignition switch position. Is that correct? FRIEDMAN: Could you not have any specific information that provided a direct link? DINGELL: So you're agreeing. FRIEDMAN: I believe so. DINGELL: OK. Now, Mr. Chairman, I'm troubled here. It appears that we have a flaw in NHTSA's decision-making process which is related to defects and their inquiries into defects. I fully recognize and I am, like most of the members of this committee, I think, critical to the fact that NHTSA is short-staffed and under-funded. At the same time, I'm compelled to agree with actually the administrator Friedman, that Congress may need to examine the usual use of special crash investigations in the defects screening process. How best to get NHTSA the information it needs for that process and how best to engage manufacturers around issue evaluations. In so doing, I think we will help (inaudible) the safety of American motorists and their families. I yield back the balance of my time. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Dr. Phil Gingrey for five minutes. GINGREY: Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Friedman, in your written testimony, you suggested that NHTSA, your agency, did not pursue investigations into the issues with Cobalts and Ion, because they were unaware of information developed by General Motors. In the years leading up to this recall, has NHTSA had any concerns with General Motors' responsiveness or lack thereof to safety defects and concerns? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I would like to get back to you on the record with that. Just... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Well, let me do this. You may not have to do that. Just look at tab 34. It's right there in front of you. In July 2013, the head of ODI emailed General Motors with a number of concerns. It's the second page, bottom of the second page. Sent to Carmen (ph). You see where I'm -- you with me? FRIEDMAN: Yes. I have not seen this before. But, yes, I see it. GINGREY: Yes. OK. Do you want to read that first paragraph? And then look up and I will know that you have read it? FRIEDMAN: Yes. GINGREY: He stated: "The general perception is that General Motors is slow to communicate, slow to act, and at times requires additional efforts of ODI that we do not feel is necessary with some of your peers." You read that, didn't you? FRIEDMAN: Yes. GINGREY: Were you aware the concerns raised by ODI in, I guess that was July of 2013? FRIEDMAN: I was not aware of this specific email, but I have been in at least one meeting where we sat down with General Motors and made clear to them that they needed to make sure that they were following an effective process when it came to their recall. GINGREY: Yes. So there was definitely some concern? FRIEDMAN: Well, we -- with each and every automaker we need to make sure that they have a good and effective process to quickly deal with this. This email clearly indicates some very specific concerns. GINGREY: Did the agency have similar concerns in 2007, 2010 when it declined to advance any investigations into non-deployment of airbags in these G.M. vehicles? FRIEDMAN: I don't know. GINGREY: You weren't with NHTSA at the time? FRIEDMAN: No. I joined NHTSA back last year. I have been there for almost a year now. GINGREY: Do you think NHTSA did enough to get the information that it needed? FRIEDMAN: I believe in this case that the team looked very clearly and very carefully at the data. I believe that the reason why we didn't move forward was because the data indicated that the Cobalts didn't stand out and that we didn't have conclusive information as to a very specific... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Well, you know in 2005, G.M. issued this technical services bulletin, and that's tab 12, if you want to flip quickly to tab 12 in the document binder. This technical service bulletin (INAUDIBLE), and it recommended a solution for complaints of this inadvertent key turn due to the low torque, particularly by the Chevrolet Cobalts. The technical service bulletin instructed the dealers exactly what to do to provide an insert that converted a key from a slot design to a hole design. I don't know exactly what that means, but they do. General Motors believed that this would help reduce the force exerted on the ignition while driving from maybe shaking of the keys or bumping it with your knee. In 2006, the technical service bulletin was expanded to include additional make and model years. Unfortunately, in the case of this young girl, 29-year-old Brooke Melton, the nurse from my congressional district, that was killed the day after she took her car in, saying, hey, this engine is cutting off for no reason. And you know, I know they must have gotten it the technical service bulletin about this issue, but all they did was clean out her fuel line, gave her the call the next day, and led her to her death. Administrator Friedman, yes or no, was NHTSA aware of General Motors's 2005-2006 technical services bulletins related to low ignition key cylinder torque effect? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Gingrey, first, if I may, Brooke's death was a tragedy. And it's a tragedy that we work each and every day to avoid. I do believe we were aware, as part of our efforts and as part of the special crash investigation that we were aware of that technical service bulletin. At the time, that technical service bulletin would not have been seen as being associated with airbag... (CROSSTALK) GINGREY: Yes, listen, I believe you. Mr. Friedman, I believe you. And, you know, obviously when people are driving impaired or texting or emailing or whatever, and, you know, they don't change the oil when they should and their tires are low and the brakes are worn out, you know, there is some responsibility there, some personal responsibility. But when they are doing everything the right way and they take their car in and, you know, they think that they trust the service department of the local dealership, and they get a situation like this, I mean, you can understand why she's gone but her parents are obviously -- and all of these parents, these families are just irate because the expectation, if they're doing the right thing, they ought to be safe. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I completely understand. And I would actually argue that consumers should expect that their cars should function as they're designed, no matter the cause of the crash. GINGREY: Absolutely. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. I yield back. MURPHY: I'd venture to say that they would assume the car keys don't have to be monitored... FRIEDMAN: Correct. MURPHY: Mr. Green, you're recognized for five minutes. GREEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Friedman, thank you for appearing today. NHTSA has a central role for consumer safety, and I would like to understand better how long it took for NHTSA to identify this fault. In your opinion, how did NHTSA not identify the deadly trend? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, when our team looked at the data, the trend did not -- there was not a trend that stuck out. In fact, when it came to airbag non-deployments, the Cobalt was not an outlier. GREEN: Was G.M. forthcoming with their data? FRIEDMAN: Well, that's the exact question and that's the exact reason why we have an open investigation into them. I do have concerns about the parts change, about conversations they had with suppliers, and any other information they may have had, which is exactly why we opened up an investigation into them. And if they did not follow the law in their requirements to get information to us and to respond quickly, we're going to hold them accountable, as we have with many other automakers. GREEN: OK. Earlier this month The New York Times reported on NHTSA's response to the consumer complaints over the years about ignition switch issues for the recalled vehicles. According to The Times, many of the complaints detailed frightening scenes in which moving cars suddenly stalled at high speeds on highways in the middle of (INAUDIBLE) traffic and while crossing railroad tracks. A number of the complaints warned of catastrophic consequences if something was not done. NHTSA received more than 260 of these consumer complaints over the past 11 years about G.M. vehicles suddenly turning off while driving. But it never once opened a defective investigation with the ignition switch issue. If consumers submitted these complaints to NHTSA, many were met with a quote of just silence. Mr. Friedman, Mary Ruddy's daughter died in a crash involving a 2005 Cobalt. Ms. Ruddy has repeatedly tried to contact NHTSA for information, but has only received form letters. She told The New York Times that "I just want someone to hear from me, we have had no closure, we still have no answers." Ms. Ruddy was -- I don't know if she's still here today, but she was in the audience. Has NHTSA been in contact with Ms. Ruddy? FRIEDMAN: Mr. Congressman, my understanding of what happened with Ms. Ruddy -- well, first of all, Ms. Ruddy deserves answers and that's exactly why we're looking into what G.M. did, that's exactly why we're making sure we understand what happened. What she has been through, it's a tragedy, and we've got to work to make sure that those don't happen again. In terms of my understanding of Ms. Ruddy's contacts with NHTSA, those contacts were made through our complaint system. In those complaint systems, as we do note on the Web site, we do not necessarily respond to all of those complaints. Because what we're doing with those complaints is we are looking for potential problems. And if those complaints don't contain sufficient information, if we have questions about them, we do follow up with consumers. But if they have the information we need, we do not, because the goal of those complaint databases is to try to find problems. In this case, my understanding is Ms. Ruddy provided those complaints after being notified of a recall that NHTSA did influence. We got the Cobalt recalled... (CROSSTALK) GREEN: I only have five minutes. But did NHTSA really receive 260 consumer complaints over 11 years about this automatic shutdown of your engine? FRIEDMAN: I don't have the exact number, but what I do know is that at NHTSA we -- human eyes look at every single one of these complaints to try to find out if there is something that stands out. My understanding of the complaints you're referencing are that they were for stalls and that only a very small number of them were related to airbag non-deployments. What we were looking for... (CROSSTALK) GREEN: Oh, I know, but 260 complaints on the car stopping on the freeway or wherever it's at. I don't know if that's a high number or low number over, you know, 11 years, but you might need to have somebody who actually looks at complaints. And I assume they come from different parts of the country. So somebody identifies it and says, hey, we need to focus on these 260 complaints. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, in this case, a human eye looks at each and every one of those. And whether that's a large or a small number, based on the analyses that I've seen, relative to the number of Cobalts that were out on the road, that was not a very large number compared to a lot of the other stall complaints that do happen for a variety of other vehicles that are out there. GREEN: Well, you told me about how NHTSA responds to consumer complaints. But it seems like in this case NHTSA might look at how they respond to consumer complaints much better, because I know as a member of Congress, believe me, if we don't respond to emails and letters, we will hear about it. And if I get a number of emails on a certain subject, you know, we obviously respond to it. So, Mr. Chairman, I know I'm almost out of time, and thank you for your courtesy. MURPHY: Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise, for five minutes. SCALISE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Friedman, thank you for being with us and participating in this investigative hearing as well. I know earlier you had talked about the decision back in 2007, when the chief of defect assessment division at your agency had suggested opening an investigation and then ultimately sometime after it was decided not to open that investigation. When was the decision made not to open the investigation? FRIEDMAN: That was also made in 2007. And basically what the chief of the defects assessment division was doing was exactly what his job requires him to do. He's supposed to look for potential defect cases and bring those up to a panel where those are considered, where a broad set of evidence is considered. SCALISE: Is that the trends in relation to peers? I think that's the language that you all were using when you are looking at, I guess, similar cars that were having similar problems with airbags? FRIEDMAN: That's one of the pieces of information that's used as well as crash investigations and other EWR data that is involved. About half of those that are brought up do not end up going to investigation. But we have designed our system to make sure that we have at least two teams always looking for potential problems. The defects assessment division is always looking for potential problems and raising that question. That's what... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: All right. And I would be curious to get the information that you've got within NHTSA that helped make that decision not to move forward with the investigation between September of 2007, when the defect assessment division decided that the -- suggested to go forward, and then when you subsequently -- your agency subsequently decided not to. Because when you look at this chart we've got from 2007, the Cobalt versus peer crash rate, there is a chart, and you have got the other peers, and you've got some fairly static numbers, and then you have got the spike here in what is called exposure rate per population that seems to spike with the Cobalt. And so if the internal decision-making was that they were similar to their peers, it doesn't seem to mesh with this chart from 2007. So if you can get me or get the committee whatever information you have on what decision-making went into NHTSA's final call to reject what was a warning or so from internal defect assessment division and -- can you get us that information? FRIEDMAN: Well, I believe we have provided that information to the committee already. But if there is additional information, I'll make sure the committee has it. But I... SCALISE: And then were you all... FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry, sir. SCALISE: Were you all -- or did you have something else you wanted to add to that? FRIEDMAN: Thank you. Yes, I apologize. I just wanted to be clear about what the data shows. I believe you're referring to this chart. The bars here represent the defect -- the potential defect or really the complaint rate. And what you'll see with these bars is they're not spiking, they're not standing out in comparison to these others. The average is here, and they're just above average. SCALISE: The blue line there on your chart. FRIEDMAN: Right. And that's what I was wondering if you were pointing to. The blue line is the volume of -- I believe that's the volume of reports -- no, that's the volume of sales. So that indicates how many vehicles were sold. But the complaint rate, that's the important data that we're looking at, are the bars. (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: OK. Did you take action on any of those other cars that are identified in that chart? FRIEDMAN: In some cases we took action, in some cases we did not. And I can get back to you on that... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: OK. So on some you did. If you can get us -- again, if you can get the committee the list of those cars where you did take action, because clearly you made the choice not to take action in the case of the Cobalt. So we would appreciate it if you can get us that. I do want to ask a few other questions, because in your testimony, you had made a few, I don't know if we would call them accusations, but I guess you could call them that, I mean, here you are saying, we're pursuing an investigation of whether G.M. met its timeliness responsibilities to report and address this defect under federal law. I know you addressed this a little bit earlier. But if you've got any specifics that you're referring to when you make that statement, can you get that to the committee? FRIEDMAN: Yes. Well, the specifics, I believe, are in my testimony that there are three things that I am concerned about based on their chronology. First and foremost is that they have identified that there is a link between the ignition switch and airbag non-deployment. Second is that they changed the part. And third is they appear to have had conversations with their suppliers about the airbag algorithm in relationship to the... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: And the final question, and I know I'm out of time, G.M. had -- this is your statement, G.M. had critical information that would have helped identify this defect. Have you gotten our staff that critical information already that you feel G.M. had that would have helped identify this defect? FRIEDMAN: So that information is the information that was referred to in General Motors's chronology. I believe the committee has asked for all of that information... SCALISE: So we don't yet have that? FRIEDMAN: ... from General Motors... SCALISE: As far as you know? FRIEDMAN: I'm not aware of exactly what documents you do or don't have. But if you don't have that information... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: If you can make sure we get that information. FRIEDMAN: I also just wanted to clarify, we don't only look for trends. If there is a clear defect, we move forward into the investigation as well. So on -- I don't know the answer, but on some of these cases, there may have not been as large of a trend, but if there was a clear defect, we would have investigated... (CROSSTALK) SCALISE: Thanks for your testimony. And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: I just want to make sure so we're very clear on this, when he is referring to the information given this committee, if you could highlight very specifically the information you did not have that GM later gave you that would have changed your decision, you make sure the committee has that? I mean, I know you said it was a part switch, and that's what we have. FRIEDMAN: Well, so what I'm referring to, and I can highlight in GM's chronology, is I'm referring to specific items that are identified in General Motors's chronology that brought concerns. We are getting that information from General Motors. MURPHY: Thank you. Thank you. Now recognize gentlewoman from Florida, Ms. Castor, for five minutes. CASTOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator Friedman, GM has confirmed that it knew as early as 2001 that its ignition switches contained defects. And by 2004, GM had a body of consumer complaints that raised enough questions for them to open an internal engineering inquiry of the switches. Meanwhile, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, your agency, was beginning to receive its own body of consumer complaints of cars stalling and ignition switch failures. And in 2005, as your agency was monitoring airbag non-deployment issues, its special crash investigation of a 2005 Cobalt found that the ignition switch was in the accessory position when the airbags did not deploy. You said at this point it was not clear to the Highway Traffic Safety Administration what was happening. But then information came out subsequently that, you can tell us, should this have pointed NHTSA in the right direction? In 2007, the agency investigated a second crash of a 2005 Cobalt where the airbags did not deploy. I think you said at this point still it did not stick out. And you've testified that you didn't see trends. The crash report found that the non-deployment could be the result of "power loss due to movement of the ignition switch just prior to impact." But at this point GM was also providing your agency with early warning reports in the third quarter of 2005, the fourth quarter of 2006, in addition to the crash -- special crash investigations. So we're all trying to figure out how it took so long for these defective ignition switches to trigger a recall at GM and the raise red flags at NHTSA, and how the Highway Traffic Safety administration could have noticed this issue sooner if GM had been more forthcoming. So the committee's investigation has revealed that GM approved switches for these cars that did not meet the company specifications in 2002, and again in 2006. Did GM ever inform the Highway Traffic Safety Administration of this fact? FRIEDMAN: Of which specific fact? I apologize. CASTOR: That the ignition switches did not meet the company specifications. FRIEDMAN: It's my understanding that we did not have that information. CASTOR: OK. The supplemental memo released this morning by the committee staff also reveals that GM had over 130 warranty claims on the recalled vehicles that specifically referred to problems with the ignition switch turning off -- turning the car off when going over bumps or when drivers accidentally hit the key with their knee or leg. Is it true that GM provides -- provided early -- in their early warning reports aggregate data of the warranty information, but not the specific warranty claims listed one by one in the comments from consumers? FRIEDMAN: What all car companies provide are aggregate numbers associated with warranties. And so we don't know when we get those counts what the reason for those warranties could be. For example, on the airbag (INAUDIBLE), I believe I mentioned before, you know, the complaints could be because the airbag light was going off when they thought it shouldn't, or because the passenger sensor was not working. So we don't -- when we have that count, we do not have the information as to the detail of exactly what each and every one of those warranty claims is. CASTOR: So if GM had shared the specific warranty claims, would that have been helpful to your agency? FRIEDMAN: The specific warranty claims I believe you're speaking of are related to the ignition switch itself. CASTOR: Yes. The 130 that have now come out with the -- due to the committee investigation. FRIEDMAN: And my honest answer is, I don't know. And that is in part because what -- at the time we did not have the information we now have from General Motors directly connecting the ignition switch to the airbag recalls. CASTOR: So the state of the law currently is that in early warning reports on any type of vehicle problem, the car companies do not have to provide you the specific warranty claims? FRIEDMAN: I believe that's the case. CASTOR: They just give you a summary in general? FRIEDMAN: Yes, I believe that's the case. CASTOR: And that's true whether it is a warranty problem with a radio or a warranty problem that could be a serious safety defect? FRIEDMAN: I believe that is correct. CASTOR: Is that -- do you think it's time to look at the law if the -- if a car company has so many -- you know, here, 130 warranty claims that are specific and they relate to a serious safety defect, do you think that would be helpful to your agency, maybe change the law and say, when a car company becomes aware that they have so many of these serious safety defects that they have to provide you the specific warranty complaints from the consumer? FRIEDMAN: Congresswoman, I have to look at the exact data to -- before I would be able to tell you whether or not it would be valuable. But what I will... CASTOR: But certainly if a company has gathered a critical mass of serious safety defect complaints, that would be helpful to your agency. FRIEDMAN: Well, if they have information regarding a defect, I believe that information they, without a doubt, have to provide to us. I believe the information... CASTOR: But the law does not require that currently. FRIEDMAN: Well, if they have information about a defect, I believe the law does. I believe what you are referring to are warranty claims, which may or may not be associated with a defect. CASTOR: OK. Well, I think this is an important issue for the committee to look at. There might be some new line-drawing or direction on what these early warning reports and if there are serious safety information that they -- a car company has gleaned through their own internal investigation, it really needs to be provided to the agency. MURPHY: Thank you. FRIEDMAN: And, Congressman -- Chairman... MURPHY: Now recognize Dr. Burgess for five minutes. Thank you. BURGESS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Friedman, for being here with us. It has been a long afternoon. Now your testimony, I think you stated that in 2007 and 2010, there was not enough evidence to conduct a formal investigation into General Motors's Chevrolet Cobalt despite the number of complaints and four fatal crashes that had already shown up. But in 2012, your agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, opened an investigation into an airbag problem that some Hyundai models -- my understanding is this was based on a single complaint. And that's OK. I think the airbag non-deployment is a serious issue. But why wasn't it a serious issue when the complaints were coming in about the Cobalt given the fact that you initiated investigation with much less evidence in the case of Hyundai? How can you -- how can you assert that there was not enough evidence to proceed with General Motors's case? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, safety is our priority. And airbag non- deployments is a serious issue. And we treat them very, very seriously. I would have to get back to you on the specifics of the Hyundai case. But it goes back to one of the points I was -- I made before, which is, we are looking for two potential things. The best thing and the easiest ability -- the best thing to be able to find and the clearest thing to be able to find is when there is an obvious indication of a defect. All it takes is one, if that's clear. BURGESS: Yes, and I agree completely. And I don't know -- I mean, you were not here when the CEO testified and we posed questions, one of the questions I posed was for the accident that occurred in Maryland in July of 2005 where a Chevy Cobalt went down a street that ended in a cul-de-sac. It was driving too fast, a lot of problems that night. But the airbag didn't deploy when the car impacted some trees. And it was a pretty serious impact. In fact, it was so serious that the driver was then pushed up, compressed against the steering wheel with such force, I mean, she only weighed 106 pounds, and she broke the rim off the steering wheel. That's a massive amount of force for a little 106-pound body to exhibit. So the airbag didn't deploy. And, you know, I've got your report here that it was in fact investigated in December of 2006. But that's a big deal that that airbag didn't deploy. Different from all of the other accidents that we were given information about . Because of the nature of this person's injuries, because of the cause of her demise, I can't tell you that the airbag would have saved her life, but I know without the airbag there was no chance at all. And, of course, that was proven that night. But an airbag might have made a difference because the steering wheel that she broke off actually compressed against the upper dome -- just below the diaphragm, below the rib cage, and lacerated the liver. And over the course of the next hour and 45 minutes, small woman, small blood volume, she bled out. I mean, an airbag might have made a big difference that night. Now contrasting that was another accident that occurred in Pennsylvania in 2009, where there was a head-on collision between a Hyundai and a Cobalt. And as I pointed out to the GM CEO, the Cobalt was not at fault in this, the driver of the Cobalt was not at fault. The Hyundai came over the center line and there was a head-on collision, closing speed was probably close to 100 miles an hour with -- add the twos speeds of the automobiles together. Everyone who was in the front seat of those vehicles died. But the Cobalt airbag did not deploy. The Hyundai did. Now unfortunately it didn't make any difference as to the overall fatality of that accident, but here you have got a side-by-side identical speeds with which the impact occurred. The deceleration forces were identical in both automobiles. Hyundai deploys, Cobalt doesn't, this is a problem, don't you agree? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, when airbags don't deploy, that's a serious issue. There's also a serious issue sometimes when airbags do deploy. Over 200 people died because airbags -- earlier airbags deployed when they shouldn't have, or deployed too strongly when they shouldn't have. Part of the challenge with all of this, part of the reason why this information ended up not being conclusive for us is because airbags are designed, even in some difficult crashes, to not go off because that's the safest thing, that's the best way to avoid potential harm. BURGESS: Sir, with all due respect, I cannot imagine, and I'm not an engineer, and I'm not a lawyer, but I cannot imagine any circumstance where impacting an oak tree at 70 miles an hour or a head-on collision at 45 miles per hour per vehicle would not be a situation where you did not want the deployment of the airbag. I can't think of a single reason why the airbag deploying would add to the lethality of that accident sequence. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, I completely understand why you feel that and why you have that impression. In the case of the 2005 crash, and in general with these airbags, if you have an unbelted occupant and a small strike first, the risk at play here is that the occupant may be moving forward during that crash. If you're moving forward during that crash and the airbag is opening, yes, it actually could cause more harm than good. When the airbag is -- system is trying to decide... (CROSSTALK) BURGRESS: It couldn't have caused any more harm that night. I would just submit that first impact was with a five-inch pine tree. And although the pine tree yielded to the Cobalt, it was still a pretty significant impact when that happened. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman's time has expired. Now recognize Mr. Barton for five minutes. BARTON: Thank you. And I want to apologize to the other members that are still here. I have been watching the hearing and -- as I've been doing meetings, but I apologize for not being here physically to go ahead of some of you folks. And having said that, I'm going to go ahead. I have listened to most of what you've said today on the television and I think it's obvious that GM has some real questions that they have not done a very good job answering today. But I also think as the federal regulator on the block, there are some valid questions for your agency to answer. My first question is, at what level of accidents or deaths or incidents of malfunction triggers more than normal NHTSA review, not necessarily a full-fledged investigation? But in this case we, in hindsight, have got 13 deaths that we feel are attributable to this ignition problem over a 10-year period. I don't know how many accidents to how many injuries. But, you know, when would NHTSA really start looking at something and say, you know, there is an anomaly here, we need to check it out? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, first, I appreciate your question. And, you know, part of where you started with this is there are important questions that NHTSA has to answer in addition to General Motors. And I think this is an incredibly important process because we have questions, you have questions. What my focus is, in addition to the recall, is making sure NHTSA does everything we can to improve the way we deal with these cases. When it comes to your question about, is there a specific level? Each case ends up being different. Ideally what I like would to have happen is that we find any -- well, first, that automakers find and fix these defects right away. If they don't, ideally, I want to find and fix these defects before any single life is lost. BARTON: But there is some internal reporting system or monitoring system. And like if a specific model started showing up 100 accidents a month that were unexplainable, that would be a big enough blip that somebody at NHTSA would say, well, what's going on there? I mean, if you had a steering problem, if you had a brake problem, if you had a gasoline tank problem that kept exploding over and over again, not once every decade, but, I mean, you know, enough that you could see in your reporting, somebody at NHTSA would say, hey, we need to check that out. Now I am told that at the staff level there were some internal NHTSA employees, and employees at NHTSA said, you know, before GM admitted there was a problem, there were some NHTSA mid-level people that said, we need to look at it, and a decision was made within NHTSA that it wasn't at a level that was worthy of further investigation. Is that true? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, we have a process to do exactly what you just said. We have people who are reading every single one of the more than 45,000 complaints that come in. We have a team dedicated to do that. We have a team dedicated to looking at all the early warning data that comes in. In this case, red flags were raised, concerns were raised, and it was proposed because of that exact process, the exact process you're talking about, that we do have. Concerns were raised, and this was brought to a panel. The job of that panel is to consider all of the evidence, the initial evidence as well as more detailed look at the data, whether or not there is a clear trend, whether or not there is enough information to have concern over a specific defect. The panel did that in this case. What I'm learning, what I'm seeing from all of this is that we need to reconsider and look at how do we deal with cases where there may be something that's considered a remote explanation. Should we change the way we follow up on it? Should we change the way we follow up on that with the car company? These are things that I think we're learning lessons that... (CROSSTALK) BARTON: My time is just about out. I want to make one general comment and then one final question. You know, we pointed out to the GM executive that was here that their part didn't meet their own specifications. And it didn't just almost not meet them, it didn't meet them by a long way. I mean, like a third. It was like two-thirds off. It was way below, not just a little bit. And that's not NHTSA's problem. And you're not expected to -- the NHTSA people aren't expected to know things at that level. But on the general point that Dr. Burgess was asking about, you know, when an airbag doesn't deploy when it runs into a tree at 40 or 50 miles an hour, and the general response from NHTSA is that we didn't know how that particular airbag system was supposed to work, I don't think that's a very good answer. FRIEDMAN: Congressman... BARTON: Isn't NHTSA supposed to know how the airbag systems work? And if they're not, if NHTSA doesn't know, aren't you and your agency supposed to find out? FRIEDMAN: Congressman, the circumstances of these crashes were much more complicated than that. We applied expertise. We applied our understanding. We applied a process that has worked to generate over 1,299 recalls over the last decade. Are there improvements that we need to make to that process based on what we've learned today? Yes, absolutely. And I am committed to making sure that that happens. But these -- I wish these crashes were as simple as they appear to be. I wish the connection was as direct as we now know it is. At the time and with the information we had... BARTON: Hindsight is always easier than current sight. FRIEDMAN: And as you've said before, hindsight is 20/20. And ideally... (CROSSTALK) BARTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MURPHY: Thank you. The gentlemen yields back. Now recognize Mr. Griffith of Virginia for five minutes. GRIFFITH: Thank you very much. Appreciate it. I appreciate you being here today and I would ask several questions following up, you know, on why didn't NHTSA know. And it is true that hindsight is 20/20. But it appears that some of your folks were at least sending up warning signals. I'm looking at what I believe is tab 18. And the DAD, which is the Defects Assessment Division, and I know you know that, but not everybody watching on TV knows that. And so I want to make sure they know because I had to look it up. Sent out and said -- in one of their emails in 2007 said: "notwithstanding GM's indications that they see no specific problem pattern, DAD perceives a pattern of non-deployments in these vehicles that does not exist in their peers and that their circumstances are such that in our engineering judgment, merited a deployment, and that such a deployment would have reduced the injury level or saved lives." When you combine that flag with the flag I think you mentioned earlier in your testimony that you were getting a number, if I remember correctly, it was about 200 and some complaints on this particular Cobalt vehicle, that they were stalling out on the road, or the engine was cutting off. And you start adding those together along with the fact that I believe you all knew that there was at least I think it was three where the airbag didn't deploy and the ignition was in the accessory mode. It would seem that somebody ought to start an investigation, that those coincidences might have been more than coincidences. And I would ask, I know you're trying to do things better, but apparently the person who put all this together was an investigator for a one-man law firm. He did have somebody of counsel, but basically you got have a one-man law firm with an engineering investigator who figures this out. So I would say to you, you know, what can you do better? And have you called on that investigator to come in and maybe train some of your folks that -- to look at some of these coincidences, because when you start seeing a series of negative things happen, that might be where you ought to be looking. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, our team was looking at this issue. The Defects Assessment Division was doing exactly their job. We have a system that is designed to raise those red flags. About half of the time the recommendations of those Defects Assessment Division end up moving on to investigations. This -- what I see in this case is one of the things I mentioned before, which is one of the things we need to look at is how do we make connections between remote defect possibilities? In this case, you had one theory that was put forth which was that the accessory -- the key being in the accessory position could have caused airbag non-deployments. In the crashes that we looked at, the circumstances of those crashes led the investigators to believe that it was much more likely that the airbags didn't go off because of the circumstances of that crash. I understand -- completely understand why it looks like it should have been clear, but it's clear now in part because we have that clear connection from General Motors. GRIFFITH: Well, but let me raise this concern. This memo indicates that there's a reliance, if you -- and I'm implying this from the wording, "notwithstanding GM's indication that they see no specific pattern problem." It shows -- that statement shows a reliance on GM. Likewise in your testimony, you state that this understanding was verified -- talking about the power-loss situation. "This understanding was verified by GM's service literature during our due diligence effort." Now, if you've got a company that has got a car that's not functioning the way it's supposed to, I would like to think that with 51 employees versus that one-man law firm out of Georgia, that you would look at something other than the service literature and not necessarily to rely on GM indications that they see no specific pattern or problem pattern. So I'm concerned that there may have been too much reliance on information from GM, including their service, make sure I get the wording right, their "service literature," and what they saw as problem patterns when, in fact, I think that you all are supposed to be finding the problem patterns. Now I understand it's easy in hindsight sitting up here to say that. But these are warning signs that go off to me as a legislator that maybe you all need to take a look at that. And, you know, when you see problems, maybe the service literature of the company that you're looking at is not the best place to get your information. FRIEDMAN: Congressman, just to be clear, we did not rely on General Motors when it came to defects, whether or not there's a defect trend. We did our own analysis of the data. And our own analysis indicated that the Cobalt didn't stand out. I also wonder if I haven't been clear enough relative to that service bulletin. We did not rely on that service bulletin at the time. We did not rely on that information from General Motors. We relied on our experts' understanding of airbag systems. GRIFFITH: But their understanding of the airbag system in the Cobalt was based on the service literature for the Cobalt according to your written testimony. FRIEDMAN: Well... GRIFFITH: Am I not correct? Is that not what you said? FRIEDMAN: My testimony sounds like it was not clear enough. What happened was once we found out about this defect, we looked into the service literature to confirm our understanding at the time. And the service literature that we looked at this year for that vehicle confirmed our understanding at the time which was that... GRIFFITH: But your... (CROSSTALK) GRIFFITH: Your understanding at the time and the service literature were both wrong, isn't that correct? Yes or no? FRIEDMAN: Yes, that's correct. GRIFFITH: Thank you. I yield back. MURPHY: The gentleman yields back. Now recognize Mr. Long for five minutes. LONG: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member and all of the members on both sides that have been here today. We originally weren't scheduled to be in this soon. And so a lot of us had to change our travel plans to get in today. And a lot of us have been sitting here through the entire both hearings today because it is a very, very important issue, of course, that we're discussing. And, thank you, Mr. Friedman, for being here with us today with your testimony. You know, when I think of NHTSA, I think of number 66 for the Green Bay Packers, linebacker Ray Nitschke. And all day we've been talking about NHTSA, NHTSA, NHTSA. Tell me what NHTSA is. FRIEDMAN: NHTSA is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. It's an organization of nearly 600 people whose mission is to save lives and reduce injuries by addressing issues like drunk driving, unbelted occupants, vehicle safety, and the subject we're talking about today, which is finding vehicle defects when automakers don't find them, themselves, which is their first and foremost responsibility. LONG: I just wanted to get that out there on the record. I, of course, know what it is, but I think a lot of people when they hear that, NHTSA, NHTSA, NHTSA, all day are thinking, what exactly is this? So the next question I would have would be, do you have any way to track consumer complaints to auto dealers short of waiting for them to reach out to you? Not the dealers, but the consumers that are having a problem. Do you have any way to track people coming in and, my car stopped, it died, it did this, it did that? Do you have any way to track that or do you have to wait for someone to contact you all? FRIEDMAN: We have early warning data which tracks the cases where warranty services are provided on vehicles... (CROSSTALK) LONG: So any time a warranty service is provided, you will be notified of that? FRIEDMAN: We're notified of a count. We have a total number -- a count of the number of those and the part that that's associated with. LONG: And how often... FRIEDMAN: Not the reason for the complaint. LONG: Do you get that annually, semi-annually, quarterly? FRIEDMAN: Once a quarter. LONG: Once a quarter. OK. FRIEDMAN: The information is required once a quarter. LONG: How would a -- what kind of marketing do you do? How would a consumer know, learn about the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration? What kind of marketing do you do? If I took my car in, had a problem, it wouldn't pop into my head to call you, so how do you market yourself? How can we let the American public know if they do have an issue, and they're not satisfied with their dealer, how can they contact you? Or what can we do to better augment that, I guess? FRIEDMAN: Well, some of the things that we're already looking at doing and that we're already making sure that happens is on every single recall letter that goes out, both NHTSA's name is on that letter, even though it's sent from the automaker, and it's in clear red letters that this is an important safety recall information. We also have apps that are available online that we try to make sure that consumers download. These apps allow people to lodge complaints directly to us. They allow them to track their recalls. We're also moving forward later on this year with a tool that will allow all consumers to come to our Web site, put in their VIN number to find out if there's a recall associated with their very specific vehicle that has yet to be addressed. We have additional efforts where we try to make sure that people are aware of who NHTSA is. But, yes, I've seen the same data. And one of the things I've talked to my staff about is that I'm concerned that we are not at the top of the list when people have complaints. And we've been talking about ways to make sure that we have campaigns to make people aware that if you've got a complaint, if you've got a concern, come to NHTSA and we need that information. Consumer complaint data is one of the vital tools that we have to try to find these defects. And I would appreciate any help anyone can provide to make sure that people are aware that people go to safercar.gov to report these defects, any help. LONG: For tomorrow you're going to be able to see on there that you can take your car in and get a free loaner or a free rental, right? FRIEDMAN: Absolutely. LONG: Very good. My last question, at what point is the consumer supposed to reach out to you? FRIEDMAN: At any point they have a concern. I mean, you know, when it... LONG: At what point is that, though? If I get a -- go home this evening, in the mail I get a recall on my vehicle and they want me to bring it in and fix this switch or that doodad there, whatever, do I run to the phone, call you, and say, hey, I've got a recall? Or do I wait until I'm not satisfied with the dealer? At what point do consumers -- should consumers reach out to you? FRIEDMAN: Well, in that case, if you get a recall letter, the first thing you should do, without a doubt, is contact your dealer and get your vehicle fixed as soon as possible. LONG: Yes, but I'm talking about contacting you. At what point do I -- if it's just a standard thing, I don't need to contact you on that? FRIEDMAN: If it's a standard recall, and you're concerned and you want to reach out to us, absolutely. But typically when we want people to contact us is well before there's a recall. We rely on, and look at, over 45,000 consumer complaints every single year to try to spot these trends. So I want someone to reach out to NHTSA the instant they have a serious concern about their vehicle and they feel that their safety is at risk, so that we can have that information. Right now we've got 45,000 complaints. I'd like to see that number get up to 50,000, 60,000, 75,000 complaints relative to safety issues so that we can have more information to be able to track down these problems. LONG: Okay. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any time left, but if I did, I'd sure yield back. ACTING CHAIRMAN: I thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Terry, for five minutes. TERRY: Thank you, acting chair. You had testified, Mr. Friedman, or in your testimony you showed, or testified that there were two SCI reports that showed indications of power loss and identified the vehicle power mode as accessory. And I think one of these has been highlighted in several newspaper articles that the SCI noted during airbag investigation, a problem with the accessory. So the question I have is, did these reports merely report the vehicle power mode as a fact? Or did it report and identify it as a potential contributing factor? FRIEDMAN: Well, the two reports handled the case differently. My understanding and my memory is that in one of the reports, it simply had an entry in the EDR data, in the event data recorder data, that indicated that the vehicle power mode was accessory. That's typically not reported. In another case, in the other case, it was included in the special crash investigation. There were two possible reasons why the airbags did not deploy. One possible reason was because of the ignition switch. The other possible reason was because the yielding nature of the trees wasn't sufficient. TERRY: You mean they're hard when they're hit. FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry? TERRY: I'm being sarcastic. You said the yielding nature of the tree is... FRIEDMAN: I'm sorry. I'm using technical... TERRY: They're hard and objects hit them. FRIEDMAN: Well, different trees of different sizes. In this case... TERRY: Anyway, I don't want to get bogged down into the force, the impact of a tree. But the point is that they were noted in two SCI reports but not acted upon. So what is the communication process between the SCI and the ODI? Someone's got to take that up and say, geez, there's a problem with the an ignition switch that's been noted, maybe we should follow up on that. What's the process? FRIEDMAN: So, the process, it depends on the circumstance. In some cases, our office of defects investigation will actually ask the special crash investigators to go out and look at a crash so that they can seek new information. In other cases, when the special crash investigators follow up on a crash, they will bring it to the attention of the Office of Defects Investigation. So we try to make sure that both teams are talking to each other and sharing critical information. TERRY: Okay. So in these two SCI reports that were filed, did the SCI -- did the special crash investigator communicate that there's a problem other than noting it in those reports on those two occasions to the ODI? FRIEDMAN: I don't know if SCI specifically communicated the accessory issue, but when the team did look at especially the investigation that indicated that there were two possible reasons for that... TERRY: Yes, so the ODI knew that there may have been -- that the switch may have been part of the problem, let's say? FRIEDMAN: ODI would have been aware of exactly... TERRY: So odi was aware? FRIEDMAN: I believe so, because my understanding is... TERRY: Right, because it looks like you have one group of people that's not talking to another group of people. FRIEDMAN: Our teams do talk to each other, but as you'll notice in my testimony, one of the thing that I do think we need to discuss is are there ways we can change the way these crash investigations are used in our defects process? But in this case, I do want to note that the draft version of this report that the team had at the time, at that moment, indicated that the crash investigators thought the more likely reason the airbags did not go off was because of the circumstances of the crash. TERRY: I would think if you note that there's a problem with the switch to automatically turning to accessory, that that would be significant enough to just follow up on whether or not it was deemed to be a contributing factor or the sole factor. I need to ask, though, on the EW -- early warning reports. You were receiving early warning, the reports from G.M., correct? FRIEDMAN: That's correct. TERRY: In my question to the chair -- I'm sorry, the president of G.M., she said that they were submitting those. Were they required when they know or feel that there is a problem with a specific item in that car, like the ignition switch to report that, or is that just one of the many items to be submitted within the EWR? FRIEDMAN: Well, my understanding is that if they're aware aware of a problem that relates to a safety defect that that actually is not reported within EWR, that needs... (CROSSTALK) TERRY: They support, under the TREAD Act, they have to support that separately. FRIEDMAN: Well, under the TREAD act, they're required to report warranty claims and a variety of other pieces of information to us. But if they saw a defect, then they needed to report that to us, completely separate from. That's simply their -- (CROSSTALK) TERRY: What's noncompliance... FRIEDMAN: ... why we have an investigation. TERRY: I'm over my time, but I do need to get on the record. What is noncompliance versus defect? FRIEDMAN: So these are two -- TERRY: And you have two seconds. FRIEDMAN: Sure. Really quickly. Noncompliance means you did not meet the standards that we have. A safety defect means that you may have met the standards, but there's something wrong with a vehicle that poses an unreasonable risk to safety. TERRY: All right. Thank you. ACTING CHAIRMAN: I thank the gentleman. I would ask for unanimous consent that the members' written opening statements be introduced into the record. Without objection, the documents will be entered into the record. Hearing none. I'll also ask unanimous consent that the contents of the documents and binder be introducted into the record, and to authorize staff to make appropration redactions. Without objection, the documents will be entered into the record with any redactions that staff determines are appropriate. Hearing no objections. In conclusion, i'd like to thank all the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Friedman. FRIEDMAN: Thank you. ACTING CHAIRMAN: And members that participated in today's hearing. I remind members that they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record, and I ask that the witnesses all agree to respond promptly to the questions. Anything else? Thank you very much. This hearing is adjourned. CQ Transcriptions, April 1, 2014 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: REP. TIM MURPHY, R-PA. CHAIRMAN REP. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, R-TEXAS REP. MARSHA BLACKBURN, R-TENN. REP. PHIL GINGREY, R-GA. REP. STEVE SCALISE, R-LA. REP. CORY GARDNER, R-COLO. REP. MORGAN GRIFFITH, R-VA. REP. GREGG HARPER, R-MISS. REP. PETE OLSON, R-TEXAS REP. RENEE ELLMERS, R-N.C. REP. BILL JOHNSON, R-OHIO REP. BILLY LONG, R-MO. REP. JOE L. BARTON, R-TEXAS EX OFFICIO REP. FRED UPTON, R-MICH. EX OFFICIO REP. DIANA DEGETTE, D-COLO. RANKING MEMBER REP. GENE GREEN, D-TEXAS REP. JAN SCHAKOWSKY, D-ILL. REP. KATHY CASTOR, D-FLA. REP. BRUCE BRALEY, D-IOWA REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C. REP. BEN RAY LUJAN, D-N.M. REP. PAUL TONKO, D-N.Y. REP. PETER WELCH, D-VT. REP. JOHN D. DINGELL, D-MICH. EX OFFICIO REP. HENRY A. WAXMAN, D-CALIF. EX OFFICIO REP. LEE TERRY, R-NEB. WITNESSES: MARY BARRA, CEO, GM DAVID FRIEDMAN, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NHTSA Source: CQ Transcriptions All materials herein are protected by United States copyright law and may not be reproduced, distributed, transmitted, displayed, published or broadcast without the prior written permission of CQ Transcriptions. You may not alter or remove any trademark, copyright or other notice from copies of the content. © 2014 CQ Roll Call All Rights Reserved...

Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Immigration Enforcement Policies LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES GRASSLEY: For the benefit of the audience and the witnesses, generally, and in this case, too, Senator Feinstein is the Ranking Member for this hearing, and she and I will make opening comments. Then we'll go to our first panel. This Committee continues to honor its pledge to conduct oversight over the implementation of the laws Congress has passed, as well as the policies and practices of the executive branch. Today we will focus on how this Committee's (sic) immigration policies and practices are hurting American families. The Committee will hear powerful testimony from a number of relatives who have lost loved ones as a direct result of the administration's failure to deport aliens or its tolerance of sanctuary policies. I'll begin by extending a special welcome to our witnesses, especially family members of victims. I hope you will accept our deepest sympathies for the losses each of you have suffered. Thank you very much for your willingness to share your stories under difficult circumstances and to pay tribute to those who, though no longer with us in body, are surely with us in spirit. Today we will honor Josh, Kate, Dennis, Danny, Grant, and many others whose lives were tragically cut short because of the administration's lax immigration policies. We had many families and relatives who wanted to testify today, but unfortunately we had to turn them away because we were limited in time and space. However, we welcome all testimony for the record and encourage them to commemorate their loved ones with stories and written letters to this Committee. We will examine the administration's policies from top down. We'll look at how federal benefits are being granted to deportable criminals by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services while criminals are being released by U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement, and how enforcement of the laws can be better achieved. We will look at how we can improve cooperation between government agencies and we'll look into how we can improve cooperation between the federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies. After all, we all work for the same taxpayer; we ought to be cooperating. We'll look at sanctuary jurisdictions and try to understand why policies that protect criminal aliens are in place. In the past few weeks, we have learned that there are thousands of detainers placed each year on federal agents -- by federal agents on undocumented immigrants with criminal records that are ignored. According to government data, between January and September 2014, there were 8,811 declined detainers in 276 counties, 43 states, including Columbia District. Of the 8,811 declined detainers, 62 percent were associated with over 5,000 individuals who were previously charged or convicted of a crime or presented some other public safety concern. And nearly 1,900 of the released offenders were arrested for another crime after being released by sanctuary jurisdiction. This is obviously disturbing, not only to me but to most Americans. There is no good rationale for noncooperation between federal-level and state and local law enforcement. Public safety is needlessly and recklessly put at risk when state and local officials provide sanctuary to law-abiding immigrants just to make a political point. This administration in too many cases has turned a blind eye to enforcement, even releasing thousands of criminals at its own discretion, many of whom have gone on to commit serious crimes, including murder. The administration has also granted deferred action to criminal aliens who have committed heinous crimes after receiving this relief from deportation. I've written to Secretary Johnson about four specific cases in which such individuals have received President Obama's deferred action for childhood arrivals, and that it is referred to as DACA in this town. One of these beneficiaries was a known gang member when he applied and received DACA, then went on to kill four people in North Carolina. Another DACA recipient used his work authorization to gain employment at a popular youth camp in California where he was recently arrested for child molestation and distribution of child pornography. I'm still waiting for responses on some of these cases. Further, the administration's completely failed to do anything about sanctuary cities, while -- all the while challenging states that took a more aggressive approach to enforcing immigration laws. I recently sent a letter to Attorney General Lynch and Homeland Security Secretary Johnson about sanctuary cities. I urged them to take control of the situation to ensure detainers are not ignored and non-documented individuals are safely transferred to federal custody and put into deportation proceedings. I implored them to take a more direct role in the matter and on that -- on those letters I have not received a response. But this isn't a new issue for this administration. I wrote to then-Secretary Napolitano and then-Attorney General Holder in 2012 and asked them to intervene in Cook County, Illinois, and other sanctuary jurisdictions. Nothing happened. In fact, since then the administration officials have publicly stated that they neither believe detainers have to be honored, nor that they even want them to be mandatory. Enforcing the immigration laws in this country is not a voluntary or trivial matter. Real lives are at stake. Things cannot continue this way. We're a nation based upon the rule of law and if that rule of law isn't respected, only chaos will succeed. That is why I'm introducing legislation today that will hold sanctuary jurisdictions accountable. It will require the executive branch to withhold certain federal funding if states or local law enforcement refuse to cooperate with federal government in holding and transferring criminal aliens. My bill will require the state and local cooperate on criminal aliens or risk losing law enforcement-related grants that are distributed by Homeland Security and DOJ. My bill will also require a mandatory minimum five-year prison sentence in addition to possible fines for individuals who enter the United States after having been deported. Current law does not require prison time and caps the possible prison sentence at two years. This section of my bill is aimed at individuals who ignore our laws time and again. No more people should die at the hands of those who break our laws just by being here. No more families should have to go through what these families and others have gone through again. I'd like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to be with us today. Your strength and determination to change the unacceptable status quo won't go unnoticed. I will now turn to Senator Feinstein. And after she does, I'll introduce the witnesses. FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much, Chairman Grassley. I want to say that our Ranking Member, Patrick Leahy, would be here but there is an urgent family appointment that he had to keep this morning. And so I sit in in his stead. And I know this is a hearing that he very much would have wanted to have attended. Yesterday I had occasion to meet with the Steinle family. And Jim Steinle is sitting front and center at the dock. And what I saw was a very hurt family, but very resolute and very concerned about doing the right thing, whatever that may be in a case like this. So I want to voice my very clear sympathy and condolences to the family members that are here today. I can't think of anything that's harder to do than what you're going to do today. And I think your strength in doing it is noted and very much appreciated. It is very clear to me that we have to improve cooperation between local, state, and federal law enforcement. The overriding concern, and a deep belief of mine, is that convicted felons should not be removed from the country -- should be removed from the country, but not released onto our streets. When immigration authorities ask that a state or local law enforcement agency notify them of an impending release of an alien with a serious felony record, that request should be honored. I strongly believe that local law enforcement should have notified the immigration authorities in the case of the accused murderer of Kate Steinle. The man who killed Kate is a classic case of multiple felonies and prior deportations. And a simple phone call would have been enough. But that did not happen. In fact, the San Francisco County Sheriff adopted his own policy on March of 2015, just four months ago. The memo states, "SFSD staff shall not provide the following information or ask access to ICE representatives," end-quote. One of the items listed in the department's memo is, quote, "release dates and times," end-quote. In other words, the Sheriff's Department barred its own deputies from informing ICE about an individual's release date and time. That, I believe, is wrong. I believe it is not required by San Francisco's ordinance as the Mayor has made clear to the Sheriff in a letter dated July 14. And Mr. Chairman, I would like to put that letter in the record, if I may. GRASSLEY: Without objection, so ordered. FEINSTEIN: Thank you. I agree with the Mayor and to prevent a similar tragedy I hope and expect that my home state of California and the city of San Francisco in particular will agree to take part in the Department of Homeland Security Priority Enforcement Program, known as PEP. This program focuses on felons and others who are high priorities for removal from the country. Under PEP, ICE can request notification of an alien's release date from a state or local -- from state or local custody. And so that they would have the opportunity, if the circumstances warranted it, to take custody of that individual itself. In some instances, PEP also allows for ICE to lodge a detainer request with local law enforcement, asking that they hold an alien for up to 48 hours. It seems to me that a simple notification to ICE could have prevented Kate Steinle's death. I have urged Mayor Lee and the board of supervisors to participate in this new program, which the Secretary announced late last year. This program prioritizes those who threaten our nation's national security. I'm pleased that Mayor Lee is taking this request seriously and is in the process of communicating with the Department of Homeland Security about participating. We all know that most undocumented immigrants are otherwise law-abiding, hard-working, and just want to provide for their families. I believe that deeply. But that's not the element of the undocumented population we're talking about today. I'm currently working on a bill, as is our Chairman and I think others on this -- in this Committee, that would require state and local law enforcement to notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the impending release from a detention center of an illegal alien who has previously been convicted of a felony, if ICE requests such notification. This bill is a work in progress. And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony today and to working with other members of this Committee so that we might produce a bill that is worthy of consideration and passage. And I thank the Chair. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Our first witness, Ms. Susan Oliver. Ms. Oliver is a widow of Deputy Danny Oliver, a police officer in Sacramento. Danny was killed while on duty by an undocumented immigrant who was previously arrested on two separate occasions on drug-related charges and twice deported. Ms. Oliver has established a foundation in her husband's name to help kids in school. Our second witness, Ms. Grace Huang, she is Public Policy Program Coordinator for the Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, a non-profit network of domestic violence founded in 1990. Our third witness, Mr. Michael Ronnebeck, the uncle of Grant Ronnebeck. He was a 21-year-old convenience store clerk who was gunned down earlier this year by an undocumented immigrant. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement released Grant's alleged murderer who was awaiting deportation. Grant was born in Iowa, but resided in Arizona and had two brothers and a sister. Our fourth witness, the Reverend Gabriel Salguero. Reverend Salguero and his wife are the co-lead pastors of Lambs Church of the Nazarene, New York City. He is also a founder of the National Latino Evangelical Coalition. Our fifth witness, Mr. Jim Steinle, of Pleasanton, California, the father of Kate Steinle, who was gunned down 20 days ago while walking on a pier in San Francisco alongside this father. Her alleged killer had seven prior felony convictions and had been deported five times. Sanchez was shielded by San Francisco's sanctuary policy, which allowed for his release in March despite an ICE detainer placed on him. Sixth person, Chief J. Thomas Manger. Chief Manger has been a chief of police, Montgomery County, since February 2004. Chief Manger also serves as president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Our seventh witness is Dr. Brian McCann. Mr. McCann's brother, Dennis, was killed in 2011 by a drunk driver who was in the country illegally and driving without a license. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement had placed a detainer on the drunk driver, but he was released under Cook County, Illinois's sanctuary city policies. Our final witness, Ms. Laura Wilkerson, of Pearland, Texas. She's a mother of Josh Wilkerson. Josh was 18-years-old when he was kidnapped and murdered by his high school classmate, an illegal immigrant, after offering his classmate a ride from school. Josh's murderer was sentenced to life imprisonment and will be eligible for parole in 30 years. I want to thank all of you for being here. And I expressed to you privately our condolences, I say so now publicly. You are very brave to come forward and testimony and we -- we welcome that very much. And we'll start with Ms. Oliver. You -- I know you folks have been told about a four-minute rule. The red light comes on. If you have a longer statement, it will be put in the record. That doesn't mean that just exactly when the red light comes on I'm going to gavel you down. But please cut it short because this is a very important hearing. We want to get the witnesses in. But the most important thing after you tell your stories is for us to hear from the administration and to question the administration. Will you start, Ms. Oliver? OLIVER: Good morning. I just wanted to first state that I'm honored that the bill has been named after my husband, Deputy Oliver, as well as Detective Davis, who were killed on October 24, 2014. Over the past nine months, my life has changed dramatically because of the loss of my husband, Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy Danny Oliver. Danny Oliver was a special person that knew that treating people with dignity and kindness resulted in stronger, healthier, and safer communities, and he worked every day to help make that a reality for communities that needed it the most. As a 15-year veteran of Sacramento County's Sheriff's Office, Danny Oliver was not a man to boast or gloat of his professional accomplishments. In fact, when he was given a standing ovation at a community meeting, he felt unsure of how to handle this overwhelming approval. Danny simply felt he was doing his job and that was all that was needed to feel accomplished. My husband's last shift with the Sacramento County's Sheriff's Office ended by doing something he had done countless times before in his career. He was policing his community and trying to make a difference. Danny was a POP officer, also known as a problem-oriented police officer. His job was to identify possible community challenges and try to get ahead of them. He had put himself into harm's way every day that he put his uniform on. And on Friday, October 24, 2014, my husband and father of two approached a car on his beat. But this time it was the last time. The last thing my husband attempted to do as a POP officer was to ask the man inside the car how his day was going. But he never made it to the driver's window. At about 10:30 a.m., that man was in the country illegally and armed with numerous illegal weapons. He aimed one outside the car of a parking lot of Motel 6 in Sacramento and opened fire, killing my husband with a shot to the forehead. I can honestly say that not a day goes by that this has not affected me. It may not be visible always. It may not be written in bold for all to see. It may not even be recognized, but it's always in the background of my mind. Sorry. It's there daily, sometimes moment by moment, as it should be. Many people ask if I've gotten past that terrible day and the answer is no. Honestly, I don't think I will ever get past that day. I lost the man I was married to for 25 years. Each day I look for parental backup for rearing my child who's 12-years-old, and I feel that loss. Each day my children reach milestones. My daughter recently got engaged and there will be a marriage that he will not be at. There will be school graduations and even our weekly family brunches that we held. I am reminded that I no longer have my husband by my side. I was with him since I graduated high school 25 years ago, and we watched each other grow up. We made careers together and we raised two children. We could just look at each other and know what we needed. Perhaps it was support, a loving smile, or even an "I'll talk to you when we get home" look. It is hard to build this trust and understanding, but we had it mastered with ease. But because of the actions of one criminal, this all ended on October 24. My life will never be the same. Unlike law enforcement, there are few professions that consistently send our loved ones into harm's way. It's frightening always knowing that each time they walk out the door it could be the last time that you see them. At the same time, not many professions consciously or intentionally give the order to take a life through the use of deadly force in order to protect others who can't protect themselves, an awesome responsibility that my husband understood clearly. And this continues to be -- to create a lot of ongoing dialogue without communities throughout the country as we see a lack of -- of -- of -- as we see a lack of -- of -- as we see a lack of continuity among law enforcement groups and communities that they serve. Every single day law enforcers at the state, local, and federal level put themselves -- themselves, their loved ones, and their communities that they serve at risk when they are forced to release criminals who are illegal, who pose a threat to community safety, all in violation of current laws that require deportation. In just the last two years, ICE released back into the nation's streets 76,000 convicted criminals who were in this country illegally. There are 169 (ph) criminals in the United States who are here illegally right now. That means there are 169,000 people in our streets who have criminal convictions and were formerly and lawfully ordered departed, but who remain here to commit other crimes, to possibly kill someone else's loved one. The administration's tolerance of sanctuary cities has also resulted in another 10,000 potentially deported illegal immigrant criminals being released by local law agencies since January of last year. And 121 of these criminals have been ordered deported in the last three years and yet were released by ICE, have now -- and have now been charged with additional homicide offenses. The man that killed my husband, Danny Oliver, was deported several times for various felonies before killing my husband on October 24, 2014. However, due to the lack of coordination between law enforcement agencies, he was allowed back into the country and in one day he committed another crime, only this time his illegal crime status impacted many in a direct and profound way when he shot and killed my husband. It would be remiss if I didn't also mention that it wasn't my -- it wasn't my life -- it wasn't just my life that was changed that day. That same criminal eluded hundreds of officers from Sacramento to Auburn, California, during a six-hour crime spree that also left Placer County Sheriff Detective Michael Davis Jr. dead, Placer County Sheriff Deputy Jeff Davis wounded, and a motorist in serious condition from a gunshot to the head. Many lives changed on October 24. Today I honor my husband, Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy Danny Oliver, and the other fallen heroes throughout this nation who are always with us in our hearts and in our memories. I wonder if I would even be here today talking to you about my loss if the government -- if the government better enforced immigration law. Unfortunately, this is now my reality. Thank you for honoring Danny and the others who have made the ultimate sacrifice. I hope by being here today and telling you about the grief my family has unnecessarily endured I can help save the life of someone else's friend, husband, or father. I hope that my husband's death won't be in vain. I hope that I can be here to make a difference. My life is forever changed and saddened. Please help put policy in place to make sure that criminal immigrants are in this country -- who are in this country illegally are never allowed to dictate (ph) the life of a true humanitarian like my husband, Deputy Danny Oliver. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Ms. Oliver. Ms. Huang? HUANG: Thank you, Chairman Grassley and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Grace Huang from the Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence. I am deeply honored to be here to comment on the impact of local law enforcement policies regarding federal immigration enforcement on victims of domestic violence. The issue of violence in our communities is challenging, complex, and deeply emotional. As someone who's worked with survivors of violent crimes for over 22 years, I know how important it is for people to feel that -- to feel that they can prevent future tragedies. And I want to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families here today. Over the years -- over the years in my work at the Coalition, I've had the honor to work with -- work in helping families make it -- work in the advocacy process in advancing effective policy solutions. Through open and honest dialogue, I hope that we can work to find solutions that are -- that make our communities safer for everyone. One crucial thing we can do is to build strong police and community relationships, which means establishing an environment of trust. If victims and witnesses do not feel safe coming forward, the police cannot do their jobs and are -- we are all less safe. Congress has affirmed that principle that immigrant victims and witnesses should feel safe to come forward by creating the U visa for victims of crime in 2000 in the Violence Against Women Act, which was recently reauthorized. I thank you all for everything you have done to make women in our communities as a whole more safe. I ask that you remember these lessons as you work to address this new challenge. As a victim advocate, I'm deeply concerned that mandating local police cooperation with immigration enforcement will strengthen the hands of violent perpetrators, helping them silence their victims and witnesses. I'm also concerned that vulnerable immigrant victims brave enough to step forward will face detention, separation from their children, and swift deportation. This was what many communities encountered with Secure Communities, and the chilling effect it had on police-community relations was both traumatic (ph) and counterproductive. One example of this chilling effect is the case of Cecilia, a young Guatemalan girl living in Colorado. Cecilia was sexually abused by a family friend at the age of 5. Her parents, who were undocumented, were terrified of reporting the crime to the police after having been told by friends and family that they would be reported to Immigration if they stepped forward. A year later, that same perpetrator sexually abused another child. In the end, after the father of that child contacted Cecilia's parents, they went to the police together and the perpetrator was caught and prosecuted. But because of their initial fear to report, another child was harmed. When immigrants are afraid to come forward with information about a crime, the entire community is less safe. When reaching out to police to address domestic violence may end up in deportation, law enforcement is effectively removed as an option for safety, which has life-threatening impacts. For example, one client, Maria, so distrusted the police that when her abuser tracked her down after she fled to another state, she tried to call her lawyer instead of calling 911. It was midnight, he was pounding on the door, and she was frantically calling over and over the closed office of her attorney, who was, of course, not at work. For Maria, the idea of calling the police was simply not an option that put her life in danger. Imagine being so fearful that even though somebody is trying to break into your house, you cannot turn to the police. As victim advocates, we're also concerned that immigrant survivors will be caught up in deportation cases when there are mandates for local police cooperation with ICE. It's not unusual for immigrant victims to be convicted of crimes stemming from their victimization. For example, in California, Cindy, a Taiwanese woman on a student visa, was arrested and convicted of felony domestic violence charges and spent nearly a month in jail before she was able to speak to somebody in her own language. She had bitten her abuser while fighting him off when he tried to rape her. Although the jury determined that she had acted to defend herself, she was convicted of felony domestic violence because the jury determined that the force she used to defend herself was greater than the assault. Because Cindy was not automatically referred to ICE, she was able to complete her studies, expunge her criminal record, and become a productive member of society. Police -- policies limiting local police cooperation with ICE may provide just enough respite for victims like Cindy to access the resources they need. Again, I want to say that we in the domestic violence advocacy field greatly appreciate the work that Congress has done, and many members of this Committee, in particular, have done to support a coordinated community response to domestic violence. Proposals that are under consideration to limit funds to so- called sanctuary cities will allow violent crimes to go un- investigated and leave victims without redress. Federal funding of law enforcement supports critical training, equipment, and staff that assists victims all over the country every day. Without such funding there will be cases that go un-investigated, protection orders that will not be served or enforced, rape kits that will not be tested, the child abuse, sexual abuse victims that will not have trained interviewers. These victims are not limited to immigrants. We recognize the fact that there are victims both with lawful status and those without that are harmed by some immigrants. We want -- we all want justice for victims and to prevent future crimes. We urge Congress to proceed with measured, thoughtful policies in order to enhance the safety of all of our communities. Thank you. RONNEBECK: Good morning, distinguished Committee members. Grant Ronnebeck was a 21-year-old son, brother, nephew, and grandson. He was a bright, young man with an infectious smile and love of life. He had a positive outlook on life and everyone he met knew it. Grant had no enemies. He was a friendly, outgoing, lovable guy. As a 21-year-old American, he was just starting out in life, starting to realize his dreams, starting to follow his heart in matters of career choices and just discovering his life's opportunities. His desire was to work his way up at the job he loved, working for the QuikTrip Corporation as he had for the previous five years, or possibly later to become a member of the law enforcement community. He loved four-wheeling in the desert around his home in Mesa, Arizona, spending time with friends and family, and watching the Broncos play during the football season. He was a pretty typical young American man, but to us he was a very special family and community member. At 4 a.m. on January 22, 2015, just six months ago, while working the overnight shift at his QuikTrip store, Grant assisted a man buying cigarettes. The man dumped a jar of coins on the counter and demanded those cigarettes. Grant tried to explain that he needed to count the coins before he could give the man the cigarettes. The man pulled a gun and said, "You're not going to take my money and you're not going to give me my cigarettes." Grant immediately offered up the cigarettes to the man. He shot him point blank in the face, killing him. Seemingly unaffected, the man coldly and callously stepped over Grant's dying body, grabbed a couple of packs of cigarettes, and then left the store. After a 30-minute high-speed pursuit through the streets of Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona, the man was taken into custody. Inside his car were the cigarettes and two handguns, one of which was believed to have been used to kill Grant. Apolinar Altamirano, the alleged murderer, is an illegal alien. According to a new article detailing his 2012 arrest, he was a self- proclaimed member of the Mexican Mafia and says he has ties to the Sinaloa drug cartel. The news article states that in August of 2012 he was arrested with two others after kidnapping and sexually assaulting a woman and burglarizing her apartment. She was allegedly held naked and against her will for a full week prior to escaping. He took a plea deal and pled guilty to a charge of felony burglary for that incident. He was sentenced to two years' probation and turned over to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency due to his undocumented status in the United States. He never served any time in custody related to that -- to that offense. ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, released the now-convicted felon Altamirano on a $10,000 bond pending a deportation hearing. In the two years since then, while awaiting his deportation hearing, Altamirano has had two orders of protection filed against him, including one from a woman who claimed he threatened to kill her and pointed a gun at her boyfriend. ICE was reportedly notified of the protection orders by a Mesa Superior Court judge. Altamirano was still allowed to remain free in our country. In addition to Altamirano, ICE reported that they released 66,564 other criminal aliens back onto the streets of our country in 2013 and 2014, and another 10,246 as of March 2015. This group included aliens convicted of violent and serious crimes, including homicides, sexual assault, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. At least 123 American citizens have been murdered by one of these released criminal aliens, including my nephew, Grant Ronnebeck. There are a number of immigration bills that have been introduced in the last several months. Among those, Grant's Law, for my nephew, Kate's Law, for Kate Steinle, the Davis-Oliver Act for law -- for law enforcement officers Danny Oliver and Michael Davis, and Jamiel's Law, for Jamiel Shaw, all Americans killed by illegal immigrants. Each of these potential laws have a specific component that would help protect American lives. I ask that each of you give consideration and priority to passing these important bills into laws. It is my family's greatest desire that Grant Ronnebeck's legacy will be more than a (inaudible) obituary, a cemetery plot, or a fond memory. Instead, we want Grant's death to be a force for change and reform in the immigration policies of this great nation. In closing, I am asking you, our elected leaders, scholars, lawyers, to make these changes, to rise above your political differences, to set aside your personal interests, and to use your resources to make sensible immigration reform a reality in the coming months, with the safety and security of American citizens first and foremost in mind. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Ronnebeck. Now Reverend Salguero? SALGUERO: My name is Gabriel Salguero. Together with my wife, Jeanette, I am the pastor of the multi-ethnic Lambs Church of the Nazarene, where immigrants, police officers, whites, African Americans, and Asians worship together. I'm also the founder of the National Latino Evangelical Coalition, which represents some of the 8 million Hispanic Evangelicals living in the United States. I offer my sincere thanks to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and the other members of the Committee. I'm honored to be here today. I want to begin by saying that I'm heartbroken by the senseless violence and tragedy that we are discussing here today. I've prayed and asked the Lord to bless these families and provide grace and comfort to each family member here today. I could only imagine that every family member, friend, and community member continues to reel from the shock, loss, and grief at the remembrance of these lost loved ones. My prayers and sincere condolences go to each of you and your families. Nothing I can do here today will heal that grief, but your families will remain in my prayers. I pray for an end to violent acts such as these, and I pray that those who would commit such acts face just consequences and redemption. I'm here to speak about my belief that we should take care to ensure that while we work to prevent these tragedies from occurring in the future, we do not harm entire communities in the process. Faith organizations, including my Evangelical community, have historically played a critical role in promoting community trust and providing safe haven to refugees, those fleeing violence, and other immigrants facing daunting challenges of opportunity in the United States. I do not believe that the tragedies we discuss here today are the result of policies that seek to promote trust and cooperation with immigrant communities. The values of sanctuary churches in the United States are deeply rooted in safety, family unity, and trust. These values are critical in the promotion of healthy, vibrant, and non-violent communities, and they are the foundation of hundreds of communities across the country who have chosen to embrace local law enforcement policies that foster and protect trust. These policies should be designed to prevent dangerous crimes, not encourage them. In the midst of our collective grief, I pray we avoid criminalizing or casting collective blame on entire communities for the actions committed by one or even a small number of individuals. In order to uphold our criminal justice system and ensure that our communities feel safe enough to come forward and interact with law enforcement, cities across the United States need to work on their role in collaborating with federal immigration authorities and in the use of immigration detainers in an effort to ensure that both survivors of domestic violence, human trafficking, and other serious crimes will cooperate with law enforcement and come forward. If we fail to create smart policies that promote trust, victims and witnesses will remain silent due to their fear that they or their loved ones face deportation after seeking protection from the police. Silence can create fear and expose all communities to greater risk. We, as a nation, should focus on solutions that will make our communities more integrated and, yes, more safe. I believe that legislation targeting immigrant communities would just lead to more crime, as it may silence many of the more than 11 million immigrants who will fear cooperation with police at the risk of deportation. I urge Congress to resist politicizing the murders and the grief of these families with sweeping measures and to instead work with local communities and churches and others to ensure community safety. Let's work together to reform our immigration laws. Faith communities should work to keep families safe, to keep families together, and to keep children with their parents. Faith communities should not permit our grief to turn us against each other or against entire communities. Yes, our immigration system is broken and it needs reform. But we should not move forward with reactionary legislation that does not address the real issues at hand. The real solution to our immigration challenges is broad, just, and humane immigration reform, which would place undocumented immigrants on an earned path to citizenship, get many people on the roles that way we know who the criminals are and who isn't, allowing them -- also, those hardworking immigrants to contribute to their families, communities, and country. As a pastor, I want to avoid scapegoating entire communities by passing legislation that focuses solely on deportation and not on integrating hardworking families in the United States. So let's work together to promote community safety. We can and should look at state and local policies carefully. I encourage communities to carefully tailor their policies to keep people safe. I encourage the federal government to carefully review its own policies and work with these localities across the country to ensure that our systems appropriately meet the goals of violence prevention against all community members. But I do not encourage us to force states and localities to pursue a one-size-fits-all policy. As we continue to mourn and pray for these families, let's work together to find real solutions that promote peace and security, not fear and not collective punishment. I pray for an end to senseless acts of violence. I pray for every policymaker here and beyond to make rational and deliberate decisions. I pray for reform that promotes thoughtful community safety policies, immigration integration, and common sense comprehensive immigration reform. I pray for the comfort for each of the families speaking here today and those who are not here. And I thank you again for inviting me here today. GRASSLEY: Reverend Salguero. Now Mr. Steinle? STEINLE: First of all, on behalf of my family, I would like to thank the members of this Committee for the honor to speak to you about our daughter, Kate. All children are special in their own way and Kate was special in the way she connected with people. We called it the "Kate effect." Kate was beautiful, kind, happy, caring, loving, deep in faith. Kate had a special soul, a kind and giving heart, the most contagious laugh, and a smile that would light up a room. Kate loved to travel, spend time with her friends, and most of all, spend time with her family. In fact, the day she was killed, we were walking arm-in-arm on Pier 14 in San Francisco, enjoying a wonderful day together. Suddenly a shot rang out, Kate fell, and looked to me and said, "Help me, Dad." Those were the last words I will ever hear from my daughter. The day Kate died she changed her Facebook cover photo to a saying that said, "Whatever's good for your soul, do it." That was true -- that truly describes Kate's spirit. After graduating from Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, she went to work for a title company and saved her money so she could see the world. She traveled to Spain, Thailand, Amsterdam, Dubai, South Africa, just to mention a few. She even met her way -- made her way to the slums of Dubai, India, to reach out to friends (inaudible). She spent time there with the woman's family and came back a changed person. Everywhere Kate went throughout the world she shined the light of a good citizen of the United States of America. Unfortunately, due to disjointed laws and basic incompetence on many levels, the U.S. has suffered a self-inflicted wound in the murder of our daughter by the hand of a person that should have never been on the streets of this country. I say this because the alleged murderer is an undocumented immigrant who had been convicted of seven felonies in the U.S. and already deported five times. Yet in March of this year, he was released from jail and allowed to stay here freely because of those legal loopholes. It's unbelievable to see so many innocent Americans that have been killed by undocumented immigrant felons in the recent years. In fact, we recently came across a statistic that says between 2010 and 2014, 121 criminal aliens who had an active deportation case at the time of release were subsequently charged with homicide-related offenses. Think about that. 121 times over the past four years and the illegal immigrant with prior criminal convictions that later went on to be charged with murder when they should have been deported. That is one every 12 days. Our family realizes the complexity of immigration laws. However, we feel strongly that some legislation should be discussed, enacted, or changed to take these undocumented immigrant felons off our streets for good. We'd be proud to see Kate's name associated with some of this new legislation. We feel if Kate's Law saves one daughter, one son, a mother, a father, Kate's death won't be in vain. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Steinle. Now Chief Manger? MANGER: Chairman Grassley, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I come to you this morning representing -- as the president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, which represents the largest cities in the United States. As cops, we see the good and the bad every day. We're witnesses to the immense benefits of immigration -- that immigration brings to our nation, but we also see the sinister side. Our priority in local law enforcement is exactly what I think you'd want and expect -- the safety of our communities across the nation and our priorities should be the prevention of crime and the protection of the public that we are sworn to serve. And that's every resident of our community. In order to do our job, local law enforcement has to have the trust and confidence of the communities that we serve. If -- if we fail, if the public or any segment of the public does not trust the police and will not come forward when we need them or when they need us. I want to talk to you this morning about the Major Cities Chiefs Association's policy with regard to immigration. And I want to start by -- by making a statement I want to be very clear. While we do not believe that local law enforcement should be saddled with the responsibility of immigration enforcement, we do believe that it is our duty to cooperate with ICE in a manner that is consistent with our duty to protect the public. To this end, we've developed a policy which I think strikes the right balance, and I'm pleased to share some of the aspects of that policy this morning. First and foremost, federal -- immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility. It is today and has always been. Local agencies cannot be expected to take on these additional duties. Secondly, we must secure our borders. Immigration is a national issue and the federal government should first act to secure the national borders, preventing any further illegal entry into the United States. Federal agents must consistently enforce existing laws prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers. Our member agencies are united in their commitment to continue arresting anyone who violates criminal laws of our jurisdictions, regardless of their immigration status. Those individuals who commit criminal acts will find no safe harbor or sanctuary from the criminal violations of law within any major city, but will instead face the full force of criminal prosecution. The decisions related to how law enforcement agencies allocate their resources, direct their workforce, and define their duties to best serve and protect their communities must be left to the control of local governments. The decision to have local police officers perform the functions and duties of immigration agents should be left to local government. This shall not be mandated or forced upon them by the federal government through the threat of sanctions or withholding of existing police assistance funding. The Major Cities Chiefs Association supports the Priority Enforcement Program that has been developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. DHS listened to our concerns and they've included us in the development of this new program that includes procedures for notification to ICE by local police agencies. My own jurisdiction, Montgomery County, Maryland, serves as an example of how the new program works well. While it's not our policy to inquire or investigate immigration status, we provide electronic notification to DHS whenever we make an arrest. Likewise, we provide notification if such person in our custody is to be released. This is a model policy of the Major Cities Chiefs and the policy of Montgomery County. Local law enforcement is cooperating with DHS through the notification process, but not engaged in routine immigration enforcement. In our view, this notification policy represents a balance that the Judiciary Committee should consider. With recognition of immigration enforcement as a federal responsibility, we ask the Committee to resist initiatives that would seek to force routine aspects of federal responsibility upon local police. Finally, regarding federal funding -- federal assistance programs of the Justice Department and Homeland Security were established to strengthen criminal justice and domestic security, not to compel local agencies to perform federal duties. Their purpose was to help local police and sheriffs, not require that we take over the job of federal agencies. It is right to call upon us for actions to protect the public from crime and violence. But it's wrong to demand that we engage in matters related solely to immigration enforcement by withholding federal funds to coerce performance of federal duties by local police. This is not why these programs were established. We welcome this dialogue and commit to our partnership with this Committee. Thank you. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Chief Manger. And now, Mr. McCann? MCCANN: On behalf of the McCann family, I want to thank you, Senator Grassley, and the other members of the Committee, for this opportunity to share with you my efforts to return justice to our family after the violent death of my brother four years ago and about six weeks. Denny was crossing Kinsey Avenue on Chicago's north side to visit with a client of his. He was a commercial insurance broker. The restaurant was named El Cid. And he and the owner would frequently dine together in the evening. And as he was crossing a walk that was at that international mark (ph), this kid, Chavez, came by, drunk as a skunk, and dragged him for about a block and a half and killed him. Chavez was charged with aggravated DUI and two days later ICE issued the detainer, and we went to court, a bunch of us, family, a couple -- I guess a week later for the arraignment. And they assured us -- see, I didn't know anything about detainers, but they assured us that the federal government had these holds and detainers and that no way would he be able to post bond and -- and -- and leave. And his bond was, what, $250,000, so -- so we were comforted, if you can use that word, that he would be prosecuted and -- and a few people in the neighborhood, one a retired judge, told me he'd probably six to eight years. So that's some measure of -- of -- of comfort that we were assured of. Well, unbeknownst to us, that summer, members of the Cook County board in Cook County, you know, they're the administrators of justice in my hometown, Chicago, they worked tirelessly without my knowledge -- you know, we have this witness -- witness notification system in Illinois that's in the Constitution. Well, nobody notified me what they were doing. And they ran through an ordinance, after the August recess, in September, without going to Committee. Now you all know how important committee work is. Well, Cook County apparently didn't in this case, and they got a -- they got it passed 10 to 5. Well, we didn't even -- we weren't even notified of that, nor was the prosecutor. She wasn't even aware of it. So somehow there's this lack of communication that the County passes this very important ordinance and they don't even tell the 400, 500 assistant states- attorneys. Because our -- our -- the lady who was prosecuting my brother's killer was never notified. So here I am sitting at home, the day -- Sunday before Thanksgiving, and I get a recorded message from some kid at the jail and said that Chavez left. He posted bond and ran. And who do I call on a Sunday? You know, nobody's working. I couldn't get a hold of the prosecutor. So I got a hold of my niece, who is a deputy sheriff in that county and she verified he in fact did -- he had been released. But I wasn't able to call the -- the prosecutor until next day. Well, she immediately runs to her supervisor and they send out a couple of cops to look for him. Well, he's gone. You know, the brother said that he never sees him and that he lives in the basement. You know, they're a bunch of -- lies are everywhere, you know. So anyhow, long story short, we also learned, and I failed to mention, this kid was prosecuted for a prior felony two years earlier and he was put on probation. And ICE was never notified because Secure Communities had just, I guess just gotten off the ground in 2008 or something, and so the notification for that -- that system that police used, it was an electronic system, was --oh, I'm going way over time here. So anyhow, long story short, we -- we've been fighting for the last couple of years. We've got a lawsuit pending. Judicial Watch is here and they've helped us. We're before the Illinois Supreme Court currently. We worked with the prior ICE guy, Morton. He was very helpful. And it's just -- it's just been a pathetic miscarriage of justice visited upon my family and hundreds of other families across the country, and I'm so glad you all were able to spend some time listening to this. (Inaudible) around both the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee. I'm convinced this is where resolution rests because the sanctuary jurisdictions, they're going to get away with literally murder, passing these policies, and you guys got to do it. And I regret that my Senator had to -- had to leave and couldn't hear my testimony, but maybe I'll talk to him later. All right, thanks. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. McCann. And Ms. Wilkerson? WILKERSON: Thank you for allowing me to tell the story of my son, Josh, and his murder. My son's name was Joshua Wilkerson. On November 16, 2010, he was beaten, strangled, tortured until he died. He was tied up, thrown in a field, and set on fire. His killer, Hermilo Moralez, was brought here illegally by his illegal parents when he was 10 years old, so he fit the Dream kid description. He was sentenced to life in prison, which means it will be 30 years before he is up for parole. He'll be a 49-year-old man who I don't expect to be deported and I just hope he doesn't come to live in your city. We had to hear this kid from the stand muttering about, in my country, in my country, never to finish that sentence. He went on to tell -- we listened to him tell us repeatedly that his killing skills took over. That Josh had kicked his dog, his killing skills took over. His parents somehow managed to provide lessons that he acquired so that he acquired a black belt in mixed martial arts. Josh, who had never been in a fight in his life, very quiet, old soul. He didn't speak a lot, but when he did, you listened to him. Like I said, he had never been in a fight in his life. So his killing skills were those martial arts that somehow his parents provided here for him. Instead of getting Joshua home that day from school, we got an autopsy report that reads, in part, "This body is received in a gray body bag. There's a tag on his toe that reads in part, "Joshua Wilkerson". He is a white male, weighing at 100lbs. He is tied up with gray rope, 13 loops around his neck with a slipknot. It goes behind his back through his back belt loop. It goes to his hands and his feet, behind his body. He has multiple fractures in his face, and nasal cavity. His throat and his voice box are crushed. He was kicked so hard in the stomach that it sent his spleen into his spine, and sliced it in two, so it was painful. The medical examiner said is it was torture. This body has significant skin loss on his buttocks, his abdomen, his penis, his hands, and his face. He has one stick of gum, and a tardy slip in his pocket. This was our family's 9-1-1 terrorist attack by a foreign invader, whether you want to recognize it, or whether you do not. This government continues fail, or even recognize that we have an issue. Americans are dying daily at the hands of criminals that we don't even know are here. You're officially notified today there's a problem when this happens. You can't deny it any longer, you can not stand by and ignore our families -- our American families. You're elected by Americans, not any other country. You should be for Americans. If you want to sit quietly by the sidelines, you've thrown your hat into the ring already. You silence speaks volumes. You're either for Americans, or you're not. I will not give up control on another one of my children so that a foreign person can have a nicer life, I'm not going to do it. You don't understand the pain. It's so deep in the soul in a place you don't even recognize you have. There aren't words to describe the pain to someone who has not gone through it. I'm not given' up another kid. Sanctuary city policies scream to the criminal element of all of illegals in this country. There is a criminal element. It screams to screams to them, "Come to our town USA, we'll protect you from our terrible policemen, we'll protect you from these tough American laws that you -- because you had a life you are not able -- to go through same motions that an American is." They are buying to that fact. Until -- it's going to take another life lost by a Senator, Congressman, a President, even another of today's heroes, someone from Hollywood before someone in a position moves on this. I urge you, you're in a position to do something about this for Americans. A thank you to Mr. Trump for getting a message out about the nation in two minutes that for four and a half years solidly, Maria Espanoza at the Remembrance Project, and countless families like my own have been trying to say for five or six years. It feels good to be heard, whether you love him, or whether you don't. I felt heard. Our family is shattered. It's shattered. It will never be the same. We'll manage, we function, we'll put on a happy face. My kids have changed, the surviving kids -- everything about us has changed. If, by the grace of God, that in our broken hearts we have a stream of memories of the loving memories that we had with Joshua. Joshua had a very deep, intense, spiritual relationship, leaving us four of five scriptures in the weeks before he died. I'm ok with where Josh is today. It's not just about missing Josh, it's about what you're doing to an entire family -- not just our immediate family, his friends, the teachers, the community, our extended family, it's incredible. I can't even explain that to you. America lost that day, you lost a good citizen that was on the brink of becoming who knows what. He had mentioned going into the Air Force like his older brother who had to come home for two weeks and bury -- he was out defending this country, Americans, and we had to bring him home for two weeks to bury his little brother when he wasn't -- being defended right here at home. It's absurd to me. Thank you for your time -- and I do want to say to, just a little bit of a rebuttal about -- they're not scared to come here. We're inviting them. Sanctuary city says, "Come on down, you can have a pass in our city," you know? You're tying policeman's hands. I'm not for mandating them to ask them where they're from, but if they pull someone for a reason, valid cause, and they're investigating them for something, they have a right to ask them. They have a right to ask me, stop me on the freeway, and ask me, "Where you goin, Ms. Wilkerson? Where you coming from? Do you have drugs?" I'm going to answer those in about 15 minutes, hopefully. It'll come out in the wash that I'm ok to leave. Why are you creating a class of people who seem to say, "We can't do that,"? They're not afraid to come here. They're not afraid to trapse across the desert. I've been to the border, I've stood there with border agents and watched them come across from jet skis. I will -- I'll finish quickly. Sympathy has never trumped the law in this country, ever. You know, you sympathize with me, can I go break the federal law? Anyone? Anyone here like to let me do that? Everyone of them here threaten national security because we don't know who they are, so they are a threat. We don't know who them -- they make a decision to come here. They're not scared, they're invited by Sanctuary -- city policies. They're not scared of standing in line for a hand out that every American has paid in the system for our children if need be. You know, they mistrust police because they come from the countries that mistrust police. They're not scared here. I want you know that our family is broken forever. We're forever broken. I thank you for your time, and I don't want the sympathy. I want you to do something. Everyone here is in a position to do something. Just throw your hat into the ring for Americans. Quit sitting silent because it's going to help you get a vote. Throw your hat into the ring for American families. (APPLAUSE) GRASSLEY: First of all, thank you for your testimony. I've heard frustration and anger about our immigration policies. We can learn a lot from you about how our immigration system needs fixed, and for me that starts with border security. Can I ask my members, 'because were here for oversight of the administration, how many of you have questions that you want to ask of this panel? If none of you want to ask questions of this panel, then I will dismiss them after thanking them. Thank you all very much for coming, and lending your expertise to this hearing, and I'll call the next panel. (OFF MIKE): Our children that are dead, and the criminals -- we should (INAUDIBLE)... GRASSLEY): ...If we could have order. (OFF MIKE): Thousands of people. Thousands. GRASSLEY: Today's hearing deals with a very special issue. I trust that members of the public here will act accordingly. I want to note at the outset that the rules of the Senate prohibit outbursts, clapping, and demonstration of any kind. This includes blocking the view of people around you. Please be mindful that those -- of those rules as we conduct the hearing, and if it isn't abided by, I will, of course, have to ask Capitol Police to remove anyone who violates the rules. Before our next panel's seated, if I -- I would like -- I would ask deliver an oath, Ms. Saldana, and Mr. Rodriguez, would you come please? But, before you sit, I'd like to -- and before I introduce you, I'd like to ask you to affirm. Do you affirm that the testimony that you're about to give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? RODRIGUEZ: I do... SALDANA: ...I do. GRASSLEY: Thank you very much. Leon Rodriguez is Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. He was confirmed by the Senate on June the 24th, 2014. Director Rodriguez was born in Brooklyn, New York. Graduated from Brown University, and earned J.D. Degree, Juris Doctorate from Boston College. Sarah Saldana is Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration, and Customs Enforcement. She was confirmed by the Senate, December 16th, last year. She's born in Corpus Christi, Texas. Graduated from Texas A&I University, and received her Juris Doctorate from Southern Methodist University. Director Rodriguez, would you please begin, and then we'll call the other Director. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. Thank you, members of the committee. In August of 1988, I was sworn in as an Assistant District Attorney in New York -- Kings County, New York. At the time that I was sworn in, New York City, like many other large jurisdictions throughout the country, was witnessing unprecedented crime rates. High homicide rates, high sexual assault rates, high robbery rates, high narcotics trafficking rates. It was in to this environment that I started as a young 26 year old prosecutor. Among my assignments as an Assistant District Attorney were homicide investigations, sex crimes special victims prosecutions, organized crime investigations and prosecutions. During my tenor as Assistant District Attorney, I sat by the side many hundreds of victims of violent crime, family members of victims crime, including homicides. I witnessed the same kind of grief without limit that I saw among the crime victims families that you saw here this morning. I witnessed the sense of profound injustice that was felt by those families. I did everything I could as an Assistant District Attorney to honor the oath that I had taken in August of 1988, and I have frequently remembered throughout my many years of government service, frequently remembered and felt the grief, and sense of injustice that I saw in those years in Brooklyn, New York. I learned another lesson as an Assistant District Attorney, and that is that in law enforcement on size does not fit all. One size fits all is the surest way to let violent criminals go free, to let the worst crimes go unaddressed. It is for that reason that there are homicide detectives that specialize in homicide. Those detectives are not asked to go and arrest the individuals who jump the turnstile at the subway. The DACA program, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program provides a way to take young people who came to this country not of their own volition, but were brought by their parents. It takes such young people who have not been convicted of a criminal offense, who do not present a threat to national security, who are not members of gangs, and who either are pursuing a course of study, or have pursued a course of study, and does nothing more than to delay their deportation, and to offer them work authorization. Now, let me be clear about one of the points that I made here. Those individuals are not supposed to have committed, and been convicted of, a prior felony, significant misdemeanor, or multiple misdemeanors, and they may not be, or have been, a member of a gang. Now, as several of you are well aware there are situations in my agency where that policy was not understood, and as a result, in a small number of cases -- approximately 20, individuals who were identified in law enforcement databases were afforded deferred action nonetheless. That is unacceptable. We took decisive steps to correct our procedures, to retrain our staff, to ensure that that bedrock requirement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was fully understood. As a result, a number of individuals have had their Deferred Action terminated. In a small number of cases, we determined that the individuals were actually not gang members at all after a thorough investigation. But, you have my pledge that we will conduct our business as USCIS, at U.S. Citizen Immigrations Service, in a way that prevents gang members from ever receiving Deferred Action. Having said that, I realize the topics that we are here to talk about are important, and grave ones. I look forward to, what I think, is the very important dialogue that, Chairman, you have convened here today. Thank you. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez. Now, Ms. Saldana. SALDANA: Thank you, Chairman Grassley. Ranking member Feinstein, and other members of this distinguished committee. Like you all, and everyone in this country, I am greatly moved by the stories that I've heard this morning, and the tragedies that have occurred, and the pain -- the very palpable pain that's been reflected on the families that we've heard from today. To them I say, "I am so sorry for the loss each of you has experienced." I know many of you have shared those condolences as well. I say that not only as the Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement, but I say it as a mother, a sister, and a grandmother -- one of my grandchildren being here today with me. I can only imagine what such a loss would -- be like.I want to say that for a decade, first as a prosecutor, then as a United States Attorney for North Texas, and now as the head of Immigration and Custom Enforcement, the largest law enforcement agency in the Department of Homeland Security, I am committed to do all I can to prevent violent crime. I had been, and I continue today to do so. I consider myself a law enforcement officer, and have for several years. While the things we did as prosecutors will not bring back the victims of any violent crime, there is some very small solace that I gained, at least, in bringing the perpetrators to justice, and I'm very proud of that work. As you know, the men and women of ICE play an integral role in public safety, and in national security. Tragic situations like the ones that the family members find themselves in are deplorable, and highlight the need to continue our work to focus on the apprehension and removal of convicted criminals who pose the greatest threat to public safety and national security. This is exactly what our Priority Enforcement Program is designed to do. We spent months talking with all kinds of people from all -- from all of the stakeholders that are interested in our program in designing it. Our objective is to take custody of dangerous individuals before they commit further crimes, and before they're released into the community. As has been said before, it's not a onesize fits all. We have been working across the country to bring people to the table to -- work with them to reach the -- their communities and the needs of the communities when it comes to public safety. Just as Senator Feinstein has done in San Francisco, I am asking for the help of each one of you, and those other members of the entire Senate, to assist us in this effort to try to have jurisdictions who have not cooperated with us in the past to start doing so now. Now. I urge, quite frankly, as a part of all that, to help with respect to a comprehensive change to immigration law. It is complex, it is broken. These are the statutes and the codes of regulations that our folks have to deal with every day, and it is -- I implore your help in that regard. Secretary Johnson has made it clear that our borders are not open to illegal migration. As such, ICE, our Enforcement and Removal Operations Director, ERO, is dedicating our resources to the removal of individuals considered enforcement priorities. We are making some progress. Along the Southwest border this year, apprehensions are done 110,000. That, I see, is a significant positive sign. Thirty-four percent from last year at this time. I likewise -- our interior enforcement efforts are also paying off. Of those people detained in our detention centers, 96 percent of them meet our top two priorities. Seventy-six percent of them, 76 percent of them meet our top priority, so I believe that our people are doing a good thing, and focusing on where the focus should be with respect to these hardened criminals. You all know, of course, the enforcement work and investigative work that other side of the house does, Homeland Security Investigations. Very fine work with respect to Transnational Crime with very good results, and one in particular that I want to point out, with respect to gang enforcement. We had an operation recently called, Operation Wildfire which netted 32,000 criminal arrests, and -- 1,000 gang members in that particular group. Some were charged with criminal offenses, of those thousand, 913, and it is very meaningful work as well. I do know that we're going to focus on the Enforcement and Removal side, and I stand ready to take any questions from this committee. GRASSLEY: I thank both of you very much for being here, and most importantly, I want to thank you for coming, and listening to the testimony of the first panel. I'm going to ask questions, then Senator Feinstein will, and because Judiciary -- the Finance committee's meeting on taxes upstairs, I'm going to half to turn over the meeting to Senator Sessions, if you'll do that please. Start with you, Mr. Rodriquez. You said that certain actions of people in your department was unacceptable in regard to DACA. So, a natural follow up to that is somebody didn't do their job right. In this particular case, somebody probably didn't do their job right, and we know that people have died as a result of it. So, then, if it's unacceptable, who's been fired, or disciplined for writing DACA to gang members? RODRIGUEZ: Senator, there was action taken to correct, and counsel, individuals who did not understand. Back in 2013, the proper manner in which to utilize the text (ph) database that identifies an individual as gang members -- we have undertaken extensive efforts to ensure that both the policy very clearly excludes gang members from Deferred Action, and the processes of our agency are fully understood. I would also add that we have run the entire population of Deferred Action DACA recipients back through the text database to identify all those instances where gang membership was not handled appropriately by our officers. So, there has been counseling in appropriate incidences. GRASSLEY: So there 323 -- how many were -- changed after review? RODRIGUEZ: Actually, sir, as I indicated, there were, of the six, nearly 700,000 DACA recipients, we identified 20 cases in which an indication of gang membership appeared in the law enforcement databases for individuals who had previously received Deferred Action. Eight of those individuals have already been terminated. Others have been turned over to ICE for appropriate handling. Several others continue to be adjudicated, and in a few cases we actually determined that, notwithstanding the identification as gang members in the database -- they were not after investigation gang members. GRASSLEY: What process, if any, do you have in your agency in place to learn about DACA's recipients criminal activity in order to immediately terminate the benefit? RODRIGUEZ: We obviously have ongoing contacts and discussion above all with ICE. We are notified in situations where individuals have either been convicted of a crime, or where information is discovered that they are gang members. When we receive that information, we act on it. We're also in the middle of the DACA renewal process right now. Some individuals have been identified as being gang members during the course of that process, and have been denied renewal, and other appropriate action taken. GRASSLEY: Does your agency require an interview in every DACA applicant that has a criminal record? RODRIGUEZ: We do interviews in those cases where in order to resolve an outstanding issue -- for example, one related to either criminality, or gang membership, we do utilize interviews in those cases to resolve those concerns. GRASSLEY: Ms. SALDANA, in March you told the House Judiciary Committee that you supported mandatory detainers. The following day, you change your position. Sanctuary cities, as you have heard, do very little to protect the public safety. They're in place to protect certain groups of lawbreakers, but there are real consequence. Can you tell the family members here today, including the Steinle family that you don't think state and local law enforcement should have to abide by detainers -- criminal aliens? SALDANA: I'm not going to say that, Senator Grassley, what I am going to say is that we are working very hard, very hard, with respect to a host -- there are about 200 last time I checked, of jurisdictions, and when I say jurisdictions, I'm talking about countries, cities, all over the country who have declined to cooperate with us in the past. As the Secretary testified last week, Senator, we're making some progress. We have actually identified the top, almost, jurisdictions that we've had little progress in the past couple of -- in the past couple of several months. We're going and meeting with those local officials to try to engage them in why the program is actually different from what their experience was with Secured Communities. We -- and you heard from some of the witnesses this morning, that there is some fear out there, and some concerns about even the impact on local law enforcement if there is a feeling of distrust between a community and law enforcement. So -- my answer, the question to me was would it be helpful. Clarity is always helpful to law enforcement, but what I would like to do is, since we've just rolled out this program, we've been working on the design and implementation of it for months, but we just rolled out this program. I want us to be given a chance to work with folks. As U.S. Attorney, my whole existence relied on relationships with state and local law enforcement. I had to work with sheriff's, D.A.'s all across North Texas to try and get them to work with us, and it's a mutual cooperation. They help us, and we help them, and I'd like to continue those efforts through that. GRASSLEY: Can you admit, yes or no, that Sanctuary cities pose a problem to public safety? SALDANA: Well, I don't know exactly what Sanctuary cities definition is, but I do know, and I've said this in the past, sir, and so has the Secretary, that not cooperating with us does -- expose our officers to greater risk because now they have to go out at large and try to recover some of these convicted criminals. And, it's a resource expenditure much greater than it would be if we could just get these people from the jails directly into our custody and through the process. GRASSLEY: Senator Feinstein. FEINSTEIN: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank the two witnesses and the very moving witnesses we heard in the prior panel. I would like to put in the record the record of Lopez-Sanchez because you see the felonies, and you see the number of deportations, and you really see the failure of the system. So, the question really comes what to do about it. It's clear to me that this man that's convicted, and served time in more than one state, deported five times, kept coming back, and this is how it ended. It shouldn't happen that way. Maybe the price on deportation is too low because it doesn't seem to be a deterrent at all, at least in this case. Mr. Ronnebeck said the following, "ICE reported that they released 66,564 other criminal aliens back onto the streets of our country in 2013 and 2014, and another 10,246 as of March 2015. This group included aliens convicted of violent, and serious crimes, including homicide, sexual assault, kidnapping and aggravated assault." Then, it goes on. It says, "123 Americans have been murdered by one of those released criminal aliens, including Mr. Ronnebeck's nephew." Are those numbers correct? SALDANA: They are. FEINSTEIN: They are, OK. SALDANA: They are, Senator. FEINSTEIN: Then how does it happen that those numbers, an additional 123 Americans have been murdered by them? SALDANA: How is it that that happened or... FEINSTEIN: ...Yes... SALDANA: ...Or how was it that they came to be released... FEINSTEIN: ...Yes. This seems to me that we've got one size fits all, that you do for the worst felon what you do for someone without that kind of record. SALDANA: And, you've really struck on the heart of our efforts in talking to jurisdictions who have not been working with us in the recent past. We tried to tell them -- work with us. Let look at your statutes, let's look you've passed, and let's see if one, we have to urge you to try and tweak it, or two, if we can work within it -- in whatever ordinance or legislation there is. I truly believe in my heart of hearts that we can bring reasonable minds to the table to work something out, and that's why we talk about one size not fitting all. It's because we're really trying to accommodate the needs of the communities. They're so different, whether West Coast, East Coast, North and South. I come from Texas, our problems there are not the same as problems in California, or New York, or in the heartland. So, that's one of the beauties of PEP (ph). Again, I need local and state law enforcement... FEINSTEIN: ...Let me ask you what should happen to somebody convicted of seven felonies in this country, in a number of different states, and someone who has been deported five times who comes back to eventually commit a heinous crime... SALDANA: ...And, of course... FEINSTEIN: ...What should -- how should that be prevented? SALDANA: My belief is in developing those relationships in communications here that was a three way law enforcement -- communication. The Bureau of Prisons, San Francisco (ph) Sheriff's Office), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. So, I'm doing all I can to try and look into -- and we actually have directed my senior staff to start opening doors, and there have been some conversations already with the Bureau of Prisons, which is overseen by my old department, the Department of... GRASSLEY: (INAUDIBLE) SALDANA: ...Prisons to try and talk about, at least with respect to federal agency, the federal agency, what we can do better. I invite your thoughts. FEINSTEIN: One last question. Supposing the Sheriff did consult with you, the city did consult with you. The record is still there. Seven felonies, five deportations, and he came back, and he's tried a number of different states and managed to commit felonies there too. What would happen to him? What would you do with him? Well, we would probably, with someone with that kind of a record, if he came into our custody, present him to the U.S. Attorney's Office for prosecution... FEINSTEIN: ...On what? SALDANA: On illegal reentry, and there are escalating punishments if you have -- depending on your criminal record. We can do that. Right now it's up to 20 years depending on the nature of the person's background. FEINSTEIN: Are there cases where you have done that? SALDANA: Oh, yes. Oh yes... FEINSTEIN: ...Can you tell me approximately how many? Where somebody with multiple deportations and multiple felonies actually goes, based on the last deportation, to jail, to federal prison, for a long time? SALDANA: We present it in every occasion that those effects arise. Unfortunately, the prosecution decision isn't up to us, it's up to the U.S. Attorney's Office. They have their own priorities. I can't quibble with that, but we do present it every time we see those facts, ma'am. FEINSTEIN: Well, let me ask you. There are members here who have bills that would like to put a minimum sentence on deportations that's violated. In other words, the individual comes back. What do you think of that? SALDANA: I've got to start, quite frankly, rather than a piecemeal approach to this tremendous problem, a more comprehensive approach to reform, a more comprehensive approach to reform, but, if we're just looking at that, I'd like to take a look at that language and what the statute provides. This fella' in Ms. Steinle's case, actually served sentences for illegal reentry, and substantial, not insubstantial sentences... FEINSTEIN: ..Yes, I have... SALDANA: ...the average sentence is 18 months to two years. In this case we have 36, 56, 46 months that this individual served. Obviously, it did not deter him. FEINSTEIN: Right. My time is up. I will put in the record two different copies of the criminal record of Mr. Lopez-Sanchez. Senator Sessions? SESSIONS: Thank you. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. You made some important points. I would note that San Francisco proudly calls itself a Sanctuary city. They're not hiding it. They're proud of it. They directed their police chief and police officers to act in that acord too. We are focused, I think, more today on the Sheriff's Department, who even the mayor has concluded, acted improperly. I would offer for the record a letter just a week ago on behalf of the San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs that work for the sheriffs there. In that letter to the Sheriff says this, "As evidence to the tragic death of Kate Steinle on July 1st, the departments refusal to coordinate, much les cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies recklessly compromises the safety of sworn personnel, citizens, and those who merely come to San Francisco area. This association hereby demands that the department immediately rescind the directives and comply with the statutory and contractual obligations to meet and confer in good faith." They go over to say, "Moreover it is the associations sincere belief that any changes that the department might pursue should honor Ms. Steinle's life by correcting the departments flawed philosophy so that the people of San Francisco, citizens, visitors, employees alike are safer in the future." Ms. Saldana, you're in charge of filing the detainers, and dealing with these issues. Do you agree with that letter from the Deputy Sheriff of San Francisco? SALDANA: (OFF MIKE) I would just say, first of all, with the lessons (ph) of what the request is, we must get cooperation. FEINSTEIN: Could you put on your microphone please? SALDANA: Thank you, Senator. Let's get cooperation. Let's do what all we can to do because we're all in the same business, and that's public safety. SESSIONS: ...Well, you are exactly right. What this is all about is protecting public safety, and isn't it a fact, Ms. Saldana, that everybody that would like to come to the United States is not entitled to be admitted on their demand? SALDANA: That's why we have these statutes and the process, sir. SESSIONS: Can you make evaluations based on people? And, if they have certain risk factors, they get here legally, or illegally, they evidence dangerous tendencies, they can be deported? SALDANA: That's certainly laid on in the statute. SESSIONS: And that's required in certain instances by the statutes. It says they shall be deported... SALDANA: There are mandatory provisions, yes sir. SESSIONS: So, I think we have a serious problem here. I believe it's directly from the top of this administration, and I believe you've been directed to carry out administration policies, and when you are asked about the Sanctuary city reform, as Senator Grassley said, you said, "Absolutely. A'men," and the next day, did you have a conversation with someone and decided to change your statement on that? SALDANA: As I said before, Senator, truly, my response was a straight out law enforcement response. It is -- what I did the next day was to clarify. I am not going against what we have -- that all our efforts in establishing, and now implementing the PEP program... SESSIONS: ...Well... SALDANA: ...We want to work with those jurisdictions. That's what I have always done, is try to set up relationships with state and local governments... SESSIONS: ...I agree with you. You and I -- United States Attorney, you gave a law enforcement response. Which is this is unacceptable. Every jurisdiction in America that I know of participates in a detainer policy that honors detainers from other jurisdictions. They don't ask whether a case is a good case, or not. They don't retry the case if a -- United States federal, state, or local jurisdiction places a detainer hold on a prisoner, that's honored. Isn't it a historic -- and really unbelieveable act that major cities in this country are refusing to comply with that basic requirement of law enforcement? SALDANA: This is why I needed the next day to clarify, sir. That, yes, we need to get there, but we've got this program that we're about to roll out, and it's all hands on deck. We can't afford not to work together in this Area. It's too dangerous... SESSIONS: ...Well, what if they don't cooperate? What if they just refuse, as they refused before? Didn't your predecessor, Mr. Morton, call on Chicago, Cook County, to stop its Sanctuary policies? SALDANA: I -- I'm sorry sir, I wasn't following that, I'm not aware... SESSIONS: ...Well, he made a clear statement about it, and -- it was a call on them to change. Now the administration, apparently, has changed and stopped pushing it. Now, after this -- these events that have achieved so much publicity, you're beginning to talk about it again. Mr. Rodriguez, you represent the Citizens on Immigration Services -- Citizenship and Immigration Service. Your council president has made a series of statement, Mr. Palinkas -- he's a head official, say, quote, "USCIS adjudications officers are pressured to rubber stamp applications, instead of conducting diligent case review, and investigation. The culture at USCIS encourages all applications to be approved, discouraging proper investigation into red flags, and in discouraging the denial of any applications USCIS has turned into an an approval machine." He goes on to say, "USCIS officers who identify illegal aliens, that in accordance with law, should be placed into immigration removal proceedings before a federal judge are prevented from exercising their authority, and responsibility." He goes on to say, Ms. Saldana, the ICE offices morale is reported to lowest in the entire federal government. They filed a lawsuit against your predecessor, the Offices Association did, claiming that they are being ordered to violate their oath to enforce the law. What actions have you taken to end this, and create -- -and meet with those officers to created a system in which they are encouraged to follow the law, not violate the law? SALDANA: I listen, Senator. I have been to several of our offices across the country. I wish I had time to do all of them in my first year on the job, but I do go there. I do listen. I meet with the Union Officers. I meet with employees top to bottom, and we discuss what our mission is, and how it's so important that commonsensical it is to focus on the most heinous crimes and convicted criminals, and I get a very good response, so I -- and, by the way, I may be a named defendant in that lawsuit. I think I've been replaced in there, so -- I take those allegations seriously, and I work with our employees across the country to discuss it. SESSIONS: Well, I've never seen the kind of morale problems from Mr. Palinkas' statement, to you Mr. Rodriguez in your official actions, and you Ms. Saldana, in your predecessor really. This is not healthy. It's very bad, and it's a product of the trends we're seeing of non-enforcement, rather than enforcement. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Durbin is not here. Senator Schumer is not here... SESSIONS: Senator Durbin is here. FEINSTEIN: I will call on Senator Durbin. DURBIN: Thank you very much, Madame Chair. First I was not able to stay at the hearing for Brian McCann's testimony. Brian McCann is from Chicago. I agreed to speak at an Alzheimer's Association research meeting, came back, got him on the phone. We're working with him through the FBI to try to help bring this fugitive to justice who is responsible for this terrible tragedy in this family. I want to put that on the record. Let me see if I can put some perspective on this for a minute. There seem to be two or three basic elements here that we ought to keep in mind. First is the belief of local law enforcement, that if they are called on to enforce the status crimes, that is persons who are here undocumented, that it could infringe on their ability to maintain order in a community. If every time a police car drove by, folks in a certain neighborhood thought they're looking for undocumented people, those folks are less likely to step up and cooperation with police and find real wrongdoers, real criminals, so that they be brought to justice. That seems to be a starting point I've heard over, and over again. Ms. Saldana? SALDANA: I agree. I've heard it also because I've met with quite a few officials, and they have a tough job. We all have a tough job. I Recognize those arguments. One jurisdiction, Oregon, has been sued, and in other jurisdictions -- and in these days of tough financial budgets, I can understand why people are concerned about being exposed to constitutional challenges like some of the law states. DURBIN: What the President has proposed in both DACA and DAPA, DACA referring to young people, "Dreamers", who were brought here as children and are undocumented, and DAPA, for those millions who are here undocumented, working, raising families and such. In both instances, the President has insisted that there be a criminal background check before they're even given a temporary permission to stay, to either live, go to school, or work. Is That not true? SALDANA: Well, certainly. My colleague, Director Rodriguez and speak more clearly to this, but yes, that is my understanding. DURBIN: Then, Director Rodriguez, out 680,000 who have successfully applied for DACA status, "Dreamers" who are able to stay on a temporary basis for a few years, and not be deported, of that number 680,000, that roughly 323, about one half of one percent have either been engaged in crime, or had a criminal record where they were disqualified from the DACA program. Is that close to what you've heard? RODRIGUEZ: That is correct. Most of those were the result of criminal conviction, some of them were because of information received that some of them were gang members, or some of them were threats to national security. DURBIN: So, they were disqualified... RODRIGUEZ: ...Correct... DURBIN: ...from the program. RODRIGUEZ: And, by the way, Senator, I would cite that as an instance where we did not rubber stamp as Mr. Palinkas, my union head, would suggest. We have certainly dug into those allegations. The President's proposal, when it comes to the millions who are here undocumented, they too will not only be subjected to a criminal background check before they're eligible to stay and work on a temporary basis. They're subject to review every time that permit comes up to see if they've committed a crime. Is that not true. RODRIGUEZ: That is correct, Senator, and it is a multi-step process of biographic, and biometric checks that are conducted on all such individuals to eliminate criminals, eliminate threats to our national security, eliminate gang members access to those... DURBIN: ...For the record, on both of these programs, DACA and DAPA, proposed by President Obama, there's been general opposition from the other side of the aisle. What the President's proposed for regular criminal background checks about these people living, who are undocumented in America, has been resisted. But, that's been a starting point in each of these proposals. Yesterday I went to Jay Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security. He just visited in Chicago to meet with some of our political leaders to talk about the specific issue that brings us here today. What do we do about those who are convicted of crimes, and also undocumented? They are working now to come to an agreement to the PEP Program, that there be an understanding that certain levels of crime will result in reporting. They have not reached an agreement, don't get me wrong, but they are moving in that direction. Can you explain to me the difference between a civil detainer, and a criminal detainer, and whether that is significant to our conversation here? RODRIGUEZ: Senator, I think I'm a little -- I do have some insight into those distinctions based on prior positions that I've held as a federal prosecutor, and also as County Prosecutor in Montgomery County, but given that it's Director Saldana's portfolio, I think I may defer to her. SALDANA: Yes. Quite frankly I'm not familiar with -- the distinction that weighed. It's more important to me that there are -- when there is a criminal case that's been presented to the United States Attorney, they've accepted it. There will be a criminal warrant, and a detainer notice sent to -- if the person is in somebody else's custody, and that has -- it's a court order. It is not administered, which is a large part of what our function is. Our function is civil, and administrative. There are some groups of illegal immigrants that we do refer to the U.S. Attorney's for criminal prosecution, but that's only where the -- that's the only place where the criminal documentation would arrive. DURBIN: What I'm trying to get to is this. If we are dealing with someone who is incarcerated, and has been found guilty of, let's say, a serious felony. No questions asked, it's over the line, serious felony. From your point of view, what you're asking is that before that they be released in their undocumented status, there be a report to your agency? SALDANA: A notice. DURBIN: A notice? SALDANA: Yeah. Please advise us, with respect to the notification part where there is not -- we've not actually established probable cause, or where we have, a detainer notice. DURBIN: But, instead of dealing with a serious felony, we are dealing with the question of illegal reentry, and illegal reentry may occur with someone who has been deported from the United States, and attempts to return, even if there's not criminal history other than that action of returning after deportation. Is that correct? SALDANA: Yes, that is right, and the U.S. Attorney's across the country are not necessarily enforcing those because of their priorities. It's just too low-level of an offense. DURBIN: So, the suggestion that we make a mandatory minimum five year sentence for people who have been deported and come back across the border with, let's say, no other criminal -- no criminal history, and no other history from the government's point of view, that seems to me to be an invitation for a lot of prosecutions. SALDANA: We're stretched on our resources already, and we're focusing on convicted criminals to expand it to just illegal entries or entries, would be very -- a very big problem for us. DURBIN: Thank you very much. GRASSLEY: Thank you, I believe Senator Lee has yielded to Senator Cruz? Thank you. Senator Cruz? CRUZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to Senator Lee. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. The testimony we've heard today is powerful. Ms. Saldana, you are a Texan. You were a prosecutor in our state, you had a good reputation as a prosecutor, but you're serving an administration that consistently refuses to follow the law, and we heard this morning the very real consequences of that. Now, in March when you were testifying before the House you were asked about Sanctuary cities. Cities like San Francisco that defy federal law, and that because of their defiance of federal law, Kate Steinle is no longer with us. She was murdered because of the refusal of local officials to recognize federal law. You were asked in that House hearing, "Should federal law compel state officials to comply with federal law?" And your answer, and I want to quote verbatim, was, "Thank you. Amen. Yes." Now, in my view, that was the former federal prosecutor speaking and giving an answer. Yet, the next day, you issued a statement retracting what you'd said, and saying, in fact, although you'd said, "Amen", which is a pretty powerful statement from the heart, you didn't in fact mean that federal law should force local officials to comply with federal laws. I want to ask you what political officials pressured you to change your statement? SALDANA: Not a single one. This came from a -- the original statement came from my heart. The clarification came from my heart. I don't mean to quibble with you, Senator, I respect you greatly. But, I will say this. The question was not asked. The question was very specific. "Would it be helpful for detainers to be mandatory?" The law enforcement response is clarity is always helpful. But, I wanted to be sure that people were not reacting to that as an indictment of PEP, or working with communities, and that's what I'm committed to do. CRUZ: So, let me make sure I understand your testimony correctly then. You said then it would be helpful, presumably helpful is something is good, is beneficial, is something you support. So, are you saying then that ICE supports making it mandatory to comply with federal detainers. SALDANA: No. CRUZ: So, it's helpful, but you don't support it? SALDANA: Well -- no sir, I support what we have proposed, and what we've been spending many hours on... CRUZ: ...But you just said it's helpful... SALDANA: ...Yes, sir... CRUZ: ...You just said you don't support it... SALDANA: ...Clarity is always helpful, but cooperation and working with our state and local partners is something I've always done, and I will continue to do it, and I'm committed to see it through, with respect to these jurisdictions that haven't been working. CRUZ: It is difficult to work in an administration where you're required to take a position where, although something would be, in your own words, "helpful" -- you nonetheless don't support it -- let me shift to a different topic. In the year 2013, how many criminal illegal aliens did the Obama administration release? SALDANA: In 2014 it was a little over 30,000. CRUZ: How many murderers? SALDANA: In that year, sir, I can't remember the number right now, but I know that we had the statistic that was said earlier. The four year period from 2010 to 2014 that there were 121 persons who committed crimes afterwards. But, I can't provide you with the exact number. CRUZ: How many rapists? SALDANA: I am not sure right now, I'd have to pull that number. CRUZ: How many drunk drivers? SALDANA: Same answer. I can certainly break that down for you, and, in fact, I think we're working on that right now. It's been requested before. CRUZ: Yesterday, how many murderers did the Obama administration release? SALDANA: Now, Senator, I don't know the answer to that question, but I want the American people to understand our job and our mission if I may. We don't release people willy-nilly. We release people pursuant to these statutes and regulations. There are only a limited number of crimes that we are required to detain people. It is mandatory. They're spelled out here very clearly. Many of them related to drug distributions and conspiracies. With the rest of the people, as you know very well, Zubaidas (ph) requires us to release some. I think that's a small percentage of the total. Also, the immigration courts have half a million case backlog. They have the proceedings they go through. They will order release because many of these folks challenge their bond, or detention. But, in the rest, and I think it's like 49 percent this past year, in the rest where ICE has discretion, where this statute has given us discretion, we have very well trained, very well experience law enforcement officers who look at the entire case just like a magistrate judge, or a federal judge... CRUZ: ...Ms. Saldana, I want to note that your testimony here, when I asked you how many criminals ICE released in 2013, you were off by a factor of three. You said 30,000, the correct answer is 104,000. There were 68,000 criminals, criminal illegal aliens that ICE declined to begin deportation proceedings against, despite the fact, as Senator Sessions observed, the federal law that you're holding up there says they shall be deported. The Obama administration refused to deport them. That's 68,000. In addition to that there were 36,000 in deportation proceedings with criminal convictions that the Obama administration released, and I would note that among those were 193 murderers with homicide convictions, 426 people with sexual assault convictions, where over 16,000 criminal illegal aliens with drunk driving convictions released by this administration because this administration refuses to follow the law. SALDANA: Sir, those numbers, I'm looking straight at them. You asked me, I thought, about 2014. That is 30,558. The good news is that at least that went down from 2013 when it was 36,007. CRUZ: But you're omitting the 68,000 criminal illegal aliens that ICE did not begin deportation proceedings against at all, and you gotta' add both of those together. It's over 100,000. SALDANA: Yes, sir, that's absolutely right. All done pursuant to this statute that the Congress has outline. CRUZ: Now, Ms. Saldana, you heard the testimony from the victim's family. I've introduced Kate's Law in the Senate, a mandatory minimum of five years in prison for anyone -- apprehended with an illegal reentry. Does ICE support Kate's Law? SALDANA: I sure would like to look at that. I haven't had a chance to, I'm not sure when it was introduced, if it has been... CRUZ: ...It was introduced last week. SALDANA: OK, I have not had a chance to look at it, I'm sorry Senator, but I'm certainly willing to look at any proposal along those lines, and consider it and work with you if I find some objection to it. CRUZ: Ms. Saldana, I will note in your opening statement here -- you said that after listening to the victim's family that you were so sorry for their loses. And yet, the Obama administration keeps doing it. When I asked you how many murders were released yesterday, you don't know. There is a reason the American people are upset. If President Obama had the courage of his convictions, he would come and look in the eyes of these men and women who have lost their sons, their daughters, their mothers, their sisters, their brothers and the administration would stop releasing murderers and rapists. It is within your power to follow federal law, and this administration refuses to do so, and that is altogether unacceptable. Thank you. SESSIONS: Senator Klobuchar. KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much, Senator Sessions, and thank you to those -- you, Director, and also to the assistant secretary, for your work. I also wanted to -- I know Senator Grassley had to step out for another hearing, but I wanted to thank him for bringing together the first panel of witnesses. I thought their testimony was moving, and I know from being a former prosecutor how difficult it can be for victims and their families to come forward, and I'm sure some of the families are still in the room today, so I thank you for being willing to come forward today. I also wanted to thank Senator Feinstein for her frankness in the criticism of the sheriff in her own state. Clearly there should have been cooperation and they should have been working with ICE, and I think it's very important to remember that there are some of us who are willing to look at these policies and look at them in a way to figure out what best helps public safety. And Deputy Secretary, you talked about some of the work that's being done to work with these local jurisdictions. In listening to the head of the major city chiefs talk about their policy, which he made clear was cooperating with ICE, but clearly that didn't happen in the case in San Francisco. Are there other sheriffs and other law enforcement people have taken that position and have policies where they are not willing to -- and I understand the mayor said that wasn't what happened in San Francisco -- but where they are not going to work with you and notify you when a repeat felon is being released? SALDANA: Well, the last time I checked the number of communities that had passed some kind of ordinance or legislation, it was a little bit over 200, 208. KLOBUCHAR: Is there -- is that correct? SALDANA: Excuse me? KLOBUCHAR: Do they vary? SALDANA: Oh, tremendously. KLOBUCHAR: OK, what I'm talking here about is that I think that is the most glaring thing is this idea that someone who has been deported several times and been convicted of lengthy felonies, that there was no notification to either try to deport him, or as you made a better point for someone who's a repeat felon like that, bring them to the U.S. attorney's office. So do you know how many have that policy that was as severe as what the sheriff did in San Francisco? SALDANA: Maybe a handful. Maybe a handful. You know, we've identified, I think I said earlier, the top 49 which have jurisdictions who have not been cooperating with us, that it would have the greatest impact with respect to their immigrant populations in their communities, and we have made real progress. As the secretary testified last week, about 33 of them have now said, over the efforts of the secretary, the deputy and quite a few officials, that they will work with us in some manner. We are working with them. KLOBUCHAR: It just seems like in a case like this it should be mandatory that something gets reported to ICE, and that's what I am trying to grapple with, and I know Senator Feinstein is. SALDANA: It's a very commonsense approach, Senator. I agree with you, and I think that PEP covers that. These are severe, heinous and dangerous criminals that we are targeting and that we are trying to work with these jurisdictions to say, can't we all agree on this category of individual and this criminal history. KLOBUCHAR: When we used to have cases sometimes -- in fact, I was just reading about one where we had convicted a man of murder. He had hacked up his wife into pieces, left her head in a bowl. It was a horrible case. He was from Russia and he's been making requests to go back to Russia, and my successor is saying no to that. And I remember the pressure he would sometimes get -- not necessarily from defendants. He wouldn't care about that. But from sometimes family members, people say, oh, send him back to the other country. I think it's an argument clearly for serving out sentences in the U.S. for public safety, but then also we brought up the U.S. attorney's office, and obviously they can't handle all these cases. But when there are the serious ones with a number of felonies, I would think this should become more of a priority when it comes to these prosecutions. Has there been discussion about this with the Justice Department at all? SALDANA: Yes, I have actually met with the deputy attorney general and discussed where we can work together to strengthen this. I've met with the Board of Immigration security subcommittee of the attorney general's advisory committee, the U.S. attorneys, and we have discussed specifically what can you do to help us make an impact with respect to some of these cases. And they seem very interested and cooperative. KLOBUCHAR: I've been a supporter of comprehensive immigration reform. I think there's a lot of focus on things that we need for economy with that bill, and allowing, you know, everyone from engineers on to be able to get green cards and to stop training our competition, and there's many important things in that bill, this bipartisan bill. But I think one of them, as you know, as also director, is more money for the border, more money for enforcement, those kinds of things. Do you think that that would be helpful as well, to pass some kind of comprehensive immigration reform? Either of you can answer this. SALDANA: It's essential. I mean -- KLOBUCHAR: And I'm talking about from a public safety perspective. SALDANA: Yes. It's like one of these very wise victims indicated this morning, that when you hear something that simply stated, you wonder why do we get bogged down. And that was, put aside political interests and let's get to work on a better immigration system comprehensively. KLOBUCHAR: Did you want to add? RODRIGUEZ: I would like to add to that. One of the issues that we've heard about this morning is the notion that individuals who are here illegally, we don't know who they are. They are not registered, they are off the grid essentially. Both what the deferred action programs and, more helpfully, comprehensive immigration reform provides is a way to know who those people are, to hold them accountable, to know who they are in those rare instances where they do commit crimes. So that's just one example of many where public safety would be promoted by immigration reform. KLOBUCHAR: And the last thing I wanted to bring up is just -- this is a different issue to me and I don't want it to get scrambled into it is the U visa program for victims of crime. We worked hard on this. I know that I had many experiences where people would be preyed upon because they thought they had power over them because -- a family member, someone else could be deported. The U visa program has been helpful in bringing cases, as one of the witnesses pointed out, who works in the domestic violence area. Could you speak to that? SALDANA: I can certainly. I prosecuted human trafficking cases and we often requested T visas, and I am happy to say that many of the victims that were involved in some of these cases actually ended up staying in the country and applying for residency, and ultimately I'm sure citizenship, and will make extraordinary American citizens if they get to that point. KLOBUCHAR: All right, thank you very much, and we look forward to working with you. SESSIONS: Senator Lee. LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thanks to both of you for coming here, for your willingness to serve our country and your willingness to talk to us today. I believe that the great majority of those who have come to the United States in violation of our laws have probably done so for very sympathetic reasons and have probably been living their lives in a way that, aside from the illegal manner in which they chose to enter the country, are otherwise living good lives, respectable lives. This fact does not, and I don't think it ever can, vest them with the right to citizenship. And it certainly cannot override the need that we have to ensure that U.S. citizens are protected from violence, including the type of violence that might result from someone who came here who should not have come here, someone with a known criminal record who has been allowed to remain here in violation of our laws. I've spoken at length in other hearings and on the floor of the Senate about some concerns I have about the use of a legal remedy known as parole within our immigration law. For those who are not steeped in immigration law, parole is a very narrow exception, one that allows a person to enter the country temporarily. The law governing parole within the immigration context is fairly specific. It points out that this needs to be narrow, it needs to be either for urgent humanitarian reasons on the one hand, or significant public benefit on the other hand. This temporary parole is meant to allow people to enter the country for temporary, finite occasions, such as the need to get medical treatment. That would be an urgent humanitarian reason to allow someone to get parole. Or if we are talking about significant public benefit, we might add to that the hypothetical of someone needing to come in to testify as a witness in a trial. But these things are temporary and they are time-sensitive. Temporary nature of parole in its narrow nature is very important because when she be granted parole, if you've been paroled into the country, you've removed an otherwise present and significant legal impediment to gaining access to citizenship. So if parole is abused, if it's granted excessively, indiscriminately, or outside the framework of what the law allows, this you can understand could really create a giant gaping hole in our immigration laws. The president has cleverly, and some might say surreptitiously, spread the definition of parole wide enough to give DACA and DAPA recipients access to citizenship in circumstances in which citizenship would otherwise be not available to them. We are now seeing the president expanding that program again, expanding yet again the use of parole. First, as Vice President Biden announced in November, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are establishing a refugee parole program that would allow those who failed to get refugee status to enter the country under parole. I reiterate, parole is meant to be a temporary admission to get past the border on a case-by-case basis, either for urgent humanitarian reasons or for a significant public benefit. It is not a substitute for refugee status and should not be used to permanently relocate non-refugees to the United States where refugee status isn't available. Second, the president announced in a report released just last week that the Department of Homeland Security will propose an expanded parole program for entrepreneurs. Now, entrepreneurs are valuable. We all love entrepreneurs in this country. In fact, we have a lot of programs that are designed specifically to help encourage more entrepreneurs, not just within the United States but to come here from other countries because we like entrepreneurs. But any program that encourages entrepreneurs to come into the United States, to this country should be established by statute, by law, not shoehorned into a narrow exception that is meant to allow the administration to step outside the normal process only under extraordinary circumstances. So Mr. Rodriguez, I'll start with you. Do you believe these programs are consistent with the limited intent and the temporary nature of the statutory text regarding parole? RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Senator, for that question. The short answer is yes, I do. And I do precisely for the point that you made, which is that these are programs that are meant to be limited. They are meant to either afford a permanent immigration benefit, nor are they meant to be utilized by everybody. LEE: So you agree with my characterization of... RODRIGUEZ: I don't agree with your characterization of the program... LEE: You agree that they are limited? RODRIGUEZ: That is correct, and that these programs are limited. So when we talk about the Central American minors program, it is a limited number of individuals who will be able to seek parole. There are very specific requirements, very specific circumstances which afford people that parole, and parole is, as you say, a temporary program. LEE: OK, so you agree that it's intended to be temporary and limited. And yet when we look at, in the DACA application for advanced parole, there's a form called form I-131, and it defines the statutory term, significant public benefit. Again, which historically is understood to refer to something like the need for someone to come into the country to testify at a trial. It defines that to include semester abroad programs and meetings with clients. Do you think that's a fair interpretation of the statute? Is it fair to shoehorn meetings with clients or semester abroad programs into a significant public benefit, something intended to give somebody the right to enter the country and testify at trial? RODRIGUEZ: So understand what we are talking about when we talk about the advanced parole. These are individuals who are participants in a deferred action, not a parole program, whose ability to temporarily remain in the United States is under a deferred action program. In other words... LEE: OK, so if it's not a parole program, then why are you using parole? RODRIGUEZ: That is basically the manner in which those individuals on either humanitarian or significant public interest basis are able then to reenter the United States. LEE: Reenter the United States. RODRIGUEZ: It permits them to temporarily leave the United States and then return to the United States. LEE: And when they return they have had a significant impediment that would otherwise exist to their pathway to citizenship lifted. RODRIGUEZ: Well, it does not make them qualify for either legal permanent resident status or for citizenship. In fact, like anybody else, they need to have an actual basis. There must be... LEE: Correct. Remember, it's not independently adequate, but it removes an impediment that would otherwise be there, namely, by virtue of the fact that they entered illegally. That would impede them from getting a green card but for the use of parole. Isn't that right? Is that correct? RODRIGUEZ: It is correct to a point, sir. The critical aspect is they need to qualify for whatever the basis is, be it for residents, for a visa, for citizenship. They need to qualify that. Advanced parole won't make them qualify. LEE: It won't make them qualify but it is a condition precedent, a condition without which they couldn't otherwise have gotten there. You have distorted this law. You have manipulated it beyond what the statutory text will bear, and that does cause me great concern. I see my time -- over my time. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Lee. That is technical and important issue. It will be Senator Vitter, Perdue and Tillis, in that order. Senator Vitter. VITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also want to thank the full committee chairman and Senator Flake for a lot of work and cooperation with me on legislation which we want to bring forward, and will be bringing forward, to stop sanctuary cities policy, to put teeth in existing federal law, which says that local law enforcement has to cooperate with immigration enforcement. So I thank you. You have been very active on that. And the full committee chairman, and Senator Flake and others who are working with me on that. And hopefully I think we're going to move that soon in committee. Thanks to you both for your service. Ms. Saldana, the White House through the press secretary recently suggested that the murder of Kate Steinle was made possible because Republicans refuse to pass the large immigration bill, which included an amnesty, during the last Congress. Do you agree with that? SALDANA: Sir, I decline to engage in this political discussion. I'm just interested in law enforcement and making sure that the immigration laws are enforced. VITTER: OK. Do you agree or disagree with that suggestion? SALDANA: I have no opinion one way or the other. I am focused on a very important job under the immigration laws, and we would prefer to work on that and answer questions related to that than political questions. That just doesn't advance the ball forward. VITTER: Well, I agree it doesn't advance the ball, and I agree Josh Ernest's (ph) statement was insulting to a lot of people, including the victims. Let me ask you this. How is your action to block sanctuary city policy through the priority enforcement program going to be any more effective than it has been through the secure communities program? Obviously it has been completely ineffective through that. SALDANA: Lots of controversy, lots of litigation arising out of secure communities. The differences are significant, particularly, I believe, as we talk to more jurisdictions, they will see this more clearly. The distinctions are material. For example, one of the problems in that Clapham's (ph) County case was that there is no basis to detain someone at the state or local level beyond 48 hours, which is what our request was. To detain them beyond 48 hours beyond what their underlying offense called for. Under PEP we will have -- we are only asking for 48 hours notice before the release of an individual, unless we have probable cause, in which case we've got indications of a true violation, with evidence that we can show the local jurisdiction. Then we ask for detaining that person the 48 hours. VITTER: And so under this new policy, to try to stop these abuses from happening, first of all, I'm glad that we are finally doing this from the administration. Under this new policy what's going to happen if and when a local jurisdiction does not comply? SALDANA: Well, this is one of the things I'm considering. I, along with the victims this morning, do not want to see their lives go, you know, without being... VITTER: I hope we can all agree about that, but the bottom line is there is no consequence now. There is no teeth now. Nothing happens to these local jurisdictions. So if this is a brand-new day brought on by these horrific incidents, what's going to happen to these local jurisdictions? SALDANA: I'm in the middle of looking at that because, as you know, we just started implementing PEP within the last couple of weeks. VITTER: So you don't know that anything is going to happen to them. SALDANA: No, we are going to work towards that, sir. I want to talk to more jurisdictions to understand exactly what the problems are with respect to their accepting our -- cooperating with us. Once I understand their local problems, I think I can help them better to help figure out a solution. I don't want to be one of these... VITTER: And after you say pretty, please... SALDANA: ...I'm the federal government and I'm here to help you. VITTER: And after you say pretty, please three times and they don't comply, is there going to be any negative consequence? SALDANA: I'm looking at that, sir, and working with the secretary to see what we can do with respect to that. VITTER: So you have not determined yet that there will be any negative consequence. SALDANA: The program has been in effect for about three weeks, sir. We just started. We ask for a chance. VITTER: Well, there are some victims' families here who asked for a chance, and their chance is gone in terms of their family member. Three weeks. This has been going on for years and you still are not prepared to say that there is ever going to be any negative consequence to those jurisdictions. When is that going to change? SALDANA: I presume when you all address comprehensive immigration reform. Perhaps it can be addressed there. VITTER: Oh, now we're going to the Josh Ernest line, right? SALDANA: The what, sir? VITTER: Ridiculous. Now we are going to the political line you just disavowed. SALDANA: Comprehensive immigration reform to me is not political. It's essential legislative effort to try.. VITTER: And absent Congress passing that bill that you and the Obama administration prefer, you don't think right now we can stop sanctuary cities from flaunting federal law? You don't think right now there can be any negative consequences when they do not properly cooperate under existing federal law and with immigration enforcement? SALDANA: And that's what I understand you all are working on. And ... VITTER: Are you working on it? You have the authority to do that now. SALDANA: Sir, not according to certain jurisdictions. A federal District Court in Oregon, for example, has ruled against us on mandatory detainers. Even citing the language that sells "shall." So I'm looking forward to -- looking at the legislation that being proposed to address these questions. I want a solution too, sir. VITTER: Well, we've been asking to a solution for that about sanctuary cities for years. There's been absolutely no effort from the administration before. Now there's a promise of an effort, but still today after these tragedies, you're not prepared to say that you support any negative consequence to sanctuary city jurisdictions if they don't properly cooperate. I eagerly await y'all to finally say that. To finally say, yes, there needs to be some consequence, because that is the only way it's going to stop throughout hundreds of jurisdictions around the United States. SALDANA: Mr. Vitter, I offer you my assistance if you would like my input with respect to any legislation you propose, to try and resolve this and get -- VITTER: I'm asking for your input right now. What should the negative consequence be that you will support? SALDANA: Well, I'm hopeful that I don't have to hit somebody over the head with a federal hammer, and work with the state and local jurisdictions, which have their own specific problems to address. I think you understand that, Senator, and that's why I'd like to work with you to try to address it jurisdiction by jurisdiction. VITTER: Unfortunately, the biggest thing I understand is that you are not prepared today as we speak, even after these horrible tragedies, to support a single negative consequence against a sanctuary city jurisdiction if they do not properly cooperate with immigration enforcement. That's unfortunately the biggest thing I understand. If that's incorrect, please tell me how. I am eager to hear that. SALDANA: It is incorrect. VITTER: OK, so what negative consequence will you support? SALDANA: Whatever you all propose with respect to legislation, I would like to work with you on it to see what we can do to help our communities, as opposed to put roadblocks in their way in their community policing. VITTER: And will you tell us what you would support in that regard right now? SALDANA: You know, sir, I am so focused on trying to correct the problem through our PEP program that I would be happy to work with you with respect to any legislation you propose. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Vitter. I would note that there was nothing in the gang of eight (ph) the comprehensive bill that fixed the sanctuary city problem. It was just one of the loopholes in that legislation. Senator Perdue. PERDUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you for being here today. This is a tremendously important crisis, as I would call it, not just an immigration crisis but a national security crisis. There are only six reasons why 13 colonies got together in the first place, six reasons. And one of those was to provide for the national defense. And we heard from six families this morning. There are many other thousands out there who have similar experiences, including in my home state, with similar tragedies. We've both got to work together and solve this thing. We heard this morning that between 2000 and 2014 there were 100 convicted criminal aliens released and then subsequently arrested again for murder, after they had been released. Those convicted criminals were in our communities because the government let them go free instead of deporting them. In 2013 alone ICE released over 36,000 criminal illegal immigrants into American communities. These illegal aliens had almost 90,000 convictions on their records, including 193 murder convictions and over 16,000 drunk driving convictions. All told, and I know this is a debatable number, but all told, according to the Center for Immigration Studies, there are over 340,000 criminal illegal immigrants walking the streets right now. I would argue that this is a national emergency. It's absolutely outrageous in my opinion. I don't think there are innocent parties in this debate. In 2000, in my home state we had a 16-year-old kid killed by an illegal immigrant. Today, 15 years later, the perpetrator of that crime is still at large. This is unconscionable when you hear the stories of these families. But we could bring thousands in here. It's time for us to do something. I just have a real quick question, Director Saldana. Thank you for your service in Texas and now nationally. But if you had this perpetrator in California in your custody -- you answered this question earlier. I just want to ask it again for clarity. What's ICE's policy? What are you driving in your organization? How would you have treated this particular incident where they were released back into the custody of the authorities in San Francisco? SALDANA: Well, as we mentioned earlier, the difference between a criminal warrant and a notice of detainer from ICE, we expect for other jurisdictions to respect the court orders that we get when we get a judicial warrant or a criminal warrant. And so... PERDUE: And what if they don't? SALDANA: Well, we -- that's not an issue we have when it comes to court orders. We take them to court then and say this individual, this jurisdiction has failed to honor this court order. That has teeth, right? When coming from a federal judge or even a local judge. And then we ask other jurisdictions to honor our criminal warrants that we get in our investigations. So to us it's a mutual benefit, and we would honor that criminal warrant typically now. The secretary testified last week on something I know he and I are going to have many more conversations about, and that is what more could be done to try to ensure that we have -- when we have a jurisdiction that's not cooperating with us, that we work, in this case with the Bureau of Prisons or someone else, to try and ensure we get custody of that person. PERDUE: I want to come back to Bureau of Prisons in just a second. But in that particular case I'm a little confused because -- and this is not a trick question, but I want to know if the policy is consistent in your organization about how you would have treated that particular perpetrator because just last week one of your senior officials inside your staff told the Judiciary Committee staff that in their opinion that ICE would have done exactly the same thing as the BOP did in that particular instance, and would have release that individual back into the authorities in San Francisco. Is that pretty much correct? SALDANA: And that's correct, sir. Here's the deal. Here's how typically law enforcement works. We have a criminal warrant signed by a judge. We call the jurisdiction -- or we see that, and we call the jurisdiction and say, are you -- is this still a live warrant, and are you going to pursue prosecution? And we work with that jurisdiction. Depending on what the answer is, we work with that jurisdiction to ensure where we are going to get the biggest bang for our buck. Is it the state prosecution or the federal prosecution? And that's where that cooperation is so important, and why I truly recommend against forcing these jurisdictions because that breaks relationships. PERDUE: I'm not worried about relationships. I'm worried about results. And right now we've got cities not adhering to federal law. And I just think that's a tremendous problem, whether it's regarding immigration or highway issues. Let me change topics some more. We just mentioned PEP earlier. You know, we sent a letter, several senators sent a letter to Secretary Johnson a couple of weeks ago. We still haven't received a response yet, by the way, but we are concerned about PEP. I really believe that, as we said to the secretary, it's pretty clear that PEP will lead to the release of additional, maybe thousands of additional criminal aliens from federal custody. And I'm really concerned about what effect that could have, just like we heard this morning. Let me ask you this. With regard to these communities and PEP, given that these communities did not previously honor ICE detainers or cooperate with federal immigration at all, why do we have confidence that they're going to work with us on PEP? Why do we think that's going to be a better approach? SALDANA: Because of the distinction, the differences that we've weaved into the new PEP program. I mentioned one earlier, and that is we are removing the objection, the constitutional objection that we are detaining people or asking for them to hold people without a basis. They've already completed their state or local sentence, and so now we're saying, okay, don't hold them 48 hours in the typical situation. Just give us notice 48 hours before. We've got some differences to communicate to them and to show them, and I think they will make a difference in many cases. And I don't remember if I shared with you, Senator. I'd like you to know this. We have identified the top 49 jurisdictions that would have the greatest impact based on their illegal populations. And 33 have already said they're going to work with us in one way or another. And 11 are still in the process of considering it. We're going to keep working that, and that will have a great impact. PERDUE: Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez, Director Rodriguez, I'm sorry. I'm almost out of time but I want to talk about the Martinez case with regard to the exception relative to gang membership and the potential loophole. I mean, this thing is pretty obvious to me. We talked about this in an earlier committee hearing, but I would like to get your opinion on isn't this just another loophole for someone to falsely claim a threat that if they were to going back home, they are under threat; therefore, they should get asylum here? RODRIGUEZ: It certainly our view that, you know, you should not be able to use your prior criminality as a way to claim particular social group. We do think that rulemaking is the right path to resolving -- or the right way to handle this issue, and we can certainly meet, Senator, and talk more about solutions to the issue that you presented. PERDUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SESSIONS: Senator Flake, we're going to Senator Tillis, or are you going next? Senator Tillis. All right, thank you. TILLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Saldana and Director Rodriguez, thank you for your service. I know you've got a tough job. A lot of people have quoted some numbers, but I want to make sure that we unify around what I think are very, very important numbers. The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that there are some 347,000 criminal immigrants at large today. According to a March 2nd report, ICE weekly departures and detentions report, there's 168,000 convicted criminal immigrants who had final orders of removal but are now at large in the United States. Now in 2013, I think that Senator Perdue mentioned there were some 36,000 aliens released. Now they represented a total of 88,000 convictions, 193 homicide convictions, including one willful killing of a police officer with a gun, 426 sexual assault convictions, 303 kidnapping convictions, 1,075 aggravated assault convictions, 1,160 stolen vehicles, 9,187 dangerous drug convictions, and 1,670 drunk or drunk driving convictions. After they were released -- now that's what they mounted. And by the way, that's on average, if my back of the napkin math is right, releasing someone who is convicted of a homicide some two or three times a week. Now after these people were released, 1,000 were convicted of another crime following their release. This is a significant problem. Those stats were only for 2013. We could quote stats before and after that. It's a serious problem, and I think that it's something that the sanctuary cities need to recognize. Senator Saldana -- or Director -- SALDANA: Quite a promotion, sir. TILLIS: I'm not sure. (LAUGHTER) TILLIS: But I guess I'm a little bit confused with the PEP program. I understand that you are trying to work with local law enforcement, but to a certain extent it seems to me that we are really excusing the fact that they are not really reading at least the spirit of the law, and some would say the letter. We've talked about whether or not we should pass legislation to be very specific about the mandatory requirements, and you don't want to do it. And it seems to me that a part of that is because you are concerned with the relationship damage that could be done by forcing them. Is that accurate? SALDANA: Well, sir, as I said, our local law enforcement relationships are vital, not just what we do in immigration. I mentioned homeland security investigations earlier. We rely on our local law enforcement partners to assist us with crime that is part of the homeland security investigations purview. TILLIS: I understand that, but shame on them if they all the sudden are not going to cooperate on these other matters of homeland security. Because we want to take a very specific, direct stand that they should obey the law. I mean, that -- that to me is like, well, we'll do a favor here or cut them some slack so they'll work with us. That's their job; that's what they're sworn to do. SALDANA: Yes, and -- and -- and just because I've worked here in law enforcement over a decade, I -- I just want to be sure you understand. Most of the jurisdictions work with us every day; thank goodness they do. And -- and let me set some context here. I think I mentioned about 200, a little over 200 jurisdictions that are not -- that have passed some kind of an ordinance or other legislation not to work with us. There are thousands of jurisdictions that do already. I'm very proud of my home state of Texas that has 254 jurisdictions in it and we have very good relationships with 99.9 percent of those. Do -- please do not assume that these 208 represent the total number of the vast majority of jurisdictions out there. TILLIS: I understand. I do think, though, that we -- we need to keep in mind that the numbers that I went through are significant. And each and every year, there's roughly the same sorts of numbers. This is a significant challenge. And I don't feel like for the bad -- what I would consider bad actor cities, sanctuary cities, shame on them. They need to cooperate with you all; you need to be able to do your job and they need to help you do your job, not because it's some sort of favor or accommodation, because that's their responsibility. Now, the -- the last question that I have relates to the DACA program. And Director Rodriguez, this may be appropriate for you. I asked the secretary when he was here if he felt certain -- you know, you're -- you're probably familiar with the Rangel-Hernandez quadruple murder down in Charlotte 20 minutes from where I live. That was someone who was granted deferred action. Determined he did have some affiliation with gang violence. And he was one of -- of the cases that I think that spurred you all's review of the other actions. Are you absolutely certain that we've scrubbed those who have received deferred action and that we don't have another Rangel- Hernandez out there waiting to happen? RODRIGUEZ: I'll -- I'll -- I'll take that as -- as -- as two -- as really two questions. So, the -- the -- the first is am I absolutely certain? I am satisfied that my staff engaged in a very thorough process of running the entire DACA cohort back through the law enforcement databases that we used to identify gang membership. I do believe that the label of gang member in that database is a reliable label so that if the individual is identified, that gives us what we need to either deny them outright or to conduct further investigation. So, that as we speak today, that does leave me with confidence that -- that as of the date that we ran and we did that review, that we were able to address all cases of -- of gang membership. If we have future cases where people either become gang members or commit crimes, we will address those, as we have. We will terminate DACA in the manner that we have in other cases. TILLIS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. SESSIONS: Senator Flake? FLAKE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Saldana, in response to a letter that I sent to -- to you along with Chairman Grassley, you mentioned that in the Altamirano case, he posted -- quote, "he posted $10,000 bond after his immigration hearing, which means that he became obligated to report to ICE upon demand and that at the time of the most recent criminal offense, ICE had not triggered his obligation to report upon demand." Now, he was released from custody in January of 2013. He was arrested for murder January 22nd, 2015, over two years. Was there any contact with ICE during that period, between ICE and Mr. Altamirano? SALDANA: He was in proceedings. It's -- that's then involved -- he's involved with the court through the immigration courts. Whether ICE had some communication with him, I -- in those -- that two-year period, I don't know, Senator. FLAKE: Do you know if the immigration court or anybody had any contact with him? SALDANA: You know, I haven't looked at that specifically, sir. FLAKE: Is that typical for somebody to go two -- two full years with seemingly no contact at all? SALDANA: It can happen, given the half a million case backlog with the immigration courts. FLAKE: ICE's policy for triggering a convicted alien's obligation to report, you mentioned that you didn't see him because there was nothing that triggered an obligation to report. Has that policy been changed, in terms of triggers for -- for reporting? In light of this case and others, has there been any change? SALDANA: Not that I'm aware of, sir. FLAKE: How many times has ICE revoked bail for those that -- that have been put out on bail like this? SALDANA: Oh, it -- it happens with some regularity. I can't give you a percentage but I'm happy to provide that to you for a specific period. FLAKE: One thing that was just striking about this is the lack of cooperation and coordination and even notification between federal and local officials. And in response to the letter that Chairman Grassley and I sent to you, you mentioned that ICE is working to implement a new initiative called the law enforcement notification system or LENS. In your testimony, you mentioned that LENS has been deployed in 11 states and full implementation is expected by the end of the year. What's stopping that from being implemented in the other 39 states? SALDANA: Because we have to work with each state office that -- that gets notices out to their counties and communities. Some like mine have a lot of counties. It's complex. We have to make our systems compatible to -- to talk. And so, we started with three states as test cases, Texas being one of them, and it worked pretty well there. We've expanded it to these -- now to the total of 11. And there's a period of time that you have to work out kinks because we want to be sure to get this right, and that's what we've been going through right now, is just the test program; we've passed that. We now have expanded it to the 11. We're liking what we're seeing and I think we'll be there by the end of the year. FLAKE: Is this being handled with a little more urgency now? SALDANA: I -- I would like to see it done earlier than the end of the year, sir. I will stay on it, I -- I assure you, to -- to make sure it done -- it gets done as quickly as we possibly can. FLAKE: So, by the end of the year, you believe that we'll be able to -- to say that in all 50 states, we have better notification requirements? SALDANA: Yes, sir. FLAKE: Thank you. Miss Saldana, in Director Rodriguez's testimony he mentioned that 43,375 new DACA requests were denied; 414 renewal requests have been denied. Of these, you know, approximately 44,000 denied requests, how many have been deported? SALDANA: Of what -- I'm sorry, sir. FLAKE: These -- there are 43,375 DACA requests that were denied and then 414 renewal requests have been denied. If somebody is not able to access DACA, then they are still eligible for deportation or that is demanded. How many of those have been deported? SALDANA: I can't give you the specific number but they go in -- it -- whether they're DACA or not eligible, sir, we look at ours the same way we do anybody else. The -- DACA doesn't get them a free pass. We have to look at them on a case by case basis as to -- as to what's the next step, whether we detain someone, whether, you know, what level of bond we place if we release them, that kind of thing. So, it's all done on the whole facts and circumstances surrounding that individual, including criminal history. FLAKE: But if they are -- if they've done something or have an offense that makes them ineligible, you would assume that they're -- they're being looked at now. Can you give me any ballpark of -- of how many of those have been deported of the 44,000 DACA cases that -- people who were not able to access DACA? SALDANA: I assure you I will get that to you, sir, as soon as I can get someone to look -- to look at it and get us an accurate number for you. I'd rather not throw out a ballpark. FLAKE: All right, thank you. Mr. Rodriguez, in the case of the murder of Kate Steinle, the individual, Mr. Sanchez, was here in the country illegally. Obviously he'd been deported five times; that means that he was able to come back across the border illegally five times. Obviously border security is something that we're very concerned about in Arizona and this committee is extremely concerned about. There's one program that we've had, Operation Streamline, in Arizona, a secure or sure (ph) consequences program. And it's helped significantly in Yuma. We've been able to bring repeat crossings down significantly, yet the Department of Justice seems to be now backing away from that program. What are your thoughts there? RODRIGUEZ: Well, Senator, I -- as you know, I -- I administer the immigration benefits structure. I -- I don't operate border security... FLAKE: I understand that, but... RODRIGUEZ: I certainly support border security. And I'm sure Commissioner Kerlikowske would be able to address those concerns that you have, sir. FLAKE: Those are serious concerns. We want to make sure the programs that we actually have working continue. And we have one that's working here there in Arizona and we're very concerned that it's not being fully implemented. The fact that Mr. Sanchez was able to so easily return across the border five times in the case, you know, in California is very disturbing, but not surprising, frankly. So, I thank you for your testimony. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Senator. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Flake. Well, the Streamline program, I don't think either one of you operate that but I hope you'll fight for it. Because backing away from it, as Senator Flake has said, was very much a retrograde step. We're also familiar with the 287(g). Miss Saldana, you know you talked about cooperating with fed -- state and local officials. Your department, Homeland Security, has dramatically weakened the 287(g) program which trains local law enforcement officers how to properly and legally assist the Homeland Security in carrying out its function. Do you support the 287(g) and what's the status of that? SALDANA: Oh, yes. I'm not sure what you're talking about with respect to weakening. We welcome any 287(g) partners and -- and -- and it -- it's not that... SESSIONS: Well, I would ask you then to just check the records and see if there hasn't been a diminution the -- the 287(g) program which I think should be expanded regularly. SALDANA: There has been, sir, but it's not because of us not wanting that partnership. It's because jurisdictions have either withdrawn or are not coming to the table anymore. SESSIONS: Well, we think it could be advanced and should be. Look, what the American people know and what the family of victims of violent crime know is that this administration has consistently and steadfastly placed the goal of amnesty above the goal of public safety; time and time and time again, that's been the fact. And you're just functionaries in that system. You've been asked to do a system but within the rules been given by the political leaders and it's just not right and it's wrong. We need to do more about that and we need to see that end. If this administration spent one-tenth of the effort on enforcement and protecting people from crimes and punishing people who are criminals who violate our immigration laws rather than on amnesty, we'd be a lot safer today. Many of the people that have been injured, robbed or killed by illegal aliens would be alive today. That's just fact and everybody knows it. So, I'm concerned about it. Miss Saldana, Chris Crane is the head of the association -- the ICE officers association; 7,000 officers. They have -- they're the ones that filed a lawsuit against your predecessor, saying that he was ordering them to carry out policies that required them to violate their oath to enforce the law. I've never heard of anything like that. The statements, Mr. Rodriguez, that your offices said, 12,000 led by Chris Crane -- on Ken Palinkas are just stunning in their criticism of supervisors and political leaders. Morale is down and it's because we're not doing what they're paid to do and they -- they know it. This is what Mr. Crane says, Miss Saldana: "ICE is crumbling from within. Morale is at an all-time low as criminal aliens are released to the streets and ICE instead takes disciplinary action against its own officers for making lawful arrests. It appears clear that federal law enforcement officers are the enemy, not those who break the laws," close quote. He goes on to say, "ICE officers requested a meeting with President Obama and are still waiting. In that time, the White House has met with big business, big labor, illegal alien activists. The administration has ramped up its non-enforcement directives, putting officers and the public in danger. Every day, dangerous and violence criminal aliens are released back into our communities," close quote. That's just what it -- that's the true facts of the situation here. And you can do better if you had leadership that would let you do better. We could -- we could do so much better. We've added thousands of officers since the last dustup in 2007 over amnesty. And we ought to be in a position that we can make real progress. SALDANA: Senator, may I say something on that point? SESSIONS: Yes, you may, I'm... SALDANA: I am very -- I was -- that's one of the first things that caught my attention when I joined the agency late last year or early this year. I am putting a lot of effort in trying to engage employees and what they do. I will tell you this, though; I don't -- I have met with Mr. Crane several times now. I've met with Mr. Trumka, the head of the AFL-CIO, as well, and -- to discuss our mutual -- their concerns, our mutual interests. And I will say when I get out in the field, this is somewhat inconsistent with the portrayal that you've just described of our employees. They are so proud of the work they do and they're so proud of being able to focus on criminal convicted aliens and removing them from the country and they go about their business in a very efficient and -- and good way and -- and they take pride in that. And I just want to mention that to you because that's a fact. I mean, that's what I've seen as I've traveled across the country. SESSIONS: Well, I believe the facts show that this administration in a host of ways has failed to take strong action to help those officers do their duty and comply with their oath. Mr. Rodriguez, on the -- Secretary Jeh Johnson, your supervisor, testified recently before the House. And you said that comprehensive immigration reform, had it passed, we would know who the criminal aliens are. But so -- but that's not so well said because I don't think anyone that has a criminal warrant out for them or has a history of criminal activities is going to register for any of these programs that you've got. In fact, Mr. Johnson admitted as much, saying, "Most criminals do not subject themselves to criminal background checks." I agree with that. So, you're not saying, are you, that if we call for people to come and register under DACA or the president's executive amnesty that people with criminal records are going to waltz in and file with you so they can be arrested, are you? RODRIGUEZ: Well, so, let me point out a few things, Senator, if -- Chairman, if I may. One, some have, to their detriment, even in the DACA program; some who had disqualifying criminal records did come and apply and in many cases became the subjects of notices to appear. But part -- part of my point also is that those who are not criminals, those who committed no other illegal act other than their illegal entering into the United States but who are not murderers, robbers or rapists are now on the record so that should they become criminals down the line, we know who they are. For the most part, I think you're right. Your ordinary criminal will not register in the manner you describe; they know what the detriment is. SESSIONS: Well, I appreciate that. RODRIGUEZ: I would also, Senator, if I could, invite you to tour a field office with me. Because if you did that with me, you would see what I have seen is that our officers take pride in their work, they feel empowered in their ability to do their work and they exercise their discretion and the chips fall where they will, meaning that if there is a case to be denied, they do that; I've seen them do it firsthand, sir. SESSIONS: Well, with regard to this DACA program and the process of providing a legal status to people in the country in the country illegally, isn't it a fact that you've set it up so that there will not be in-person interviews for the people? RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, to my -- and my point it -- it is... SESSIONS: But isn't it a fact that experts tell us that an in- person interview is critical to a proper evaluation of a person who's applying for legal status? RODRIGUEZ: And -- and we do do in-person interviews in those cases that raise concerns that need to be investigated by (ph) officers (ph). (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Well, how do you know if it's going to raise concern if you haven't met with them? RODRIGUEZ: Because again, another one of the things that I do is look through our files. And I know that at the time that we are reviewing a file, there is extensive information about that individual where our experienced, trained officers can identify is if there is the kind of information about that individual that warrants a -- an actual in-person (ph) interview (ph). (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Well, Mr. Palinkas has been very clear in this -- in his opinion on what ICE (ph) going to work in the real world. And it's been set up so there'll be very few in-person interviews and he says that denies your officers the ability to make rational choices that can protect the public's safety. So, I guess you just disagree with him on that. RODRIGUEZ: I respectfully do. SESSIONS: Now, with regard to your -- your processes, is it true that over 95 percent of the DACA applicants have been improved? Or 90 -- maybe 99 percent? RODRIGUEZ: I -- I wouldn't be able to tell you the specific percentages other than to say that there are a significant number who have been denied or... SESSIONS: So you don't know what percentage have been denied? RODRIGUEZ: I couldn't as I stand before you other than to say that it's substantial -- substantial number who have been denied because of criminality or national security (ph). SESSIONS: Would you say less than one half of 1 percent is a substantial number? RODRIGUEZ: I -- I wouldn't say what the percent is. SESSIONS: You don't know? I mean, you're the director of this program. RODRIGUEZ: What matters to me is -- is the manner in which... SESSIONS: I just asked a question. What matters to me is what percentage are being denied? RODRIGUEZ: I -- again, I couldn't tell you as I sit here before you. Again, I know that a significant number have been denied because of these kinds of issues (ph). SESSIONS: Well, I'm looking at a sworn statement by Mr. Palinkas in the lawsuit that --in Texas that we've referred to. According to the most recent data I've seen -- this is his quote under oath; quote, "According to the most recent data I've seen, U.S. CIS reports a 99.5 percent approval rate for all DACA applicants. "The approval rate is high because U.S. CIS leadership," you, "prevented immigration officers from conducting case by case investigations of DACA applications. Leadership has intentionally stopped proper screening and enforcement and in so doing, it has guaranteed that applications will be rubberstamped for approval, a practice that virtually guarantees widespread fraud and places public safety at risk." So, I'll ask you, does this process allow for person to person interviews for even a substantial minority of the applicants? (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: As I mentioned, when there are concerns that warrant such an interview, yes, the process does allow for it. SESSIONS: He goes on to say, "As explained above, by routing DACA applications through service centers instead of field offices all over the country, U.S. CIS management has intentionally created an application process that bypasses traditional in-person investigatory interviews with trained U.S. CIS adjudications officers." So, now the way this will work, I guess somebody sends in an e- mail or mails in a document. Is that what they do, and they're approved based on that? RODRIGUEZ: Well, there -- there -- there is obviously a lot of information that is collected. SESSIONS: How? How is the information collected? (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: From -- from requestors; there -- there are specific items that are request -- required as part of the initial request. There are requests for evidence that are subsequently sent to the requesters. There is a full suite of biographic and biometric checks to examine either criminal history issues or national security issues. That forms the entirety of the file. In those cases where those raise concerns, then yes, those are referred for interview. SESSIONS: Well, let me show -- go further with what our Mr. Palinkas said under oath. "For example, new U.S. CIS computer systems -- to use a new U.S. CIS computer system to screen applications known as, quote, 'transformation' has proved to be a disaster as the agency has spent upwards of $2 billion for a system that would eventually allow an alien, now referred to as a customer under U.S. CIS policy, as I previously stated, to upload their own information via the Internet for adjudication purposes," close quote. So, it'll be information sent through some $2 billion computer system by Internet and there won't be an interview of most of the applicants. Isn't that correct? RODRIGUEZ: I'm -- I'm not sure that -- no, I really don't agree with that premise at all, Senator. The -- the -- a few things. One, I believe we are -- we have turned the corner on the transformation process. There is no doubt that historically, there was a development approach that was not working. We recently launched the replacement green card; that has gone very, very well. It actually built a number of functionalities that we're going to be able to apply to other forms. The -- the use of electronic filing as the means of receiving and the adjudicating applications does not change which programs will have interviews associated with them. That -- that -- that is not set to change as part of the transformation process. SESSIONS: Well, look, it's not going to be an in -- in-person interview. Mr. Palinkas has said for years now this is -- they're overwhelmed and cannot do the kind of proper background check. You need to be defending the people's public safety. If you need more money to do this, you need to ask for it. If you want to rubberstamp the process, keep doing the way you're doing. Now, Miss Saldana, section 1373 of Title VIII of the U.S. code provides, among other things, quote, "a federal, state or local government entity or official may not prohibit or in any way restrict any government entity or official from sending to or receiving from ICE information regarding the citizenship or immigration status lawful or unlawful of any individual," close quote. Don't you think that resolutions by city councils or state governments or sheriffs in certain jurisdictions directing their offices not to honor (ph) detainers (ph) or otherwise notify ICE that they've arrested someone that's in -- unlawfully in the country could violate or would violate section 1373? SALDANA: Well, you know, all of that is part of litigation, Senator. Quite frankly, I think we've taken that position in litigation that -- that -- that is the case. SESSIONS: That they do have to supply information? In other words, you've taken a position which I think is -- I understand you correctly, you are correct to say, cities, you have to comply with this law. SALDANA: Yes. And again, is it more practical to work through all this morass of litigation or can we work with these jurisdictions to try to get them to cooperate? SESSIONS: Well... SALDANA: I -- I think it's the latter. SESSIONS: I understand you're saying that but forgive me if I'm not persuaded. This has been going on for many years. It came up in 2007 when we had a debate about all of this and it was wrong then and it's wrong now. It's gotten to be I think it's 300 or so jurisdictions that are sanctuary jurisdictions out of, what, 17,000 maybe? So, but some are very big cities who have very large immigrant populations. And so, it's a huge matter, but most cities are -- are cooperating. And if you want to know what I hear, the complaints about the federal government enforcement from our law -- law enforcement officers is that you won't allow them to help you, that they -- if they arrest somebody and they call your office, nobody comes, nobody cares, nobody responds. And so, that's the big problem we've got in the country, is maybe bigger than the other. But at any rate, I hope that you will understand, Miss Saldana, that you're talking with them is not going to change the situation. Do you have any cities that have indicated to you they're going to make a change in their policy? SALDANA: I mentioned -- I mentioned the numbers earlier, sir. We -- we're -- just as a matter of focus, we've looked at these 49 in particular and 33 are working, have come and said that they will work with us in some way or another, again, tailored to their needs. And we've only had five that really have said of those 49 no; and we'll continue working with them. SESSIONS: Well, I'm sure they -- after all the events of the last few months certainly should be willing to listen about this. But I have serious doubts that we're going to see any change unless Congress takes some action or unless this administration takes some action. Miss Saldana, one problem I know you have that's -- I'm sure it's frustrating to you is countries not taking back criminals that you've arrested and ordered deported. Can you tell us the status of that situation? SALDANA: Yes, as you know, the Department of State obviously has a vast interest in this and I have worked with the Department of State and met -- met with the -- the individual who is -- oversees these relationships and we are working very closely to try to open doors. I went to China a couple of months ago, Beijing in particular, and China has been a challenge for us. And we've signed together and -- a kind of astounding agreement that they will actually have two people here to help process Chinese going back to the country who are repatriating from this country; that's some progress. But we continue to work with them. I've worked with South American countries. I visited Guatemala and El Salvador and we -- we're -- continue to work with our -- my counterparts there to try to ensure that we have -- and we actually have signed memorandum understanding with them regarding their -- their citizens. SESSIONS: Working with them -- working with them is one thing. But this has been going on for years also, many years. How long have you been in office? SALDANA: Seven months. SESSIONS: Seven months; so, I can't blame you for all that's gone on over the years. (CROSSTALK) SALDANA: Oh, you can. (LAUGHTER) SESSIONS: But I want you to know I understand that you -- you have professional training and you understand the world. So, it -- are there powers and actions the United States government can take without legislation that would put pressure on these countries to accept back individuals who we have ordered deported? SALDANA: Obviously this isn't the province of the Department of State largely because there relationships with -- with international countries. But yes, I -- I understand that they -- they have some authorities to do that. As you know, Senator, it's a very complex picture when it comes to international relationships and one agency's issues may not hold (ph) sway (ph) over the bigger picture in the relationship with that country. SESSIONS: Well, I remember Senator Specter, the former chairman of this committee a number of years ago, now, I was outraged by all of this. And actually, I offered legislation that would mandate reducing our -- mandate a reduction of visas from countries that don't comply. Doesn't it cost you a lot of money and -- and create huge time involvements in dealing with situations where a country won't take back one of their own? SALDANA: It's a great challenge, sir, and -- and that's where we face issues under (ph) Salvador (ph) for example, where we can't get papers or cooperation from those countries and we actually have to release them under that Supreme Court opinion after a certain period of time. SESSIONS: On the Supreme Court opinion, if a country won't take them back and a year goes by? SALDANA: Oh, I think it's actually more like 180 days and we have to -- we have to -- we got to... (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Hundred-and-eighty-days and you have to release them? SALDANA: Well, we can extend that period of time but there's a point at which we've got to release them. SESSIONS: And that takes a lot of your officers' and agents' time and effort. SALDANA: It does, sir. SESSIONS: And you have to pay to house people in high quality prisons while you're waiting on this instead of being able to deport them promptly. SALDANA: Yes, that's correct. SESSIONS: I think we -- I have a recollection. Was it Mr. Von (ph) Rob (ph) the customs chief in years gone by? When he shut the border down with Mexico over some disagreement over their responsibilities, caused quite a stir; he just closed the border. But I would just say to you, Miss Saldana, I think it's time for the State Department and your department to stand up and say we're not going to accept this anymore. If you don't accept back promptly people we deport, then you're going to suffer serious consequences. And any relationship that deals in visas is a reciprocal relationship, isn't it, so that if we accept people, then they agree to take them back and likewise if they accept individuals from the United States and they deport them, we accept them back. Isn't that a -- isn't that -- is there a law that requires that or is that just State Department agreements with -- with these countries? SALDANA: Sir, I'm sorry, you're way above my -- my knowledge here when it comes to the State Department and -- and... SESSIONS: Well, you're going to have to stand up to the State Department; looks like we all are. This cannot continue. We don't have the money to continue to bicker with these countries for years and years and years and not get this matter settled; so, we'll try to work on that. I think legislation would be appropriate, too, although it's not necessary. If the president and the State Department stood up and were clear on it, I could be fixed promptly, in my opinion. I may submit some additional questions for the record. Mr. -- but we're having some problems getting answers to our records. Mr. Rodriguez, when do you plan to send us your responses to our questions for the record following the March hearing on oversight of your agency? RODRIGUEZ: As soon as possible. I thought -- I thought we had satisfied all of those requests. We will make sure to get those to you as soon as possible, sir. (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: I'm not -- I don't believe we have. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, if -- if there are outstanding requests, that is -- I'm obviously not happy about that and we will -- we will act quickly to -- to respond, sir. SESSIONS: Thank you. Well, the record will remain open for one week. And if there's nothing further -- but I will say one more thing. (LAUGHTER) Both of you are good law officers. You know how the system works. And I hope you know that things are going as well as they should; a lot of that is because of administration policy. At some point, you'll have to decide whether you're going to execute that policy or not. Some of the policies I think cannot be defended. But I respect your integrity and I appreciate your commitment to your country and your service to your country. The hearing is adjourned. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Chairman. SALDANA: Thank you. CQ Transcriptions, July 21, 2015 List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: SEN. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, R-IOWA CHAIRMAN SEN. JEFF SESSIONS, R-ALA. SEN. ORRIN G. HATCH, R-UTAH SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM, R-S.C. SEN. JOHN CORNYN, R-TEXAS SEN. MIKE LEE, R-UTAH SEN. TED CRUZ, R-TEXAS SEN. JEFF FLAKE, R-ARIZ. SEN. DAVID VITTER, R-LA. SEN. DAVID PERDUE, R-GA. SEN. THOM TILLIS, R-N.C. SEN. PATRICK J. LEAHY, D-VT. RANKING MEMBER SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, D-CALIF. SEN. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, D-N.Y. SEN. RICHARD J. DURBIN, D-ILL. SEN. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, D-R.I. SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR, D-MINN. SEN. AL FRANKEN, D-MINN. SEN. CHRIS COONS, D-DEL. SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, D-CONN. WITNESSES: SUSAN OLIVER, WIFE OF DEPUTY SHERIFF DANNY OLIVER GRACE HUANG, PUBLIC POLICY COORDINATOR FOR THE WASHINGTON STATE COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MICHAEL RONNEBECK, UNCLE OF GRANT RONNEBECK REV. GABRIEL SALGUERO OF THE LAMBS CHURCH, NEW YORK CITY JIM STEINLE, FATHER OF KATHRYN STEINLE J. THOMAS MANGER, CHIEF OF POLICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT BRIAN MCCANN, BROTHER OF DENNIS MCCANN LAURA WILKERSON, MOTHER OF JOSH WILKERSON LEON RODRIGUEZ, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES SARAH SALDANA, DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

Senate Judiciary Committee Holds Hearing on Immigration Enforcement Policies LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES GRASSLEY: For the benefit of the audience and the witnesses, generally, and in this case, too, Senator Feinstein is the Ranking Member for this hearing, and she and I will make opening comments. Then we'll go to our first panel. This Committee continues to honor its pledge to conduct oversight over the implementation of the laws Congress has passed, as well as the policies and practices of the executive branch. Today we will focus on how this Committee's (sic) immigration policies and practices are hurting American families. The Committee will hear powerful testimony from a number of relatives who have lost loved ones as a direct result of the administration's failure to deport aliens or its tolerance of sanctuary policies. I'll begin by extending a special welcome to our witnesses, especially family members of victims. I hope you will accept our deepest sympathies for the losses each of you have suffered. Thank you very much for your willingness to share your stories under difficult circumstances and to pay tribute to those who, though no longer with us in body, are surely with us in spirit. Today we will honor Josh, Kate, Dennis, Danny, Grant, and many others whose lives were tragically cut short because of the administration's lax immigration policies. We had many families and relatives who wanted to testify today, but unfortunately we had to turn them away because we were limited in time and space. However, we welcome all testimony for the record and encourage them to commemorate their loved ones with stories and written letters to this Committee. We will examine the administration's policies from top down. We'll look at how federal benefits are being granted to deportable criminals by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services while criminals are being released by U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement, and how enforcement of the laws can be better achieved. We will look at how we can improve cooperation between government agencies and we'll look into how we can improve cooperation between the federal government and state and local law enforcement agencies. After all, we all work for the same taxpayer; we ought to be cooperating. We'll look at sanctuary jurisdictions and try to understand why policies that protect criminal aliens are in place. In the past few weeks, we have learned that there are thousands of detainers placed each year on federal agents -- by federal agents on undocumented immigrants with criminal records that are ignored. According to government data, between January and September 2014, there were 8,811 declined detainers in 276 counties, 43 states, including Columbia District. Of the 8,811 declined detainers, 62 percent were associated with over 5,000 individuals who were previously charged or convicted of a crime or presented some other public safety concern. And nearly 1,900 of the released offenders were arrested for another crime after being released by sanctuary jurisdiction. This is obviously disturbing, not only to me but to most Americans. There is no good rationale for noncooperation between federal-level and state and local law enforcement. Public safety is needlessly and recklessly put at risk when state and local officials provide sanctuary to law-abiding immigrants just to make a political point. This administration in too many cases has turned a blind eye to enforcement, even releasing thousands of criminals at its own discretion, many of whom have gone on to commit serious crimes, including murder. The administration has also granted deferred action to criminal aliens who have committed heinous crimes after receiving this relief from deportation. I've written to Secretary Johnson about four specific cases in which such individuals have received President Obama's deferred action for childhood arrivals, and that it is referred to as DACA in this town. One of these beneficiaries was a known gang member when he applied and received DACA, then went on to kill four people in North Carolina. Another DACA recipient used his work authorization to gain employment at a popular youth camp in California where he was recently arrested for child molestation and distribution of child pornography. I'm still waiting for responses on some of these cases. Further, the administration's completely failed to do anything about sanctuary cities, while -- all the while challenging states that took a more aggressive approach to enforcing immigration laws. I recently sent a letter to Attorney General Lynch and Homeland Security Secretary Johnson about sanctuary cities. I urged them to take control of the situation to ensure detainers are not ignored and non-documented individuals are safely transferred to federal custody and put into deportation proceedings. I implored them to take a more direct role in the matter and on that -- on those letters I have not received a response. But this isn't a new issue for this administration. I wrote to then-Secretary Napolitano and then-Attorney General Holder in 2012 and asked them to intervene in Cook County, Illinois, and other sanctuary jurisdictions. Nothing happened. In fact, since then the administration officials have publicly stated that they neither believe detainers have to be honored, nor that they even want them to be mandatory. Enforcing the immigration laws in this country is not a voluntary or trivial matter. Real lives are at stake. Things cannot continue this way. We're a nation based upon the rule of law and if that rule of law isn't respected, only chaos will succeed. That is why I'm introducing legislation today that will hold sanctuary jurisdictions accountable. It will require the executive branch to withhold certain federal funding if states or local law enforcement refuse to cooperate with federal government in holding and transferring criminal aliens. My bill will require the state and local cooperate on criminal aliens or risk losing law enforcement-related grants that are distributed by Homeland Security and DOJ. My bill will also require a mandatory minimum five-year prison sentence in addition to possible fines for individuals who enter the United States after having been deported. Current law does not require prison time and caps the possible prison sentence at two years. This section of my bill is aimed at individuals who ignore our laws time and again. No more people should die at the hands of those who break our laws just by being here. No more families should have to go through what these families and others have gone through again. I'd like to thank our witnesses for taking the time to be with us today. Your strength and determination to change the unacceptable status quo won't go unnoticed. I will now turn to Senator Feinstein. And after she does, I'll introduce the witnesses. FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much, Chairman Grassley. I want to say that our Ranking Member, Patrick Leahy, would be here but there is an urgent family appointment that he had to keep this morning. And so I sit in in his stead. And I know this is a hearing that he very much would have wanted to have attended. Yesterday I had occasion to meet with the Steinle family. And Jim Steinle is sitting front and center at the dock. And what I saw was a very hurt family, but very resolute and very concerned about doing the right thing, whatever that may be in a case like this. So I want to voice my very clear sympathy and condolences to the family members that are here today. I can't think of anything that's harder to do than what you're going to do today. And I think your strength in doing it is noted and very much appreciated. It is very clear to me that we have to improve cooperation between local, state, and federal law enforcement. The overriding concern, and a deep belief of mine, is that convicted felons should not be removed from the country -- should be removed from the country, but not released onto our streets. When immigration authorities ask that a state or local law enforcement agency notify them of an impending release of an alien with a serious felony record, that request should be honored. I strongly believe that local law enforcement should have notified the immigration authorities in the case of the accused murderer of Kate Steinle. The man who killed Kate is a classic case of multiple felonies and prior deportations. And a simple phone call would have been enough. But that did not happen. In fact, the San Francisco County Sheriff adopted his own policy on March of 2015, just four months ago. The memo states, "SFSD staff shall not provide the following information or ask access to ICE representatives," end-quote. One of the items listed in the department's memo is, quote, "release dates and times," end-quote. In other words, the Sheriff's Department barred its own deputies from informing ICE about an individual's release date and time. That, I believe, is wrong. I believe it is not required by San Francisco's ordinance as the Mayor has made clear to the Sheriff in a letter dated July 14. And Mr. Chairman, I would like to put that letter in the record, if I may. GRASSLEY: Without objection, so ordered. FEINSTEIN: Thank you. I agree with the Mayor and to prevent a similar tragedy I hope and expect that my home state of California and the city of San Francisco in particular will agree to take part in the Department of Homeland Security Priority Enforcement Program, known as PEP. This program focuses on felons and others who are high priorities for removal from the country. Under PEP, ICE can request notification of an alien's release date from a state or local -- from state or local custody. And so that they would have the opportunity, if the circumstances warranted it, to take custody of that individual itself. In some instances, PEP also allows for ICE to lodge a detainer request with local law enforcement, asking that they hold an alien for up to 48 hours. It seems to me that a simple notification to ICE could have prevented Kate Steinle's death. I have urged Mayor Lee and the board of supervisors to participate in this new program, which the Secretary announced late last year. This program prioritizes those who threaten our nation's national security. I'm pleased that Mayor Lee is taking this request seriously and is in the process of communicating with the Department of Homeland Security about participating. We all know that most undocumented immigrants are otherwise law-abiding, hard-working, and just want to provide for their families. I believe that deeply. But that's not the element of the undocumented population we're talking about today. I'm currently working on a bill, as is our Chairman and I think others on this -- in this Committee, that would require state and local law enforcement to notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement of the impending release from a detention center of an illegal alien who has previously been convicted of a felony, if ICE requests such notification. This bill is a work in progress. And Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony today and to working with other members of this Committee so that we might produce a bill that is worthy of consideration and passage. And I thank the Chair. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Our first witness, Ms. Susan Oliver. Ms. Oliver is a widow of Deputy Danny Oliver, a police officer in Sacramento. Danny was killed while on duty by an undocumented immigrant who was previously arrested on two separate occasions on drug-related charges and twice deported. Ms. Oliver has established a foundation in her husband's name to help kids in school. Our second witness, Ms. Grace Huang, she is Public Policy Program Coordinator for the Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, a non-profit network of domestic violence founded in 1990. Our third witness, Mr. Michael Ronnebeck, the uncle of Grant Ronnebeck. He was a 21-year-old convenience store clerk who was gunned down earlier this year by an undocumented immigrant. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement released Grant's alleged murderer who was awaiting deportation. Grant was born in Iowa, but resided in Arizona and had two brothers and a sister. Our fourth witness, the Reverend Gabriel Salguero. Reverend Salguero and his wife are the co-lead pastors of Lambs Church of the Nazarene, New York City. He is also a founder of the National Latino Evangelical Coalition. Our fifth witness, Mr. Jim Steinle, of Pleasanton, California, the father of Kate Steinle, who was gunned down 20 days ago while walking on a pier in San Francisco alongside this father. Her alleged killer had seven prior felony convictions and had been deported five times. Sanchez was shielded by San Francisco's sanctuary policy, which allowed for his release in March despite an ICE detainer placed on him. Sixth person, Chief J. Thomas Manger. Chief Manger has been a chief of police, Montgomery County, since February 2004. Chief Manger also serves as president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Our seventh witness is Dr. Brian McCann. Mr. McCann's brother, Dennis, was killed in 2011 by a drunk driver who was in the country illegally and driving without a license. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement had placed a detainer on the drunk driver, but he was released under Cook County, Illinois's sanctuary city policies. Our final witness, Ms. Laura Wilkerson, of Pearland, Texas. She's a mother of Josh Wilkerson. Josh was 18-years-old when he was kidnapped and murdered by his high school classmate, an illegal immigrant, after offering his classmate a ride from school. Josh's murderer was sentenced to life imprisonment and will be eligible for parole in 30 years. I want to thank all of you for being here. And I expressed to you privately our condolences, I say so now publicly. You are very brave to come forward and testimony and we -- we welcome that very much. And we'll start with Ms. Oliver. You -- I know you folks have been told about a four-minute rule. The red light comes on. If you have a longer statement, it will be put in the record. That doesn't mean that just exactly when the red light comes on I'm going to gavel you down. But please cut it short because this is a very important hearing. We want to get the witnesses in. But the most important thing after you tell your stories is for us to hear from the administration and to question the administration. Will you start, Ms. Oliver? OLIVER: Good morning. I just wanted to first state that I'm honored that the bill has been named after my husband, Deputy Oliver, as well as Detective Davis, who were killed on October 24, 2014. Over the past nine months, my life has changed dramatically because of the loss of my husband, Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy Danny Oliver. Danny Oliver was a special person that knew that treating people with dignity and kindness resulted in stronger, healthier, and safer communities, and he worked every day to help make that a reality for communities that needed it the most. As a 15-year veteran of Sacramento County's Sheriff's Office, Danny Oliver was not a man to boast or gloat of his professional accomplishments. In fact, when he was given a standing ovation at a community meeting, he felt unsure of how to handle this overwhelming approval. Danny simply felt he was doing his job and that was all that was needed to feel accomplished. My husband's last shift with the Sacramento County's Sheriff's Office ended by doing something he had done countless times before in his career. He was policing his community and trying to make a difference. Danny was a POP officer, also known as a problem-oriented police officer. His job was to identify possible community challenges and try to get ahead of them. He had put himself into harm's way every day that he put his uniform on. And on Friday, October 24, 2014, my husband and father of two approached a car on his beat. But this time it was the last time. The last thing my husband attempted to do as a POP officer was to ask the man inside the car how his day was going. But he never made it to the driver's window. At about 10:30 a.m., that man was in the country illegally and armed with numerous illegal weapons. He aimed one outside the car of a parking lot of Motel 6 in Sacramento and opened fire, killing my husband with a shot to the forehead. I can honestly say that not a day goes by that this has not affected me. It may not be visible always. It may not be written in bold for all to see. It may not even be recognized, but it's always in the background of my mind. Sorry. It's there daily, sometimes moment by moment, as it should be. Many people ask if I've gotten past that terrible day and the answer is no. Honestly, I don't think I will ever get past that day. I lost the man I was married to for 25 years. Each day I look for parental backup for rearing my child who's 12-years-old, and I feel that loss. Each day my children reach milestones. My daughter recently got engaged and there will be a marriage that he will not be at. There will be school graduations and even our weekly family brunches that we held. I am reminded that I no longer have my husband by my side. I was with him since I graduated high school 25 years ago, and we watched each other grow up. We made careers together and we raised two children. We could just look at each other and know what we needed. Perhaps it was support, a loving smile, or even an "I'll talk to you when we get home" look. It is hard to build this trust and understanding, but we had it mastered with ease. But because of the actions of one criminal, this all ended on October 24. My life will never be the same. Unlike law enforcement, there are few professions that consistently send our loved ones into harm's way. It's frightening always knowing that each time they walk out the door it could be the last time that you see them. At the same time, not many professions consciously or intentionally give the order to take a life through the use of deadly force in order to protect others who can't protect themselves, an awesome responsibility that my husband understood clearly. And this continues to be -- to create a lot of ongoing dialogue without communities throughout the country as we see a lack of -- of -- of -- as we see a lack of -- of -- as we see a lack of continuity among law enforcement groups and communities that they serve. Every single day law enforcers at the state, local, and federal level put themselves -- themselves, their loved ones, and their communities that they serve at risk when they are forced to release criminals who are illegal, who pose a threat to community safety, all in violation of current laws that require deportation. In just the last two years, ICE released back into the nation's streets 76,000 convicted criminals who were in this country illegally. There are 169 (ph) criminals in the United States who are here illegally right now. That means there are 169,000 people in our streets who have criminal convictions and were formerly and lawfully ordered departed, but who remain here to commit other crimes, to possibly kill someone else's loved one. The administration's tolerance of sanctuary cities has also resulted in another 10,000 potentially deported illegal immigrant criminals being released by local law agencies since January of last year. And 121 of these criminals have been ordered deported in the last three years and yet were released by ICE, have now -- and have now been charged with additional homicide offenses. The man that killed my husband, Danny Oliver, was deported several times for various felonies before killing my husband on October 24, 2014. However, due to the lack of coordination between law enforcement agencies, he was allowed back into the country and in one day he committed another crime, only this time his illegal crime status impacted many in a direct and profound way when he shot and killed my husband. It would be remiss if I didn't also mention that it wasn't my -- it wasn't my life -- it wasn't just my life that was changed that day. That same criminal eluded hundreds of officers from Sacramento to Auburn, California, during a six-hour crime spree that also left Placer County Sheriff Detective Michael Davis Jr. dead, Placer County Sheriff Deputy Jeff Davis wounded, and a motorist in serious condition from a gunshot to the head. Many lives changed on October 24. Today I honor my husband, Sacramento County Sheriff Deputy Danny Oliver, and the other fallen heroes throughout this nation who are always with us in our hearts and in our memories. I wonder if I would even be here today talking to you about my loss if the government -- if the government better enforced immigration law. Unfortunately, this is now my reality. Thank you for honoring Danny and the others who have made the ultimate sacrifice. I hope by being here today and telling you about the grief my family has unnecessarily endured I can help save the life of someone else's friend, husband, or father. I hope that my husband's death won't be in vain. I hope that I can be here to make a difference. My life is forever changed and saddened. Please help put policy in place to make sure that criminal immigrants are in this country -- who are in this country illegally are never allowed to dictate (ph) the life of a true humanitarian like my husband, Deputy Danny Oliver. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Ms. Oliver. Ms. Huang? HUANG: Thank you, Chairman Grassley and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Grace Huang from the Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence. I am deeply honored to be here to comment on the impact of local law enforcement policies regarding federal immigration enforcement on victims of domestic violence. The issue of violence in our communities is challenging, complex, and deeply emotional. As someone who's worked with survivors of violent crimes for over 22 years, I know how important it is for people to feel that -- to feel that they can prevent future tragedies. And I want to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families here today. Over the years -- over the years in my work at the Coalition, I've had the honor to work with -- work in helping families make it -- work in the advocacy process in advancing effective policy solutions. Through open and honest dialogue, I hope that we can work to find solutions that are -- that make our communities safer for everyone. One crucial thing we can do is to build strong police and community relationships, which means establishing an environment of trust. If victims and witnesses do not feel safe coming forward, the police cannot do their jobs and are -- we are all less safe. Congress has affirmed that principle that immigrant victims and witnesses should feel safe to come forward by creating the U visa for victims of crime in 2000 in the Violence Against Women Act, which was recently reauthorized. I thank you all for everything you have done to make women in our communities as a whole more safe. I ask that you remember these lessons as you work to address this new challenge. As a victim advocate, I'm deeply concerned that mandating local police cooperation with immigration enforcement will strengthen the hands of violent perpetrators, helping them silence their victims and witnesses. I'm also concerned that vulnerable immigrant victims brave enough to step forward will face detention, separation from their children, and swift deportation. This was what many communities encountered with Secure Communities, and the chilling effect it had on police-community relations was both traumatic (ph) and counterproductive. One example of this chilling effect is the case of Cecilia, a young Guatemalan girl living in Colorado. Cecilia was sexually abused by a family friend at the age of 5. Her parents, who were undocumented, were terrified of reporting the crime to the police after having been told by friends and family that they would be reported to Immigration if they stepped forward. A year later, that same perpetrator sexually abused another child. In the end, after the father of that child contacted Cecilia's parents, they went to the police together and the perpetrator was caught and prosecuted. But because of their initial fear to report, another child was harmed. When immigrants are afraid to come forward with information about a crime, the entire community is less safe. When reaching out to police to address domestic violence may end up in deportation, law enforcement is effectively removed as an option for safety, which has life-threatening impacts. For example, one client, Maria, so distrusted the police that when her abuser tracked her down after she fled to another state, she tried to call her lawyer instead of calling 911. It was midnight, he was pounding on the door, and she was frantically calling over and over the closed office of her attorney, who was, of course, not at work. For Maria, the idea of calling the police was simply not an option that put her life in danger. Imagine being so fearful that even though somebody is trying to break into your house, you cannot turn to the police. As victim advocates, we're also concerned that immigrant survivors will be caught up in deportation cases when there are mandates for local police cooperation with ICE. It's not unusual for immigrant victims to be convicted of crimes stemming from their victimization. For example, in California, Cindy, a Taiwanese woman on a student visa, was arrested and convicted of felony domestic violence charges and spent nearly a month in jail before she was able to speak to somebody in her own language. She had bitten her abuser while fighting him off when he tried to rape her. Although the jury determined that she had acted to defend herself, she was convicted of felony domestic violence because the jury determined that the force she used to defend herself was greater than the assault. Because Cindy was not automatically referred to ICE, she was able to complete her studies, expunge her criminal record, and become a productive member of society. Police -- policies limiting local police cooperation with ICE may provide just enough respite for victims like Cindy to access the resources they need. Again, I want to say that we in the domestic violence advocacy field greatly appreciate the work that Congress has done, and many members of this Committee, in particular, have done to support a coordinated community response to domestic violence. Proposals that are under consideration to limit funds to so- called sanctuary cities will allow violent crimes to go un- investigated and leave victims without redress. Federal funding of law enforcement supports critical training, equipment, and staff that assists victims all over the country every day. Without such funding there will be cases that go un-investigated, protection orders that will not be served or enforced, rape kits that will not be tested, the child abuse, sexual abuse victims that will not have trained interviewers. These victims are not limited to immigrants. We recognize the fact that there are victims both with lawful status and those without that are harmed by some immigrants. We want -- we all want justice for victims and to prevent future crimes. We urge Congress to proceed with measured, thoughtful policies in order to enhance the safety of all of our communities. Thank you. RONNEBECK: Good morning, distinguished Committee members. Grant Ronnebeck was a 21-year-old son, brother, nephew, and grandson. He was a bright, young man with an infectious smile and love of life. He had a positive outlook on life and everyone he met knew it. Grant had no enemies. He was a friendly, outgoing, lovable guy. As a 21-year-old American, he was just starting out in life, starting to realize his dreams, starting to follow his heart in matters of career choices and just discovering his life's opportunities. His desire was to work his way up at the job he loved, working for the QuikTrip Corporation as he had for the previous five years, or possibly later to become a member of the law enforcement community. He loved four-wheeling in the desert around his home in Mesa, Arizona, spending time with friends and family, and watching the Broncos play during the football season. He was a pretty typical young American man, but to us he was a very special family and community member. At 4 a.m. on January 22, 2015, just six months ago, while working the overnight shift at his QuikTrip store, Grant assisted a man buying cigarettes. The man dumped a jar of coins on the counter and demanded those cigarettes. Grant tried to explain that he needed to count the coins before he could give the man the cigarettes. The man pulled a gun and said, "You're not going to take my money and you're not going to give me my cigarettes." Grant immediately offered up the cigarettes to the man. He shot him point blank in the face, killing him. Seemingly unaffected, the man coldly and callously stepped over Grant's dying body, grabbed a couple of packs of cigarettes, and then left the store. After a 30-minute high-speed pursuit through the streets of Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona, the man was taken into custody. Inside his car were the cigarettes and two handguns, one of which was believed to have been used to kill Grant. Apolinar Altamirano, the alleged murderer, is an illegal alien. According to a new article detailing his 2012 arrest, he was a self- proclaimed member of the Mexican Mafia and says he has ties to the Sinaloa drug cartel. The news article states that in August of 2012 he was arrested with two others after kidnapping and sexually assaulting a woman and burglarizing her apartment. She was allegedly held naked and against her will for a full week prior to escaping. He took a plea deal and pled guilty to a charge of felony burglary for that incident. He was sentenced to two years' probation and turned over to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency due to his undocumented status in the United States. He never served any time in custody related to that -- to that offense. ICE, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, released the now-convicted felon Altamirano on a $10,000 bond pending a deportation hearing. In the two years since then, while awaiting his deportation hearing, Altamirano has had two orders of protection filed against him, including one from a woman who claimed he threatened to kill her and pointed a gun at her boyfriend. ICE was reportedly notified of the protection orders by a Mesa Superior Court judge. Altamirano was still allowed to remain free in our country. In addition to Altamirano, ICE reported that they released 66,564 other criminal aliens back onto the streets of our country in 2013 and 2014, and another 10,246 as of March 2015. This group included aliens convicted of violent and serious crimes, including homicides, sexual assault, kidnapping, and aggravated assault. At least 123 American citizens have been murdered by one of these released criminal aliens, including my nephew, Grant Ronnebeck. There are a number of immigration bills that have been introduced in the last several months. Among those, Grant's Law, for my nephew, Kate's Law, for Kate Steinle, the Davis-Oliver Act for law -- for law enforcement officers Danny Oliver and Michael Davis, and Jamiel's Law, for Jamiel Shaw, all Americans killed by illegal immigrants. Each of these potential laws have a specific component that would help protect American lives. I ask that each of you give consideration and priority to passing these important bills into laws. It is my family's greatest desire that Grant Ronnebeck's legacy will be more than a (inaudible) obituary, a cemetery plot, or a fond memory. Instead, we want Grant's death to be a force for change and reform in the immigration policies of this great nation. In closing, I am asking you, our elected leaders, scholars, lawyers, to make these changes, to rise above your political differences, to set aside your personal interests, and to use your resources to make sensible immigration reform a reality in the coming months, with the safety and security of American citizens first and foremost in mind. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Ronnebeck. Now Reverend Salguero? SALGUERO: My name is Gabriel Salguero. Together with my wife, Jeanette, I am the pastor of the multi-ethnic Lambs Church of the Nazarene, where immigrants, police officers, whites, African Americans, and Asians worship together. I'm also the founder of the National Latino Evangelical Coalition, which represents some of the 8 million Hispanic Evangelicals living in the United States. I offer my sincere thanks to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and the other members of the Committee. I'm honored to be here today. I want to begin by saying that I'm heartbroken by the senseless violence and tragedy that we are discussing here today. I've prayed and asked the Lord to bless these families and provide grace and comfort to each family member here today. I could only imagine that every family member, friend, and community member continues to reel from the shock, loss, and grief at the remembrance of these lost loved ones. My prayers and sincere condolences go to each of you and your families. Nothing I can do here today will heal that grief, but your families will remain in my prayers. I pray for an end to violent acts such as these, and I pray that those who would commit such acts face just consequences and redemption. I'm here to speak about my belief that we should take care to ensure that while we work to prevent these tragedies from occurring in the future, we do not harm entire communities in the process. Faith organizations, including my Evangelical community, have historically played a critical role in promoting community trust and providing safe haven to refugees, those fleeing violence, and other immigrants facing daunting challenges of opportunity in the United States. I do not believe that the tragedies we discuss here today are the result of policies that seek to promote trust and cooperation with immigrant communities. The values of sanctuary churches in the United States are deeply rooted in safety, family unity, and trust. These values are critical in the promotion of healthy, vibrant, and non-violent communities, and they are the foundation of hundreds of communities across the country who have chosen to embrace local law enforcement policies that foster and protect trust. These policies should be designed to prevent dangerous crimes, not encourage them. In the midst of our collective grief, I pray we avoid criminalizing or casting collective blame on entire communities for the actions committed by one or even a small number of individuals. In order to uphold our criminal justice system and ensure that our communities feel safe enough to come forward and interact with law enforcement, cities across the United States need to work on their role in collaborating with federal immigration authorities and in the use of immigration detainers in an effort to ensure that both survivors of domestic violence, human trafficking, and other serious crimes will cooperate with law enforcement and come forward. If we fail to create smart policies that promote trust, victims and witnesses will remain silent due to their fear that they or their loved ones face deportation after seeking protection from the police. Silence can create fear and expose all communities to greater risk. We, as a nation, should focus on solutions that will make our communities more integrated and, yes, more safe. I believe that legislation targeting immigrant communities would just lead to more crime, as it may silence many of the more than 11 million immigrants who will fear cooperation with police at the risk of deportation. I urge Congress to resist politicizing the murders and the grief of these families with sweeping measures and to instead work with local communities and churches and others to ensure community safety. Let's work together to reform our immigration laws. Faith communities should work to keep families safe, to keep families together, and to keep children with their parents. Faith communities should not permit our grief to turn us against each other or against entire communities. Yes, our immigration system is broken and it needs reform. But we should not move forward with reactionary legislation that does not address the real issues at hand. The real solution to our immigration challenges is broad, just, and humane immigration reform, which would place undocumented immigrants on an earned path to citizenship, get many people on the roles that way we know who the criminals are and who isn't, allowing them -- also, those hardworking immigrants to contribute to their families, communities, and country. As a pastor, I want to avoid scapegoating entire communities by passing legislation that focuses solely on deportation and not on integrating hardworking families in the United States. So let's work together to promote community safety. We can and should look at state and local policies carefully. I encourage communities to carefully tailor their policies to keep people safe. I encourage the federal government to carefully review its own policies and work with these localities across the country to ensure that our systems appropriately meet the goals of violence prevention against all community members. But I do not encourage us to force states and localities to pursue a one-size-fits-all policy. As we continue to mourn and pray for these families, let's work together to find real solutions that promote peace and security, not fear and not collective punishment. I pray for an end to senseless acts of violence. I pray for every policymaker here and beyond to make rational and deliberate decisions. I pray for reform that promotes thoughtful community safety policies, immigration integration, and common sense comprehensive immigration reform. I pray for the comfort for each of the families speaking here today and those who are not here. And I thank you again for inviting me here today. GRASSLEY: Reverend Salguero. Now Mr. Steinle? STEINLE: First of all, on behalf of my family, I would like to thank the members of this Committee for the honor to speak to you about our daughter, Kate. All children are special in their own way and Kate was special in the way she connected with people. We called it the "Kate effect." Kate was beautiful, kind, happy, caring, loving, deep in faith. Kate had a special soul, a kind and giving heart, the most contagious laugh, and a smile that would light up a room. Kate loved to travel, spend time with her friends, and most of all, spend time with her family. In fact, the day she was killed, we were walking arm-in-arm on Pier 14 in San Francisco, enjoying a wonderful day together. Suddenly a shot rang out, Kate fell, and looked to me and said, "Help me, Dad." Those were the last words I will ever hear from my daughter. The day Kate died she changed her Facebook cover photo to a saying that said, "Whatever's good for your soul, do it." That was true -- that truly describes Kate's spirit. After graduating from Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, she went to work for a title company and saved her money so she could see the world. She traveled to Spain, Thailand, Amsterdam, Dubai, South Africa, just to mention a few. She even met her way -- made her way to the slums of Dubai, India, to reach out to friends (inaudible). She spent time there with the woman's family and came back a changed person. Everywhere Kate went throughout the world she shined the light of a good citizen of the United States of America. Unfortunately, due to disjointed laws and basic incompetence on many levels, the U.S. has suffered a self-inflicted wound in the murder of our daughter by the hand of a person that should have never been on the streets of this country. I say this because the alleged murderer is an undocumented immigrant who had been convicted of seven felonies in the U.S. and already deported five times. Yet in March of this year, he was released from jail and allowed to stay here freely because of those legal loopholes. It's unbelievable to see so many innocent Americans that have been killed by undocumented immigrant felons in the recent years. In fact, we recently came across a statistic that says between 2010 and 2014, 121 criminal aliens who had an active deportation case at the time of release were subsequently charged with homicide-related offenses. Think about that. 121 times over the past four years and the illegal immigrant with prior criminal convictions that later went on to be charged with murder when they should have been deported. That is one every 12 days. Our family realizes the complexity of immigration laws. However, we feel strongly that some legislation should be discussed, enacted, or changed to take these undocumented immigrant felons off our streets for good. We'd be proud to see Kate's name associated with some of this new legislation. We feel if Kate's Law saves one daughter, one son, a mother, a father, Kate's death won't be in vain. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Steinle. Now Chief Manger? MANGER: Chairman Grassley, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify. I come to you this morning representing -- as the president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, which represents the largest cities in the United States. As cops, we see the good and the bad every day. We're witnesses to the immense benefits of immigration -- that immigration brings to our nation, but we also see the sinister side. Our priority in local law enforcement is exactly what I think you'd want and expect -- the safety of our communities across the nation and our priorities should be the prevention of crime and the protection of the public that we are sworn to serve. And that's every resident of our community. In order to do our job, local law enforcement has to have the trust and confidence of the communities that we serve. If -- if we fail, if the public or any segment of the public does not trust the police and will not come forward when we need them or when they need us. I want to talk to you this morning about the Major Cities Chiefs Association's policy with regard to immigration. And I want to start by -- by making a statement I want to be very clear. While we do not believe that local law enforcement should be saddled with the responsibility of immigration enforcement, we do believe that it is our duty to cooperate with ICE in a manner that is consistent with our duty to protect the public. To this end, we've developed a policy which I think strikes the right balance, and I'm pleased to share some of the aspects of that policy this morning. First and foremost, federal -- immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility. It is today and has always been. Local agencies cannot be expected to take on these additional duties. Secondly, we must secure our borders. Immigration is a national issue and the federal government should first act to secure the national borders, preventing any further illegal entry into the United States. Federal agents must consistently enforce existing laws prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers. Our member agencies are united in their commitment to continue arresting anyone who violates criminal laws of our jurisdictions, regardless of their immigration status. Those individuals who commit criminal acts will find no safe harbor or sanctuary from the criminal violations of law within any major city, but will instead face the full force of criminal prosecution. The decisions related to how law enforcement agencies allocate their resources, direct their workforce, and define their duties to best serve and protect their communities must be left to the control of local governments. The decision to have local police officers perform the functions and duties of immigration agents should be left to local government. This shall not be mandated or forced upon them by the federal government through the threat of sanctions or withholding of existing police assistance funding. The Major Cities Chiefs Association supports the Priority Enforcement Program that has been developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. DHS listened to our concerns and they've included us in the development of this new program that includes procedures for notification to ICE by local police agencies. My own jurisdiction, Montgomery County, Maryland, serves as an example of how the new program works well. While it's not our policy to inquire or investigate immigration status, we provide electronic notification to DHS whenever we make an arrest. Likewise, we provide notification if such person in our custody is to be released. This is a model policy of the Major Cities Chiefs and the policy of Montgomery County. Local law enforcement is cooperating with DHS through the notification process, but not engaged in routine immigration enforcement. In our view, this notification policy represents a balance that the Judiciary Committee should consider. With recognition of immigration enforcement as a federal responsibility, we ask the Committee to resist initiatives that would seek to force routine aspects of federal responsibility upon local police. Finally, regarding federal funding -- federal assistance programs of the Justice Department and Homeland Security were established to strengthen criminal justice and domestic security, not to compel local agencies to perform federal duties. Their purpose was to help local police and sheriffs, not require that we take over the job of federal agencies. It is right to call upon us for actions to protect the public from crime and violence. But it's wrong to demand that we engage in matters related solely to immigration enforcement by withholding federal funds to coerce performance of federal duties by local police. This is not why these programs were established. We welcome this dialogue and commit to our partnership with this Committee. Thank you. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Chief Manger. And now, Mr. McCann? MCCANN: On behalf of the McCann family, I want to thank you, Senator Grassley, and the other members of the Committee, for this opportunity to share with you my efforts to return justice to our family after the violent death of my brother four years ago and about six weeks. Denny was crossing Kinsey Avenue on Chicago's north side to visit with a client of his. He was a commercial insurance broker. The restaurant was named El Cid. And he and the owner would frequently dine together in the evening. And as he was crossing a walk that was at that international mark (ph), this kid, Chavez, came by, drunk as a skunk, and dragged him for about a block and a half and killed him. Chavez was charged with aggravated DUI and two days later ICE issued the detainer, and we went to court, a bunch of us, family, a couple -- I guess a week later for the arraignment. And they assured us -- see, I didn't know anything about detainers, but they assured us that the federal government had these holds and detainers and that no way would he be able to post bond and -- and -- and leave. And his bond was, what, $250,000, so -- so we were comforted, if you can use that word, that he would be prosecuted and -- and a few people in the neighborhood, one a retired judge, told me he'd probably six to eight years. So that's some measure of -- of -- of comfort that we were assured of. Well, unbeknownst to us, that summer, members of the Cook County board in Cook County, you know, they're the administrators of justice in my hometown, Chicago, they worked tirelessly without my knowledge -- you know, we have this witness -- witness notification system in Illinois that's in the Constitution. Well, nobody notified me what they were doing. And they ran through an ordinance, after the August recess, in September, without going to Committee. Now you all know how important committee work is. Well, Cook County apparently didn't in this case, and they got a -- they got it passed 10 to 5. Well, we didn't even -- we weren't even notified of that, nor was the prosecutor. She wasn't even aware of it. So somehow there's this lack of communication that the County passes this very important ordinance and they don't even tell the 400, 500 assistant states- attorneys. Because our -- our -- the lady who was prosecuting my brother's killer was never notified. So here I am sitting at home, the day -- Sunday before Thanksgiving, and I get a recorded message from some kid at the jail and said that Chavez left. He posted bond and ran. And who do I call on a Sunday? You know, nobody's working. I couldn't get a hold of the prosecutor. So I got a hold of my niece, who is a deputy sheriff in that county and she verified he in fact did -- he had been released. But I wasn't able to call the -- the prosecutor until next day. Well, she immediately runs to her supervisor and they send out a couple of cops to look for him. Well, he's gone. You know, the brother said that he never sees him and that he lives in the basement. You know, they're a bunch of -- lies are everywhere, you know. So anyhow, long story short, we also learned, and I failed to mention, this kid was prosecuted for a prior felony two years earlier and he was put on probation. And ICE was never notified because Secure Communities had just, I guess just gotten off the ground in 2008 or something, and so the notification for that -- that system that police used, it was an electronic system, was --oh, I'm going way over time here. So anyhow, long story short, we -- we've been fighting for the last couple of years. We've got a lawsuit pending. Judicial Watch is here and they've helped us. We're before the Illinois Supreme Court currently. We worked with the prior ICE guy, Morton. He was very helpful. And it's just -- it's just been a pathetic miscarriage of justice visited upon my family and hundreds of other families across the country, and I'm so glad you all were able to spend some time listening to this. (Inaudible) around both the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee. I'm convinced this is where resolution rests because the sanctuary jurisdictions, they're going to get away with literally murder, passing these policies, and you guys got to do it. And I regret that my Senator had to -- had to leave and couldn't hear my testimony, but maybe I'll talk to him later. All right, thanks. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. McCann. And Ms. Wilkerson? WILKERSON: Thank you for allowing me to tell the story of my son, Josh, and his murder. My son's name was Joshua Wilkerson. On November 16, 2010, he was beaten, strangled, tortured until he died. He was tied up, thrown in a field, and set on fire. His killer, Hermilo Moralez, was brought here illegally by his illegal parents when he was 10 years old, so he fit the Dream kid description. He was sentenced to life in prison, which means it will be 30 years before he is up for parole. He'll be a 49-year-old man who I don't expect to be deported and I just hope he doesn't come to live in your city. We had to hear this kid from the stand muttering about, in my country, in my country, never to finish that sentence. He went on to tell -- we listened to him tell us repeatedly that his killing skills took over. That Josh had kicked his dog, his killing skills took over. His parents somehow managed to provide lessons that he acquired so that he acquired a black belt in mixed martial arts. Josh, who had never been in a fight in his life, very quiet, old soul. He didn't speak a lot, but when he did, you listened to him. Like I said, he had never been in a fight in his life. So his killing skills were those martial arts that somehow his parents provided here for him. Instead of getting Joshua home that day from school, we got an autopsy report that reads, in part, "This body is received in a gray body bag. There's a tag on his toe that reads in part, "Joshua Wilkerson". He is a white male, weighing at 100lbs. He is tied up with gray rope, 13 loops around his neck with a slipknot. It goes behind his back through his back belt loop. It goes to his hands and his feet, behind his body. He has multiple fractures in his face, and nasal cavity. His throat and his voice box are crushed. He was kicked so hard in the stomach that it sent his spleen into his spine, and sliced it in two, so it was painful. The medical examiner said is it was torture. This body has significant skin loss on his buttocks, his abdomen, his penis, his hands, and his face. He has one stick of gum, and a tardy slip in his pocket. This was our family's 9-1-1 terrorist attack by a foreign invader, whether you want to recognize it, or whether you do not. This government continues fail, or even recognize that we have an issue. Americans are dying daily at the hands of criminals that we don't even know are here. You're officially notified today there's a problem when this happens. You can't deny it any longer, you can not stand by and ignore our families -- our American families. You're elected by Americans, not any other country. You should be for Americans. If you want to sit quietly by the sidelines, you've thrown your hat into the ring already. You silence speaks volumes. You're either for Americans, or you're not. I will not give up control on another one of my children so that a foreign person can have a nicer life, I'm not going to do it. You don't understand the pain. It's so deep in the soul in a place you don't even recognize you have. There aren't words to describe the pain to someone who has not gone through it. I'm not given' up another kid. Sanctuary city policies scream to the criminal element of all of illegals in this country. There is a criminal element. It screams to screams to them, "Come to our town USA, we'll protect you from our terrible policemen, we'll protect you from these tough American laws that you -- because you had a life you are not able -- to go through same motions that an American is." They are buying to that fact. Until -- it's going to take another life lost by a Senator, Congressman, a President, even another of today's heroes, someone from Hollywood before someone in a position moves on this. I urge you, you're in a position to do something about this for Americans. A thank you to Mr. Trump for getting a message out about the nation in two minutes that for four and a half years solidly, Maria Espanoza at the Remembrance Project, and countless families like my own have been trying to say for five or six years. It feels good to be heard, whether you love him, or whether you don't. I felt heard. Our family is shattered. It's shattered. It will never be the same. We'll manage, we function, we'll put on a happy face. My kids have changed, the surviving kids -- everything about us has changed. If, by the grace of God, that in our broken hearts we have a stream of memories of the loving memories that we had with Joshua. Joshua had a very deep, intense, spiritual relationship, leaving us four of five scriptures in the weeks before he died. I'm ok with where Josh is today. It's not just about missing Josh, it's about what you're doing to an entire family -- not just our immediate family, his friends, the teachers, the community, our extended family, it's incredible. I can't even explain that to you. America lost that day, you lost a good citizen that was on the brink of becoming who knows what. He had mentioned going into the Air Force like his older brother who had to come home for two weeks and bury -- he was out defending this country, Americans, and we had to bring him home for two weeks to bury his little brother when he wasn't -- being defended right here at home. It's absurd to me. Thank you for your time -- and I do want to say to, just a little bit of a rebuttal about -- they're not scared to come here. We're inviting them. Sanctuary city says, "Come on down, you can have a pass in our city," you know? You're tying policeman's hands. I'm not for mandating them to ask them where they're from, but if they pull someone for a reason, valid cause, and they're investigating them for something, they have a right to ask them. They have a right to ask me, stop me on the freeway, and ask me, "Where you goin, Ms. Wilkerson? Where you coming from? Do you have drugs?" I'm going to answer those in about 15 minutes, hopefully. It'll come out in the wash that I'm ok to leave. Why are you creating a class of people who seem to say, "We can't do that,"? They're not afraid to come here. They're not afraid to trapse across the desert. I've been to the border, I've stood there with border agents and watched them come across from jet skis. I will -- I'll finish quickly. Sympathy has never trumped the law in this country, ever. You know, you sympathize with me, can I go break the federal law? Anyone? Anyone here like to let me do that? Everyone of them here threaten national security because we don't know who they are, so they are a threat. We don't know who them -- they make a decision to come here. They're not scared, they're invited by Sanctuary -- city policies. They're not scared of standing in line for a hand out that every American has paid in the system for our children if need be. You know, they mistrust police because they come from the countries that mistrust police. They're not scared here. I want you know that our family is broken forever. We're forever broken. I thank you for your time, and I don't want the sympathy. I want you to do something. Everyone here is in a position to do something. Just throw your hat into the ring for Americans. Quit sitting silent because it's going to help you get a vote. Throw your hat into the ring for American families. (APPLAUSE) GRASSLEY: First of all, thank you for your testimony. I've heard frustration and anger about our immigration policies. We can learn a lot from you about how our immigration system needs fixed, and for me that starts with border security. Can I ask my members, 'because were here for oversight of the administration, how many of you have questions that you want to ask of this panel? If none of you want to ask questions of this panel, then I will dismiss them after thanking them. Thank you all very much for coming, and lending your expertise to this hearing, and I'll call the next panel. (OFF MIKE): Our children that are dead, and the criminals -- we should (INAUDIBLE)... GRASSLEY): ...If we could have order. (OFF MIKE): Thousands of people. Thousands. GRASSLEY: Today's hearing deals with a very special issue. I trust that members of the public here will act accordingly. I want to note at the outset that the rules of the Senate prohibit outbursts, clapping, and demonstration of any kind. This includes blocking the view of people around you. Please be mindful that those -- of those rules as we conduct the hearing, and if it isn't abided by, I will, of course, have to ask Capitol Police to remove anyone who violates the rules. Before our next panel's seated, if I -- I would like -- I would ask deliver an oath, Ms. Saldana, and Mr. Rodriguez, would you come please? But, before you sit, I'd like to -- and before I introduce you, I'd like to ask you to affirm. Do you affirm that the testimony that you're about to give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? RODRIGUEZ: I do... SALDANA: ...I do. GRASSLEY: Thank you very much. Leon Rodriguez is Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. He was confirmed by the Senate on June the 24th, 2014. Director Rodriguez was born in Brooklyn, New York. Graduated from Brown University, and earned J.D. Degree, Juris Doctorate from Boston College. Sarah Saldana is Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration, and Customs Enforcement. She was confirmed by the Senate, December 16th, last year. She's born in Corpus Christi, Texas. Graduated from Texas A&I University, and received her Juris Doctorate from Southern Methodist University. Director Rodriguez, would you please begin, and then we'll call the other Director. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member. Thank you, members of the committee. In August of 1988, I was sworn in as an Assistant District Attorney in New York -- Kings County, New York. At the time that I was sworn in, New York City, like many other large jurisdictions throughout the country, was witnessing unprecedented crime rates. High homicide rates, high sexual assault rates, high robbery rates, high narcotics trafficking rates. It was in to this environment that I started as a young 26 year old prosecutor. Among my assignments as an Assistant District Attorney were homicide investigations, sex crimes special victims prosecutions, organized crime investigations and prosecutions. During my tenor as Assistant District Attorney, I sat by the side many hundreds of victims of violent crime, family members of victims crime, including homicides. I witnessed the same kind of grief without limit that I saw among the crime victims families that you saw here this morning. I witnessed the sense of profound injustice that was felt by those families. I did everything I could as an Assistant District Attorney to honor the oath that I had taken in August of 1988, and I have frequently remembered throughout my many years of government service, frequently remembered and felt the grief, and sense of injustice that I saw in those years in Brooklyn, New York. I learned another lesson as an Assistant District Attorney, and that is that in law enforcement on size does not fit all. One size fits all is the surest way to let violent criminals go free, to let the worst crimes go unaddressed. It is for that reason that there are homicide detectives that specialize in homicide. Those detectives are not asked to go and arrest the individuals who jump the turnstile at the subway. The DACA program, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program provides a way to take young people who came to this country not of their own volition, but were brought by their parents. It takes such young people who have not been convicted of a criminal offense, who do not present a threat to national security, who are not members of gangs, and who either are pursuing a course of study, or have pursued a course of study, and does nothing more than to delay their deportation, and to offer them work authorization. Now, let me be clear about one of the points that I made here. Those individuals are not supposed to have committed, and been convicted of, a prior felony, significant misdemeanor, or multiple misdemeanors, and they may not be, or have been, a member of a gang. Now, as several of you are well aware there are situations in my agency where that policy was not understood, and as a result, in a small number of cases -- approximately 20, individuals who were identified in law enforcement databases were afforded deferred action nonetheless. That is unacceptable. We took decisive steps to correct our procedures, to retrain our staff, to ensure that that bedrock requirement of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program was fully understood. As a result, a number of individuals have had their Deferred Action terminated. In a small number of cases, we determined that the individuals were actually not gang members at all after a thorough investigation. But, you have my pledge that we will conduct our business as USCIS, at U.S. Citizen Immigrations Service, in a way that prevents gang members from ever receiving Deferred Action. Having said that, I realize the topics that we are here to talk about are important, and grave ones. I look forward to, what I think, is the very important dialogue that, Chairman, you have convened here today. Thank you. GRASSLEY: Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez. Now, Ms. Saldana. SALDANA: Thank you, Chairman Grassley. Ranking member Feinstein, and other members of this distinguished committee. Like you all, and everyone in this country, I am greatly moved by the stories that I've heard this morning, and the tragedies that have occurred, and the pain -- the very palpable pain that's been reflected on the families that we've heard from today. To them I say, "I am so sorry for the loss each of you has experienced." I know many of you have shared those condolences as well. I say that not only as the Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement, but I say it as a mother, a sister, and a grandmother -- one of my grandchildren being here today with me. I can only imagine what such a loss would -- be like.I want to say that for a decade, first as a prosecutor, then as a United States Attorney for North Texas, and now as the head of Immigration and Custom Enforcement, the largest law enforcement agency in the Department of Homeland Security, I am committed to do all I can to prevent violent crime. I had been, and I continue today to do so. I consider myself a law enforcement officer, and have for several years. While the things we did as prosecutors will not bring back the victims of any violent crime, there is some very small solace that I gained, at least, in bringing the perpetrators to justice, and I'm very proud of that work. As you know, the men and women of ICE play an integral role in public safety, and in national security. Tragic situations like the ones that the family members find themselves in are deplorable, and highlight the need to continue our work to focus on the apprehension and removal of convicted criminals who pose the greatest threat to public safety and national security. This is exactly what our Priority Enforcement Program is designed to do. We spent months talking with all kinds of people from all -- from all of the stakeholders that are interested in our program in designing it. Our objective is to take custody of dangerous individuals before they commit further crimes, and before they're released into the community. As has been said before, it's not a onesize fits all. We have been working across the country to bring people to the table to -- work with them to reach the -- their communities and the needs of the communities when it comes to public safety. Just as Senator Feinstein has done in San Francisco, I am asking for the help of each one of you, and those other members of the entire Senate, to assist us in this effort to try to have jurisdictions who have not cooperated with us in the past to start doing so now. Now. I urge, quite frankly, as a part of all that, to help with respect to a comprehensive change to immigration law. It is complex, it is broken. These are the statutes and the codes of regulations that our folks have to deal with every day, and it is -- I implore your help in that regard. Secretary Johnson has made it clear that our borders are not open to illegal migration. As such, ICE, our Enforcement and Removal Operations Director, ERO, is dedicating our resources to the removal of individuals considered enforcement priorities. We are making some progress. Along the Southwest border this year, apprehensions are done 110,000. That, I see, is a significant positive sign. Thirty-four percent from last year at this time. I likewise -- our interior enforcement efforts are also paying off. Of those people detained in our detention centers, 96 percent of them meet our top two priorities. Seventy-six percent of them, 76 percent of them meet our top priority, so I believe that our people are doing a good thing, and focusing on where the focus should be with respect to these hardened criminals. You all know, of course, the enforcement work and investigative work that other side of the house does, Homeland Security Investigations. Very fine work with respect to Transnational Crime with very good results, and one in particular that I want to point out, with respect to gang enforcement. We had an operation recently called, Operation Wildfire which netted 32,000 criminal arrests, and -- 1,000 gang members in that particular group. Some were charged with criminal offenses, of those thousand, 913, and it is very meaningful work as well. I do know that we're going to focus on the Enforcement and Removal side, and I stand ready to take any questions from this committee. GRASSLEY: I thank both of you very much for being here, and most importantly, I want to thank you for coming, and listening to the testimony of the first panel. I'm going to ask questions, then Senator Feinstein will, and because Judiciary -- the Finance committee's meeting on taxes upstairs, I'm going to half to turn over the meeting to Senator Sessions, if you'll do that please. Start with you, Mr. Rodriquez. You said that certain actions of people in your department was unacceptable in regard to DACA. So, a natural follow up to that is somebody didn't do their job right. In this particular case, somebody probably didn't do their job right, and we know that people have died as a result of it. So, then, if it's unacceptable, who's been fired, or disciplined for writing DACA to gang members? RODRIGUEZ: Senator, there was action taken to correct, and counsel, individuals who did not understand. Back in 2013, the proper manner in which to utilize the text (ph) database that identifies an individual as gang members -- we have undertaken extensive efforts to ensure that both the policy very clearly excludes gang members from Deferred Action, and the processes of our agency are fully understood. I would also add that we have run the entire population of Deferred Action DACA recipients back through the text database to identify all those instances where gang membership was not handled appropriately by our officers. So, there has been counseling in appropriate incidences. GRASSLEY: So there 323 -- how many were -- changed after review? RODRIGUEZ: Actually, sir, as I indicated, there were, of the six, nearly 700,000 DACA recipients, we identified 20 cases in which an indication of gang membership appeared in the law enforcement databases for individuals who had previously received Deferred Action. Eight of those individuals have already been terminated. Others have been turned over to ICE for appropriate handling. Several others continue to be adjudicated, and in a few cases we actually determined that, notwithstanding the identification as gang members in the database -- they were not after investigation gang members. GRASSLEY: What process, if any, do you have in your agency in place to learn about DACA's recipients criminal activity in order to immediately terminate the benefit? RODRIGUEZ: We obviously have ongoing contacts and discussion above all with ICE. We are notified in situations where individuals have either been convicted of a crime, or where information is discovered that they are gang members. When we receive that information, we act on it. We're also in the middle of the DACA renewal process right now. Some individuals have been identified as being gang members during the course of that process, and have been denied renewal, and other appropriate action taken. GRASSLEY: Does your agency require an interview in every DACA applicant that has a criminal record? RODRIGUEZ: We do interviews in those cases where in order to resolve an outstanding issue -- for example, one related to either criminality, or gang membership, we do utilize interviews in those cases to resolve those concerns. GRASSLEY: Ms. SALDANA, in March you told the House Judiciary Committee that you supported mandatory detainers. The following day, you change your position. Sanctuary cities, as you have heard, do very little to protect the public safety. They're in place to protect certain groups of lawbreakers, but there are real consequence. Can you tell the family members here today, including the Steinle family that you don't think state and local law enforcement should have to abide by detainers -- criminal aliens? SALDANA: I'm not going to say that, Senator Grassley, what I am going to say is that we are working very hard, very hard, with respect to a host -- there are about 200 last time I checked, of jurisdictions, and when I say jurisdictions, I'm talking about countries, cities, all over the country who have declined to cooperate with us in the past. As the Secretary testified last week, Senator, we're making some progress. We have actually identified the top, almost, jurisdictions that we've had little progress in the past couple of -- in the past couple of several months. We're going and meeting with those local officials to try to engage them in why the program is actually different from what their experience was with Secured Communities. We -- and you heard from some of the witnesses this morning, that there is some fear out there, and some concerns about even the impact on local law enforcement if there is a feeling of distrust between a community and law enforcement. So -- my answer, the question to me was would it be helpful. Clarity is always helpful to law enforcement, but what I would like to do is, since we've just rolled out this program, we've been working on the design and implementation of it for months, but we just rolled out this program. I want us to be given a chance to work with folks. As U.S. Attorney, my whole existence relied on relationships with state and local law enforcement. I had to work with sheriff's, D.A.'s all across North Texas to try and get them to work with us, and it's a mutual cooperation. They help us, and we help them, and I'd like to continue those efforts through that. GRASSLEY: Can you admit, yes or no, that Sanctuary cities pose a problem to public safety? SALDANA: Well, I don't know exactly what Sanctuary cities definition is, but I do know, and I've said this in the past, sir, and so has the Secretary, that not cooperating with us does -- expose our officers to greater risk because now they have to go out at large and try to recover some of these convicted criminals. And, it's a resource expenditure much greater than it would be if we could just get these people from the jails directly into our custody and through the process. GRASSLEY: Senator Feinstein. FEINSTEIN: Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank the two witnesses and the very moving witnesses we heard in the prior panel. I would like to put in the record the record of Lopez-Sanchez because you see the felonies, and you see the number of deportations, and you really see the failure of the system. So, the question really comes what to do about it. It's clear to me that this man that's convicted, and served time in more than one state, deported five times, kept coming back, and this is how it ended. It shouldn't happen that way. Maybe the price on deportation is too low because it doesn't seem to be a deterrent at all, at least in this case. Mr. Ronnebeck said the following, "ICE reported that they released 66,564 other criminal aliens back onto the streets of our country in 2013 and 2014, and another 10,246 as of March 2015. This group included aliens convicted of violent, and serious crimes, including homicide, sexual assault, kidnapping and aggravated assault." Then, it goes on. It says, "123 Americans have been murdered by one of those released criminal aliens, including Mr. Ronnebeck's nephew." Are those numbers correct? SALDANA: They are. FEINSTEIN: They are, OK. SALDANA: They are, Senator. FEINSTEIN: Then how does it happen that those numbers, an additional 123 Americans have been murdered by them? SALDANA: How is it that that happened or... FEINSTEIN: ...Yes... SALDANA: ...Or how was it that they came to be released... FEINSTEIN: ...Yes. This seems to me that we've got one size fits all, that you do for the worst felon what you do for someone without that kind of record. SALDANA: And, you've really struck on the heart of our efforts in talking to jurisdictions who have not been working with us in the recent past. We tried to tell them -- work with us. Let look at your statutes, let's look you've passed, and let's see if one, we have to urge you to try and tweak it, or two, if we can work within it -- in whatever ordinance or legislation there is. I truly believe in my heart of hearts that we can bring reasonable minds to the table to work something out, and that's why we talk about one size not fitting all. It's because we're really trying to accommodate the needs of the communities. They're so different, whether West Coast, East Coast, North and South. I come from Texas, our problems there are not the same as problems in California, or New York, or in the heartland. So, that's one of the beauties of PEP (ph). Again, I need local and state law enforcement... FEINSTEIN: ...Let me ask you what should happen to somebody convicted of seven felonies in this country, in a number of different states, and someone who has been deported five times who comes back to eventually commit a heinous crime... SALDANA: ...And, of course... FEINSTEIN: ...What should -- how should that be prevented? SALDANA: My belief is in developing those relationships in communications here that was a three way law enforcement -- communication. The Bureau of Prisons, San Francisco (ph) Sheriff's Office), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. So, I'm doing all I can to try and look into -- and we actually have directed my senior staff to start opening doors, and there have been some conversations already with the Bureau of Prisons, which is overseen by my old department, the Department of... GRASSLEY: (INAUDIBLE) SALDANA: ...Prisons to try and talk about, at least with respect to federal agency, the federal agency, what we can do better. I invite your thoughts. FEINSTEIN: One last question. Supposing the Sheriff did consult with you, the city did consult with you. The record is still there. Seven felonies, five deportations, and he came back, and he's tried a number of different states and managed to commit felonies there too. What would happen to him? What would you do with him? Well, we would probably, with someone with that kind of a record, if he came into our custody, present him to the U.S. Attorney's Office for prosecution... FEINSTEIN: ...On what? SALDANA: On illegal reentry, and there are escalating punishments if you have -- depending on your criminal record. We can do that. Right now it's up to 20 years depending on the nature of the person's background. FEINSTEIN: Are there cases where you have done that? SALDANA: Oh, yes. Oh yes... FEINSTEIN: ...Can you tell me approximately how many? Where somebody with multiple deportations and multiple felonies actually goes, based on the last deportation, to jail, to federal prison, for a long time? SALDANA: We present it in every occasion that those effects arise. Unfortunately, the prosecution decision isn't up to us, it's up to the U.S. Attorney's Office. They have their own priorities. I can't quibble with that, but we do present it every time we see those facts, ma'am. FEINSTEIN: Well, let me ask you. There are members here who have bills that would like to put a minimum sentence on deportations that's violated. In other words, the individual comes back. What do you think of that? SALDANA: I've got to start, quite frankly, rather than a piecemeal approach to this tremendous problem, a more comprehensive approach to reform, a more comprehensive approach to reform, but, if we're just looking at that, I'd like to take a look at that language and what the statute provides. This fella' in Ms. Steinle's case, actually served sentences for illegal reentry, and substantial, not insubstantial sentences... FEINSTEIN: ..Yes, I have... SALDANA: ...the average sentence is 18 months to two years. In this case we have 36, 56, 46 months that this individual served. Obviously, it did not deter him. FEINSTEIN: Right. My time is up. I will put in the record two different copies of the criminal record of Mr. Lopez-Sanchez. Senator Sessions? SESSIONS: Thank you. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. You made some important points. I would note that San Francisco proudly calls itself a Sanctuary city. They're not hiding it. They're proud of it. They directed their police chief and police officers to act in that acord too. We are focused, I think, more today on the Sheriff's Department, who even the mayor has concluded, acted improperly. I would offer for the record a letter just a week ago on behalf of the San Francisco Deputy Sheriffs that work for the sheriffs there. In that letter to the Sheriff says this, "As evidence to the tragic death of Kate Steinle on July 1st, the departments refusal to coordinate, much les cooperate with federal law enforcement agencies recklessly compromises the safety of sworn personnel, citizens, and those who merely come to San Francisco area. This association hereby demands that the department immediately rescind the directives and comply with the statutory and contractual obligations to meet and confer in good faith." They go over to say, "Moreover it is the associations sincere belief that any changes that the department might pursue should honor Ms. Steinle's life by correcting the departments flawed philosophy so that the people of San Francisco, citizens, visitors, employees alike are safer in the future." Ms. Saldana, you're in charge of filing the detainers, and dealing with these issues. Do you agree with that letter from the Deputy Sheriff of San Francisco? SALDANA: (OFF MIKE) I would just say, first of all, with the lessons (ph) of what the request is, we must get cooperation. FEINSTEIN: Could you put on your microphone please? SALDANA: Thank you, Senator. Let's get cooperation. Let's do what all we can to do because we're all in the same business, and that's public safety. SESSIONS: ...Well, you are exactly right. What this is all about is protecting public safety, and isn't it a fact, Ms. Saldana, that everybody that would like to come to the United States is not entitled to be admitted on their demand? SALDANA: That's why we have these statutes and the process, sir. SESSIONS: Can you make evaluations based on people? And, if they have certain risk factors, they get here legally, or illegally, they evidence dangerous tendencies, they can be deported? SALDANA: That's certainly laid on in the statute. SESSIONS: And that's required in certain instances by the statutes. It says they shall be deported... SALDANA: There are mandatory provisions, yes sir. SESSIONS: So, I think we have a serious problem here. I believe it's directly from the top of this administration, and I believe you've been directed to carry out administration policies, and when you are asked about the Sanctuary city reform, as Senator Grassley said, you said, "Absolutely. A'men," and the next day, did you have a conversation with someone and decided to change your statement on that? SALDANA: As I said before, Senator, truly, my response was a straight out law enforcement response. It is -- what I did the next day was to clarify. I am not going against what we have -- that all our efforts in establishing, and now implementing the PEP program... SESSIONS: ...Well... SALDANA: ...We want to work with those jurisdictions. That's what I have always done, is try to set up relationships with state and local governments... SESSIONS: ...I agree with you. You and I -- United States Attorney, you gave a law enforcement response. Which is this is unacceptable. Every jurisdiction in America that I know of participates in a detainer policy that honors detainers from other jurisdictions. They don't ask whether a case is a good case, or not. They don't retry the case if a -- United States federal, state, or local jurisdiction places a detainer hold on a prisoner, that's honored. Isn't it a historic -- and really unbelieveable act that major cities in this country are refusing to comply with that basic requirement of law enforcement? SALDANA: This is why I needed the next day to clarify, sir. That, yes, we need to get there, but we've got this program that we're about to roll out, and it's all hands on deck. We can't afford not to work together in this Area. It's too dangerous... SESSIONS: ...Well, what if they don't cooperate? What if they just refuse, as they refused before? Didn't your predecessor, Mr. Morton, call on Chicago, Cook County, to stop its Sanctuary policies? SALDANA: I -- I'm sorry sir, I wasn't following that, I'm not aware... SESSIONS: ...Well, he made a clear statement about it, and -- it was a call on them to change. Now the administration, apparently, has changed and stopped pushing it. Now, after this -- these events that have achieved so much publicity, you're beginning to talk about it again. Mr. Rodriguez, you represent the Citizens on Immigration Services -- Citizenship and Immigration Service. Your council president has made a series of statement, Mr. Palinkas -- he's a head official, say, quote, "USCIS adjudications officers are pressured to rubber stamp applications, instead of conducting diligent case review, and investigation. The culture at USCIS encourages all applications to be approved, discouraging proper investigation into red flags, and in discouraging the denial of any applications USCIS has turned into an an approval machine." He goes on to say, "USCIS officers who identify illegal aliens, that in accordance with law, should be placed into immigration removal proceedings before a federal judge are prevented from exercising their authority, and responsibility." He goes on to say, Ms. Saldana, the ICE offices morale is reported to lowest in the entire federal government. They filed a lawsuit against your predecessor, the Offices Association did, claiming that they are being ordered to violate their oath to enforce the law. What actions have you taken to end this, and create -- -and meet with those officers to created a system in which they are encouraged to follow the law, not violate the law? SALDANA: I listen, Senator. I have been to several of our offices across the country. I wish I had time to do all of them in my first year on the job, but I do go there. I do listen. I meet with the Union Officers. I meet with employees top to bottom, and we discuss what our mission is, and how it's so important that commonsensical it is to focus on the most heinous crimes and convicted criminals, and I get a very good response, so I -- and, by the way, I may be a named defendant in that lawsuit. I think I've been replaced in there, so -- I take those allegations seriously, and I work with our employees across the country to discuss it. SESSIONS: Well, I've never seen the kind of morale problems from Mr. Palinkas' statement, to you Mr. Rodriguez in your official actions, and you Ms. Saldana, in your predecessor really. This is not healthy. It's very bad, and it's a product of the trends we're seeing of non-enforcement, rather than enforcement. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions. Senator Durbin is not here. Senator Schumer is not here... SESSIONS: Senator Durbin is here. FEINSTEIN: I will call on Senator Durbin. DURBIN: Thank you very much, Madame Chair. First I was not able to stay at the hearing for Brian McCann's testimony. Brian McCann is from Chicago. I agreed to speak at an Alzheimer's Association research meeting, came back, got him on the phone. We're working with him through the FBI to try to help bring this fugitive to justice who is responsible for this terrible tragedy in this family. I want to put that on the record. Let me see if I can put some perspective on this for a minute. There seem to be two or three basic elements here that we ought to keep in mind. First is the belief of local law enforcement, that if they are called on to enforce the status crimes, that is persons who are here undocumented, that it could infringe on their ability to maintain order in a community. If every time a police car drove by, folks in a certain neighborhood thought they're looking for undocumented people, those folks are less likely to step up and cooperation with police and find real wrongdoers, real criminals, so that they be brought to justice. That seems to be a starting point I've heard over, and over again. Ms. Saldana? SALDANA: I agree. I've heard it also because I've met with quite a few officials, and they have a tough job. We all have a tough job. I Recognize those arguments. One jurisdiction, Oregon, has been sued, and in other jurisdictions -- and in these days of tough financial budgets, I can understand why people are concerned about being exposed to constitutional challenges like some of the law states. DURBIN: What the President has proposed in both DACA and DAPA, DACA referring to young people, "Dreamers", who were brought here as children and are undocumented, and DAPA, for those millions who are here undocumented, working, raising families and such. In both instances, the President has insisted that there be a criminal background check before they're even given a temporary permission to stay, to either live, go to school, or work. Is That not true? SALDANA: Well, certainly. My colleague, Director Rodriguez and speak more clearly to this, but yes, that is my understanding. DURBIN: Then, Director Rodriguez, out 680,000 who have successfully applied for DACA status, "Dreamers" who are able to stay on a temporary basis for a few years, and not be deported, of that number 680,000, that roughly 323, about one half of one percent have either been engaged in crime, or had a criminal record where they were disqualified from the DACA program. Is that close to what you've heard? RODRIGUEZ: That is correct. Most of those were the result of criminal conviction, some of them were because of information received that some of them were gang members, or some of them were threats to national security. DURBIN: So, they were disqualified... RODRIGUEZ: ...Correct... DURBIN: ...from the program. RODRIGUEZ: And, by the way, Senator, I would cite that as an instance where we did not rubber stamp as Mr. Palinkas, my union head, would suggest. We have certainly dug into those allegations. The President's proposal, when it comes to the millions who are here undocumented, they too will not only be subjected to a criminal background check before they're eligible to stay and work on a temporary basis. They're subject to review every time that permit comes up to see if they've committed a crime. Is that not true. RODRIGUEZ: That is correct, Senator, and it is a multi-step process of biographic, and biometric checks that are conducted on all such individuals to eliminate criminals, eliminate threats to our national security, eliminate gang members access to those... DURBIN: ...For the record, on both of these programs, DACA and DAPA, proposed by President Obama, there's been general opposition from the other side of the aisle. What the President's proposed for regular criminal background checks about these people living, who are undocumented in America, has been resisted. But, that's been a starting point in each of these proposals. Yesterday I went to Jay Johnson, the Secretary of Homeland Security. He just visited in Chicago to meet with some of our political leaders to talk about the specific issue that brings us here today. What do we do about those who are convicted of crimes, and also undocumented? They are working now to come to an agreement to the PEP Program, that there be an understanding that certain levels of crime will result in reporting. They have not reached an agreement, don't get me wrong, but they are moving in that direction. Can you explain to me the difference between a civil detainer, and a criminal detainer, and whether that is significant to our conversation here? RODRIGUEZ: Senator, I think I'm a little -- I do have some insight into those distinctions based on prior positions that I've held as a federal prosecutor, and also as County Prosecutor in Montgomery County, but given that it's Director Saldana's portfolio, I think I may defer to her. SALDANA: Yes. Quite frankly I'm not familiar with -- the distinction that weighed. It's more important to me that there are -- when there is a criminal case that's been presented to the United States Attorney, they've accepted it. There will be a criminal warrant, and a detainer notice sent to -- if the person is in somebody else's custody, and that has -- it's a court order. It is not administered, which is a large part of what our function is. Our function is civil, and administrative. There are some groups of illegal immigrants that we do refer to the U.S. Attorney's for criminal prosecution, but that's only where the -- that's the only place where the criminal documentation would arrive. DURBIN: What I'm trying to get to is this. If we are dealing with someone who is incarcerated, and has been found guilty of, let's say, a serious felony. No questions asked, it's over the line, serious felony. From your point of view, what you're asking is that before that they be released in their undocumented status, there be a report to your agency? SALDANA: A notice. DURBIN: A notice? SALDANA: Yeah. Please advise us, with respect to the notification part where there is not -- we've not actually established probable cause, or where we have, a detainer notice. DURBIN: But, instead of dealing with a serious felony, we are dealing with the question of illegal reentry, and illegal reentry may occur with someone who has been deported from the United States, and attempts to return, even if there's not criminal history other than that action of returning after deportation. Is that correct? SALDANA: Yes, that is right, and the U.S. Attorney's across the country are not necessarily enforcing those because of their priorities. It's just too low-level of an offense. DURBIN: So, the suggestion that we make a mandatory minimum five year sentence for people who have been deported and come back across the border with, let's say, no other criminal -- no criminal history, and no other history from the government's point of view, that seems to me to be an invitation for a lot of prosecutions. SALDANA: We're stretched on our resources already, and we're focusing on convicted criminals to expand it to just illegal entries or entries, would be very -- a very big problem for us. DURBIN: Thank you very much. GRASSLEY: Thank you, I believe Senator Lee has yielded to Senator Cruz? Thank you. Senator Cruz? CRUZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to Senator Lee. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. The testimony we've heard today is powerful. Ms. Saldana, you are a Texan. You were a prosecutor in our state, you had a good reputation as a prosecutor, but you're serving an administration that consistently refuses to follow the law, and we heard this morning the very real consequences of that. Now, in March when you were testifying before the House you were asked about Sanctuary cities. Cities like San Francisco that defy federal law, and that because of their defiance of federal law, Kate Steinle is no longer with us. She was murdered because of the refusal of local officials to recognize federal law. You were asked in that House hearing, "Should federal law compel state officials to comply with federal law?" And your answer, and I want to quote verbatim, was, "Thank you. Amen. Yes." Now, in my view, that was the former federal prosecutor speaking and giving an answer. Yet, the next day, you issued a statement retracting what you'd said, and saying, in fact, although you'd said, "Amen", which is a pretty powerful statement from the heart, you didn't in fact mean that federal law should force local officials to comply with federal laws. I want to ask you what political officials pressured you to change your statement? SALDANA: Not a single one. This came from a -- the original statement came from my heart. The clarification came from my heart. I don't mean to quibble with you, Senator, I respect you greatly. But, I will say this. The question was not asked. The question was very specific. "Would it be helpful for detainers to be mandatory?" The law enforcement response is clarity is always helpful. But, I wanted to be sure that people were not reacting to that as an indictment of PEP, or working with communities, and that's what I'm committed to do. CRUZ: So, let me make sure I understand your testimony correctly then. You said then it would be helpful, presumably helpful is something is good, is beneficial, is something you support. So, are you saying then that ICE supports making it mandatory to comply with federal detainers. SALDANA: No. CRUZ: So, it's helpful, but you don't support it? SALDANA: Well -- no sir, I support what we have proposed, and what we've been spending many hours on... CRUZ: ...But you just said it's helpful... SALDANA: ...Yes, sir... CRUZ: ...You just said you don't support it... SALDANA: ...Clarity is always helpful, but cooperation and working with our state and local partners is something I've always done, and I will continue to do it, and I'm committed to see it through, with respect to these jurisdictions that haven't been working. CRUZ: It is difficult to work in an administration where you're required to take a position where, although something would be, in your own words, "helpful" -- you nonetheless don't support it -- let me shift to a different topic. In the year 2013, how many criminal illegal aliens did the Obama administration release? SALDANA: In 2014 it was a little over 30,000. CRUZ: How many murderers? SALDANA: In that year, sir, I can't remember the number right now, but I know that we had the statistic that was said earlier. The four year period from 2010 to 2014 that there were 121 persons who committed crimes afterwards. But, I can't provide you with the exact number. CRUZ: How many rapists? SALDANA: I am not sure right now, I'd have to pull that number. CRUZ: How many drunk drivers? SALDANA: Same answer. I can certainly break that down for you, and, in fact, I think we're working on that right now. It's been requested before. CRUZ: Yesterday, how many murderers did the Obama administration release? SALDANA: Now, Senator, I don't know the answer to that question, but I want the American people to understand our job and our mission if I may. We don't release people willy-nilly. We release people pursuant to these statutes and regulations. There are only a limited number of crimes that we are required to detain people. It is mandatory. They're spelled out here very clearly. Many of them related to drug distributions and conspiracies. With the rest of the people, as you know very well, Zubaidas (ph) requires us to release some. I think that's a small percentage of the total. Also, the immigration courts have half a million case backlog. They have the proceedings they go through. They will order release because many of these folks challenge their bond, or detention. But, in the rest, and I think it's like 49 percent this past year, in the rest where ICE has discretion, where this statute has given us discretion, we have very well trained, very well experience law enforcement officers who look at the entire case just like a magistrate judge, or a federal judge... CRUZ: ...Ms. Saldana, I want to note that your testimony here, when I asked you how many criminals ICE released in 2013, you were off by a factor of three. You said 30,000, the correct answer is 104,000. There were 68,000 criminals, criminal illegal aliens that ICE declined to begin deportation proceedings against, despite the fact, as Senator Sessions observed, the federal law that you're holding up there says they shall be deported. The Obama administration refused to deport them. That's 68,000. In addition to that there were 36,000 in deportation proceedings with criminal convictions that the Obama administration released, and I would note that among those were 193 murderers with homicide convictions, 426 people with sexual assault convictions, where over 16,000 criminal illegal aliens with drunk driving convictions released by this administration because this administration refuses to follow the law. SALDANA: Sir, those numbers, I'm looking straight at them. You asked me, I thought, about 2014. That is 30,558. The good news is that at least that went down from 2013 when it was 36,007. CRUZ: But you're omitting the 68,000 criminal illegal aliens that ICE did not begin deportation proceedings against at all, and you gotta' add both of those together. It's over 100,000. SALDANA: Yes, sir, that's absolutely right. All done pursuant to this statute that the Congress has outline. CRUZ: Now, Ms. Saldana, you heard the testimony from the victim's family. I've introduced Kate's Law in the Senate, a mandatory minimum of five years in prison for anyone -- apprehended with an illegal reentry. Does ICE support Kate's Law? SALDANA: I sure would like to look at that. I haven't had a chance to, I'm not sure when it was introduced, if it has been... CRUZ: ...It was introduced last week. SALDANA: OK, I have not had a chance to look at it, I'm sorry Senator, but I'm certainly willing to look at any proposal along those lines, and consider it and work with you if I find some objection to it. CRUZ: Ms. Saldana, I will note in your opening statement here -- you said that after listening to the victim's family that you were so sorry for their loses. And yet, the Obama administration keeps doing it. When I asked you how many murders were released yesterday, you don't know. There is a reason the American people are upset. If President Obama had the courage of his convictions, he would come and look in the eyes of these men and women who have lost their sons, their daughters, their mothers, their sisters, their brothers and the administration would stop releasing murderers and rapists. It is within your power to follow federal law, and this administration refuses to do so, and that is altogether unacceptable. Thank you. SESSIONS: Senator Klobuchar. KLOBUCHAR: Thank you very much, Senator Sessions, and thank you to those -- you, Director, and also to the assistant secretary, for your work. I also wanted to -- I know Senator Grassley had to step out for another hearing, but I wanted to thank him for bringing together the first panel of witnesses. I thought their testimony was moving, and I know from being a former prosecutor how difficult it can be for victims and their families to come forward, and I'm sure some of the families are still in the room today, so I thank you for being willing to come forward today. I also wanted to thank Senator Feinstein for her frankness in the criticism of the sheriff in her own state. Clearly there should have been cooperation and they should have been working with ICE, and I think it's very important to remember that there are some of us who are willing to look at these policies and look at them in a way to figure out what best helps public safety. And Deputy Secretary, you talked about some of the work that's being done to work with these local jurisdictions. In listening to the head of the major city chiefs talk about their policy, which he made clear was cooperating with ICE, but clearly that didn't happen in the case in San Francisco. Are there other sheriffs and other law enforcement people have taken that position and have policies where they are not willing to -- and I understand the mayor said that wasn't what happened in San Francisco -- but where they are not going to work with you and notify you when a repeat felon is being released? SALDANA: Well, the last time I checked the number of communities that had passed some kind of ordinance or legislation, it was a little bit over 200, 208. KLOBUCHAR: Is there -- is that correct? SALDANA: Excuse me? KLOBUCHAR: Do they vary? SALDANA: Oh, tremendously. KLOBUCHAR: OK, what I'm talking here about is that I think that is the most glaring thing is this idea that someone who has been deported several times and been convicted of lengthy felonies, that there was no notification to either try to deport him, or as you made a better point for someone who's a repeat felon like that, bring them to the U.S. attorney's office. So do you know how many have that policy that was as severe as what the sheriff did in San Francisco? SALDANA: Maybe a handful. Maybe a handful. You know, we've identified, I think I said earlier, the top 49 which have jurisdictions who have not been cooperating with us, that it would have the greatest impact with respect to their immigrant populations in their communities, and we have made real progress. As the secretary testified last week, about 33 of them have now said, over the efforts of the secretary, the deputy and quite a few officials, that they will work with us in some manner. We are working with them. KLOBUCHAR: It just seems like in a case like this it should be mandatory that something gets reported to ICE, and that's what I am trying to grapple with, and I know Senator Feinstein is. SALDANA: It's a very commonsense approach, Senator. I agree with you, and I think that PEP covers that. These are severe, heinous and dangerous criminals that we are targeting and that we are trying to work with these jurisdictions to say, can't we all agree on this category of individual and this criminal history. KLOBUCHAR: When we used to have cases sometimes -- in fact, I was just reading about one where we had convicted a man of murder. He had hacked up his wife into pieces, left her head in a bowl. It was a horrible case. He was from Russia and he's been making requests to go back to Russia, and my successor is saying no to that. And I remember the pressure he would sometimes get -- not necessarily from defendants. He wouldn't care about that. But from sometimes family members, people say, oh, send him back to the other country. I think it's an argument clearly for serving out sentences in the U.S. for public safety, but then also we brought up the U.S. attorney's office, and obviously they can't handle all these cases. But when there are the serious ones with a number of felonies, I would think this should become more of a priority when it comes to these prosecutions. Has there been discussion about this with the Justice Department at all? SALDANA: Yes, I have actually met with the deputy attorney general and discussed where we can work together to strengthen this. I've met with the Board of Immigration security subcommittee of the attorney general's advisory committee, the U.S. attorneys, and we have discussed specifically what can you do to help us make an impact with respect to some of these cases. And they seem very interested and cooperative. KLOBUCHAR: I've been a supporter of comprehensive immigration reform. I think there's a lot of focus on things that we need for economy with that bill, and allowing, you know, everyone from engineers on to be able to get green cards and to stop training our competition, and there's many important things in that bill, this bipartisan bill. But I think one of them, as you know, as also director, is more money for the border, more money for enforcement, those kinds of things. Do you think that that would be helpful as well, to pass some kind of comprehensive immigration reform? Either of you can answer this. SALDANA: It's essential. I mean -- KLOBUCHAR: And I'm talking about from a public safety perspective. SALDANA: Yes. It's like one of these very wise victims indicated this morning, that when you hear something that simply stated, you wonder why do we get bogged down. And that was, put aside political interests and let's get to work on a better immigration system comprehensively. KLOBUCHAR: Did you want to add? RODRIGUEZ: I would like to add to that. One of the issues that we've heard about this morning is the notion that individuals who are here illegally, we don't know who they are. They are not registered, they are off the grid essentially. Both what the deferred action programs and, more helpfully, comprehensive immigration reform provides is a way to know who those people are, to hold them accountable, to know who they are in those rare instances where they do commit crimes. So that's just one example of many where public safety would be promoted by immigration reform. KLOBUCHAR: And the last thing I wanted to bring up is just -- this is a different issue to me and I don't want it to get scrambled into it is the U visa program for victims of crime. We worked hard on this. I know that I had many experiences where people would be preyed upon because they thought they had power over them because -- a family member, someone else could be deported. The U visa program has been helpful in bringing cases, as one of the witnesses pointed out, who works in the domestic violence area. Could you speak to that? SALDANA: I can certainly. I prosecuted human trafficking cases and we often requested T visas, and I am happy to say that many of the victims that were involved in some of these cases actually ended up staying in the country and applying for residency, and ultimately I'm sure citizenship, and will make extraordinary American citizens if they get to that point. KLOBUCHAR: All right, thank you very much, and we look forward to working with you. SESSIONS: Senator Lee. LEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thanks to both of you for coming here, for your willingness to serve our country and your willingness to talk to us today. I believe that the great majority of those who have come to the United States in violation of our laws have probably done so for very sympathetic reasons and have probably been living their lives in a way that, aside from the illegal manner in which they chose to enter the country, are otherwise living good lives, respectable lives. This fact does not, and I don't think it ever can, vest them with the right to citizenship. And it certainly cannot override the need that we have to ensure that U.S. citizens are protected from violence, including the type of violence that might result from someone who came here who should not have come here, someone with a known criminal record who has been allowed to remain here in violation of our laws. I've spoken at length in other hearings and on the floor of the Senate about some concerns I have about the use of a legal remedy known as parole within our immigration law. For those who are not steeped in immigration law, parole is a very narrow exception, one that allows a person to enter the country temporarily. The law governing parole within the immigration context is fairly specific. It points out that this needs to be narrow, it needs to be either for urgent humanitarian reasons on the one hand, or significant public benefit on the other hand. This temporary parole is meant to allow people to enter the country for temporary, finite occasions, such as the need to get medical treatment. That would be an urgent humanitarian reason to allow someone to get parole. Or if we are talking about significant public benefit, we might add to that the hypothetical of someone needing to come in to testify as a witness in a trial. But these things are temporary and they are time-sensitive. Temporary nature of parole in its narrow nature is very important because when she be granted parole, if you've been paroled into the country, you've removed an otherwise present and significant legal impediment to gaining access to citizenship. So if parole is abused, if it's granted excessively, indiscriminately, or outside the framework of what the law allows, this you can understand could really create a giant gaping hole in our immigration laws. The president has cleverly, and some might say surreptitiously, spread the definition of parole wide enough to give DACA and DAPA recipients access to citizenship in circumstances in which citizenship would otherwise be not available to them. We are now seeing the president expanding that program again, expanding yet again the use of parole. First, as Vice President Biden announced in November, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State are establishing a refugee parole program that would allow those who failed to get refugee status to enter the country under parole. I reiterate, parole is meant to be a temporary admission to get past the border on a case-by-case basis, either for urgent humanitarian reasons or for a significant public benefit. It is not a substitute for refugee status and should not be used to permanently relocate non-refugees to the United States where refugee status isn't available. Second, the president announced in a report released just last week that the Department of Homeland Security will propose an expanded parole program for entrepreneurs. Now, entrepreneurs are valuable. We all love entrepreneurs in this country. In fact, we have a lot of programs that are designed specifically to help encourage more entrepreneurs, not just within the United States but to come here from other countries because we like entrepreneurs. But any program that encourages entrepreneurs to come into the United States, to this country should be established by statute, by law, not shoehorned into a narrow exception that is meant to allow the administration to step outside the normal process only under extraordinary circumstances. So Mr. Rodriguez, I'll start with you. Do you believe these programs are consistent with the limited intent and the temporary nature of the statutory text regarding parole? RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Senator, for that question. The short answer is yes, I do. And I do precisely for the point that you made, which is that these are programs that are meant to be limited. They are meant to either afford a permanent immigration benefit, nor are they meant to be utilized by everybody. LEE: So you agree with my characterization of... RODRIGUEZ: I don't agree with your characterization of the program... LEE: You agree that they are limited? RODRIGUEZ: That is correct, and that these programs are limited. So when we talk about the Central American minors program, it is a limited number of individuals who will be able to seek parole. There are very specific requirements, very specific circumstances which afford people that parole, and parole is, as you say, a temporary program. LEE: OK, so you agree that it's intended to be temporary and limited. And yet when we look at, in the DACA application for advanced parole, there's a form called form I-131, and it defines the statutory term, significant public benefit. Again, which historically is understood to refer to something like the need for someone to come into the country to testify at a trial. It defines that to include semester abroad programs and meetings with clients. Do you think that's a fair interpretation of the statute? Is it fair to shoehorn meetings with clients or semester abroad programs into a significant public benefit, something intended to give somebody the right to enter the country and testify at trial? RODRIGUEZ: So understand what we are talking about when we talk about the advanced parole. These are individuals who are participants in a deferred action, not a parole program, whose ability to temporarily remain in the United States is under a deferred action program. In other words... LEE: OK, so if it's not a parole program, then why are you using parole? RODRIGUEZ: That is basically the manner in which those individuals on either humanitarian or significant public interest basis are able then to reenter the United States. LEE: Reenter the United States. RODRIGUEZ: It permits them to temporarily leave the United States and then return to the United States. LEE: And when they return they have had a significant impediment that would otherwise exist to their pathway to citizenship lifted. RODRIGUEZ: Well, it does not make them qualify for either legal permanent resident status or for citizenship. In fact, like anybody else, they need to have an actual basis. There must be... LEE: Correct. Remember, it's not independently adequate, but it removes an impediment that would otherwise be there, namely, by virtue of the fact that they entered illegally. That would impede them from getting a green card but for the use of parole. Isn't that right? Is that correct? RODRIGUEZ: It is correct to a point, sir. The critical aspect is they need to qualify for whatever the basis is, be it for residents, for a visa, for citizenship. They need to qualify that. Advanced parole won't make them qualify. LEE: It won't make them qualify but it is a condition precedent, a condition without which they couldn't otherwise have gotten there. You have distorted this law. You have manipulated it beyond what the statutory text will bear, and that does cause me great concern. I see my time -- over my time. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Lee. That is technical and important issue. It will be Senator Vitter, Perdue and Tillis, in that order. Senator Vitter. VITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also want to thank the full committee chairman and Senator Flake for a lot of work and cooperation with me on legislation which we want to bring forward, and will be bringing forward, to stop sanctuary cities policy, to put teeth in existing federal law, which says that local law enforcement has to cooperate with immigration enforcement. So I thank you. You have been very active on that. And the full committee chairman, and Senator Flake and others who are working with me on that. And hopefully I think we're going to move that soon in committee. Thanks to you both for your service. Ms. Saldana, the White House through the press secretary recently suggested that the murder of Kate Steinle was made possible because Republicans refuse to pass the large immigration bill, which included an amnesty, during the last Congress. Do you agree with that? SALDANA: Sir, I decline to engage in this political discussion. I'm just interested in law enforcement and making sure that the immigration laws are enforced. VITTER: OK. Do you agree or disagree with that suggestion? SALDANA: I have no opinion one way or the other. I am focused on a very important job under the immigration laws, and we would prefer to work on that and answer questions related to that than political questions. That just doesn't advance the ball forward. VITTER: Well, I agree it doesn't advance the ball, and I agree Josh Ernest's (ph) statement was insulting to a lot of people, including the victims. Let me ask you this. How is your action to block sanctuary city policy through the priority enforcement program going to be any more effective than it has been through the secure communities program? Obviously it has been completely ineffective through that. SALDANA: Lots of controversy, lots of litigation arising out of secure communities. The differences are significant, particularly, I believe, as we talk to more jurisdictions, they will see this more clearly. The distinctions are material. For example, one of the problems in that Clapham's (ph) County case was that there is no basis to detain someone at the state or local level beyond 48 hours, which is what our request was. To detain them beyond 48 hours beyond what their underlying offense called for. Under PEP we will have -- we are only asking for 48 hours notice before the release of an individual, unless we have probable cause, in which case we've got indications of a true violation, with evidence that we can show the local jurisdiction. Then we ask for detaining that person the 48 hours. VITTER: And so under this new policy, to try to stop these abuses from happening, first of all, I'm glad that we are finally doing this from the administration. Under this new policy what's going to happen if and when a local jurisdiction does not comply? SALDANA: Well, this is one of the things I'm considering. I, along with the victims this morning, do not want to see their lives go, you know, without being... VITTER: I hope we can all agree about that, but the bottom line is there is no consequence now. There is no teeth now. Nothing happens to these local jurisdictions. So if this is a brand-new day brought on by these horrific incidents, what's going to happen to these local jurisdictions? SALDANA: I'm in the middle of looking at that because, as you know, we just started implementing PEP within the last couple of weeks. VITTER: So you don't know that anything is going to happen to them. SALDANA: No, we are going to work towards that, sir. I want to talk to more jurisdictions to understand exactly what the problems are with respect to their accepting our -- cooperating with us. Once I understand their local problems, I think I can help them better to help figure out a solution. I don't want to be one of these... VITTER: And after you say pretty, please... SALDANA: ...I'm the federal government and I'm here to help you. VITTER: And after you say pretty, please three times and they don't comply, is there going to be any negative consequence? SALDANA: I'm looking at that, sir, and working with the secretary to see what we can do with respect to that. VITTER: So you have not determined yet that there will be any negative consequence. SALDANA: The program has been in effect for about three weeks, sir. We just started. We ask for a chance. VITTER: Well, there are some victims' families here who asked for a chance, and their chance is gone in terms of their family member. Three weeks. This has been going on for years and you still are not prepared to say that there is ever going to be any negative consequence to those jurisdictions. When is that going to change? SALDANA: I presume when you all address comprehensive immigration reform. Perhaps it can be addressed there. VITTER: Oh, now we're going to the Josh Ernest line, right? SALDANA: The what, sir? VITTER: Ridiculous. Now we are going to the political line you just disavowed. SALDANA: Comprehensive immigration reform to me is not political. It's essential legislative effort to try.. VITTER: And absent Congress passing that bill that you and the Obama administration prefer, you don't think right now we can stop sanctuary cities from flaunting federal law? You don't think right now there can be any negative consequences when they do not properly cooperate under existing federal law and with immigration enforcement? SALDANA: And that's what I understand you all are working on. And ... VITTER: Are you working on it? You have the authority to do that now. SALDANA: Sir, not according to certain jurisdictions. A federal District Court in Oregon, for example, has ruled against us on mandatory detainers. Even citing the language that sells "shall." So I'm looking forward to -- looking at the legislation that being proposed to address these questions. I want a solution too, sir. VITTER: Well, we've been asking to a solution for that about sanctuary cities for years. There's been absolutely no effort from the administration before. Now there's a promise of an effort, but still today after these tragedies, you're not prepared to say that you support any negative consequence to sanctuary city jurisdictions if they don't properly cooperate. I eagerly await y'all to finally say that. To finally say, yes, there needs to be some consequence, because that is the only way it's going to stop throughout hundreds of jurisdictions around the United States. SALDANA: Mr. Vitter, I offer you my assistance if you would like my input with respect to any legislation you propose, to try and resolve this and get -- VITTER: I'm asking for your input right now. What should the negative consequence be that you will support? SALDANA: Well, I'm hopeful that I don't have to hit somebody over the head with a federal hammer, and work with the state and local jurisdictions, which have their own specific problems to address. I think you understand that, Senator, and that's why I'd like to work with you to try to address it jurisdiction by jurisdiction. VITTER: Unfortunately, the biggest thing I understand is that you are not prepared today as we speak, even after these horrible tragedies, to support a single negative consequence against a sanctuary city jurisdiction if they do not properly cooperate with immigration enforcement. That's unfortunately the biggest thing I understand. If that's incorrect, please tell me how. I am eager to hear that. SALDANA: It is incorrect. VITTER: OK, so what negative consequence will you support? SALDANA: Whatever you all propose with respect to legislation, I would like to work with you on it to see what we can do to help our communities, as opposed to put roadblocks in their way in their community policing. VITTER: And will you tell us what you would support in that regard right now? SALDANA: You know, sir, I am so focused on trying to correct the problem through our PEP program that I would be happy to work with you with respect to any legislation you propose. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Vitter. I would note that there was nothing in the gang of eight (ph) the comprehensive bill that fixed the sanctuary city problem. It was just one of the loopholes in that legislation. Senator Perdue. PERDUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of you for being here today. This is a tremendously important crisis, as I would call it, not just an immigration crisis but a national security crisis. There are only six reasons why 13 colonies got together in the first place, six reasons. And one of those was to provide for the national defense. And we heard from six families this morning. There are many other thousands out there who have similar experiences, including in my home state, with similar tragedies. We've both got to work together and solve this thing. We heard this morning that between 2000 and 2014 there were 100 convicted criminal aliens released and then subsequently arrested again for murder, after they had been released. Those convicted criminals were in our communities because the government let them go free instead of deporting them. In 2013 alone ICE released over 36,000 criminal illegal immigrants into American communities. These illegal aliens had almost 90,000 convictions on their records, including 193 murder convictions and over 16,000 drunk driving convictions. All told, and I know this is a debatable number, but all told, according to the Center for Immigration Studies, there are over 340,000 criminal illegal immigrants walking the streets right now. I would argue that this is a national emergency. It's absolutely outrageous in my opinion. I don't think there are innocent parties in this debate. In 2000, in my home state we had a 16-year-old kid killed by an illegal immigrant. Today, 15 years later, the perpetrator of that crime is still at large. This is unconscionable when you hear the stories of these families. But we could bring thousands in here. It's time for us to do something. I just have a real quick question, Director Saldana. Thank you for your service in Texas and now nationally. But if you had this perpetrator in California in your custody -- you answered this question earlier. I just want to ask it again for clarity. What's ICE's policy? What are you driving in your organization? How would you have treated this particular incident where they were released back into the custody of the authorities in San Francisco? SALDANA: Well, as we mentioned earlier, the difference between a criminal warrant and a notice of detainer from ICE, we expect for other jurisdictions to respect the court orders that we get when we get a judicial warrant or a criminal warrant. And so... PERDUE: And what if they don't? SALDANA: Well, we -- that's not an issue we have when it comes to court orders. We take them to court then and say this individual, this jurisdiction has failed to honor this court order. That has teeth, right? When coming from a federal judge or even a local judge. And then we ask other jurisdictions to honor our criminal warrants that we get in our investigations. So to us it's a mutual benefit, and we would honor that criminal warrant typically now. The secretary testified last week on something I know he and I are going to have many more conversations about, and that is what more could be done to try to ensure that we have -- when we have a jurisdiction that's not cooperating with us, that we work, in this case with the Bureau of Prisons or someone else, to try and ensure we get custody of that person. PERDUE: I want to come back to Bureau of Prisons in just a second. But in that particular case I'm a little confused because -- and this is not a trick question, but I want to know if the policy is consistent in your organization about how you would have treated that particular perpetrator because just last week one of your senior officials inside your staff told the Judiciary Committee staff that in their opinion that ICE would have done exactly the same thing as the BOP did in that particular instance, and would have release that individual back into the authorities in San Francisco. Is that pretty much correct? SALDANA: And that's correct, sir. Here's the deal. Here's how typically law enforcement works. We have a criminal warrant signed by a judge. We call the jurisdiction -- or we see that, and we call the jurisdiction and say, are you -- is this still a live warrant, and are you going to pursue prosecution? And we work with that jurisdiction. Depending on what the answer is, we work with that jurisdiction to ensure where we are going to get the biggest bang for our buck. Is it the state prosecution or the federal prosecution? And that's where that cooperation is so important, and why I truly recommend against forcing these jurisdictions because that breaks relationships. PERDUE: I'm not worried about relationships. I'm worried about results. And right now we've got cities not adhering to federal law. And I just think that's a tremendous problem, whether it's regarding immigration or highway issues. Let me change topics some more. We just mentioned PEP earlier. You know, we sent a letter, several senators sent a letter to Secretary Johnson a couple of weeks ago. We still haven't received a response yet, by the way, but we are concerned about PEP. I really believe that, as we said to the secretary, it's pretty clear that PEP will lead to the release of additional, maybe thousands of additional criminal aliens from federal custody. And I'm really concerned about what effect that could have, just like we heard this morning. Let me ask you this. With regard to these communities and PEP, given that these communities did not previously honor ICE detainers or cooperate with federal immigration at all, why do we have confidence that they're going to work with us on PEP? Why do we think that's going to be a better approach? SALDANA: Because of the distinction, the differences that we've weaved into the new PEP program. I mentioned one earlier, and that is we are removing the objection, the constitutional objection that we are detaining people or asking for them to hold people without a basis. They've already completed their state or local sentence, and so now we're saying, okay, don't hold them 48 hours in the typical situation. Just give us notice 48 hours before. We've got some differences to communicate to them and to show them, and I think they will make a difference in many cases. And I don't remember if I shared with you, Senator. I'd like you to know this. We have identified the top 49 jurisdictions that would have the greatest impact based on their illegal populations. And 33 have already said they're going to work with us in one way or another. And 11 are still in the process of considering it. We're going to keep working that, and that will have a great impact. PERDUE: Thank you. Mr. Rodriguez, Director Rodriguez, I'm sorry. I'm almost out of time but I want to talk about the Martinez case with regard to the exception relative to gang membership and the potential loophole. I mean, this thing is pretty obvious to me. We talked about this in an earlier committee hearing, but I would like to get your opinion on isn't this just another loophole for someone to falsely claim a threat that if they were to going back home, they are under threat; therefore, they should get asylum here? RODRIGUEZ: It certainly our view that, you know, you should not be able to use your prior criminality as a way to claim particular social group. We do think that rulemaking is the right path to resolving -- or the right way to handle this issue, and we can certainly meet, Senator, and talk more about solutions to the issue that you presented. PERDUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. SESSIONS: Senator Flake, we're going to Senator Tillis, or are you going next? Senator Tillis. All right, thank you. TILLIS: Thank you, Mr. Chair. Director Saldana and Director Rodriguez, thank you for your service. I know you've got a tough job. A lot of people have quoted some numbers, but I want to make sure that we unify around what I think are very, very important numbers. The Center for Immigration Studies estimates that there are some 347,000 criminal immigrants at large today. According to a March 2nd report, ICE weekly departures and detentions report, there's 168,000 convicted criminal immigrants who had final orders of removal but are now at large in the United States. Now in 2013, I think that Senator Perdue mentioned there were some 36,000 aliens released. Now they represented a total of 88,000 convictions, 193 homicide convictions, including one willful killing of a police officer with a gun, 426 sexual assault convictions, 303 kidnapping convictions, 1,075 aggravated assault convictions, 1,160 stolen vehicles, 9,187 dangerous drug convictions, and 1,670 drunk or drunk driving convictions. After they were released -- now that's what they mounted. And by the way, that's on average, if my back of the napkin math is right, releasing someone who is convicted of a homicide some two or three times a week. Now after these people were released, 1,000 were convicted of another crime following their release. This is a significant problem. Those stats were only for 2013. We could quote stats before and after that. It's a serious problem, and I think that it's something that the sanctuary cities need to recognize. Senator Saldana -- or Director -- SALDANA: Quite a promotion, sir. TILLIS: I'm not sure. (LAUGHTER) TILLIS: But I guess I'm a little bit confused with the PEP program. I understand that you are trying to work with local law enforcement, but to a certain extent it seems to me that we are really excusing the fact that they are not really reading at least the spirit of the law, and some would say the letter. We've talked about whether or not we should pass legislation to be very specific about the mandatory requirements, and you don't want to do it. And it seems to me that a part of that is because you are concerned with the relationship damage that could be done by forcing them. Is that accurate? SALDANA: Well, sir, as I said, our local law enforcement relationships are vital, not just what we do in immigration. I mentioned homeland security investigations earlier. We rely on our local law enforcement partners to assist us with crime that is part of the homeland security investigations purview. TILLIS: I understand that, but shame on them if they all the sudden are not going to cooperate on these other matters of homeland security. Because we want to take a very specific, direct stand that they should obey the law. I mean, that -- that to me is like, well, we'll do a favor here or cut them some slack so they'll work with us. That's their job; that's what they're sworn to do. SALDANA: Yes, and -- and -- and just because I've worked here in law enforcement over a decade, I -- I just want to be sure you understand. Most of the jurisdictions work with us every day; thank goodness they do. And -- and let me set some context here. I think I mentioned about 200, a little over 200 jurisdictions that are not -- that have passed some kind of an ordinance or other legislation not to work with us. There are thousands of jurisdictions that do already. I'm very proud of my home state of Texas that has 254 jurisdictions in it and we have very good relationships with 99.9 percent of those. Do -- please do not assume that these 208 represent the total number of the vast majority of jurisdictions out there. TILLIS: I understand. I do think, though, that we -- we need to keep in mind that the numbers that I went through are significant. And each and every year, there's roughly the same sorts of numbers. This is a significant challenge. And I don't feel like for the bad -- what I would consider bad actor cities, sanctuary cities, shame on them. They need to cooperate with you all; you need to be able to do your job and they need to help you do your job, not because it's some sort of favor or accommodation, because that's their responsibility. Now, the -- the last question that I have relates to the DACA program. And Director Rodriguez, this may be appropriate for you. I asked the secretary when he was here if he felt certain -- you know, you're -- you're probably familiar with the Rangel-Hernandez quadruple murder down in Charlotte 20 minutes from where I live. That was someone who was granted deferred action. Determined he did have some affiliation with gang violence. And he was one of -- of the cases that I think that spurred you all's review of the other actions. Are you absolutely certain that we've scrubbed those who have received deferred action and that we don't have another Rangel- Hernandez out there waiting to happen? RODRIGUEZ: I'll -- I'll -- I'll take that as -- as -- as two -- as really two questions. So, the -- the -- the first is am I absolutely certain? I am satisfied that my staff engaged in a very thorough process of running the entire DACA cohort back through the law enforcement databases that we used to identify gang membership. I do believe that the label of gang member in that database is a reliable label so that if the individual is identified, that gives us what we need to either deny them outright or to conduct further investigation. So, that as we speak today, that does leave me with confidence that -- that as of the date that we ran and we did that review, that we were able to address all cases of -- of gang membership. If we have future cases where people either become gang members or commit crimes, we will address those, as we have. We will terminate DACA in the manner that we have in other cases. TILLIS: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. SESSIONS: Senator Flake? FLAKE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Saldana, in response to a letter that I sent to -- to you along with Chairman Grassley, you mentioned that in the Altamirano case, he posted -- quote, "he posted $10,000 bond after his immigration hearing, which means that he became obligated to report to ICE upon demand and that at the time of the most recent criminal offense, ICE had not triggered his obligation to report upon demand." Now, he was released from custody in January of 2013. He was arrested for murder January 22nd, 2015, over two years. Was there any contact with ICE during that period, between ICE and Mr. Altamirano? SALDANA: He was in proceedings. It's -- that's then involved -- he's involved with the court through the immigration courts. Whether ICE had some communication with him, I -- in those -- that two-year period, I don't know, Senator. FLAKE: Do you know if the immigration court or anybody had any contact with him? SALDANA: You know, I haven't looked at that specifically, sir. FLAKE: Is that typical for somebody to go two -- two full years with seemingly no contact at all? SALDANA: It can happen, given the half a million case backlog with the immigration courts. FLAKE: ICE's policy for triggering a convicted alien's obligation to report, you mentioned that you didn't see him because there was nothing that triggered an obligation to report. Has that policy been changed, in terms of triggers for -- for reporting? In light of this case and others, has there been any change? SALDANA: Not that I'm aware of, sir. FLAKE: How many times has ICE revoked bail for those that -- that have been put out on bail like this? SALDANA: Oh, it -- it happens with some regularity. I can't give you a percentage but I'm happy to provide that to you for a specific period. FLAKE: One thing that was just striking about this is the lack of cooperation and coordination and even notification between federal and local officials. And in response to the letter that Chairman Grassley and I sent to you, you mentioned that ICE is working to implement a new initiative called the law enforcement notification system or LENS. In your testimony, you mentioned that LENS has been deployed in 11 states and full implementation is expected by the end of the year. What's stopping that from being implemented in the other 39 states? SALDANA: Because we have to work with each state office that -- that gets notices out to their counties and communities. Some like mine have a lot of counties. It's complex. We have to make our systems compatible to -- to talk. And so, we started with three states as test cases, Texas being one of them, and it worked pretty well there. We've expanded it to these -- now to the total of 11. And there's a period of time that you have to work out kinks because we want to be sure to get this right, and that's what we've been going through right now, is just the test program; we've passed that. We now have expanded it to the 11. We're liking what we're seeing and I think we'll be there by the end of the year. FLAKE: Is this being handled with a little more urgency now? SALDANA: I -- I would like to see it done earlier than the end of the year, sir. I will stay on it, I -- I assure you, to -- to make sure it done -- it gets done as quickly as we possibly can. FLAKE: So, by the end of the year, you believe that we'll be able to -- to say that in all 50 states, we have better notification requirements? SALDANA: Yes, sir. FLAKE: Thank you. Miss Saldana, in Director Rodriguez's testimony he mentioned that 43,375 new DACA requests were denied; 414 renewal requests have been denied. Of these, you know, approximately 44,000 denied requests, how many have been deported? SALDANA: Of what -- I'm sorry, sir. FLAKE: These -- there are 43,375 DACA requests that were denied and then 414 renewal requests have been denied. If somebody is not able to access DACA, then they are still eligible for deportation or that is demanded. How many of those have been deported? SALDANA: I can't give you the specific number but they go in -- it -- whether they're DACA or not eligible, sir, we look at ours the same way we do anybody else. The -- DACA doesn't get them a free pass. We have to look at them on a case by case basis as to -- as to what's the next step, whether we detain someone, whether, you know, what level of bond we place if we release them, that kind of thing. So, it's all done on the whole facts and circumstances surrounding that individual, including criminal history. FLAKE: But if they are -- if they've done something or have an offense that makes them ineligible, you would assume that they're -- they're being looked at now. Can you give me any ballpark of -- of how many of those have been deported of the 44,000 DACA cases that -- people who were not able to access DACA? SALDANA: I assure you I will get that to you, sir, as soon as I can get someone to look -- to look at it and get us an accurate number for you. I'd rather not throw out a ballpark. FLAKE: All right, thank you. Mr. Rodriguez, in the case of the murder of Kate Steinle, the individual, Mr. Sanchez, was here in the country illegally. Obviously he'd been deported five times; that means that he was able to come back across the border illegally five times. Obviously border security is something that we're very concerned about in Arizona and this committee is extremely concerned about. There's one program that we've had, Operation Streamline, in Arizona, a secure or sure (ph) consequences program. And it's helped significantly in Yuma. We've been able to bring repeat crossings down significantly, yet the Department of Justice seems to be now backing away from that program. What are your thoughts there? RODRIGUEZ: Well, Senator, I -- as you know, I -- I administer the immigration benefits structure. I -- I don't operate border security... FLAKE: I understand that, but... RODRIGUEZ: I certainly support border security. And I'm sure Commissioner Kerlikowske would be able to address those concerns that you have, sir. FLAKE: Those are serious concerns. We want to make sure the programs that we actually have working continue. And we have one that's working here there in Arizona and we're very concerned that it's not being fully implemented. The fact that Mr. Sanchez was able to so easily return across the border five times in the case, you know, in California is very disturbing, but not surprising, frankly. So, I thank you for your testimony. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Senator. SESSIONS: Thank you, Senator Flake. Well, the Streamline program, I don't think either one of you operate that but I hope you'll fight for it. Because backing away from it, as Senator Flake has said, was very much a retrograde step. We're also familiar with the 287(g). Miss Saldana, you know you talked about cooperating with fed -- state and local officials. Your department, Homeland Security, has dramatically weakened the 287(g) program which trains local law enforcement officers how to properly and legally assist the Homeland Security in carrying out its function. Do you support the 287(g) and what's the status of that? SALDANA: Oh, yes. I'm not sure what you're talking about with respect to weakening. We welcome any 287(g) partners and -- and -- and it -- it's not that... SESSIONS: Well, I would ask you then to just check the records and see if there hasn't been a diminution the -- the 287(g) program which I think should be expanded regularly. SALDANA: There has been, sir, but it's not because of us not wanting that partnership. It's because jurisdictions have either withdrawn or are not coming to the table anymore. SESSIONS: Well, we think it could be advanced and should be. Look, what the American people know and what the family of victims of violent crime know is that this administration has consistently and steadfastly placed the goal of amnesty above the goal of public safety; time and time and time again, that's been the fact. And you're just functionaries in that system. You've been asked to do a system but within the rules been given by the political leaders and it's just not right and it's wrong. We need to do more about that and we need to see that end. If this administration spent one-tenth of the effort on enforcement and protecting people from crimes and punishing people who are criminals who violate our immigration laws rather than on amnesty, we'd be a lot safer today. Many of the people that have been injured, robbed or killed by illegal aliens would be alive today. That's just fact and everybody knows it. So, I'm concerned about it. Miss Saldana, Chris Crane is the head of the association -- the ICE officers association; 7,000 officers. They have -- they're the ones that filed a lawsuit against your predecessor, saying that he was ordering them to carry out policies that required them to violate their oath to enforce the law. I've never heard of anything like that. The statements, Mr. Rodriguez, that your offices said, 12,000 led by Chris Crane -- on Ken Palinkas are just stunning in their criticism of supervisors and political leaders. Morale is down and it's because we're not doing what they're paid to do and they -- they know it. This is what Mr. Crane says, Miss Saldana: "ICE is crumbling from within. Morale is at an all-time low as criminal aliens are released to the streets and ICE instead takes disciplinary action against its own officers for making lawful arrests. It appears clear that federal law enforcement officers are the enemy, not those who break the laws," close quote. He goes on to say, "ICE officers requested a meeting with President Obama and are still waiting. In that time, the White House has met with big business, big labor, illegal alien activists. The administration has ramped up its non-enforcement directives, putting officers and the public in danger. Every day, dangerous and violence criminal aliens are released back into our communities," close quote. That's just what it -- that's the true facts of the situation here. And you can do better if you had leadership that would let you do better. We could -- we could do so much better. We've added thousands of officers since the last dustup in 2007 over amnesty. And we ought to be in a position that we can make real progress. SALDANA: Senator, may I say something on that point? SESSIONS: Yes, you may, I'm... SALDANA: I am very -- I was -- that's one of the first things that caught my attention when I joined the agency late last year or early this year. I am putting a lot of effort in trying to engage employees and what they do. I will tell you this, though; I don't -- I have met with Mr. Crane several times now. I've met with Mr. Trumka, the head of the AFL-CIO, as well, and -- to discuss our mutual -- their concerns, our mutual interests. And I will say when I get out in the field, this is somewhat inconsistent with the portrayal that you've just described of our employees. They are so proud of the work they do and they're so proud of being able to focus on criminal convicted aliens and removing them from the country and they go about their business in a very efficient and -- and good way and -- and they take pride in that. And I just want to mention that to you because that's a fact. I mean, that's what I've seen as I've traveled across the country. SESSIONS: Well, I believe the facts show that this administration in a host of ways has failed to take strong action to help those officers do their duty and comply with their oath. Mr. Rodriguez, on the -- Secretary Jeh Johnson, your supervisor, testified recently before the House. And you said that comprehensive immigration reform, had it passed, we would know who the criminal aliens are. But so -- but that's not so well said because I don't think anyone that has a criminal warrant out for them or has a history of criminal activities is going to register for any of these programs that you've got. In fact, Mr. Johnson admitted as much, saying, "Most criminals do not subject themselves to criminal background checks." I agree with that. So, you're not saying, are you, that if we call for people to come and register under DACA or the president's executive amnesty that people with criminal records are going to waltz in and file with you so they can be arrested, are you? RODRIGUEZ: Well, so, let me point out a few things, Senator, if -- Chairman, if I may. One, some have, to their detriment, even in the DACA program; some who had disqualifying criminal records did come and apply and in many cases became the subjects of notices to appear. But part -- part of my point also is that those who are not criminals, those who committed no other illegal act other than their illegal entering into the United States but who are not murderers, robbers or rapists are now on the record so that should they become criminals down the line, we know who they are. For the most part, I think you're right. Your ordinary criminal will not register in the manner you describe; they know what the detriment is. SESSIONS: Well, I appreciate that. RODRIGUEZ: I would also, Senator, if I could, invite you to tour a field office with me. Because if you did that with me, you would see what I have seen is that our officers take pride in their work, they feel empowered in their ability to do their work and they exercise their discretion and the chips fall where they will, meaning that if there is a case to be denied, they do that; I've seen them do it firsthand, sir. SESSIONS: Well, with regard to this DACA program and the process of providing a legal status to people in the country in the country illegally, isn't it a fact that you've set it up so that there will not be in-person interviews for the people? RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, to my -- and my point it -- it is... SESSIONS: But isn't it a fact that experts tell us that an in- person interview is critical to a proper evaluation of a person who's applying for legal status? RODRIGUEZ: And -- and we do do in-person interviews in those cases that raise concerns that need to be investigated by (ph) officers (ph). (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Well, how do you know if it's going to raise concern if you haven't met with them? RODRIGUEZ: Because again, another one of the things that I do is look through our files. And I know that at the time that we are reviewing a file, there is extensive information about that individual where our experienced, trained officers can identify is if there is the kind of information about that individual that warrants a -- an actual in-person (ph) interview (ph). (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Well, Mr. Palinkas has been very clear in this -- in his opinion on what ICE (ph) going to work in the real world. And it's been set up so there'll be very few in-person interviews and he says that denies your officers the ability to make rational choices that can protect the public's safety. So, I guess you just disagree with him on that. RODRIGUEZ: I respectfully do. SESSIONS: Now, with regard to your -- your processes, is it true that over 95 percent of the DACA applicants have been improved? Or 90 -- maybe 99 percent? RODRIGUEZ: I -- I wouldn't be able to tell you the specific percentages other than to say that there are a significant number who have been denied or... SESSIONS: So you don't know what percentage have been denied? RODRIGUEZ: I couldn't as I stand before you other than to say that it's substantial -- substantial number who have been denied because of criminality or national security (ph). SESSIONS: Would you say less than one half of 1 percent is a substantial number? RODRIGUEZ: I -- I wouldn't say what the percent is. SESSIONS: You don't know? I mean, you're the director of this program. RODRIGUEZ: What matters to me is -- is the manner in which... SESSIONS: I just asked a question. What matters to me is what percentage are being denied? RODRIGUEZ: I -- again, I couldn't tell you as I sit here before you. Again, I know that a significant number have been denied because of these kinds of issues (ph). SESSIONS: Well, I'm looking at a sworn statement by Mr. Palinkas in the lawsuit that --in Texas that we've referred to. According to the most recent data I've seen -- this is his quote under oath; quote, "According to the most recent data I've seen, U.S. CIS reports a 99.5 percent approval rate for all DACA applicants. "The approval rate is high because U.S. CIS leadership," you, "prevented immigration officers from conducting case by case investigations of DACA applications. Leadership has intentionally stopped proper screening and enforcement and in so doing, it has guaranteed that applications will be rubberstamped for approval, a practice that virtually guarantees widespread fraud and places public safety at risk." So, I'll ask you, does this process allow for person to person interviews for even a substantial minority of the applicants? (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: As I mentioned, when there are concerns that warrant such an interview, yes, the process does allow for it. SESSIONS: He goes on to say, "As explained above, by routing DACA applications through service centers instead of field offices all over the country, U.S. CIS management has intentionally created an application process that bypasses traditional in-person investigatory interviews with trained U.S. CIS adjudications officers." So, now the way this will work, I guess somebody sends in an e- mail or mails in a document. Is that what they do, and they're approved based on that? RODRIGUEZ: Well, there -- there -- there is obviously a lot of information that is collected. SESSIONS: How? How is the information collected? (CROSSTALK) RODRIGUEZ: From -- from requestors; there -- there are specific items that are request -- required as part of the initial request. There are requests for evidence that are subsequently sent to the requesters. There is a full suite of biographic and biometric checks to examine either criminal history issues or national security issues. That forms the entirety of the file. In those cases where those raise concerns, then yes, those are referred for interview. SESSIONS: Well, let me show -- go further with what our Mr. Palinkas said under oath. "For example, new U.S. CIS computer systems -- to use a new U.S. CIS computer system to screen applications known as, quote, 'transformation' has proved to be a disaster as the agency has spent upwards of $2 billion for a system that would eventually allow an alien, now referred to as a customer under U.S. CIS policy, as I previously stated, to upload their own information via the Internet for adjudication purposes," close quote. So, it'll be information sent through some $2 billion computer system by Internet and there won't be an interview of most of the applicants. Isn't that correct? RODRIGUEZ: I'm -- I'm not sure that -- no, I really don't agree with that premise at all, Senator. The -- the -- a few things. One, I believe we are -- we have turned the corner on the transformation process. There is no doubt that historically, there was a development approach that was not working. We recently launched the replacement green card; that has gone very, very well. It actually built a number of functionalities that we're going to be able to apply to other forms. The -- the use of electronic filing as the means of receiving and the adjudicating applications does not change which programs will have interviews associated with them. That -- that -- that is not set to change as part of the transformation process. SESSIONS: Well, look, it's not going to be an in -- in-person interview. Mr. Palinkas has said for years now this is -- they're overwhelmed and cannot do the kind of proper background check. You need to be defending the people's public safety. If you need more money to do this, you need to ask for it. If you want to rubberstamp the process, keep doing the way you're doing. Now, Miss Saldana, section 1373 of Title VIII of the U.S. code provides, among other things, quote, "a federal, state or local government entity or official may not prohibit or in any way restrict any government entity or official from sending to or receiving from ICE information regarding the citizenship or immigration status lawful or unlawful of any individual," close quote. Don't you think that resolutions by city councils or state governments or sheriffs in certain jurisdictions directing their offices not to honor (ph) detainers (ph) or otherwise notify ICE that they've arrested someone that's in -- unlawfully in the country could violate or would violate section 1373? SALDANA: Well, you know, all of that is part of litigation, Senator. Quite frankly, I think we've taken that position in litigation that -- that -- that is the case. SESSIONS: That they do have to supply information? In other words, you've taken a position which I think is -- I understand you correctly, you are correct to say, cities, you have to comply with this law. SALDANA: Yes. And again, is it more practical to work through all this morass of litigation or can we work with these jurisdictions to try to get them to cooperate? SESSIONS: Well... SALDANA: I -- I think it's the latter. SESSIONS: I understand you're saying that but forgive me if I'm not persuaded. This has been going on for many years. It came up in 2007 when we had a debate about all of this and it was wrong then and it's wrong now. It's gotten to be I think it's 300 or so jurisdictions that are sanctuary jurisdictions out of, what, 17,000 maybe? So, but some are very big cities who have very large immigrant populations. And so, it's a huge matter, but most cities are -- are cooperating. And if you want to know what I hear, the complaints about the federal government enforcement from our law -- law enforcement officers is that you won't allow them to help you, that they -- if they arrest somebody and they call your office, nobody comes, nobody cares, nobody responds. And so, that's the big problem we've got in the country, is maybe bigger than the other. But at any rate, I hope that you will understand, Miss Saldana, that you're talking with them is not going to change the situation. Do you have any cities that have indicated to you they're going to make a change in their policy? SALDANA: I mentioned -- I mentioned the numbers earlier, sir. We -- we're -- just as a matter of focus, we've looked at these 49 in particular and 33 are working, have come and said that they will work with us in some way or another, again, tailored to their needs. And we've only had five that really have said of those 49 no; and we'll continue working with them. SESSIONS: Well, I'm sure they -- after all the events of the last few months certainly should be willing to listen about this. But I have serious doubts that we're going to see any change unless Congress takes some action or unless this administration takes some action. Miss Saldana, one problem I know you have that's -- I'm sure it's frustrating to you is countries not taking back criminals that you've arrested and ordered deported. Can you tell us the status of that situation? SALDANA: Yes, as you know, the Department of State obviously has a vast interest in this and I have worked with the Department of State and met -- met with the -- the individual who is -- oversees these relationships and we are working very closely to try to open doors. I went to China a couple of months ago, Beijing in particular, and China has been a challenge for us. And we've signed together and -- a kind of astounding agreement that they will actually have two people here to help process Chinese going back to the country who are repatriating from this country; that's some progress. But we continue to work with them. I've worked with South American countries. I visited Guatemala and El Salvador and we -- we're -- continue to work with our -- my counterparts there to try to ensure that we have -- and we actually have signed memorandum understanding with them regarding their -- their citizens. SESSIONS: Working with them -- working with them is one thing. But this has been going on for years also, many years. How long have you been in office? SALDANA: Seven months. SESSIONS: Seven months; so, I can't blame you for all that's gone on over the years. (CROSSTALK) SALDANA: Oh, you can. (LAUGHTER) SESSIONS: But I want you to know I understand that you -- you have professional training and you understand the world. So, it -- are there powers and actions the United States government can take without legislation that would put pressure on these countries to accept back individuals who we have ordered deported? SALDANA: Obviously this isn't the province of the Department of State largely because there relationships with -- with international countries. But yes, I -- I understand that they -- they have some authorities to do that. As you know, Senator, it's a very complex picture when it comes to international relationships and one agency's issues may not hold (ph) sway (ph) over the bigger picture in the relationship with that country. SESSIONS: Well, I remember Senator Specter, the former chairman of this committee a number of years ago, now, I was outraged by all of this. And actually, I offered legislation that would mandate reducing our -- mandate a reduction of visas from countries that don't comply. Doesn't it cost you a lot of money and -- and create huge time involvements in dealing with situations where a country won't take back one of their own? SALDANA: It's a great challenge, sir, and -- and that's where we face issues under (ph) Salvador (ph) for example, where we can't get papers or cooperation from those countries and we actually have to release them under that Supreme Court opinion after a certain period of time. SESSIONS: On the Supreme Court opinion, if a country won't take them back and a year goes by? SALDANA: Oh, I think it's actually more like 180 days and we have to -- we have to -- we got to... (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: Hundred-and-eighty-days and you have to release them? SALDANA: Well, we can extend that period of time but there's a point at which we've got to release them. SESSIONS: And that takes a lot of your officers' and agents' time and effort. SALDANA: It does, sir. SESSIONS: And you have to pay to house people in high quality prisons while you're waiting on this instead of being able to deport them promptly. SALDANA: Yes, that's correct. SESSIONS: I think we -- I have a recollection. Was it Mr. Von (ph) Rob (ph) the customs chief in years gone by? When he shut the border down with Mexico over some disagreement over their responsibilities, caused quite a stir; he just closed the border. But I would just say to you, Miss Saldana, I think it's time for the State Department and your department to stand up and say we're not going to accept this anymore. If you don't accept back promptly people we deport, then you're going to suffer serious consequences. And any relationship that deals in visas is a reciprocal relationship, isn't it, so that if we accept people, then they agree to take them back and likewise if they accept individuals from the United States and they deport them, we accept them back. Isn't that a -- isn't that -- is there a law that requires that or is that just State Department agreements with -- with these countries? SALDANA: Sir, I'm sorry, you're way above my -- my knowledge here when it comes to the State Department and -- and... SESSIONS: Well, you're going to have to stand up to the State Department; looks like we all are. This cannot continue. We don't have the money to continue to bicker with these countries for years and years and years and not get this matter settled; so, we'll try to work on that. I think legislation would be appropriate, too, although it's not necessary. If the president and the State Department stood up and were clear on it, I could be fixed promptly, in my opinion. I may submit some additional questions for the record. Mr. -- but we're having some problems getting answers to our records. Mr. Rodriguez, when do you plan to send us your responses to our questions for the record following the March hearing on oversight of your agency? RODRIGUEZ: As soon as possible. I thought -- I thought we had satisfied all of those requests. We will make sure to get those to you as soon as possible, sir. (CROSSTALK) SESSIONS: I'm not -- I don't believe we have. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, if -- if there are outstanding requests, that is -- I'm obviously not happy about that and we will -- we will act quickly to -- to respond, sir. SESSIONS: Thank you. Well, the record will remain open for one week. And if there's nothing further -- but I will say one more thing. (LAUGHTER) Both of you are good law officers. You know how the system works. And I hope you know that things are going as well as they should; a lot of that is because of administration policy. At some point, you'll have to decide whether you're going to execute that policy or not. Some of the policies I think cannot be defended. But I respect your integrity and I appreciate your commitment to your country and your service to your country. The hearing is adjourned. RODRIGUEZ: Thank you, Chairman. SALDANA: Thank you. CQ Transcriptions, July 21, 2015 List of Panel Members and Witnesses PANEL MEMBERS: SEN. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, R-IOWA CHAIRMAN SEN. JEFF SESSIONS, R-ALA. SEN. ORRIN G. HATCH, R-UTAH SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM, R-S.C. SEN. JOHN CORNYN, R-TEXAS SEN. MIKE LEE, R-UTAH SEN. TED CRUZ, R-TEXAS SEN. JEFF FLAKE, R-ARIZ. SEN. DAVID VITTER, R-LA. SEN. DAVID PERDUE, R-GA. SEN. THOM TILLIS, R-N.C. SEN. PATRICK J. LEAHY, D-VT. RANKING MEMBER SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, D-CALIF. SEN. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, D-N.Y. SEN. RICHARD J. DURBIN, D-ILL. SEN. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, D-R.I. SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR, D-MINN. SEN. AL FRANKEN, D-MINN. SEN. CHRIS COONS, D-DEL. SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, D-CONN. WITNESSES: SUSAN OLIVER, WIFE OF DEPUTY SHERIFF DANNY OLIVER GRACE HUANG, PUBLIC POLICY COORDINATOR FOR THE WASHINGTON STATE COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE MICHAEL RONNEBECK, UNCLE OF GRANT RONNEBECK REV. GABRIEL SALGUERO OF THE LAMBS CHURCH, NEW YORK CITY JIM STEINLE, FATHER OF KATHRYN STEINLE J. THOMAS MANGER, CHIEF OF POLICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT BRIAN MCCANN, BROTHER OF DENNIS MCCANN LAURA WILKERSON, MOTHER OF JOSH WILKERSON LEON RODRIGUEZ, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES SARAH SALDANA, DIRECTOR, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT